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1
Images of Britain
Historians do not work in a vacuum. Our knowledge of the past is influenced by the
world in which we live and the way the past intrudes on us on a day-to-day basis. We
see images of the past all around us in paintings and, from the 1840s, in photographs
and, more recently, through moving images on film and television. But the past is also
interpreted for us in writing, whether in the fictional works of Daniel Defoe, CharlesDickens or Graham Greene, or the overtly non-fictional, though often self-justifying,
accounts left by participants. All of these shape how we see the country. But so too
does the language we use to talk about the past.
The rural landscape contains much about our past. In itself the countryside was in
1707 central to the economy, peoples living and everyday existence. The very nature
of country landscape tends to recall the past to us a slower pace of life, fewer services,
poorer houses and lower standards of education and culture. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the bulk of people lived in small labourers cottages, most of which have long
since been knocked down. However, the aristocracy and gentry moved out of the
fortified structures or modest farmhouses of previous centuries and erected palatial
and elegant country houses amid parkland and gardens which today (through visits toNational Trust properties) dominate our appreciation of rural landscape and leisure.
The kinds of change that have taken place in the built environment reflect the
changes in social structures, in politics and in economics that have taken place in
Britain over the last 300 years. In almost all cities, there is an historic social division
between east end and west end one strongly middle-class and one working-class
in composition. In all cities, suburbs grew in the nineteenth century based on social
distinctions, with the better-off generally moving ever westwards to escape the smoke,
Approaches to Britains history
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4 INTRODUCTION
the smells, the crowds, the dangers of the centre, while the less well-off moved east-
wards. Within predominantly working-class areas, streets of the skilled and the clerical
were separated from those of the rough, whilst middle-class homes became larger to
accommodate servants. Although social divisions grew in British cities between 1707 and
1950, the geographies have been changing since then, with gentrification of city centres
and of some working-class suburbs, making our landscape history more complex.
A look at any townscape tells us other things about the past. The numbers of spires
and church towers many now put to secular uses reveal a highly religious society in
the last three centuries. A visit to any of the countrys great cathedrals dramatically
brings out the links between church and state the battle standards of British Army
regiments are still housed in the great Christian churches, alongside the memorials
commemorating wars against French, Russians, Afghans, Zulus, Boers and Germans.
Statues to heroes and (more rarely) heroines of the past still dot cityscapes. Military
ones proliferate, with long-forgotten generals present in abundance; few now recall the
importance of General Henry Havelock (statue in Trafalgar Square), General ColinCampbell (in Glasgows George Square), or the relatively unsuccessful General
Redvers Buller (in Exeter). Politicians and great aristocrats proliferate. Everywhere
in statues and street names there are Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, although
few other monarchs are so commemorated outside London. Most cities also have
their splendid town halls. These are often extraordinary statements about local pride,
wealth and power: Leeds town hall built in 1858 on woollen industry wealth,
Manchesters of 1888 on king cotton, and Glasgows, also of 1888, on shipbuilding
and engineering.
The history of our islands also come to us through art. John Constables painting
The Hay Wain (1821), with its thatched cottages with flowers growing up the wall;
Sir Edwin Landseers Monarch of the Glen (1851), with hills and heather behind the
mighty stag, and the darker social commentary of Hogarths London scenes or Joseph
Wright of Derbys paintings of industry and science in the eighteenth century provide
the visual grammar by which we understand Britains past. Artists, like historians, have
had a tendency to idealise the British countryside for its rustic values, and to regard
the cities that sprang up in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as dark and
forbidding places to be condemned for their poor environment and health conditions.
The idealisation continued with eighteenth-century paintings of individuals and
families (by artists like Allan Ramsay, Joshua Reynolds or Thomas Gainsborough) that
revealed a wealthy, peaceful elite, often with their country house in the background
and evidence of their culture by their side. By the early nineteenth century, a wealthymiddle class was also getting itself painted. However, it was photography that, from
the 1840s, changed images of Britain bringing not just the successful to our view but
also the exotic (with scenes from the British Empire of native peoples and places), and
the working classes and the poor at home. Photographs give us a strong sense of our
family history perhaps the most personal and universal way in which we each have
an investment in the past. Moving images also bring us fictionalised versions of the
past which have been extremely influential especially of Britons at war in William
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APPROACHES TO BRITAINS HISTORY 5
WylersMrs Miniver(1942), Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburgers One of Our Aircraft
is Missing(1942), Lewis Gilberts Reach for the Sky (1956) and David LeansBridge on the
River Kwai(1957). The idea of Britain still depends to a great degree on the notion of
unity and heroism brought by the Second World War, lingering in television series as
well as films.
Language of the past
Particular images of the past also come from phrases in regular use a thousand years
of British history, the mother of Parliaments, our island history, and democratic
traditions and values. The 1980s saw a lively debate on Mrs Margaret Thatchers
invocation of Victorian values, echoed in John Majors Back to Basics campaign in
the 1990s and Gordon Browns promotion of Britishness in the 2000s. Nostalgia
for an undated lost age of order, of politeness, of neighbourliness, of respectability,of deference and patriotism has been a major factor in creating what, if polls are to
believed, is sometimes a discontented and unhappy society. The evidence on most of
these is that such a lost age never did exist, but the narrative to the contrary remains
the powerful one.
Of course, a great deal of the past that has been shown in paintings and films is
pure invention. History is often false history in the sense that it has been used to push
a cause or strengthen an institution, or merely to make money from a people keen to
celebrate its own virtues. This tendency to manufacture a past is particularly powerful
when a national history is involved. Historians and others have argued long and
hard over what a nation is, and how the sense of national identity is fostered and
developed. In a well-known study, the American Benedict Anderson argued that
nations do not exist other than in the imagination, in what he terms imagined com-
munities, invented and fabricated for political reasons not least to keep us in order.
In this argument, no one is born instinctively feeling English, Welsh or Scottish. It has
to be instilled. The historian Linda Colley has shown the efforts that politicians and
others went to in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to generate a sense of
Britishness, using anthems, flags, jubilees and parades. And this campaign to create a
sense of Britishness worked by making England and Britain largely synonymous, with
Welshness largely disappearing from the public view and the Scots rushing to identify
themselves as North Britons. However, this imagining of Britishness has been faltering.
In the 1920s, Ireland was partitioned between a British north and an Irish republicin the south. In the 1950s and 1960s, the British Empire ended, leading to Britain
becoming home to increasing numbers of black and Asian peoples, as well as, more
recently, to East European migrants. And since the 1970s, there has been rising
pressure for home rule and independence in Wales and Scotland, as the distinct iden-
tities of those countries emerge. In all sorts of ways, then, the unity of Britain and
Britishness established in the first two centuries covered by this book has in the last
century become vulnerable.
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6 INTRODUCTION
This means that the language of the past and present is not stable. Britishness has
changed meaning and resonance. It is a term which, by 2000, was being displaced by
competing multicultural identities of black, Asian, Scottish, Irish and Welsh, and
also the re-mergence of English identity. Yet, the British state still perpetuates
Britishness in parades, military regiments, national war memorials and pageants of
royalty and celebrity. Though monarchy was, by 2000, much less influential than it
had been even a hundred years before, it remains a symbol of political unity. As
nationalism rises in Scotland and Wales, and devolved government returns in the
2000s to Northern Ireland, Queen Elizabeth remains a vital source of identity for
most Britons, and confounds many predictions of the end of monarchy. More than any
other single institution, the Royal Family is the nations central vehicle for expressing
its history. But, like monarchy itself, the nations past is not a single, agreed under-
standing. History is like politics it is open to debate.
The disputed British past
History is dominated by debate, and historians of Britain are just as likely as any others
to disagree over interpreting the nations past. Sometimes, the debate is over what
happened. New knowledge, new information about events, based on documents or
other sources that have come to light, can change the basic knowledge of an episode
or process in the past. Most of the time, however, historians are not disputing facts
but debating the significanceof events and processes, and how to interpret them. It is
analysis and interpretation that drives forward new publications in books and history
journals. Looking at history writing (historiography, as it is called) is thus to consider
different interpretations and approaches to the past.
Historians will argue from evidence as to what is the best way to explain episodes
from the past. At the same time, though, there are different approaches. For example,
there are political historians, economic historians, social and cultural historians, intel-
lectual historians, historians of religion, historians of the labour movement, historians
of science and of philosophy. With the rise of the feminist movement in the 1970s, the
history of women become a major part of the writing of history. More recently, there
has been a tremendous growth in environmental history, resulting from new knowledge
about climate change and the impact that humankind has had upon the planet. On
the other hand, with the decline of religion in Britain in the later twentieth century, the
emphasis on religious history has waned (though not disappeared). These instancesdemonstrate that the way history is written tends to be strongly influenced by the
concerns of the present time. With each decade, the past is re-examined to bring out
modern agendas and understanding, contemporary concerns and perspectives.
Economic historians, rather more than other historians, are given to constructing
their research around large questions that form the centres of debate. There are
several examples of these. Was the Industrial Revolution really industrial or a revolu-
tion? Did the British working classes benefit from industrialisation between 1760 and
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APPROACHES TO BRITAINS HISTORY 7
1830? Did the late Victorian economy fail? Was the British economy regenerated in
the 1930s? Was the British economy in decline from the 1960s? This book in part
reflects this tendency, with a greater than usual focus on disputed interpretations in the
chapters on economic matters. This reflects the way in which there is less emphasis on
an agreed narrative of British economic history than on exposing the lines of debate.
In other areas, historians are more prone to seek to produce consensus in their
narratives, and to seek to influence the way in which this narrative is produced by
introducing new areas of research and new angles on existing ones. Thus, topics like
social and cultural history, gender history, and the history of immigration and race
appear as part of the increasing diversity of the narrative of British history, rather than
as subjects based around clearly defined disputes. Of course, there are disputes going
on everywhere in the study of British history. But they are often complex and subtle,
rather than structural to the study of each subject.
Political history: putting the Great in Britain
The earliest history of Britain, dating from the eighteenth century, was written mostly
by men. As the Enlightenment evolved, the history they wrote moved further and
further away from medieval conceptions of the role of religion. Rather than seeking
religious lessons from the past, the Enlightenment prompted a rejection of the power
of religion in interpretation while sustaining a place for religion as a stabilising social
force. The Enlightenment encouraged a search for truth and objectivity, and stressed
the primacy of facts and the creation of policy from facts as both possible and supe-
rior to any other method. Studying the past could teach lessons and release modern
knowledge from the unwelcome power of religious fanaticism and superstition.
Nevertheless, behind the search for truth there lingered a strong romance about
the developing greatness of Britain. One consequence was a tendency to marry his-
tory with philosophy, as in David Humes History of Englandof the 1750s. Britain was a
nation envisaged as the culmination of intellectual and cultural progress, though in
Humes Tory/Jacobite view it lost merit because of the Hanoverian succession.
Moreover, the way in which historians such as Hume and Edward Gibbon wrote
placed emphasis on the creative imagination of events rather on documentary evidence
and scrupulous attention to detail. A sceptic of historical writing, Samuel Johnson,
wrote in 1775: We must consider how very little history there is; I mean real
authentick history. That certain Kings reigned, and certain battles fought, we candepend upon as true; but all the colouring, all the philosophy of history is conjecture.1
The romantic view of British greatness continued in nineteenth-century writing,
but in the work of one of the great exponents, T.B. Macaulay, the Tory view was
replaced by a Whig outlook of upward progress in a grand idealistic narrative. Here
1 Quoted in M. Bentley,Modern Historiography: An Introduction (London, Routledge, 1999), p. 13.
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8 INTRODUCTION
the romance of British greatness focused considerably on Britains constitutional
monarchy from 1688, which seemed to have modernised its outlook and legitimacy
whilst, in the anciens rgimesof European nations, there seemed to be a rigidity that had
led to revolution, the breakdown of social harmony and an end to progress itself. The
British system was seen as far superior to anything elsewhere in the world. There was
an assumption of the nationalistic uniqueness of the English and Scots as superior and
well-adjusted peoples who had systems of law, education and rational religion that
allowed for the dutiful acknowledgement of both the world of God and the world of
man. The history of Britain was written as the story of the gradual extension of consti-
tutional government since 1688 and resistance to any attempts to increase royal power.
English historians had particular faith in a trait of English character that seemed to
desire liberty, a desire they traced back to Anglo-Saxon times and which could never
be totally suppressed.
Historians writing at the peak of British imperial progress in the nineteenth century
found it difficult to avoid speaking in praise of the nation its progress, its leadershipand dominance, its superiority in religion, law, education and industry. This tendency
is one that underscores much of the writing of British political history until the mid-
twentieth century. Praise came for the absence of revolution and civil war on mainland
Britain after the 1740s, often attributed to the unwritten constitution and the facility it
allowed for change, together with the absorption of new elites into the hierarchies of
power. Social mobility was seen as a benefit to civil progress. The emphasis was on the
peculiar stability of Britain and its steady progress.
This gave rise to what is referred to as the Whig interpretation of British history,
which sought to trace a centuries-long progress of constitutional change, leading to the
present. The emphasis was on English exceptionalness because of the avoidance of
revolution (other than what was regarded as an exceptional and therefore Glorious
English Revolution in 1688) and the formation of an apparently free society. The focus
was very much on political history, and such an approach came under attack from the
1930s, with demands for other areas of history to be studied. Even so, it was still very
easy for historians to slip back into Whig interpretations that take the present as the
starting point and look at how things arrived there, and for these interpretations to be
embedded in other parts of the history discipline in ideas such as the rise of the
welfare state and the long march of labour.
One of the strongest challenges to the Whig interpretation was in Sir Lewis
Namiers study of The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (1929), which
presented a picture of politics not shaped by ideas but by the narrow self-interest ofindividuals. Constitutional reform came about as a result of manoeuvres among the
political elite, not as a result of pressures from outside. It encouraged the study of
the minutiae of a period or of individual lives, rather than trying to devise some grand
narrative. Influenced by such an approach, many historians of the mid-twentieth cen-
tury rejected the influence of ideas in determining human progress. In their view, ideas
did not cause history to change. On the contrary, ideas changed as a result of history
changing a vision of history matching what seemed the sensible, responsive, utilitarian
and pragmatic political system of Britain itself. This outlook suited the imperial
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APPROACHES TO BRITAINS HISTORY 9
mentality of the time as the British Empire moved towards the liberation of the old
colonies to constitute the British Commonwealth of independent nations. So, British
historians, like British imperial elites, saw the British as not fixated on ideas and prin-
ciples like the French or even the Germans. On the contrary in this outlook, Britons
subordinated ideas to the need to get the job done.
This vision of the past has been overtaken by more complex and varied narratives
in recent political history writing. Few historians now regard the British Empire or
restricted voting rights as having been an unalloyed good thing, but they adopt more
pragmatic criteria with which to judge the politicians and administrators who man-
aged the country under those circumstances. Unlike Namiers history style, however,
there is now a more nuanced understanding of the influence in previous centuries of
ideas and ideologies upon the minds of the great leaders and their formulation and
conduct of national policy. Significant in the origins of this trend was the emergence of
labour and social history.
Labour and social history
The reputed greatness of British history was challenged by emerging anti-industrial
intellectuals of the nineteenth century. William Cobbett (17631835) wrote in a diary
called Rural Ridesof a trip around England in the 1820s in which he saw industrialism
destroying the landscape and the yeoman people who were the backbone of the nation.
Like many radicals of the time, he developed a critique of Britains supposed greatness
that was essentially conservative yet which saw radicalism as the maintenance of the
tried and tested past. This established a tradition of combined scholarship and com-
mentary that regarded worker-radicalism not as revolutionary but as essentially
opposed to change; radicalism was seen asprotectingthe people from harmful change.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this tradition merged with the
growing Labour movement of trade unions, radical political campaigns and pronounced
revolutionary notions. With husband and wife historians, J.L. and Barbara Hammond,
there emerged in the 1910s a concerted critique of the benefits of economic and con-
stitutional progress for the plight of working people. The Hammonds wrote:
The social system produced by the Industrial Revolution reflected a spirit that we may
describe as a spirit of complacent pessimism, and this spirit has done more than any
event in English history to create the two nations of which Disraeli used to speak. . . .This age had taken for its aim the accumulation of economic power, and its guiding
philosophy was a dividing force, because it regarded men and women not as citizens
but as servants of that power. If the needs of that power seemed to conflict with the
needs of human nature, human nature had to suffer. In its extreme form this theory
made the mass of the nation the cannon-fodder of industry.2
2 J.L. Hammond and B. Hammond, The Town Labourer 17601832: The New Civilisation (London,
Longmans, Green & Company, 1920), p.vi.
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10 INTRODUCTION
In this way, capitalism itself became the target for historical criticism and, with
Marxist historians, became openly the object of assault by those in pursuit of the pro-
letarian revolution. Marxists looked upon Britain as the first industrial nation, which
should produce, or have produced, the first proletarian revolution. That it did not
aroused tremendous scholarly inquiry into what factors in Britains past prevented
this from happening. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the writing of British history
was radically altered by a generation of left-wing writers. British Marxist historians,
such as Christopher Hill, Eric Hobsbawm and E.P Thompson, were originally
members of the Communist Party and their scholarship of the 1950s and after grew
out of what was termed scientific Marxism. In this view, history was an ineluctable
progression through the states of primitivism, feudalism and capitalism towards
an ideal state of communal ownership (in which private possessions were reduced to
the level of individual need). According to Marx, what caused history to progress was
economic determinism, self-interest and the need to survive as social groups. As he
and Engels wrote: The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of classstruggles.3 So the work of these scholars combined economic history with a new
strong social history, concentrating on the people, the downtrodden and the poor in
an empathetic manner. As E.P. Thompson wrote in 1963: I am seeking to rescue the
poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the obsolete hand-loom weaver, the utopian
artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous
condescension of posterity.4
This group and others trained a generation of historians who, from the mid-1960s,
took the surge towards social history to new heights. University history departments,
especially in new and adventurous universities, were rapidly staffed with left-wing
social historians. Many of these took up the ideas of the Italian Marxist theorist
Antonio Gramsci to examine how the working people of Britains past were held down
not merely by economic oppression in the workplace, but also by what he called the
hegemony (or dominance) of the pervasive bourgeois culture in schools, colleges,
churches and public affairs in general. This brought historians to re-examine the flaws
of economic and political advance the oppression of the people through the loss
of rights to control the work process, and through declining cultural freedom.
Scholarship came also to look more directly at how the people resisted such pressures
and came close to erupting in that supposedly inevitable revolution to overturn
capitalism, but never quite did so. Indeed, much of British social history of the 1960s
and 1970s was devoted to answering the question why Britain, the first nation to
industrialise, failed to produce a proletarian revolution. This produced a vastexplosion of historical investigation into British labour history, the history of social
organisation and the social condition of the people.
3 K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848), which can be read at http://
www.marxists.org/archive4 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968 edn), p. 13.
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APPROACHES TO BRITAINS HISTORY 11
The rise of left-wing history writing was accompanied by a growing influence of
sociological theory amongst historians. Sociologists in the mid-twentieth century
developed a large and adaptable theory, the theory of modernisation, to explain the
emergence of modern society, principally from the eighteenth century onwards. The
theory positioned this transformation as a long-term one, incorporating intellectual and
social movements which fostered modern social relations and outlooks, and claimed to
explain much of the nature of the modern condition of a largely unreligious, socially
stratified urban world with few social bonds of paternalism and deference. In this way,
the rush to social history accompanied theories which seemed to permit historians
Marxist and right-wing alike to explain the creation of the secular, alienated, urban
consumerist society of the mid-twentieth century. One book typified this influence,
Peter Lasletts The World We Have Lost (1965), which in its very title conveyed the
hypothesis that there had been a golden age of social harmony and relative peace
before the Industrial Revolution, when primitivism and navet dominated. Of that
age, he wrote: All our ancestors were literal Christian believers, all of the time.5
This represents a powerful thread running through much left-wing historiography
golden ageism and the adverse impact of industrialism and urbanism upon the lives
of the people. In many ways it is the opposite of a Whig approach in that the pre-
industrial past (of the eighteenth century at least) is seen as one of good community
relations, individual worker freedoms, a calm pace of life and what E. P. Thompson
called a moral economy. Social and labour historians do not deny that standards of
living improved in more recent times, but they tend to look negatively at the impact of
the Industrial Revolution.
Economic history
Underlying the rise of social history, though not always in agreement with it, has been
economic history. With so many British historians viewing the progress of Britains
past in terms of material advance, it was understandable that economic conditions
were often at the forefront of explaining important moments of historical change.
At the same time, historians of the right, who favoured capitalism as the exemplar of
modernity and progress, were keen to provide a more systematic and scientific
understanding of what made Britain the first nation to industrialise and, from the
late nineteenth century, the first nation to experience what seemed to be economic
decline.Economic historians from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century
were optimistic and bullish. This was best seen in the influential work of an American
historian, W.W. Rostow, who in the midst of the Cold War in 1960 argued that
the British Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century should be exported to the
5 P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost(London, Methuen, 1965), p. 71.
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12 INTRODUCTION
developing nations of the world as a model for growth to counter the export of com-
munism from the Soviet Union.6 But whilst the British Industrial Revolution remained
an exemplar of economic progress, much of the history written about Britains recent
economic past was, by the 1960s, about failure. This became even more pronounced
in the 1980s when there was a challenge to what was perceived as a culture of decline
in British politics, marked by the rhetoric and politics of the Thatcher Conservative
government elected in 1979. Along with this came a great deal of historical writing
that looked at the economic origins of British decline, suggested cultural causes and, in
some cases, looked even for its moral origins. A few economic historians of the 1980s
were strongly influenced by the outlook of the Thatcher government, taking the
British economy to be in decline, and tracing the reasons for this in the negation of
the conditions of individualism and weak state power that had caused the Industrial
Revolution. History mattered politically.
From this arose the notion of a dependency culture which, fostered by the welfare
state after 1945, had eroded individuality, entrepreneurship and originality. It wasclaimed that insufficient numbers of people with drive and ambition, and willing to
take economic risks, lay at the root of Britains failure to move with the economic
times. A continued reliance on manufacturing of older staple products, and the domin-
ance in economic thinking of coal mining, shipbuilding, engineering and volume car
production, were held to have diverted investment and risk-taking away from exciting
new products like electronics, passing the baton of progress to countries like the USA
and Japan. At the same time, decades of poor industrial relations between trade
unions and company management were blamed for bad working practices; British
manufacturing methods bred labour-intensive operations, low investment in new
machinery and, above all, low productivity. On top of this, there was the so-called
British disease strikes that were seen to have crippled the British economy from the
1950s onwards. In the 1970s, they argued, successive disputes caused high wage
inflation, undermined savings investment, and produced immoral behaviour (includ-
ing the strike of grave diggers in 1979), finally contributing to the fall of the Labour
government of James Callaghan in that year.
Some economic historians trace these problems of Britain further back. The
shedding of empire in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s was seen as one cause, diverting
excessive resources into the maintenance of overseas colonies in their declining years
prior to independence, and undermining the sense of British national purpose. Blame
now fell upon the Empire for a conglomeration of economic mistakes even earlier
notably, diverting investment overseas in the 18701914 period, just when it was mostneeded at home to re-invent manufacturing industry for new products and new
markets. Whilst reliance on the closed imperial market was seen to have been a benefit
to nurturing industry between 1760 and 1870, it became blamed for allowing British
6 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1960).
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APPROACHES TO BRITAINS HISTORY 13
manufacturers to rest on their laurels thereafter, relying on imperial sales, and not
keeping up with innovation by American, German and French manufacturers. This
developed into a theory of an economic climacteric in the late 18701914 period a
pinnacle of British progress from which British economic decline could be dated
which enjoyed considerable support amongst economic historians through the 1980s.
The cultural origins of Britains supposed decline had developed as an intrinsic
element in the economic story. But this cultural analysis pushed the origins of the
problem further back to the very foundations of the Industrial Revolution. The
argument here was centred on the idea that Britain never really accepted industrial
capitalism. Supporters of this argument spotted various elements. First, British
entrepreneurship was flawed by a constant preference for being gentlemen rather
than players for playing the game rather than playing to win. Secondly, there
was talk of a generational decline in entrepreneurship. The original founders of big
enterprises were innovative and risk-taking; the second generation began to turn away
from the firm and involve themselves in public affairs; and the third generation wereprepared to live off the profits of the firm but to take little interest in how they were
made, instead partying their familys fortune away on the French Riviera. The third
major argument was that the cause of this was a fundamental absence of a spirit of
industrial capitalism. The American historian Martin Wiener asserted that the British
were fundamentally hostile to industrial cities, to the grime and smog of such places,
and to the factory. We examine the Wiener thesis in Chapter 20, but it is important to
note here that this approach amounted to describing a failure of the industrial spirit in
Britain, bringing in failure in education and religion, and an aversion to urban living.
The moralfailings of Britain also entered the rhetoric of historians who argued for
the decline of Britain hypothesis. Led by Margaret Thatcher, there was a particular
denigration of what the youth culture of the 1960s had done to British moral fibre.
The rise of popular music, sexual promiscuity and drug-taking represented a loss of
inhibition and restraint that was blamed for social breakdown and the rise of crime in
Britain from 1957 onwards. With it, there was reputedly a decline of hard work and
thrift, which were replaced by increasing reliance upon the state for social handouts.
Whilst not all historians agreed with this analysis, there were scholars like Christie
Davies who argued from the 1970s onwards that moral deviance had become the
norm in British young people. A new moral right emerged in politics and, to some
extent, amongst scholars.
In the 1990s and 2000s, historians have once again begun to reshape the under-
standing of British economic history. With this, came reassessments of the post-warBritish economy. The first realisation was that during the period 195090, the British
economy was not in decline. It was growing and, moreover, at a very healthy rate.
At the same time, a series of myths that had developed were shown, under close exam-
ination, to be untrue. It had been widely believed that British productivity and rates
of investment had been low and that the British disease strike action had been
a massive problem that had distinguished British experience from that of the USA
and most European countries. The new research showed these statements to be false.
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14 INTRODUCTION
The statistical hard data, when looked at dispassionately and closely, showed that
Britain was either at the top or pretty near to the top of the economic performance of
advanced industrial nations, with other west European nations catching up with the
British position.
The second realisation was that the reason this account of the British past had
developed was that a culture of decline pervaded the British elites the top echelons
of government, including the civil service and political parties and was commonly
found in the British press, in overseas images of Britain, and amongst many historians.
This realisation led to the culture of decline itself becoming an interesting object
for study: just why did British commentators becomes so pessimistic about British
economic and cultural life in the 1960s and 1970s? Part of the answer, the pessimists
averred, was the loss of empire, and the loss of a role. Other explanations lay in
a desire to see failure in a period of change. The economy was adjusting to a post-
manufacturing age. There was cultural revolution in the air and these developments
were seen to be undermining British traditional values and experience. It thus becamevital to look at cultural explanations of economic history analysis and to think about
the different ways in which the nations economic past had been branded.
Cultural history
One of the powerful trends in the writing of British history since the 1980s has been
the rise of cultural history. This developed mainly within social history, but was to
spread across the whole discipline, and brought British historiography more closely in
line with historians ideas from Europe and elsewhere.
At the root of cultural history lay a series of concerns with social history. This
was seen as too dependent on sociological theories (like modernisation) which com-
pelled thinking in terms of progress or its reverse, as too obsessed with studying
Marxist-driven ideas about class struggle and the chances of worker revolution, and
as too little concerned with thinking about gender, race, religion and other categories.
The reliance on social science methodology supposed the past could be understood
with the certainties of science itself, creating the prospect of historians only ever being
chroniclers of modernisation. For some in the 1980s and 1990s, a new cultural history
grew directly out of Marxism a new cultural history of the left. But others traded
the theories of Marx, Gramsci and sociology for those of Barthes, Foucault and
Derrida for a modern cultural theory (sometimes referred to as postmodernismand poststructuralism).
Cultural historians had a significant impact on the way British history was studied.
Poststructuralism raised doubts about the validity of historians structures like social
class. Class came to be regarded as increasingly problematic for study because of
its variable and indeterminate meanings, and because too much reliance had been
placed on it by left-wing historians to explain British history. In its stead, many
womens historians placed gender as a category of analysis that was of immense and
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APPROACHES TO BRITAINS HISTORY 15
underrated importance, while historians of colour looked to race and ethnicity as
categories that required to be examined intensively in British domestic and imperial
history.
These impulses fostered amongst historians a cultural understanding of Britains
past. This has had a number of key characteristics. First, it has encouraged reflection
on the historians gaze: how factors in our own time determine what aspects of the
past interest us, and how our interpretations of the past derive from present concepts,
beliefs and ideologies. This starts with reflecting on the language we use to write
our historical narrative our use of terms (ranging from nation and empire, to
Industrial Revolution, social class and inequality) and what we are implying by
them. When we use these words, we must immediately consider whether the peoples
of Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries used them and, if so, whether
they understood them in the same way as we do today. History as a written account
is conjured by the words we invoke, and we carefully consider our meaning and the
meanings of past peoples. This interest is not limited to understanding individualwords, but encompasses wider representations. The cultural historian gains much by
reflecting on the meaning of entirely commonplace things, peoples and identities.
For example, what place did material things like cutlery, bowls and bed-sheets have in
the eighteenth-century world of status? How did a man foster a sense of masculinity
in industrialising Britain of the early nineteenth century? Why did so many married
women of the mid-twentieth century adopt housewife as a self-description? How
were arriving Afro-Caribbeans and Asians looked upon by a predominantly white
society in the 1950s? To answer these questions, the historian essentially explores the
differences in meaning between then and now. Looking at representations of such
objects in daily life results in a deeper appreciation of how each age understood itself.
A key device of the cultural historian, then, is to look at representations often
referred to as discourses. A discourse is an injunction or interpretation being
expressed by a representation to which people adhere in daily life. Discourses tell us
what, in a given time and culture, was considered to be ideal behaviour and what was
considered deviant or unacceptable. For example, we will see later in the book how,
from around 1800 to 1960, it was considered by most of the British middle classes
that a womans proper desire was to be married and that her place was in the home,
without a job, bringing up children, whilst her husband worked; to be a spinster was
seen as undesirable on the shelf , having failed to catch a man. Though very large
numbers of married women (especially of the working classes) did, in fact, go out to
work, this discourse was approvingly represented for many centuries in the wordhousewife. However, in more recent times, notably since the 1960s, the term and its
discourse have fallen from universal popularity; the approving meaning of housewife
has become more ambiguous (sometimes implying a woman who has missed out on
a career and worldly excitement), though it retains a greater power and significance
amongst some ethnic groups.
The study of a term like housewife and what it has represented in different times
and for different people is one example of how cultural history has changed ways of
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16 INTRODUCTION
viewing the past and has expanded the agenda of issues for study. This technique is
sometimes referred to as discourse analysis, and we will see its influence in a variety of
chapters in this book (including in sections on gender, sexuality and black Britain).
In this way, the former notion that British history is about the nation only, about
what powerful men did, and what irrefutable single visions can be used in writing it, is
no longer acceptable. Historians bring different skills to studying different themes, and
the nation has developed a rich, eclectic and multicultural history that has only
recently been more fully recognised. This book reflects the trend towards diversifying
the angles of approach to the history of Britain.
Further reading
Bentley, M.,Modern Historiography: An Introduction (London, Routledge, 1999)
Brown, C.G., Postmodernism for Historians(Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2005)
Burke, P., (ed.),New Perspectives on Historical Writing(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001)
Cannadine, D., What is History Now?(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
Colley, L.,Britons. Forging the Nation 17071837(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992)
Green, A. and Troup, K. (eds), The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-century
History and Theory (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999)
Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and Directions in the Study of Modern History
(London, Longman, 2000)