The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 5 | Number 16 | Article ID 5374 | Mar 01, 2020

1

Anti-Olympic Rallying Points, Public Alienation, andTransnational Alliances

Sonja Ganseforth

Abstract: Since the radicalization of someleftist movements in the 1960s and 1970s,political activism in Japan is often met withskepticism or suspicion, and social movementsare largely characterized by small and seniormembership. Anti-Olympic opposition in Japanis largely sustained by activist veterans fromthis “invisible civil society”. While this activismmay alienate the public, connections to otherJapanese social movements are rich, especiallyto the anti-nuclear movement that has emergedsince the 2011 nuclear disaster.

When Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko andOlympic dignitaries pushed the button to lightup an Olympic symbol floating off Odaiba, therewas a discernible and discordant backgroundnoise on the live TV broadcast despite the loudcelebratory fireworks: the voices of protestorsscreaming, “Stop the Olympics right now!”1

Members of the group Hangorin-no-kai(English: No Olympics 2020) had gathered infront of the luxury hotel where the festiveceremony rang in the six month count down tothe Tokyo Summer Olympics. In addition,OkotowaLink, the broader network Orinpikku-saigai-okotowari-renrakukai (No Thank You to2020 Olympic Disasters Link), held ademonstration on a close-by waterfront deck.“Many people seem to be excited about theupcoming Games, but quite a lot of foreigntourists asked us why we are protesting,” oneactivist relates afterwards. “Most Japanesedon’t talk to us, but unlike at our usualprotests, this time, many also accepted ourJapanese-language flyers!”2

Fig. 1: Anti-Olympic protest at Odaiba,January 24, 2020 Photo: Sonja Ganseforth

This response reflects the divided coverage ofanti-Olympic protests in foreign and domesticmedia. One activist complains, “Why are peopleabroad paying so much attention to us, whenwe do not receive any attention in Japan?!”Anti-Olympic campaigners therefore celebratedtheir transgressive audio infiltration of nationaltelevision as a major success. “The bignewspapers are full of celebratory reporting –no wonder!” complains another: the mainJapanese newspapers Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi,Nikkei and Sankei are all official sponsors forTokyo 2020. Anti-Olympic activism, however,can be spotted at monthly protest actionsaround Tokyo, and criticism is also expressedin public lectures and in (mostly academic)publications and opinion pieces, including anumber of edited volumes (e.g. Amano & Ukai2019; Watanabe 2019; Amano 2017;Ogasawara & Yamamoto 2016; Sekai 2016).

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

2

Drawing on qua l i ta t ive in terv iews ,participatory fieldwork, and a literature reviewof critical publications, this article analyzes themain arguments of anti-Olympic activists inTokyo, their historical roots in socialmovements in Japan, and their connectivity tothe larger Japanese public.

Alienated social movements in Japan

Since the radicalization of some leftistmovements in the 1960s and 1970s, politicalactivism in Japan is often met with skepticismor suspicion, and social movements are largelycharacterized by small and senior membership.The new millennium, however, has seen somerevival as the nuclear accident in Fukushima in2011 sparked new mass demonstrationsagainst nuclear energy policies in Japan andthe Students Emergency Action for LiberalDemocracy (SEALDS) movement rallied againstthe Abe administration’s security legislation in2015 (Andrews 2016). Anti-Olympic oppositionin Japan, however, is largely sustained byactivist veterans from an “invisible civilsociety” (Steinhoff 2018), continuing theiroppositional work off the radar since the 1960sor 1970s. Asked about this apparentgenerational gap, OkotowaLink members blamethe Japanese education system neglectingmedia literacy and not allowing students tovoice their own opinion. Nevertheless, theyhope to sustain opposition until Japanesesociety is ready for mass mobilization again –possibly triggered by a post-Olympic economicrecession: “The Olympics could be a chance tospark protest among young people, just like theglobal protests started after the 1964 ‘RecoveryOlympics’.”

During Tokyo’s unsuccessful bidding for the2016 Olympics, surveys conducted by the IOCas well as by anti-Olympic campaigners showedlower support rates than the surveys conductedby the Tokyo 2016 bid committee (Kietlinski2011, 462). Activists believe that privately,

many people are not too happy about theOlympic Games coming to Tokyo, but “…theyinvolve the mass media in fomenting ‘Olympicfever’, making whoever is against the 2020Tokyo Olympics seem like a bad citizen.” (Koide2019, 111) “In Japan, protesting after adecision has been reached is considered anti-social,” remarks one activist. Even iffundamental criticism is limited to socialmovement activists and academic publications,however, Japanese newspapers are full ofproblematic news concerning the TokyoOlympics. Broadly defined, there are threecategories of arguments against the Olympicswith differing degrees of connectivity tobroader public opinion: financial, technical, andprocedural issues; socio-economic and politicalproblems surrounding the Olympics; and,finally, more fundamental political, social, andcultural arguments.

The hot and potholed road to Tokyo 2020

Probably most straightforward, a range ofscandals and financial, technical, andprocedural problems haunting the TokyoOlympics has been widely discussed inJapanese mainstream media. Tokyo 2020organizers now calculate their adjusted budgetat 1.35 trillion yen, around double the originalamount (TOCOG 2019). Other estimatesincluding related costs, however, put the priceat over 3 trillion yen. In view of explodingexpenses and negative financial legacies, somecandidate cities have withdrawn their bids, andinterest in hosting the Olympics is fading(Ogawa, M. 2016, 108–111). Hangorin-no-kaiassert that in view of budget cuts in socialservices, the severe lack of childcare facilities,and the recent consumption tax rise, moneywould have been much better invested inwelfare and social facilities instead (alsoOgawa, M. 2016, 58–60).

A number of scandals and hiccups accompaniedTokyo 2020 preparations. The official logo had

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

3

to be replaced after allegations of plagiarism.Spiraling costs led to the scrapping of theoriginal design for the New National Stadiumby Zaha Hadid in favor of a leaner design byJapanese architect Kuma Kengo. Downplayingthe real costs of the Olympics seems to be acommon strategy, but there were otherinstances of sugarcoating and outrightuntruthfulness in the bidding process.Promotional material described the Japanesesummer as “an ideal climate for athletes toperform at their best,” and it was only after2019 World Athletics Championships in Dohathat the International Olympic Committee(IOC), fearing for the athletes’ safety in thesweltering Tokyo summer heat, disregardedTokyo’s opposition and moved the marathonand walking competitions to Sapporo. Besidesvarious technical measures to protect athletesand spectators from the heat, water sportsvenues in Tokyo Bay are a lso seeingsophisticated technical installations in the fightagainst critical levels of pollution withenterobacteria (Kuhn 2020). With millions ofinternational visitors expected, Tokyoites arebracing for further strain on infamouslycongested public transportation, with plans toclose a number of road lanes for exclusive useof Olympic participants aggravating theseconcerns.

Allegations of corruption in Tokyo’s successfulbid for the Olympics, likely the gravest scandalin the run-up to 2020, have led to a criminalinvestigation in France against the resignedPresident of the Japanese Olympic CommitteeTakeda Tsunekazu and raised suspicionsagainst Japan’s influential advertising companyDentsu. Procedures were further tainted by theinvolvement of Princess Takamado Hisako inthe bidding process, widely discussed as anunconstitutional political instrumentalization ofthe imperial family (Singler 2019, 23-42).Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s strongstatement about the safety of the damagednuclear power plant Fukushima Dai’ichi beforethe IOC in Buenos Aires in 2013 immediately

drew a wave criticism, exasperation, andridicule (Singler 2019, 20-23). Coined the“under control” lie, this affair connects tolarger issues and other social movements inJapan.

Fig. 2: Information produced by anti-Olympic groups

Photo: Sonja Ganseforth

Socio-economic grievances surroundingthe Olympics

For their critics, the Tokyo 2020 Games are aprism comprising most of the problems incontemporary Japanese society, bringingtogether activists from a variety of differentsocial movements (Amano 2017; Ganseforth2020a). Pointing to the ongoing nuclearemergency in Fukushima, further threatenedby lurking dangers of a large earthquake in theKantō region, and the great reconstructionchallenges in Tōhoku, protestors often ask,“Orinpikku yatte iru ba’ai kai?!” – Is this reallythe time to hold the Olympics?!” There are thusstrong connections to the anti-nuclearmovements in Japan, which persist even afterthe mass demonstrations of 2012 subsided.Some anti-nuclear activists have joined the

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

4

anti-Olympic groups, and their transnationalnetworks also mobilize against Tokyo’s“radioactive Olympics” (Watanabe 2019).“Using the Olympics, they are trying to divertour attention from the nuclear risk and createthe illusion that the situation in Fukushima isback to normal. Now evacuees are told theyhave to move back, but in reality, theemergency continues,” says one activist.D e n y i n g t h a t t h e “ F u k k ō G o r i n ”(Reconstruction Olympics) would serve thedisaster-stricken Tōhoku Region (Koide 2019),she continues, “Tax money is being squanderedon the Olympics instead of supporting thevictims of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima.”Making regular solidarity trips to Tōhoku, anumber of activists are criticizing Tokyo-centricdevelopment policies and the “colonialistexploitation” of other regions for the sake ofthe capital, as exemplified by the installation ofrisky nuclear technology in Fukushima tosupply electricity for Tokyo – and by holdingthe Tokyo Olympics in venues located inFukushima and Hokkaido.

With rising global awareness of environmentalcrises, international mega events such as theOlympics have come under increasing pressureto prove they are not just a waste of publicmoney, destroying nature, and leaving behinduseless gigantic stadiums. Sustainabilitytherefore figures prominently in Tokyo 2020promotional material. Not necessarily opposingthe Olympics per se, a variety of environmentaland animal welfare advocacy groups is trying toleverage the international attention to push forhigher environmental standards, condemningTOCOG’s Sustainable Sourcing Code for notupholding the benchmarks of the 2012 LondonOlympics (Ganseforth 2020b). EnvironmentalNGOs allege that timber linked to rainforestdestruction and human rights abuses inIndonesia and Malaysia was used in theconstruction of Tokyo’s Olympic venues.(Singler 2019, 51-54). According to a TOCOGrepresentative (interview on 19.2.2019), theformulation of timber standards was indeed one

of the most contested issues covered in thesourcing code, necessitating the issuance of athird edition of the Code in 2019. In view of themeagre track record of the Olympics in termsof financial austerity and environmentalprotection, the proposed “sustainabilitylegacies” (Tomlinson 2014) are oftencondemned as “greenwashing”.

Advocates of workers’ rights decry inhumaneworking conditions and huge amounts ofovertime at Olympic construction sites, havingcost the lives of four workers by the end of2019 (Ogasawa & Yamamoto 2019, 12–14). Therecruitment of around 110,000 volunteers, arecord number for Olympic Games so far, isalso heavily criticized for exploiting free labor,while contracting companies are making hugeprofits. With a large number of OkotowaLinkmembers having a background as educatorsand school employees, they are also furiousthat university schedules have been adjusted toaccommodate Olympic requirements such asopening up campus facilities for athletes’ usageand allowing students to participate asvolunteers.

Hangorin-no-kai first formed in early 2013around activists l iving in a nojukusha(homeless) tent community in Yoyogi Park.They started protesting against the Tokyo 2020bid when the route taken by visiting IOCmembers was temporarily “cleared” ofhomeless people. Naturally, Hangorin-no-kai isputting a strong focus on the defense ofhomeless and marginalized communities.“Olympics kill the poor”, is a prominent slogannot only in their protest, but around the world.City redevelopment, evictions, gentrification,and the privatization of public space are sharedgrievances of anti-Olympic movements in manycountries (e.g. Cohen 2013). Even thoughdisplacement of marginalized communities isby far not as dramatic as in Rio de Janeiro,Tokyo 2020 constructions are not victimless.Several Hangorin-no-kai activists stayed with ahomeless community living in Meiji Park near

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

5

the site of the New National Stadium, until thepark was cleared by force and constructionwent ahead. Similarly, the residents in theneighboring Kasumigaoka public housingcomplex were evicted and their homesdemolished to make way for new Olympicstructures (Ogawa, T., 2016). In the followingyears, individual nojukusha have also lost theirliving space, for example for the installation ofbeach-volleyball sites on Odaiba, and aconsiderable number of nojukusha sleeping inShinjuku Station have received informal noticethat the area would be “cleaned up” for theGames (Kageyama 2020).

Referring to Klein’s (2007) observation thatcapitalist policies are pushed through againstthe public’s will in times of crisis and disaster,one Attac Japan member in OkotowaLink says,“The whole world depends on shock doctrinesnow, and the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushimaand the Olympics are Japan’s shock doctrines.”While Klein speaks of “disaster capitalism”, inhis analysis of Olympic spectacles, Boykoff(2014) coins the term “celebration capitalism”:Similar to disasters, such megaevents create asocietal state of exception, with newopportunities for capitalist exploitation – albeitin a much more joyous atmosphere and with agreater reliance on private profits throughpublic-private partnerships. As a case in point,Hangorin-no-kai condemn the cheap sell-out ofpublic land on Harumi Island to privatedevelopers for the construction of the Athletes’Village, with additional public funds earmarkedto rebuild the complex into a private housingcomplex after the Games.

A poster campaign by Tokyo Metro boastsincreased camera surveillance for a safer Tokyo2020 titled “Get strong, Tokyo”. The Olympicsand public safety are thus being invoked tolend leg i t imacy to ramped up s ta tesurveillance. The danger of a terrorist attack atthe upcoming Olympics was cited regularly asan urgent reason to pass the contested “anti-conspiracy bill” (kyōbōzai-hōan) in 2017, which

criminalizes a wide range of activities vaguelyconnected to the planning of a crime mostlyunrelated to terrorism. Critics contend the newlaw is threatening privacy and freedom ofexpression (Ogura 2017), and the Abeadministration is misusing the Olympics topush an unpopular political agenda (Ogasawa& Yamamoto 2019, 61–65). Protestors deplorethat Tokyo schools are now required to teach35 hours of “Olympic education”, where criticalcommentary is discouraged, underminingeducational goals and threatening freedom ofspeech and democratic rights (Masuda 2019).In response, transnational anti-Olympicactivists in Los Angeles are now thinking ofdeveloping an “anti-Olympic curriculum”,reports one Hangorin-no-kai activist.

Sports, biopolitics, and nationalism

Some of the most fundamental criticisms touchupon issues dealing more directly with sports,athletic competitions, and their historical roots.Corruption scandals and an excessive focus oncompetition for medals have repeatedlytarnished the image of the Olympics (Ogawa,M., 2016, 63–93). Doping scandals are likelythe most publicized aspect of what criticsdenounce as the exploitation of athletes inprofessional sports. For one OkotowaLinkactivist, spectators are complicit in theexploitation, which for her follows the samelogic as ancient Roman gladiator games:“Olympics cannot exist without the spectators,everything caters to them. The fans areadmiring the athletes, but they let them fighteach other. The sponsors are making relentlessdemands on the athletes, and the spectatorsare demanding a satisfying performance fromthe athletes. In this way, the Olympics violatehuman dignity.”

Since the women’s Olympic judo team accusedtheir coach of violence and power harassmentin 2012, the exposure of a culture of violenceand abuse in Japanese sports by coaches and

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

6

senior athletes has forced society to confrontthis endemic problem. (Ogasawa & Yamamoto2019, 36–52; Singler 2019, 54–57). With abackground in feminist activism, Hangorin-no-kai members are also putting a spotlight ongender issues such as discriminatory binary sexcategories and femininity tests (Itani 2019), aswell as homophobia, sexual harassment, andabuse in sports. They criticize as “pink-washing” the showcase project Pride House, asafe space for LGBT athletes, volunteers, andvisitors, which, when first installed inVancouver 2010, led to the ecological andcultural destruction of sacred indigenous lands(Itani 2016). Even though the activists areaware of the highly positive image of theParalympics and the alienating potential theircriticism might have, they assert that ratherthan promoting the rights of people withdisabilities, Paralympics discriminates againstthem and subjects them to performancepressure (Kitamura 2017).

Sports should be a joyous and cooperativeactivity, and instead of pumping a lot of moneyinto commercialized elite sports, more fundingshould go into public sports facilities,permitting “sports for everyone”, stresses asenior sports analyst and occasional speaker atOkotowaLink lectures (Taniguchi 2019).However, not everyone in OkotowaLinkbelieves in the inherent value of sports. “Wedisagree mainly on two things: How we thinkabout sports – and how we should split thetab,” jokes one activist. Criticizing modernfitness discourses, he continues, “It is fascist tosay we need sports because everyone should behealthy, we do not need unhealthy people, theycost a lot of welfare and medical costs.” Ananti-royalist protest veteran adds, it’s, “Just likecreating a strong body for combat,” pointingout continuities from militarist mobilization forthe tennō in the past to contemporary violentsports education (Ogasawa & Yamamoto 2019,36–52) . For the ant i -nat ional is ts inOkotowaLink, the Olympics are just likefighting a war by other means, and the athletes

serve as tools to promote the image of thenation and the tennō. Decrying a lack ofreflection on Japanese historical guilt andresponsibilities, they criticize that athleticshave normalized the usage of imperialsymbolism in the 1990s: “Today’s Olympiansare happy to use the hinomaru in celebratingvictory, even when they are in countriesattacked by Japan in the past. The joint soccerworld cup with Korea in 2002 served to allowthe imperial Japanese flag on Korean grounds –unthinkable for anyone with somehistorical awareness.”

Fig. 3: Anti-Olympic protest in Shibuya,February 23, 2019

Photo: Sonja Ganseforth

Transnational alliances

Anti-Olympic criticism thus concerns a broadrange of issues in Japanese society, politics,and culture. This comprehensive coverage isrooted in the biographies of protestors. TheOlympics provide a rallying point for activistsfrom different movements “…because theTokyo Olympics are bringing to light most ofthe many problems and contradictions incontemporary Japanese society,” as one activist

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

7

explains (see also Ganseforth 2020a). Anti-Olympians have been marching againstnationalism, constitutional reform, the emperorsystem, militarization, hyper-capitalistglobalization, and nuclear energy production;they have campaigned for freedom of speech,the rights of workers, low-income households,squatters, women, sexual minorities – and evenPalestinians; and they have fought the use ofthe hinomaru flag, the kimi-ga-yo anthem, andrevisionist history textbooks in schools.

While anti-Olympic activism in general, andappeals to abolish the tennō system orfundamental criticism of “fascist” sports inparticular, are more likely to alienate thepublic, connections to other Japanese socialmovements are rich, especially to the anti-nuclear movement. Transnational anti-nucleargroups have also taken up the issue of Tokyo2020 in their campaigns (Watanabe 2019), andrelations to a transnational anti-Olympicmovement are growing stronger. Transnationaldiscourses on shared grievances such asgentrification, displacement, securitization, andsustainability deficits are influencing thearguments of Japanese campaigns, and groupshave entered into a lively exchange ofinformation and statements on their webpagesand social media accounts. Some Hangorin-no-kai activists are part of the Planetary NoOlympics Network and visited Rio de Janeiro,Pyeongchang, and Los Angeles counterparts. Anumber of activists from the former and futureOlympic host cities London (2012), Rio deJaneiro (2016), Pyeongchang (2018), Paris(2024), and Los Angeles (2028) came to Tokyofor a week-full of protest events in July 2019,uniting under the slogan “No Olympicsanywhere!” In his introduction to the 2016“Anti-Olympic Manifesto”, Ukai Satoshi (2016,20) proclaims, “What we must take over fromRio is not the interest-ridden “Olympic fire”,but the internationalist duty of a popularstruggle against the Olympic attack, turnedinto global fascism, right now.” It remains to beseen whether the “Anti-Olympic Torch” – in fact

an artifact made of a toilet plunger withbanners and inscriptions from former hostcities, passed on from one anti-Olympic groupt o t h e n e x t – w i l l s t r e n g t h e n t h einternationalization of Japanese socialmovements in general – and maybe converselyeven increase their acceptance at home.

References

Amano, Yasukazu & Satoshi Ukai (eds.). 2019.De, Orinpikku yamemasenka? [Why don’t youstop the Olympics?] Tokyo: Akishobo.

Amano, Yasukazu (ed.). 2017. “Tokushū2020nen mondai: Tōkyō Orinpikku – genpatsusaikadō – kaiken – tennō tai’i [Focus: theprob lems o f 2020: Tokyo Olympics ,recommissioning nuclear plants, constitutionalreform, and emperor’s living succession].”People’s Plan 76 (Spring), 34–120.

Andrews, William. (2016). Dissenting Japan. Ah is tory o f Japanese rad ica l i sm andcounterculture, from 1945 to Fukushima.London: Hurst & Company.

Boykoff, Jules. (2014). Celebration capitalismand the Olympic Games. Abingdon: Routledge.

Cohen, Phil. 2013. On the wrong side of thetrack? East London and the post Olympics.London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Ganseforth, Sonja. 2020a. “The differencebetween zero and one: Voices from the Tokyoanti-Olympic movements.” In Holthus, Barbara,Isaac Gagné, Wolfram Manzenreiter & FranzWaldenberger (eds.): Japan through the lens ofthe Tokyo Olympics. Abingdon: Routledge,110–115.

Ganseforth, Sonja. 2020b. “Olympic leverages:Contending food standards and the struggle fora sustainability legacy.” In Holthus et al. (eds.):Japan through the lens…, 124–129.

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

8

I t a n i , S a t o k o . 2 0 1 9 . “ S u p ō t s u t ojendā/sekushuariti: nashonarizumu toshokuminchi shugi no shiten kara [Sports andgender/sexuality: From the perspective ofnationalism and colonialism].” In Amano &Ukai (eds.): De, Orinpikku yamemasenka?,159–180．

Itani, Satoko. 2016. “Supōtsu megaibento toshokuminchi shugi: kuia undō to iu shiten kara[Sports mega-events and colonialism: From theperspective of queer activisms].” Supōtsu tojendā kenkyū 14, 105–117．

Kageyama, Yuri. 2020. “In the shadow of thegames: Tokyo's homeless fear removal ahead ofOlympics.” Japan Times , January 26.https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/26/national/social-issues/tokyo-homeless-fear-removal-olympics/#.XjLNAiNS82w (28.1.2020).

Kietlinski, Robin. 2011. “One world one dream?Twenty-first century Japanese perspectives onhosting the Olympic Games.” Sport in Society14(4), 454–465.

Kitamura, Sayo. 2017. “Kurōzu appu sareruPararinpikku: Tatakau mono de aru kagirisabetsu ha kakudai suru [Paralympics ischeered, but discrimination deepens ascompetition is its guiding principle].” In Amano(ed.): Tokushū 2020nen mondai…, 100–103.

Klein, Naomi. (2007). The shock doctrine: Therise of disaster capitalism . New York:Metropolitan Books.

Koide, Hiroaki. 2019. Fukushima jiko to TōkyōOrinpikku/The disaster in Fukushima and the2020 Tokyo Olympics. Tokyo: Komichi Shobo.

Kuhn, Jan Lukas. 2020. “Ho(s)t City: Tokyo’sfight against the summer heat.” In Holthus etal. (eds.): Japan through the lens…

Masuda, Rana. 2019. “Gakkō genba de Ori Parkyōiku [Olympic Paralympic education atschool].” In Amano & Ukai (eds.): De,

Orinpikku yamemasenka? , 49–54.

Ogasawara, Hiroki & Atsushi Yamamoto. 2019.Yappari iranai Tōkyō Orinpikku [We do notneed the Tokyo Olympics after all]. IwanamiBooklet 993. Tokyo: Iwanami.

Ogasawara, Hiroki & Atsushi Yamamoto (eds.).2016. Han-Tōkyō Orinpikku sengen [The Anti-Olympic Manifesto: Against Tokyo 2020Olympic and Paralympic]. Tokyo: Koshisha.

Ogawa, Masaru. 2016. Tōkyō Orinpikku:‘Mondai’ no kakushi ha nani ka [TokyoOlympics: What is the core of the ‘problem’? ].Tokyo: Shueisha.

Ogawa, Tetsuo. 2016. “Orinpikku to seikatsu notatakai [The struggle between the Olympicsand livelihoods].” In Ogasawara & Yamamoto(eds.): Han-Tōkyō Orinpikku sengen, 110–132.

Ogura, Toshimaru. 2019. “Kyōbōzai: ‘Dōgi-tekikeihō’ no bōrei to jimintō no kaiken [Criticizingthe conspiracy crime bill – a foretaste of‘moralistic criminal code’ to take shape underthe LDP version of the constitution].” In Amano(ed.): Tokushū 2020nen mondai…, 72–81.

Sekai. (2016). Tokushū rinen naki TōkyōOrinpikku [Focus: Tokyo Olympics withoutprinciples]. Sekai 878(2).

Singler, Andreas. 2019. Tōkyō 2020: Olympiaund die Argumente der Gegner. Norderstedt:Books on Demand.

Steinhoff, Patricia. (2018). “The Uneven Path ofSocial Movements in Japan.” In Chiavacci,David and Julia Obinger (eds.): Socialmovements and pol i t ical act iv ism incontemporary Japan: Re-emerging frominvisibility. Abingdon: Routledge, 27–50.

Taniguchi, Gentaro. 2019. Orinpikku no owarino hajimari [The beginning of the end of theOlympics]. Tokyo: Commons.

TOCOG. 2019. Soshiki i’inkai oyobi sono hoka

APJ | JF 18 | 5 | 16

9

no keihi [Costs of the Organisation Committeea n d o t h e r s ] .https://tokyo2020.org/jp/games/budgets/(25.1.2020).

Tomlinson, Alan. 2014. “Olympic legacies:Recurrent rhetoric and harsh realities.”Contemporary Social Science 9(2), 137-158.

Ukai, Satoshi. 2016. “Imēji to furēmu: gorinfashizumu o mukaeutsu tame [Image and

frame: to strike back against Olympicfascism].” In Ogasawara & Yamamoto (eds.):Han-Tōkyō Orinpikku sengen, 6–20.

Watanabe, Etsuji/Citizens Appealing theDanger of Tokyo 2020 (eds.). 2019. Tōkyō gorina motarasu kiken: Ima soko ni aru hōshasennōto kenkō higai [What Endangers TokyoOlympics – Clear and Present Radioactivity andHealth Damage]. Tokyo: Ryokufu.

This article is a part of the Special Issue: Japan’s Olympic Summer Games -- Past andPresent, Part II. See the Table of Contents here(http://www.apjjf.org/2020/5/APJ.html).

Sonja Ganseforth is a principal researcher at the German Institute for Japanese Studies inTokyo. Her dissertation analyzed Japanese development cooperation in the Middle East andwas published in 2016 with Transcript. Her main research interests include the socialgeography of the globalization of agrifood systems, rural livelihoods, the political ecology offood, and social movements in Japan. She is currently conducting research on Japanesefisheries and sustainability discourses as well as protests surrounding the Tokyo Olympics.ganseforth@dijtokyo.org (https://apjjf.org/mailto:ganseforth@dijtokyo.org)

Notes1 See here(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TN__4_BzETM&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR1F_EkfTcrm-Oku9dYhETuEuMvARW9afurt0f2OWfKlQLH1GlTFbeqcyFg) (29.1.2020).2 Unless stated otherwise, quotations are from interviews conducted in January and February2019, and January 2020. In order to protect the interviewees’ privacy, no names are given. Alltranslations of Japanese language quotes are by the author.