Approved 20090414 Garrett OCTS in the 21stCentury-A New Policy

8/7/2019 Approved 20090414 Garrett OCTS in the 21stCentury-A New Policy

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One Country, Two Systems in the 21st

Century: A New Policy?

Chinas Rise and Its Impact on Asia: Democratization, Development and

Culture, 20 - 22 March 2009

Daniel Garrett

ODNI Research Fellow

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

National Defense Intelligence College

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official

policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Cleared by DOD/OSR for publication: 09-S-1525.

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ABSTRACT

Thirty-years ago from the ruins of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping and LiaoChengzhi were forming what would eventually become the One Country, Two System

(OCTS) policy aspects of which started New China on its new long march towardssocialist modernization, thereby enabling China to become the world power it is today. Avital component of that modernization was the territory of Hong Kong, then a colonialpossession of Great Britain and today, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of thePeoples Republic of China that continues to serve a special role in the middle kingdomsrise and reaching out to the West.

It was partly on the basis of Dengs envisioned role for Hong Kong in Chinasmodernization that he entertained the special policies for it that came to be codified in theBasic Law of the Hong Kong SAR. Those policies were supposed to freeze thecommunity in stasis for fifty-years. However, over the past three decades unforeseen

quarrels over elections became the foremost political issues in the Hong Kongcommunity, ultimately eclipsing and sidetracking it from fulfilling Beijings original goalof aiding socialist modernization. Concurrent with the transformation of Hong Kongsociety from a colony in 1978 to being a SAR in 1997 and subsequently moving towardsbeing Chinas first international city, has been the democratization of Taiwan a realitythat outstripped OCTS even before Hong Kong returned to China and which has addedadditional complications for implementing OCTS in Taiwan at some future point.

Since 1978, China has experienced phenomenal changes and today China is evenadvocating democracy. The world situation has also changed dramatically as has Chinasstanding in it and, more recently, its relationship with Taiwan too. At a juncture which

some have described as a new situation there are indications that Chinas newgeneration of leaders may be considering, or already implementing, changes in theOCTS policy for Hong Kong and potentially towards Taiwan. This paper proposes toexamine those indicators and attempt to characterize what a new OCTS might look likeand what it portends for Hong Kong and Taiwan.

This paper is a component of a larger work in progress on how Chinas implementation

of the One Country, Two Systems policy in Hong Kong has affected the prospects for

realizing universal suffrage in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It will be

published by the Center for Strategic Intelligence (CSIR), National Defense Intelligence

College (NDIC) in early-to-mid 2009. The views expressed in this paper are those of

the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the CSIR, the NDIC, theDepartment of Defense or the United States Government. Cleared by DOD/OSR for

publication: 09-S-1525

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INTRODUCTION

The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in Hong Kong. The previouscapitalist system and way life shall remain unchanged for 50 years. This is the core

essence of the One Country, Two Systems (OCTS) policy for Hong Kong, Macau andTaiwan as given by Deng Xiaoping and constantly reiterated by successive Chineseleaders for the last quarter of a century. Chinese leaders from Deng forward have saidthat Chinas basic policies on Hong Kong would not change. That they would adhere tothe OCTS policy and its subordinate guiding principles Hong Kong people rulingHong Kong and a high degree of autonomy. Those assurances were predicated,however, on Chinas policies being correct and there being no need for changes. This,however, has not been the case. Since the early 1980s when the return of the colony andthe OCTS policy was announced Hong Kong (and China) has changed tremendously.Hong Kong has become a quintessentially political city over the issues of democracy,elections and universal suffrage despite the best efforts of the Central Authorities to

prevent it from becoming anything other than an economic metropolis.

As the Central Authorities and their supporters in Hong Kong see it, the hijacking ofHong Kongs role for aiding socialist modernization by the pan-democrats and foreignand external forces supporting them over the issue of universal suffrage, has evolved tothe point where it places the viability of retaining the Two Systems in their current stateat risk because Chinas sovereignty is challenged at every corner and the prosperity ofstability of Hong Kong is endangered by the escalating conflicts over universal suffrage.The continued prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, they argue, is the guarantor ofOCTS not democratic politics or universal suffrage. The most conservative warn thatthe publics fixation with universal suffrage jeopardizes Beijings willingness to maintain

OCTS and the retention of the Two Systems. As early as 1991, the director of the HongKong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO), Lu Ping, had warned Hongkongers overfighting with Beijing over universal suffrage saying that, If the future SAR [turns]confrontational against the central government, it has absolutely no future. i Yet, this isexactly was has occurred in the eighteen years since Director Lus warning and thesituation has grown more dire since reunification.

In fact, right before the ten-year anniversary of the HKSAR in mid-2007, NationalPeoples Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) Hong Kong Basic Law Committee andformer Legislative Council (Legco) member, Maria Tam Wai-chu, found it necessary tobluntly tell Hongkongers what they had to do if they wanted the HKSAR and OCTS to

survive, Hong Kong should not hinge on democratic protests against the centralauthorities or on the support of foreign countries or international society for ourdemocratic progression, but instead rely on implementing the national policies of China.The operation of one country, two systems implies that the previous capitalist systemand way of life remain unchanged. First of all, we should safeguard the sovereignty ofthe central authorities. Second, we should maintain the economic and social stability ofHong Kong ii

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Today, as the 12-year anniversary of the turn-over of Hong Kong to the PeoplesRepublic of China (PRC) approaches, Beijing and its proxies in Hong Kong continue toexperience befuddlement, consternation, disbelief, frustration, and enduring gaffes inattempting to absorb a highly-educated, cosmopolitan, and animated population into theOCTS model. Ruling Hong Kong with patriots has failed to achieve the model level of

political control the PRC had desired over Hong Kong. Instead of being an exemplar ofOCTS that China sought to use to encourage Taiwans reconciliation and return, Taipeihas vocally derided OCTS in the past and today remains dubious over it. Moreimportantly, however, for the future of OCTS, has been that the incessant fights in HongKong over the issue of universal suffrage has distracted the SAR from the primary roleand goals China intended for it contributing to socialist modernization, maintaining itsown prosperity and stability and acting as bridge and window between the Mainland andthe West.

As a result, China has decided that it has to accelerate the process of integrating HongKong into the cultural, economic and social fabric of the Mainland and has begun

intensifying efforts to introduce the a Hong Kong-styled socialist system in the SAR.The goal is to transform Hong Kong society into a patriotic bastion dedicated tocontributing to socialist modernization and national rejuvenation and who will, of theirown accord, accept Chinas form of universal suffrage and only elect patriots andpatriotic parties who will in turn cooperate with the Chinese Communist Partysrepresentative in Hong Kong the chief executive (CE). To achieve this, theintroduction into Hong Kong of the Partys socialist core value system (SCVS) thebasis of todays socialism with Chinese characteristics and its socialist moral system isbeing pursued because the SAR Government has failed to assuage Western-styledemocratic aspirations and demands over the last decade.

This failure, from the Central Authorities perspective, has prevented the HKSAR fromensuring its prosperity and stability not once but twice; the first time being during theAsian Financial crisis after the Handover and now once again during the global financialtsunami. Hong Kong was never supposed to be a problem for the Central Authoritiesand according to various Chinese academics that is exactly what it has become because ithas been obsessed on fighting for or against universal suffrage instead of pursuingdevelopment and contributing to their countrys modernization. One commentator in2007 even observed that Hong Kong is no longer the golden goose that lays golden eggsfor China.iii

This paper will address the issue that the implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong has not

progressed as well as the Central Authorities had desired and that they feel the SARs

preoccupation and fights with the Central Government over the issue of universal

suffrage has threatened the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Chinas

sovereignty over it. It will discuss how the Central Authorities, their advisors and some

members of the SAR Government believe that the existing generations of Hongkongers

may be so beyond recovery that a fundamental transformation of the society, starting

with the youth, is necessary to ensure a future patriotic and loyal HKSAR where true

universal suffrage could be allowed.

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It will introduce the suggestion that China has decided that, in spite of the prohibition in

the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law against the socialist

system being practiced in Hong Kong before 2047, it must introduce a Hong Kong-style

socialist system to create the type of society it desires and that this will occur through

the SAR Governments national education efforts and selective cultivation ofHongkongers for leadership positions within the SAR. In conjunction, the paper will

briefly consider how Beijings decision to accelerate the integration of Hong Kong into

the Mainland may also reflect, in combination with its national education efforts in Hong

Kong and the possible development of nomenklatura system through its patriotic

education efforts, an adjustment to the OCTS policy that some might argue constitutes a

new development or a new OCTS. These latter issues will be more substantively

addressed in a forthcoming work to be published by the Center for Strategic Intelligence

Research, National Defense Intelligence College, of which this paper is a component.

Seeking Truth from Facts: Big Trouble in the HKSAR

Despite all the public professions of success in implementing the OCTS principle inHong Kong over the last decade, there could probably be no more definitive or tellingbellwether of the Central Authorities perception of the success and the state of HongKongs return to China than President Hus clarion call on eve of the tenth anniversary (1July 2007) of Hong Kongs return when he called for the transformation of youngHongkongers into a new generation who would abide by one country, two systems andthe Hong Kong Basic Law (the legal embodiment of OCTS), safeguard Hong Kongsprosperity and stability and be responsible for the prosperity of the country and therejuvenation of the Chinese nation.iv

President Hus comments were reiterated several times over the next six months by othersenior Chinese leaders and HKSAR Government officials in addition to being carried inthe China Daily, Peoples Daily andXinhua. In his annual policy address in October ofthe same year, CE Donald Tsang Yam-keung proclaimed, Over the next five years, weneed cultivate a new spirit for these new times. We needto become new Hongkongers,better equipped to sustain developments in the new era.v Also significant were thestatements of the chairman of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference(CPPCC), Jia Qinglin, who in a December 2007 speech to 1,000 Hong Kong students,teachers and HKSAR officials in Beijing for a national education exercise, repeatedPresident Hus transcendental call for Hongkongers to become a new generation, telling

the HKSAR Government that they needed to make greater efforts and set a higher targetto ensure the smooth operation of the patriotic education campaign in order to achievethe goal.vi

Resisting Beijing and Losing Control

The calls for a new generation of Hongkongers reflect a perception among some Chineseleaders and academics that in spite of all the public pronouncements by the Chinese

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Government of the successful implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong, Beijingsresumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong has not been satisfactory or complete. Forinstance, a December 2007 HKSAR Government think tank report,Hong KongsRelationship with the Mainland, concluded that while Hong Kong and the mainland hadgrown closer since reunification, there is still work to be done and that, The

strengthening oftrust and affection between the people of the two places remain[ed] apriority issuevii This conclusion mirrored an earlier, separate assessment by respectedChinese national security analyst, Yan Xuetong, who observed in June 2007 that eventhough Hong Kong was again in its mothers bosom, The return of Hong Kong to Chinais just half achieved. Hong Kong is still regarded as a special place of China, stillregarded as a foreign country. Hong Kong has returned in name, but not in substance.viii

This view is also held by some influential loyalist officials and academics in Hong Kongas well. For instance, Professor Lau Siu-kai, the head of the Central Policy Unit (CPU),the HKSAR Government think tank overseeing public consultations for the HKSARsconstitutional development towards universal suffrage, holds that, The acquisition of

Hong Kong by China in 1997 has not been accompanied by political rapport between theChinese government and the Hong Kong people, thus sowing seeds for lingering frictionbetween them.ix More poignantly, Dr. Lau has explicitly written that Chinas efforts tocreate a new political orderx (NPO) in the SAR has met unexpected and substantialresistance from anti-new order forcesxi (ANOF) that were cultivated by the British tosabotage Hong Kongs return to China and prevent it from exercising sovereignty over it.

This resistance to Beijing described by Professor Lau was most dramatically manifestedon 1 July 2003 when half-a-million Hongkongers marched against a proposed nationalsecurity bill and over a bevy of other economic, governance and universal suffrage-related grievances against related to the administration of then CE Tung Chee-hwa. Thisled to the SAR Government withdrawing the legislation from consideration aftercontinuing public outcry over the legislation led to one the primary pro-Beijing politicalparties bailing from supporting the bill and the Administration. Dr. Lau also states it wasthis event that forced the Central Authorities to realize their previous policy approach ofimplementing the OCTS policy in the SAR was flawed and a more active one was neededto prevent the derailment of the OCTS project in Hong Kong.xii

This included the Central Authorities creating a Coordinating Leading Group on HongKong Affairsxiii and the sending of many agents to Hong Kong to ascertain the actualsituation in the SAR since their traditional information sources had failed to predict thelevel of public displeasure leading up to 1 July. It also marked the beginning of asubstantial role and level of involvement for the United Front Work Department (UFWD)in Hong Kong in order to improve Chinas image and lower the attractiveness of the pan-democrats. Later in the year, however, the pro-Beijing camps largest political party, theDemocratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, still lost the 2003 District Councilelections to pan-democratic forces in another unsettling political development for Beijing.

By years end, the Central Authorities felt the situation in the SAR had deteriorated to thepoint it was necessary to express their dissatisfaction over the state of the implementation

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of OCTS in Hong Kong. This occurred during a duty visit by CE Tung to Beijing wherePresident Hu Jintao told him that the Central Authorities were highly concerned withconstitutional development trends in the HKSAR. Following up President Hus censure,were critical commentaries by four mainland legal scholarsxiv who were also formerdrafters of Hong Kongs Basic Law. They strongly singled out the territorys lack of

understanding of OCTS and the Basic Law. In one analysis of the incident, by WangXiangwei, a former China Daily journalist and current China editor at the South ChinaMorning Post(SCMP) opined that,

The remarks by Mr. Hu and the legal experts signal a significant shift in the centralgovernments policy towards Hong Kong with far-reaching implications. Thecentral government appears to have adopted a more proactive approach in handlingissues related to Hong Kong following the mass anti-government protest on July 1and the embarrassing defeat of the pro-government Democratic Alliance forBetterment of Hong Kong in last months district council elections. Mainlandanalysts said the central government wanted to have a bigger say on Hong Kongs

political reform, elevating its importance to that attached by defense and foreignaffairs.xv

The following year in Hong Kong, 2004, saw the NPCSC attempting to remove universalsuffrage from the political discourse for the upcoming Legislative Council elections byissuing a decision saying universal suffrage would not be instituted in 2007-08 theearliest point that the Basic Law allowed universal suffrage to be considered. A fiercepatriotic campaign initiated by Beijing also targeted the pan-democrats in the lead up tothe September Legco elections. In that election, the pro-Beijing forces won the largestnumber of legislative seats but the pan-democrats still retained most of their strength.This allowed them to continue to confront the SAR Government while lobbying forquicker and double universal suffrage (simultaneously electing the chief executive andthe Legco by universal suffrage.) The political situation in Hong Kong remainedunsettling as far as the Central Authorities were concerned and in December 2004, whilein Macau on the occasion of the 5

thanniversary of the Macau SARs return to Chinese

sovereignty, President Hu Jintao gave CE Tung Chee-hwa yet another high profile rebukeover the state of OCTS in Hong Kong, admonishing him to follow the Macau SARsexample. However, more significant episodes of Hongkongers resistance were yet tocome.

Rejecting Beijing & the Chief Executive

In 2005 two significant examples of Hongkongers resistance that struck at the heart ofthe implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong occurred. The Central Governmentperceived these are affecting the nature of the relationship between the CentralAuthorities and the HKSAR and the operation of the executive-led political systemestablished by Beijing and headed by the chief executive. According to the CentralAuthorities and the HKSAR Government, the design of the political structure is toensure the comprehensive implementation of the basic policies of the Central Authoritiesregarding Hong Kong.xvi

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The first incident occurred in March 2005 when continued public discontent over ChiefExecutive Tung Chee-hwas poor performance and governance led to the embattled CEstepping down ostensibly for health reasons. But his resignation was widely believed tobe due to his inability to stem growing calls for universal suffrage in the SAR. He was

replaced by then Chief Secretary for Administration (CS) Donald Tsang who had headedthe SAR Governments Constitutional Development Task Force (CDTF) created inJanuary 2004 after the President Hu had warned CE Tung over Hong Kongsconstitutional development.xvii The CDTF was the first major effort by the CentralAuthorities and the SAR Government to define and scope the limits of political reformand universal suffrage in Hong Kong. Through its public consultation exercise andconstitutional development reports, the CDTF was supposed to set Hong Kong rightregarding the limitations and boundaries of universal suffrage under OCTS.

After eighteen-plus months of work and five reports by the Task Force, in October 2005the Government submitted a political reform package to the Legco. That package was

based on the CDTFs recommendations and findings. This created the setting for thesecond most damaging incidence of resistance by Hongkongers to Beijings wishes whenthe reforms failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority (40 votes) in the Legco forpassage. This occurred because the pan-democrats were united in opposing the reforms.The pan-democrats had deemed the package to be insufficiently democratic and whilethey had lost some seats in the 2004 Legco elections, the pan-democrats still retainedenough legislators to prevent the Administration from securing the necessary number ofvotes in the Legco. Next to the 1 July march, this was arguably one of the most visiblyembarrassing developments for the SAR Government and the Central Authorities.

The rejection by the pan-democrats of a constitutional reform package already ostensiblyblessed by the Central Authorities (by virtue of the SAR Governments prior coordinationwith the Mainland) represented a major public relations fiasco for the Central Authoritiesand the SAR Government. In the weeks prior to the vote, CE Tsang and hisadministration had expended a lot of political capital with the Central Authorities tofashion a political reform package amenable to Beijing, and according by media accounts,he had indicated to them that the SAR Government could push it through the Legco.

In announcing the launch of the reform package, CS Rafael Hui boldly declared that theSARs constitutional development had entered into a defining stage.xviii CE Tsangupped the ante by exaggerating what in reality was only an incremental developmentxixwhen he exclaimed, This is a defining moment for constitutional development in HongKong. I call on all political parties, and all sectors of the community, to focus on thecommunitys overall interests and put their own preconceptions and differences on oneside. These proposals will lead us to the ultimate goal of universal suffrage. I hopeeveryone will give them their full support.xx

As the debate over the sufficiency of the reform package became more confrontationalbetween the Government and the pan-democrats it became apparent that the pan-democrats were not falling in line with Beijings expectations. In November 2005, the

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Country, Two Systems and aim to maintain stability and prosperity in Hong Kong inline with its legal status and actual situation.xxvi

China, it appears, also views proposals to amend the Basic Law to change Hong Kongspolitical system in a similar vein a challenge to Chinas sovereignty. xxvii Therefore,

calls by pan-democrats to amend the Basic Law in order to make the political systemmore like Western-democratic models are antitheses to OCTS. And while it may not beunderstood in the West or even in Hong Kong, calls for the overthrow of the CommunistParty and the socialist system are, by the Central Authorities definition, also counter tothe principle of OCTS. This refers back to Deng Xiaopings comments that neithersystem should eat the other otherwise there would be no Two Systems. Most considerthis in reference to socialism replacing capitalism in Hong Kong, but in reality it alsoapplies to capitalism, or democracy, replacing the socialist system of the PRC.

OCTS Not Getting It

Over the decades and throughout the debates over universal suffrage an often heard retortby senior Chinese officials and the mainland academics providing policy support to themis that a sound understanding of OCTS is required before the Basic Law can beunderstood and implemented correctly. As explained by Deputy Secretary-General of theNPCSC, Qiao Xiaoyang, Understanding and handling the relationship between onecountry and two systems correctly is the key to understanding and handling therelationship between the CPG and the HKSAR correctly. It is also the key tosuccessfully implementing the Basic Law.xxviii

From Chinas perspective, the failures of the Hong Kong people to: appreciate andembrace OCTS and the Basic Law; to be grateful to Beijing and show proper respect

and be subservient to the Central Authorities; and, the publics continuing support forpan-democrats whom the Center views as radicals, unpatriotic and under foreign controland influence, have been significant barriers to political reform. This, the Beijingloyalists claim, has prevented the Central Authorities from permitting substantiveprogress towards universal suffrage for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council.The 2005 defeat of Chief Executive Donald Tsangs political reforms reportedly sparkedrenewed bitterness in Beijing towards Hong Kongs pan-democrats and their cries foruniversal suffrage and greater democracy. CE Tsang even reportedly referred to the pan-democratic cohorts mass mentality as horrifying animals without being reasonable.xxix

Senior Chinese officials, such as Qiao Xiaoyang, have openly questioned whether or not

Hong Kong people are ready for political changes because they have disrespected theBasic Law and that, everyday the constitution [i.e., the Hong Kong Basic Law] ischallenged, questioned, distorted and even condemned.xxx Three-and-a-half yearsearlier, in April 2004, Qiao had also remarked negatively about Hong Kongs patriotism many people of Hong Kong still had an inadequate understanding of one country,two systems and the Basic Law. The concepts of one country, national identity, thelegal status of Hong Kong and meaning of universal suffrage were not so clear to the

,

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general public.xxxi The reference to Hong Kongs legal status alludes to the fact that itis only a local administrative region under the Central Peoples Government.

Hong Kongs lack of understanding of OCTS and the Basic Law was also criticizedduring the election for the chief executive in March 2007 when the pan-democratic

candidate proposed diminishing the Central Authorities power to appoint HKSARofficials by changing the Basic Law. This alarmed the Central Authorities who laterremarked that, There is still a long way to go before the Basic Law is fully implementedand understood by all, as demonstrated by the recent challenge to the centralgovernments power to appoint officials. That is why promoting the Basic Law remainsas urgent a task as ever.xxxii Any reference to changing the Basic Law to proscribe theCentral Authorities or Central Peoples Governments authority or powers over HongKong is apparently a red line for Beijing bordering on separatism.

And, as recently as the lead up to the ten-year anniversary celebration of the Hong KongSAR, senior Chinese leaders were still emphatically stating that they wanted Hong Kong

to try harder to understand their position in the hierarchy of being a SAR of China thatof just a local administrative region. In June 2007, NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo wascited by the ChinaDaily stressing the need for an accurate understanding of the essenceof the Basic Law.xxxiii He emphasized three underlying principals as the essence of theBasic Law: safeguarding the countrys sovereignty, maintaining a high degree ofautonomy in Hong Kong, and securing the SARs prosperity and stability.xxxiv

Triggers for these admonishments of Hongkongers ignorance tend to revolve aroundcontentious public debates over the limits and nature of Hong Kongs autonomy,constitutional development, political structure, its relationship to the central authorities,and the form, pace and substance of universal suffrage. Chinese officials responsible forHong Kong affairs have often lamented Hong Kongs lack of understanding of OCTS,the Basic Law, the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR andHong Kongs unwillingness to submit to Beijings primacy. Legion among many of thecriticisms has been that Hong Kongers have misinterpreted Chinas purpose in creatingthe Basic Law and the impetus behind OCTS and are ascribing greater autonomy andindependence to the SAR than China ever envisioned.

Universal Suffrage = Separation

Some officials have claimed that some in Hong Kong are even attempting to create an

independent Hong Kong or reverse the relationship between Beijing and the SAR incontravention of the spirit of OCTS and the Basic Law. Basic Law drafters and Chineselegal scholars have stressed that the overarching principal and pretext guiding thecreation of the Basic Law was that of keeping the country united, i.e., One Country.xxxvThey emphasize that without One Country there is no Two Systems and that all ofHong Kongs autonomy, rights, privileges and future prosperity are fully contingent onChinas authority and benevolence. The proper relationship between Hong Kong andthe Central Authorities, they argue, is that of the supervisor and the supervised or

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between the leader and the ledxxxvi and the relationship between Beijing and theHKSAR is the key issue in the practice of the concept of one country, twosystems.

xxxviiAttempts to democratize Hong Kongs legislature are seen by some in

China as an attempt to make Hong Kong independent thereby attacking andundermining the countrys sovereignty and national unity (not to mention the

legitimacy of the Party.)

In fact, the view of some of the Central Authorities leadership is that the Britishintroduced representative government and elections in Hong Kong purely as a tool tosubvert the OCTS policy for their own benefit and to further deny Chinas sovereigntyover Hong Kong. This view appears to be shared by some Mainland and Hong Kongacademics who advise the Central and SAR Government on constitutional development,the Basic Law and the implementation of OCTS and other relevant Hong Kong issueswhich also have impact on Hong Kongs progression towards universal suffrage, such ashelping the Central Authorities to ascertain what the actual situation is on the ground inHong Kong. Former Vice-Premier and Chairman of the HKSAR Preparatory Committee,

Qian Qichen has described Britains efforts and motivations as follows,

In the 1980s, after China and the UK signed the Joint Declaration on the Question ofHong Kong, China began to draw up a draft for the Basic Law for the future HongKong Special Administrative Region and to design a brand-new political systemembodying the concept of one country, two systems At this time, the UK intendedto use the transitional period to carry out the reform for a so-called representativegovernment, so that it would become a fact before the Basic Law was finalized, thusinfluencing the Basic Law arrangements for the future political system. The goal ofthe representative government was actually to change the executive-led setup into alegislative-led one, to restrain the executive body by enhancing the power and statusof the legislative body, and finally to transform the returned Hong Kong intoan independent entity separated from the motherland for the benefit of the UKslong-term political and economic interests there.xxxviii

Moreover, according to some in the Hong Kong government and their advisors, they feelthat some Hongkongers even use the OCTS as an excuse to deny Chinas sovereigntyover Hong Kong and to push China away. This sentiment was, unsurprisingly, includedin one of the conclusions of the Task Group on National Educations (TGNE) April 2008report on status of and challenges to promoting national education in the HKSAR,Although One Country, Two Systems is a cornerstone principle for Hong Kong, it isalso provides an excuse for a few Hong Kong people to resist forging closer links withthe Mainland.xxxix One headline in the SCMP, the leading English-language daily in theSAR, in July 2006 aptly depicts the gulf in perceptions between loyalists and pan-democrats regarding Hong Kongs return to China with headline,July 1 One Big Partyfor Patriots, One Big Protest for Democrats.xl

REMAKING HONG KONG

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Implicit in the high-level eviscerating criticisms by Chinas leaders directed at HongKongs pan-democrats and their supporters over Hongkongers lack of patriotism, poorknowledge of the Basic Law and opposition to the central governments policies vis--visuniversal suffrage, is the insinuation that the pre-Handover generations of Hongkongersthat grew up under colonial rule are damaged goods. That they are tainted by alien

ideologies and Western influences and instilled with hatred of the Communist Party andeven their own culture because they mimic and covet Western ideologies such asdemocracy. For instance, in his 2007 paper,In Search of a New Political Order, CPUHead Lau Siu-kai described how colonial actions and influence had polluted Hong Kongand obstructed the emergence of Beijings NPO which he defines as the post-1997political order envisaged by Beijing in accordance with Chinas policy towards HongKong,

For one-and-a-half centuries, Hong Kong people, many of whom had fled theMainland to avoid political oppression, treasured the protection against the variousChinese regimes that the colonial rulers provided. Colonial rule was also associated

with Hong Kongs post-World War II economic miracle and social progress. ManyHongkongers were resistant to and fearful of Hong Kongs return to China, eventhough they had won the best possible deal from Beijing. In this politico-psychological context, it was natural that the majority of Hong Kong people wouldsuccumb to the political persuasions of the ANOF [anti-new order forces].xli

Expounding on what constitutes the ANOF, Professor Lau writes,

The main components of the ANOF are the political parties (notably the DemocraticParty and the Civic Party), a number of politicians and retired senior civil servantsgroomed by the colonial regime with suspicion and apprehension, intellectualssteeped in Western political ideas, anti-communists and public personalities withliberal proclivities. What unite them are mistrust and hostility towards Chinesecommunists and their desire to see China democratizing in the Western fashion.Their common goal is bring about full democracy in Hong Kong as soon as possibleso that Hongkongers can have more power at their disposal to withstand any possiblepolitical interference from Beijing after the handover. They portray themselves as theguardians of Hong Kongs interests and the spokesmen of Hong Kong citizens. xlii

Another Hong Kong politico, Professor Anthony B.L. Cheung, a member of the CETsangs Executive Council and a well known academic in Hong Kong, argued in April2007 that Hong Kongs chief executive, despite having inherited much of the legacycolonial governors autocratic powers has, since the Handover, had those powersneutralized to the point where the SAR government has almost been rendered a disabledstate and that a continuing political quagmire persisted in Hong Kong despite theefforts of the second chief executive.xliii According to Cheung,

The new SAR political order was supposed to be a continuation of the previous modeof executive-led and bureaucracy-based governance. Such continuation, however,proved to be unsustainable. Even during the final years of British rule, the last

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governor, Chris Patton, had already quickened the pace of politicization and made thegovernment more open and responsive to legislative scrutiny and local public opinion.The introduction of legislative elections in the transitional period saw the emergenceof political parties and elected legislators as new political actors. Apart from theattempt at democratization as part of the British agenda of decolonization, there was

obviously a real need for the departing administration to accede to some demandsfrom these rising local politicians. The government had become less strong and civilsociety less weak than before.xliv

Given the world view of PNOF in Hong Kong described by Professor Lau, Hongkongersespousing Western-style democratic views are intrinsically inimical to the NPO thatbrought about Hong Kongs return. Indeed, Lau has concluded that the problem withHongkongers resistance to the NPO was so endemic that an ideological reorientationwas required to ensure the correct implementation of OCTS and the Basic Law,

Despite Beijings pledge to maintain Hong Kongs pre-1997 status quo after the end

of colonial rule, the implementation of OCTS still requires an ideologicalreorientation towards China, the CCP, the central authorities and compatriots in theMainland. Making ideological changes in these respects, however, does not entail thedenigration of colonial rule and rejection of colonial legacies. It certainly calls for theimaginative crafting of a new Hong Kong identity that creatively combines patrioticsentiments, a pragmatic understanding of Hong Kongs situation and the selectivepreservation of those aspects of the colonial legacy that represent modernity.xlv

Professor Lau continues on to warn that without a viable and successful nationaleducation program Hongkongers would be further turned against Beijing:

very little has been done since the handover to respond to the imperative ofideological reorientation. Strong psychological resistance to anything that smacks ofpolitical brainwashing has been one reason for the lack of such efforts. Theweakness of the PNOF and the Tung administration has been another. What is worseis that the ANOF is taking advantage of the situation to reorient Hongkongerstowards a direction marked by nostalgia for colonial rule, Hong Kong localism, andmistrust of Beijing and indifference to its OCTS policy.xlvi

Current Generations Cant Be Trusted

As seen in the earlier comments by some senior Chinese leaders and academics involvedin Hong Kong affairs in the previous section, these people in Hong Kong who grew upunder the national humiliation of colonialism but who still view colonial rulenostalgically, they reason, can not be trusted with universal suffrage in Chinas SAR topick patriots for the position of chief executive or the legislature; that Hongkongers haveyet to reconcile themselves with the NPO in a Hong Kong that is part of China or, morepointedly, that is part of a China under Chinese communist rule; China has been acceptedbut Communist primacy over the SAR has not.

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The concept that Hongkongers dont know they are part of the motherland of CommunistChina has been a constant theme among patriotic camp in Hong Kong who haveceaselessly lobbied for enhancing and increasing national education in the SAR and whosee it as a panacea for all Hong Kongs ills. While a China-centric national education

program has been practiced in the SAR since the Handover, it has been one conductedmuch more in words than deed. The Governments efforts have often come undercriticism by leftists, some of who have been appointed to Government or advisorypositions, who feel that Hong Kongs national education and Basic Law promotionprograms were too watered down and that Hong Kongs inferior position to Beijing hadbeen minimized.

Other SAR officials have also called for Hongkongers to rectify their thinking. Oneexample is a speech by former Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung in February 2007criticized the mentality of Hongkongers raised under colonial times and called for themto change their mode of thinking. To some degree, this typified the perspective of some

in the administration and presaged President Hu Jintaos and other Chinese leaders callfor a new generation of Hongkongers that would come a few months later. In her speech,Secretary Leung called upon Hong Kong people to gain a better understanding of theBasic Law through which the city derives its power of a high degree of autonomy fromthe central government and urged that Hong Kong people must appreciate the meaningof Chinas resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and adjust theirmindset accordingly.xlvii

To achieve this, she advocated that a Basic Law promotion campaign was necessary toeducate the younger generation about the concept of once country, two systems.

xlviii

Not only did the SAR Government need to institute a Basic Law campaign, SecretaryLeung claimed, but Hongkongers themselves had to reevaluate their relationships withHong Kong and its ruler. Citing a 2005 Census and Statistics Department survey thatshowed that 85 percent of a surveyed 15,000 Hongkongers claimed to not [to]understand the Basic Law well, Secretary Leung said this necessitated Hongkongers tomake a paradigm shift so they could accept Chinas sovereignty over Hong Kong.Explaining, she said,

Under the British rule, they [Hongkongers] were governed by a sovereign of a nationto which they did not belong. There was the subconscious repulsion toward thesovereignty. Since nationalism was not encouraged under colonial rule, Hong Kongpeople would have to find their new identity as Chinese citizens after reunification.Many of them do not understand what sovereignty entails.Once we understandHong Kongs legal position vis--vis the whole country, we will accept the newconstitutional order under the Basic Law, and recognize the PRC as our sovereign.We would support the principle of one country, two systems and commit ourselvesto making it a success.xlix

Months later in another speech, Elsie Leung, who is also a deputy director on theNPCSCs Hong Kong Basic Law Committee, continued to critique Hongkongers

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resistance against the Basic Law and China, emphasizing that the relationship betweenthe Central Authorities and Hong Kong is one of subservience, with one side leadingand supervising the other. The SAR is not an entity independent from the nation.

lShe

also berated the superficiality of Hongkongers understanding of OCTS, retorting that itwas not realized by just changing to a new national flag and regional flag and changing

a few names and that, a long mental journey was needed before one recognized thecountry and the nation.li

Reeducating Hongkongers

From the perspective of some senior Party leaders and their advisors in the HKMAO, theResearch Institute of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, and the Legislative AffairsCommission and Hong Kong Basic Law Committees of the NPCSC, as well as leftistsand loyalists in Hong Kong, the problems of Hongkongers loyalty, patriotism and weaknational identity are so endemic and pervasive that the only viable remedy is to remake

Hong Kong society and Hongkongers themselves. Hong Kong society and people mustbe transformed into patriots and transformed into part of new China. The obviousquestion is how can this be achieved?

The answer, these advocates claim, is by enhancing Hong Kongs national education andidentity formation efforts, by promoting a positive and benign image of China, byinstilling a patriotic fervor and by guiding Hongkongers to the proper understandingand acceptance of their position in OCTS. Intrinsic to this approach, the CentralAuthorities believe, is the filtering into Hong Kong society of a Mainland-centric viewof the duties and obligations of Hongkongers which mirrors the socialist honor anddisgrace model of President Hu Jintao and the socialist core values system on the

Mainland.

This, the Center hopes, would lead Hongkongers to dedicate themselves to supportingsocialist modernization and national rejuvenation, the building a harmonious society inHong Kong (and China), supporting the HKSAR Government and the Centers policies,and upholding the best of Chinas culture as advanced citizens of the PRC, who just alsohappen to be HKSAR residents. Where does the Party hope to find this vanguard ofpatriotic Hongkongers to lead this new politically compliant and dedicated generation ofHongkongers into the future? From Hong Kongs youth.

Building a New Generation of Hongkongers

As part of China, the Central Authorities expect Hong Kongs youth to serve the samerole as the Mainlands younger generations do for China. President Hu Jintaounambiguously communicated this to Hong Kong in June 2007 when, speaking at the eveof the ten-year anniversary of the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, hetold an audience of SAR government officials and Hong Kong dignitaries that, Theyouth are the future and hope of Hong Kong, as well as the future and hope of thecountry.

liiThe President then instructed the HKSAR government that the proper

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ideological education and preparation of these youth was an important task that had to beaccomplished,

What I want to particularly emphasize is that teenagers constitute Hong Kongs futureand hope and also the countrys future and hope. We must attach importance to

conducting national education among teenagers and strengthen exchanges betweenHong Kongs young people and the young people in Mainland China so as to pass onHong Kong compatriots fine tradition of loving the country and loving Hong Kongfrom generation to generation.liii

Shortly after President Hus comments in June 2007, the SAR Government formed theTGNE under the CPUs Commission on Strategic Development to review Hong Kongspolicies and practices in promoting national education since the Handover. The TGNEwas created with a view to proposing necessary improvement to the relevant strategicdirection, policies and measures, enhancing the public awareness of the Basic Law, andstrengthening the sense of national identity among Hong Kong residents, particularly the

younger generation.

liv

This emphasis on the youth was carried forward in the CEsannual policy address in October, where CE Tsang, as the Central Authorities highestrepresentative in Hong Kong, parroted President Hu Jintaos directive,

The future lies with our young people. In the interest of our countrys developmentand the continued success of One Country, Two Systems, the HKSAR Governmentwill make every effort to promote national education among our young people, so thatthey grow to love our motherland and Hong Kong, aspire to win honor and makecontributions for our country, and have a strong sense of pride as nationals of thePeoples Republic of China.

lv

In April 2008, the TGNE issued its report on the status of Hong Kongs nationaleducation efforts and carried similar language as that used by President Hu and ChairmanJia; declaring that the way forward for Hong Kongs national education promotion was toenable members of the general public to become new Hongkongers who love themotherland and Hong Kong and take pride in being citizens of the Peoples Republic ofChina.lvi (emphasis added) National education for youth (primary to university-level)was expected to promote the formation of a national identity and enable them to ponderover their responsibilities towards the motherland. The focus on the public, incomparison, would be to put forward as a program of general education formulatedto foster their understanding of Chinese culture, history and current national affairs. lvii

In identifying the way ahead for national education, the TGNE singled out the youth inprimary, secondary and university levels as the targets of the scheme as opposed to thegeneral public. The effort to target the latter was significantly less ambitious and wouldutilize a more passive approach. Hong Kongs civil servants would also be targets ofeducational indoctrination and some limited Hong Kong-Mainland national educationexchanges, but the primary marks of the SAR Governments efforts were Hong Kongsyounger generations.

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Why the Young? The Role of Youth in a Socialist Society

Since the mid-1990s, the Party has increased its emphasis on appealing to Chinasyouth and have actively recruited youth members with significant numbers making upthe CPC. According to the All China Youth Federation (ACYF) at the conclusion of

1994, more than 21 per cent of the CPCs 55 million members were below the age of 35and by the end of 2006, party members below the age of 35 represented 23.4 per cent ofParty members.

lviiiAn additional indicator of the extensive role of younger Chinese in

Chinas modernization is that as of the end of 2005, over 75 per cent of the permanentstaff of the Chinese Academy of Sciences were under the age of 45 which the ACYF hascharacterized as demonstrating the greater participation of youth in social developmentand scientific and technological progress.lix

The CCP views the youth as the future builders of the motherland and successors to thecause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and considers their ideological educationas a paramount task for ensuring that the Party has future successors for the Partys and

nations cause.lx

As described in a dated, yet highly relevant analysis for understandinghow the CPC views the role of youth in a socialist society, The Functions of the ChineseCommunist Youth Leagues (1929-1949), Klaus Pringsheim explained that bothCommunist and Fascist societies target their youth and use youth organizations forturning the young into faithful and reliable tools or willing helpers of the ruling group ofparty and seek to instill the correct political outlook. lxi President Jiang Zemin alsoidentified at the 16th Party Congress that the selection and training of young cadres tohelp them cultivate their Party spirit was part of the CPC party building efforts.lxii

The Partys aspirations and plans for shaping Hong Kongs youth and its nationaleducation promotion program to reflect the proper political attitudes and dedication to

national modernization and rejuvenation in the SAR are no different. As President HuJintao stated in June 2007, young people in Hong Kong represent the future ofHong Kong, indeed, the future of China. We should foster a strong sense of nationalidentity among the young people in Hong Kong and promote exchanges between themand the young people on the mainland so that they will carry forward the Hong Kongpeoples great tradition of loving the motherland and loving Hong Kong. lxiii Andwhile Hong Kongs national education approaches have been adapted to local realities,the goals remain the same as in China the promotion of socialist core values, the Eighthonors and dishonors, and the pursuit of common affluence/prosperity, social harmonyand national unity although expectations of their success and pace are more measuredand pragmatic for Hongkongers than what is expected of Mainland youngsters and young

adults.

Role of Youth Groups

Pringsheim also notes that the ultimate purpose of youth groups created by the State inthese societies is to mould the thinking of youngsters and to establish an apparatusfor control for assisting the government in pursuing its objectives. lxiv GregoryFairbrother has described this political socialization as, The process by which regimes

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attempt to justify their rule and motivate populations behind national goals is politicalsocialization, whereby children are taught about, and encouraged to form attitudesupportative of, the political system and the nation.

lxvYouth groups in Hong Kong form

an important part of the SAR Governments approach in promoting the formation of anational identity, its national education efforts, and as targets of the promotion of the

Basic Law. In fact, these groups are the main foci of the Central Authorities and SARGovernments national education-related Hong Kong-Mainland exchange programs.Previously, the activities of these groups were not well coordinated. However, starting in2008 and continuing in 2009, the SAR Government began to create an infrastructure tobetter coordinate their exchange efforts.

The primary Hong Kong youth groups supporting the SAR Governments nationaleducation efforts closely interact and coordinate with Mainland youth organizations andChinese Government and Communist Party counterparts such as the Communist YouthLeague (CYL) or the ACYF. This includes groups like the Hong Kong Federation ofYouth Groups (HKYFG) and Hong Kong United Youth Association (HKUYA). Some

of the executive management of these Hong Kong youth groups also have overlappingmembership or affiliations with the CYL, the ACYF or Mainland provincial youth bodieswhich provides Beijing further control over Hong Kongs youth groups.

Moreover, these groups often receive financial assistance from the SAR Government inthe form of grants for national education training and Hong Kong-Mainland exchangeprograms. The association of the ACYF with Hong Kongs youth groups is of no smallconsequence. The ACYF is led by the CYL. As such, it holds considerable implicationsfor shaping the SARs national education and identity formation programs to bettersupport the CCP and the pro-Beijing elements of Hong Kongs political society.Professor Tam Chi-Kuong of the University of Macau has described the ACYFs role asbeing a united front organization of Chinese authorities coordinating youthorganizations on the Mainland.lxvi

The importance of these Hong Kong-Mainland national education exchanges is seen inthat during these exchanges, Hong Kong youth meet with high-level Chinese governmentand Party officials and leading Chinese academics on Hong Kong affairs. This includesChinese organs such as the HKMAO, the NPC, and the CPPCC. Members from theUFWD are also often involved. The Liaison Office of the Central Peoples Governmentin the HKSAR (CGLO) even has a Youth Department that handles youth development inthe Hong Kong and Macao SARs. The Director and Deputy Director of the CGLO alongwith principal HKSAR Government officials including the chief executive are commonfaces at national education and Basic Law promotion youth-centric events in Hong Kong.Some youth organizations in Hong Kong, such as the Hong Kong Federation of YouthGroups (HKFYG), even hold coming of age ceremonies reminiscent of Partyceremonies for youth on the Mainland. These have also been attended by high-rankingSAR Government and CGLO officials.

Elite youth selected from Hong Kong schools and the community to participate in theseprograms. Afterwards, they are expected to offer testimonials on how their awareness

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and national identity was strengthened after the visits. Some of those participating inMainland national education exchange visits will become seed students for motivatingand encouraging their fellow youth in Hong Kong to be more receptive and accepting ofChina and to contribute to its modernization. These exchanges, the Party feels, promotea closer and more harmonious relationship of mainland China with Hong Kong lxvii

One recent example of youth activities focusing on the development of an elite core offuture Beijing-friendly community and political leaders is theHong Kong 200 (HK200)leadership development program. TheHK200 program was launched by the leftistHKFYG and the ACYF in 2006. The ten-year program will provide intensive politicaland leadership training for 2,000 youth leaders between 2006 and 2016. According toHK200 promotional material, one of the goals of the program is to nurture youth so as tohelp in the creation of a pool of future leaders, competent and committed to contributingto Hong Kong. With One Country, Two Systems and Hong Kong People Ruling HongKong, there is a great need to encourage and foster leadership knowledge, skills andtraining at an early age in order to maximize their potential.

lxviiiAs part of their 200

hours of training in Hong Kong and on the Mainland, the elite youth receive specializedtraining session from the ACYF. The best of theHK200 yearly cohorts are expected tohelp with the education of future participants and interact with the community as rolemodels and advocates for national education.

Eventually, some of these youth are expected to take up leadership positions within thepro-Beijing organizations, political parties and civil service positions. Professor Tam hasdescribed a similar process in Macau where pro-Beijing organizations serve as trainingground for their future leadership. Promising candidates in the youth organizations willeventually be groomed for important positions in the pro-Beijing forces as well as in theGovernment.lxix Hong Kongs pro-Beijing political parties have taken a similar tact ingrooming young Hongkongers. The SARs largest political party, the pro-BeijingDemocratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) has created aYoung DAB branch for members less than 35 years old. And in December 2007, theDAB started a Political Leadership Development Programme for DAB Young Talents.The principal goal of the program is to foster the young to participate in politics andenhance their capabilities. It may also be that this will be part of a Hong Kong-stylenomenklatura system that will eventually create a cadre of suitable candidates cultivatedfrom the SARs elite by Beijing in ordering to serve in the legislature, civil service andamong the principal officials and the chief executive. No doubt some will also fill theranks of Hong Kongs CPPCC and NPC ranks. Some of these individuals may also beused to penetrate Hong Kongs civil society and non-governmental organizations similarto how the UFWD is on the Mainland.

One of the most recent beneficiaries of the DABs political leadership training was StarryLee Wai-king who was a DAB Standing Committee member and District Councilor whenshe participated in the program and has been referred to as one of the DABs youngpolitical stars. In September 2008 she won a geographic constituency Legco seat andbecame the second youngest member in the Legco. Another example of the DABsinvestment in young talents is Gary Chan Hak-kan who is the youngest member in the

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2008-2012 Legco. Like Starry Lee, Gary Chan has been described as a young DABstar. Gary Chan was born in 1976 and served as a District Councilor from 1999 to 2003and then served as a special assistant to CE Tsang from 2006 to 2008. When he wasselected to be a special assistant to CE Tsang, Chan was a member of the HKSARGovernments Commission on Youth and the chairman of the Federation of New

Territories Youth.

lxx

Chan had also participated in the DABs Deputy SpokesmanScheme which allowed young party members to work for a DAB lawmaker toobserve the operations of the Legislative Council and perform as a deputy spokesmanfor their issue areas. Chan had served as a deputy spokesman for DAB member LauKong-wah. According to Lau Kong-wah, Teenagers are the future of our party.lxxi

Patriotic Education & Patriotism

On the mainland, the CCPs principle vehicle for developing youth to become futurebuilders is throughpatriotic education. Patriotic education is considered to be a longterm strategic task for the Party and its implementation is important and urgent task

according to the CCPs Central Committee.

lxxii

Its purpose is to ultimately imbue a formof patriotism that is equivalent to socialism a position explicitly stated in the 1994Action Plan for Patriotic Education (hereafterAction Plan), In contemporary China,patriotism is essentially identical to socialism. lxxiii Indeed, the process of patrioticeducation in China itself, according to Professor Gregory Fairbrother, is specificallydesigned to engender support for the CCP and its principles and policies. lxxiv PresidentHu Jintao has said that the winning over youths is tantamount to winning the future. lxxv

The CCPs convergence of patriotism and socialism into a whole is one of the basicprinciples of patriotic education mentioned in a September 1994Xinhua article,AProgram for Education in Patriotism, In contemporary China, patriotism, in essence, isidentical to socialism, and building socialism with Chinese characteristics is the maintheme of patriotism in the new period. lxxvi Professor Fairbrother has also noted that inthe process of conducting patriotic education on the mainland, patriotism is equatedwith love for the socialist system and the Communist Party, and a number of objectivesfor students knowledge and attitudes include upholding socialism, the leadership of theCCP, and a continuation of its basic policies.lxxvii

The 2004 patriotism campaign in Hong Kong instituted by the Central Authorities andthe UFWD after the Center expressed their serious concernslxxviii over Hong Kongsconstitutional development to CE Tung heavily promoted this convergence theme.Professor Eric Ma of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has characterized the event as,Fearing Hong Kong politics might go out of control, the central governmentsideological apparatus was activated to inject into Hong Kong a strong version ofnationalism, even to an extend of equating loving the Chinese nation with loving theCommunist Party.lxxix Years later in 2008, the TGNE continued this emphasis statingthat part of creating a national identity in Hongkongers was the need to imbue anunderstanding and support for the institutions of our country, in other words for theChinese Government and for the CCP.

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HKSAR Governments Efforts Not Enough

Because Hong Kongs post-retrocession national education efforts had been very diffusedand not effective in achieving the political buy-in from the community that the CentralAuthorities and leftists in Hong Kong have desired or in curbing demands for Western-

style democratic traditions and universal suffrage, the SAR Government has faced a lot ofcriticism to increase its involvement and coordination of communitys national educationefforts. An often heard criticism from loyalists has been that national education, identityformation and Basic Law promotion was not a priority for the various Administrations(Tung Chee-hwas and Donald Tsangs alike.)

This has reportedly included complaints to Chinas senior leaders by loyalist Legcoleaders such as by Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai.lxxx Rita Fan served as the HKSARs firstPresident of the Legco during the first decade of Chinas rule, is a member of the NPCStanding Committee, and is also a member of the NPCSC Hong Kong Basic LawCommittee. According to the SCMP, in March 2006 Rita Fan blasted CE Tsangs

national education efforts and questioned his commitment to the effort when she met withNPCSC deputy secretary-general Qiao Xiaoyang and CGLO Director Gao Siren in aclosed-door session in Beijing,

In his political manifesto for the chief executive election, [Mr. Tsang] mentioned hewould promote national education. He also said he would promote education inChina when he met Election Committee members, yet after he became chiefexecutive, he did not even devote a word to national education or education in Chinain his first policy address. Why is that the case? What is our government doing?lxxxi

Task Group on National Education

However, the situation of the SAR Governments laissez faire approach for promotingnational education largely remained the same until President Hus comments on the eveof the tenth-anniversary. Afterwards, the Government moved quickly to create theTGNE. Part of the Task Groups mandate was to examine how the SAR Government hadpromoted national education, the efficacy of those efforts, and how the Governmentshould address any deficiencies. It met several times in the intervening months and inApril 2008 issued its findings, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong CurrentSituation, Challenges and Way Forward(hereafter Way Forward.) The key conclusionwas that the SAR Government had to become more deeply involved not only in the

nature of the promotion of national education and the Basic Law, but would also increaseits funding, policy involvement and leadership role,

National education is a task of paramount importance that demands progressive andcontinuous efforts. There should be long-term planning and systemic promotionstrategies regarding national education. Relevant measures should be implementedwith more vigor and in a more holistic way. The Government should continue toassume a coordinating role in the promotion of national education, accord a higher

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priority to national education among its various policy areas, allocate more resourcesto this area and step up its effort in cooperating with the relevant Mainlandauthorities.

lxxxii

The primary emphasis of Hong Kongs national education efforts would be on its youth.

This was necessary so that the community could eventually become new Hongkongerswho love our motherland and Hong Kong, take pride in being a national of the PeoplesRepublic of China and aspire to win honor and make contributions for our countrylxxxiii --unlike the current generations tainted by colonialism and Western notions of democracy.By concentrating on Hong Kongs youth, the SAR Government could achieve PresidentsHus hope that the torch of patriotism would be passed down generation by generationthrough educating the young people of Hong Kong. lxxxiv

During the remainder of 2008, the SAR Governments Secretary for Home Affairs(HAB), Tsang Tak-sing, a well-known leftist in Hong Kong, was quoted several timespromoting the new national education effort and stressing their importance, often using

terminology more akin to Chinas patriotic education traditions than necessarily HongKongs civic education legacy or its current international status.

In July 2008 Hong Kong Secretary for Home Affairs, Tsang Tak-sing, referencedthe importance of Hong Kongs national education efforts in similar terms as theCCP has used to describe its patriotic education campaign, National education isan important and long-term mission for Hong Kong lxxxv This mirrored howthe Chinas Central Committee has described patriotic education as a long termstrategic task and as an important and urgentlxxxvi task.

In September 2008, Secretary Tsang also commented, Young people are the

future pillars of our society. The Home Affairs Bureau is committed tostrengthening youth development and training, as well as promoting civic andnational education, with youngsters being the target.lxxxvii The reference to theyouth being the future pillars of our society tracks with previous comments bythen Politburo member Hu Jintao and head of the UFWD and CPPCC vice-chairperson Liu Yandong in 1999 and 2004 respectively. lxxxviii

In general, the HABs policy portfolio covers many areas that, on the Mainland, the Partywould traditionally be responsible for guiding through propaganda and united frontlevers in order to control the publics interaction with the Party and the Governmentincluding contact with the youth. In Hong Kong, the HAB is responsible for: Social

Harmony & Civic Education; Culture; District, Community and Public Relations; andRecreation, Sports and Entertainment Licensing. It is through the HAB that the SARGovernment works with the Commission on Youth and the Committee on the Promotionof Civic Education to achieve the policy objectives of the Government (e.g., enhancingyouths understanding of Chinese culture and heritage, promoting national education andenhancing a sense of belonging to the community, promoting the Basic Law,encouraging their participation in voluntary and community work, etc.) lxxxix

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Leading & Guiding Hongkongers

The goal of the youth-centric national education strategy being applied to Hong Kong bythe Central Authorities and the SAR Government is to subtly lead or guide HongKong youth to adopting a Hong Kong-style socialist core value-like system in order to

reduce opposition from Hongkongers to the Communist Partys rule over Hong Kong, toengender more support for the CPC, to inspire their contributions to the modernizationand rejuvenation of the motherland, and the fostering of national unity. This includeshelping Hong Kong youth to understand that we are all China and that this we-nessshould include noting that the understanding of and support for the institutions of ourcountry is conducive to the development of commonalities among the mass of people.

xc

National education promotion has been identified by the SAR Government as being animportant aim of its Moral and Civic Education curriculum. Hong Kongs EducationBureau has indicated that in the course of pursuing a national education agenda that itmust cultivate a sense of national identity and commitment for contributing to the

nation and society so that Hongkongers will see their destiny as married to that of theMainlands. As portrayed by one pro-Beijing youth group, theHok Yau Club, Nomatter what you political affiliation may be, you cant change the reality that politicallyand socially we are integrating more with China. Our aim is to help youth understandmodern China. We dont want them to put China aside that wont work. China is inour daily life.xci In the TGNEs Way Forwardthe Government explained that byimproving Hong Kongs youths understanding of the Mainland that the enhancedunderstanding they gained of the Mainland would naturally lead them, of their ownvolition, to wanting to contribute to Chinas development,

The national education policy in Hong Kong is to cultivate a sense of national identity,

pride and responsibility in our people. This is achieved mainly through enhancing thepublic knowledge of China, including its culture, history, peoples and currentdevelopment, that would enable them to develop a better understanding of, and inturn greater affection and a sense of belonging to the motherland. This affection andsense of belonging would then influence their behavior, motivating them to take up

more social responsibilities and contribute to the well-being of their country and their

compatriots.xcii

(emphasis added)

Elsie Leung communicated the same theme in her Wen Wei Po article, Full Developmentof the Basic Law Under the Common Law System, when she described in June 2007 thatthe implementation of the Basic Law on 1 June 1997 also represented the beginning of a

new chapter in the history of the Chinese Constitution and nation,

Although we practice a system different from the mainland, we are not anindependent entity. We live on the same piece of land with our comrades in themainland. We all belong to the Chinese nation, use the same language, and share thesame culture and long history. Hong Kong is part of the country, and the countrymeans the People's Republic of China. We are obliged to maintain the security, honor,and interests of the country, alongside other duties. We cannot put into peril the

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country's safety, honor, and interests (Articles 51 to 56, Constitution of the People'sRepublic of China.xciii

The method of leading or guiding Hong Kong residents to accept an identity as asubject of Communist China with responsibilities and duties to the country under the

leadership of the CPC is similar to how the Party approaches guiding Mainland Chinesecitizens to embrace the socialist value system of their own accord. As stated at the 17thParty Congress,

The ideological and moral qualities, scientific and cultural qualities and health statusof the whole nation will be improved markedly and further progress will be made infostering a sound moral atmosphere and harmonious interpersonal relationships. Toachieve this, we shall filter socialist core values into the minds of people and help

them reach a wide agreement on moral standards such as patriotism, devotion,

honesty and friendliness.xciv (emphasis added)

Socialist Core Value System & Socialist Honor System

The SCVS, which was announced at the Sixth Plenum of the 16th

Party Congress,consists of Marxism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, patriotism, the spirit ofreform and innovation and the socialist sense of honor and disgrace. In his work reportto the 17th Party Congress, President Hu Jintao described the SCVS as representing theessence of socialist ideology.xcv Professor Cheng Enfu, president of the Academy ofMarxism has explained that the SCVS takes Marxism as its soul to guide all kinds ofsocial trends of thought and social practice.xcvi

The foundation of the SCVS is President Hu Jintaos Eight Honors and Eight Disgraceswhich is also referred to as the socialist honor-and-shame perspective or socialisthonor system. In tandem, the socialist honor-shame system and the SCVS illustrate thePartys demand for basic socialist moral norms and social practices. It is the integrationof the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation with the spirit of the times. xcvii Thisworld view provides the basic benchmarks for the value orientations and moraljudgment relevant to life in contemporary society.xcviii The eight honors and eightdisgraces are:

Love, do not harm the motherland;

Serve, don't disserve the people;

Uphold science, don't be ignorant and unenlightened;

Work hard, don't be lazy and hate work;

Be united and help each other, don't gain benefits at the expense of others;

Be honest and trustworthy, not profit-mongering at the expense of your values;

Be disciplined and law-abiding instead of chaotic and lawless;

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Know plain living and hard struggle, do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures.

Some Government entities and affiliates in Hong Kong are promoting the SCVS in theHKSAR both overtly and subtly. For example, Hong Kongs Educational Bureau hasextolled the CCP values for its students, with senior Hong Kong Government officials

sometimes even using traditional Mainland mechanisms such as patriotic role models tomotivate students to emulate socialist mores. In 2003 then Permanent Secretary forEducation, Fanny Law, wrote a series of letters, 10 Letters to Youth, telling Hong Kongskindergarten, primary and secondary school students that As members of the PeoplesRepublic, you young people must assume an active role in fulfilling your obligations asChinese nationals. You should get to know your country, love your country, prepare todedicated yourselves to the service of your country, and link your career to thedevelopment of the country as a whole.

xcix

Interestingly, because of the SAR Governments general efforts to avoid presenting itsnational education efforts in a style clearly resembling patriotic education on the

Mainland, in the same letter Secretary Law relied on the use of a patriotic role model,Zhu Kezhen, to motivate the students to accept the values of nationalism, patriotism, andselflessness (in contributing to the Country.) In her example, Secretary Law wrote,

The growth and development of a country depends upon the dedication andparticipation of its people. In the Mainland, many young people who are still inschool already have plans about how they can contribute to the country. The late ZhuKezhen, a famous Chinese meteorologist, geographer and educationalist, recalled thathe was once asked by a language teacher to make a sentence with the words bitterand sweet. He replied: The bitterest thing is to surrender our countrys sovereignrights under humiliating terms, and the sweetest thing is when our country is

prosperous and strong. To pursue prosperity for the country was the foundation ofZhus aspirations. In summing up the achievements of his lifetime, he said: I regardit my duty to promote technological development and nurture talents for my country.I do so out of a sense of patriotism and a desire for a stronger and more prosperouscountry. My young friends, do you have the same sense of patriotism? Are youready to dedicated yourself to the service of your country, just like Zhu? c

Patriotic role models are traditionally used on the Mainland by the Party to promote itsideology and world views and to provide more exemplars for students to follow andaspire to. According to Mei Zhang, Chinas use of patriotic role models for educationpurposes was a common defining characteristic of the Chinese governments in history

and that since 1978, In the reform era, while the Party put up new reform role models asdefined by the courage to develop market economy and achieve material prosperity, theParty continued to present traditional socialist role models as defined by altruism andself-sacrifice in public interests to promote socialist spiritual civilization as a means tocounteract corruption, money fetishism, and excessive interest in personal benefits.ci

In another situation where socialist values were being promoted in Hong Kong by theGovernment or its affiliates, the Estate Agents Authority (EAA) a statutory body which

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regulates real estate industry in the SAR and whose members are appointed by the ChiefExecutive promoted President Hus honor system in one of its official newsletter urgingthat, His message is worth pondering for all of us.

ciiEmphasizing the duties that its

estate agents had to the nation and not just their profession, the EAA told its membersthat,

Honor and disgrace is not only a concern at the country or national-level, but also inthe daily life of every single citizen. Morality and justice will prevail if everyone hasa sense of disgrace. The saying Where every intellectual understands disgrace, thecountry will never be in disgrace. Means that a country will stay away fromhumiliation if every intellectual has a sense of disgrace Thus, we can see that theability to understand honor and disgrace is not only a matter of personal character andreputation it also affects the rise and fall of a country or nation.

ciii

The Purpose in Introducing SCVS in China (and Hong Kong)

The efforts to introduce and adopt the SCVS and socialist honor system, or a Hong Kong-style derivative of the two, in to the SAR should be viewed as a significant developmentbecause, as Professor Liu Jianping has observed, the Construction of the socialist corevalue system is interrelated with the construction of the socialist system.civ Theintended effect of introducing the SCVS or a Hong Kong-style SCVS in the SAR is tofacilitate the creation of a new Hong Kong society filled with patriotic residents, to builda harmonious society in the SAR and to foster a harmonious relationship betweeCentral Authorities and the HKSAR; the latter being a key aspect of the implementationof the OCTS in Hong K

n the

ong.

It can be logically assumed, if one follows the logic of some advocates of strengtheningOne Country at the cost of Two Systems, that if President Hus call for a newgeneration of Hongkongers is to be realized that it will have to be accompanied orpreceded by a change in Hong Kong society itself a situation necessitated by thecorruption and pollution of the current generations of Hongkongers as discussed earlieron. For instance, Presidents Hus socialist morality system has been lauded by aprominent member of the NPCSC Hong Kong Basic Law Committee member, Lau Nai-keung, as an ideological antidote to the lack of morality in China to unchecked greedwhich has just destroyed the American capitalist system and threatens to destroy oursocialist system before we know it.cv

According to some CPC theorists, the formation of a new society normally occurs when anew system of values materializes in the society. In Hong Kongs case, this could beconsidered to include the introduction of the SCVS and socialist honor system. Asexplained in one Qiushi commentary,

As a society engages in the long-term process of fostering mutual understanding andactivities to achieve this, it will certainly form a system of values. Within this system,it is the system of core values that constitutes its key importance, serving a dominant

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and spearheading role. The birth of a new society is usually preceded by theformation of a system of core values. Likewise, the stability and developments of asociety are dependent on a system of core values for its establishment and perfection.A system of core values not only is relevant to various facets of a society includingthe economy, politics, culture, and social life, but also affects the global outlook, life

perspective, and values orientation of every member of the society indelibly.

cvi

Thus, from the Partys perspective, if China is to create a new Hong Kong society whichis sympathetic and submissive to the Central Authorities then it must introduce newvalues to replace the colonial legacies and Western influences. On the Mainland, thedevelopment of individuals moral compasses to align with that of the Party has been agoal of Chinas construction of a spiritual civilization, advanced citizens and the creationof socialist harmonious society. Since 2001 the SAR Government has listed Moral andCivic Education (MCE) as one of four key tasks for Hong Kong schools when itreformed Hong Kong schools curriculum. Under the banner of MCE the EducationBureau classified national education as one of the key learning experiences for students

as part of its curriculum development. In its 2006-07 annual report the Education Bureauidentified that fostering national identity was a priority of its MCE curriculum.cvii In2008, the Secretary for Education describes MCE as emphasizing the promotion ofpositive values and attitudes among students for whole-person development. cviii

Another aspect of Hongkongers identity that the Central Authorities and the SARGovernment are attempting to change is Hongkongers perception of superiority to Chinaand their image of China as backward and oppressive. These perceptions are viewed asinhibiting Hongkongers reconciliation with the Mainland and are also a sore point forBeijing loyalists and nationalistic Hongkongers. One Education Bureau presentation,Mapping Hong Kong Identity, notes that the perception of China prior to 1997 was that of,China as primitive and [the] authoritarian other set against Hong Kong as modern andliberal metropolis.cix The presentation considered post-1997 challenges and periods thatthe community has and is going through such as: re-nationalization, [a] tarnishedeconomic miracle, [the] re-inventing [of] local identity, the imagination of Hong Kong asa city, re-inventing multiple histories, heightened political awareness, unstable culturalpositions, rescaling the local, the regional, the national and the international andconcluding with the question of if this journey results in a A new Hong Konggenerations?

Defining Good Hongkongers

Part of the political socialization process under the socialist value and honor system hasbeen an emphasis on the duties and obligations Chinese citizens have to the country andto society. As described by Lau Nai-keung, the socialist morality code summarizeswhat a good citizen should regard as honorable or shameful and represents a CPCmoral code for the country.cx Beyond their applicability to Mainland Chinese, manyChinese and HKSAR Government officials and loyalist academics have also stated that

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Hongkongers have similar obligations to the PRC as do their Mainland compatriots. Ingeneral, some of these socialist duties include the obligation to,

1) safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its nationalities;2) abide by the Constitution and the law, keep state secretes, protect public property,

observe labor discipline and public order and respect social ethics;3) safeguard the security, honor and interests of the Peoples Republic of China;4) defend the motherland, resist aggression, perform military service, and join the

military in accordance with the law;5) pay taxes in accordance with the law, and6) practice family planningcxi

While some of these duties such as military service and family planning do not apply tothe HKSAR, other duties such as safeguarding national unity and protecting the honor ofthe country are clear expectations of Hongkongers even though they appear no where inthe Hong Kong Basic Law; only the Duty to Obey the Law, Article 46 of the Basic Law

is listed as a duty under Chapter III Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents.The duty to keep state secrets falls under the obligation the HKSAR Government has toenact the Article 23 national security legislation which sparked the massive publicdemonstrations against the SAR Government and the governance of CE Tung. However,despite their absence from the Basic Law, senior Chinese officials and loyalists arguetheir application is implicit in the Basic Law and in the concept of OCTS. Their feelingis that under the premise of One Country Hongkongers have the same duties forupholding and protecting national unity and contributing to Chinas rejuvenation andmodernization.

Hong Kongs youth-centric national education promotion efforts and exchanges are likelyto be the primary vehicle used by the SAR Government to filter SCVS into Hong Kongsociety and to improve the image of the Party among Hongkongers. Chinese and HongKong media and cinema, however, will also be a major avenue of filtering thesesocialist values and continuing to polish Beijings image among Hongkonge

Documents

Approved 20090414 Garrett OCTS in the 21stCentury-A New Policy