Application for restricted byways in the parishes of ... · Charmoor Drove Consultation – Comments Joanna Roseff September 2018 2 8. In a slightly less recent case, Rex v The Inhabitants

Charmoor Drove Consultation – Comments Joanna Roseff September 2018

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Application for restricted byways in the parishes of Coombe St Nicholas and Broadway, 630M, 632M and 633M

Comments on the report by ED – 25th July 2018

Point 2.5 Ownership to the centre line 1. The common law presumption that landowners own up to the centre line applies

only to public ways, whether they are via regia or communis strata.

2. These classifications were examined in Dunlop and the erroneous conclusion was drawn that communis strata were restricted as to user. Evidence will be presented that shows that communis strata are public ways.

3. It follows that the purported ‘common way’ available for use by adjoining landowners only, does not apply to ways in the countryside, although it does apply to developments for housing in C18 where a specific plot of land in private ownership was turned into a street.

4. Private restricted as to user ways in the countryside are in the nature of an easement and will always pass over land the ownership of which can be identified with certainty.

5. If a private, meaning restricted as to user, way, is obstructed, in the absence of a deed or grant, there are three possible remedies and every one of them requires that the freeholder be stated:

i. By prescription or time immemorial

ii. By lost modern grant

iii. Under the Prescription Act 1832

6. In an ancient Year Book case, 33 Hen VI 10, 1455, Seipp Number 1455.062, where the plaintiff failed to name the freeholder, Moyle JCP said:

it does not appear by the writ who is the freeholder of the way (bovel) where the

nuisance is supposed, because it might perhaps be the highway (haut chemyn), in

which case no action of any kind lies, because it is a 'popular action' and he who has

thus stopped the king's highway should be presented at the leet and fined, but no

common person can have an action against him, though it is lawful for anyone to

break down the wall where the nuisance is, if it is a common nuisance; and so he

(plaintiff) ought to show who has the freehold, or else it will be understood by us

that it is the highways

7. According to case law, the ad medium filum principle does not apply at all in inclosure awards. In Poole v Huskinson 1843 11 M & W 827, Parke B said:

…As to the ownership of the soil, I do not apprehend that there is any difficulty. It

remains in the lord of the manor, for that portion of the soil only is taken from him

for which he receives compensation, and which is allotted to others.


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8. In a slightly less recent case, Rex v The Inhabitants of Edmonton, 1831, it was decided that roads set out under an inclosure Act do not by presumption of law belong to the adjoining owners. Lord Tenterden CJ, referring to the ad medium filum presumption, said:

I should doubt whether that presumption would hold here, where the roads are

made under an inclosure Act. The presumption that the roads are the property of

the adjacent owners is founded on the supposition that the roads originally passed

over the lands of the owners, and therefore they still belong, ad medium filum viae,

to the adjacent owners.

9. So the assumption that these ways belong to the adjoining landowners is incorrect.

Point 4.1.3 Stopping up of Little Common Lane 1. The Combe St Nicholas Inclosure award, 1818, incorporated the provisions of the general

Inclosure Act, 1801.

2. This act by s VIII required that if the Commissioners were empowered in the local act:

to stop up any old or accustomed Road, passing or leading through any Part of the

Old Inclosures in such Parish, Township, or Place, the same shall in no Case be done

without the Concurrence and Order of two Justices of the Peace

3. The local act quoted in Appendix 4 says that the Commissioners could stop up any:

“public highways or highway” etc in through or over any of the lands intended to

be inclosed or other lands within the said parish which might in his judgement be

diverted or turned without inconvenience to the public into any other public

highway or highways … or other Road or Roads … or to be diverted or turned so as

to make the same more convenient to the public or be stopped up and destroyed as

superfluous and unnecessary with the concurrence …

4. The statement in the report that “where there may have been public rights predating inclosure, they were legally stopped up by the award” raises unjustified doubts as to the existence of such a pre-existing public way, the Quarter Sessions order being ample proof of that fact.

5. Secondly, the words in the local act make it clear that such stopping up was either to be for the convenience of the public, meaning that the road was to be diverted onto a more commodious line for the public, or, it was because such a road was superfluous and unnecessary because an alternative was provided.

6. It can be seen from the Ordnance Survey 1811 map, in Appendix 8, that the old road continued north directly from K but appears to co-incide with part of the claimed route to the south.

7. The exact location of the road stopped up is not specified, presumably because the Quarter Sessions order has not been found.

8. The most likely reason for the stopping up is that the public rights continued over the claimed routes and to the south of point K at least, its continuation would have been superfluous.


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Point 4.1.3 Dunlop reference 1. The sentence beginning “Case law confirms that there was a distinction between public

highways and private roads” and continues saying that “private roads bore rights of access which were limited to a ‘class which might be defined by any of a number of factors or criteria’” is taken from the judgement in Dunlop.

2. Dunlop is the only modern case that has tried to establish what rights existed over private carriage roads.

3. It did so by looking at a few cases and legal text books from 1628 – 1834 to determine what rights existed over a class of road called communis strata to try to determine if there were two classes of public road, one of lesser importance than the other.

4. Unfortunately, there were mistakes in the material put before the judge, Sedley J, as he was then, and he was led into conclusions that weren’t correct and he found, wrongly, that communis strata were restricted as to user.

5. Sedley then said that this ‘history’ was compelling evidence for private carriage roads also to be restricted as to user:

‘In my judgment there was a true distinction, certainly into the 18th century,

between private or common roads and public roads or highways. The distinction

between them was apparently held not to matter where nuisance by obstruction

was laid since in either case the offence was the same. But so far as rights of access

were concerned, these differed by definition, being limited in the case of a private or

common way to a class which might be defined by any of a number of factors or

criteria.

By the beginning of the 19th century, however, it appears that legal usage had

changed so as to conflate common ways with highways and to distinguish these

from private ways: see Hawkins Pleas of the Crown 1787 and 1824 editions, and

Tomlins' Law Dictionary (4th edition, 1835). This history furnishes compelling

evidence for the construction advanced on the applicant’s behalf, namely that both

in the Act of 1801 and in the Glatton with Holme Inclosure Award of 1820 public

and private carriage roads were deliberately distinguished, and that the distinction

signified differential rights of user, embracing all the monarch's subjects in the

former case and a limited if unspecified class in the latter.’

6. And also:

‘No internal evidence suggests that the choice of words in the Award is casual or

accidental. Exactly the same, admittedly complex, formulation is used for Mill Road

as for Denton Road, which is appropriate since they are continuous with one

another; and different language is used, as I have indicated, for other roads in the

Award. But throughout the words ‘public’ and 'private' are used differentially and

with evident care in a context suggestive of the defining of rights to use the road

rather than of the characterisation of the road's quality or status . All the

indications are that 'private carriage road' is deliberately used in the Award as a

term of art distinguishing the particular road according to the extent of the


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particular rights over it from the public carriage roads on which all subjects enjoyed

an equal right of vehicular passage.’

7. Dunlop is only legally binding as to the actual point at issue, which was the interpretation of the Glatton with Holme inclosure award. Its authority in relation to other awards, is merely persuasive and not binding.

8. This is because the judgment in Dunlop depended in part on the 'care' Sedley observed in the award, different language being used for other roads in the award (see above).

The mistakes in Dunlop 1. Sedley began with a quotation from Coke’s book, ‘On Littleton’, first published in 1628,

which divided cartways in via regia and communis strata.

2. His ‘history’ began by establishing from Thrower and Austin that roads could be divided into highways and private ways, which could be common to e.g. a vill or to parishioners, to go to church.

3. He was persuaded that the rights over roads described as ‘common’ were not the same as the rights over public roads.

4. The first piece of evidence was R v Saintiff, where at the end of the case it was suggested to Sedley that the indictment was found bad because it apparently ended 'there is common for two, three or more'.

5. But as can be seen from the full case report, the indictment was found good on the authority of Thrower:

So all that sticks with me is the manner of laying it; for the word commune does not

ex vi termini import, that it is common to all the Queen’s subjects, as it ought to do

to maintain an indictment. And one of the precedents produced has the word

“publicus,” which is of wider extent than “communis,” for there is common for two,

three or more; and it will be hard to understand the word "common” to be universal

to charge a man’s freehold. And without doubt the conclusion will not help it, if so

much be not expressly charged in the premises. And here it is not said to whom it is

common. It is, therefore, very fit to see precedents before we determine it (d).

…

(d) It is said, S. C. 2 Ld Ray. 1175, that the exception to communis semita was over-

ruled, and that the indictment was, in this respect, held well enough, on the

authority of Rex v Thrower, I Vent. 208, but they held the indictment was naught,

because it was pons pedalis instead of pedestris, S. C. 1 Salk. 360.

6. Note also that the indictment said “ad commune nocumentum omn. ligeor, dominae Reginae illac transeunt”, which means to the common nuisance of all his majesty’s liege subjects that go that way.

7. Sedley relied on his conclusion in respect of Saintiff to decide that the cited reason for the verdict in R v Hammond was wrong - because if common did not mean public (as he thought


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he had concluded from Saintiff) then communis strata could not mean the same as via regia because via regia undoubtedly meant a public road.

8. The indictment in Hammond said:

Indictment for that the defendant tali die anno et loco ten loads of straw and dung

in communi strata sive alta regia via posuit et locavit et ibidem per decem dies

remanere permisisit, ita quod the king’s subjects could not pass

9. It was objected that the indictment was bad for duplicity because a road could not be both via regia and communis strata.

10. It was reported that the indictment was found good because the court decided that the two expressions meant the same thing. This did not agree with Sedley’s view, which was that common ways were for a restricted user, and so he had to find a reason of his own for the indictment being found good.

11. He decided that it did not matter in an indictment for common nuisance whether it was all the public or only a “proportion of the public” that were affected. This was despite the wording in the indictment that said the effect of the nuisance complained of was that “the king’s subjects could not pass”.

12. And Sedley had already seen the evidence of Thrower to say that an indictment would not stand for a way that was for “the parishioners” to go to church. He did not reconcile his finding on common nuisance with the obvious contradiction in Thrower.

13. The next part of the argument addressed the fact that legal text books clearly state that the term common way and highway mean the same.

14. Those presenting evidence to Sedley got over this by showing him an edition of Tomlins published in 1787 and convinced him that there must have been a change in terminology between 1717, when Hammond was heard, and 1787 when Tomlins was published. They did this without being able to evidence any reason for the change with a particular case.

15. But the version of Tomlins presented to Sedley was the 6th edition, which happened to be identical to the 1st edition published in 1716, the year before Hammond was heard. This explains why, although Tomlins refers to Saintiff, Thrower and Austin, it does not mention the case of Hammond, heard in 1717.

16. So it was in 1716 that Tomlins wrote:

there seems to be no reason why any way leading from village to village, which

does not terminate there, but is also a thoroughfare to other towns, may not

properly be called a common or highway

17. This agreed with the later verdict in R v Hammond that communis strata and via regia are both public ways. So the common law would call them both highways although statute law, which is based on classical definitions, would vary. The reason is found in the original extract from Coke’s ‘On Littleton’, which says that via regia belongs to the king but communis strata belong to a private person, which may be a body politic or corporate, such as a vill or a city or a borough town.

18. Statues, originating from the king, will not recognise as a highway any way that does not belong to the king unless specially defined as in, for example s 5 HA 1835 or the legislation concerned with the Definitive Map review in NPACA 1949.

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Errata: In 14-16 for Tomlins read Hawkins


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19. The phrase via regia and communis strata was used in the Statute of Marlborough, 1267, which prohibited anyone except the king’s officers from distraining in the highway or common street. Coke wrote in Book II of The Institutes that this was to make sure that the king’s people had free passage when they were going about their business.

20. So the public nature of communis strata dates back to at least 1267 and because they are public, any obstruction of them is a public nuisance.

21. The law of public nuisance in common ways is explained by Coke in Book I of the Institutes in Coke on Littleton. In it, he explains that an action on the case for the obstruction of a common way will only stand for a private person if there is a special damage. The normal remedy is presentment in the leete or the tourne, presentment being a procedure not available to private individuals.

22. There is further evidence of the public nature of communis strata in the report of the case held in India, Satku Valad Kadir Sausare vs Ibrahim Aga Valad Mirza Aga on 12/12/1877. This expounds at length on the rules around a special damage, but at point 7 makes a clear and unequivocal statement that the public had the right to pass in any public highway whether via regia or communis strata.

23. The practical effect of this corrected history on interpreting inclosure awards, is that the natural presumption is, as agreed in Dunlop, that the via regia correspond to the public carriage roads in the enabling legislation and communis strata correspond to the private carriage roads.

24. It is evident from ss 8 – 10 IA 1801 that the main characteristic distinguishing the public carriage roads from the private carriage roads was that the former were repairable out of the statute duty whereas the private roads repairable by some other method. Although sometimes this was by the parish or the vill, it was normally by the allottees.

25. The Commissioners could only award that a way was to be repairable by the parish or the vill if it was pre-existing and already repairable by the parish or the vill. But this did not mean that such a private road would be repairable out of the statute duty because that resource derived from statute and was intended for use on ways used by travellers.

26. Statute duty was supervised by the parish surveyor and he had authority to take stone from various places including waste land, to use to repair the road. The common law liability was discharged in a different manner, often by simply letting in light and air and there were provisions in the highways acts placing obligations on occupiers of land adjoining all highways to keep their ditches scoured and their hedges low so that the sun and wind could work best on well-drained land.

27. The work then done by the parish consisted of pecking out the ruts and making the way as good as it had ever been – see Reg v the Inhabitants of Clueworth, 1705.

28. After the common highways passed into the care of the highways surveyor by HA 1835, the standard of repair changed. By Reg v the Inhabitants of High Halden, 1860, the repair standard required that the road be made as good as necessary for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood all year round.

29. Other common law methods of repair include ratione tenurae and ratione clausurae. R v Flecknow (I’ll send it if you want it) prevented them from making a single allottee liable to repair ratione clausurae because the value of the allotment might be less than the cost of repair, so often, as in IA 1801 s 10, the local act provided that private roads were to be repaired at the expense of all the allottees.

30. It is a legal principle that he who has the benefit should bear the cost of repair and hence the private carriage road appointment clauses that say the roads are for the benefit of all


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the allottees were mainly concerned with justifying putting the burden of repair on the allottees. This does not mean that they cannot be used by anyone else. The statutory conditions for extinguishing pre-existing roads like Common Hill Lane makes clear that there were rights for the public to traverse private carriage roads that did not need to be stated.

31. It may be argued with truth that private carriage roads are not highways but neither in strict law, are communis strata. This is why the justices could not use their powers to deal with highways to regulate the communis strata but relied instead on the fact that obstruction or out of repair was a public nuisance, with which they were authorised to deal – see Saintiff for more details as to the powers of the Justices.

32. But it is not necessary to demonstrate the existence of a highway for a way to be added to the Definitive Map, only the existence of a public right of way. Ways shown on the Definitive Map are highways according to the definitions in NPACA 1949.

The Consistency Guidelines on private carriage roads 1. At 7.37 the Consistency Guidelines say:

Use of the term ‘private’ in a local act does not exclude the possibility that some

form of public right existed. That may be obvious from the language of the award

itself, e.g. the description of a highway as a ‘public bridleway and driftway and

private carriage road.’ In some instances it is explicit in the award that the public

have full rights of use over the ‘private’ road.

2. In the Coombe St Nicholas award, there is implicit evidence that public rights exist over the claimed routes because of the terms of extinguishment of Common Hill Lane that are enshrined in statute. The road awarded in the Neroche Forest Award is contiguous with a road previously awarded in the Coombe St Nicholas Award and it would be a nonsense if the same rights to pass did not exist over the combined length. But even if the private carriage roads were restricted as to user, how would that fact be communicated to the public when the only statutory obligation to inform the public was that maps should be published showing the public carriage roads and the private carriage roads.

3. Until now, the presumption that communis strata are restricted as to user has driven a belief that such ways can exist under the common law as well as being created by inclosure awards. It has now been shown that there is no evidence of this – and so the default status of private carriage roads, in the absence of explicit evidence to the contrary, is that they are minor public rights of way.

4. So the reverse of the situation described by Sedley applies, which is not that there must be some evidence of a right of way for the public over a private carriage road but that designation as a private carriage road per se implies a public user in the same way that designation as a public carriage road does.

5. To find otherwise, there must be positive evidence that the public are excluded from use and this may be the definition of a servient and dominant tenement such as is often found in awards creating easements over individual plots of land to other particular plots of land.

6. There is no such evidence in this case, the private carriage roads being bounded on both sides and separated from the adjoining land as well as communicating with the pre-existing highway network at both ends.


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Point 4.3.1 Tithe records 1. The sentence “Some private roads, due to use could be equally not liable to a tithe” is wrong

even though it derives from the Consistency Guidelines Section 8 Tithe Commutation Documentation. This is because the term ‘private road’ has been used here to imply a ‘restricted as to user way’.

2. Public roads, unrestricted as to user, are of several kinds:

i. Public highways over land bought for the purpose

ii. Alta regia via being ancient ways leading from place to place of importance

to travellers e.g. market towns, borough towns, cities, and some of these

may be called ‘great roads’

iii. Via regia, a loose term, meaning any way where the king has the passage for

himself and his people

iv. Communis strata, belonging to a lesser entity than the state, which are also

of several kinds:

a. Those leading to local places of importance e.g. from vill to vill, which

may be called public or parish roads or even via regia or common

highways

b. Those which are through ways but are mainly used to go to the fields

and closes, anciently called common ways

c. Those of local importance only leading only to local places only such

as the church or the common fields, restricted as to purpose more

than restricted as to user, anciently called private ways.

3. Of these ways, all except (iv) (c) may be subject to a public nuisance because they could be of use to anyone.

4. Also, different systems of classification may divide these roads differently, for example, the classical system divides roads strictly according to the origin of the soil, whether it was purchased by the state or whether it was contributed by a private person – and this classification cannot change unless the land is sold: hence the statement in Austin that ‘it is a matter of fact and much depends on common reputation’.

5. And in English common law, the term via regia, following the definition in (iii), is used loosely to mean any public way, regardless of the ownership of the soil, and it is obvious that many unimproved public ways pass over soil belonging to the landowners on either side, which may, by economic development, come to lead to important places and be called public highways.

6. The situation topographically of all of these public ways is permanent and cannot change simply because the ownership and occupation of the land they pass over changes.

7. But the ‘restricted as to user way’ is in the nature of an easement and is impermanent and will be destroyed if all the lands come into the same ownership and occupation.

8. It is defined as the right for someone to pass over land in the occupation of another, thus making it a true private way in all senses. The right may be personal for general purposes or it may be real and dependant on use of another piece of land.


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9. Ways shown in brown on Tithe maps will be public ways that, in theory at least, normally will not move without due process of law, originally a writ ad quod damnum, determined by the justices.

10. This is important: Tithe maps showed public roads because internal divisions within landholdings might change. So plotting the public roads on the map would be useful if that happened later, to ensure that each ‘new’ subdivision made the correct contribution to the tithe rent charge.

11. It is agreed that the brown colouring on a tithe map will not be evidence of a public highway because it includes ways that are communis strata. Also, it is not an indication of ways repairable by the parish in any manner, whether by the statute duty, common law liability or supplementary assessment by a rate under any highways act.

12. This is because a public way may be repairable by a private person ratione tenurae or ratione clausurae. Also, via regia and the communis strata may be repairable by a vill by prescription or ratione tenurae. And private carriage roads created by parliamentary inclosure may be repairable by the allottees in any manner directed by the Commissioners and these are also public ways.

13. So roads coloured brown on the tithe map were public roads of a variety of statuses and subject to a variety of ways of repair. There is nothing else that they could be.

14. Further, separating a way off from the adjoining land by boundaries and leaving it open at both ends to a public road is an act of express dedication at common law.

15. But the private roads in the ‘restricted as to user’ sense are easements over a plot that will have a freeholder and an occupier. They are part of an hereditament and so they had to be recorded. Some easements, particularly on large estates, were well enough used as to be visible as a beaten track over a larger hereditament in cultivation.

16. But because the tithe commutation is a percentage of the yield of the whole hereditament, it is not necessary to exclude strip of land over which the private way passes. The rent charge calculation, based on the yield of the previous seven years, will naturally allow for the use of the private way because the yield would be affected to a greater or lesser extent each year depending on the use made of it.

17. The same applies to public footpaths across private inclosures as described in The Consistency Guidelines in the summary of Stoney v Eastbourne Rural District Council, 1927, 1 Ch 367.

18. To show easements on tithe maps would be an unnecessary complication and it is perfectly obvious that tithe maps do not show easements because otherwise they would show a right of way to each landholding, which they do not.

19. But the roads coloured brown may not be the full extent of the public ways shown on the Tithe map. This is because the grass and herbage on public ways may be subject to tithe.

20. It has been noted by SCC that private roads are sometimes listed separately in a Tithe Apportionment. These could be either the common ways described by Coke, or they might be inclosure awarded private carriage roads, the grass and herbage on which, for example, according to s 11 IA 1801:

shall forever belong to and be the sole Right of the Proprietors of the Lands and

Grounds which shall next adjoin the said Roads and Ways on either Side thereof, as

far as the Crown of the Road


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21. Another kind of public road liable to tithe would be one where the soil is known to belong to a private person, e.g. one awarded at inclosure because the plot was too narrow for the road to be fenced separately. So in this case there will be a public road with an owner as well as an occupier.

22. Tithe maps are good evidence that a particular piece of land did not have an owner because the Tithe Commissioners were required to record the ownership, occupation and state of cultivation of all messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments, including barren land because it might at some point be brought into cultivation, although the definition of barren land as land needing extensive manuring before it would be productive, does not suggest a road.

24. The lack of an owner in fee simple, as has been demonstrated by 33 Hen 6 10, 1455, is good evidence of a public road.

25. So, any road shown on a Tithe map coloured brown will definitely be a public road. It will not be a footpath because according to British Parliamentary Paper, 1837 XLI 405, Conventional Signs to be used on the Plans made under the Act for the Commutation of Tithes, (reproduced p 46 What is a Cross Road, Susan Taylor), footpaths were to be shown with a row of dots.

26. For Tithe awards that used existing maps, reference would need to be made to the Key, but it is not usual in old maps to shows footpaths in the same way as higher rights. And by their nature, public footpaths tend to be shortcuts across private inclosures rather than double-bounded ways. It must be remembered that the Definitive Map is without prejudice to the existence of higher rights over the ways that it depicts.

27. Additionally, public roads will be found amongst those listed separately as ‘Private’ and occasionally they will be listed in the Apportionment with an owner and occupier and part of their description will be ‘Road’.

4.3.2 and 4.3.4 Broadway and Combe St Nicholas Tithe Maps 1. Contrary to the report, as shown above, the coloured ways on Tithe maps will be public

roads of some description.

2. In this case, the immediate history of these roads is known as originating from the inclosure awards of the same two places as the tithe maps. There is the additional evidence that part of 633M was in substitution for a pre-existing public road that was stopped up.

3. It is not known to what extent the remaining parts of the claimed routes are private carriage roads set out over pre-existing roads, although the fact that the road crossing the boundary between Combe St Nicholas and Broadway continued to be contiguous between and after the two awards, suggests that this road at least, was a direct substitution for a pre-existing road.

4. Consideration of the Tithe map evidence has been diminished, together with that of the inclosure awards in Section 8 on the grounds that:

i. Per 4.1.3 and 4.2.1, the judgment in Dunlop has been cited to show that,

normally, public rights do not exist over private carriage roads, and so the

inclosure awards are “excellent evidence” that these roads were ‘restricted

as to user’

ii. And per 4.3.5 that “tithe maps do not weigh either for or against public rights

over the application routes”


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Conclusion 1. It has been shown above that Dunlop was in error has to the general existence of local ways

that were restricted as to user, such ways as existed under common law being public ways of little or no importance to the travelling public, thereby distinguished from highways. It follows that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, private carriage roads carried similar rights as the communis strata because together they formed a local network of ways open to anyone who had occasion to use them.

2. In respect of the Tithe maps, it has been demonstrated that the only ‘restricted as to user’ ways that can exist without being evidenced by a deed or grant, are those that are in the nature of our modern easements, which necessarily have a dominant and servient tenement. The tithe apportionment, by omitting to record an owner or private occupier of these ways, shows that it would be impossible for them to be servient tenements. The only other states available to them under English common law are ‘common way’ or highway, both of which terms denote a public way.

3. I hope SCC will revise their conclusion and decide to award these ways as BOATS or RBs.

Additional documents submitted

1. 1628 Coke Section 68 Tenant at Will

2. Coke 2nd part of The Institutes Vol I on statute of Marlborough c 15

3. Austin 1 Vent 189

4. Thrower 1 Vent 208

5. Thrower 3 Keb 28

6. R v Saintiff 6 mod Cas 259 case 369

7. R v Hammond, 1717, 1 Strang 44

8. R v Hammond, 1717, 10 Mod 382

9. The Queen v Inhabitants of Clueworth 1705

10. Reg v Inhabitants of High Halden 1860

11. Satku Valad Kadir Sausare vs Ibrahim Aga Valad Mirza Aga on 12/12/1877

12. Extracts from Hawkins Pleas of the Crown 1716 edition

13. Extracts from Hawkins Pleas of the Crown 1787 edition

14. 33 H 6 10, 1455

15. What is a Cross Road, Sue Taylor, p 46 – I cannot reproduce it.

Joanna Roseff 16th September 2018

Documents

Application for restricted byways in the parishes of ... · Charmoor Drove Consultation – Comments Joanna Roseff September 2018 2 8. In a slightly less recent case, Rex v The Inhabitants