AOROR - ERIC · iocuntN; RESUME ED-111-62U AOROR,,COxi Rodney V.,- Jr. TITLE, 4 41The DefenSe of the United States. Aerospace Education III. Inptiuctional'Unit V.. SE 017 497 INSTITUTION

iocuntN; RESUME

ED-111-62U

AOROR ,,COxi Rodney V.,- Jr.

4TITLE, 41The DefenSe of the United States. Aerospace EducationIII. Inptiuctional'Unit V.

. SE 017 497

INSTITUTION Air Univ., Maxwell AFB, Ala. Junior Reserve Office.

. Training Corps. I

PUB' DATE _Sep 73 .

NOTE 49p.; For' the accompanying textbook,, see SE 017456

EDR1,PRICE, MF-$0.764HC-$1.95' ilus Postage

DESCRIPTORS *Aerospace Education; *Aerospace Technology.; CourseOrganization; Curriculum' Guides; *Instructional

_ -

Materials; lilitary Organilations *Military Schools;,*Yational Deiense;. Resource Materials; SecondaryEduCition; Teaching Guides; Unit Plan

IDENTIFIERS *Air Force Junior ROTC; Departaent of Defense..

. 4ABSTRACT

, , .

i

This curriculum guide. is ,prepared- for the AerospaceEducation III series -pubiication entitled "The Defense of the UnitedStates." TAle.gilide_provides guidelines for each chapter in the

textbook_ .as_well_ as leneral,:objectilies for the compleie course. TheorganiiatiOn, for each aapter includes objectives, behavioralobjectiVes, suggeSted,outline, orientation, stggested key points,instruCtonal'aidS, prOjects, and:further reading. Page referencescorresponding to the textbook are given where appropriate. (PS)

O

*****************************************************4 e**********1", *** Documents acquired by Epic include many informal unpublished-, ** materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort ** to obtain the best copy aVailable. nevertheless, items Of 'marginal ** ieproducibility_are often encountered. and this affects the quality° ** of the microfighe and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available ** via the ERIC Document,Reproduction Service (EDRS)r. EDRS is not ** responsible for the quality of the original document.,Reproductions ** supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original. ***************#********************************************************

U.S. DE PARTMENT OF HEALTH',EDUCATION 11WELPARRNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

'EDUCATIONTHIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN- REPRO-DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED ,FROMTHE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGIN,ATING IT POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONSSTATED DO NOT NECESSARILY, REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFEDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

A

a

''INSTRUctioNA( 'UNIT. V'

SEPTEMBER :1973

0

THE DEFENSE OFT!IE lINITED . STATES

PREPARED 'UNDER

THE li7RECTION OF -

MAJOR.ROPNEY.Y4.:COG-OR,

AEROSPACE' EDUCATION 'COURSE DIRECTOR.

O

0

SEPTEMBER 1973

;INSTRUCTIONAL UNIT V

THE -DEFENSE: OF- THE UNITED STATES',

INSTRUCTICHAI..UKT O.RiECTIVES; At the end of this unit ofinstruction',, each atii4ent.

a. Be, familiar ,with -the general historical 'development of,

kAmerican..niilitarY policy. '

b. Pnderstand, the effect that technological advancements,.have..had on the 'conduct ,of war.. . ,

c., Understand, the constitutional provisions for Inationa,I'defe,nse and: Alai.; they .are- .implemented through thelegislatiVe and executive branches of ,Government.

Understand the reasons for the ifferent method ofwagin'gifar.: in Korea and.*Vie,tnam.

e. 'Be familiar with the inissicins and capabilities 'of the IT&,Ariny;: Nat', and Marine Forces.

PHASES IN INSTRUCTIONAL UNIT 14.

:Page

I. From ;,the Founding, through the 'Civil War V=1

II. From 865 through-World War II V-10

III. 'The Department of DefenSe V-19

IV. 'The Korean wand Vietnani 'Wars- V-27

V. ,Land and Sea'. Forces in the United States V-35

FHASE,I - FROM THE FOUNDING THROUGH. THE CIVIL WAR

Phase I of this unit presents a brief history of United States

military,policy, military forces, and military technology from thecolonial period through the Civil,War. A traditional distrustof o'large standing army and a national policy of isolationismgreatly influenced AmeriCan military development from its incep-tion, beginning along history of precipitous postbelluM troopreductions. United Stated fOreign'policy,,guided'by the Monroeitctrindand a spirit of "manifest destiny," remained focused onthe Weatern Hemisphere, eventually-erupting in -the MOXican'Wor-(1846-1848):, Phase, I concludes on an important turning point inAmerican political and military htstory: the technologicalinnovations of the Civil War, much like the Crimean War, 01854-1856)in Europe, introduced a new, Modern, And extremely deadly, eraof warfare.

1. PHASE I OBJECTIVES: At the end of this phase of instructioneach Atudent should--

a. Understand the development 4)f American foreign Toney,

'especially isolationism, the Monroe Doctrine, ManifestDestiny; and the influence-these concepts had on thehistory of the U.S. military;

'b. Know some of the strengths and weaknesses of the forcesthat defdnded the United States from its beginningthrough the Civil Wan

c. Know some of the difficulties encountered by the Govern-bent in'hiintaining an adequate level of militaryrecruitment.

4

d. Be familiar with the history of American involvement inwar during the initial stages' of our national development

and.the successive advances in.military technology'resulting from these. conflicts.

2. BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES: At the end OfIthis phase of instruction,each student should,bd able to--

a. Explain how geographic, international, and paitiCalCOntingencies helped-shone American military. olicies.

b. List at least four major deficiencies of the first U. S,.Armed Forne.

Outline the:growth of the United States Army and Navy,indidOting changes in manning strength and technologywith each successive confliCt.

c.

V-1

ti

Explain the basic'concepts included'in the. Notate

Doctrine and'hManifest Destiny".'

.e Identify at leapt four leaders.other than U. S. presi-

dents who had,an effect on American technology andpolicy from. the Revolution' through the, CiVil

Explain their accomplishments -:

3. SUGGESTED pir4Itc;

a, The foundations ,of th Afterican Defense Establishment

(1)/ -Policy, foundations

(2) CoiOniai forces-b., The Americati,RiVoldtio4 1.77-1783

05 Military Policy i

Forces, <3) Early technology

c. Post 4volutionary through. the War of 1812 Developments(1) Policy -

(2)' 414i4rSi--PrePid. The Monroe DOCtrine and 1anffest Destiny:

(1): Developments- leading to foreign policy(2) The-Mexican Wer,'1848-1848

:(0 ..Military policyMilitarY'o-rces

(c) TechnOlOgical adVances during and'afterthe war.

e. The CivirMar 1861-186.-(1) Military policy'<2) Military Torcds.(3). Military, technological developments,-

4. ORIENTATION:

Unit V is essentially a study of the, 'history of the AmericanArmed Forces'and a closer look at the present structure ofthe Defer* Establishment. Phase I of the-unit is importantnot only because it discdsaes the early his.tory of the mili-tary, 'but also" because it lays the foundation for manypractices that characterized the military' throughout its-history. As the student 'learns how foreign policy influencedthe levelopment of .the pefense Establishment from the beginn-ing,,,he will better appreciate the significant interconnection

between America's position in international' relations andhei military-posture in general. Nevertheless, recognitionof the importance of a strong armed force did, not come

immediately; real ptOminence was 1:Tily achieved after the

advancein manpower ,and technology of the Civil War.

V-2

5. SUGdESTED.TEY.POINTS:

A. Aberican foreignvoli has always played. a role in.

shaping military concep S'atid doctrines. :From its

inception, American milit ry 'policy :has beeninfluenced' by a hational,&.,trust of a large stand=ingarMy in&a-recurient poi y of

ah4c seof our

English heritage and our geograp id-security.Starting 'a tradition of pbs'twt 'dis,arnent, the

Go4trnMent maintained TiOTtrmanint -MY after the*** (V-9136 close of the Revolution. American foigñ polity.pp 3, 13-15 after 1823 was largely guided by the,Mo roe Doctrine

and the concept of Manifest Destiny. 'Witk Britishbacking, America barricade&Suropean natiph from try-ing to seize former colonies in the Western, eMisphere.The United 'States thus -assumed a-greater-Mili rYrole'in thtRedisphere an&a.beliefr-almost

a.

crusading faith-emerged that inevitably Americandemodracy,an& ideals Would engulf-the whole of Ae4ca.

--"

This aggressie.attitude g entually explOded into the\Mexican WarI846-i848.

b. Early Atherican fighting forces Were ,plagued by anumber of inherent weaknesses 'but, nevertheless hadgreat ability, in certain' areas. lollowing.the"EtigIishtraditiori,-the first American fighting man,a member of the colonial maIitia,vasexpecte&toprovide his own weaponand'auppliesfor nhortexeditions although fortunately local authorities,

***-c(T...9136) woui&collecOlUskets-and ammunition for longerpp 4-5 engageMents. The militiamen tledte& their own** (W.9137) officers, trained several days,each,year, and stoodpp 6-8 xtadY..f

attaCics. besPite the relaxed training.an&pre--paration practices, of the 'militia. itTfOved to be anefficient fighting forct. During the Revolution,the Continental Army was stillfar_lroii being ahomogeneous armed unit. 'Discipline, remained' lgx.and sides reenlistment'rateslOtmanpOwer

low (aredurring.prOlem). The Creation of aSoar&of Warand 'Ordnance in l776, changed tO,a Secretary of Warin 1781,, helped' solve many problems" relating toam y affairs, Further. measures toward better'organization were adrted in 1789 when the Consti-**tutAn gave the Fedtral COvernMent the power to'pp 3-4 provide for an army and a navy and made the Presidentthe Commander in 'Chief of the 'Armed Forces. More

V-3

\ -;

*** (V-9136)pp, 4 -15

*** (V-9137)

,pp 4-12, 17-20_

rt

steps toward centralization occurred after theestablishment of a War DeOirtment with a Secretary,and,in.1798, a Department of the-Navy was created /

as well.

c. The .American Armed' Forces have traditionally had a

.-_-recruiting problem, often creating one of:the weakest

links in our chain of defense. In July 1775, GeorgeMashingtomaesUmed_command of a patriot force of

17,060.44. one-third' of the total forceVaa_orginiiedatoquickly mobilized and deployed,"minuteminn'companies_ of the Massachusetts_ militia.

._. These, forces,4along with reserves, had met-..the

;British -at Lexington and Concord before t*New.England colonie6 banded together to- form-an army.

Unfortunately, with oloniai governors withdrawingwhole units, desertiOn, disease, and shoreterm

, enlistment,. actions, were needed' to maintain

a stable troop-strength. Congress authorized 110'

battalions or about 76,060/sroolis.. As an. inducement,.each -new enlisted- private and non-comMissioned-officerwas promised, $20, ,a new suit of clothes,

end-100-acies-ofAandy- Even*--with-alonger-eniist`went -period, George Washington never had more than17',000,men. During, the War of 1812, active militaryforces were raised -to 44,500. ,A $16 bounty, in

addition to three months' pay and 160 acres of landupon satisfactory completion of service-, were-offered to encourage enlistment in the:Reg:tiler

Army. 'At one time approximately 528,000 troops wereunder,arms. AlthOUgh prior, to the outbreak ofthe Mexican War U.S. troop strength was,ty0callylow "(just over 5,000 men)-,.a better. system:r.of

general recruiting had been inaugurated -sinceand the U.S.-Military Academnt,,cieated in-1802, '

had produced 500 active duty Officers, Volunteerscould enlist fcrr 5 years or the duration of the war.Neyerthels*, .0!Lerican forces were often outnumberedand Mexien,Pit)kwas captured with a force cilf only6,000 men..-Troop strength at the :outset of; theCivil War was a little over 16,000. Nearly 100,000volunteer militiamen were raised,-but short -termenlistments continued to'handicep-troop operations.Early in 1863, after the initial 'fervor haOub-sided, Congress passed the Enrollment Act,, the first

national conscription legislation in the history ofthe,nation: With certain exceptions, it stipulatedthat all men between the ages of 20 and 45:Were liablefor military service. Volunteers were enrolled for 2

V -4

years-while those drafted .served fak 3 years or theyduration of the-war,but unfortunately a draftee'could hire a substitute- for. In spite of draft'riots,. nearly 3,000,000 men'wereenlisted during thecourse,ofthe warhy the 'North.' The Navy alsorequired Tersonnel additions and was eventuallyraised to 58,000 men. The Confederate forCes 'facedsimilar problems.

d. After the 'American Revolution,. United. States Armed

Forces.saw action early in the nineteen century.British-confiscationof,AMerican cargoes, andimpressment of American;deamen eventually led,President James Madisonto recommend war in 1812'.Facing. the strongest naVal power in the world,, ourNavy was badly outnumbered with only 20aships andI65'gunboats.. Admiral Perry's2remarkable victoryon Lake Erie and Andrew JaCkso's successful,'defense okre-14 Orleans contributed to. the final

** (V-9136) outcome of:the war, allowing, the United States topp 11 -15 Conclude a relatively-mild treatyofpeace;after a*** (V-9137) conflict thenationlad,not been prepared, for.pp 1220 Latei in the century, when Stephen: Austin began*'(V-9138) a colonization drive into Mexican-territory inPP 7-9 texas -, the Mexican Government became concerned about

the large number of Anglo-AMericans (approximately30,000) liVing in the region:. Attempts to disarmthe,Texans eventually ledtto open rebellion and the

4P Republic of Texae, won its'independence in-1836,, but9 years rater was adiitted tOheynievab the'28th:State. 'Friction over territorial.hoUndarieserupted, into warfare when Geri. Santa Anna sent theMexican Army against Gen 2aChary-JaY4Ws_foroesgathered across. the' Rio. Grande., The successful

prosecution of this'conflicEdid.noe'reault frommilitary legislative policy or technologicalsuperiority, but largelY from the .daring'and capableleadership of the_AMerican expedition.

e. Through the early part-of American history techno-

logical development was extremely, slow and had verylittle effect on the outcome of any battles. The oneexception to this was the Kentucky rifle: AlistairSmith in his great television documentary-, "America"claims ',that the accuracy thiS rifle gave the colonistsoldiers provided the Americns arreMeidous advantageover the British troops:. A skilled marksman could hithis target at yet unheard*of ranges. A sniper couldpidk off a-single man at 300 yards. -This was 3times the effective range-of the' musket. As Tointed

:c

z

out in the text, the rifle was used only by selected

troOps,due to the way major battles were fought in ,

the Revolutionary War. However, theblonistsdepend a great deal on what has becoMe known as"guetilla" warfare.. From behind bushes or otherpleas the Kentucky Rifle gave the colonists theadvantageliver the Redcoat's. The,first.real indicationttitt the industrial revolution' had affected military

technology came with the Civil War. Before then,muzzle-loading muskets and cannons, 4th slow firing,inaccurate, and short-ranged, greatlyyrestricted-thedesttuctiVe,pOwer of opposing, armies. The CivilWar, often calledHthe first Modern, war, showed thewide influence ofmachines and theii prodUbts. Theextensive use of, railroads, the telegraph, the,develop-ment of iron-clad batt4ships,,raetallic.dartridges,the Gatlin machinegun, improved revolvers and handgrenades, land mines, ,even the, use of balloon' forobservation ilddedjo the increase in firepower anddevastation: The outcome Of the war, the preserva-

tion of the Union and the defeat of the South canprobably be. attributed to the blockade of theConfederate states and, the economic advantages.

the North." The Confederate Navy began with el#OstAO warships, guns, ammunition, or material, 'but itdid have experienced naval officers. All in. all, theU. S. Navy captured or destroyed some 1,500 vessels.

NOTE: Few of the reference book .n you AFJROTCLibrary contain information about PhaSe I. Your schoollibrary indlastory teachers should -be able to giveyoU some excellent references- to use with thisphase of instructioti. .A few references are listedunder "Further Reading."

6. SUGGESTIONS FOR TEACHING:

,a. Suggested .time

1.6

Number of Academic Recommended Number of. Periods forEach Phase= 7.Periods per Week

2 , 3 4.

, .

3 . ..

,

.

4

.

.

9v-6 /

b. Lessons in history lend themselves readily to class-* room lectures., A chronological delivery of events

is easily followed and understood, but you shouldnot lose sight of the overall picture. Lecture to-prove a point; use qle events in history to indicate

their causal relationship to the final outcome. Donot simply retell 44 facts. Try to know your.'subject well enough that you do hot hive to rely'heavily on your notes,. Become enthused with the'.gaterial yoU are trying toyiget across to yourstudents;Inowledge can be contagious. Write keynames and dates on thetboard as you lectuie. Alwayssupplement youi lecture withinformation gatheredoutside the textbook. Anecdotes and documentaryquotations captivate student attention and placehistory on a personal level. To enhance your class'understanding, keep an eye out for contemporaryhiitorical analogies to the material you are dis-cussihg. Finally, do not be afraid of interruptionsfor questions. In fact, encourage your studentsto add their own observations and comments to yourlectures..

1,c. A tlass of topflight' students is often well enough

informed to participate in a class discussion. Thismay be started by haying four students discuss thecauses, effects, and'events of the conflictsstudied, 411 Chapter 1. Or the discussion may beapproached"topically with students ieading debateson ad'ances in military technology, recruiting, andenlistment problems, relationships 'between foreignand military policy, or other matters handled inChapter .1. ,;

d. The United States is. filled with Federal, State, andlocal museums, all replete with military hiStorydisplays. Take advantage of these fadilities, but'remember to plan your tour carefully.

e. Very few of your AFJROTC references deal extensivelywith the subject matter in Chapter 1. The biblio-graphy atthe end of she chapter should provide

,

several excellent scuicesof inforMation. Certainlyyour school: library will contain many more books onearly'imerican history.

4

f. Therere bound to be some gun buffs in your class;turn them loose:researching the eVolution of therifle. The National Rifle Association has someoutstanding'material for this.

44

g. there- are -three main points, in this phase thai are

. carried through the book. The evolution- of policy,

forces, and: technology.. ShoW' how what happened

during and before this phase affected modern aiypolicy, forces;,, and technology.

h. Student assignment: Read pages 1-34

i. Do not neglect essay- questiens when evaluatingstudents on Phase 'I.

7. INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS 'Air. Yorce films.

AFIF 14.. Country Tis of Thee..

21 Min. Cedar. 1951.

AFIF 45. Decision' at ,Williamsburg. 20 Min. COlor. 195'4.

AFIF 83: The Battle of GettysbUra. 30 min. COlor. 1957.

AFIF 99. Old Glory. 28 min: Color: 1960. 'AFIF 101. Williantsbureltatii.(21. 36 min.

Color. 1960.

AFIF 112. Keeping Informed. 19 min. B&W: 1962.AFIF 136. One Force. 20' min. B &W: 1964.AFIF 143. A Free-People. "20-iiiii7"'Cb-ittit.966.:

AFIF 144. Our Heritage: 28 min. Color.' 1965.AgIT 552.. Matthew'Brady. 13 min. B&W.. 1957.

SFP 1643, A Nation Sets its Course. 33 min. Color. 1965.SFP 1646.. To Freedom. 30 Min. B&W. 1965.

8." PROJECTS:

See page 34 of textbook.

9. FURTHER READING:

Dufour, Charles L The Mexican War, a Compact.History.Net,/ York: HawthorW-BOoks, 1968.. 'A

French Marion 0. America and'Wark. HarrisbUrg:Military Service, 1947.Fuller, Mai. Gen. J. F. C. Armament and, History.Nei? York: Charlea 'Scribner's 'Sons, 1945.'Green, Constance M. Eli Whitney and the Birth of American .

Technology. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956:Kantor, Mackinlay. Lee and Grant at Appomattox. New York:Random .House,. 1950.

'Leckie, RObert. The Wars of America. New York: Harper '&,Row, 1968.

Matlo0., 'Maurice, ED. American Military History. (Army.Historical Series). Washington, D. C.: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1969. 'Chapters. 2712.

V-8

North,, Sterling. George Washington, 'Frontier Colonel.

New York: Random House; 1957.Tdrner, Gordon B. A History of Military Affairs Since

the Eighteenth Century. Rei.rised Edition. New York:

MacMillan, 1952.Warren, Robert Penn. Remember the Alamo! New York:,

Random House, 1958.

,

I

c.

IL

1 A

IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE ,TEXT1300K

AND/OR INSTRUCTOR S GUIDE AND 'TEACHING__TECHNIQUES MOST EFFECTIVE ?OR THIS _PHASE .

TO BE COMPILED :AT END OF TEXT AND SENT TO iRd.

<11

a

. 4

GrA

J

;PRASE 1865,THOUGHIWORLD WAR II

Phase II of#

this'll:lit continues the historical discUssionofthe-evolution of American miiitaryPolidy, military forces, and

,militeri,technology by taking the_siudent from the Civil War

ttirough'World War II. It. explains the persistence of Isola-tiOhiat in American foreign Polley until the dramatic technologicalancl,intereational 'changes. of ;World War II made isolation impossible.

Another important factor, .emphaeized-.thriiiigliait the' phase, is

theAadual.improvement in United Stites forces despite thediffictlties caused by repeated demobilization following eachmajordenflict through World War II. Finally the unit traces.lifesuccesaive Changes, in technology that have affected mill.-'tary strategy and ;policy Since 1865.

*PIIASE II OBJECTIVES: At, the completion of this phase ofInstruction eaa` student should- -

a. Understand changes in American defense policy since,1865end the reasons for these changes.

b. Know some of the innovations and improvements in militaryorganization, training, and technology and some nf the sz.

.results of these developments.

Understancl.why American fOreign p.,144has evolved from .

isOlationiSm to an active role in world affairs and,understandwhat effect this has, had on the United'States Armed Forces.

d. 'Be familiar with the history of American involvement in warin the late nineteenth and twentieth Centuries;

2. sBEHAVfORAL OBJECTIVES: At the completion'of this phase ofinstruction .each student should-be able to:

a. Explain the reason for and the nature of American defensepolicy changes 'sinde 1865.

b. Describe the improvements, in military organization andtraining which-have gradually improVed and strengthenedUnited-States military forces since the Civil War.

c. Explain whytthe U iced States had to abandon a policy ofisolationism for n'active role in iniernational, relations.

d. Outline Americanspecifying the causes,weaponry of each. .;.

,

ita conflicts Since theCivil War,th effects, andedvancements in

e. List technological, advances made during the period and explain'4. how-they,affeCted U. S. military policy and tactics.

4

V-10

Po

14

3. SUGGESTED OUTLINE:, o

Poet 'Civil *War military fOrcea and conflicts(1) IheSpanisb-AteriCanliat, 1898:,

(a)- Military -policy developments. 4

(b) Changes in. ;military strength and orgy .ization

reaultiwgf,from.war

(c) ,TechnolOgidal deVelopments(2) World' War t _ _ _ _

TajWiliary pOlity.(b) Military force's

(c) Technological break-through in military weaponry.ib. Post WorlOjar,I military forces and-conflicts

(lj Military policy'and forces between world wars,1:2) , Technology- betwebn thevars

c. 'World War Ii,:193045'(1). The organization and strength of U. military forces(2) technology ".

Tc* W9rld:-War It-developments', 1945-1950. 1

(1).,Iniernational cOmpliCationa(2). Military forOes-

.13

4.. ORIENTATION:

Phase: II of the unit traCeshe growth of the American ArmedForces since the Civil'War. It indicatea the remarkabledevelopment in the military tight of the United tates after 1865and discusses some of the technological factors that introduced

the modern,era of warfare.- An important point to consider isthe significant changes brought about in world Affairs by World-War II. The new -fact of international relations, plaguedthe threat of Communist, Meant that the traditional isolationismof-America was,no.longer-feasible._

V-11__

O

5. SUGGESTED KEY. POINTS.:

***(. 9164) pp 6-31**(V=022)pp 247=294

311 -326

-1((V-9042) pp 3 -13

44-56

*(V-9136)-Pp 13 -15**(V-9137)

PO*(V -:9143) pp 15=60

**(V-9125)pp 396-398

415-426

**(v -9164) pp 61-99

4

a. Americandefense policy has evolved to meet nhanges in

military technology'an&intern4tionalcontingencies,but i?ftenimproveMentsname about slowly. Repeated

pOetwar deiegilization up through, World War. II was one

of our nation's most serious defense handicaps.During thenifieteenth Century, American Military_prowess, plainly evident as a result of the' Civil

War, lostits-effectiVeness when .traditional. post-war, deMobilization greatly depleted troop'strength.Navy cutbacks were also extensive; in the.1870s theUnited .States Navy ranked 12th in SeaPower, behindevenZbind and Denmark. Demobilization after, the

Spanish-Ameican War was-not quite as extensive; infact, in 1901 the-maximuntsize of the Regular, Armywas set at 100,000offiders and men. America hadrealized -that shehadibecome a world ppWer. Neyer-

theless, maximium troop strength was never reached,prior to World War I. Unfortunately, the, UnitedStates drifted into a new position of isolation. after

World War I and the,country extensively ,dibbandedits military forces. Again, weakened American mili-tary might tras useless as a,deterient to aggression

and the ,rise of the Nazis in Germany; the Fascistsin Italy, and the Kodo -Ha in Japan proceede&unchallenged.Demobilization after' World WTI was once again,typically extensive. ,Navyperbonnel'strength droppedfrom a total of almost 3,500,000 in-1945 to-about 375,000and :approximately 6.,400 vessels-were placed-in the-"Mothball fleet." The Army Air Forces dwindled to485,000 from' peak' strength of 2,153;000-and.effectivecombat unitsvere reduced- from-218 to 2.Post-World War II tensions forced the 'United 'States to

regroup its defenses and reformulate'' its, defensepolicy. Military CoMMunism attempted tofill the power'vacuums: left in Europe.and,Asia after the defeat o_f

the -Axis forces. A dramatic example of.Communistefforts to control new territory during the periodoccurred in Berlin in 1948. The free world,, with theUnited States playing_a leading role, :Countered anattempted blockade of the city, with a ngssiVe airlift,'World War II also revealed that firepoWer had increased'mare than ever. AMerican miiitary,developments hadto be designed .0 counter the highly successful Germanblitzkrieg forces that used Panzer divisions combinedwith tactical airpower. The great increase in

V=12

-

44,

_44 44

destructive capabilities iniroducedby- hue:leer- .

, weaponry meant that defense facilities couldi-nOlonger,-

telY on a time margin to Maki:u.ii,defiCiencies And

shortages. *.folicy Of instant defenie resjuinee nolonger tolerared'traditiOnalTeacetiia relaxation ofmilitary strength. Another World Warconiequence of

,

'was the develOpOnt of highly sPecia4zedequipmentfor OiefinaMphit,i6U6,:,deiert, jungle ,.mpuntsin,.arctic, coMiando,,paratroop, and Other-tyeiof

4 : special operations xt-,... ,,

P4

b. AccOMianying changes in American defense policybrought advances irk many areas of militaryyorgani-

t'r zatiOn,andechnOlogy, At the outbreak of theSpanish-American War, TagOlar'Ar* to strength

. ' 4 ,+-4,,, . , , ,

was slightly Overp,000:And although NationalGuard Units were considerably larger, they were

neVertheless,pOorly,trained,sequippe#anddiaciplined.Furthermore, these units continued., to resist the controland.stsndirdiistion-of the Regular Army.. This

0(17479136)-TrobleM:waScorrecied'in 1903 by,.thei:MilitiaAct4

pp 15447163 WhiAlirOght the'iationalGoard,more,in line with1Ccit-914.3j the ,RegOl4r Army by prescribing regular drill sessionspp 25.4430, and setting ,up, annualjrainingperioda. Subsequent

changes 4aVethe'Rresident the.authority-tb-Trescribethe length of time ,the-Goard,Might beicalled'tO

.FederalerviCe and, with the advice, and consent ofthe Seite, the authority to appoint all officersof the'00arddOring;thia'tiMO. An90ersignificant

, .

organizational change replaCed-the,p0ition-cif

COMManding,;Geperal.With'a Chief ofHStaff,_whtwasthe Adviserand,agent OftheChief_.4ecutive throughhis Secretary of War The Army -Reorganization Act:e.f:1920,,senetally considered one oOthemcatconsttuCtiVe, pieces, of military legislation, dividedthe Atmy into three components (l); the Regulart- 4

Army', -(2) the civilian National Gdard; and (3) the> . civilian'Organiied-Reiervei, Which, was further

divided into an OrfitersReserve'COrpti and an.

Enlisted 'Reserve Corps y The War.,DepartMent furnished','. the-Geard:With ei;u4ment, with some 4nancial support,,., and with officers for 4nairuCtion, drill

and: field training. Personnel redrOittent, a tradi-tional,prOblet, was aided by4egislation-enacted in

-! . c . ), *:

May 1917 which proVided, for three sotnces of military'manpower ; -(1) the Regular Army; ,W the National'Guardc and (3). a NatiOna]: Army raised by selective

.,:.,V3 .

service, including all Men-between-the ages of 21 and. IA

30 ,(later changed to 18 and 45). -Nearly 3,00,600,.,

. conscripts were chosen by lot, or nearly, 70 percent ofthe total armed forces. Naval 'personnel were also, ,

II

4

-40-9022)

pp 65-72***(V-9137)pp 21-35*(V79346) pp 5-9

tfr

greatly increased from ,65:,000, to. just under

500,660. The Selective Service Act Of 1940 authorizeda veacetime draft for the first ,time in history.Theibulk,ofthe,ArmY. waSattaited through thisdraft until. 19.7,2 when the All-Volunteer Force was

begun: bUiing-,Wotld War I the Army morethandoubled in size, increasing to. well over ;8,000,000-

by 1945. Peak strength, of thellaVy reached 3,256,000andthe.ArMy Air Forces numbered 245p0,600 personnel.In several noncombatant areas, threatened manpowerahOrtages, were eliminated by the use of volunteerwoMet. The Women's -Army Corps (WAC) and the WomenAppointed in Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES)became auxiliary units of the Army atd Navy.

c. Military technological advances since the Civililar,partieularly sinCe19,39,,have been spettacular.Even during the' titeteetth century, advances inweaponry stimulated, the rapid development of pro-fessional military education, By 1911 the UnitedStates 4taVyhad acquired- 28subMarines, arid naval,gunnery was vastly improved by the telescopIc sight,range finders, ao centrallzed'firf Control. Elec-tronic commtnications-werealso a great aid to shipand troop movement. The Army enjoyed technologicaladyandes,paralleling.thOgeOf the Nay, in smallarms, artillery, Oct:ammunition.. New iMproved-SPringfield rifles, 45-caliber automatic pistols, machineguns, and Wroprieuthetic recoil artillery,pieceswere all ittroduded. The lieavy Volute _of firepower;faulting fromthese'technolOgical advances madefrOntalatticks prohibitive, and consequently,World War I became a long stalemate Of, trenchwarfare. Poison gas was' first used by the Germans

ima,eurpriSeattack at :54,e thiri 1915, In seawarfare,, ii_yaa the ,German SubMarine,-or U-boat,

that became, the :greatest menace 10 the Alliednavies. Fortunately, Submakinesdefetses-buili arounddestroyers and small subchasers, the convoy' system Ofmoving supplieaand,,troopss,, and :the ,thorough mining

of the North Sea area enabled the Allies to containthe threat. Still,.U-boats sunk about 11,000,000tons of shipping.

cr.' The development of air poxer made a modest beginningin 1907 with the establiahmentgf the Aeronautical

invision pf the Army Signal Corps, consisting of .

one officer and one enlisted tan. .Army aviation wasofficially recOgnized in juiy,l9l4wwhen Congresscreated the.Aviation Section sg the'Signal Corps with60 officers and 260 enlisted men. UnfortunatelyAmerica 'failed to fully exploit,the great potential

'** .(1-012)53-63, 134-135(V-9136)

pp 1417447 .

#)t.' (V-9137)

29-31Ai (V-9143)

4p 15-24**, (V-0125)

129,435,

,(V-9164).

',10p195-250

;.

(V=9125)

301-426,

*** (V-9042)

0 1713-

4

of the airplane. Although the. United States attempted

to make practical nse,of the,newweapan in the NeXicanborder expedition of 1916, all 8 craft we 'lost tO

mishap and mechanical failure. When the United States,

entered: Warld War I the Navy possessed only 54 air-7

planes and 38 fliers,, and-the:Army hadjnst $5 airplanesand 7& fliers, but no' one airplane WaSpnitable forcombat use. The OerMaris and the French if phe' mean-,whileLhadover_2,900 airplanes.teorgenization Act ok'492p,made the military air rñia COmbatant armwith the designation.of.Air Service.Then in 1926 it becaMe-the Air Corps and in 1941, theArmy Air Forces. These organizational changes wereaccompanied by one of the ,most signikicant develop-ments in military technology, the 1-17 lo4-rangebobber. Produced at first in limitedinlmbera as a

defensive weipOn,,the bomber soon proved its potentialas a-strategic weapon. The aircraft carrier, anotherbetween-the-t4ars,deVelopment, also did,muih ta advanceMilitary aviation *abilities. Peak airplanestrength during,tha war actually reached well over150,000 craft, ,AdVanceS In Eirepowerduring,WjrldVar II Were-conaiderable. The air forcesrshOwedgreat technological advances iirapid4ireguns,radar,, rocketa napalm, high explosive Superbombp and-eventuallyothe atom bomb. Other important develop-ments included ,concentrated -packaged ra0ans andsonar. In recent years technology has kept paceWithchangea. intdefense.needs,

e. One of the mOstiMportani aspectsofthiachapteris the explanation of post4lotld,Wer:II internationaldeyelOpments. Isolationism a recurrent feature ofAmeran foreign ,poliy, has often heenitarilydisadvaniageoub when aggression threatened, other-parts of the world. After World War II when militantCommunism threatened to engulf the power vacuumsleft in: Axis held territories af Europe and' Asia,the United States had to organize the freerworld intocollective security. American intervention into worldaffairs meant thattnitedStatep military capabilitieshad to halm a-mobile and flexible response to aggressionanyl'ahere. Rapid deployment of defense forces, anecessity in the missile and jet age,, and the great

;. destructive capabilities of modern.firepower noRinger would'allow the isolated ,security Americahad enjoyed. during an earlier era.

s

1V-15

19

41

f. America has been involved in two WorldVars andseveral minor conflicts since the Civil War. The

unexplained sinking of the United States battleshipMatne, in Haver& Harbor on 15 February 1898, ledAmericans, already sympathetic with the Cubaninsurrection against Spain, to demand war. American

victories gave the United States possession of theTerritory, of PuertoRico and-temporary custodyover Cuba and the Philippine Islands. The spark

that ignited World War I (1914 -1918) was theassassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand ofAustria by Serbian patriots, but rivalry generatedby colonial disputes and secret alliances as wellas resentments over past wars set the stage for theconflagration. Although the United States tried to

remain neutral, German unrestricted submatineactivity, especially the sinking of the Britishliner Lusitania, eventualY drew America to theside of the Allies. (Note: The sinking of theLusitania has some mysterious aspects triat came tolight in 1973). Drifting into a new position of

isolation after 'World War I, the United Statesextensively disbanded its military strength although,during the 1930's the aggressive nature of Japan.and Germany was becoming plainly evident. WhileFrance, Great Britian, Soviet Russia, and the UnitedStates failed to take decisive collective securitymeasures, Hitler initiated bit *plans for 'European

conquest by invading Poland 'in September 1939.After World War II, cold war tensions destroyed muchof the hope that the United Nations would play aleading role in a new era of peace. CommUnistsubversion in Turkey and Greece was thwarted byAmerican aid, implemented through the Truman Doctrine,while the rest of free Europe was bolstered economicallythrough the European recover program, or MarshallPlan. In 1948 a Communist effort to isolate Berlin bysealing off the borders of east Germany to westerntraffic was broken by a massive airlTft that broughtfood and clothing over the blockade.

Note: Like Phase I,, Phase II has few referencesin your AFJROTC Library. Two books V -9164 andV,9125 give outstanding background information forWorld War II.. A few more references are listedunder "Further Reading."

V-16

ti

61*SUGGESTIONS FOR TEACHING:

a. Suggested time

Number of Academic Recommended Number of Periods for EachPhasePeriods, per Week

.1 2 3 4 1 5 6

2.

3

4 NI

b. As with the first phase, Phase II lends itself to

a classroom lecture. If you choosea chronologicalapproach, be sure to emphasize those points thathave contributed to the formation of the present dayAmerican fighting fotces. The concluding portionof your lesson, can serve as an introduction toChapter-3 of the text.

c. As with the first phase, the instructor may prefer to__use a class discussion of the majorlssues of thephapter. Avoid windy tangents on the more dramaticevents in military history, of the twentieth century,but to spark student interest do not ignore someof the more exciting aspects of tha two world wars.Plan your discussion so that you allow enough"timeto cover the major points. More than likely yourWorld War II stories have already been told, trynot to repeat them here.

d. As was emphasized after Phase I, there aremanyfacilities, military and civilian, throughout theUnited States that are useful to illustrate militaryhistory. With Phase II the instructor. may evenlocate professional military figures who canpresent interesting and informative personal accountsof military conflicts. Again, do noCuse thesepossibilities haphazardly, but have adequatepreparation for either a guest lecturer or a tour.

e. As with Phase I, very few of yourARJROTC referencesdeal extensively with the subject matter covered inthe text. The bibliography at the end of ChapterII should provide several excellent sources of infor-mation that are available in your school library,How about asking one of your history teachers to givesome,background on our entry into World Mar I andWorld War II?

V-17

4

f. Student assignment: Read pages 35-73.

g. ifs With Phase ,I, essay, questions are useful to

,evaluate 'a student's 'knowledge of historical data.

.7. INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS: Air Force films are almost tooabundant for World War II coverage. Be careful not tobecome known as "Movie Time" in this block of instruction.

AFIF 132. The MacArthur Story. 20 Min. B&W. 1964AFIF 136. One Force. 20 Min. B&W. 1964.AFIF 175. Which Way America. 32 Min. Color. 1969AFMR 648. World War. II --20 Years Later. 20 Min. B&W. 1965AFSM 555. Theodore Roosevelt. 20 Min. B&W. 1958AFSM 579. John J. Pershing. 20 Min. B&W. 1960AFSM 587. Chester W.Nimitz. 21 Min. B&W. 1960SFP Memphis Belle. 42 Min. Color. 1946.SF? 189. Target for Today. 59 Min. B&W. 1945.SFP 263-01 through 263-26. The Air Force Story.

These are, very good films when used selectively. Do notattempt to use the entire series.

SFP 274. Air Power American. 14 Min. Color. 1952,SFP 305. Alliance For Peace. 40 Min. B&W. 1953.SFP 501 through' 2l. Air Power Series.

These are very good films when used selectively.Do not attempt to use 'the entire series.

SFP 1060. Things to be Remembered. 22 Min. Color. 1961.

8. PROJECTS:

See page 73 of, the text.

9. FURTHER READING:

As"with Phase I, you will have to consult books not in yourlibrary when preparing your lectures. References suggestedfor Phase I should also prove useful here. In addition,your textbdok'lists several excellent sources of information.The following three books, although limited to flying,are very good references:

Carastro, L. R. Of Those' Who Fly.Air Force Officer Training Corps,Loomis, Robert D. Great AmericanWar II. New York: Random House,Toland, John. The Flying Tigers.House, 1963.

V-18

Maxwell AFB, Alabama:1972.

Fighter Pilots of World1961.

New York: Random

69,

/

IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE TEXTBOOKAND/OR INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE AND TEACHING

TECHNIQUES MOST EFFECTIVE. FOR THIS PHASE.TO BE COMPILED AT END OF TEXT AND SENT TO JRC.

N.

PHASE III - THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

We have brought the history of American fighting forces upthrough World War II. At this point in Retory the NationalSecurity Act of 1947 was passed which created what is nowknown as the Department of Defense. Phase III examines thebases, structure, and organization of the U. S. defense-establishment. It presents, the provisions for nationaldefense contained in.the United States Constitutionand identifies the defense responsibilities of. the Presidentand the Congress. The phase also describes the advisoryagencies that aid the President in formulating United Statesdefefise policy and presents, a brief history of the Departmentof Defense, including the various reorganizations it hasundergone.

,Phase III also studies the national defense responsibilities

of the Secretary of Defense as well as the role of theJoint Chiefs of Staff. Finally this phase indicates theimportant differences between the chain of command used foroperational forces and that used for support forces.

1. PHASE'III OBJECTIVES: At the completion of this phase ofinstruction each student should--

a. Understand how the Constitution provides for nationaldefense throUgh the President and. Congress.

b. Understand tha ,Presidential responsibilities for

national' defense and be familiar with the variousagencies of the Executive Branch that assist thePresident in formulating defense policy.

c. Be familiar with the history of the Department ofDefense' and understand the significance of the variousreorganizations of the department.

d. Be familiar with the basic structure and functionsof 'the Department of Defense.

e. Understand the responsibility and authority of theSecretary of Defense and those who assist him.

f. Understand the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andthe differences between the chain of command used foroperational, forces and that used for support forces.

2. BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES: At the completion, of this phase'ofinstruction each student should be able to--

a. Discuss those aspects of the Constitution that providefor national defense and the responsibilities of thePresident and Congress in carrying out these provisions.

b. Give a brief outline of the responsibilities andorganization of the various executive agencies whichaid the President in formulating national defense policy.

c. Briefly describe the development of the Department ofDefense and discuss the reasons for its reorganization.

d. Outlie the basic organizational structure of the Depart-ment of 'Defense.

e.\

Explain the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defenseand of those who directly assist him..

f. Define the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and explainits internal organization.

g. Explain the difference between the operational combatantcemmand structure and the support command structure.

h. Define unified and specified commands.

1

3. SUGGESTED OUTLINE:

a. Legal bases for national defense

(1) Constitutional provisions for national -defense(a) Presidential power and Authority(b) Congressiortal power and authority

(2) The executive branch in defense policy(a) The Cabinet(b) The Executive Office

b. Development of the Defense Department(1) Creation of the Defense-Department

(a) The National Security Act of 1947(b) The establishment of the Defense Department

(2) 'Defense Reorganization after 19 3(a) Reorganization 'Plan No. 6, 1953-(b) The Reorganization Act of 1958

c. Secretary of Defense(1) Armed Forces Policy '.ouncil(2) Office of the Secretary of Defense

4; Joint Chiefs of.ptaff Organization(1) Joint Chiet*oeStaff(2)- Joint Staff

e. Operational command structure

(1) Unified and Specified Commands(2) Support command structure

f. Functions of the military departmentsg. Civil Defense Functions

V-20tet,..1

* (V-9144)

pp 235-236

4, ORIENTATION:

Phase III studies the contemporary Defense Ebtablish-ment by first examining some of the legal bases found inthe Constitution for national defense. It then examines

the present structure of the Department of Defense andthe role it plays in the national defense structure.Beginning at the top this phase discusses the responsi-bilities of the President and the Congress. One sectionis devoted to the advisory responsibilities of variousagencies within the Executive Branch. Continuing down theChain of command, this phase presents a brief history

of the Department of Defense and its responsibilities inthe defense structure. The reorganizations which the'Department-of Defense has undergone sets the scene for adiscussion of the Department's present structure. It

illuctrates'how the legal authority for nation&. securityextends through the executive and legislative branchesto the Armed Forces. As this chain of coAmand must respondimmediately in time of national crisis, there is a more direct^line of communications between the Chief Executive, theSecretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and theunified and specified commands in situations requiringop5rational rather,:than support forces. This phase ctn-clmies with a short discussion of the functions, includingcivil defense, of the military departments.

5. SUGGESTED KEY POINTS:

a. The Constitution clearly lays provisions fornational defense although these provisions are

open to liberal interpretation as to ,exactly how theguidelines should be, implemented. One of the mostimportant provisions is the guarantee of civiliancontrol of the military, naming the President themilitary Commander in Chief.

b. The President, although he is Commander in Chief,does not have the power to declare war-but can orderthe defense of the nation in the case of a surpriseactack. Only Congress can issue a declaration ofwar. A ego-year limit on Army appropriations is anadditional assurance that the Congress keeps a-'tight rein on the military machinery of the nation.Because of the great complexity of national defenseproblems, the President must rely on many executiveagencies for advice. Along with Cabinet positions,the Executive Office of the President, made up ofthe White House Office, Office of Management and

V-21

ei 6 S

fr

*(V-9042) pp 26-31

i**(V-91(4)pp 3-49, 62-67,317-333

**(V-9144)

pp 78-95,

98-126, 211-221

oir

Budget, the National Security Council, the CentralIntelligenceligency, the National Aeronautics and SpaceCouncil, theOffice of Emetgency Planting,. theOffice of Science and Technology, a0d others, providesthe President.with.a broad,staff ofsrfecialists.

c. The origins of the present day Department of Defenselie in the National Security Act of,1947, whihheliminated the old concept.of strictly dividedcontrol over the U. S. Army and the"U. S. 'Navyte level of Commander in Chief. This law provided aconsiderably broadened concept of defense organizationand emphasized the interdependentore3ationship betweenmilitary and civilian elements in the Government.The National Security Council, the Central IntelligenceAgency, and the National Security Resources Boardwere established to assist thOational MilitaryEstablishment headed by a Secretary of Defense. Thelaw also crqated the Joint Chiefsof Staff. In 1949,the National Security Act provided fhp an UnderSecretary of Defense (later renamedteputy Secretaryof Defense), made the National :Mftlitary Establishment .

a cabinet- level, department with the name of Department

of DeAnse, and increased the powers' of the Secretaryof Defense. The final step in the 1.8rmatiori of thecurrent defense establishment was the 'ReorganizationAct of 1958.wAich established a firis ecoMand linefrom the Secretary of Defense to therbnified.andspecifiedcommands. This removed the service secre-taries-and the military chiefs of the Services fromthe command channel and thus gave the- President arapidly deployed line of command toithe combatcommanders.

4. The Department of Defense has to diversify and specializeto meet the *arious defense requiremtnts of an agewhen nuclear holocaust and guerilla insurgency areboth a threat. The Department is headed by a Secretaryof Defense, a Ca, net officer who is, primarilyresponsible for: ) strategic and tactical planning,(2) operational comm nd, (3) supplies and servicesamong the military de artments.

e. Acting by authority o the Secretary of Defense, itis the Joint Chiefs o Staff that serve. as the oper- 1

ational link 'between he President and the unifiedand specified combat, ommanda. Although 'prohibited.by law from becoming an overall Armed Forces generalstaff, the Joint Chiefs is the principal militaryadvisory body to the Chief Executive and his

**(V-9136)

pp 120-125**(V-9144)pp 226-231

**(V-9136)

pp 125-140.**(V-9137) p 77

***(V-9144)

pp 143-162

Secretary of Defense. In accordance with the law,the Staff acts as a separate organization representingthe three military departments. The group consistsof a Chairman, appointed by the President with theadvice and consent oD the Senate from one of thethree'Services; The Chief of Staff of the Army,The Chief of Naval Operations; and The Chief ofStaff of the Air Force. The Commandant of theMarine Corps acts as a coequal member of the JointChiefs, of Staff when matters pertaining to the MarineCorps are, under consideration.

f. Because high -level decisions concerning the securityof the country must be put in operation as rapidlyas possible, the- Reorganization Act of 1958 made theunified commands truly unified,by placing allservice elements in them under a single commander.Orders going to operational commandgis directly fromthe President through the Secretary of Defense andthe Joint Chiefs of Staff avoid delays that couldoccur if they were relayed through the three ServiceSecretaries, the Chief. of Staff for each of themilitary departments, end finally) to the unified andspecified commanders.' Unified commands (AlaskanCommand, Atlantic-Command, Continental Air DefenseCommand, European CoMmand, PacifiC CommAnd, SouthernCqmmand, and Readiness Command) are composed ofcomponents of two or more services under a singlecommander. A specified command (presently only theStrategic Air Command is a specified command) isestablished and designated by the President and isnormally composed of forces from only one serviceto handle.a broad and continuing mission.,

g. In its over twenty-fiveyears of,existence, the' func-

tions of the Department of Defense and its militarydepartments'have been understood only by a few.There have been many arguments by the publid overwhether these agencies have carried out their responsi-bilities. For all its critics the one standard thatthe military should be judged by is whether it getsresults.. The presence .of SACts bombers and missileshave been major factors in preventing World War III.The aid programs, which have received much of thecriticism have won many little victories through civicaction projects. In the series of confrontationswith aggression in Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and Vietnamthe Department has shown fantastic persistence,

V-23

patience, and success. These. confrontations have

not been allowed to escalate into global Isar. Agood summation of the new Department of Defense isgiven on page 162 of V-9144:

"Rarely over the years, has the Defense Departmentbeen given much credit for its success inlierformingthese missions, i.e., in preventing nuclear war,halting the escalation in intensity of limited-sizeconflicts, containing the spread of Communism generally,and 4oing,its assigned work with the least-possibleimposition on the rest of the nation under thecircumstances.' But this absence of cheers can betaken to mean that no longer does the Defense,Department march to a brass band. -To the extentthat the muting of martial music indicates that the

DOD is doing what it is supposed to do in 4 somber.

world--serve as a viable, effective iftstruitent tocarry out foreign policy--it can claim that the

. nation's military forces have4seldom been usedmore successfully than they are today."

6. SWESTIONS FOR TEACHING:

. a. Suggested time

. "Number of Academic

Periods per WeekRecommended Number of Periods for

Each Phase1 j 2

2

,

3

b. Phase III departs from A strictly chronologicalaccount of American military history and deals withthe structure of the Defense Department. Lecturescan still be used to present the material but a fewguidelines might be useful. (1) Avoid cluttering yourlecture with too much ordinary information aboutGovernment agencies and their function. Much ofthis is adequately discussed in the textbook. (2)When you do discuss Government Organizations and

their structure make ample use of charts and diagrams,

V-24

otherwise students will become confused by the maze

of names and functions. (3) There are several abstract

ideas in Phase III that deserve special emphasis

in your lecture and,aAditional discussion, from your

students., Emphasize Whe importance, of a constitutional

basis for the military establishment And insure that

your class understands the significance of the

constitutional provisions for civilian control of the

military, Secondly, emphasize the major need for

a department of defense and the need.to make this

organization extremely responsive to the immediate

requirements of the Chief Executive.

c. As was indicated above, Phase III has excellentmaterial for a classroom discussion. Not only does

this enhance the students comprehension of theimportant ideas lying behind the factual material,but it also eliminates tedious descriptions, ofGovernment agencies. Furthermore, present day

interest in the military establishment and itspositian in American society will stimulate dialogueand debate, and with proper teacher guidance, will

produce a productive classroom session. Remember,

as &Iteacher your responsibility in classroom discussions

is not to monopolize the time or steal-the show, butinstead to supplement and.expand and to pump in facts

where students tend to generalize. Be prepared for

some tough discussion on the handling of the Southeast

Asian experience. The next phase covers this areabut this is an appropriate' place for discussion ofcivilian control of military operations.

d. The reference library provides you with a few booksto draw from in order to -support this phase.

e. Student-assignment: Re4d pages 75-101.

f. When evaluating students on Phase III, avoid ques-tions that require rote memorization of Governmentagencies and their functions, but instead encourageyour students to have an .understanding of the principleslying behind the American defense system.

V-25

\N

les

7. INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS:

Air Force Films.

AFIF 79. Your Congressman at Work. 30 min. Color. 1957.AFIF 109. Architects of Peace, 22 min. B&W. 1961.AFIF 157. Illt!gamess. 31'min. B&W. 1967.AFIF 163, The Presidency. 28 min.' B&W. 1967.AFIF 168. We.the Peotle--The Story of our Federal

GovernMedt. 28 -Min. B&W. 1967.OSD 1-63, The Pentaic&eort. 32 min. Color. 1963.SP 1137. The Eagle's Talon. 26 min. Color. 1961.WA-9.- The Mission of the Joint Chiefs. 25 min. B&W. 1959.

8. PROJECTS:

See page 102 of the text.

9. FURTHER READING::

Ferguson, John H. and Dean E. McHenry. The .AmericanSystem of Government. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965.powers, Lt Cal Patrick W. ,A .Guide to National Defense..1eSrTx.a.nderationsoftlfiliteEstablishment. New York: Federick A. Praeger, 1964.United, States Government Or anizational Manual.Washington, D. D. S. Government Printing Office.(Thrsmanual is revised periodically.)

V-26

,

IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT. OF THE TEXTBOOKAND/OR roTRuctoRt s GUIDE AND TEACHING

TECHNIQUES MOST EFFECTIVE FOR THISTO BE COMPILED AT END OF MT AND: SENT TO JRC.

PHASE. IV - THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS

Phase IV of this unit presents a synopsis of the U. S.

involvement in the Korean and-Vietnam Wars. The attempt

is made to give an unbiased explanation of the events

leading up to each of the involvements. This Phase

begins with a short background of how the threat ofCommunism disturbed America and its allies after World War II.It proceeds to the invasion of South Korea by North Koreaand the subsequent involvement of United Nations forces'under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.CArrying out the theme set in the first two phases, adiscussion of forces, technology, and policy is coveredduring the war and afterward. The gradual process of

involvement in Southeast Asia by America is explained.The technological innovations of this war are looked atclosely and this phase of instruction ends on & positivenote showing how a technique of war has application inpeacetime.

1. PHASE IV OBJECTIVES: At the completion of this phase of

instruction each student should-- 2

a, Be familiar with ,the events leading up to the

Korean and VietnamWars.

b. Know some of the innovations and improvements inmilitary technology during this period and the resultsof thesesdevelopmentS.

Understand the difference in U. S. force level policyfollowing the Korean War.

2. BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES: At the completion of this phaseof instruction each student should be able to--

. .

a. Describe the events leading up to US/UN involvementin the Korean War.

b. Explain why U. S, airpower was not used to its fuNeffectiveness in Korea and Vietnam.

c. Describe the basic change in U. S. military policy toa position of deterrence and flexibility that hasevolved since the Korean War.

d. Explain why troop level strength policy changed after

1953.

V-27

4

e. Outline the causes of U. S. participation in theVietnam War.

f. Compare the nature of the Vietnam War withprevious wars.

Identify innovations and technological developmentsderived during the Vietnam War. 4'

h. Describe how techniques developed for war can,aidendeavors in peace.


a. The Korean War,(1) Events leading to US /UN involvftent(2) Korean War military forces and' technologyMilitary policy, technology,, and forces betweenKorea and Vietnam

c. The war in Vietnam(1) Events leading to U. S.'involvement in Vietnam(2) The new nature of war

MTectimloguadevelpimentsand,resulting strategychanges

(4) Wartime developments--peacetime blessings

ORIENTATION:

Phase IV of this unit traces IL S. involvement in twounpopular wars that have caused some drastic changes inpolicy, technology, and doctrine. Limited war was new to.military thinking and the flekible response makes aninteresting point for discussion., Another major pointin this phase is that for the first time in history theU. S. did not completely demobilize after the Korean War.The technological developments in this period ran the gamutfrOmtrereading old aircraft into gunships, to theapplication of the very latest developments such as lasertheory. This phase concludes with the interesting conceptof applying wartime innovations in peacetime situations.


***(V-9042)pp 11-16

***(V-9022)pp-297-299

a. FollOwing the end of World War II the U. S. ArmedFordes set 'out in the most massive and quickestdemobilization ever seen. The Army and Air Forcemustered out people so-fiat that they disappeared,before the material they were working with couldbe properly disposed. General Twining (V-9042, pp 11)described the military force as melting away' "as thoughit had never existed." Within days, the nation'sgreat airpower was just a memory.

V-28

4

*** (V-9022)

pp 300-309

As pointed out in our AE-II book, Civil Aviationand Facilities, 1946 and 47, saw our whole aviation,

industry 'sink to its low ebb. During this drawdownof U. S. military forces the USSR did not do the same:They were building twelve aircraft for every one webuilt. The U. S. military sought a betterment of

-the-derfense'posture but received little help fromCongiess or the people.

Mr. 'Louis A. Johndon, Secretary of Defense, feltthat the military had' plenty of punch and felt itcould lean down more. As he set out to cut down moreof the military, intelligence sources in the FarEast were warning-of imminent danger of NorthKoreans invading, South, Korea. Intelligence reportedthat South Korea would fall.

b. Sunday, jUile25, 1950, the,arthy of Communist NorthKorea launched a full-scale attack against theRepublic of Korea. All American dependents wereevacuated, some under fire.. President Truman, neverone to avoid a tough decision, ordered General

Douglas MacArthur to use all his-forces to supportSouth.Korea. However, the President limited air-and naval operations to below the 38th Parallel,the line between North and South Korea. GeneralraeArthur lave verbal permission for allIcks into

,

North Korea and the first step in winni g the counter=attack, achieving air superiority was on its way.The second phase, air interdiction, bombing behindthe lines was set into motion.

In the meantime the North Korean ground advancepushed forward in spite of a valiant effort by the.outnumbered American and'U. N. troops. They took astand at the port city of Pusan and kept themselvesfrom being swept into the sea. General MacArthurlaunched an amphibious landing at Inchbn, Korea anddrove across,the Korean Penieula in hope6 of cuttingoff the North Koreans in the South. The results weredramatic,, and the North Koreans were driven all theway to the Chinese Border. The Chinese joined thebattle and the possibility of a prolonged or evenworld war led the United Nations to take steps toachieve an armistice.

V-29

ti

Nobody won or lost the Korean War in the literalsense of the terms. We did learn many things however,

one of which was that strategic bombing can be

decisive. The Air Force committed itself well andmany felt that airpower was the most positive factor,but for the first time we saw the use of airpower

limited for political reasons. The'objective in this

type war was not to win but to gain a truce. We

were to see this happen-again all too soon.

c. A very different and new military policy was the direct

***(V-9022) result of being caught with our defenses down for

pP,311326 the sixth time in the history of our country. After

Korea the American people finally realized, for atleast-a time, that our enemies :sere .:encouraged when

we became weak. The 1950s and early 60s saw thedevelopment of many new weapons systems. The B-52

and KC -135 proved to be excellent strategic weaponssystems.' Missiles were developed and deployed.Along with the mew weapons came the new militarypolicy of deterrence and flexibility: The test of

the policy came in 1962 with Cuba.. Because the'was strops and had the ability to move

quickly, the Russians backed down after trying toput missiles into Cuba.

When the United Kingdom was at the peak of theirpower, little countries used to."Nip-at the Lion'sTail." These small countries were pretty sure thatEngland would not,unleash its full power. It appears

that this nipping is the fate of all great powers.Being the strongest power in the anti-Communist worldthe U. S. fell heir to containing the growth ofCommunism. We did it in Europe andi.qorea. The

next spot was a small Southeast Asian country calledVietnam. Once a French colony this country has beentorn with war for over twenty years. In 1954 as aresult of the Geneva AccordePthe country was divided'in half. Instead of solving the strife it just drewthe lines and fighting continued. The U. S. was drawninto the conflict gradually. As a matter of factour strategy took the name "gradual escalation."It was believed we could apply increasing pressurein hopes of making the enemy capitulate with theminimum effort. The concept looked sound on paper andin computer problems but it-violated many basicmilitary principles such as mass and surprise.

V-30

36

Even, in Korea, the newspapers were able to show

front lines and arroVs of military thrust. Vietnam

was a different war.L *Heavy jungle canopy hiding

mud trails, both ene and ally looking the same,and no Clearly defined lines made necessary a totalreassessment of how ,'to fight...a: war of this nature.

Like Korea, airpower was limited. Local commanders

were not allowed to pick the targets outside South

Vietnam. This was done 8000 miles away in Washington.Another interesting'reversal was that tacticalfighters like the FH4 and F-105 were used for strategicbombing while the B-52 strategic' bomber was used

for tactical purpOses. It was a very differentwar indeed.

e. Rising to meet the challenge of this "war unlikeother wars" the military developed many innovationsin tactics and technology. This was the war of thehelicopter. The Army had found their new cavalry.Their steeds were Called "Huey" but they loved them,

as much as the horse cavalrymen loved his horse.The airmobile concept and helicopters got a fullChance in this war.

War is not a nice thing. To say good things aboutwar usually results in pained expressions fromlyouraudience.. Nevertheless everything that comes outof war is not bad. (MAST) (pp.118, text) is oneexample; another closely associated result ofVietnam was the paramedic. Young men after receivingexcellent medical training were sent to SoutheastAsia to not only perform medical first-aid on thewounded but to go into the villages and tend to thesick. These young men were not doctors but theirperformance in para-professional areas was so out-standing that their services are now being appliedin the U. S. to alleviate the doctor shortage.

There are many examples of good ideas comingfrot this war. For example, laser technology hasbeen advanced tremendously.

6. `SUGGESTIONS` FOR TEACHING:

a. 'Suggested time.

Number of Academic RecomMended Number of Periods forPeriods per Week L Each Phase

1' ! 2

3

V-31 ,""F-41

b. Phase IV is potentially one of the .toughest in

thr whole curriculum. History has not had much of

a chance to make decisions About Vietnam. Most of

the students are old enough to remember the negativismwhich abounded during the height of,he war. The

teacher led discussion is ,probably the best method

of ,getting the information across. However you

must be prepared to face some very, tough questions.

Do not try to "blow smoke", mistakeg were made,admit it and show how we can learn from them. With

classroom disCussion do not put yog,self in aposition of defending the policies and strategies

of this period.

,c. For those who like, a few war stories won't hurt this.phase of instruction. Make sure, htWever, that thes 'tory has a purpose and makes a point enhancing the

discussion., Personal experiences add greatly to.

discussions.

d. The reference library is extremely weak on Vietnam.Periodicals of the past few years are probably thebest references for this phase. ti

'e. Student assignment: Read pages 103-121.

f. An evaluation of the student's knoWiedge on thisphase of instruction could be done through both shortanswer and essay tests. .This might,be the time togive an oral qui; or set up a debate with teamsdiscussing "Vietnam--Again or not or "Is LimitedWar Worth It?" This is another phase ,that rote

facts are. not the primary objective;, concepts andprinciples are More important.

4:6

7, INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS:

Air Force Films

AFIF 85. A Motion Picture History of the Korean War.58 min. B&W. 1958.

AFIF 96. Korean Armistice7-27 min. B&W. 1961.

AFIF 106. KoreaBattleground for Liberty. 48 min.Color. 1961.

AFIF 153.. The Unique War. 25 min. Color. 1966AFIF 162. Thailand - -Where Men are Free;. t4 20 min., B&W. 1967AFIF 172. Know your Enemy - -the Viet Cong.' 22 min.

B&W. 1968.

AFIF 176. The Battle of Khe Sanh. 30 min. Color. 1969.AFIF 180. Korea--ReVisited. 20 min. Cb1or. 1968

V-32

.1%

AFMR 624. War and Advice. 20 min. B&W. 1964.

AFMR 638. ortAmard14. 10 min. B &W.,' 1965.

FR 661. MAC Combat Airlift -- Operation Blue Light. 26 min. -

Color. 1969.

FR 724. USAF REPORT: Southeast Asia--Jungle Doctor. 14 min.

Color. 1966.

FR 778. Tactical Airlift- -Modes of Aerial Delivery. 20 min.

Color. 1968.

FR 848. FAC--F100 Supports U. S. Array.. 4 min. Color, 1967.

FR 849. Blind Bat. 4 min: Color. 1967.'

FR 859. Combat and Support Activities SEA-1-1 August 1967.

7 min. Color, 1967.

FR 1002. United States Air Force in Southeast Asia-1967.28 min. Color. 1968,

FR 1006. Combat and Support Activities AEA--15 March--Pararescue Training in SEA. 5 min. Color. 19,68.

FR 1009. . Khe -Sanh Victory fog Air Power. 18 min

Color. 1968.

FR 1010. . C-7 Operations in South Vietnam. 9 min

Color. 1968.

FR 1039. .,Soviet 122 mm Rocket. Color.1968.

FR 1042. . 6 min. Color. 1968.

SFP ?63-V2CH2. The Air Force Story--Vol. 2, Chapter 2-- Meetingthe Red Challenge. 14 min. 'B&W. 1959.

26I-V2CH3 4 On to the Yalu, June, 1950.SFP 263-V2CH4 . Korea, the Final Phase. 14 min.B&W. 1960.

SFP 263-V2CH5. . Our Worldwide Air Force, 1953,59.15 min. B&W. 1962.

SFP 263-25. . The, New Air Force, 1945-1947. 14 min.B&W. 1959.

SFP 263 -26. . The Gold War, .1948- 1950'. 14 min.B&W. 1959.

SFP 264. Thunder from the Skies. 14 min. B&W. 1951.

SFP 552. Air PoWer-The Cold Decade--To the Yalu. 27 min. B&W.

1957.

SFP 523. . Korean Stalemate. 27 min.B&W. 1957.

SFP*1186. Cuban Crisis. 14 min. B&W. 1963.SFP 15448. Medal of Honor--One for One. 5 min. B&W. 1967.SFP 15440 . Capt Hilliard A. Wilbanks. 10 min.Color.' 1968.

SFP 1697. B-52. 38 min, Color. 1969.SFP 1756. There is a Way.. 58 min. Color. 1967.SFP 1758. Twenty - -five Story of Air Force F105s.27 min. 'Color. 1967.SFP 1767 . 27 min. Color. 1967,

V-33

:39

1 .0>

SFP'1872. Alone, Unarmed and Unafraid -- Tactics' Reconnaissance

in Southeast Asia. 28 min. Color. 1968.

ti -3880. Forward Air Control Procedures for Special Air Warfare.

le min,. Color. 1968.

TF.6485. ,On Target--The Air Strike Team. 25 min. Color. 1971.

8. PROJECTS: See page 121 of the text.

9. FURTHER READING:

Broughton, Colonel Jack. Thud Ridge. Philadelphal J. B.

Lippincott Co., 1969'.

Guevana, Che. Guefind Warfare,_ New York: Frederick A.

Praeger. 1962:

to

.1

V-34

A

IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF IRE TEXTBOOKAND/OR INSTRUCTOR' S GUIDE AND VEACHING

TECHNIQUES MOST EFFECTIVE FOR THIS PHASE. .

TO BE COMPILED, AT END OP TEXT AND SENT TO JRC.

,./

z

PHASE V - LAND AND SEA FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

4hase V examine6 the missions and capabilities of the

U. S. Army, Navy, and Marine forces. Included in the

discussion of capabilities is a look at some of the advancedequipment being.employed by each of the, services. Army

employment is discussed by looking at how it fits into theoverall defense scheme and Army capability-is described bylooking at some of its weapons. The Navy part of this phase

emphasizes developments in submarines, aircraft carrier,

and amphibious warfare. Finally the structure of the Marine

Corps is discussed.

1. PHASE V OBJECTIVES: At the completion of this phase ofinstruction each student should--

a.r = Understand the primary functions and responsibilitiesof each of the Armed Forces.

b. Be familiar with the basic, organizational structureof each military service.

c. Know some of the special, conventional, and nuclearwarfare capabilities of the Army, the Navy, and the

Marine Corps.

2. BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES: At the completion of this phaseof instruction each student should be able to--

4. List the tasks of U. S. military forces.

b. Cutline the Army missions in cold, limited, andgeneral war.

c. Name and describe three Army weapons, three Navyweapons, and two Marine weapons.

d. Explain the relationship of the Marine Corps to theNavy.


a. Fundamental tasks of military forces.b. The United States Army.

(1) Role in National Defense(2) Organization(3) Weapons

c. The United States Navy(1) Mission *(2) Organization

(a) .Nuclear equipment(b) Conventional equipment

(3) Technology of the future

V-35 42

***(V-9136)pp 30-47

***(V-9137)pp 5644***(V-9138)pp 75-107

d. Theynited State's Marine Corps(1) Relationship.to Navy(2) Organization ,

(a) Fleet Marine Forces(3) Advanced equipment

4. ORIENTATION:

Phase V concludes the study of the present Defense Establish-ment by taking a close look at the structure and organizationof today's land and sea forces. Phase V is an excellentcpportunity not only to examine each of the fighting forces,but also to review the entire National Delense theme ofAerospace Education. By reviewing the Air Force role inthe Defense Establishment with the study of this chaptera complete picture can be drawn. The functions andresponsibilities of our Armed Forces have only developedgradually and the military history of the nation doesmuch to explain the nature of our present Armed Forces.


a. The general objective of the Armed Forces is (1) tosupport and defend the Constitution of the UnitedStates against all enemies foreign and domestic;(2) to insure, by timely and effective militaryaction, the security of the United States, itspossessions and areas vital to its interests; (3)to uphold and advance the national policies andinterests of the United States; and (4) to safeguardthe internal security of the United States. Thechief of Staff of the Army and of the Air Force,the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandantof the Marine Corps, the ranking members of eachbranch of the service (except for the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs), are responsible to the variousservice secretaries for the efficiency and effec-tiveness of military operations.

b. Each of the three military departments is headed bya secretary, a civilian appointee of the President.Policies coming from the Chief Executive are implementedby each secretary through the various commandingofficers of each branch of the Armed Forces. Theseofficers (the Chief of Staff of the Army and of theAir Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and theCommandant of the Marine Corps) are appointed bythe President with the advice and consent of theSenate. They are assisted by military staffs composedof deputies and assistants. The organizationalstructure of each service varies according to thenature of their different missions.

V-36

43 .

W4

*** (V-9136)Aft pp 141-153lop ** (V-9137)

pp 115-134

** (V-9137)

pp 135-159

** (V-9138)pp 146-169

c. Throughout the history of the Defense Establishmentthe ability to engage in battle' with the enemy hasprobably only been matched by the ability of theseparate services to engage in battle. with themselves.The conflicts between the three major services- -Army, Navy,, and Air Forcer-have been over their rolesand missions, over the dividing up of funds,'and over

manpower. This competition has not been all bad. It

has kept each of the services from becoming complacent,encouraged inventiveness, and required each service togive a penetrating analysis to their own roles toinsure their viability. All this creates strength

and vitality for the overall mission of defense.ofthe United States. Unfortunately, this rivalry alsocauses waste and duplication, The rivalry also hinders,to some extent, joint defenses A good example ofthis rivalry is the mission of air power. This

battle had raged since the discovery of the militaryrole of the airplane and still .is not fully resolved.

The Army has always wanted its own Air Force, one itcan control fully. The WY, from the very first, hasdemanded a flying role while at the same time claim-

ing that air power has limited effectiveness. Todayall three services (also the Marines and CoastGuard) have their own air arm. The rivalry betweenthe services rages. 'With the mil tary budgetcoming under increasingly intensefire, a gooddiscussion can be held over the place of air power and_who should control it. This discussion can beexpanded into, "Why not a complete merger of all theServices?" Canada has done it, can we follow?This discussion should include the functions,missions, and weapons of each of the services.

d. The weaponry of war has reached a fantastic degreeof sophistication. The text has traced the improve-ments in weaponry from the rifle through this phasewhich talks of fast firing rifles,, anti -tank weapons,

jet aircraft launched from floating carriers tomissiles that can cover thousands of miles and hit atarget with precise accuracy and more destruction thanhas been unleashed in all previous wars put together.Only a few of the weapons have been mentioned inthe text, matty more can be researched and discussed.

Trips to local Army, Navy, and Marine units to viewthese weapons will bring this phase alive. Don'tforget the local National Guard units, for they arenow getting some of.the very latest equipment.

II/V-37

'14.

_

e, The U. S. Coast Guard, a military, service and abranch of the Armed Forces, is normally assigned tothe Department of Transportation rather than tothe Department of Defense. The Coast Guard isprimarily charged with providing search and rescueservices, developing and administering a merchantmarine safety program, providing navigation aids andport security, enforcing laws an the high seas orwaters under the jurisdiction of the United States,and maintaining a general readiness in the event ofwar or national emergency.

f. Throughout the National Defense theme of the Aero-space Eaudationctirricuium there has been very littlemention of the role of the Reserve Forces. TheNational Guard and ReserVes of all the services havea long history. A discussion of their place in nationaldefense is certainly in order in this phaSe ofinstruction.

The Army National Guard is the oldest of the reserveforces. The idea behind 'a National Guard has notChanged greatly since its beginning. It Was and is apart -time organization of soldiers who could enter aconflict to supplement the regular ariy. Today theNational Guard has expanded its role until the Armyand Air Force Guard make up the bulk of the U. S.air defense posture. It also has a very definiterole as a peacetime force to protect property andto preserve order for state authorities 14 :case ofdisaster or insurrection,

6. SUGGESTIONS FOR TEACHING: A

a. Suggested time

Number of AcademicPeriods per Week

Recommended Number of Periods forEach Phase

2

3 t/e 11111

IN

V-38

45

bd Lecturing on Phase V-may be difficult, and other

forms of instruction may be mare profitable. Do not

suffocate your students with a wealth of departments,

divisions, units, commanders, and functions that no

one can be expected to memorize. Discussingdifferent aspects of each branch of the Armed

Forces on a, personal level--that is, describing what

a student or young officer would see or do at diff-erent operational assignments--may help to enliven

your discussion. Otherwise, students are likely to

lose interest and retain little.. Students will

probably be intereated.in some of the differencesin organization betweemthe services. It is also

likely that they will want to know more about thedifferent warfare capabilitieb of each brandh.

c. Students may have many questions. Their questions

may be an opening for awider discussion. Or, you

may have several students present reports on different

military units and their functions.

d. Phase V presents an opportunity for a.review of allthe material covered it' .the unit. Informationdiscussed in Chapter V of the text can be relatedto the history of the military and to the Departmentof Defense in general.

e. The reference library. provides you with several books

to draw from in order to suppOrt this phase.

7. INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS:

a. Air 'Force 35mm slides

V0031. United States Army.

V0032. United States Nam.

b. Air Force Films.

FR 941. Exercise Pathfinder Express. 17 min. Color.

1968.SFP 1471. Tactical Weather Support. 23 min. Color.

1966./

.

TF1-5452. Army Weather Support. 36 min. Color. 1963.

TF 6463. Cardinal Rules for Attack Helicopters.42.min. Color. 1969.

V-39

TF 6554. The ArmYlAir Force'28 min. Color. 1970.AFSM 590. NATO-Antisub. 16TF 5765. Nuclear Defense atTF 5766. Seapower. 14 min.

Team in Action.

min. B&W. 1960.

Sea. 35 min. Color. 1961.

Color. 1959.

NOTE: If there is an Army, Navy, or Marine JROTCunit in your area, swap films with them.

8. PROJECTS: See page 149 of the text.

a. Swap a class with the Army or Navy JROTC instructorin your area. Have your cadets make up a panel todiscuss the Air Force and travel to other JROTC unitsto make a presentation.

9. FURTHER READING:

The AFJROTC library and the Suggestions for FurtherReading listed in your testbook should provide you withenough sources to prepare for these classes. Do notoverlook periodicals and outside reference people assources. Also, an excellent up-to-date resource formilitary organization Id:

United States Government Organization Manual. Washington D. C.Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government PrintingOffice (Updated periodically).

V-40

47 S

4'

IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE TEXTBOOKAND/OR INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE AND. TEACHING

TECHNIQUES MOST EFFECTIVE FOR THIS PHASE.TO BE COMPILED AT END OF TEXT AND SENT TO JRC.

'p

PLEASE COMFIT THE COMMENTS FOR EACH PHASE AND

FbRWARD TO AFROT(/JRC, MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA 36112 .

iRESE41ILL"BE,1YSED FOR FUTURE REVISIONS (IF TIME IS

CRITICAL, PLEASE REMOVE THE INDIVIDUAL PHASE COMMENT

MIEET§I AND/FORWARD THOSE),.

o'

49

4

S.