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Any Questions from Last Class?

Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

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Page 1: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Any Questions from Last Class?

Page 2: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Chapter 11Direct Price Discrimination

COPYRIGHT © 2008Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson, the Star logo, and South-Western are trademarks used herein under license.

Page 3: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Chapter 11 – Take Aways

If a seller can identify two groups of consumers with different demand elasticities, and it can prevent arbitrage between two groups, it can increase profit by charging a higher price to the low-elasticity group.

Price discrimination is the practice of charging different people or groups of people different prices that are not cost-justified.

A direct price discrimination scheme is one in which we can identify members of the low-value group, charge them a lower price, and prevent them from reselling their lower-priced goods to the higher-value group.

It can be illegal for business to price discriminate when selling goods (not services) to other businesses unless price discounts are cost-justified, or discounts are offered to meet competitors’ prices.

Price discrimination schemes may annoy customers who know they’re paying more than others and can make them less willing to buy because they know someone else is getting a better price.

Page 4: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Review of Chapter 10 After acquiring a substitute product

Raise price on both products to avoid cannibalizing each other’s sales. Raise price by more on the low-margin (more elastic demand) product. Reposition the products so that there is less substitutability between them.

After acquiring a complementary product Reduce price on both products to avoid cannibalizing each other’s sales.

If fixed costs are large relative to marginal costs, and capacity is fixed, you should price to fill available capacity.

Price-related promotions (coupons, end-of-aisle displays, etc.) tend to make demand more elastic. If you are making demand more elastic, it makes sense to reduce price

concurrently Product-related promotions (quality advertising, celebrity endorsements,

etc.) tend to make demand less elastic. If you are making demand less elastic, it makes sense to raise price

concurrently

Page 5: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Anecdote: Conference Pricing The American Association for Clinical Chemistry

(AACC) sponsors 3-day conferences 90% of the attendees from same city or surrounding

region Foreign participants

Greater travel costs Longer travel times Applying and interviewing for travel visas Choose to attend conferences in own countries

To increase attendance, the AACC proposed reducing price to more distant participants while maintaining prices to local attendees

Page 6: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Anecdote: Cell Phone Pricing Global cell phone manufacturer in 1997

World-wide uniform price of $120 Most sales in wealthy countries Important future markets, like Philippines, ignored Competitors underpricing in these future markets 10% penetration point is crucial

The largest market share will grow 40% w/out marketing when market penetration grows to 30%

Considering charging different price in Philippines

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15Time in years from opening of first digital network

Mob

ile p

hone

pen

etra

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Philippines in 1997

Page 7: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Pricing Tradeoff & Discrimination Remember the tradeoff from the pricing

chapter Lower pricesell more, but earn less on each unit

sold Higher pricesell less, but earn more on each

unit sold

Price discrimination avoids the tradeoff Higher prices to some Lower prices to others

Page 8: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Why (Price) Discriminate?

Example Demand= {$7,$6,$5,$4,$3,$2,$1} Marginal Cost= $1.50 Optimal price is $5

At price of $5, low-value consumers, {$4, $3, $2, $1}, don’t purchase Even though their values are above MC Unconsummated wealth-creating transactions!

Set separate price for this group Price at $3; sell 2 extra units

Page 9: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Direct Price Discrimination

Motivation: price discrimination allows a firm to sell items to low-value customers who otherwise would not purchase because the price is too high (the firm consummates a wealth-creating transaction!)

Definition: Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices that are not cost-justified to different people P1/MC1P2/MC2.

Optimal prices for two groups (P1-MC1)/P1=1/|elasticity1|

(P2-MC2)/P2=1/|elasticity2|

Page 10: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Direct Price Discrimination

The more unique, innovative and useful is the product, and the fewer substitutes, the more profit there is in designing a price discrimination scheme.

3 conditions Market power ID different groups with different elasticities Prevent arbitrage

Direct Price Discrimination Can identify members of low-value group Charge them a lower price Prevent resale

Indirect When cannot ID consumer groups ID high-value consumers by willingness to buy high-priced good

Page 11: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Direct or Indirect?

Discussion: Movie theaters

Discussion: Grocery stores

Discussion: Airlines

Discussion: Describe a price discrimination opportunity facing your company

Page 12: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Robinson-Patman Act Robinson-Patman Act

Prohibits providing price discount to a good sold to another business

Defenses

Cost-justified; or

Meet the competition

Europe has similar and stronger laws

Promotional allowances or vertical integration may avoid Robinson-Patman liability Discussion: Herbicide that has both farming and home uses

Page 13: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Conference Price Discrimination More distant consumers have more elastic demand

for the conferences. Adopt policy of lower prices for traveling attendees

Local: $800 National: $600 International: $400

Implementation ideas Mail regional editions of conference brochures containing

different prices to different customers. Require a foreign mailing address to get international rate

Page 14: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Cell Phone Discrimination Manufacturer reduced price in Philippines to $90 Same standard (GSM)

Arbitrage threatened sales in other countries (15 million units annually)

SIM-locks allow calls only in local operators’ networks Turkish hackers broke SIM lock

15,000 phones to Western Europe 1998, Firm X sold 200,000 phones to Philippines

Share went from 10% to 25% in one year 1999, Firm X returned to global uniform pricing

Competitors followed 2000, penetration reached 12%

Market share rose to 34%

Page 15: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Warning: Only Fools Pay Retail Consumers do not like knowing they are

paying higher prices For example, when shown a box for a

promotional code on a website, click-through rates dramatically dropped

People don’t like knowing they are fools So, if you are price discriminating, it is

important to keep the scheme secret if you can

Page 16: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

Alternate Intro Anecdote: Medical Test Strips In Germany, Holland and Scandinavia

Machines for $25 50 test strips sells for $22 12 million boxes of test strips

Southern Europe Italy and Spain: insurance companies’ reimbursement

rates are 50% lower Firm has capacity to produce additional 6 million

Potential market for test strips is $200 million per year If acquire 30% of the market, the opportunity cost of

not entering the southern markets is about $60 million in revenue

Page 17: Any Questions from Last Class?. Chapter 11 Direct Price Discrimination COPYRIGHT © 2008 Thomson South-Western, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson,

North/South Europe Price Discrimination Implementation Lower prices to Southern Europe

Test strips at $11 Measurement devices at $12.50

Arbitrage prevention ROM key ensures north/south incompatibility

EC antitrust laws reduce the measurement speed of the devices from 11 to 25 seconds. It is important that these slower devices cost less, so that the price difference has some cost justification.