Arab Insight 23

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Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ISLAMISTS

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?KHALIL AL-ANANI, Egypt

Alone at the Ballot Box: American Rejection o IslamistsATEF ABOU SAIF, Palestinian Territory

Trial and Error: Washington and Iraq’s ShiiteIBRAHIM AL-BAYDANI, Iraq

The Cold Embrace: U.S. & Islamists in North AricaMOHAMED EL-GHALI, Morocco

ISLAM OUTSIDE THE MOSQUE

Islamic Roots o Good GovernanceMAZEN HASHEM, Syria

Islam and Human Rights: Revisiting the DebateJUMANA SHEHATA, Egypt

A Response to Western Views o Islamist MovementsRADWAN ZIADAH, Syria

Separation o Islam & Political Islam: The Case o MoroccoHOSSAM TAMAM, Egypt

InsightIslam, Political Islam and America

Bringing Middle Eastern Perspectives to Washington

Vol. | No. SPRING 2007

Ara



PUbLISHER Bruce G. Bair

EDITOR IN CHIEF Mohamed Emenshawy

ASSISTANT EDITOR Pau Wusberg

MANAGING COPY EDITOR Whitney Parker

ADDITIONAL COPY EDITORS

Ashey HomanUgochukwu Iteogu

SPECIAL ADvISOR Hesham Saam

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Bringing Middle Eastern Perspectivesto Washington

Arab Insight, an innovative journa that eatures

authoritative anayses rom Midde Easternexperts on critica regiona issues, seeks toimprove the reationship between the UnitedStates and the Arab word by cutivating a bet-ter understanding o the compex issues acingthe Midde East among Western poicy-makersand the pubic at arge.

Artices in Arab Insight do not represent anyconsensus o opinion. Whie readers may agreeor disagree with the ideas set out in these ar-tices, it is our purpose to present a diversity o views rather than identiying with a particuarbody o beies.

The anayses, interpretations and concusionsexpressed in Arab Insight artices are soeythose o the individua authors and shoud notbe attributed to the Word Security Institute orany other individuas or organizations in theMidde East or the United States.



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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ISLAMISTS

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?Khai a-Anani, Egypt

Interview with Dr. Issam al-Iryan,

Chie o the Muslim Brotherhood Political Department

Conducted by Khai a-Anani

Alone at the Ballot Box: American Rejection o Islamists Ate Abou Sai, Paestinian Territory

Trial and Error: Washington and Iraq’s ShiiteIbrahim a-Baydani, Iraq

The Cold Embrace: U.S. & Islamists in North AricaMohamed e-Ghai, Morocco

ISLAM OUTSIDE THE MOSQUE

Islamic Roots o Good GovernanceMazen Hashem, Syria

Islam & Human Rights: Revisiting the Debate Jumana Shehata, Egypt

A Response to Western Views o Islamist MovementsRadwan Ziadah, Syria

Separation o Islam and Political Islam: The Case o MoroccoHossam Tamam, Egypt

InsightAra

Bringing Middle Eastern Perspectives to Washington

Vol. | No. SPRING 2007





AlTHOUGH THE FACTORS accounting or the deterioration o America’s reputa-tion in the Arab and Musim word ater Sept. 11 are numerous, the U.S. position

vis-à-vis poitica Isam remains an important actor in reinorcing the negative

view o America. An important issue that has driven much o the anti-Americanism

we observe in the region today pertains to an evident contradiction between U.S.

discourse on democratization and poitica reorm on one hand, and its negative

response to the eectora gains made by groups ike Hamas in the Paestinian Ter-

ritories or the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt. As a resut o this discrepancy, many

observers have proposed aternative ways or Washington to advance the cause o democracy in the Arab word. One o the proposed ideas invoves hoding-o on

caing or immediate eections, and ocusing instead on promoting other prereq-

uisites o poitica reorm. Others suggested empoying new strategies that woud

guarantee the deeat o poitica Isamists at baot boxes.

Undoubtedy, there is a soaring need or a better understanding o Isamist

movements in the region, given the undamenta dierences among such groups.

Moreover, many Isamist movements are experiencing a process o change that

warrants a revision o the existing conventiona wisdom about poitica Isam. Not

ony that, but many o those groups remain unknown in Western, particuary

American, discussions o Isamist movements. Thereore, ormuating a construc-

tive and eective American poicy toward Isam in a broad sense, but more speci-

cay toward poitica Isam, wi require a new and a more nuanced inteectua

mapping o contemporary Isam and poitica Isam in the region.

Given these various demands, the editoria team o Arab Insight took the initia-

tive to shed ight on the topic o American poicies toward both Isam and poitica

Isam. The topic is presented in two sections:

Section I presents severa Arab responses to American poicy toward Isamists.

Editors’ Note

5



It begins with an artice examining the Egyptian Musim Brotherhood’s view o

the United States. Missing rom this artice are aegations o secret taks between

the U.S. and the Brotherhood. Rather, the author ocuses on how the Brotherhood

perceives the United States and its poicies. Section I aso presents a short interview

with one o the eaders o the Brotherhood, Dr. Essam a-Iryan. The three other ar-

tices in the section grappe with the question o why the United States accepts (or

toerates) the activities o some Isamist movements and not others. The rst artice

addresses seeming U.S. rejection o Isamist groups in Egypt, lebanon, and the Pa-

estinian Territories. The second artice ooks at U.S. reations, or ack thereo, with

Isamist groups in the Maghreb region. The third artice anayzes the reationship

between the United States and Iraq’s Shiite Isamist groups, ocusing on the sources

o tensions in this reationship.Section II provides an overview o the position o

Isamist groups and movements in their respective societies. This section covers

Isamic views on issues o governance, human rights, and reations with the West.

The rst artice attempts to dene “Isamic governance,” in ways that transcend

conventiona understandings o phrases ike “Isamic rue,” “impementation o

Shariah” or “impementation o democracy.” The second artice grappes with the

question o whether there is a comortabe t between Isam and human rights.

The third artice anayzes Western views o Isamist movements. The ourth artice

examines the important transormations exhibited by the A-Tawheed Wa-Isah

movement in Morocco over the past years.

6 Arab Insight



Is “brotherhood” with America Possile?*

khalil al-anani

“THERE IS NO CHANCE OF COMMUNICATING with any U.S. administration so

ong as the United States maintains its ong-standing view o Isam as a rea danger,

a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have

no pre-conceived notions concerning the American peope or the U.S. society and

its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no probem communicating with

the American peope but no adequate eorts are being made to bring us coser,”

said Dr. Issam a-Iryan, chie o the poitica department o the Musim Brother-

hood in a phone interview.

A-Iryan’s words sum up the Musim Brotherhood’s views o the American peo-

pe and the U.S. government. Other members o the Musim Brotherhood woud

agree, as woud the ate Hassan a-Banna, who ounded the group in 1928. A-

Banna viewed the West mosty as a symbo o mora decay. Other Saas – an Is-

amic schoo o thought that reies on ancestors as exempary modes – have taken

the same view o the United States, but ack the ideoogica fexibiity espoused by

the Musim Brotherhood. Whie the Musim Brotherhood beieves in engaging the

Americans in civi diaogue, other extremist groups see no point in diaogue and

maintain that orce is the ony way o deaing with the United States.1

* This artice was written beore the U.S. House Majority leader Steny Hoyer met with the Brotherhood’s

pariamentary eader, Mohamed Saad E-Katatni in Cairo. On Apri 5, 2007, Hoyer and E-Katatni metonce at the pariament buiding and ater at the home o the U.S. ambassador to Egypt.1 Teephone conversat ion with Issam a-Iryan on Feb. 2, 2007.

7

Specialist in political Islam and author o the orthcoming The Poitica Rise o the

Musim Brotherhood in Egypt, to be published in Cairo.



8 Arab Insight

The way the Muslim Brotherhood views the United States

Unike other Isamic poitica groups, the Musim Brotherhood is a pragmatic

movement that reates in a eve-headed manner with regiona and internationa

powers. However, the nature o its reations with the United States can be viewed

as a somewhat specia case. The Musim Brotherhood has proound reservations

about the United States. And Musim Brotherhood ocias doubt that they can

maintain a norma iaison with the U.S. government or nd a way to promote com-

mon understanding. Nonetheess, this artice is about the Egyptian chapter o the

Musim Brotherhood, not oth-

er branches o the same group

that exist in other Arab coun-

tries, or each independent

Musim Brotherhood group

deas with the United States

according to its interests and

goas. In act, some Musim

Brotherhood groups have a cordia reationship with Washington, incuding those

o Kuwait, Syria, Jordan and Morocco. The Egyptian branch o the Musim Broth-

erhood, however, takes a grim view o the United States or historica, ideoogica

and poitica reasons. That doesn’t mean that there are no “backdoor” channes o

communication between the two entities. But the mere act that communication

goes unpubicized is a sign o the ragie nature o reations between Egypt’s Mus-

im Brotherhood and the U.S. government.

Severa actors infuence the Musim Brotherhood’s attitude toward the United

States. One is Washington’s poitica attitude and perceived eve o trustworthi-

ness. Another is the degree to which Washington may be wiing to make the

Egyptian regime stop harassing the Musim Brotherhood and aow the atter to be

“egay” integrated in poitica ie. Besides, Washington may be using the MusimBrotherhood as a too to scare the Egyptian regime, and that itse cannot be good

or the Musim Brotherhood reputation.

Doctrinal and other considerations

The Musim Brotherhood sees the United States rom more than one ange,

some o which are infuenced by the doctrina beies o the Egyptian group and

its history.

a. The doctrinal angle: The Musim Brotherhood sees Isam as a hoistic sys-

“The Muslim brotherhood iews the Unit-

ed States as an occupation orce in Iraqand Aghanistan, and it supports despotic

regimes in the Ara World.”



Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible? 9

tem incorporating ie, man and the word together. This is a vision that

Hassan a-Banna, the group’s ounder, put together rom its inception. A-

Banna wanted Isam to ead humanity toward security, reedom, equaity

and justice. Thereore, the Musim Brotherhood sees the West as a riva that

has usurped this position o eadership. It aso beieves that Western civiiza-

tion, incuding American hegemony, is nearing its end.2

b. The civilization angle: A-Banna’s writings remain the main source or the

Musim Brotherhood’s views o the West. A-Banna criticized Western civi-

ization in the strongest o terms, accusing it o decay and unbrided deca-

dence. For him, Western civiization is a “materia civiization” devoid o

spiritua and mora substance.3

Athough a-Banna’s origina teachings were centred on European nations,

rather than the United States, his views were adopted, amost verbatim, by

current Musim Brotherhood eaders in reation to the United States. The

current Musim Brotherhood supreme guide, Mohammad Mahdi Ake,

says in one o his weeky etters that “the new internationa system ed by

the United States is an od imperia system using new toos … combining

seduction with repression, intration and domination with aegations o

partnership ... and breaking up countries whie caing on nations to ray

against hegemony. The United States is inciting minorities, provoking bor-

der troubes, and encouraging ethnic and sectarian sedition as we as civi

war. It is trying to separate Arab societies rom Musims societies. It is doing

so through anning nationaism, targeting the minds o youth, undermining

the vaue system, and spreading eeings o rustration.”

“The West pretends to be benevoent, but it has divided the word into twoparts. One is the West itse ‘that must remain strong, rich, armed, conquer-

ing, and productive.’ The other is the rest o the word ‘that must remain

weak, poor, disarmed, invaded, occupied, and consuming.’ The West is ‘try-

ing to impose its vision through orce, just as it is perpetuating disparity

2 Hassan a-Banna, Coection o the letters o the Martyred Imam, Message to the Fith Conerence. (A-exandria, Dar a-Daawa, 1988).

3 Hassan a-Banna, “The Fundamentas o Isam as a Socia System,” Al-Shihab 2, no. 14 (1947).



0 Arab Insight

among nations. The orms o expoitation may have changed, but the system

remains the same. It is a system based on racist concepts. It adopts the ideas

o Darwin and Nietzsche, with the West aways acting at the center, aways at

the hem. It is surviva o the ttest, and the West wants a others to remain

unt,” says Ake.4

Musim Brotherhood’s Dr. a-Iryan concurs with this overarching view o the

West and expresses the oowing opinion o the United States: “It is dicut to

speak o a civiization in the usua sense when taking o a country that’s no more

than 200 years od. Even assuming that the United States is a civiization, it is one

that has been born out o excusionist tendencies and through the eradication o

the Native Americans. It is aso a ‘materia’ civiization based on the twin piars o

money and power,” he says.5

The same view is echoed by Dr. Mohammad Habib, rst deputy o the Musim

Brotherhood’s supreme guide, who beieves that the U.S. civiization is based on

“surviva o the ttest” as we as on doube standards, especiay when it comes to

the issues o democracy and reedom.6

The Musim Brotherhood views the United States as an occupying orce in Iraq

and Aghanistan, and it supports despotic regimes in the Arab Word

c. The political angle: The Musim Brotherhood views the United States as

an occupying orce. Mahdi Ake, the Brotherhood’s supreme guide speaks

o the United States in the same tone a-Banna used when taking about the

British, French, or Itaian occupation o Arab countries. In act, a-Banna

once wrote that “the days o hegemony and repression are over. Europe can

no onger rue the East with iron and re. Those outdated practices do not

tay with the course o events, with the deveopment o nations, with the

renaissance o Musim peope, or with the principes and eeings the warhas created.” Ake coud use the same words today, but ony in reerence to

the United States.

Both a-Iryan and Habib agree that the United States wants to manipuate the

Arab region to promote its own interests. The invasion o Aghanistan and Iraq are

4 The weeky address by the Genera Guide, rom ikhwanonline.com, Jan. 3, 2007.5 Teephone conversat ion with Issam a-Iryan on Feb. 2, 2007.6 Teephone conversat ion with Mohammad Habib on Feb. 3, 2007.



Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

seen as evidence o U.S. intentions, the two woud argue. The Musim Brotherhood

is critica o the United States’ cose inks with Israe and beieves that the United

States and Israe share the same poitica agenda. Ake rais against the United

States and “Western bias towards the Zionist entity.” Habib says both America and

Israe were ounded on an ethos o expansionism and cooniaism. A-Iryan puts it

bunty, “One o the main reasons or our negative opinion o the United States is

its ties with Israe. Its ties with Israe wi remain a dening actor in our reations

with the United States.”

The U.S. support o des-

potic regimes in the Arab

word and its doube standards

in matters reated to reedom

and democracy oer another

stumbing bock in the cur-

renty sour reationship. The

Musim Brotherhood has aways espoused the view that the “West” bosters the

ruing regime in most o the Isamic word whie using them to promote its own

interests. Musim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau member Mahmoud Izzat says that

“the poicy o the United States in the Arab word is to support tyranny. U.S. deeds

confict with its rhetoric insoar as democracy is concerned.”7

Habib equay has itte regard or U.S. rhetoric on reedom, democracy and

human rights. The United States is interested not in democracy but rather in its

own schemes in the region, he says, reerring in particuar to U.S. poicy towards

Hamas. “The United States is not a charity organization or a reorm agency.”8 In

recent years, the doube standards issue suraced oowing the end o the Egyptian

pariamentary eections, in which the Musim Brotherhood won an unprecedented

20 percent o the seats (88 out o 454 seats). When the Musim Brotherhood was

ater subjected to various acts o persecution and harassment, the United Statesturned a bind eye.

The course o relations

Reations between the Musim Brotherhood and the United States go a the

way back to Word War II, when the United States was about to inherit the Brit-

ish Empire and the Musim Brotherhood was one o the most popuar movements

7 Interview with Mahmoud Izzat by the Washington Post on June 27, 2006, cited by ikhwanonline.com.8 Teephone conversat ion with Mohammad Habib on Feb. 3, 2007.

“Up until the conclusion o the Palestinian

elections, the United States was sending

positie signals to the Muslim brother-

hood.”



2 Arab Insight

in the region. The British, acting with U.S. bessing, wanted to estabish a riva

group to compete with the Musim Brotherhood. The new group, named Freedom

Brothers, was supposed to attract the youths with its cutura, socia, and ibera

programs, but never quite made it. Aterwards, the United States began firting

with top Isamic gures in Egypt. At one point, a U.S. Embassy ocia taked with

a-Banna about cooperating against the prevaiing communist threat, but the gap

in views proved too wide to bridge. In the ate 1970s, the U.S. sought the hep

o Musim countries in organizing jihad-stye resistance against the Soviets in A-

ghanistan. The Americans wanted Anwar a-Sadat to get the Musim Brotherhood

to ght the Soviets in Aghanistan, but the Musim Brotherhood was none too

enthusiastic.

later on, the Carter administration needed hep with the hostage crisis in

Tehran. The U.S. Embassy asked Omar a-Temesani, then Musim Brotherhood

genera guide, to intervene and use his good oces with the eader o the Iranian

Revoution, Ayatoah Khomeini. With a-Sadat’s permission, a-Temesani asked

the Iranians to et him come to Tehran or taks. Tehran’s answer was brie. “You’re

most wecome, but we’re not going to discuss the American hostages.” The visit

didn’t take pace. The Iranians waited ti Carter ost the eections to Ronad Reagan

and then reeased the hostages.9 In the 1980s, reations between the United States

and the Musim Brotherhood improved as the United States, with Saudi mediation,

sought coser ties with Isamic poitica groups in the region as part o its quest to

drive the Soviets out o Aghanistan.

However, the Sept. 11 attacks represented a watershed in the reations between

the Musim Brotherhood and the U.S. administration, so much so that one can

speak o both a pre-Sept. 11 phase and a post-Sept. 11 phase in their reations.

1. The pre-Sept. 11 phase: This phase covers most o the 1990s. In 1995,

the Musim Brotherhood won some seats in the Peope’s Assemby, and reportsspoke o exchanges between the Musim Brotherhood and the U.S. Embassy in

Cairo. Former U.S. Amb. Danie Kurtz said that he met Musim Brotherhood o-

cias or peope representing them. Some Musim Brotherhood members denied

the reports at the time, but others conrmed them.10 The taks didn’t amount to

negotiations, since the Musim Brotherhood had nothing to negotiate about, but

9 Riaat a-Said, “Egypt’s Musim Brotherhood and the Americans … the Bogeyman,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,

Dec. 16, 2005.10 Mana lut, “The Musim Brotherhood and America… How the Doors o Diaogue Opened… and WiThey be Cosed?” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Jan. 15, 2007.




invoved an exchange o views as Musim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mamoun

a-Hudeibi said at the time.11

Furthermore, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak conrmed the meetings

when he said in 1995 that Washington had exchanges with the Musim Brother-

hood, which he described as a “terrorist” group.12 The Egyptian regime consistenty

attempted to undermine any orm o rapprochement between the Musim Brother-

hood and the United States. The same year, the Egyptian government arrested a

arge number o Musim Brotherhood eaders and sentenced severa Musim Broth-

erhood eaders to three to ve years in prison, incuding the current supreme guide

Mahdi Ake, a-Iryan, Habib, and Khairat a-Shatir.

2. The post-Sept. 11 phase: In this phase, the United States turned against

many Isamic poitica organizations, mainy those engaged in unbrided acts o

vioence. But the dierence between moderate groups and vioent ones was not

aways cear or U.S. poicy-makers. When Hamas won the Paestinian eections,

the United States reversed its earier rhetoric about democracy. Up unti the con-

cusion o the Paestinian eections, the United States was sending positive signas

to the Musim Brotherhood and a moderate Isamists. President George W. Bush

and Secretary o State Condoeezza Rice both suggested that a moderate Isamic

government anywhere in the Arab word woud be acceptabe to the United States.

Here are a ew sampes o this view:

• Speaking to the U.S. Counci on Foreign Reations, Richard Haass, direc-

tor o poicy panning or the U.S. State Department, said that the United

States does not oppose Isamic parties and knows that democracy may

bring Isamic parties to power, due to the act that the atter were the best

organized opposition groups around.13 The remarks were in recognition

o the poitica gains the Isamists were making in Turkey, Morocco andBahrain.

• The Rand Corporation reeased a report by Chery Benard about the possi-

biity o the United States supporting ibera Isam in the Midde East. The

11 Dr. Hassanein Tawq Ibrahim, “The Egyptian Poitica Regime and the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt…rom Toerance to Conrontation, 1981-1996,” (Beirut: Dar a-Taiaah, 1998, 87).

12 Ibid., 44.13 Richard N. Haass, “Towards Greater Democracy in the Musim Word,” Address to the Counci onForeign Reations, Washington, D.C., Dec. 4, 2002.



4 Arab Insight

report impied that moderate Isamists were about to become part o the

mainstream poitica process.14

• Foowing a Midde East tour, Rice, speaking on June 23, 2005, hinted that

the United States was not aarmed by the prospect o an Isamist victory

in ree eections anywhere in the Arab word.15 Ater the Musim Brother-

hood won about 20 percent o the Egyptian pariamentary seats, some

U.S. ocias seemed in avor o communicating with moderate Isamists,

incuding the Musim Brotherhood. But the White House hawks and the

neoconservatives were not in avor o such a course o action.

For its part, the Musim Brotherhood didn’t mind hoding meetings with U.S.

government ocias. A-Iryan says that the Musim Brotherhood was wiing to

engage in diaogue with the United States, reerring to simiar statements he made

to Agence France Presse to this eect, oowing the 2005 pariamentary eections.

“The Musim Brotherhood position is that we beieve in diaogue and in coopera-

tion among civiizations, so ong as it is conducted on an equa ooting. We aso

beieve that there are common vaues that bind a cutures and nations.”16

Nonetheess, the Musim Brotherhood insists that a representative o the Egyp-

tian Foreign Ministry be present in a Musim Brotherhood meetings with Ameri-

can ocias, as Ake tod A-Sharq A-Awsat in December 2005. “Any such meet-

ing shoud be arranged through the Egyptian Foreign Ministry,” he said.17 This

precaution is designed to aay the Egyptian regime’s ear o exchanges between the

group and the Americans. The Musim Brotherhood aso wants to make sure that

the Mubarak regime is not going to use its contacts with the Americans to tarnish

its reputation. No direct diaogue existed between the Musim Brotherhood and

the Americans in this phase, but the reations between the two were raught with

optimism. The U.S. and the Musim Brotherhood sought out ways to circumventthe regime’s reservations, perhaps through the intercession o Musim Brotherhood

pariamentarians.

However, things changed ater Hamas won the Paestinian pariamentary eec-

14 Chery Benard, “Civi Democratic Isam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies,” Rand Corporation, SantaMonica, Cai., 2003.

15 “Secretary Rice’s Trip to the Midde East and Europe,” June 17 to June 23, 2005, mutipe speechesavaiabe at http://usino.state.gov/mena/midde_east_north_arica/rice_trip_june_2005.htm.

16 Originay in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Dec. 11, 2005; pubished in Engish at: Al-Ahram Weekly Online, IssueNo. 773, Dec. 15-21, 2005, http://weeky.ahram.org.eg/2005/773/eg5.htm.




tions on Jan. 26, 2006. The Hamas victory revived od U.S. ears that a tide o

radica Isam was sweeping over the region. Since then, there have been no reports

o U.S.-Musim Brotherhood exchanges. Hamas originay started out as an Mus-

im Brotherhood group, so the United States hardy caims to be on good terms

with the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt but unabe to tak to Hamas. Interestingy

enough, the United States rerained rom denouncing the arrests o Musim Broth-

erhood eaders in Egypt oowing the group’s impressive perormance at the March

2006 eections. For the time being, the United States seems to be revising its ideas

about democracy in the Midde East.

The impediments o dialogue

Even i the United States and the Musim Brotherhood were serious abouttaking to each other, severa issues sti hamper the chances o having a ruitu

diaogue:

a. The lack o trust: Musim Brotherhood eaders are not convinced that the

United States is serious about taking to them. They aso question the U.S. com-

mitment to promoting democracy in the Arab word. Writing in Al-Sharq Al-Aw-

sat, a-Iryan said that the United States must make its position cear on a ew mat-

ters beore hoding a diaogue with the Musim Brotherhood. First o a, it shoudrenew its commitment to internationa aw, rerain rom interering in the interna

probems o other countries, and respect the nationa sovereignty o other states.

Aso, the United States must accept democracy even i it were to bring its adver-

saries to power in other countries. Washington, he added, needs to show more

respect or other cutures and or the interests o other nations.17 Undoubtedy, the

Musim Brotherhood has strong doubts about the true intentions o the United

States. For exampe, is the United States reay interested in engaging in diaogue

with the Musim Brotherhood, or is it just caing or diaogue so as to pressure theEgyptian regime into taking sides with it on Iraq, Paestine and Sudan? The United

States aso has a history o turning the opposition against governments o the re-

gion, as happened in Iraq and Syria, with devastating resuts. This is something

that the Musim Brotherhood doesn’t want to be part o, expains a-Iryan.

b. The popularity actor: The Musim Brotherhood knows that the pubic

mood has turned against the United States, and it doesn’t want to risk its own

17 Issam a-Iryan, “In Search o legitimacy and an Agenda,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Dec. 16, 2005.



6 Arab Insight

popuarity by associating with the Americans. Aso, the Musim Brotherhood does

not want the Mubarak regime to use such diaogue to deame it, something which

has happened in the past. A-Iryan recas that in 1954, the Musim Brotherhood

conducted taks with ocias o the British Embassy and this was done with the

knowedge and support o Gama Abde Nasser’s government. Aterwards, the re-

gime accused the Musim Brotherhood o hoding secret taks with the occupiers

just to tarnish its image. But in actua act, the Musim Brotherhood had been

taking a hard-ine stance in the taks with the British in order to strengthen the

regime’s hand, a-Iryan notes.18

c. Ideological dierences: The greatest impediment to diaogue is that the

Musim Brotherhood and the United States have a signicanty dierent word

view. The Musim Brotherhood beieves that the United States is seeking word

domination. Meanwhie, the Musim Brotherhood says it is dedicated to Isamic

reormation and renaissance across the word. In his above-mentioned artice, a-

Iryan says that the Isamic project or renaissance aims at iberating Musim and

rom a orms o oreign domination and at reorming governments in Isamic

countries and estabishing “Isamic” reedom and democracy.

d. Fear o reprisal: The Musim Brotherhood has a precarious ega position,

or it is sti treated as a “banned” group. This position puts it at the mercy o

the Egyptian regime, which oten cracks down on groups with ties to the United

States. The Egyptian regime doesn’t want anyone taking to the Americans behind

its back, i at a.

Prospects o dialogue

The impediments mentioned above woud seem to precude a diaogue be-

tween the United States and the Musim Brotherhood. But the need or the UnitedStates and the Musim Brotherhood to tak with each other may prove greater than

a existing impediments. It is true that the ideoogica dierences between the

United States and the Musim Brotherhood are unbridgeabe, but se-interest may

eave much to tak about. Sti, any uture diaogue woud remain unikey un-

ess a ew things happen rst. One is that the United States woud need to tak to

the Egyptian regime about its repression o the opposition, incuding the Musim

18 Ibid.




Brotherhood. Another is that the United States shoud acknowedge – yet again

– that democracy may bring the Isamists to power. Aso, the United States woud

have to distance itse somehow rom Israe, or no Isamic group woud want to

associate itse with Israe’s ater ego.

The United States has two reasons to tak to the Musim Brotherhood: (1) it

knows that the Musim Brotherhood is a ikey poitica aternative in the event o a

“sudden” power vacuum deveoping in Egypt, and (2) an improvement in U.S. re-

ations with the Musim Brotherhood may soten the view that other Isamists have

o the United States. So ar,

there seems to be three pos-

sibe channes or taks be-

tween the United States and

the Musim Brotherhood:

1. U.S. ocias can actuay meet with Musim Brotherhood pariamentar-

ians, which is aready happening, but a interaction can occur on a more

reguar basis. This is because the U.S. Congress can, or exampe, invite

Egyptian pariamentarians, incuding Musim Brotherhood members, or

an ocia visit.

2. U.S. academic institutions and think tanks may engage in diaogue with

Musim Brotherhood ocias. This is something that Musim Brotherhood

eaders wecome, but it can ony happen i the regime reaxes restrictions

on Musim Brotherhood trave.

3. The United States may exert pressure on the Egyptian regime into egaiz-

ing the Musim Brotherhood. This may sound ike a ta order, considering

the regime’s resistance to “intervention” in interna aairs. But the UnitedStates can argue that the Musim Brotherhood is aready in Pariament and

is a peaceu movement.

‹end part ›

“The United States has two reasons to talk

to the Muslim brotherhood.”



8 Arab Insight

Q: How does the Musim Brotherhood see the United States?

Al-Iryan:

This question can be answered on three eves. The rst eve is the way the

Musim Brotherhood sees the U.S. government. We beieve that the United

States embraces a pre-conceived idea, one that successive administrations

have embraced, to the eect that “Isam is a rea danger.” This idea is being

transated into a strategy that the United States is currenty pursuing with

regard to the Musim word. Thereore, I don’t think that there is any chance

o communicating with the United States so ong as it has this pre-conceived

idea, or this idea puts it in the same boat as the Zionist enemy – Israe. The

second eve is in reation to the Musim community in the United States.

Here, one can say that there are two main options or communication. One

is through Musim activists, such as the Musim-American Society, which has

recenty been estabished by some Pakistanis. The society used to be an arm

o the Pakistani Isamic Group, but has recenty become independent. We are

hoding consutations and coordinating with this group, but this is not tak-

ing pace on an organizationa eve because this woud be inconvenient or

both o us. The other option is to communicate with the rest o the Musim

community in America and earn more about their aairs. The third eve has

‹begin part 2 ›

Interiew with Dr. Issam al-Iryan

Chie o the Muslim brotherhood PoliticalDepartment

Conducted by Khalil al-Anani, Feb. 2, 2007




to do with the U.S. media. Since Sept. 11, there has been a growing interest

in the Isamists and especiay the Musim Brotherhood. Athough U.S. media

ocuses more on domestic aairs, I have been interviewed repeatedy by U.S.

networks, incuding CNN. The U.S. view o this region is quite negative, un-

ike Europe which has a more impartia outook, mosty because it is a cosmo-

poitan society.

Q: Concerning U.S. society and peope, how do you see them?

Al-Iryan:

We have no pre-conceived position against the American peope or the U.S.

society, its civic organizations, or think tanks. We have no probem commu-

nicating with the American peope, but no adequate eorts are being made to

bring us coser.

Q: Does this mean that you’re in avor o unocia communication with the

United States?

Al-Iryan:

Yes, there is no probem with unocia communication conducted through

non-governmenta organizations or think tanks, and the Musim Brotherhood

doesn’t have any reservations in this respect. We are uy prepared to com-

municate with any unocia U.S. organizations and to accept invitations we

may receive in this regard.

Q: What do you think o U.S. civiization?

Al-Iryan: It is dicut to speak o a civiization in the usua sense when taking o a

country that’s no more than 200 years od. Even assuming it is a civiization,

it is one that was born out o excusionist tendencies and through the eradica-

tion o the Native Americans. It is aso a ‘materiaistic’ civiization based on the

twin piars o money and power.

Q: How about U.S. ibera vaues, don’t they oer a democratic mode worthy o

respect?



20 Arab Insight

Al-Iryan:

Pease excuse my candor, but democracy in the United States is a mere açade.

It is hard to speak o a U.S. mode o democracy which is comparabe with

that o the United Kingdom, France and Germany. There is a big dierence.

The U.S. eections are a commercia phenomenon repete with media cam-

paigns designed to ater pubic perceptions. For exampe, there are not equa

opportunities or the candidates, because the massive campaign expenditure

is beyond the abiities o any ordinary individua. Besides, the ibera vaues

have ebbed since the 1960s and there is nothing appeaing anymore about the

American mode which – i you ask me – is hard to repicate esewhere any-

way. It is a mode based on “manuacturing poiticians,” or as Noam Chomsky

pointed out, the Americans don’t choose according to what they want, but

to what they see. The worst part about U.S. democracy is that it is a “oca”

democracy with no interest in oreign aairs. The American peope cannot

determine their country’s oreign poicy, or this is the job o the edera gov-

ernment.

Q: But the U.S. society is a muti-ethnic one and as such oers inspiration to

others.

Al-Iryan:

I beg to disagree. The U.S. view o others is negative, unike the European

view, which is more cosmopoitan.

Q: But America is a cosmopoitan society.

Al-Iryan:

Yes, but it is a “oca” rather than an externa cosmopoitan society. Americanoreign poicy has one dimension rather than many dimensions and visions.

Q: How does Israe t into your view o the United States?

Al-Iryan:

One o the main reasons or our negative opinion o the United States is its ties

with Israe. Israe wi remain a dening actor in our reations with the United

States. ‹end part 2 ›



THE PARTICIPATION OF ISlAMIC PARTIES in the democratic process in Arab

countries is one o the centra issues in discussions about democracy that are taking

pace among the region’s promoters o democracy, as we as within Arab capitas

and in academia. For decades, Isamists were excuded rom participating in state

institutions or chose not to do so. Internationa actors and advocates o democracy

aike did not avor the incusion o Isamists and did nothing to encourage their

participation. The United States, with its ong history o intervention in the region

and riendy reations with many o the Arab regimes, as we as vita interests at

stake, has generay opposed the participation o the Isamists in the democratic

process in the ear that they wi gain contro o their respective governments. “Thearger the Ageria scenario ooms in American poicymakers’ minds as the night-

mare to be avoided at a costs, the more U.S. poicy is parayzed; recacitrant Arab

eaders are quick to see this,” wrote Tamara Coman Wittes, a research eow or

the Saban Center or Midde East Poicy at the Brookings Institution, in 2004. The

prevaiing wisdom behind this rejection is that Isamists were thought to oppose

American interests in the region. This ear deepened ater the Sept. 11 attacks, and

the mistaken inkage between Isam and terror became stronger.

Paradoxicay, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks opened the eyes o democracy pro-moters, incuding those in the United States, to the dangers that autocratic regimes

Alone at the ballot box:

U.S. Democracy Promotion and Rejection o Islamists

atef abou saif Ate Abou Sai has a Ph.D. rom the European University Institute in Florence in Italy.

He is a regular contributor to several Palestinian and other Arabic language newspapers

and journals.

2



22 Arab Insight

pose to internationa security. Many poicy-makers and oreign observers have

come to beieve that bad poicies, poor economies, under-deveopment, and cosed

poitica systems are the best circumstances or recruiting young terrorists. In ight

o this, absence o democracy was identied as a threat to American security and

to American interests abroad.

On the other hand, Isamists have become more interested in running in poiti-

ca eections. They reaize that in the post-Sept. 11 era, cards are stacked against

Musim movements. The

best way to avoid interna-

tiona anger is to gain egiti-

macy through eections. In

many countries, they have

done so. It remains true,

however, that Isamists rep-

resent the ony viabe opposition orce in undemocratic regimes. Finay, there is a

growing reaization that true democratization in the Arab countries cannot happen

without the incusion o Isamist poitica parties.

However, this reaization has not been uy transated into poicies. The Unit-

ed States, or exampe, sti opposes the integration o the Isamists in democratic

processes. A arge number o Isamist organizations remain incuded on the State

Department’s ist o “terrorist” groups. The undamenta mistake by American po-

icy-makers is assuming that any and every Isamist group is inherenty vioent or

a-Qaida-oriented.

The American rejection o the Isamists adds to the negative perception o U.S.

poicies in Arab countries and esewhere, and discourages any possibiity o orging

true democratic processes in a region that has ong suered rom autocracy and

the absence o basic reedoms. Tak about Isam’s incompatibiity with the require-

ments o modernity, the instrumenta use o democracy by the Isamists, and theopposition o Isamist-ed governments to internationa conventions, a add to a

deteriorating image o democracy in the region. In the eyes o the Arab community,

the worst among those promoting democracy is the United States.

The oowing anaysis considers the U.S. rejection o Isamist groups in three

specic countries to refect a genera picture o American poicy in the region.

Thus, lebanon, Egypt and Paestine wi be the oca point o the discussion. Be-

sides Syria and Jordan, these three countries constitute one regiona unit very much

at the heart o the Arab-Israei confict. Syria and Jordan have been excuded romthe anaysis within this essay or a ew key reasons. First, oreign poicymaking in

“The American rejection o the Islamists

adds to the negatie perception o U.S. poli-

cies in Ara countries and elsewhere.”



Alone at the Ballot Box 23

Jordan is not o the mandate o the government, but rather that o a very power-

u constitutiona monarchy, and any change in the government wi not bring a

radica change to Jordan’s internationa or regiona poitics. Second, the Isamists’

participation in the Syrian eections is not a reevant question as democracy and

eections are not issues there. Contrary to this, in the three countries under scru-

tiny, Isamists participated and managed to secure some success in the eections.

In one country they became part o the government (lebanon), in another they

ormed by themseves the rst pure Isamist cabinet in the Arab word (Paestine),

and in the third, they constitute one-ourth o the Pariament and are ikey to in-

crease their presence in the coming eections (Egypt). More important, in the three

countries examined beow, the incusion o Isamists is expected to bring about at

east a ew oreign poicy changes. In at east one o these countries, the changes

may be dramatic.

It is not accurate to characterize the American poicy toward democratization

in the Midde East as a genera U.S. rejection o Isamists in Arab poitica processes.

Instead, I propose here that the U.S. poicies are better understood by studying the

context o each case separatey. The discussion shoud transcend the ubiquitous

arguments that there exists a cutura rejection o Isam, or that Isam “cashes”

with ibera systems, Western vaues or civiization. I wi imit this discussion to

the American position towards Hezboah in lebanon, the Musim Brotherhood in

Egypt, and Hamas in Paes-

tine. These three groups are

the most prominent Isamist

parties or movements in their

countries. Moreover, each

has some experience partici-

pating in recent eections.1

Hezbollah: a long history o rejection

The United States not ony rejects Hezboah as a poitica actor in the leba-

nese system, but it aso perceives the “party” as a target or potentia U.S. attacks.

Hezboah’s reations with the United States has receded rhetoric provocation. As

eary as 1983, 241 American Marines, participating in a mutinationa peace group

“From the ery eginning, Hezollah was

categorized as part o the axis o eil, which

now includes Iran and Syria.”

1 For instance, Isamic jihad did not participate in the genera eections in Paestine. Aso some jihadistmovements did not do so in Egypt.



24 Arab Insight

were attacked by a suicide bomber. The American Embassy in Beirut was bombed

in 1983 and 1984.2 In both cases, Hezboah was suspected o paying a roe. As

Danie Byman noted, ong beore Sept. 11, “Hezboah has caimed pride o paces

as the top concern o U.S. counterterrorism ocias.”3 This being said, it is not

possibe to detach the U.S. position toward the party rom the overa American

strategy in lebanon and the Midde East.

First, Hezboah is active in lebanese poitics. It represents a arge segment o

the country’s Shiite popuation. Athough Shiites are underrepresented in the Par-

iament when compared to two o the other argest groups, Christians and Sunnis

(Shiites have 27 seats compared to 64 or the Christians and 27 or Sunnis), their

participation in the poitica ie o

the country is vita.4 The Israei oc-

cupation o South lebanon contrib-

uted to the ascendance o the sect’s

roe given that the South is a strong-

hod o the Shiites. As Hezboah ed

the miitary resistance, the Israei

withdrawa rom the country gave momentum to the party’s interna poitica as-

pirations. less than ve years ater the Israei withdrawa, another poitica event

hit the country and has infuenced its poitics ever since. lebanese Prime Minister

Raq Hariri was assassinated Feb. 14, 2005, dividing the country into two arge

poitica camps: the March 14 coaition,5 and Hezboah-orchestrated opposition.

The turbuence in the lebanese poitica system has not gone unnoticed by the

United States.

Apparenty, the United States does not avor any change to the lebanese con-

essiona poitica system. Such changes, i they happen, woud mean more en-

gagement o Hezboah in the making and shaping o lebanese poicies. Whie the

“The staility o the Egyptian political

system means the security o the oil

supply through the Suez Canal.”

2 This is in addition to other actions that Hezboah was accused o organizing, such as the hijacking o TWA fight 847 and the death o an American Navy driver in 1985.

3 For exampe, Bush decared that any war against terrorism must incude Hezboah. Even some Ameri-can ocias ranked Hezboah as team A whie a-Qaida was considered part o team B among terroristorganizations. Danie Byman, “Shoud Hezboah be Next?” Foreign Aairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 54-5.

4 Shiites represent around 34 percent whie Sunnis represent around 20 percent o the popuation. Thetota Christian popuation stands at 36 percent; Druze, 8 percent; the remaining sma sects amount to 2percent. Figures are based on data provided in Ared B. Prados, “CRS Issue Brie or Congress: lebanon,”Congressiona Research Serv ice, updated June 8, 2006, 2, Tabe 1, http://pc.state.gov/documents/orga-

nization/68811.pd.5 The March 14 coaition was named or the date o a huge pro-Harari, anti-Syrian protest, caed the CedarRevoution, one month ater the saying o the popuar prime minister in 2005.




lebanese government handes their interna conficts careuy, earing the spread

o civi war ike those they have suered in the past, it is ikey that this confict

wi bring with it dramatic changes to the distribution o power within lebanese

institutions. Change is what the United States ears, and it is very much interested

in infuencing whatever changes do occur. I Hezboah ais to reaize its demands

and i Fouad Siniora’s government passes the test, this wi impact negativey on

the position o the party. The United States ceary supports the government’s re-

quest that Hezboah miitia must be integrated with the nationa army and that no

party hijacks the poitica uture o the country. This means that the party is not

permitted to open a war with Israe whenever it ikes.

Not surprisingy, the U.S. administration is supporting the March 14 coaition.

From the very beginning, Hezboah was categorized as part o the axis o evi,

which now incudes Iran and Syria. Syria and Iran are beieved to be the party’s

main suppier o arms and money, and thus its most infuentia sources or poicy-

making. Accordingy, the American war against the Iranian and Syrian regimes is

viewed as a war against Hezboah.

The United States woud preer that the lebanese government not be ead by

Hezboah aies or severa reasons. There is a growing concern in the Sunni Arab

word regarding the increasing roe o Shiites in Arab poitics. Neither the United

States nor countries ike Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gu countries a-

vor such a scenario. From the Sunni Arab perspective, Americans were mistaken in

empowering the Iraqi Shiites and disempowering their eow Sunnis. Obviousy,

the creation o a Shiite bet (composed o Iran, Iraq, northern parts o Saudi Ara-

bia, Kuwait, Qatar, as we as South lebanon) is not a positive deveopment in the

region’s poitics. America’s Sunni Arab aies are very aware o and sensitive about

the issue. Thus, the stabiity o the lebanese system is o regiona interest and an

American concern as we.

Equay important to the United States, Hezboah is part and parce not onyo lebanese poitica ie but aso o the Midde East confict. The roe o the party

in conronting Israe during the ast three decades gave the party popuarity out-

side lebanon. In the demonstrations in the streets o Cairo, Amman and Gaza,

the circuation o photos o Sayyid Hassan Nasraah, the secretary genera o the

lebanese Hezboah, were signs protest against American poicies in the region.6

6 In a survey conducted by Ibn Khadun Centre or Deveopment Studies in Cairo, Hassan Nasraah was

chosen rst in a ist o 20 pubic gures in the Arab word as the most popuar pubic Arab, Isamic andEgyptian gure. Avaiabe at http://www.eicds.org/engish/activities/programs/poproject.htm (accessedFeb. 2, 2007).



26 Arab Insight

The party’s suspected support or and nancing o the Paestinian resistance has

been a persistent compaint o U.S. poicy-makers. likewise, it proves the atter’s

accusation that the party breeds goba anti-Americanism.

Many Arabs beieve that the centra reason Americans have rejected Hezbo-

ah is because o the party’s roe in ghting Israe. The prevaiing sense in the Arab

word is that the ony common thread o American poicies in the region is the

protection o Israei security. It is thus not surprising that the majority o the Arab

popuation considers American hostiity towards Hezboah as part o American

support or Israe. The party understands this and uses it, as Hamas does, in its

media campaigns to accuse rivas o being backed by the American government.7

Furthermore, the aiure o the Israei war against Hezboah in 2006 was con-

sidered by the party a deeat o American infuence as we.8 To put it bunty,

America and Israe are two sides o the same coin. For instance, one party eader

beieves that America “wants to turn this country into a coony; a poitica, security

and miitary base.”

Utimatey, as the previous anaysis shows, the American rejection o Hezbo-

ah is inked to arger regiona and internationa poitics o which reations and po-

sitions towards neighboring countries rank as the most sensitive eements. Given

that, the oowing question deserves a careu attention. I Hezboah had engaged

in a peace dea with Israe, woud it remain perceived by Americans as a terrorist or-

ganization? Though many other conditions may be proposed by the United States,

it is beieved among the Arab inteectuas and citizens aike that a peace dea wi

be enough to move Hezboah rom the boc o enemies to that o riends.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: a sot rejection

Musim Brotherhood is one o the odest poitica opposition groups in Egypt.

Founded in 1928, the movement has managed to survive the ups and downs o its

reations with Egyptian regimes or neary eight decades. Though the movement’sinvovement with some vioent actions in the past is evident, currenty, it does

not seek to contro by orce. legay banned, it succeeded in winning 88 seats

out o the 454 seats in the 2005 pariamentary eections. The group’s reationship

with the United States has never been riendy despite some unconrmed reports

7 For exampe, Hezboah accuses the Siniora government o acting on the U.S. ambassador’s instructions. Am Saad-Ghorayeb, “In Their Own Words: Hezboah’s Strategy in the Current Conrontation,” Policy

Outlook, Carnegie Endowment or Internationa Peace, Midde East Program, Washington, D.C., January2007: 3.8 The U.S. considered the Israei war part o its “goba war on terrorism.”




about consutation or taks between American dipomats in Cairo and eaders o

the movement. Three concerns underie the U.S. rejection o the movement: stabe

reations between the United States and the Mubarak regime, the secure passage

o oi and suppies through the Suez and other trade routes, as we as the need or

overa regiona stabiity and peaceu reations with Israe.

Egypt is the argest Arab recipient o American aid. American aid to Egypt

amounts to around $2 biion annuay. In 2002, it reached $1.9 biion; in 2003,

$2.2 biion; and in 2004, it was $1.87 biion. O a o this aid, annua miitary

support is stabe at $1.3 biion.9 It is beieved that U.S. administrations have, or

many years, preerred to support riendy regimes in Egypt rather than gambe on

true and genuine eections that might bring up new eaders who are opposed to

American interests in the region. Thus, American endeavors to bring about demo-

cratic transormation in Egypt have never been wecomed by either the Isamic op-

position or the regime. Whie the Isamic opposition is aware that they wi not be

supported by the Americans even i they win eections, the Egyptian regime under-

stands that democratization eorts are simpy a poitica means to exert pressure

on the government to give up on certain regiona issues. Accusing Washington o

not being serious in its democracy eorts, the genera guide o the Brotherhood

wrote that the movement perceives the United States as the heir o the Western

coonization.10

A riendy undemocratic regime is better than a noisy democratic one. The

record o the United States in supporting regimes that are ar rom democratic is

teing in this regard: cases range rom latin America to the Midde East. Thus even

when the United States and other oreign democracy promoters show interest, they

imit their intervention to reorming the ruing Nationa Democratic Party, and

negect other existing poitica parties.

Notwithstanding this, one must not orget in a this anaysis that Egypt might

be a unique situation. Washington cannot and is not wiing to push or a seriousdemocratization o the argest Arab country and to toppe a regime that is one o

its aies in the region. Much o the security o the oi suppies depends on Egypt.

The stabiity o the Egyptian poitica system means the security o the oi suppy

9 Figures are aggregated rom Abed Monem Said Ay, “An Ambivaent Aiance: The Future o U.S.-Egyp-tian Reations,” Saban Center Anaysis, no. 6, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., January 2006: 33,Tabe 1.

10 See his artice in Arabic on the ocia website o the movement. A etter rom the Genera Guide Moha-mad Mahdi Ake, “Our Ca between the Originaity o the Thought and the Honesty o the Position,”http://www.ikhwanonine.com/Artice.asp?ID=13234&SectionID=210 (accessed on Jan. 20, 2007).



28 Arab Insight

through the Suez Cana. The United States may not be abe to accept a regime that

might backmai the internationa community by disrupting the passage o sup-

pies through the cana.

Furthermore, Egypt is the most infuentia Arab country in the discourse o the

Arab-Israei confict. The Musim Brotherhood opposed the Camp David Accords

between Egypt and Israe and opposes the normaization o reations between the

two countries. It might ca or suspension o the treaty when it contros the egis-

ature or even the presidency. This is not very ar rom the White House and State

Department thinking.

Nevertheess, the Brotherhood has never used this position to mobiize upris-

ings or riots in the cities. In the ast decade, the movement has instead ocused on

interna issues ike constitutiona reorm, civic rights, pubic reedoms and socia

services. Whie the movement opposes American poicies in the region and shares

the majority o the Arabs beie that the United States is not an honest broker in

the Midde East (and rather avors Israe), it does not portray Washington as an

enemy. In principe, it woud not reject an invitation coming rom Washington or

taks or consutations.

Aso, there is a growing concern in American circes on the need to reconcie

with the Isamists in Egypt. There is a good chance that they wi become part o

the government. On the other hand, encouraging the regime to crack down on

them wi harm the aready fawed image o the White House as an advocate or de-

mocracy. U.S. invovement wi be integra to encourage the movement’s peaceu

integration in the poitica system. Its integration wi push the movement toward

more pragmatism. In turn, this might ead the movement to be more modern and

fexibe in its treatment o internationa and interna issues. The Turkish Justice

and Deveopment Party wi serve as a mode or the preerred path o the move-

ment. But or this to happen, the eaders o the movement must not ee as though

they are excuded rom ega participation in the system.The American government wisey does not excude the possibiity that the

Musim Brotherhood may ascend to dominate Egyptian poitica ie. Athough the

American administration woud not wecome such an event, they wi be prepared

to dea with the new reaity i it happens. Undoubtedy, the Brotherhood move-

ment is the argest and most rooted Egyptian poitica opposition.

Thus, it woud not be surprising i the United States decided to engage in an

open diaogue with the movement on the uture o the country at some point. O

course, major issues ike reations with Israe, positions on the Camp David Ac-cords and perceptions about a asting soution to the Arab-Israei confict wi come




to the surace. The same questions that Hamas, the Paestinian wing o the Musim

Brotherhood, has aced, their Egyptian Brothers wi ace. Some argue that poiti-

ca issues and reations with Israe wi not be o much importance or the Musim

Brotherhood. Keeping their regime together wi be much more important.

Hamas: conditions frst

There are no other Isamic movements in the Arab countries that have aced

as much pressure as Hamas. Now dominating the Paestinian legisative Counci

ater the January 2006 eections, Hamas ormed the rst pure Isamic government

in the Arab word. Emerging in 1987, the movement gained an increased popuar-

ity in the Paestinian streets through its engagement in the nationa strugge against

the Israei occupation o Paestine. From the very beginning, Hamas opposed the

peace treaty between the PlO and Israe and denied the egitimacy o the Paes-

tinian Nationa Authority because it was estabished as a resut o the treaty with

Israe.

Though Washington abeed the movement as “terrorist” and ocia taks or

diaogue with the movement is egay prohibited, the U.S. administration has et

some o its ormer Centra Inteigence Agency (CIA) agents and dipomats meet

with representatives o Hamas. low-eve meetings took pace with Hamas in

1993; in eary 2004, an American convoy met secrety with the Hamas eaders in

Gaza; and in 2005, meetings between the two groups took pace in Beirut. Appar-

enty, Washington was exporing ways to tame the movement. This is what an Arab

writer sardonicay reers to as “containing and taming Hamas through its incusion

in everyday poitics.”11 According to one Hamas research center, the movement

was oered a roe in exchange or accepting the peace deas.

The main thrust o the U.S. rejection o Hamas is based on the atter’s use o

vioence against Israe – attacking civiians through suicide bombings, sheing the

Israei viages aong the border o the Gaza Strip with sma scae rockets. Hamashas never exported its actions outside the borders o mandated Paestine. It aways

emphasized that its ony enemy is Israe and that its main goa is to iberate the

homeand and estabish a state. Nevertheess, the movement does not use riendy

rhetoric in reerence to the United States, though it has never abeed it as an en-

emy. The U.S. position and its rejection o the movement were aways perceived by

Hamas sympathizers and within the arger Arab communities as one o the admin-

11 Moumin Bessisso, “ihtwa’ hamas syasian: iihan amrici” [Containing Hamas Poiticay: An American?],Islamonline.net, Oct. 27, 2005, http://www.isamonine.net/Arabic/poitics/2005/10/artice13.shtm.



30 Arab Insight

istration’s strategies to support and deend Israe. Most o the Paestinian resistance

movement, incuding the miitary wing o the Abbas-ed Fatah, A Aqsa Brigade,

are abeed “terrorist” by the State Department. In the words o another pubication

o the above-mentioned Hamas research center, the American rejection o Hamas is

another expression o the American rejection o Paestinian rights.

When suddeny, though expectedy, Hamas announced its intention to par-

ticipate in the nationa eections in January 2006, the United States opposed the

move. The United States expressed worries that what it abeed a “terrorist group”

woud be taking part in a

democratic process. It made

such participation conditiona

upon the movement denounc-

ing vioence. Ater an interven-

tion rom President Mahmoud

Abbas, Hamas was approved

to run candidates in the eec-

tions. At that time, nobody – incuding Hamas eaders – expected that the move-

ment woud dominate the majority o the legisative Counci. But it happened; the

diemma o the United States was that Hamas came to power through eections

that were supervised by the internationa community. Thus, the new government

is now ed by a group abeed by the U.S. government as terrorist.

Washington’s way out was orchestrating internationa sanctions against the

Hamas-ed government, starting with the cutting o o internationa oreign aid,

stopping dipomatic communication at a eves, and most importanty imposing

a set o conditions that the movement woud have to meet to have the sanctions

ited. The Quartet on the Midde East, composed o the United States, the Euro-

pean Union, Russia, and the United Nations, stipuated the three conditions to

Hamas. First, the movement must recognize the state o Israe. Second, it mustrenounce vioence as a means o poitica action. Third, it must accept the peace

treaties reached between the PlO and Israe. It was beieved that economic hard-

ships caused by the sanctions woud ead to socia upheavas and thus push the

government to change its position. During the 11 months o the Hamas-ed gov-

ernment, none o those conditions were accepted by the movement.12

It was beieved that Hamas woud not easiy give in and adhere to the interna-

tiona conditions. From the American perspective in this scenario, though it won

12 The government resigned on Feb. 15, 2007.

“When suddenly, though expectedly, Hamas

announced its intention to participate in

the national elections in January 2006, the

United States opposed the moe.”




the eections, Hamas was unabe to govern. In other words, Hamas was not thrown

out o the government because the United States wanted it, but rather because the

Isamic movement did not stand or quaity government. When internationa mon-

ey does not fow and when economic hardship makes peopes ives unbearabe,

then it is the government that must have the poitica skis to secure a better ie

or its popuace. From this perspective, the rst experience with an Isamic Arab

government was a big aiure. Moreover, it wi not be easy or other Musim par-

ties to caim that they can do better. These perceptions wi impact the preerences

o the voters. A previousy quoted pubication about Hamas writes that the United

States is not interested in the success o the Paestinian (democratic) experience,

which means “the success o a undamentaist Isamic state.” This, as the pubica-

tion proceeds, goes against American interests in the region.

On the other hand, i Hamas had accepted the internationa conditions, the re-

sut woud have been avorabe or the Americans. The acceptance woud have ed

to a pethora o changes in the movement’s poitica stands. The American experi-

ence in taming Hamas woud have set a precedent or taming other Isamic parties.

In other words, had Hamas accepted the conditions to recognize Israe, join the

peace process and denounce vioence, the Midde East confict and the reevant

questions woud not have remained obstaces in reation to other Isamist parties in

the neighboring Arab countries. Moreover, other non-Arab Isamic countries, Iran

in particuar, woud no onger have a reason to intervene in the region. Ater a, no

one can be more Cathoic than the Pope.

Despite Hamas’ seeming reusa to consider the internationa demands, the

movement has graduay moved towards imiting the goa o its strugge to estab-

ishing a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This change was documented in

the Nationa Consensus Initiative proposed by the prisoners and endorsed by the

movement. As Khaid Haroub argues ater reading three main recent documents

o the movement, it was a considerabe departure rom their origina position.Though they did not meet the conditions, the movement reached a point where

interests undering those conditions were met: basicay accepting a two-state sou-

tion. In the Mecca Agreement on a nationa unity government, concuded on Feb.

8, 2005, Hamas impicity accepted the estabishment o a state on the West Bank

and Gaza Strip adjacent to the state o Israe.

Values versus interests

The U.S. rejection o the Isamic poitica parties in the three countries dis-cussed refects a genera pattern. In each o these three countries the issue o se-



32 Arab Insight

curity and poitica stabiity is the rst priority or the U.S. administrations. The

preerences o the Isamists are aso inked to regiona security issues incuding the

Midde East confict (Hamas, Hezboah and to a esser extend Musim Brother-

hood) and oi suppies (Musim Brotherhood), which expains in part the admin-

istration’s hesitation in accepting the democratic incusion o the Isamists. Ironi-

cay, these are the same reasons behind the Isamists’ ack o trust in the American

poicies in the region.

In essence, the United States

proved ready in certain moments

to cooperate with Isamist parties

when it satised its interests. The

ormer Iraqi Prime Minister Ibra-

him Jaari, coming rom the A

Dawa Isamist party, was backed

by the U.S. administration. Simu-

taneousy, Washington was expor-

ing ways to tame Isamists. Hamas and Hezboah participated in taks aongside

other Isamist parties, ormer CIA agents and ormer British dipomats in March

2005.13

I democracy in the region is vita to American nationa security, as Sept. 11

taught, then Isamist parties shoud be encouraged to join the poitica process. No

true democratization in the Arab word can take pace without the genuine partici-

pation o the Isamist parties. long years o oppression and imprisonment ed to

the growth o a strong Isamist network that ed vioent groups with supporters. To

counter that history, Isamists have to integrate into the poitica system and must

have u reedom to participate in state institutions.

Washington’s diemma is the meeting o two seemingy contradictory interests:

its own nationa security and the incusion o Isamists in regiona poitics. Aterneary one year in power, Hamas tes an interesting story rom which the United

States can earn. For instance, once in power, Isamist parties wi earn to behave

according to certain norms that secure the continuity o their regime in the inter-

nationa system. In other words, whie interna support matters or winning eec-

tions, externa actors, incuding reations with regiona and internationa actors

wi matter more once power is secured. This was evident in the essons earned by

“I democracy in the region is ital to

American national security, as Sept.

11 taught, then Islamist parties shoulde encouraged to join the political

process.”

13 The other two Isamic parties that participated are the lebanese Isamic Group (Sunni) and the PakistaniIsamic Group.




Hamas. However, it is notabe that unike the Paestinians, not a Arab countries

are dependant on externa aid, which the Hamas-ed government did not manage

to secure rom other sources. Nevertheess, when economic pressure became un-

bearabe, Hamas did not choose to give up the Cabinet and mandate independents

or technocrats to govern; rather it chose to bargain with what were or a ong time

its unquestionabe and sacred positions. These positions were associated with va-

ues such as hoiness, and, the state and reations with Israe. Hamas was advised

by many Arab inteectuas and anaysts to eave the government i these positions

were unbending.

However, the U.S. position toward the Arab-Israei confict and the unimited

support Israe enjoys rom Washington is worrying not ony or the Isamists but

aso or ibera Arabs as we. For instance, Washington recenty aunched a mas-

sive war and invaded an Arab country (Iraq) and seems ready to strike another

Musim country because o its attempt to acquire nucear capabiities (Iran). Ad-

ditionay, it supports Israe nanciay, miitary and dipomaticay despite Israe’s

reusa to adhere to many UN Security Counci resoutions, its occupation o the

and o three Arab countries, and its acquisition o nucear capabiities. Summariz-

ing a view expressed in the Arab press, Marina Ottaway concuded that the eorts

exerted by Washington cannot be taken seriousy uness it renews eorts to bring

the peace process in the Midde East back on track.

In a simiar vein, the presence o the American troops in Iraq and the rag-

mentation o the country harms the American image, incuding its credibiity as a

poitica partner and as an advocate or democracy. In sum, Washington has to be

more sensitive to the poitica issues that concern the Isamic parties and toward

the Arabs in genera.

Finay, Washington’s position on the participation o the Isamists in demo-

cratic ie in the three countries has to be considered careuy. As much as de-

mocratization has an externa dimension, it is an interna process when it is donewe. Washington’s intererence in the detais o the democratic process, and in

particuar its support o one party whie attacking the others (Isamists), harms

the process itse. On the other hand, Isamists and iberas aike must ee that the

United States is honest in its support or democratization and that it is not a oreign

poicy too used to bring American riends to power.

In this regard, the United States shoud consider the disarmament o Hezbo-

ah as an interna lebanese issue, and that achieving disarmament is inked to

setting peace agreements between Israe, Syria and lebanon. By so doing, Wash-ington can transorm Hezboah into just one more lebanese poitica raction,



34 Arab Insight

according to Byman. Simiary, Washington must not interere in the detais o

Paestinian poitics. Interna tension between Hamas and Fatah wi bring the two

movement’s position coser, as was apparent during the negotiations at Mecca. The

United States must end credit to its desire to bring democracy to the region by

demonstrating poitica wi. likewise, incusion o the Musim Brotherhood in the

Egyptian system shoud be seen positivey. It wi hep in changing the movement’s

positions towards goba and regiona issues. Isamist groups do not deny the uni-

versaity o the ibera vaues; they do ee uneasy, however, ike the majority o

their eow Arabs, in accepting the universaity o American interests. Vaues can

buid common interests, but not vice versa.



THE UNITED STATES DID NOT COME TO IRAQ with the goa o achieving

democracy and guaranteeing human rights. Rather, its occupation o the country

was the resut o regiona and internationa motivations, goas, and interests de-manded by its oreign poicy ocused on securing soe goba eadership. It sought

to secure its poitica, economic, and strategic interests that woud ensure its rue

over the word and dominance over internationa reations in combination with

their interest in oi and the security o Israe. In addition to these motivations were

the mistakes and crimes committed by Saddam Hussein that oered a pretext or

and created conditions aowing the United States to reach its goas; it expoited

the regime’s mistakes and empoyed them to meet its aims. Now, the occupation o

Iraq has created a massive poitica vacuum that must be ed, and so the UnitedStates can neither overook the opposition parties outside Iraq nor the various

components o Iraqi society and its infuentia orces.

When the United States was examining the opposition orces that coud the

poitica vacuum created ater the ouster o Saddam, it coud not ignore the Shiites

in the South, who orm 65 percent o the popuation and whom they abandoned

in 1991. Yet, it coud not hide its apprehension about estabishing a regime con-

troed by the Shiites – whose eadership ived in Tehran – and the act that a Shiite

regime woud have cose ties with Iran. This is the source o its ear o the Shiites,whom the United States views as being tied to Iranian intervention and which

Trial and Error:

Washington and Iraq’s Shiite

ibrahim said al-baydaniDirector o the Strategic Center or Research and Studies. Baghdad, Iraq

35



36 Arab Insight

coud utimatey end with the estabishment o a reigious state.

The new poitica situation in Iraq requires recognition o the injustice and

oppression Shiites in Iraq have been subjected to, incuding the despotic measures

imiting their participation in government and banning some reigious rituas. This

situation has ed the Shiites to seek a greater roe or the Naja seminary in the

new Iraq. This institution hods an infuentia position in the ie o Iraqi citizens

and has enjoyed the support and mobiization o Iraqi communities in the South

and the centra Euphrates region.

Decision-makers in the United States

have been orced to acknowedge its

important position or the major-

ity o Iraqi citizens. In addition, it

is necessary to note that the Shiites’

roe in modern Iraq has a nationa

basis and has not been isoated rom

other movements in Iraqi society – it has had not a sectarian hue, but rather a

nationa character.

The United States appears uneasy about a Shiite eadership roe in Iraq’s po-

itica process given its ear o an Iranian roe in post-Saddam Iraq. U.S. ocias

beieved that major reigious and ethnic orces in the country were characterized

by a ack o trust and sometimes hatred or the other caused by years o oppression

by Saddam’s regime. The United States was thus prepared or the depoyment o

internationa orces in the regions where vioence was expected to break out. In

act, it did not hide its concern that a neighbor (Iran) might seek to gain contro o

certain areas in the north and south o Iraq.

Iran may be acing thorny issues in deaing with post-Saddam Iraq. On the one

hand, Iran views the a o Saddam as deiverance rom a despotic regime opening

new horizons or Shiite expansion. Iran aso beieves that a reigious state modeedon its own may be estabished in Iraq, given Shiite eectora dominance. On the

other hand, Iran is worried about other consequences, such as the seminary in

Naja regaining the reigious position it ost due to persecution experienced under

the rue o Saddam. The re-emergence o the seminary in Naja wi weaken the

infuence that Iran enjoyed over Shiites around the word thanks to its seminary in

Qom. Furthermore, some Shiite schoars avor the reviva o an Arab eadership or

the Shiite reigious authority in Iraq.

We cannot, thereore, deny the reaity o Iranian motivations and interests re-ated to intererence in the Iraqi situation. These motivations are connected to

“The new political situation in Iraq

requires recognition o the injustice

and oppression Shiites in Iraq haeeen sujected to.”



Trial and Error 37

Iran’s poitica and reigious roe in the eadership o the word’s Shiites. At the

same time, however, the Shiites in Iraq cannot be treated as though they are ony

ed by Iranian infuence.

Approaching secular Shiites

The ormation o the governing counci and interim government in Iraq stirred

up doubts and accusations due to its sectarian approach. The process took into con-

sideration the socia, ethnic, and sectarian composition o Iraqi society and might

bear positive resuts through the creation o an opportunity or coexistence, dia-

ogue and coective eorts. However, the ear is that it wi become a set approach

in the poitica process, excuding competent nationa payers and causing poitica

and nationa probems. The ormation o the governing counci was appropriate

or the interim period, athough the country sti remains in the throes o a rebirth,

as an appropriate mechanism or rue has not yet been estabished. Athough the

ormation o the rst government did not entirey refect the reaity o society, it did

express the incumbent necessities o the transition period. However, it aso created

a tense baance, and did not represent a strong, cohesive government.

The ack o U.S. support or an Isamist Shiite eadership is evidenced by its

attempts to nd a secuar Shiite aternative. The United States seected Iyad A-

awi as the rst head o an Iraqi government oowing the tria experience o the

governing counci. A White House spokesperson commenting on his seection as

the head o the Iraqi government stated that Aawi was undoubtedy a good eader

and enjoyed wide support among Iraqis.

Whie news agencies were reporting the seection o Aawi as prime minister,

British newspapers were discussing his reationship with the American and Brit-

ish inteigence agencies. Among these was The Independent, which suggested that

Aawi’s mission woud be to convince Iraqis and the word that the occupation

had ended despite the presence o thousands o American sodiers in Iraqi territory.The mission woud aso be to try to convince other states that he woud ead an

independent government, a dicut eat given his reationship with American and

British inteigence. The newspaper stated that his strong ties to the West might

weaken his reputation among Iraqis, though he may have been seected as prime

minister to secure a baance between domestic Iraqi parties – whether within Shiite

society or even with the Sunnis – who et marginaized at that time.

The United States paced its bets on the secuar Aawi in order to contain the

rising infuence o the Shiite reigious cerics. The seection o Aawi came oow-ing its aiure with Ahmed Chaabi. The United States tried to use Aawi as a bridge



38 Arab Insight

to buid a reationship with the supreme Shiite reigious authority, a-Sistani, but

this attempt aied due to a-Sistani’s wariness about deaing with Aawi and his

American protectors.

This context o poitica activity certainy refected on Aawi’s poitica roe

and perormance. Aawi retained his position among Iraqi citizens and became an

important choice in the Iraq arena; his party was abe to garner an impressive 40

seats in the Nationa Assemby. Aawi’s poicies eventuay estranged him rom the

majority o Shiites, and contrary to expectations that he woud make urther gains

in the December 2005 eections, Aawi ost ground.

The American agenda aso refected on Aawi’s perormance. The United States

has deat extremey severey with the Sadrist movement during its conrontations

in Naja, as it considers the poitica and miitary agenda o Muqtada a-Sadr to be

a major chaenge to its overa strategy. For strategic purposes – in the context o

imiting Iranian infuence and the reigious authority in Naja – Aawi moved to

orm an aiance with the Baathists and Sunni reigious orces. This isoated him

rom infuence in Shiite circes, bady hurting him in the December 2005 eections,

and weakening the overa trend o secuar Shiism, the United States’ preerred

choice.

The path chosen by Aawi oowing the announcement o the eection resuts

cannot be separated rom the assumption that they were disappointing to the Unit-

ed States. Aawi ed a oca and internationa campaign questioning the eection

resuts and ormed the Maram boc, which rejected them. He reappeared on the

scene rst as part o the nationa reconciiation program, then in the Nationa Se-

curity Counci, and then as opposition to Ibrahim a-Jaaari, assuming eadership

o the new government, and nay caing or the ormation o a nationa savation

government. The goa behind a o these positions was weakening the Shiite roe

in the upcoming government and bypassing the eection resuts. This was a cear

expression o U.S. hatred o the Isamists and their unwiingness to support a re-igious Shiite eadership.

In response to the resuts gained by the United Iraqi Aiance in the January

2005 eections, ormer U.S. Deense Secretary Donad Rumsed downpayed ears

o Iranian infuencing spreading in Iraq. He expicity stated that the Shiites in Iraq

were Iraqis, not Iranian, and brushed aside concerns that a reigious government

modeed on Iran’s was ikey to appear. His opinion was supported by Vice Presi-

dent Dick Cheney, who said that there was no justication or the American ear

that the Iraqis woud embark on something that did not meet American approva.Despite the resuts o the January 2005 eections and the Shiites’ advance, the



Trial and Error 39

United States considered Iraqi citizens’ engagement with democracy to be a cha-

enge to terrorism and an important step towards opposing the ideoogy o extrem-

ism and hatred. It was seen as a chaenge to the approach adopted by a-Zarqawi

and the Takris, who decare their enemies to be unbeievers, and an opportunity

to buid a unied, democratic Iraq.

Secretary o State Condoeezza Rice expressed comort with the emergence o

the Shiites in Iraq because they represent the majority o the popuation and had

ong been oppressed. However, she did not hide her ear that Shiite dominance

in government – as a resut o their overwheming victory in the January 2005

eections – might refect on the ormuation o the new Iraqi constitution and its

reiance on Isamic aw, which she views as imiting women’s rights. She stressed

her country’s support o women’s rights in the countries o the Midde East and the

Isamic word.

The United States was unabe to contro Iraq without accepting the Shiites,

who orm the greatest orce in Iraqi society. Athough the Shiites did not generay

empoy conrontation or direct rejection o the Americans ater the occupation

became reaity, the position o the Shiites is predominatey one o dissatisaction

with the American presence. The reigious authority has urged oowers to em-

brace negotiations, diaogue, and peaceu demonstrations with the goa o hod-

ing eections – an approach ed

by a-Sistani. As or the Sadrist

movement, the other wing o

the Shiites and a arge and im-

portant one, it has empoyed an

approach and rhetoric rejecting

the oreign presence in Iraq.

It was driven to conront the

Americans by their poicy’s reiance on oppression and vioence, the reaizationthat the United States was working to imit Shiite power, and because the United

States aied to provide security or the Shiite community. Thus, the Shiites’ disap-

pointment grew and their negative responses to the American presence increased.

Athough sectarianism is not the primary probem acing Iraq, it woud be

a mistake to ignore the sectarian spit present throughout its history. The Shiites

were excuded under Ottoman rue, which paced a Sunni poitica eite in power.

This situation continued even oowing the a o the Ottoman state and Britain’s

occupation o Iraq. The Sunni poitica eite maintained eadership o Iraqi societywhie the Shiites suered rom persecution unti 2003. It can be said that the dier-

“The Shiites’ disappointment grew and

their negatie responses to the American

presence increased.”



40 Arab Insight

ences between the Shiites and Sunnis are poitica more than they are reigious and

sectarian. They are aso infuenced by the nature o poitica regimes and regiona

and internationa confict and competition. Thus, the change that took pace in

2003 aowed the Shiites to search or an opportunity they had ong been denied.

The deep-rooted change in the nature o rue in 2003 and the Sunnis’ sense that

they ost the power they had enjoyed or centuries has thus been refected in the

poitica, socia, and sectarian reaity in Iraq.

The sectarian orientation has grown signicanty and rapidy since the bomb-

ing o one o the Shiite’s hoiest

shrines in Samara on Feb. 22, 2006.

There is no denying that there was a

strong Shiite response to this crimi-

na act which targeted the core o

their beies and symbos. However,

it must be said that there is a cear

escaation in the amount and type o vioent acts and kiing that have taken on a

sectarian hue or been executed under extremist sectarian sogans. The Americans,

in their capacity as the occupying state hoding a the cards, choices, and power,

have neither been abe to stop the vioence nor grant the government the actors

and conditions that woud enabe it to bring security.

In its discourse on Iraq, the American government has attempted to avoid the

phrase “civi war” in describing the current environment in the country. The reason

or this may be poitica motivations, or a civi war woud weaken the American

pubic’s support or the war in Iraq. Yet, it appears as i this characterization is now

unavoidabe. The term “civi war” has become widey used in American newspa-

pers such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times, as we as on NBC. More-

over, the years 2006 and 2007 witnessed a signicant rise in sectarian vioence.

Bi Keer, executive editor o the New York Times, said that it was dicut to arguethat the generay accepted denition o civi war coud not be appied to the situa-

tion in Iraq. Gen. John Abizaid, ormer commander o the U.S. Centra Command,

tod members o the Senate Armed Forces Committee Aug. 3, 2006, that sectarian

vioence in Iraq – and Baghdad in particuar – had become the worst vioence Iraq

had ever seen. He warned that i the vioence did not stop, Iraq woud head into

civi war.

The Sunni Arab states’ actorThe American position towards the Shiites o Iraq is infuenced by that o

“The American position towards the

Shiites o Iraq is inuenced y that

o Sunni Ara states.”



Trial and Error 4

Sunni Arab states. There is a great dea o debate in Jordan over the issue o “Shi-

acation” with the presences o thousands o Iraqi Shiites in Jordan, the regiona

poitica ocus on the Iranian-Syrian axis, and Arab ear o Iranian infuence in

Iraq and the Arab countries. Athough the issue o “Shiacation” remains imited,

Jordanians view it with concern. Newspaper reports point out that the Jordanian

security agencies have not conceaed their ear o this phenomenon. Moreover, the

Jordanian pubic seems to disapprove o the Iranian poicy towards Iraq, Iranian

sectarian intererence in Iraq and Iran’s support o Shiite miitias. Sources have be-

gun to speak o Jordanian-Saudi coordination in opposing aeged Iranian support

o the miitary wing o the Supreme Counci o the Isamic Revoution in Iraq, the

Badr Organization, and the Da’wa Party. Testimonies by Iraqi ocias and pubic

gures such as Aawi, Hazim a-Shaaan, Faah a-Naqib, Ayham a-Samarie, and

members o the Iraqi Nationa Diaogue Front and the Board o Musim Cergy,

have contributed to Jordanian ears and concerns. Countries have agreed to coor-

dinate their positions with regard to the so-caed rising Iranian infuence in Iraq.

The statements o the Saudi oreign minister, Saud a-Faisa, and his attack on the

Shiites and support o the Sunnis can be read within this ramework. This new

coordination incudes Washington, as they encourage U.S. ocias to hep counter

Shiite and Iranian infuence in Iraq.

The supreme eader o Iran, Ayatoah Ai Khamenei, has accused the United

States o provoking sectarian strie between Sunnis and Shiites. In a Friday sermon

deivered in Tehran in October 2006, he stressed that the United States wanted the

Sunnis and Shiites to ki each other. Surey, Khamenei does not want to u the

United States’ accusation that Iran oering support to Shiite miitias. Yet in any

case, the exchanged accusations are in act among some o the most important and

sensitive issues and have become infuentia in the Iraqi arena.

However, there are severa reasons that may drive the Americans to think about

withdrawa, incuding the ever-rising nancia and human cost to their presence inIraq. These costs have paced a burden on the American economy and may muti-

py the expected edera decit over the next 10 years. These numbers ony ue the

increasing doubts over the continuing presence and activity o U.S. armed orces in

Iraq. In addition, the arge-scae American presence in the country is aecting the

United States’ abiity to make important decisions on other signicant issues. A o

these actors have put increasing pressure on both the Repubicans and Democrats

in U.S. Congress to withdraw rom Iraq. It is beieved that even a partia with-

drawa may contribute to improving the situations in Iraq and America.The United States, thereore, has two choices beore it. The rst is a partia,



42 Arab Insight

tactica withdrawa that aows the Americans to maintain their presence in the

country, but with ess eort and cost. The second is to buid permanent miitary

bases in Iraq that meet their needs. Either scenario may require the aid o an Iraqi

government, possiby an Isamist Shiite one, stoking American concerns.

The United States beieves that wide-scae participation by Sunni Arabs in

the poitica process is necessary to ensure that the country is in act democratic.

In a speech given on Dec. 20, 2005, in Washington, D.C., U.S. Nationa Security

Adviser Steve Hadey stated that “there is growing recognition that aiure is not an

option in Iraq,” and that deeat in Iraq woud create a “sae haven or the terrorists”

in a country with vast natura resources that coud be used to und uture terror-

ist attacks. “There is growing recognition o the enormous benets o success in

Iraq,” he said. It wi deiver a decisive bow to the ideoogy that ues internationa

terrorism. A democratic Iraq wi serve as a beacon o iberty, inspiring democratic

reormers throughout the Midde East.”

Hadey noted that the current consensus or an Iraq strategy is centered on

ve points: training o Iraqi security orces and subsequent transer o increased

security responsibiities; bringing Sunni Arab citizens into the poitica process;

supporting Iraqis as they review and amend their constitution so that it becomes a

nationa pact between various Iraqi groups; expanding the internationa commu-

nity’s support or and participation in rebuiding Iraq; and reocusing support or

reconstruction and economic eorts that woud create tangibe benets and jobs

or Iraqis.

Hadey aso said that the key to success in amending the constitution was to

make amendments that address the ears o the Sunnis without creating expecta-

tions. He added that the ast thing desired was or amendments or changes to take

pace that did not address the Sunnis’ ears and then or the Sunnis to withdraw

rom the poitica process. He stressed that this woud require rea statesmanship

rom the three communities, Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.This characterization is representative o American sentiments toward U.S.

poicy in Iraq. The United States strongy encouraged the Sunnis to participate in

the eections and even to orm a nationa unity government. Moreover, the United

States opened communication channes with the terrorists and began to reconsider

its terminoogy, exchanging “terrorists” or “insurgents.” It must be understood

that this reorientation aims to create a baance within the next Iraqi government

and imit the infuence and domination o Shiite poitica orces in the poitica

process during the coming stage. Athough the Baker-Hamiton report indicatesthe impossibiity o acceding to a the contradictory components o Iraqi society,



Trial and Error 43

and athough the rights o the Sunnis can be guaranteed even with armation o

the rights o the majority (the Shiites and Kurds), Bush has insisted on his strategy

or granting more room or the participation o Sunnis in the poitica process and

on deaing with extremists among both the Shiites and Sunnis. A o this comes

within the ramework o securing what wi be a tense baance – one that does not

aow the Shiites to dominate or hod the ony keys to the soution in Iraq.

Human rights is another indicator that the United States is careuy watch-

ing in Iraq, and adds another point to their genera dissatisaction with Isamist

Shiites. The 2006 Human

Rights Watch report or the

country stresses the dete-

rioration o human rights in

Iraq and points out the vioa-

tions committed by the joint

American-Iraqi orces during

the queing o terrorism and insurgency, especiay those that ed to the death o

civiians and vioations o the aws governing armed confict. The report states that

most o the caims concerning the mistreatment o detainees reate to the Iraqi

Deense Ministry orces and eements o other armed orces unctioning under its

command.

Bush has aso directed criticism towards the Shiites in his speeches. For ex-

ampe, in one speech, he said that “a country that divides into actions and dwes

on od grievances cannot move orward – and risks siding back into tyranny,” and

added that “we must ensure that the poice understand that their mission is to

serve the cause o a ree Iraq – not to address od grievances by taking justice into

their own hands.”1

In the new strategy announced by Bush at the start o 2007, he described the

issue o miitias as the most serious aspect to American poicy in Iraq, and pacedwhat he caed death squads and miitias on the same eve as terrorists. Since the

A-Jadriya sheter incident and unti today, there has been consistent pressure paced

on the Shiites and accusations against the response o some armed Shiite orces.

In addition, the arge majority o reconstruction programs and poicies un-

dertaken by the Iraqi government – which is argey controed by Isamist Shiite

parties – have aied. Reconstruction projects in Iraq over the ast three years have

1 Speech o U.S. President George Bush to the veterans o oreign wars, Jan. 10, 2006.

“The rights o the Sunnis can e guaranteed

een with afrmation o the rights o the

majority (the Shiites and Kurds).”



44 Arab Insight

been characterized by suggishness and ambiguity. The percentage o those actu-

ay executed is extremey imited; a Japanese study indicates that ony 5 percent o

a reconstruction projects have been executed. Yet, even this percentage does not

go entirey to reconstruction, as administrative corruption, spending, and oreign

wages skew the numbers urther. The most recent study by the Iraqi Ministry o

Panning shows that the costs o approved projects unti February 2005 came to

$2.5 bion, channeed through the United Nations and Word Bank unds and

biatera aid, in addition to a U.S. grant totaing $2.9 biion, taking the tota o

reconstruction aid up to $5.4 biion doars. There has been a controversy over

the administrative aid accompanying construction eorts that weren’t executed

and or which American ocias and Iraqi poiticians and administrators have

been bamed. There has aso been tak o the disappearance o biions o doars

whie the issue o security has bocked reconstruction, oering an opportunity or

continued piering.

Yet, some Americans view the Iraqi economy with optimism, maintaining the

beie that there are positive actors such as a stabe currency, an independent stock

market, a centra bank, an investment aw, and soid tax aws. Bush has described

the greatest chaenge acing Iraq as the reconstruction o its oi and eectricity in-

rastructure. He has promised to continue reconstruction eorts and to assist the

new government in appying reorms and instaing a modern economy. He has

aso caed on a states to return rozen Iraqi assets and has encouraged them to

orgive Iraq’s debt, in addition to oering oans and aid.

And thus, it is not ony the a-Jaaari and a-Maiki governments who are re-

sponsibe or both past aiures in rebuiding eorts and or uture rebuiding en-

deavors, but aso the United States, who – based on their actions – shoud share a

arge proportion o the bame and burden. Iraqi citizens have not et any positive

deveopments on the ground that can refect an improvement in ie, security, or

stabiity in Iraq.

Conclusions

• The Shiites have not succeeded in removing doubts o Iranian interer-

ence or o Iranian infuence on the programs o Isamist Shiite parties. Nor

have they succeeded in opening up an opportunity to cooperate with the

United States and buid bridges o condence with the country. The Unit-

ed States continues to ack condence that its interests might be served

with Isamist Shiite parties eading the poitica process. Moreover, theShiites have not been abe to show their cohesion and empoy pressure to



Trial and Error 45

guarantee American support o their poitica program in Iraq. They have

not been successu with ensuring security, whether due to their aiure to

obtain the necessary American support or to mobiize society in ghting

terrorism and strengthening the state’s miitary and security institutions.

Shiite poitica discourse has not risen to the eve o conronting cam-

paigns o doubt, rejection and chaenge. This has aected the American

position, which is concerned with disruptions within the ministry o the

interior. The United States has not granted the government the necessary

authority, and the issue o miitias has occupied the majority o concerns

in America’s pans or Iraq.

• The United States has not granted the Iraqi government the necessary au-

thority, and the issue o miitias has occupied the majority o concerns in

America’s pans or Iraq.

• The persistence o obstaces and aiures in Iraqi security is driving rea-

tions between the United States and the Shiites toward confict. The aiure

or success o the poitica arena in Iraq is pegged on soving the security

crisis. A new program or strategy concerning Iraq that doesn’t take into

consideration a na end to the vioence woud neither be deemed serious

nor succeed. In addition, another aiure o the eected government woud

be a setback in reations between the United States and the Shiites and

woud drive the Shiites to poitica and miitary conrontation. It woud

bring the American miitary presence into a new crisis possiby even more

serious than those the United States is now acing in Iraq.

• The continuation o vioence, sectarian strie, and crimina, terrorist acts

aows the dominance o miitias and radicas over the poitica arena andon the ground. In turn, this brings greater strie and the continuation o

kiings and assassination, thwarting the American strategy. Continued

aiure in Iraq wi push the country toward urther deterioration, strie,

and civi war. Encouraging the emergence o a poweru secuar poitica

orce – combined with an active U.S. presence in the country – remains a

choice and expectation. However, this wi not contextuaize through the

creation o crises, the pacing o obstaces, or the continuing spira o vio-

ence. Rather, it might come to be through the creation o an atmosphereo security, stabiity, and deveopment in the poitica process. Moreover,



46 Arab Insight

the secuar aternative that the United States wants to make a reaity in the

Iraqi poitica arena wi not necessariy appear through conrontation with

the Isamists who hod current power. The Isamist aternative, and par-

ticuary in the case o the Shiites in Iraq, carries broad infuence. It must

be deat with through new reaism and understanding that a united and

representative government can perorm a greater nationa roe, and coud

ead to the emergence and deveopment o a secuar Isamic orientation.

• The act that the American strategy pushes Iraq towards Iran makes Iraq

an arena or confict and competition between the two countries. It resuts

in the United States not having an amicabe approach towards the Shi-

ites in Iraq. The United States cannot reconcie the success o the Shiites

in Iraq with striking the Shiites in Iran. The expected miitary campaign

against Iran has driven the United States to pace pressure on the Shiites

in Iraq and mobiize Arabs against the so-caed Iranian infuence in Iraq.

And thus, Iraqi Shiites have become the victim o an Iranian agenda that

has not succeeded in its attempt to preoccupy and thwart the American

miitary presence in Iraq. They have aso become the victim o an Ameri-

can agenda aiming to sette a score with Iran and either bar its nucear

deveopment or change its poitica regime.

• The United States has raised the banners o human rights and democracy

and heraded the estabishment o a deveoped civi society in Iraq. These

buzzwords have taken up a great dea o space in the speeches o Bush and

other top U.S. ocias. The United States is thus obiged, on beha o its

ocias, the American pubic, and goba pubic opinion, to do what is

required to pace Iraq on the path to democracy.

• When compared to the current strategy o the U.S. administration, the rec-

ommendations provided by the Baker-Hamiton report and the congres-

siona Democrats regarding the schedue or withdrawa, granting the Iraqi

government sweeping security powers, and rejecting the ca or a “troop

surge,” as we as the ca or diaogue with the reigious authorities in

Naja and Muqtada a-Sadr, a appear more reaistic and ogica in deaing

with Iraq’s conditions and bringing about positive resuts eading toward a

soution that may open new horizons and a more reaistic view o IsamistShiites in Iraq.



IN THE 1990s, as the word came out o the Cod War era with its bipoar capitaist

and communist camps, a new type o internationa system began to emerge based

on economic, socia, and poitica cooperation instead o competitive, contentiousreations dominated by the arms race and the ormation o bipoar aiances. At

the same time, severa civi wars erupted, some threatening to become whoesae

regiona wars, in Arica, Asia and Europe. This internationa situation ostered the

emergence o new protest movements and strengthened others, particuary inside

nations experiencing probems in managing the poitica and civi rights o their

pubic. This incuded Arab countries, both in the levant and North Arica.

The emergence o protest movements, particuary reigiousy-based move-

ments that used Isam to egitimize their discourse, caed into question the egiti-macy o ruers. loca regimes were accused o corruption and an inabiity to meet

their citizens’ needs; on the oreign ront, they were accused o abandoning the

pioneering roe payed by Arab-Isamic civiization internationay, which, these

movements maintained, ed to the oss o Paestine and the occupation o Iraq.

The interna disorder in many Arab countries brought about by the rise o

reigious protest movements utimatey strengthened these movements’ position,

giving them the power to directy threaten the interests o Western states, whom

they hed responsibe or supporting authoritarian domestic orces. These move-ments began engaging in direct cashes both through armed attacks on Western

The Cold Emrace:

U.S. and Islamists in North Arica

dr. mohamed el-ghaliProessor o Political Science, al-Qadi ‘Ayyad University, Faculty o Law, Morocco

47



48 Arab Insight

interests and by mobiizing vounteers to ght in wars ed by Western nations in

Aghanistan, Iraq, Somaia and Chechnya.

This situation has given rise to a discourse o tota annihiation between these

reigiousy-based movements and Western nations – a discourse that reached its

peak during the administration o George W. Bush. The primary resut has been

the prevaence o a discourse o “insecurity,” which raises the question: how and

at what cost can we extricate ourseves rom this instabiity? It has been suggested

that the soution ies in opening a ine o communication between Western coun-

tries and moderate Isamist movements, which has ed the United States to view

some moderate Isamists, such as the Justice and Deveopment Party (PJD) in Mo-

rocco and the Isamic Action Front in Jordan, more positivey.

This paper wi address U.S. acceptance and rejection o Isamist movements

in Arab North Arica by attempting to address two themes:

Why has the United States accepted Isamist movements in some Arab states to

the excusion o others? What is the poitica cost o this acceptance?

Considering the ideoogica ramework o these movements, what are the stra-

tegic imits o America’s positive attitude towards the rise o some Isamist

movements? To what extent wi these movements engage the positive Ameri-

can stance?

This paper wi ocus on the PJD and the Justice and Spirituaity Group in Mo-

rocco, the Nahda (Renaissance) Party in Tunisia, and the Isamic Savation Front

(FIS) in Ageria.

The legitimacy o engaging with American acceptance

To examine American acceptance o Isamist movements, a major question

must rst be asked: to what extent does the discourse o Isamist movements en-gage and respond to American acceptance, i it exists?

The inteectua rameworks o Isamist movements in Arab North Arica, ike

their counterparts in the levant, are based on the we-known sources o Isamic

aw: the Quran, the Sunna (the Prophetic tradition), consensus and anaogy. The

dierent methodoogies o these groups and the way they transate these sources

into practice is what divides Saa trends rom socia movements, and radica rom

moderate or peaceu movements.

At rst gance, their shared Isamist discourse may ead us to put a thesemovements in one basket, but it is vita to distinguish how this discourse is used:

1.

2.



The Cold Embrace 49

does the discourse use the sources to ook or simiarities between these Isamic

movements and reaity (a conciiatory discourse)? Or, are the sources used in such

a way that reaity is obiged to adapt and conorm to the reigious ramework (the

conservative Saa discourse)? This is the primary criterion by which to distin-

guish the groups, and it wi hep us understand the wiingness o Isamist move-

ments to positivey engage with U.S. acceptance. Here we can distinguish between

the two types o discourses.

A. The conservative Salaf discourse

This coud aso be termed the discourse o absoute rejection. This discourse

is characterized by its rm adherence to precise, particuar interpretations o rei-

gious texts and its rejection o broader, more fexibe interpretations. Everything

outside o this particuar interpretation is considered sinu and is termed a harm-

u innovation, which is judged according to the Prophetic tradition: “Every in-

novation is misguidance and every misguidance is in he.” Reaity is shaped by

the conduct o individuas in the community o beievers, which must in turn be

subjected to the rue o the ega text.

This discourse portrays every disaster that has beaen the Isamic community

as a consequence o the community’s deviation rom the appication o Isamic aw

and as stemming rom the coonization o Arab states, or which the West bears

mora and nancia responsibiity. As such, rom the perspective o movements

that adopt this discourse, the confict with the West is not reducibe to modes or

method, but is at heart a confict between Musim civiization and an inde civi-

ization. As ong as the West

occupies Musim territory,

with its natura resources

and human capabiities,

ghting it in both word anddeed is an individua duty

or every Musim. The most

prominent purveyors o this discourse are a-Qaida, ed by Osama bin laden in the

levant, and the Saa Group or Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Ageria, which

on Jan. 26, 2006, decared that it had joined a-Qaida and woud henceorth take

the name “a-Qaida in Isamic North Arica.”

These groups have adopted an outook that requires the tota uprooting o

the West in Isamic ands, through combat ( jihad), striking economic interests, ortaking the batte to the West, in what they consider jihad and the West terms “ter-

“These groups hae adopted an outlook that

requires the total uprooting o the West in

Islamic lands, through comat ( jihad ).”



50 Arab Insight

rorism.” As such, the American initiative or them is contrary to divine reveation

and must be rejected. Indeed, proponents o this view beieve that those who do

respond to the U.S. initiative are reprehensibe coaborators.

B. The conciliatory discourse

The conciiatory Isamist discourse is moderate and renounces vioence, and

movements that adopt this discourse choose diaogue and preaching as the pri-

mary means to disseminate their ideas. Within this discourse, which ooks or

conciiatory soutions in its attempts to “Isamicize” reaity, we can urther identiy

two distinct eves in North Arica:

1. The rst is a discourse o accepting the other – that is, an acceptance o the

rues o the game as payed by the existing poitica regime, meaning that groups

that adopt this discourse wi work within existing poitica institutions, whether

as part o the estabishment or part o the opposition, as is the case with the PJD in

Morocco, which won seats in the sixth pariament (1997-2002). Initiay, the party

tended to pay the roe o the aithu opposition, but ater, in the same pariament

and in the seventh pariament (2002-2007), it began to take an increasingy critica

stance. In its discourse and practice, the party seeks to give the impression that it is

a civi, not reigious party – athough its inteectua ramework is based on Isamic

sources – and that its primary objective is to contribute to the socia and economic

advancement o citizens.1

Simiary, the Nahda Party in Tunisia, which adopts a conciiatory discourse,

has expressed its desire to work within the existing poitica system, but this wish

has cashed with the choices o the poitica regime, which absoutey rejects the in-

tegration o Isamist movements into ocia poitica ie and reuses to distinguish

between them based on their stance on the use o vioence, putting them a in one

basket. The discourse o the Nahda Party adopts two types o protest derived romits conciiatory bent. It opposes the regime arguing that its orientation is not con-

sistent with Isamic vaues (reigious, peaceu protest), and it opposes the regime

arguing that it is not oowing through with its modernist enterprise to buid the

country and care or the citizenry. That is, it opposes and criticizes the regime rom

inside its own modernist perspective (poitica protest).

1 The Poitica Parties law o Morocco (04/36) states in Art ice 4 that no party can be estabished on thebasis o reigion or ethnicity.



The Cold Embrace 5

Among movements that take Isam as their starting point, the conciiatory dis-

course o the PJD and the Nahda Movement puts them in the pragmatic camp.

2. The second type o conciiatory discourse is based on a rejection o vioence

as a means o change, but it expicity does not accept the rues o the game or, in

turn, the egitimacy o existing institutions. Instead it criticizes by oering advice

(jihad o word), as is the case with Justice and Spirituaity in Morocco.

The group’s supreme guide, Abdessaam Yassine, wrote three etters o advice

to the regime. The rst, entited

“Isam or the Food,” written in

1974, expicity stressed the re-

gime’s need to return to Isamic

aw to avert a disaster. The sec-

ond, “The letter o the Century,”

was written in 1981, and a copy

o the third, “A Memo to Whom

It May Concern,” was sent to the

roya oce. In short, it encouraged repentance, a return o the community’s weath

to the community, a pedge o aegiance based on a contract between the ruer and

the subjects, an end to the corruption in the administration to restore the peope’s

trust, saving the country rom debt, and a common eort to buid a Morocco ca-

pabe o meeting the chaenges o the uture. This group remains a sociopoitica

opposition protest group that has not been expicity recognized by the authorities,

which prevents it rom taking direct action rom within ocia state institutions.2

The FIS diers rom a o the above movements. It is an Agerian poitica par-

ty estabished in March 1989 ater the constitutiona amendments o 1988 intro-

duced party puraism. Historicay, the FIS beongs to the Agerian Isamist move-

ment and the nationaist movement that worked to ree Ageria rom coonia rueand estabish an independent state based on Isamic principes. The party seeks to

estabish a civi, puraistic system based on God’s authority and popuar steward-

“The second type o discourse rejects

iolence as a means o change, ut it ex-

plicitly does not accept the legitimacy o

existing institutions. Instead it criticizes

y oering adice ( jihad o word).”

2 Abdessaam Yassine is the group’s supreme guide. His poitics can be identied in severa works: Al-Man-haj al-nabawi tarbiya wa tanziman wa zahan, vo. 1 (Ghasht, 1981); Li-rijal, vo. 1 o the series al-Ihsan,1989; Muqaddimat f-l-manhaj, Juy 1989; Al-Islam wa-l-qawmiya al-‘ilmaniya, 1989; Nazarat f-l-fqhwa-l-tarikh, 1990; La révolution àl’heure d l’islam; Mihnat al-‘aql al-Muslim , 1994; Hiwar ma‘ al-udala’

al-dimuqratiyin, 1994; Fi-l-iqtisad, 1995; Risala ila-l-talib wa-l-taliba, 1995; Tanwir al-mu’minat, 1996; Al-Shura wa-l-dimuqratiya, 1996; Hiwar al-madi wa-l-mustaqbal, 1997; Hiwar ma‘ sadiq amma zayghi,1997; Islamiser la modernité, 1998.



52 Arab Insight

ship. The FIS stood in Ageria’s rst ree eections in 1990 and took 853 o 1,539

districts, or 55 percent o the vote, as we as 32 o its 48 provinces, or 67 percent.

It aso sated candidates or the ree pariamentary eections o Dec. 26, 1991, win-

ning 188 seats, whie the ruing liberation Front won ony 15 seats and the Socia-

ist Forces Front took 25 seats. It is estimated that i the second round o eections

had been hed, the FIS woud have won 250 out o 430 seats, but the army inter-

vened on Jan. 11, 1992, to stop the eections. The FIS was ociay dissoved in

March 1992, which punged Ageria into a cyce o vioence and counter-vioence,

especiay ater the FIS estabished its own army, the Isamic Savation Army. As a

resut, other movements and groups emerged that beieved vioence was the ony

means o gaining power and appying Isamic aw, among them the GSPC.

As a resut o deveopments, many FIS eaders came to beieve that eections

aone, as a conciiatory act, coud not guarantee change.

Ceary, based on the oregoing categorization o Isamist movements, the con-

servative Saa discourse osters a rejection o American acceptance initiatives,

which, or groups that adopt this discourse, is simpy a tactic to spread doubt and

division among members o the community o Isam. On the other hand, groups

that adopt a conciiatory discourse, with its seectivity and pragmatism, do not re-

ject positive engagement with such initiatives, seeing them as a means to open up

to the other and achieve mutua understanding to dispe the doubts and ears that

have stigmatized Isamist movements.

II. Motives or the American acceptance o some Islamist groups

The American acceptance o some Isamist groups comes in an internationa

context that is experiencing growing pains as a resut o competing interests even

within one ideoogy, iberaism. Thus the U.S. acceptance o some Isamist groups

can be attributed to both subjective and objective motives.

A. Subjective motives

These motives are reated to the U.S. administration’s view o nationa objec-

tives and interests, which is primariy based on the principe that there are no

permanent riends or enemies, ony permanent interests. To maintain its nationa

interests, the United States has become a major payer in the heart o the Arab

Isamic region. In turn, considerations o nationa interests require nding a way

to coexist with the various active agents in these countries. Given the rising roe o

Isamist movements in Arab poitics, particuary the gains made by these move-ments in eections (in Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, Paestine, Egypt, Ageria and Mo-



The Cold Embrace 53

rocco), it is important to deveop a dened American poicy toward these groups,

seen as poitica actors that cannot be ignored.

In act, Isamist orces have become an essentia actor that cannot be over-

ooked or discounted as an enemy. Pragmatism, which ies at the heart o Ameri-

can poitica phiosophy, dictates an examination o conciiatory soutions based

on an understanding around common interests. The exampe o Turkey’s Justice

and Deveopment Party provides an important mode that might be reproduced in

the Arab word: a party based on an Isamic oundation working within a poitica

system that uphods secuarism as the basic prerequisite or joining eectora com-

petition. The Turkish experience has iustrated the abiity o an Isamist party to

attain mutua understanding and coexistence, ar rom absoute rejection, as we as

compy with basic conditions, such as maintaining Turkey’s NATO obigations and

preserving baanced reations with Israe, whom other Isamist movements con-

sider an enemy o their civiization and the cause o the Arab Isamic community’s

troubes, protected by the United States.

Turkey’s Justice and Deveopment Party experiment constitutes a subjective

motive or taking the Turkish exampe as the mode or initiatives to hep buid

a ramework o direct interaction with Isamist movements in some Arab Isamic

countries. This raises the question o the U.S. criteria o acceptance – why it inter-

acts with some movements to the excusion o others – which in turn eads us to

objective motives.

B. Objective motives

In essence, these are ound in the extent to which the conduct, discourse and

practices o Isamist movements correspond to the Western democratic vaue sys-

tem. For the United States, this constitutes the primary guarantee or trust-buid-

ing.

Some practices o Isamist movements correspond to the Western democraticvaue system. For the United States, this constitutes the primary guarantee or

trust-buiding.

The objective expanation o these motives now eads us to ook at each indi-

vidua case study.

Case one: the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria

The FIS won the Agerian pariamentary eections o Dec. 26, 1991, the resuts

o which were annued by a miitary coup two weeks ater. The FIS was thendisbanded in March 1992. Many saw the coup and the dissoution o the FIS as



54 Arab Insight

constitutionay iega, beieving it took pace with American compicity, and they

based their beies on the assumption that Isamist movements approach eections

as a means o empowerment, not as a democratic too or the peaceu rotation o

power. Partisans o this view point to the ack o any American action to reinstate

constitutiona egitimacy as it did ater other coups in Panama and Nigeria, or

exampe.

Based on the FIS discourse and practice at the time, the group can be cassied

as part o the radica Isamist

trend, or which eections

are ony a procedura too to

gain power. The FIS was not

a mode on which the Unit-

ed States and the West coud

rey, and it did not meet the

conditions that woud ead

the United States and the

West to open up to it. In this context, we shoud note the stance o the ate French

president, Francois Mitterrand, toward the decision by ormer Agerian president,

Chadi Bendjedid, to iberaize the poitica system and aow the ormation o

poitica parties: “I beg you to reconsider your position to icense a poitica par-

ties, particuary Isamist parties,” Mitterrand wrote Bendjedid. “I am prepared to

orgive a o Ageria’s debt.”3 Since the 1992 decision to disband it, the FIS has

remained outside the ocia poitica system.

There are other Isamist orces that enjoy ocia existence in the poitica sys-

tem, most importanty the Nahda Movement, part o which spintered o as the

Isah (Reorm) Movement in 1999, and the Society o Peace Movement (Hamas).4

But in ight o the unstabe poitica situation in Ageria, it seems too eary to dis-

cuss U.S. acceptance o any o these movements given the ambiguity o the Age-rian situation and the staemate between the authorities and anti-regime orces.5

3 Abdeiah Benkiran, al-Haraka al-Islamiya wa ishkaliyat al-manhaj, no. 2, Ikhtartu lakum (Casabanca:a-Najah a-Jadid Press, 1999), 9.

4 ‘Arus a-Zubayr, “a-Haraka a-Isamiya a-musharika --mu’assisat a-siyasiya: haat a-Jaza’ir,” studyrom a seminar organized by the Center or Poitica and Constitutiona Studies, Marrakech Facuty o

law, “a-Isamiyun wa--hukm --biad a-‘Arabiya wa Turkiya,” Marrakech, June 16-17, 2006, 123-47.5 It is noteworthy that recenty the GSPC dropped its origina objective – bringing down the government– in avor o targeting Westerners and disseminating its operations over the Internet.

“The FIS was not a model on which the Unit-

ed States and the West could rely, and it did

not meet the conditions that would lead the

United States to open up to it.”



The Cold Embrace 55

Case two: Justice and Development in Morocco

There are two competing stories about the origin o the PJD. To stress the par-

ty’s secuar ine, it is said that the party grew out o the Constitutiona Democratic

Popuar Movement (MPDC)6; to stress its reigious ine, it is said that its origins

are to be ound in the Jama’ah Isamiya, which in 1992 changed its name to the

Reorm and Renewa Movement. At the same time, its eader, Abdeiah Benkiran,

decared that his movement was peaceu and accepted the monarchy.

In 1992, the Reorm and Renewa Movement aied in a bid to orm the Na-

tiona Renewa Party, whose objectives were seen by the authorities as inconsistent

with existing ega and pariamentary rameworks. In turn, the movement’s eaders

contacted Dr. Abdekrim Khatib and proposed that he resurrect the MPDC. Khatib

agreed on three conditions: the party woud (1) embrace Isam, (2) recognize the

constitutiona monarchy, and (3) renounce vioence. The party convened an ex-

ceptiona conerence in 1996 to induct the Isamist eadership into the genera

secretariat, and since that time, the party has been seen as an Isamist party.7

The party partiay participated in the pariamentary eections o 1997, avoid-

ing excessive zea and careu not to present itse as the soe aternative party,

having earned rom the experience o Ageria and the FIS. The party eded can-

didates in ony 24 o 325 eectora districts and won nine seats, most o them in

Casabanca, the country’s economic capita. In run-os in other districts, the party

came away with three additiona seats, and two other MPs joined the party’s paria-

mentary boc, bringing its tota number o seats to 14. When Abderrahmane Yous-

sou, with the Sociaist Union Party, was charged with orming a government on

Feb. 4, 1998, he sought to incude the party by giving it one ministeria portoio,

but Khatib preerred to remain supportive o the government, whie at the same

time outside o it, taking the roe o the constructive critic. However, the party soon

reinquished its supportive roe and became an opposition party giving advice to

the government, attempting to institute new poitica traditions regarding the wayIsamist parties were treated. The party sought to become an exempar, hoping to

6 The party was estabished in by Dr. Abdekrim Khatib in 1967 ater he broke away rom the PopuarMovement Party, ed by a-Mahjub Ahradan, known or his Amazigh tendencies. Then the speaker o the Pariament, Khatib reused to consent to the king’s decaration o a state o emergency, which didnot pease the paace. The paace in turn harassed Khatib and the spit occurred. The party ater aced adead-end due to severa obstaces, eading it to withdraw rom poitics.

7 At this time, two actions o the Isamist movement were trying to merge: the Reorm and Renewa Move-

ment (which issued the paper a-Isah, oowed by a-Raya) and the league or an Isamic Future (whichpubished a-Sahwa). These eorts were crowned by the decaration o a new organization containingboth actions, the Unity and Reorm Movement, ed by Dr. Ahmed a-Raissouni.



56 Arab Insight

win the trust o others and convince them that the party’s objective was coopera-

tion and the acceptance o divergent opinions.

The MPDC took part in the pariamentary eections o Sept. 27, 2002, using

a new name announced by its nationa counci in 1998: the Justice and Deveop-

ment Party. Its sogan was, “Toward a Better Morocco: Authenticity, Sovereignty,

Democracy, Justice, and Deveopment or a Comprehensive Renaissance.” Its poit-

ica patorm reied on “incrementaism” and it reused to seek out a privieged po-

sition in Moroccan poitics. Out o 91 eectora districts, the party sated candidates

in ony 57. It won 42 seats,

coming in third ater the So-

ciaist Union Party (50 seats)

and the Independence Party

(48 seats). It thus became

the eading opposition party.

Throughout the pariamen-

tary session o 2002-2007,

the PJD has sought to pres-

ent itse as a baanced party by adopting a poitica discourse consistent with the

state’s constitutiona ramework and exercising its oversight o government through

questions in Pariament and proposing egisation. In other words, the party has

worked to reconcie and resove its confict with other parties rom within the con-

stitutiona system, not, as is thought, through a discourse based on reigion.8

The conduct and practice o the PJD eads us to concude that it is trying to ce-

ment a conciiatory discourse that bends Isamic vaues with Western, democratic

vaues, which suggests that it respects humanistic vaues whatever their source,

since it utimatey sees them a as a singe vaue system. This makes it extremey

ikey that the United States wi open up to the party. That is, the ine o commu-

nication is sti open uness proven otherwise.

Case three: the Nahda Movement in Tunisia

Isamist movements’ participation in poitics is a good indicator o the imits

and possibiities o rapprochement between these movements and the U.S. admin-

“PJD leads us to conclude that it is trying to

cement a conciliatory discourse that lends

Islamic alues with Western, democratic

alues. This makes it extremely likely that

the United States will open up to them.”

8 ‘Abd a-Saam Tawi, “Qira’a --masar a-siyasi i hizb a-‘adaa wa--tanmiya a-Maghribiya: dirasa --

maahim a-hakima i--musharaka a-siyasiya,” study rom a seminar organized by the Center or Poiti-ca and Constitutiona Studies, Marrakech Facuty o law, “a-Isamiyun wa--hukm --biad a-‘Arabiyawa Turkiya,” Marrakech, June 16-17, 2006, 9-87.



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60 Arab Insight



The Cold Embrace 6

istration. In Tunisia, the year 1981 was a turning point, when the cash between

the Isamists and the ocia authorities became a direct confict. The authorities

beieved that the Isamists, through the Isamist Tendency Movement, wanted to

dismante the state by intrating the security services and taking contro o rei-

gious aairs by orciby appointing imams in mosques.9 Despite a period o reax-

ation rom 1984 to 1985 oowing an ocia meeting between the government

(represented by Mazai) and the Isamists (represented by Rachid Ghannouchi and

Abdeattah Mourou), tensions began to resurace and the cash again erupted at the

end o the Bourguiba era (1986-87). Poitica tension began to subside ater Presi-

dent Ben Ai’s white revoution and his assumption o the presidency oowing the

Nov. 7, 1987, decaration. In the statement, he vowed to recaim tradition in a way

that satised poitica Isam and introduce constitutiona amendments ocusing on

sovereignty o the aw and poitica puraism. He aso reeased some 600 prison-

ers rom the Isamist movement and issued a nationa pact which guaranteed the

participation o various poitica actors and uphed democracy and Tunisia’s Arab

Isamic identity. In his view, “Arabization” was a cutura demand and the state was

required to respect Isamic vaues. To accimate to the new ega conditions (the

Parties law o May 3, 1988, which prohibits the estabishment o reigious parties),

the Isamic Tendency Movement changed its name to the Nahda Movement.10 The

movement entered the Supreme Nationa Pact Counci in ate 1988 and sated

independent candidates or the 1989 pariamentary eections, ater the authorities

reused to recognize the movement as a poitica party on the grounds that its ead-

ers sti aced sentences issued against them by the State Security Court in 1987

and the act that the party patorm acked carications on some cutura issues

and the principe o civic equaity.11 Ater the eections, the movement became the

second-argest orce ater the ruing party. The eection resuts brought an end to

the period o reconciiation between the movement and the authorities, and a new

era o confict was inaugurated (1990-2006).

9 Dr. A‘iya ‘Aani, “Isamiyun bi-Tunis bayn a-muwajaha wa--musharaka: 1980-2006,” study rom a semi-nar organized by the Center or Poitica and Constitutiona Studies, Marrakech Facuty o law, “a-Is-amiyun wa--hukm --biad a-‘Arabiya wa Turkiya,” Marrakech, June 16-17, 2006, 158-60.

10 For the charter o the Nahda Movement, see Rachid Ghannouchi, op. cit.11 Rachid Ghannouchi is the main ideoogue o the Nahda Movement. For books in which he denes his

movement’s poitica ramework see: al-Muwatana: huquq ghayr al-Muslim f-l-dawla al-Islamiya (Tunis: Dara-Sahwa, 1988); al-Haraka al-Islamiya f Tunis: buhuth f ma‘alim al-haraka ma‘ naqd dhati (Khartoum: Dar

a-Qaam, 1991); Min al-fkr al-Islami f Tunis (Khartoum: Dar a-Qaam, 1992); al-Hurriyat al-‘amma f-l-dawla al-Islamiya, op. cit.; al-Haraka al-Islamiya wa-l-taghyir (london: Moroccan Center or Researchand Transation, 2001).



62 Arab Insight

This brie review iustrates the stormy reationship between the regime and

the Isamist movement. This reationship has not ostered an expicit decaration

o intentions, which in turn has not heped to buid trust based on the recognition

o the other as a competitor or partner. The ack o poitica openness has aso not

heped to provide the minima grounds or reconciiation that might encourage a

rapprochement and avoid a cash. This experience stands in contrast to the poiti-

ca experience o Morocco, where parties to the poitica equation – whether they

are oya to the regime or rom the Isamist or etist opposition – have adopted the

ogic o conciiation and mutua understanding to resove poitica probems, par-

ticuary ater 1990. These baanced reations have heped estabish mutua trust

that considers a cuture o moderation better than a cuture o miitancy and con-

fict. In turn, this provides an entry or the U.S. administration’s acceptance o the

Moroccan Justice and Deveopment Party. The PJD works within a poitica system

that is now an ay in the new American anti-terrorism enterprise, athough we

must aso consider the sensitive nature o such conditiona acceptance or Israe,

America’s avorite ay. In any case, a o these conditions are sti ar rom being

obtained in the case o the Nahda Movement.



63

THIS ARTIClE BEGINS by introducing a denition o the phrase “Isamicay good

governance,” and oows with an eaboration on the choice o terms:

Isamicay good governance is that which:

• strives to achieve justice in society;

• aspires to maintain the dignity o individuas (both mae and emae) and

protect group reedom, regardess o reigious or nationa aiation;

• steers individuas toward achieving a means o sustainabe iveihood be-

ore aspiring or other uxuries;

• encourages virtue, imits vice, and rejects compusion in matters o rei-

gion; and,• achieves its aims through consutation, participation, representation, ac-

countabiity mechanisms, and through ega conventiona reguations in

a socia ormations, ow or high.

It is important to note that this denition avoids the use o three popuar

phrases: Isamic rue, enorcing Isamic aw (Sharia), and democracy. I wi eabo-

rate more on the reasons or excuding these terms in the context o the disappoint-

ments o the modernist mode o deveopment in the Third Word.

Islamic Roots o Good Goernance

mazen hashem, ph.d. University o Caliornia, Riverside



64 Arab Insight

Dream o Islamic governance

The dream o the Isamic mode that has not ceased to maniest in peope’s

ives, athough it has ost its ruing power. Historians do not disagree the socia

conscience o Musims has aways been aected by the vaues o Isam, regardess

o how Isamic their practices were. It is evident today that Musim peopes across

the gobe want Isam to pay some roe in the poitics o their countries, despite

a the attempts to suocate and marginaize the aspirations o the masses. From

Maaysia and Indonesia to Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and the Maghreb, one

nds a popuar desire in coun-

tries with Musim majorities

to have a voice or Isam in

pubic ie – in dierent orms

and degrees, which raises the

probem o what “Isamic gov-

ernance” means. Musim peo-

pes have dierent views o Is-

amic governance: rom a historica heritage to take pride in, to a hope or a uture

that merges between Isamic eements and what they regard as “positive” in the

contemporary Western mode. The detais o such a mixture dier among peope.

Some want to “Isamicize” modernism, whie others hod Isamic oundations and

ink them to dierent appications borrowed rom the modernist mode.

Isamist currents deveoped dierent ideoogies about governance. Some o the

Isamic movements infated the poitica dimension in Isam and amost made it a

synonym to the nation-state concept. More sophisticated views sought to discover

a unique poitica vision o Isam. However, or the common peope who are ex-

cited in the prospects o an Isamic way o ie, one argey nds vague and dreamy

sogans that, practicay, represent a barrier to orming a poitica uture o which

the majority wi approve. The purpose o this essay is to put orward a simpe andcear denition to what the phrase “Isamic governance” can appropriatey mean.

First, the denition at the beginning o the essay did not use the phrase “Is-

amic rue” because o the misunderstanding that such a term connotes. It coud be

understood as a reerence to a poitica vision inspired by the vaues o Isam, or to

theocratic rue. I wi mention two sources o the second probematic meaning o

Isamic governance. First, the Iranian experience that ended up with an internay-

conficting poitica arrangement between a ega, constitutiona authority and the

authority o the muahs. Second, the popuar use o the phrase “the separation o reigion and state” in the media and the press, and juxtaposing it on the Musim

“It is eident that Muslim peoples want

Islam to play some role in the politics o

their countries, despite all the attempts to

suocate and marginalize them.”



Islamic Roots of Good Governance 65

experience. The compexity o the issue cannot be uy addressed here; however, it

is sucient to point out the contradiction in the phrase “separation o church and

state.” How can one separate two things i one o them did not exist, which was the

case in Isam? A quick ook at Musim history wi show that the reigious schoars

and cerics were not poitica ruers; rather they payed speciaized roes in various

aspects o ie (ega schoars, judges, consoers, preachers, etc.). Furthermore, i

reigion is understood as a wordview or a consteation o vaues, then the separa-

tion o reigion rom poitics is not conceivabe in the rst pace. Poitics necessariy

adopt one set o vaues, either rom modern secuar precepts, or those o the three

God-centered reigions, or o other major reigions o the word, such as Buddhism

and Hinduism, or a mixture o this and that.

Describing Isamicay-guided governance as “Isamic” is not precise, and it

raises urther conceptua probems using the interna ogic o Isam itse. Any

orm o Isamic rue wi be an attempt to approach an idea that it can never reach.

Thereore, caing one orm o rue “Isamic” is necessariy se-righteous. Simpy

put, it is a “Musim” government, not an “Isamic” one. It woud be interesting to

note here that Omar, the second Caiph o Isam, disiked naming anyone Muham-

mad or ater any o the prophets, earing the possibiity that one o them woud

grow up to be o a fawed character.

Sharia versus Islamic law

Secondy, our chosen denition did not use the phrase “appying Isamic aw,”

because o vagueness and possibe misunderstandings. Some peope reate the

concept o Isamic aw with

persecution o peope, orc-

ing them to perorm their

reigious duties, and prevent-

ing them rom doing actionsthose in power beieve are

reigiousy unawu, corrupt-

ing, or simpy rowned upon.

The reasons or such misunderstandings are numerous. Many wi reca the image

o Taiban rue and their ignorance. Some point to the media as the main source o

conusion. Nevertheess, we cannot excuse some preachers and those who pose as

speakers on beha o Isam or their probematic and uneducated utterances.

The Quran does admonish peope to enjoin right conduct and orbid inde-cency. This is a ca or a peope to be an exempary nation/ummah. For those

“Descriing Islamically-guided goernance

as “Islamic” is not precise, and it raises

urther conceptual prolems using the in-ternal logic o Islam itsel.”



66 Arab Insight

who think that such admonition is meant or orming eite reigious groups shoud

be reminded with the reaity o Musim history. The history o Musim societies

coud be adequatey described as a history o civi associations refected in neigh-

borhoods, guids, and other oca socia units. Moreover, the phrase “enorcing

Isamic aw” may suggest orcing non-Musims to oow it – which actuay con-

tradicts Isamic aw itse.

Furthermore, the term Isamic aw is surrounded by obscurity and shoud be

dierentiated rom what is reerred to as Sharia. In the minds o Musim scho-

ars and inteectuas, Sharia is pre-

mised on the major vaues, mora

oundations, and ethica guidance

o Isam. However, the common

understanding, among both ay-

men and many preachers, is that

Sharia is the accumuated body o

historica work in the area o juris-

prudence. The ack o a cear dis-

tinction between the two terms entais major impications at the eve o practica

appication.

When Sharia is seen as a vaue orientation (the rst denition), the issue o the

inaterabiity o Sharia becomes understandabe since it has to be reinterpreted in

time and space. The resuting ega arrangements o continuous reinterpretations

woud share the same phiosophica roots, and the arger picture woud be o sta-

biity as we as adaptabiity.

In the second denition, however, Isamic aw ( fqh) reers to historica preer-

ences and understandings that i were correct interpretations in their time may not

be suitabe or the reaity o today. Athough the Musim heritage is rich, worthy

o deiberation, and u o essons, caing it Sharia can resut in contradictingthe intent o Sharia itse or becoming circumscribed to what is irreevant to our

present circumstances. Thereore, the use o the term “enorcing Sharia” without

urther expanation o the meaning o Sharia raises doubts among some Musims

who ear stagnation and contro orced upon others by those who rigidy invoke

the heritage.

Perhaps even more important, using the phrase “appying Sharia” aows gov-

ernments the atitude to manipuate its use. It is convenient or arbitrary orms o

governments try to enhance their egitimacy by caiming that they appy punish-ments according to Isamic aw – as i Sharia is merey a code o punishments – or

“Islamic law (fqh) reers to historical

preerences and understandings that

i were correct interpretations in their

time may not e suitale or the reality

o today.”




by singuary ocusing on the appication o persona status aws – as i Isam can

be reduced to aws organizing marriage and divorce. Furthermore, such govern-

ments usuay choose the most stringent orms o historica jurisprudence and

stir up pubic support toward it or poitica gains. In this case, some Musim

aypeope may ee pressured because opposing the government woud appear to

be opposing Isam itse that they admire. Such governments may expoit the ra-

ying behind Sharia to distract rom their negigence o serving the pubic in vita

issues such as heath and education, deepening the arger socia and economica

probems o their countries.

“Democracy,” popular but vague

Thirdy, the denition o Isamicay good governance, as suggested in the be-

ginning o this essay, has avoided use o the term “democracy,” despite its popuar-

ity, because it now encompasses a wide variety o connotations or dierent peope.

Specicay, the term democracy can denote a practica aspect o organization or

a phiosophica view about human ie. The rst being the toos and procedures

o administering and managing peope’s aairs; the second represents its ibera

component that considers man as the utimate reerence and generay averts rom

invoking the transcendenta or the non-utiitarian.

It is evident that there is itte disagreement over the acceptance o the term

democracy in its practica meaning. It is aso we known, but oten muted, that

democratic practices in the sense o egaity and coective decision-making were

not singuary invented in the Western part o the word. Hammurabi knew some-

thing about ega codes. Severa peopes throughout history, incuding Musims

and the Iroquois, have practiced various orms o coective decision-making.

Because o those two dierent meanings or democracy, its use in the deni-

tion o Isamicay good governance shoud be probematic. One may wonder i

the conusion can be avoided with using the phrase “democratic means,” insteado democracy as a singe word. Nevertheess, it is more constructive to discuss the

eements o democracy instead o insisting on a term that might provoke conusion

and turn into a mere sogan. Indeed, why not emphasize that the issue is about

consutation, purposeu participation, various methods o representation, and es-

tabishing the rue o aw?

Speaking o the aw as an important organizing mechanism brings us to the

issue o customs and to what degree they shoud be invoked. Taking oca customs

into consideration is important in communities’ ives as it aows the aw to be fex-ibe – one o the major diemmas o modern democratic practice. To mitigate the



68 Arab Insight

excessive power o the state, shoud not governments abstain rom intererence as

ong as peope are abe to sette matters through oca customs and tradition? This

is a critica issue because aw enorcement requires monitoring by the government,

which eventuay requires coercive means. Historicay speaking, the stabiity o

Musim societies o the past can not be attributed to authoritarian poitica ead-

ership, but rather to dense communities and smaer buiding bocks o amiies,

cans, guids, etc., organized around customs – cose to what we ca civi society

today.

Some Isamic activists o today invoke the term hakimiyya – a term that has a

range o meanings, incuding divine sovereignty and that utimate authority be-

ongs to God. When invoked without quaications, the terms “democracy” and

“hakimiyya” remain vague and Musims ascribe dierent meanings to them.

Dr. Hassan a-Turabi, a we-known Isamic eader, tried to sove the probem

o dening hakimiyya by announcing that “hakimiyya beongs to God, and poiti-

ca authority beongs to peope.” As noted beore, the probem associated with the

use o the term democracy may be easiy soved by using it within a specic con-

text or by couping it with quaiers: “democratic means” or “means o representa-

tion and poitica participation.”

It is worth adding here that simiar phrases such as “Isam is the soution” and

“the Quran is our constitution” are aso generaized sogans that can become a

source o conusion. Isam can inspire a soution ony when Musims put orward

a cear poitica program, and whether Isam can proer any soution to an issue is

dependent on a practica and detaied vision. When the devout say that the Quran

is our constitution, this is comprehensibe at the rhetorica eve since the Quran is

not a poitica or a ega document. From an Isamic viewpoint, the Quran is sup-

posed to be a source o inspiration and to serve as a background or a civi and ega

constitution. There is no doubt that the popuar Isamic poitica imagination acks

a practica ormuation o how to coordinate, maintain rights, and distribute du-ties in a cear and dened way. It is ony appropriate here to note that the Prophet

o Isam has supervised the drat o what is known as the Medina Charter, which

speed out civic organizing principes or a puraistic society ormed o dierent

tribes and reigions that existed then. Evidenty it was a viabe constitution or civi

contract or its time and pace.

Undoubtedy, making reservations about using the term democracy woud

seem strange or it has now become a standard poitica term and a staging ground

in the attempt to “spread democracy” to the Isamic word. However, it is dicutto – scienticay – pinpoint evidence that shows how promising or potentiay




successu such eorts may be. Interestingy, surveys show an overwheming posi-

tive attitude toward democracy as a orm o rue, whie ed data indicate that the

pubic acks condence in the wide caims o democracy. Some evidence o this

can be observed either in the press or in the spontaneous and sarcastic comments

peope make in their daiy ives about the term democracy. This ambivaence is

not due to the ack o readiness to democracy, rather an understandabe response

to ived reaities: rst, the average person knows that cooniaism passed through

democratic channes; second, the contemporary discourse on democracy is seen

by some peope as threatening since it is widening the sectarian divide instead o

bridging it. The most eementary knowedge o marketing and human communi-

cation reminds us that any popuar motto must address peope’s reaity.

To add to that, cas or democracy oten make the oowing diagnosis: that

Arab, Isamic cuture is inherenty undemocratic and Musims need to “understand”

democracy and “ascend” to its reach, internaizing the Orientaist iterature which

presents despotism as an integra part o Orienta cuture. Ironicay, the depth o

the justice dimension o Isam in the minds o Musims couped with the stagnation

o the contemporary poitica Isamic discourse on one hand, and the disappoint-

ments rom (Western) democratic practice on the other, makes it dicut to agree

on one meaning o democracy reevant and trustworthy to Third Word peope.

Acknowedging that the practica experience o contemporary Musims in how to

appy an Isamic poitica vision is sti imited, ack o experience is one thing and

their assumed civiizationa inabiity is another matter atogether. The experience

o East Asian countries – ike China and Vietnam – serves as a good iustration.

Communist sociaism has aied to

take root in these paces. In actuai-

ty, it was Buddhism and other East-

ern reigions that served as a basis

or pubic awareness and poiticaimagination. Furthermore, it can

aso be said that sociaism aied in

severa latin American countries,

especiay in instances when it was

based on pure Marxist principes. Today, some latin American countries are rein-

troducing equaizing poicies couched in the anguage o oca cutures that highy

regard pubic participation and egaitarianism.

Some suggest that we can remove the obscurity o the term “democracy” byredening it as ibera democracy. However, considering the recent history o Arab

“Calls or democracy oten make the

ollowing diagnosis: that Ara, Islamic

culture is inherently undemocratic.Muslims need to ‘understand’ democ-

racy and ‘ascend’ to its reach.”



70 Arab Insight

societies, it is doubtu that a discourse anchored in Western mora phiosophy wi

prevai. We need to remind ourseves that this is not the rst attempt to ocaize

such Western jargon as democracy, iberaism or sociaism. This is exacty what the

region witnessed ater the coonia period. Such sogans aied to win a pace in the

ream o pubic imagination – despite the act that Isamic discourse then was ess

diverse and probaby ess mature than it is today. Sady, the ormation o ideoogi-

ca eites then who adopted Western ideas aied to connect to the hopes o the

masses, paving the way or conusion and disappointment, and then to despotism.

The probem o despotism among the poitica eadership o severa Arab coun-

tries is not restricted to the monopoy o economic resources and excusive power.

Rather, it is especiay deepened by the amost compete oss o cutura egitimacy,

which expains to some extent the rejectionist attitude o those governed, which

sometimes deveops into vioent resistance.

Unquestionaby, there are dierences in poitica cuture, especiay between

the ibera-utiitarian mode and that o the Isamic cuture. It is not a secret that

such a probem is used by the internationa media to give the impression that Mus-

im cuture is ataistic and unabe or unready to receive democracy. There exists

two kinds o Western poitica visions or the uture o Musims: a sympathetic one

that arms that Musim peopes are aso humans and that a they need is time

and opportunity to digest ibera principes, and a biased one that does not hide

its conviction regarding the impossibiity o enightening Musims with ibera de-

mocracy, and sees no aternative to controing them and their destinies to protect

the word rom their evi.

From the perspective o Isamic Arab cuture, both schoos o thought and per-

spectives are shaow. Even the sympathetic mind does not see that Isamic cuture

is ooking orward to embracing justice at a deeper eve than democratic proce-

duraism promises. Overa, the Isamic vision regards the phiosophica eanings

o Thomas Hobbes and John locke simiary. Both o these views, Hobbes with histheory o an overpowering state, and locke with his principes on the rue o aw,

entrust the state and its structure as the utimate arbitrator in pubic order instead

o the ordinary socia units – kinship, community, neighborhood, paces o wor-

ship – on which the Isamic view (and reigious societies, in genera) reies. Indeed,

the underying ogic o this essay is that the schism between the mora content and

the practica maniestations o a poitica mode is at the center o the probem. As

ong as the ssure exists, the possibiity o imported methods succeeding is mini-

ma. Success – i it happens – wi be mosty short-ived. The wider the gap, themore ikey a oreign poitica method wi ai or resut in confict. It a engthens




the journey or the deveopment o a ocaized poitica vision. In act, the journey

may be missed atogether.

Finay, I ike to equay stress that human experience cannot be sideined. The

need to evauate and benet rom the dierent orms o modern democratic regu-

ations and arrangement as deveoped mainy by Western experiments is beyond

doubt. Practicay speaking, some o the democratic principes must be put in use,

simpy because the mode o the modern state has argey been imported. As the

modern state mode – by its nature, structure, and mechanisms – has predatory

potentias, it must be suppemented with its adequate set o reguations, checks

and baances. A poitica democratic order cannot stand simpy on a singe eg o

voting, but has to be couped with viabe socia institutions. We cannot aord the

vague use o terms, incuding democracy; it is ar better to tak about democratic

eements. There are other reated eves o meanings that democracy can point

to, such as rejecting monarchy, hereditary authority, and poitica sectarianism, in

addition to the unequivoca rejection o any orm o despotism, the insistence on

poitica decentraization and the separation o powers. These are a good reasons

or the ocus on the content o ideas and not on abes.

In concusion, the restessness and heightened aspirations that are observed

o Musim pubics makes it necessary to eucidate what governance – with some

measure o Isamic orientation – is about. It shoud go beyond the phase o abes,

sogans, and semantics, to begin a process o debating certain basic dimensions

(this essay suggested ve at its beginning), in order to buid upon and eaborate

the detais o a indigenous poitica system.

Aso, and quite ranky, peace and stabiity in Musim countries are dependent

on the coective abiity to go beyond verbay repudiating authoritarianism and

incompetent ruers. It argey depends on positivey drating a nationa project

that receives the approva o the majority o the society’s actions, incuding non-

reigious individuas who accept Isam ony as a civiizationa, not conessiona,identity. Isamic movements may have reaized, and shoud theoreticay and prac-

ticay comprehend, that the reorm o society is a matter that goes beyond devout

worship and persona piety; it is about institutiona reorm, and thereore, nationa

consensus comes above any other consideration.



72 Arab Insight



NO CONSENSUS HAS THUS FAR BEEN REACHED regarding the status o hu-

man rights within Isamic discourse. When trying to integrate human rights aw,a contemporary phenomenon1 buit on universa standards, within an Isamic

context, divergent opinions wi naturay surace as Isamic aw is argey buit

on fqh (Isamic jurisprudence): an aggregation o individua opinions and juristic

interpretations, which dier not ony rom one country to another, but which aso

change with the passage o time.

In essence, discussion arose as cutura reativists expressed the beie that the

tenets o Isam were not compatibe with human rights. Some said human rights

are a Western phenomenon with imperiaist roots in Christianity. Because o itsroots in iberaism and individuaism, some caimed that human rights coud not

be appied in Isamic states where the roe o the amiy and the duties an indi-

vidua owes to his or her amiy are o undamenta importance to society.

However, in their counterargument, universaists advocate that Isam shoud

be an active participant in the human rights debate precisey because the modern

discourse on human rights is universa and not imited to Western views. The

Islam and Human Rights:

Reisiting the Deate

jumana shehata Jumana Shehata is a reporter at the Daiy Star Egypt. She is an expert in children’s

legal rights and holds a master o arts in international and comparative legal studies

rom the University o London.

1 The denition o human rights here is “rights due to a human beings by virtue o their humanity with-out distinction…” as stated in the UDHR 1948.

73



74 Arab Insight

preambe o the Dec. 10, 1948, Universa Decaration o Human Rights (UDHR),

emphasizes the act that rights are universa, “a common standard o achievement

or a peopes and a nations,” and, in Artice 1 o the decaration, that “a human

beings are born ree and equa in dignity and in rights.”

Despite their origins in Western history, the understanding o human rights has

evoved with the participation o representatives rom Isamic cutures. In 1963,

a resoution was passed on a simiar issue and it provided the ramework or the

United Nations to adopt the Convention on the Eimination o A Forms o Dis-

crimination Against Women

(CEDAW). However, it is

worthwhie to note that out

o 22 state sponsors o the

resoution, ve were Isamic

countries.

Generay speaking, the

conservative reativist approach taken by some Musim schoars invoves ooking

at human rights within the context o Isamic principes. They argue that Isam has

provided a natura code or human rights, which occurred over 14 centuries ago

through the Quran and other sources.2

In addition, the concept behind Isamic human rights is to achieve an idea

society (ummah) through adl,3 or justice, where specia merit is given or rewards,

and ihsan,4 where specia treatment is given to the sociay disadvantaged. For ex-

ampe, whie the punishment or promiscuity is equa or both men and women,

it is dierent among dierent casses o women. For the same crime, a save wom-

an might get ha the punishment that a ree Musim woman receives, whie the

prophet’s consort woud get doube that o the ree Musim woman.

Thereore, it is important within the context o Isamic human rights discourse

to distinguish between non-derogative rights,5 which assert that a human beingsare equa beore God, and equitabe rights toward society – in which peope are

equa in weight but dierent based on specic circumstances.

2 Sunnah (traditions o the Prophet), Hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet), Fiqh (jurisprudence) andSharia (code o aw).

3 Merit in the Quran is attained by righteousness and beie. Those who strive in the cause o God arerewarded more than passive beievers. To achieve justice, “ad” or equaity, in this same concept, not ev-eryone gets the same punishment, as peope have dierent circumstances as expained by R iat Hassan.

4 literay means “restore the baance by making up a oss or deciency.”5 Such as the right to ie, respect, justice and reedom.

“There is a need to redefne Islam within the

context o human rights to achiee recon-

ciliation despite issues with compatiility.”



Islam and Human Rights 75

Even though Artice 1 o the Aug. 5, 1990, Cairo Decaration on Human Rights

in Isam6 cas or equa rights or a, without discrimination on any grounds, there

is no mention o gender unti Artice VI o the same convention. Here it restates

equaity in dignity, but distinguishes between the rights o a woman and the roe

o man as the head o the househod – signiying a dierence in the equity versus

equaity equation.

By and arge, ibera Musims approach the idea o Isam in the human rights

debate as that o assimiatory universaism. Whie there may be dierences be-

tween both Isam and human rights, this view seeks to dene rights as they exist

within the Universa Decaration o Human Rights and make them truy universa

whie respecting existing reigious cutures.

According to Abduah an-Naim,7 it’s most popuar propagator, ibera Mus-

ims argue that in our word today there are no monoithic reigions and that the

rejection o human rights is merey a wish to remain ensconced in tradition. With

a mora and poitica justication o rights in Isamic theoogy, but inconsistency

with human rights, there is a need to redene Isam within the context o human

rights to achieve reconciiation despite issues with compatibiity.8

Isamic texts can be “re-interpreted” by extracting rom the Quran; dierences

between Suras (a chapter o the Quran) were studied in Mecca and Medina, or

instance, which aowed some o the important messages o Isam to be reveaed

more than 14 centuries ago. Many Isamic schoars beieve that interpretations o

the Quran are either intended or the needs o peope at the time o the interpreta-

tion, whereas others beieve that the interpretations orm part o the unchanging

message o Isam that is intended to ast throughout history.

N’aim argues that the ormer view enabes jurists to substitute certain texts with

others which have a basis in cassica Isamic theoogy, and makes it egitimate to do

so – whie sti respecting the poitica, socia and economic context o its beievers.

Regardess o the many arguments made in the human rights debate, the cha-enge remains to strike a baance between internationa supervision o rights,

whie respecting domestic jurisdiction. This may resut in rights that are “binding”

under internationa aw, whie appication is et to the individua nation-state and

6 This is not reay egay binding yet carries poitica weight in that it brings together Musim states.7 Commony regarded as a constructivist reativist and a moderate reativist. For more inormation, see

Jason Foster, “Reverse Moderate Reativism Appied: Third generation Internationa Human Rights orm

an Isamic Perspective,” University o Berkey Press, 2004: 235.8 An-Naim beieves that the vaue o protection o internationa human rights in checking abuse o statesbest provided by UDHR and must be achieved.



76 Arab Insight

eaves room or discrepancy.

In act, whie the UDHR presents itse as a “universa” document, it contra-

dicts itse in eaving permissibe derogation oophoes by which a nation-state

can deviate rom its major principes. Accordingy, Artice IV o the Internationa

Covenant on Civi and Poitica Rights (ICCPR)9 decares that signatories are a-

owed in a situation o pubic emergency to derogate rom estabished principes

o undamenta rights, yet what is considered a egitimate reason, or emergency, is

or the state to decide.

Fexibe rues regarding reservations in the discourse on human rights are an-

other faw in the system. Musim nation-states use the priviege o expressing their

reservations as a way o eigning incusion in the human rights discourse. In the

end they may just be paying ip service to the internationa community, whie

denying their citizens both the rights granted to them by Isam and their human

rights enshrined in the UDHR. This is cearest when ooking at CEDAW,10 particu-

ary Artice XVI pertaining to amiy aw.

Reservations

According to Artice IX o the Vienna Convention on the law o Treaties, a

reservation must satisy a number o requirements in order to be hed vaid:11

A state may, when signing, ratiying, accepting, approving or acceding to a

treaty, ormuate a reservation uness:

(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

(b) the treaty provides that ony specied reservations, which do not incude

the reservation in question, may be made; or

(c) in cases not aing under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is

incompatibe with the object and purpose o the treaty.

Nevertheess, in the case o human rights treaties the issue o reservations is

controversia, since the primary beneciaries o a human rights regime are indi-

viduas and not states.

9 Internationa Covenant o Civi and Poitica Rights (1976) is one o the main constituents o the bi o rights together with the UDHR and ICESC.

10 CEDAW is the most comprehensive internationa treaty providing equa rights to men and women. It

seeks to reguate state activities, and urther aims to pace imits on private non-governmenta action.11 The reservations regime is governed by the provisions o the Vienna Convention on the law o Treaties(1969).




In its Genera Comment 24, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UN-

CHR),12 estabished under the Internationa Covenant on Civi and Poitica Rights,

ound that specic instances o reservations coud not go against the object and

purpose o the treaty in question. Moreover, the commission asserted that reser-

vations deemed invaid are nuied, rendering the state a u party to the treaty

without regard to the reservation. Finay, the commission concuded that “reserva-

tions to human rights treaties must be specic and transparent,” and that interpre-

tive decarations shoud not require domestic aw to prevai over the provisions o

the treaty.

However, there is no

monitoring too that can

orce a state to dea with its

domestic vioations.

This is apparent, or ex-

ampe, in the case o Egypt

and its nationaity aw. The

change in the nationaity aw 26/1975 seemed to be ong awaited, and aowed

women the same priviege as men when passing on citizenship rights to their chi-

dren. However, when the aw is careuy reviewed many oophoes are reveaed.

For exampe, the new amendments grant chidren born to oreign athers and

Egyptian mothers Egyptian nationaity ony when they reach the age o 21 (ater

having resided in Egypt or at east 10 years and reached a eve o prociency in

Arabic). The resut is that during their eary years, the chid does not receive the

benet o pubic education at oca ees (ike Egyptians), or other entitements.

Prior to this ega amendment, Egypt had expained its reservation to Artice

IX as a way o averting insecurity and a prejudicia uture or chidren who carry

dua nationaity. However, this argument contradicts itse since chidren o Egyp-

tian men married to oreign women are automaticay entited to dua nationaity– without the restrictions imposed by Egyptian aw. The argument urther em-

phasizes that changing the status quo o amiy aw vioates Sharia, which wi be

proven incorrect.

The Egyptian exampe goes contrary to the principes aid down in CEDAW,

and which denes discrimination against women as “... any distinction, excusion

12 Athough genera comments o the treaty-monitoring bodies are not considered binding aw, they em-body authoritative interpretations o the text o the treaty, carried out by independent experts and wideyaccepted by the internationa community.

“It would proe prolematic to integrate

Sharia without setting a margin o apprecia-

tion or limitations as no single ody o law

orms the Sharia.”



78 Arab Insight

or restriction made on the basis o sex which has the eect or purpose o impair-

ing or nuiying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective

o their marita status, on a basis o equaity o men and women, o human rights

and undamenta reedoms in the poitica, economic, socia, cutura, civi or any

other ed.”

Nonetheess, Isam aso honors commitments to treaties. In act, the rst verse

o Chapter V o the Quran makes the oowing decaration: “Oh ye who beieve!

Fu (a) obigations.” Thereore when entering into a treaty, a state is obiged to

honor Uqud (contracts or obigations) and abide by them.

Thus, even though this may be an improvement to the previous Egyptian na-

tionaity aw, it certainy does not provide equaity or women and thereore sti

vioates the CEDAW without being based on reigion. It vioates conditions o

Uqud and is considered an invaid reservation under the principes o Sharia. One

is aso orced to question whether this aw came about as a resut o internationa

pressure or i it is merey a poitica pay on reigious grounds.

Nevertheess, many Isamic schoars and states woud justiy their reservations

by arguing that CEDAW is a Western attack on Isamic countries, which secuarizes

women and ais to take into account the particuarities o Isamic cutures and the

principes o Sharia, by which amiy aw is reguated in Musim countries.

On the other hand, it woud prove probematic to integrate Sharia without

setting a margin o appreciation or imitations as no singe body o aw orms the

Sharia. To the contrary, Isamic aw, or Sharia, is based on fqh, Isamic jurispru-

dence. O particuar note, however, is the act that numerous Isamic states have

expressed reservations on the rues stipuated in Artices II and XVI o the conven-

tion and its core provisions, which aim to eiminate discrimination and incorporate

the convention into domestic poicy – and serve as the ramework in passing or

repeaing appicabe egisation.

Thereore, it is ironic that the reservations have been accepted athough theyare in cear contravention to the object and purpose o the treaty, which aims to

eiminate discrimination. Essentiay, these reservations permit discrimination and

thereore the aim to achieve equaity under the convention must be questioned.

Besides contradicting Artice XXVIII, the “impermissibiity principe” ound in

the Vienna Convention, it aso goes against the convention artice that states that

“neither traditiona, reigious or cutura practice nor incompatibe domestic aws

and poicies can justiy vioations o the convention.”

With the exception o Turkey, Yemen and Indonesia, a o the 40 Isamic coun-tries that have ratied the CEDAW have based their reservations on the principes




o Sharia. However, whie Bangadesh, Tunisia, Iraq, libya, Jordon, the Madives,

and Kuwait have expressy stated that their reservations are based on the tenets o

Sharia, other states, such as Ageria and Jordan, have not expicity mentioned the

issue o Sharia. Moreover, we wi nd that there is a signicant degree o dierence

between the reservations o each o the parties.

For exampe, Saudi Arabia has ony entered a reservation to Artice IX o the

convention, which grants equa rights to men and women to pass on nationaity to

their chidren. They have decared no reservation with regards to the other provi-

sions estabishing equaity and prohibiting discrimination on the basis o gender.

On the other extreme, the Madives entered a reservation indicating that the

convention wi be oowed except or “those principes that the government may

consider contradictory to the principes o Sharia.” Again, libya has made a gen-

era reservation against CEDAW and caims that it conficts with Isamic aws reat-

ing to “persona status derived rom the Isamic system o Sharia.”13

Reservations such as this one seek to ater, i not excude, most o the provi-

sions o the convention. This aso seems to aow space or the state party to deter-

mine what they wi accept behind a reigious mask.

Reservations on Artice XV o the convention provide another indication o the

poitica pay between reigion and inconsistent interpretations. Artice XV guaran-

tees the right to reedom o movement and domicie.

However, Egypt has entered a reservation to this cause on the basis that “ac-

cording to the Quran, the husband must choose the site o the matrimonia home

and the wie has the same domicie as her husband.”14 In act, the Quran contains

no provisions to that eect and eventuay Egypt withdrew the reservation ater

domestic aws had been changed.

Furthermore, Artice XVI which deas with marriage and amiy reations has

aso been subject to numerous detaied reservations. It stipuates that “state parties

sha take a appropriate measures to eiminate discrimination against women in amatters reating to marriage and amiy reations” and species a number o rights

that must be guaranteed to women in u equaity. One o the more controversia

provisions cited by Musim countries in the Vienna Convention is the stipuation

o equa “rights and responsibiities during marriage and at its dissoution.”

13 J. Connors, “The Women’s Convention,” in Feminism and Islam, ed. Mai Yamani and Andrew Aen (New

York: New York University Press, 1996), chap. 16.14 l. Wechman, “Isamic law: Stuck with the State?” ed. Andrew Huxey, in Religion, Law and Tradition (london: Routedge Curzon, 2002).



80 Arab Insight

At one point, Egypt had ed a reservation to Artice XVI expaining that un-

der Sharia a husband had obigations in marriage: to pay brida money, to provide

or the wie and to pay compensation in the case o divorce. In return, whie the

wie had no such obigations and retained ownership rights over property, she was

restricted by judicia deci-

sion in attaining a divorce.15

Thereore, Isam had dened

“equaity” as giving equa im-

portance to dierent roes.16

Moreover, under the

principe o Sharia, the rights

and obigations o the spous-

es may be negotiated in the

marriage contract to refect the kind o marita reations the parties woud ike to

have. They are thus ree to make the choice regarding the equaity or inequaity o

the reationship. Thereore, there is no contradiction between the rights and ree-

doms guaranteed under internationa aw and the principes o the Sharia.

However, it coud be argued that making these rights subject to negotiation

rather than being unconditiona rights puts women in an insecure position partic-

uary since societa pressures and ack o education prevent a woman rom making

too many demands in her contract.

Unortunatey, current interpretations o the Sunnah (the way o the prophet)

that are new to Isam have aowed or a weakening o women’s autonomy and

status in society. Isamic states, as the impementing agents o rights, have the ob-

igation under internationa aw to reverse negative socia conditions that serve to

entrench discrimination based on gender.

Unifcation o International Human Rights Law with the Islamic LawProponents o equaity woud then argue that human rights concentrate on

poitica justice by setting up basic standards and do not intend to repace reigious

vaues. However, they are poitica means o identiying human dignity in a egay

15 This has been atered with law 1 o Khu divorce o 2001 aowing women to annu a marriage in returnor dowry price given to her at time o marriage.

16 This is expained by Nadia Hijab as a contradiction between equaity under internationa obigations and

equaity under Isamic aw (48); or more inormation, see Nadia Hijab, “Isam, Socia Change and theReaity o Arab Women’s lives,” ed. Yvonne Haddad and John l. Esposito, in Islam, Gender, and SocialChange (New York: Oxord University Press, 1998): 45-55.

“Under the principle o Sharia, the rights

and oligations o the spouses may e nego-

tiated in the marriage contract to reect the

kind o marital relations the parties would

like to hae.”




binding way. Even though the scope o rights is imited, its infuence goes beyond

poitics and aws and this is where it can cash with cuture or reigion.

In act, codiying rights into aw makes equa rights and reedom accessibe to

a, perhaps even more on the individua eve than those attained through tradi-

tion or reigion.17

Despite the importance and infuence o rights and the overapping consensus

concept, it is sti commony argued that even i this is not a notion rejected by

Isam per se, it is a chaenge to achieve human rights in Isamic countries because

the pre-conditions o human rights are acking.

This atter point is best summarized by Fred Haiday’s incompatibiity theory.

Haiday states that Isamic cutures do not pay a supportive roe in human rights;

there exists no autonomy in society or in ega constituents o human rights prac-

tice, and there exists no secuarism because Isam does not conceive o the idea o

separation o church and state.

But as discussed earier, An-Naim does not ook at prospects o reconciiation

o Isam and human rights as a choice, but as a must. Isamic countries comprise

one-th o the word’s citizens and simpy can not be ignored. Whie Isamic states

are pressured into accepting

internationa human rights

norms, without domestic

diaogue or interna changes,

a situation arises whereby

the supposed beneciary o

rights – humans – may a

into an area where they are

not protected by Isamic aw or human rights aw.

And since human agency18 has been historicay invoved, and Isam does not

in act mean the same thing or dierent peope at dierent times, there is no rea-son why schoary ijtihad (the process o making a ega decision by independent

interpretation o the ega sources) can not take pace rom cassica text to incude

the modern human rights context.

17 Freedom, according to Kant is “the ony origina right beonging to every man by virtue o his humanity.”Quoted in Heiner Bieeedt, “Musim Voices in the Human Rights Debate,” Human Rights Quarterly 17, no.4 (1995): 587-617.

18 An-Naim taks o peope’s understanding and practice o their reigion and not the reigion as an abstractnotion. Abduah an-Naim, “The Best o Times, and the Worst o Times: Human Agency and HumanRights in Isamic Societies,” Muslim World Journal o Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2004): artice 5.

“Islamic law is thereore not stagnant and

ased on a dormant set o rules; it is ased

on fqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and is open

to interpretation.”



82 Arab Insight

This is made easier by the act that Isamic aw is based on severa sources.19

Isamic aw is thereore not stagnant and based on a dormant set o rues; it is based

on fqh (Isamic jurisprudence) and is open to interpretation.

This argument is urther supported by the act that a great impediment or

women’s rights in traditiona Isamic interpretations is the ack o women interpret-

ers o Isamic aw in Musim history. I this can be addressed today, women can

pay a strong roe in reigious strugges just as they did at the time o the Prophet.

Moreover, despite the dierent interpretations o rights in Isam and interna-

tiona norms, there are common grounds upon which to buid reconciiation. In

essence, the idea o human dignity has roots in amost a cutures and traditions,

incuding the assertion that a peope “are entited to equa respect.”20

Human dignity can provide a critica diaogue or human rights on the one

hand and cutura and reigious norms on the other.21 Both cassica Isamic aw

and human rights share the same objective o protecting human sanctity and en-

suring basic non-derogative rights that are granted to everyone by birth, irrespec-

tive o their status as Musim or non-Musim.22

Aso, both Isam and human rights vaue the principe o coectivity, even i at

varying degrees. Famiy and duty are piars in Isamic rights discourse. likewise,

Immanue Kant argued that the duty o a peope is to use pubic reason to achieve

a just society. Moreover, the notion o the amiy is emphasized in Artice XVI o

the decaration which abes the amiy as the undamenta unit in society and thus

needs to be protected by society.

Again, the coective rights concept is echoed in Artice 19 (3) o the ICCPR

and it taks o reedom o expression but imits it to respecting the rights o others

and protecting nationa order and security.

Thereore, what is required is both a degree o puraism in the human rights

debate to aow or cutura sensitivities, as we a redenition o human rights “in

an excusive Isamic ramework.”23

19 Isamic aw is based on the Quran, the text o Isam, the Sunnah, the exampe o the Prophet Muhammad.Uama (Musim schoars) interpret the Quran by means o qiyas (anaogy), ijma (consensus), and ijtihad(inteectua striving). Joee Enteis, “Internationa Human Rights: Isam’s Friends or Foe?” FordhamInternational L J 1251 (1997).

20 This idea has been echoed by many. Ai Saman in “human rights and Isam:…” portrays the Qur’anicnotion that a humans are equa as they originate rom the same creation (Addamiyah): 1. Ai Saman,“Human Rights and Isam: Some Points o Convergence and Divergence,” Rennaissance.com.pk, Paki-stan, http://www.renaissance.com.pk/octvipo2y1.htm (accessed May 1, 2007).

21 Bieeedt, “Musim Voices in the Human Rights Debate.”

22 This is derived rom the Hania Isamic schoo whereby “A Ismah A addamiyah” cover a basic rights byvirtue o birth – stated in interview with Recap Senturk on the socioogy o rights.23 Ibid.




As such, it is important to simutaneousy engage in a modern interpretation

o the principe o Sharia and a reormuation o the provisions o CEDAW to “ad-

equatey address the reaity o diverse groups o women.”

Reservations to CEDAW shoud be narrowed down ater the authenticities o

the reigious practices they are based on are anayzed. “Isam” is a abe given to

non-Isamic practices ike emae genita mutiation (FGM), honor kiings and

even terrorism, and this eads to probems with internationa codes. But these

crimes occur anywhere and have no Isamic rationae. They are a resut o tradi-

tions and not reigion.

On a parae eve, Isamic states can orm a patorm to gain goba support

in incorporating “equivaency rights” with “equaity” to hep emancipate women

without harming their identity or beies. There is an obvious gap between what

the Quran, Sunnah and Sharia speciy, and how they are practiced. A cear exampe

is in the appication o the hadd penaty (such as the severing o hands or stoning

to death).

Even though the fexibiity in appying reservations may appear to oer re-

igious puraism, it stands in the way o achieving a nexus between Sharia and

women’s rights and acts ony as a too or Musim states to orce more contro on

their peope. However, one cannot ay a the bame on a regressive interpretation

o reigious texts or patriarcha eaders.

Internationa aw that is traditionay meant to protect human rights does not

respect Isam, and thus the question is raised about the basic reaity regarding the

appication o power reations within internationa organizations.

The number and nature o reservations expressed with regard to the CEDAW

indicate the existence o a certain degree o cutura confict between internationa

obigations and reigious principes, which cannot be dismissed.

The committee estabished under the CEDAW must aso renew its approach

to state reports, particuary as it reates to cutura practices i it is to be viewedas egitimate by member states and their constituent societies. For exampe, one

commentary documented in Artice XVI condemns arranged marriages invoving

payment or preerment, which is obviousy short-sighted in the context o Isamic

marriages.

Furthermore, there is an assumption that arranged marriages in Musim soci-

eties do not invove choice or consent. Whereas marriages are oten customariy

arranged in Isam, the rues o Sharia recognize the ega capacity o both men and

women to contract their own marriages. Condemning such a signicant cuturapractice without adequate reasoning or sound ogic renders the opinion o the



84 Arab Insight

committee both irreevant and iegitimate in the eyes o Isamic societies, who see

such opinions as Western precepts.

This urther encourages doube standards and paradoxes on the ground. On

the one hand, the Egyptian state aowed or divorce out o Urf24 marriage (a mar-

riage without an ocia contract) with the 2000 Khul aw (in which women gained

the abiity to ask or divorce).25 Urf marriage aows or marriage at any age ater

the onset o puberty, provided that the consent o the gir has been attained.

Previousy, Urf marriage had not been recognized by the Egyptian state. How-

ever, with the new aw, the

state is indirecty recognizing

Urf marriage by being orced

to accept any subsequent re-

quest or annument. The

consequence is that the aw

now provides ega redress

or the gir and her chid (i

there is one), especiay since

this type o marriage sti takes pace. Sti, it does not recognize the age o marriage

which is a provision or this kind o marriage. It can thereore be assumed that

the age o marriage being set at 16 came as a resut o internationa pressure as it

remains a aw on paper ony (in practice it has not changed).

Simiary, the UN Commission or Human Rights was wrong to abe as dis-

criminatory “any aw or custom that grants men a right to a greater share o prop-

erty ... on the death o a reative.” It is naïve to perceive this as inequaity towards

women, because in traditiona Isamic cuture the man is required to provide or

the amiy. I inheritance was made equa or both genders without changing the

context o appication, or exampe, this woud be a discrimination against men.

Men woud receive an equa share o inheritance, whie being simutaneousy ex-pected to carry the burden o providing or the amiy.

As the context stands, it can be ooked at as positive discrimination towards

women. A woman is entited to her own property rights, as we as being abe to

receive in her ietime any gits in the orm o money and sti have a stake in in-

heritance, whereas the man is required to share what he has.

24 A reigiousy accepted customary marriage that has not been previousy recognized by the state.25 lynn Wechman, “Egypt: New dea on Divorce,” The International Survey o Family Law (2004): 123-142.

“A woman is entitled to her own property

rights, as well as eing ale to receie in her

lietime any gits in the orm o money and

still hae a stake in inheritance, whereas

the man is required to share what he has.”




It can be argued that the context in which this aw existed made it possibe to

oer ihsan to women that needed it; but the context has now changed, and eco-

nomic reaities are making it harder to support a the women in a househod. The

question arises then, wi this arrangement ai?

To entertain the idea o changing behavior where both partners in a marriage

woud be equa contributors woud take generations o education, and may not be

accepted by the majority.

The Isamic principe o “equitabiity,” thus provides a denition o the signi-

cance o equay important roes or both genders and may dier in nature rom the

modern understanding o equaity. Nevertheess, this is an indication o puraity

o interpretation which shoud be respected in the internationa context. In order

or CEDAW to make progress or a women, it must make progress to understand

the Isamic notion o equity.

Notwithstanding these probems, the ack o internationa enorcement mecha-

nisms or human rights makes it dicut to compe nation-states to be responsibe

actors. Naim beieves that advocates on the ground have to gain oca support and

motivate popuations through their cuture to orm pressures against their govern-

ments and ensure the enorcement o human rights treaties.26

An opposing view, based on a critique o An-Naim’s moderate cutura reativ-

ism concept that accepts cutura dierence but paces internationa norms as the

benchmark to be achieved (which may have underying neo-cooniaist impica-

tions), beittes the appication o human rights norms. This opposing view aso

introduces a reverse paradigm o moderate reativism, where the concept o duties

in Isamic discourse can be a better enorcement mechanism to human rights.

This theory proposes beginning with other ega systems as the benchmark to be

reached in internationa human rights aw.27

Aso, An-Naim’s supposition that Isamic aw is open to change whie the hu-

man rights benchmark that he hopes to reach is based on a stagnant document, theUDHR, or imited to the UN Bi o Rights, weakens the argument.

Moreover, An-Naim does not give a ramework o methodoogy or re-inter-

pretation o reigious texts, or who shoud carry them out. It coud be argued, or

26 Abduah an-Naim, “Isam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universaity Debate,” lecture given on theoccasion o the 94th Annua Meeting o the American Society o Internationa law, Apri 2000, http:// www.asi.org.

27 The exampe around which this theory is ormed is third generation soidarity rights, in terms o howIsamic concepts o duties can be used to infuence understanding third generation rights in the humanrights debate. See Foster, “Reverse Moderate Reativism Appied,” 1-7.



86 Arab Insight

exampe, that on the poitica eve, re-interpretation is aready taking pace, but

without genuine reigious motivation.

lega reorms in Musim countries in the area o amiy aw, ike divorce, and

restrictions on poygamy have been interpreted dierenty, yet they a consider

themseves governed by Isamic aw.

Musim governments choose to turn a bind eye to some interpretations o

Isamic texts ike the hadd penaty and Rhibba (which invove crimes that directy

disobey the aw o God, and or which perpetrators are given the most severe pun-

ishments), and choose to compy with others reating to women.

Thereore, buiding on An-Naim’s vaue or reconciiation o human rights and

Isam through the support o cuture, and Jason Foster’s reverse moderate reativ-

ism theory o taking other ega systems as benchmarks to enhance the cross-cu-

tura diaogue o human rights, a proposition is put orward where cuture is not

used ony as a support o human rights, but as a methodoogy to dene and set

better principes to provide cearer denitions and provide imitations that shoud

encourage compiance.

One can extract a dierent imitation device simiar to the margin o apprecia-

tion doctrine used by the European Court o Justice that is ound in the Isamic

stye o Ijma’a, or majority consensus. The our schoos in Isamic aw have oten

diered in their ruings on certain issues, ike the age o chid custody, where each

has their own interpretation.

By anaogy, principes ike “equaity” in CEDAW, or “the best interest principe”

in the CRC,28 can be dened by imitations set by regions (ike the our Isamic

schoos) that woud provide each state party with dierent benchmarks or each

issue given the dierent options as is in ijtihad, whie sti ensuring at east the

minimum standards o human rights are attained rom which a state cannot devi-

ate, ike the Isamic pubic poicy issues that are centra to a schoos. This coud

be monitored by the committee that monitors state party reports to its respectiveconventions.

28 Convention on the Rights o the Chid, United Nations, Oce o the High Commissioner on HumanRights, http://www.unhchr.ch/htm/menu3/b/k2crc.htm.

29 Quran Sura 4:1 reads: “O peope! Revere God who created you rom one sou and created out o it hermate and spread rom them many men and women; and revere God, through whom your demand yourmutua rights, and the wombs (that bore you), (or) God watches you.”




Conclusion

In essence, both Isam and internationa aw aim to protect human dignity. The

ethica voice o Isam shows cear equaity between men and women in the eyes o

God,29 as is guaranteed by poitica and civi rights in the ramework o internation-

a aw. However, the rights o peope toward each other and toward Isamic society,

may raise probems in the interpretation o the notion o “equaity.” In that sense,

rights in Isam can be compared to the economic, socia, and cutura rights where

the anguage is vague, and are usuay considered as secondary rights in human

rights discourse, compared to

poitica and civi rights.

In appication, cuture

pays a pivota roe in sup-

porting human rights and

may in some cases re-assess

and re-dene its norms. Unti

reconciiation occurs between

the two, at best states wi be orced (through internationa conventions) to accept

human rights on paper (in their written aws as seen above), whie in practice

nothing wi change.

In order to avoid this situation, whie being mindu to avoid orcing human

rights on nations in a way that resuts in a oss o cuture in the process, we need

to engage in a goba diaogue on human rights to achieve standards that are a re-

fection o a societies. Unti this can happen, however, the impementation o the

current human rights standards on a parae basis shoud not be hated, as they do

pace some sort o reaction to human rights vioations wordwide.30 An anaogy can

be made here with the domestic situation in Musim countries.

Many consider the Internationa Bi o Rights, which was drated in Western

countries, to be based on ideas that have roots in Christianity and Western history.However, it is men in Musim countries that initiay made and sti make the aw.

Women’s perspectives are not incuded in the ormuation o these aws. leaders

in Musim countries can and must take part in the internationa diaogue about

human rights. At the same time, women in Musim countries must be active par-

ticipants in the aw-making process in their countries.

In Isam, women have been granted many undamenta reedoms, and their

30 Bieeedt, “Musim Voices in the Human Rights Debate.”

“Many consider the International bill o

Rights, which was drated in Western coun-

tries, to e ased on ideals that hae roots

in Christianity and Western history.”



88 Arab Insight

status was eevated at the time o the Prophet to unprecedented eves. The sub-

sequent regression that took pace was not because o the principes inherent in

Isam, but because o the regressive interpretations o the reigious texts that were

carried out by patriarcha schoars. Many o these individuas wanted to maintain

the status quo and cose the door to ijtihad and independent reasoning. Today, that

has spied out into the choice o eaders o the states to ratiy internationa treaties

deaing with women’s rights. A soution requires the removing o the “vei” paced

on women in patriarcha societies by poitica expediency and providing a niche

where both human rights activists and Musim schoars can interact and achieve a

set o standards to protect the rights o those individuas.

More importanty, human rights norms must not be taken at ace vaue without

critica evauation and review; norms shoud be open to cutura questioning and

must activey reorm to create an overapping consensus.



THE EVENTS OF SEPT. 11, 2001, made Isam a domestic concern in the West.

Ater having viewed it as ony a oreign, reigious source o agitation, the West now

views Isam as a source o poitica and miitary threats.

An opinion po conducted by the Pew Research Center or the Peope and

the Press in Juy 2005 showed that a majority o Americans and Europeans are

concerned about the goba rise o Isamic extremism. The po covered 17 coun-

tries, and showed that 75 percent o citizens in the United States and European

countries such as Britain, France, Germany, Hoand, Spain and Russia are worried

about Isamic extremism around the word. Most o those poed in America, the

European states, and India described Isam as the most vioent reigion out o a ist

that incuded Isam, Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism. A tota o 87 percent o

the French and 88 percent o the Dutch poed considered Isam the most vioent

o a reigions.

A tota o 22 percent o those poed in the United States indicated that they

hed a negative view o Isam, compared to 57 percent who expressed a positive

view. In France, 34 percent o those poed said they had a negative perception o

Isam, compared to 64 percent who expressed a positive view o it. A majority o

those poed in European states said they sensed that Isamic identity is on the rise

in their countries, a phenomenon they considered a negative deveopment.1

A Response to Western views

o Islamist Moements

radwan ziadahDirector o the Damascus Center or Human Rights Studies

89



90 Arab Insight

Negative image o Islam

The image o Isam as refected by this po can be described as extremey nega-

tive. Perhaps this stems rom poitica and historica causes reaching much urther

back than the events o Sept. 11. Yet the subsequent, more deepy entrenched

negativity since then has ikey produced poicies that aim to respond to such

negative perceptions, but indirecty refect them. Take, or exampe, the manner in

which the Danish government deat with the Prophet Muhammad cartoon crisis,

which was a natura reac-

tion stemming rom West-

ern preconceptions about

Isam.

The construction o

such an image stems pri-

mariy rom the arbitrary

judgments issued by the

Western media and the poitica, inteectua and cutura eite standing behind it.

Maise Ruthven, a Scottish writer and historian on reigion, undamentaism, and

especiay Isamic aairs, or exampe, bames Isamic aiures on ruptures within

Isamic societies as embodied in the break between a traditiona past and higher

education with its Western, civi content. The shaken identity o these societies

eads them to pay a pivota roe in hosting various orms o cashes between Isam

and the West.2

Another exampe is Fred Haiday, who hods that a undamentaist move-

ments, and not ony Isamic ones, are inimica to both modernism and democracy

because they reject the “other” on principe. They combine reigious and ethnic

identities matched by hatred or the “other” that brings them coser to espousing

racism.3 He breaks with Ruthven in stressing that undamentaist movements are

not concerned with deveopment or gobaization, but rather they unne theirury toward their ruers, toward mora corruption, and toward the West and Israe.

Their vision o the West is based on their view o themseves and the word. More

precisey, it stems rom their view o their own identity, which has become soey

reigious.

“The negatie image o Islam stems primarily

rom the aritrary judgments issued y the

Western media and the political and intellec-tual elite standing ehind it.”

1 See Al-Safr , Beirut, Juy 15, 2005.2 Maise Ruthven, A Fury or God: The Islamist Attack on America. (london: Granta Books, 2002).3 Fred Ha iday, Two Hours that Shook the World. (london: Saqi Books, 2002).



A Response to Western Views 9

Yet some go urther in their anaysis, reading into the socia and poitica back-

ground that has aowed the rise o poitica Isam. This background is represented

by the coapse o modernization pans ed by the Arab regimes oowing indepen-

dence in the 1950s, as we as their aiure to iberate Paestine. This ed to the Pa-

estinian cause gaining greater importance in the Arab and Isamic consciousness.

This was oowed by the aiure o socio-economic deveopment, refected signi-

canty in the rise o poverty and the dwinding iving standards o citizens in the

Arab and Isamic words. This was accompanied by the urther growth o various

orms o absoute poitica domination that vary rom one Arab state to the next,

but that are simiar in their aiure to achieve any sort o democratic advancement.

This deteriorating situation was aso accompanied by Israe’s rise as a regiona mii-

tary, economic, and technoogica orce and the aiure o Arabs to respond to any

o the criticisms eveed against Israe. A o this created an environment condu-

cive to the growth o reigiosity that permeated the rura poor and midde casses,

in turn creating ertie ground or the growth o extremist currents within viages

and impoverished neighborhoods.4

Whie Osama bin laden oered an aternative through the rise o extremist

Isam, his vision was imited to the eite and the vanguard. It was not entirey the

case with regard to the pubic or its oowers, most o whom were raised in sums

with nothing – neither water, nor work opportunities, nor heathcare, nor any-

thing ese.

This brings us to the di-

visions o poitica Isam and

the serious chaenges posed

by the standards or methods

on which these divisions are

based. Dierences are ound

in inteectua and ideoogicaorientations, as we as those stemming rom various geographic areas and others

reated to poitica positions and views. Yet most o the sanctioned divisions and

standards by which researchers sort Isamist movements rest upon their position

towards vioence or extremism. This standard ocuses on the poitica eect o

these movements and either their abiity to change through peaceu means or their

adoption o various orms o vioence, the atest maniestation o which has been

4 Francois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam. (london: I.B. Taurus, 2003).

“Western studies that classiy Islamist

moements ocus on the act that there is

a mainstream ersion that is characterized

y tolerance and moderation.”



92 Arab Insight

intercontinenta vioence as represented by the attacks o Sept. 11.

Searching or either deep-rooted or supercia dierences between Isamist

movements surey springs rom a poitica sentiment stipuating separate deaings

with each movement on the basis o its popuarity, eectiveness and infuence on

the street. These actors might make overooking them, or even choosing to ignore

or condone them, oohardy because it woud not treat the root causes or their

growth or their rising popuarity that is “rea,” as opposed to the orms o popu-

ar mobiization some Arab regimes impose upon their societies. Such popuarity

is rauduent and used to ensure society’s submission, compeing it to vaidate

“truths” presented by the regime.

In genera, most o the studies that cassiy Isamist movements ocus on the

act that there is a mainstream version that is characterized by toerance and mod-

eration. This is what traditiona Isamic schoarship cas “Isam o the majority,”

rom which exampes are drawn in many o the schoary works on Isamic aw

when reerence is made to the Musim masses. Sunni, or Orthodox Isam, is thus

the midde way. The others are spinter groups the extent o whose Isamism can

be measured by their proximity to the Isam o the majority in the way o beies

and practices.5

And thus we nd many Western poiticians, incuding U.S. President George

W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Bair, describing a-Qaida as an organiza-

tion that has hijacked Isam rom its primary adherents, having diverged rom the

genera guideines o Isam that mandate moderation, toerance, and the disavowa

o vioence.

As or the West in genera, with the exception o some right-wing parties and

personaities, it does not have a probem with Isam as a reigion or the peope who

proess it. Yet it has suered, particuary oowing the bombings that took pace

in london and Madrid, rom those who hod a specia understanding o Isam they

beieve aows adherents to ki their enemies due to dierences over poitica, in-teectua, reigious and ideoogica views. The coverage these individuas received

in the media – especiay considering that they were raised among Western, ibera

vaues in the major Western cities o london, Paris and Madrid – has caused a

setback by uneashing a ear o Isam and its oowers.

This scenario has varied depending on the degree to which the peope o a

given country have experience with puraism and concepts o cutura dierence.

5 Radwan A-Sayyid, “Contemporary Isam: Its inteectua and poitica currents and cutura transorma-tions around the word,” london, Apri 9, 2005.




It aso depends on the country’s understanding o itse. For instance, there is a

signicant dierence between the Musims o Britain and those o France and their

roe and infuence in their respective societies.

Searching or mainstream Islam

During the ast three decades, the West’s ocus has been on Shiite Isam, which

has generay been considered more o a threat than other brands o Isam. Now,

however, the Western ocus is directed at Sunni activity, and most Western ear

stems rom the perception o Sunni Isam as strict and undamentaist.6

The Internationa Crisis Group’s (ICG) report “Understanding Isamism” a-

rms that the term “poitica Isam” is o American origin and came into use o-

owing the Iranian Revoution, athough this supposes that there was an apoitica

Isam unti Khomeini suraced and turned everything upside down, ater which

Isam became a orce in the poitica ie o the Midde East.7

The ICG report attempts to categorize the main currents in Sunni Isamist

activity in a manner that goes beyond a simpied and discriminatory cassica-

tion o “extremist” and “moderate.” Instead, it distinguishes between movements

on the basis o the beies hed by their oowers. These beies incude dierent

characterizations o the probems aced by Isamic societies and dierent views

on Isamic aw, as we as dierent conceptions o poitica, reigious and miitary

issues that require action. The report aso denes the type o activity movements

consider egitimate or appropriate. In other words, it reies on criteria that can

orm a source o dierence and over which goas are in many cases contradictory.

This approach is undamentay dierent rom the traditiona distinction between

Sunni and Shiite; it is a distinction between the orms o contemporary Isam more

than that between historica Isamic traditions. The presence o such a distinction

within the ranks o Sunni Isam in particuar is a reativey new deveopment that

is not yet compete. It appears to be an ongoing process, as noted in the report.8 The report spits Sunni Isamist currents into three primary orientations. The

rst is termed poitica Isamism, in that these movements prioritize poitica activ-

ity over reigious proseytism. They seek to gain power through poitica means

and not vioence, in particuar through organizing themseves as poitica parties.

6 Internationa Crisis Group, “Understanding Isamism,” Midde East/North Arica Report, no. 37, March2, 2005.

7 Ibid.8 Ibid.



94 Arab Insight

The primary exampe o this current is the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt and its

various branches, particuary those in Jordan and Ageria.

The second current incudes both revivaist and undamentaist missionary ac-

tivism. Movements in this category avoid direct poitica activity and neither seek

power nor cassiy themseves as poitica parties. Rather, they ocus on missionary

activity such as preaching to reinorce or revive beie. Exampes incude the Saa

movement9 that is widespread in the Arab word and the Tabigh movement,10

which was ounded in 1926 in India and has since spread throughout the word.

The third current is that o the jihadists, activists committed to vioence be-

cause they are concerned with what they consider the deense o Isam, and in

some cases the expansion o its dominion. This current comprises two primary

groups. The rst is the jihadist saas, comprising peope with a undamenta-

ist outook who have been mobiized as extremists and who eschew non-vioent

activity reated to preaching in order to join the ranks o armed jihad. The other

group is the Qutbists, activists infuenced by the radica thought o Sayyid Qutb,

an Egyptian thinker and writer who is oten credited with providing an ideoogica

basis or vioence in the name o reigion, though this contention can be debated.

In the beginning they were prepared to wage jihad against the “near enemy,” the

oca regimes they described as indes, particuary in Egypt. This was beore re-

directing their jihad to the outside word, against the “distant enemy,” in particuar

Israe and the West, ed by the United States.11

The report issued by the U.S.-based Rand Corporation in 2003 tited “Civi

Democratic Isam: Partners, Resources and Strategies” cassies contemporary Is-

amic currents into our groups: secuarists, undamentaists, traditionaists and

modernists. It denes the positions o these currents towards a number o primary

issues, incuding democracy and human rights, poygamy, pena measures and Is-

amic justice, minorities and the status o women. It concudes with an attempt to

orm a recommended strategy or the United States based on identiying partnersin the deveopment o democratic Isam, which it views as accepting American

vaues and particuary those o democracy.12

The Carnegie Endowment or Internationa Peace report entited “Isamist

Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab Word: Exporing Gray Zones,”

9 The term “saa movement” generay reers to those movements committed to a undamentaist interpre-tation o the Quran and the sayings o the Prophet Muhammad.

10 The Tabigh movement is generay considered to be an apoitica socia movement that seeks to bringabout a spiritua reviva among Musims.

11 Ibid.12 A-Sayyid Yassin, “The American Roots to a Theory o a libera Isam,” in Al-Nahhar, Beirut, Juy 25,

2004.




dierentiates between Isamist movements based on whether or not they empoy

vioence. It hods that the moderate Isamist movements, and not the radica ones,

wi have the greatest infuence on uture poitica deveopments in the Midde

East. It denes these moderate movements as those that have eschewed vioence

and ormay renounced it, and which seek to reach their goas through peaceu

poitica activity. The most important o these movements are the Musim Brother-

hood and its various derivatives, the Moroccan Justice and Deveopment Party, the

Isamic Action Front in Jordan, and the Reorm Party in Yemen, among others.13

The report admits the imitations o this dierentiation, and stresses that it

does not assume that these movements are uy committed to democracy, that they

have reinquished their goa o making Isamic aw a basis or a egisation, or that

they accept u equaity or women. What the report reers to as “grey zones” in

the thought o Isamic movements are the resuts o the contradiction ound in the

moderate Isamist movements’ purposeu reusa to openy decare their positions

on thorny Isamic issues. This is done so as not to aggravate the West or ose their

reputations as moderate movements. Yet the report aso recognizes a quaitative

deveopment within these movements’ thought and in their poitica strategies.14

The United States Institute o Peace has issued severa reports on ijtihad, the

eort to exercise reason in interpreting Isamic aw in a contemporary context, and

on deaings with Isamists. It considers one o the primary reasons or the aiure

o Musims to reconcie Isam and modernism as the act that ijtihad, within the

circes o Sunni Isam, has been hated or centuries. Despite this, however, there

have been attempts to interpret Isam’s diviney reveaed texts in ight o modern

acts and knowedge. In order or ijtihad to succeed in any society, democracy and

the reedom o opinion must prevai.15 As such, a separate report authored by the

Rand Corporation directs U.S. oreign poicy to support “Isamic renewa,” or those

initiatives characterized by Isamic moderation and that adopt programs based

upon reigious reorm and renewa within the Isamic arena.16 The Rand Corpora-tion report aso suggests that U.S. oreign poicy shoud generay encourage dipo-

macy towards the Isamic word.

13 Carnegie Endowment or Internationa Peace, “Isamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab Word: Exporing Gray Zones,” Carnegie Paper No. 67, March 2006.

14 Ibid.15 The United States Institute o Peace, “Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Isamic Principes or the Twenty-rst Cen-

tury,” Specia Report No. 125, 7, August 2004.16 Abdesam M. Maghraoui, “American Foreign Poicy and Isamic Renewa,” United States Institute o

Peace Specia Report No. 164, June 2006.



96 Arab Insight

This atter recommendation was adopted in the most recent pubication o

the Deense Science Board o the U.S. Deense Department. It warned that any

pan or open reations must be buit on a strategic basis and attempt to expain

its dipomacy to the Isamic word by stressing that their embracing o moderation

does not mean submitting to the American way. It aso caed or distinguishing the

majority o Musims who do not practice vioence rom those extremist Musims

who embrace the idea o jihad.17

This has materiaized in U.S. support or the spread o democracy in the Mid-

de East despite the act that Isamists recenty swept the eections in Egypt, Iraq

and Paestine – a deveopment that ed Ayman a-Zawahiri, a eader in the a-Qaida

organization, to condemn the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt or its participation in

the eections. The United States attempted to take advantage o this apparent rup-

ture and empoy it to deepen the dierences between moderate movements on the

one hand and the a-Qaida organization and the extremist movements that support

it on the other, so as to benet and egitimize the “war on terrorism.”18

The democratic victory recenty gained by Isamist movements has driven the

United States to orm a “strategic vision” based on the encouragement o poitica

reorm in the Arab region despite the ikeihood that such reorm coud strengthen

the infuence o orces inimica to America and the West. U.S. Secretary o State

Condoeezza Rice stressed that this act refects a necessary transition period prior

to the reaization o poitica regimes that are more stabe and open to the West.

Regimes aowing or some reorm woud reap benets that coud incude the abi-

ity to oer better choices to their peopes and the opportunity to estabish more

constructive reations with the rest o the word.19

And thus, Bush vowed to continue supporting poitica reorm in the Midde

East, even i its resuts run counter to the wishes o Washington. He stated, “The

ony way to deeat the terrorists is to deeat their dark vision o hatred and ear by

oering the hopeu aternative o poitica reedom and peaceu change.” Yet heaso admitted that the choices decided by the region’s peope woud not aways

17 Al-Mustaqbal, Beirut, Nov. 26, 2004.18 See the speech o U.S. Secretary o State Condoeezza Rice at the United States Institute o Peace, in which

she described the situation between America and the Isamic word as being a reationship in which theUnited States has gone to war ve times since the end o the Cod War to hep Musims. “Without excep-tion, these were wars o iberation and o reedom.” Quoted in Al-Safr, Beirut, Aug. 20, 2004.

19 George W. Bush, State o the Union Address by the President, United States Capito, Washington, D.C., Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateotheunion/2006/.

20 Ibid.




conorm with American views, or “democracies in the Midde East wi not ook

ike our own, because they wi refect the traditions o their own citizens.”20

This is the position the European Union aso ormed oowing major resis-

tance. It now hods that one must enter into diaogue with Isamist opposition

organizations in the Midde East to encourage a transormation towards democracy.

This was stressed in a report issued by the oreign ministers o the European Union

in luxembourg, which opened by noting that the EU had in the past preerred to

dea with the secuar inteigentsia o Arab civi society at the expense o the more

representative Isam-inspired organizations. It thus convinced the EU o the neces-

sity o opening a diaogue with “Isamic ‘aith-based’ civi society” in Arab states.21

Overa, this European-American congruence on the inevitabiity o deaing

with Isamist movements can be considered a strategic move, especiay i one con-

siders the disparities that have in the past characterized American and European

views on their deaings with Isamism.

21 Al-Mustaqbal, Beirut, Apri 17, 2005.





THE BlENDING OF PROSElYTIZING WITH POlITICS comprises one o the

oremost diemmas acing Isamist movements throughout the word. The phe-

nomenon has caused considerabe debate and discussion among poitica orces

who resent the Isamists’ monopoization and use o the reigion card. Under the

banner o Isam, some Isamist movements are abe to gain an immense edge in

the poitica arena, despite having no other quaications. Other, more mission-

ary Isamist groups, have aso strugged to dene the ne ine between reigion

and poitics. In some cases, reigiousy-inspired activities have been vunerabe to

restrictions and security campdowns on the grounds that they orm a back door

through which poitica Isamists practice their poitics.By anayzing past poitica eections, we can see exampes o how some Is-

amists tried to encourage voters to use reigion as a deciding actor when they cast

their baots. The most recent exampe was the Egyptian pariamentary eections,

in which reigion exercised a strong presense. Members o the Musim Brother-

hood constituted a arge portion o the candidate poo and won one-th o the

seats in pariament; they used an unprecedented amount o campaign sogans and

speeches heaviy dominated by reigious symbos and rhetoric.

It is not the intent o this artice to enter the interminabe debate over themixture o reigion with poitics, nor is it an attempt to argue against or or the

Separating Islam rom Political Islam:

The Case o Morocco

hussam tamam Editor o the Cultural Page, Arabic section, or Isamonine.net, and an expert o

political Islam.

99



00 Arab Insight

right o Isamic orces to maniest their reigious identity in the course o poitica

competition. However, I woud ike to use the exampe o two organizations in

Morocco that highight the ne ine between reigion and poitics and iustrate

the way a distinction can be made between the two within an Isamist movement.

It aso iustrates how both a poitica movement and a reigious movement can

become dominant orces within an Isamic society without one overstepping the

boundaries o the other.

The Moroccan Unication and Reorm Movement (MUR) is an Isamic mis-

sionary organization aiated with the Justice and Deveopment Party (PJD),

though the groups are independent rom one another. MUR is the argest o a the

Isamist actions that have agreed to participate in and adhere to the rues o the

poitica process in Morocco, unike the Justice and Benevoence Society, which is

organizationay stronger and has a wider oowing, but boycotts the Moroccan

poitica order in its entirety.

The MUR was ounded approximatey 10 years beore a number o Isamist

orces, notaby the Isamic Future league and the Reorm and Renovation Society,

came together or a process o ideoogica introspection, triggered by the wave o

poitica vioence in the 1970s invoving some o their members. Ater the meeting,

the MUR became their way o ociay repairing their rupture with the miitant

approach o A-Chabiba A-Isamiya (the Isamic Youth Society) and showing their

dedication toward peaceu poitica action. In their rst attempt to egitimize the

organization within the poitica system, they sought to estabish themseves as

a poitica party caed the Nationa Renovation Party; however, the government

rejected their appication. Then, in 1996, the group’s eaders made a historica

pact with Dr. Abdekrim a-Khatib, the eader o the Popuar Democratic and Con-

stitutiona Movement (MPDC). The MPDC was restructured to incorporate MUR

members and renamed the Justice and Deveopment Party (PJD).

Athough the MUR and the MPDC disagreed over the extent o their reation-ship and its impact on the poitica poicy o the MPDC, they did agree to deer

deiberations over the probem o bending proseytizing and poitics unti ater the

1997 pariamentary eections.

In 1998, inspired by its eectora successes, the MUR movement began to de-

veop a more cear perception o its reationship with the PJD. In the process, MUR

eaders began to show their incination or keeping the dissemination o their beies,

moras, and the genera shaping o society as their main unctions, and to deer to

the party as the organizationa ramework or the pursuit o poitica aairs. Ater the Casabanca bombings on May 16, 2003, some ibera members with-



Separating Islam from Political Islam 0

in the PJD partiay bamed the MUR or heping to give rise to terrorism. As a

response, MUR eaders urgenty began to reassess the infuence o reigion within

the movement and the reationship between Isam and poitics within the party.

MUR eaders concuded that they wanted a greater distinction between the two, a

systematic dierentiation between Isamist missionary action and poitica action.

It was decided that this process woud be engineered poiticay by PJD Genera-

Secretary Saadedine Othmani and organizationay by MUR eader Mohammed

a-Hamdawi.

This new strategic orienta-

tion was ideoogicay and theo-

reticay couched in a document

caed “Poitica Participation

and the Reationship Between

the Movement [MUR] and the

Party [PJD].” The document had

been the subject o extensive deiberations within MUR since 2003 and was uno-

ciay reeased in 2006.

Based on knowedge o the centra concepts o the new orientation and in-

terviews with severa o its architects, the dierentiation between reigious and

poitica advocacy within the movement has matured consideraby at the theoreti-

ca eve. Consequenty, there are strong indications that the theory has taken root

within the movement and put into action.

In the course o investigating this pioneering experiment on the part o an

Isamist movement, I met with Dr. Mohammed Yatim, both a prodigious schoar

and an ardent poitica activist. He serves as the deputy chairman o the MUR and

is a member o the genera-secretariat o the PJD. To a considerabe extent, Yatim

serves as the chie theorist or both organizations and is the person argey respon-

sibe or aying the phiosophica oundations or the move toward demarking theboundaries between his movement’s reigious mission and the poitica spheres in

which it acts. He has authored numerous schoastic studies and artices incuding:

Islamic Action and Approach to Civilizational Change and The Islamist Movement: Be-

tween Proselytism and Politics.

Yatim states that because his movement is grounded on the principe o the a-

encompassing nature o Isam, it strives to be equay comprehensive in its aims.

It seeks, or exampe, to participate in the reaization o Isamic tenets concerning

the individua, the amiy, the community, the state and the Isamic nation. It asoseeks to contribute to the shaping o society as a whoe. However, this comprehen-

“MUR is the largest o all the Islamist

actions that hae agreed to participate

in and adhere to the rules o the political

process in Morocco.”



02 Arab Insight

siveness has not binded the movement to the act that it is ony one o many con-

tributors to the estabishment o an Isamic state. In addition, as Yatim’s movement

regards Morocco as an Isamic state with a vast record o historic achievements or

the advancement o Isam, he presents the movement as ony a compiment – not

an aternative – to other experiences.

The MUR’s eds o operation are as diverse as its mission is broad: it works with

individuas and with groups, engages in poitica, economic, and socia work, as we

as cutura and inteectua activities. In act, it operates in neary the entire gamut

o intersections between hu-

man activities and Isam.

The diversity o the

movement’s activities and

the breadth o its goas ne-

cessitates separation between

what Yatim cas the primary

unctions o the movement (proseytism, incucation o vaues, mora ormation)

and what he reers to as speciaized activities (a other activities). The primary unc-

tions are those that dene the movement itse – its caing and its raison d’être – and

are what aows the movement to cooperate with a ike-minded entities, whether

they be the state or other movements and infuentia bodies. The speciaized ac-

tivities, by contrast, are those that reside outside the scope o the movement’s core

reigious caing. They incude, or exampe, invovement in poitics, socia work

(phianthropic societies), and workers’ rights advocacy. Whie operating within the

ideoogica ramework o the movement, these activities must be organizationay

distinct. Yatim dened the reationship between the MUR (embodying the pursuit

o the movement’s primary unctions) and the PJD (which articuates its specic

poitica unction) in a singe sentence: the two “converge in rame o reerence and

compement each other but are unctionay separate.”MUR eader Mohammed a-Hamdawi views the reationship between his move-

ment and the PJD in simiar terms. He sees it as a partnership between two inde-

pendent institutions, or a strategic coaboration between an Isamic missionary

movement and a poitica party. Both the movement and the poitica Party share

the same ideoogica rame o reerence, but operate dierenty at the structura

eve. To hep the pubic understand this reationship, he compares it to a simiar

situation among environmentaists. A environmentaists share the same overarch-

ing goa: to protect and conserve the environment. However, on an organizationaeve, a unction in dierent ways. Some organizations ocus on advocacy, where-

“The dierentiation etween religious and

political adocacy within MUR has matured

consideraly at the theoretical leel.”




as others work on a more poitica eve. Yet others ocus on ony certain aspects

o conservation – widie or cimate, etc. In the same way, the MUR and the PJD

are structuray dierent yet dedicated to a common endeavor: the estabishment

o the Isamic state.

The concept in practice

In spite o the act that 80 percent o PJD members are aso MUR members

– representing some 30 percent o its active membership – MUR eaders have been

keen on sustaining a tota separation between the movement and the party at the

administrative eve.

Current MUR eader Mohammed a-Hamdawi was a PJD member, but resigned

his membership when eected as chie o the MUR. Expaining his decision to ed

himse as MUR eader, a-Hamdawi said that he wanted both the MUR and the

PJD to have modern eadership, as previousy the movement’s eadership consisted

o mae eders and eaders with theoogica backgrounds, whereas a-Hamdawi

was a student o engineering. He et that i he was going to serve in the MUR

eadership, it was necessary to resign rom the party so as to rearm the party’s

independence rom the movement. In a simiar spirit, the head o the PJD, Saaded-

dine a-Othmani, was not considered a candidate or the MUR’s executive board

(the movement’s highest authority) even though he remained a member o the

movement’s eected Shura Counci.

The movement now devotes itse to the administration o its subsidiary insti-

tutions, in a manner simiar to other civi society organizations, and its directives

are considered binding ony within the ream o these institutions’ activities. On

poitica orientation and positions, the PJD takes precedence over the MUR and

the movement’s eaders ask that members who aso are members o the PJD deer

to the party’s hierarchica rameworks or poitica guidance. The PJD aso has its

own autonomous eadership (embodied in the Shura Counci and an executivebureau), and its own eectora processes or seecting and reguating this eader-

ship. The most the movement invoves itse in the activities o the party is when

it hods genera discussions o poitica matters in MUR Shura Counci meetings,

though it rerains rom intervening in the party’s genera poicies. leadership rom

neither party is obigated to the other. In order to arm their independence even

urther and to impress its membership, the MUR newspaper requenty pubishes

ocia etters to the PJD genera-secretary, iustrating the separation between the

two parties.In addition, the MUR opposes reigious soganeering in poitica party activity.



04 Arab Insight

It ears that its mission wi benet rom poitics in the ong run but that it wi be

jeopardized by direct invovement in daiy poitics. Interestingy, a-Hamdawi aso

beieves that Isamic poitica action wi eventuay subside in the ong run, not

necessariy out o an inherent probem o its own, but as a consequence o the aws

o socia evoution and the ogic o democracy. As a-Hamdawi put it, “In the most

advanced democracies, a poitica patorm asts no more than one or two terms,

ater which it recedes and yieds to an aternative.”

During the ast Egyptian

pariamentary eection – in

which reigious soganeering

was ubiquitous – the MUR

mouthpiece, Al-Tajdid, eatured

severa commentaries by one o

the movement’s eaders Bia a-

Taidi, criticizing the campaign

sogan, “Isam is the soution.”

MUR’s motto is, “I want to reorm what I can,” which is ampied by the subsidiary

motto dening the MUR as “An Isamic renewa drive to participate in the estabish-

ment o aith and the reorm o society.” The PJD motto, “Authenticity, Deveopment

and Justice,” is devoid o any Isamic symboism or pea to reigious sentiments.

On ormative and acculturation programs

A cear separation between the movement and the party aso necessitated a

eve o dierentiation between their respective ormative and accuturation pro-

grams, as dictated by the nature o each institution. In act, the dierentiation

begins at the eve o membership quaications.

Whereas the MUR stricty adheres to the character requirements o its mem-

bers (members must adhere to certain codes o rectitude and have no record oreven suspicion o induging in prohibited substances or vices), the PJD is reativey

fexibe in this regard, as ong as members adhere to the poitica positions and

genera poitica outook o the party. The two organizations aso dier in interna

promotion practices and discipinary action against members who ai to adhere

to the codes o either the movement or the party. For exampe, a member may be

expeed rom the PJD or poitica reasons but sti remain a member o the MUR,

which is concerned soey with the ethica probems directy reated to its mem-

bers’ commitment to the movement and its mora codes. An iustrative exampe o the constitutiona separation was seen during a par-

“MUR opposes religious sloganeering in

political party actiity. It ears that its mis-

sion will eneft rom politics in the long

run ut that it will e jeopardized y direct

inolement in daily politics.”




iamentary eection in which the PJD participated. When MUR eaders earned that

a PJD candidate, who was simutaneousy a member o the MUR, was accused o

purchasing votes to win the eection, the movement conducted an extensive in-

terna investigation, ending with the revocation o the candidate’s membership in

the movement or having breached the requirements o his aiation. The entire

procedure took pace with no consutation or inormation rom PJD eaders. Ony

aterwards did MUR eaders inorm PJD eadership o their decision, though these

eaders had no expectations that their PJD counterparts woud take simiar action.

In act, they did not anticipate a response rom the party at a.

The separation o the two groups maniests itse in a the ormative programs

organized by the movement and the party. The movement’s programs are designed

or the advancement o its reigious and cutura mission by engaging in activities

such as reigious education, sermons and pubic meetings. Poitica mobiization

is not conducted through the movement’s structures and activities. The MUR does

not specicay address or organize specia activities or its members who are in-

voved in poitics. Rather, it is determined to keep its proseytizing, rectiying and

educationa mission addressed to the pubic at arge.

On guarantees or conormity

Naturay, some circes within both the MUR and the PJD eadership beieve

that mutua independence coud eventuay ead the organizations into confict

with one another. This anxiety is particuary strong among activists who are dedi-

cated to the dissemination o Isam and ear the eects o the dictates o poitics.

This concern gave rise to considerabe discussion over whether certain measures

shoud be taken to ensure that the party deers to the ideoogica guidance o

the movement. Utimatey, however, opinion prevaied against such measures. Not

ony woud they be impractica to impement, but, more importanty, the very no-

tion o reguatory mechanisms to saeguard the mora authority o the movementruns counter to the principe o independence and, in practice, woud hamper the

party’s organizationa and poitica ecacy. The movement decided that there can

be no institutionaized guarantees to reguate party conormity to the movement

and that the ony guarantee or such conormity resided in the nature o the party’s

ideoogica commitments.

The relationship with other Islamic movements

The strategy o separation between proseytism and poitics has proved hepuin promoting the movement’s reationships with other Isamic entities. Reigious



06 Arab Insight

activity in Morocco engages a broad and diverse range o payers, rom governmen-

ta institutions, such as the Ministry o Awqa (reigious endowments) and Isamic

Aairs, its subsidiary agencies and academic councis, to nongovernmenta enti-

ties, such as the Su orders and other Isamist groups, especiay the Justice and

Benevoence Society – the argest Isamist organization in Morocco.

Operating under the principe that they are ony one o many contributors to

the estabishment o Isam, the MUR is prepared to cooperate with other groups

who share their dedication to the aith, regardess o their poitica outooks or

positions. Thus, the movement wecomed the Ministry o Awqa’s project or re-

structuring reigious activity in Morocco on the basis o common denominators o

Isamic thought. The movement ociay praised the government’s initiative to re-

structure reigious activity, “as opposed to uprooting it,” and regarded the initiative

as a step orward or Isam and one that required support rom a Isamist organi-

zations. Accordingy, MUR acted as a partner with the state in this endeavor and be-

gan to cooperate with the Ministry o Awqa toward the reaization o its objectives.

Indeed, many o the members o the ministry’s higher academic councis, which

are among the most important bodies engaged in this project, are MUR members.

For exampe, MUR members Ezzeddine a-Tawq, Mohammed a-Roki and Farid

a-Ansari (recenty resigned) are aso the ministry’s top supervisors, overseeing the

training o preachers, and A-Abadi Ahmed, the ministry’s director o Isamic A-

airs, had previousy been a MUR eader. Through its use o media outets, the

MUR aso activey supports the state’s reigious initiative. The MUR mouthpiece,

Al-Tajdid, aocates considerabe space to covering the news o the ministry’s aca-

demic councis and praises their

achievements and the eorts o

their sta.

At the nongovernmenta eve,

the MUR has made no secret o itsdierences with its chie competi-

tor, the Justice and Benevoence

Society, over such crucia issues as recognizing the egitimacy o the Moroccan

poitica system and working within it, and over the broader, more visionary ques-

tions that inorm their respective positions on these issues. Nevertheess, MUR

eaders have resoved to transcend the ogic o ostracism and antagonism and in-

stead have accepted to work with groups even though there are certain areas they

might not be in tota agreement with, such as their support or the Paestinianand Iraqi resistance movements. In addition, the MUR does not ear the awkward

“MUR seeks to emrace eeryone who

has an Islamist outlook, regardless o

their political positions or allegiances.”




repercussions it may receive rom working with a group that is ociay banned

and repressed.

Indeed, the reationship between the MUR and other Isamist organizations

iustrates the principe o separation between the MUR and the PJD. The MUR

has voiced its concern over actions the government has taken against the Justice

and Benevoence Society – the detentions and the cosures o its headquarters and

“open door” centers or communicating with the pubic – and it has issued a or-

ma statement condemning what it deems an excess o censorship. Moreover, it

has ent its newspaper to the society – which is under siege by the rest o the media

– as a orum or expressing their points o view, as exempied by the interview

the newspaper hed with a spokesman or the Justice and Benevoence Society,

Fathaah Arsan. The party, on the other hand, took a more pragmatic approach.

As the PJD wi ikey take part in orming the next state government, they opted

to remain sient on the subject, unwiing to antagonize the regime in hopes o re-

taining their continued condence. Thus, not ony has the PJD not issued a orma

comment on the arrests o the Justice and Benevoence Isamists when pressed by

media representatives in Tangiers, PJD Secretary-Genera Saadeddine a-Othmani

stated that the society’s “open-door advisory councis” were iega because they

had not been approved by the authorities. In other words, his position toward

his eow “brethren” Isamists was infuenced by poitica cacuations and which

made the MUR put these cacuations beore their principes.

The ogic o dierentiating between proseytism and poitics may aso be the

reason or the marked change in the MUR’s reations with Moroccan Su orders.

Ater years o shunning and opposing the Moroccan Su orders, the movement has

dropped its barriers and has become open to their points o view. To a arge extent,

this is attributed to the act that in the process o transorming the movement into

a purey Isamic missionary organization rather than a poitica one, the dynamics

o harmony and unison have come to prevai over the dynamics o discord andconrontation.

Dierentiation at the rhetorical, operational and leadership levels

It is possibe to identiy three eves at which the dierentiation between poi-

tics and proseytizing operates:

At the level o discourse

As a missionary movement, MUR seeks to embrace everyone who has an Is-amist outook, regardess o their poitica positions or aegiances. Ater a, the



08 Arab Insight

Isamist rame o reerence can not be reduced to any singe poitica expression

or be communicated through a singe poitica discourse. Poitica discourse pre-

sumes diversity in opinion, poitica rivaries, and requires the potentia or evou-

tion and change to best suit emerging or changing poitica interests. In contrast,

the movement is contingent upon orever adhering to the coective Isamist rame

o reerence or a who subscribe to it.

Thereore, the MUR made an unequivoca decision to prohibit its members

who are preachers or proseytizers rom participating in eections, whether as can-

didates or as ocia supporters o candidates. It urther prohibited MUR eaders

rom taking part in PJD eectora campaigns on the grounds that the movement

shoud represent an a-embracing Isamist rame o reerence that is open to a

Moroccans and shoud not be reduced to supporting a singe poitica party. In

addition, the decision was meant to protect the MUR rom taking an antagonistic

stance toward a potentia poitica riva or being subject to the mire o narrow po-

itica partisanship.

On the whoe, the movement sought to deveop a genera, a-encompassing,

moray instructive rhetoric that was as distinct as possibe, in anguage and sub-

stance, rom poitica rhetoric. In addition, the MUR decares no bias except or

a set o mora principes and does not aow or the organization to get entanged

in direct poitica attacks. It seeks to maintain its ocus on issues and ideas as op-

posed to individuas and institutions.

In a urther move to curtai any overap between the rhetoric o the movement

and that o the party, MUR eaders disassociated Al-Tajdid rom the PJD and in turn,

the PJD is now in the process o ounding a newspaper o its own. Both newspapers

wi have corresponding websites, competey unreated and independent rom one

another.

At the level o operationsIn their atest review o operations, MUR eaders drew distinct ines between

the movement and the party. They have determined, or exampe, not to issue

statements on specic current aairs, such as the repair o a bridge or irrigation

cana, or a poitica or economic event. They wi eave the initiative to the party

and conne the movement to causes that keep with its character as a civi society

organization o which a Moroccans can be a part. The MUR is an organization

estabished or the purpose o disseminating Isamic vaues and shaping the char-

acter o the individua and his or her society. Such causes shoud be o a generaand mora tenor, such as ghting injustice and unempoyment, promoting virtu-




ous behavior and proessionaism at work, encouraging oyaty to the nation, and

supporting centra Arab-Isamic causes in Paestine, Iraq and Aghanistan.

This operationa dierentiation, however, begs some dicut questions regard-

ing whether Isamist poitica activists shoud concern themseves with questions

o identity. What amount o space shoud be aocated to identity issues in the par-

ty’s discourse? Can identity questions, in act, become poitica issues, or are they

purey cutura and mora ones that a within the jurisdiction o the movement?

In the opinion o Yatim, “It is in the party’s interests to minimize its invove-

ment in identity poitics

and to devote itse more to

rening its poitica and in-

strumenta rhetoric.” Nev-

ertheess, he acknowedges

the dicuty o bringing this

about in practice. Identity

questions are sti o major

concern to the pubic and determine, to a great extent, the party’s reputation and

reach. It woud thereore not be poiticay wise or the party to suddeny orsake

its attention to such issues. He added that the movement may be near a soution to

this diemma in having internaized the principe that it is the party’s responsibi-

ity to take direct actions and concrete positions on the immediate concerns and

probems o the peope, even i identity is one o them. He caed it the “Prophet

Joseph” approach: Joseph presented himse to the Pharaoh not in his capacity as a

prophet, but as the man best suited to sove a country’s economic crisis.

However, some issues are ar too intricate and invoved to be ceary assigned

to the purview o either the movement or the party. Take, or exampe, the censor-

ship o the arts and the government’s roe in protecting moras, or the prevention o

oenses to pubic decency, an issue recenty brought to the ore by the m Maroc.The m caused such an outcry or its sexua expicitness and its oensive portraya

o Moroccan women – which some regarded as an insut to Morocco – that the cen-

sors were orced to step in and ban the m.

On such issues, the movement draws a distinction between matters that have

signicance to a segments o society versus those that ony pertain to a certain

segment’s mora or vaues system, obviating the possibiity that they woud be

tramping the rights o an opposing ideoogica trend or point o view. Aso, the

party careuy chooses the types o issues it adopts as poitica causes. Perhaps thecearest exampes o the appication o this distinction can be seen when appied

“MUR draws a distinction etween matters

that hae signifcance to all segments o

society ersus those that only pertain to a

certain segment’s moral or alues system.”







2 Arab Insight

on the movement. In the ong run, he beieves, this wi be in the interests o the

movement, as the party currenty detracts rom the movement by overshadowing

its missionary character as accompishments are immediatey credited to the party.

On the other hand, he reaizes that the party sometimes serves to protect the move-

ment. This poitica orce counteracts any designs against the movement, such as

those that reared their head in the wake o the Casabanca bombings in May 2003,

in the orm o an unprecedented campaign utimatey aimed at banning and dis-

soving the movement entirey.

Finay, the attempt on the part o the MUR and the PJD to dierentiate be-

tween proseytism and poitics is an experiment that is sti argey in its conceptua

phase, in spite o the numerous eorts to test the appicabiity o the concepts.

However, in its conceptua richness, it serves as a useu starting point or the

discussion o other Isamist experiences, or it resoves many o the probems that

arise in the hypothetica reationship between Isamist missionary action and Is-

amist poitica action. Above a, it oers considerabe hope or the possibiity that

an Isamist movement is capabe o nurturing a course o poitica action, com-

bined with the rameworks and eadership needed to guide this action, without u

immersion in the poitica arena. Fu immersion ony poiticizes and hence negates

the a-encompassing spirit o Isam.







EDITORIAL POLICY

Arab Insight is an internationa and interdiscipinary quar tery poicy journa dedicated to bringing diverseperspectives to bear on v ita Midde Eastern issues that impact the region’s strategic deveopment and its re-ations with the United States and the word. The journa seeks to improve the understanding o the Midde

East among American poicy practitioners and the pubic by providing authoritative anayses on criticasecurity issues.

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These are schoary artices that provide anaytica descriptions o, and prescriptions or addressing,probems that represent a major chaenge or trend in the Midde East. We wecome authors to provide newthinking about practica poicy recommendations. We do not accept opinion pieces. Art ice ength shoudbe 3,000 to 4,500 words. We wecome papers written either in Arabic or Engish. Transated pieces wi besubject to na review o the authors.

book and Literature Reiews

Each issue aso contains reviews o recenty pubished Arabic books and other orms o iterature (mono-

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The best guide to what we are ooking or, in terms o both substance and stye, is what we have areadypubished. Prospective authors shoud start by examining current and recent issues o the journa. We reyon authors to ensure the veracity and originaity o their statements. A art ices shoud be supported withootnotes. Uness otherwise inormed, we assume any artice submitted to us i s being oered excusivey, andthat no ar tice accepted or pubication wi be pubished esewhere simutaneousy in any orm without ourknowedge.

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ARAb INSIGHT

Artices in Arab Insight do not represent any consensus o opinion. Whie readers may agree or disagree withthe ideas set out in this artice, it is our purpose to present a diversity o views rather than identiying with aparticuar body o beies.

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