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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES CSC 28 / CCEM 28

EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZON

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR FURTHER

MILITARIZATION AND THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE

By/par Major Jacques Boudreau

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions that the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Table of Contents

Section/Sub-Section Page

Table of Contents i

Section 1 – Introduction 1

Background 1

Thesis 1

Approach 2

Section 2 – The Growing Strategic Value of Space and Its Importance for Humanity

3

General 3

Telecommunications 3

Navigation Systems 4

Earth Observation and Geomatics 5

Space Exploration and Potential Exploitation of Space Resources 6

Growth and Diversification of Space Capabilities 8

Key Points and Implications 9

Section 3 – The Strategic Importance of Space for Military Operations 12

General 12

Historical Highlights 12

International Environment, Treaties and Conventions 13

U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative 15

Development of Space Weapons As Of The Early 1990s 17

Impact of the Persian Gulf War 18

Key Points and Implications 21

i

Section/Sub-Section Page

Section 4 – Some Recent Developments and Their Implications 23

General 23

Geopolitical and Commercial Factors 23

Technological Factors 24

U.S. Policy, Doctrinal and Technology Developments 25

Recent Developments in Other Countries 32

Key Points and Implications 36

Section 5 – Conclusion 39

Bibliography 42

ii

Section 1 – Introduction

Background

The relationship between space and warfare has been short-lived and yet is quite

complex. Long hidden under the dark clouds of the Cold War, the role of satellites in the

preservation of global security slowly emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. The

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that they monitored were to travel through

space, but they were not perceived as “space weapons.” Yet, the media quickly assigned

the nickname “Star Wars”1 to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, whose objective was

to counter the Soviet ICBM threat. With more recent conflicts—starting with the Persian

Gulf War, the general public has become better informed of the role that space systems

play in the conduct of modern military operations. Given this evolution, it is worthwhile

to investigate the possible consequences of the historical relationship to date between

space and military power.

Thesis

The growing strategic importance of space, combined with the historical record of

the past 40 years and recent or ongoing geostrategic, doctrinal, and technological

developments, signal a trend towards further militarization2 and possibly the

weaponization of space.3

1 This expression was inspired by the title of a popular and highly imaginative science-fiction movie. 2 In the present context, the expression “militarization of space” implies the use of space for military purposes, but excludes the deployment and use of weapons in or from space.

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Approach

To establish the validity of this assertion, a three-fold approach will be followed.

First, Section 2 will discuss the growing strategic value of space and its importance for

humanity. Then, Section 3 will describe the military importance that space has acquired

in the first three decades of the Space Age, until the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf.4

Section 4, in turn, will argue that more recent geostrategic, doctrinal and technological

developments should contribute to further the militarization of space and possibly its

weaponization. Finally, Section 5 will present a summary and conclusion of this paper.

3 In the present context, the expression “weaponization of space” implies the deployment and possible use of weapons in or from space. 4 Here, an observation on methodology is in order. In this paper, the discussion of space power thought and historical milestones will be based strictly on open sources, and in large part on documentation that concerns the history of the United States (U.S.) military space program. There are a number of reasons for this. One is the relative abundance and accessibility of unclassified official information on the U.S. space program, as compared to other countries that have also had an active military space program. Associated with this is the relatively large volume of independent studies on the U.S. military space program that have been produced by analysts with no official links to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Finally, a large volume and wide variety of essays, papers and theses on the application of space power has been generated within the U.S. DOD, particularly on the Air University campus at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This not only reflects the emphasis that the U.S. places on space power thought and debate, but also the fact over the past fifteen years, the U.S. has developed considerable experience in the utilization of space-based assets at the tactical and operational levels of war.

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Section 2 – The Growing Strategic

Value of Space and Its Importance for Humanity

General

Since the first Soviet Sputnik satellite was orbited in 1957, space has gained a

growing strategic value for humanity. This section describes the current and future

importance of space for human activities on a global scale.

Telecommunications

Satellite communications (SATCOM) has grown tremendously since the 1960s

and is now used extensively for commercial and government communications, as well as

the distribution of television signals.5 SATCOM, while often less cost-effective than

high-capacity optical fiber systems, provides and will retain distinct advantages in many

applications:

Such applications include service provision directly to customers using small, low-cost earth stations; mobile communication to ships, aircrafts [sic], land vehicles and individuals; and direct-to-public television/sound broadcasts and data distribution/gathering from widely distributed terminals.6

SATCOM is also seen as “the best way to bridge the ‘digital divide’ between

developed countries with high-speed Internet access and developing countries that lack

even adequate telephone infrastructures.”7 Finally, SATCOM is extremely useful in

military operations, when there is a need for mobile or rapidly deployable, high-capacity

5 A. Houston and M. Rycroft, eds., Keys to Space: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Space Studies (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 1-5 and 1-6. 6 M. Richharia, Satellite Communication Systems: Design Principles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 1.

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communication systems, in austere areas that lack a permanent telecommunication

infrastructure.8

Navigation Systems

Two Global Navigation Satellite Systems are currently in operational use: the

U.S. NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS system.9

These systems have brought substantial benefits:

[They] now enable us to know our accurate positions and to navigate anywhere on Earth. There are many practical uses, including maritime and air navigation, precision approach and landing systems for aircraft, car navigation, as well as cartography.10

Both GPS and Glonass are military systems that have come to be used extensively

by civilian users worldwide.11 With due consideration for the crucial military benefits

that the U.S. has derived from GPS, some have pointed out the risks that unrestricted

access to high-precision GPS data poses if that system is used by hostile forces, and

advocated that the U.S. government maintain strict control over the GPS signal.12 Others

have observed that GPS signals are not immune to jamming or other forms of

interference, and that GPS users—military forces in particular— may have been lulled

7 Frank Morring, Jr., and Michael A. Taverna, “Satellites Seen as Bridge Over ‘Digital Divide’,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155, no. 18 (29 October 2001), 86-87. 8 U.S. Army, The 2000 Army Satellite Communications Architecture Book (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2000), 1-1, 1-8 and 1-9. Available from <http://www.army.mil/ciog6/references/armysat.html>. [Accessed 16 April 2002]. 9 Houston and Rycroft, op. cit., 14-27. More specialized systems, such as telemetry satellites and search and rescue satellite constellations, complement the two existing Global Navigation Satellite Systems. An example of the latter type of constellation is the COSPAS-SARSAT system, which was implemented by four countries including Canada. 10 Ibid., 1-7. 11 Baker, David, ed., Jane’s Space Directory, Fifteenth Edition, 1999-2000 (Coulsdon (Surrey, U.K.): Jane’s Information Group Ltd, 1999), 510-513.

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into a “false sense of security.”13 Europe, having realized the strategic importance of

global navigation systems and concerned about the availability of GPS signals in times of

crisis, is now planning the deployment of its own system, Galileo, so as to reduce its

dependence on non-European systems.14

Earth Observation and Geomatics

Scientists and government agencies rapidly realized and exploited the

extraordinary potential of satellites for earth observation. Today, many satellites15 are

positioned in various orbits and use different remote-sensing techniques16 to perform

numerous useful missions:

Satellites provide us with accurate and timely maps and environmental data anywhere on the Earth….They are the best available tool to study and monitor the global environment – agricultural and geological resources, pollution, desertification, deforestation, fish resources and climate change, to name but a few. Satellite observations of weather systems are familiar to television viewers of tomorrow’s weather forecast. Satellites have also saved countless lives: the number of fatalities from nearly

12 Irving Lachow, “The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits,” International Security 20, no. 1: 126-148. 13 David Foxwell and Mark Hewish, “GPS: Is It Lulling the Military Into A False Sense of Security?,” Jane’s International Defense Review 31, no. 9 (September 1998), 32-41. 14 See: - Laurent Bastide, “L’Europe dans les étoiles,” Défense, no. 258 (March 2001), 49-50. - Laurent Bastide, “Un facteur de puissance,” Défense, no. 258 (March 2001), 35-37. - Gérard Brachet, “Espace et Défense,” L’Armement, no. 66 (June 1999), 19-21. - Jean Dupont, “Premières retombées d’Egnos,” Air & Cosmos, no. 1818 (16 November 2001), 30-31. - Roger Handberg, Seeking New World Vistas: The Militarization of Space (Wesport (Connecticut):

Praeger, 2000), 133-135. - Ben Iannotta, “Europe Weighs Building Its Own GPS,” Aerospace America 37, no. 9 (September

1999), 34-37. - Michael A. Taverna, “Europe Declares Satnav Independence,” Aviation Week and Space Technology

156, no. 13 (1 April 2002), 24-25. 15 For example: Landsat (United States), SPOT (France), IRS (India) and Radarsat (Canada). 16 Remote sensing “is obtaining information about an object or phenomenon without having direct contact with it.” (Houston and Rycroft, op. cit., 15-3) Remote sensing systems can work with visible light signals or “use devices that measure electromagnetic radiation outside the normal visual range – microwave, radar, thermal infrared, and ultraviolet – as well as multispectral sensors that record data from several different spectral bands at once.” (Ibid.)

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identical Bay of Bengal cyclones decreased significantly after the use of information from geostationary weather satellites for making forecasts.17

Many practical applications of space-based remote sensing exist, touching a

variety of sectors.18

Space Exploration and Potential Exploitation of Space Resources

Despite strong advocacy for space exploration and colonization,19 the significant

funding challenges experienced by near-Earth projects20 suggest that future space

activities will have to be motivated by clear economic benefits. Space-based industrial

activities that may be financially attractive include mining, manufacturing and the

exploitation of solar energy.21 Although geological mapping of the Moon is not yet

complete,

17 Ibid.18 The main sectors in which remote-sensing applications have been developed are: - “Earth resource applications: forestry, agriculture, rangeland management, geology, oil and resource

prospecting, fishing, etc. - Environmental monitoring: ecology, ecosystems analysis, pollution monitoring and impact assessment,

natural disaster studies, etc. - Geodetics, cartography and surveying. - Cultural studies: urban growth, human dimensions of environmental change. - Military applications. - Meteorological, atmospheric and oceanographic measurement and forecasting.” (Ibid., 15-3) It is worth noting that through the discipline of geomatics, remote-sensing applications are becoming more and more integrated, thus facilitating data analysis and decision-making. (Ibid., 15-28) 19 Space “visionaries” like Carl Sagan and Robert Zubrin have championed space exploration and colonization, as a means to safeguard the future of humanity. See, in particular: - Houston and Rycroft, op. cit., 19-18 to 19-26. - Robert Zubrin, Entering Space: Creating a Spacefaring Civilization (New York: Jeremy P.

Tarcher/Putnam, 1999). - Robert Zubrin, “The Mars Direct Plan,” Scientific American 282, no. 3 (March 2000), 52-55. 20 For instance, the International Space Station (ISS). See: - David Baker, ed., Jane’s Space Directory, 15th ed., 1999-2000 (Coulsdon (U.K.): Jane’s Information

Group, 1999), [15] to [18], 23-24. - Dave Dooling, “Research Outpost Beyond the Sky,” IEEE Spectrum 32, no. 10 (October 1995), 28-33. - Michael A. Taverna, “Europe OKs Galileo, Defers ISS Funding,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 155, no. 21 (19 November 2001), 88. 21 Houston and Rycroft, op. cit., 16-3 to 16-18.

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[o]xygen, silicon and metals are abundant and address many of the requirements for propellants, life support, structures, shielding and production of photovoltaic cells, and hence make lunar soil a resource with great potential.22

Another industrial project that possibly could be implemented within two decades

is the mining of certain asteroids whose orbits occasionally bring them close to Earth.23

Studies also indicate that at some point in the 21st century, Solar Power Satellites could

provide an economical alternative to Earth-based fossil and nuclear energy sources.24

Space, in short, is gifted with an enormous economic and industrial potential.

Given the history of the human race on the Earth, it can be anticipated that the

exploration and colonization of outer space, and the exploitation of space resources, will

be accompanied by rivalry between political and economic actors, which ultimately could

culminate in military confrontations in space.

22 Ibid., 16-5. 23 It has been estimated that one such asteroid, Amun, has mineral deposits totaling U.S. $20 trillion in value. See: Mark Ingebretsen, “Mining Asteroids,” IEEE Spectrum 38, no. 8 (August 2001), 34-39. 24 Such systems could use thermodynamic or photovoltaic conversion and transmit power to the Earth using microwave or laser beams. See: Houston and Rycroft, op. cit., 16-13 to 16-18. The following articles provide complementary details on the technical aspects and economical feasibility of these proposed systems: - Richard M. Dickinson and Jerry Grey, “Lasers That Beam Power to Earth,” Aerospace America 37,

no. 7 (July 1999), 50-54. - Joel S. Greenberg, “Space Solar Power: The Economic Realities,” Aerospace America 38, no. 5 (May

2000), 42-46. - John C. Mankins, “The Space Solar Power Option,” Aerospace America 35, no. 5 (May 1997), 30-36.

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Growth and Diversification of Space Capabilities

U.S. and Soviet dominance of space, in both the military and civilian sectors, was

clear for much of the Cold War.25 The two superpowers deployed photoreconnaissance,

communications, weather and navigation satellites that were deemed essential for their

national security. Non-military space applications were initially implemented through

tightly controlled government agencies, such as the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space

Agency (NASA). Eventually, commercial telecommunication satellites were put in orbit,

but these were owned by governments or by large international consortia that they

controlled.26

The decline and end of the Cold War, combined with the growth of information-

based economies throughout the world, has led to an increasing demand for space-based

services, particularly those related to telecommunications and imagery.27 Another

significant change is the emergence of the private sector on this market, often in the form

of international joint ventures.28 In space-based imagery, two significant developments

have occurred since the mid-1980s: the commercialization of image products by non-U.S.

25 Gonzales, Daniel, The Changing Role of the U.S. Military in Space, Rand Report MR-895-AF (Santa Monica (California): Rand Corporation, 1999), 1. Available from <http://www.rand.org/> [Accessed 24 March 2002]. 26 For example, the INMARSAT and INTELSAT organizations. 27 Gonzales, op. cit., 1-12. 28 In the telecommunication sector this has given rise, for example, to a number of projects seeking to use low and medium earth orbits to provide global voice and low-rate data services that are highly flexible. Well-known examples of such projects are the ORBCOMM and Iridium constellations. (Ibid., 3-4)

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suppliers like the French firm Spot Image,29 and the liberalization of very restrictive rules

that had been imposed thus far to U.S. firms operating in that field.30

Key Points and Implications

Since Sputnik was put into orbit in 1957, humanity has deployed generations of

increasingly sophisticated systems in space. These now constitute “global utilities”31 that

enable instantaneous communication between men and provide them with formidable

tools to observe and understand their environment. In the face of galloping demographics

and the colossal energy and resource problems that will confront mankind in the future,

space offers remarkable potential, and it is possible to envision that humanity will

progressively evolve towards sophisticated forms of space exploitation and colonization.

Based on man’s historical record and the commercial and power interests at stake, it is

unlikely that this will occur without rivalry and conflict.

Thus, the explosion in the need for space-based services, as well as the

proliferation of space actors and systems, have important security implications. One

interesting aspect is the fact that commercial firms can now often provide high-quality

29 Spot Image is the company that markets space-based Earth imagery obtained by the Spot satellites. (Baker, op. cit., 344) 30 This was motivated by the need to remain competitive in the face of international competition, so as to to generate revenues for future U.S remote sensing systems. Thus, “[p]ermission was given to U.S. firms to develop, sell and operate remote sensing satellites with resolutions of up to one meter in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 23, which was signed by President Clinton in March 1994.” (Gonzales, op. cit., 6) 31 These “global utilities” are analogous to the public utilities that support industrially developed countries, although they have a much wider reach.

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telecommunication services or imagery to defence organizations.32 In the future, more

and more military organizations will have access to and increasingly rely on commercial

systems.33 In the absence of any form of control, this increasing availability of space-

based services will assist not only “friendly” militaries, but also their potential enemies.

For some time this has caused some concern, particularly in regard to the potential use of

these systems by “rogue states” and terrorist groups.34

From another perspective, the fact that the growing inventory of complex and

costly satellite systems in orbit currently has little or no protection against both hostile

acts and natural hazards is worrisome.35 Societies throughout the world, except perhaps

32 For example, during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, coalition forces discovered that the French Spot system was able to provide “niche” imagery that costly military photoreconnaissance systems—optimized for detailed analysis of Soviet and Chinese strategic sites—could not supply. On this particular aspect, see: - Handberg, op. cit., 94-95. - Christian Lardier, “Accord Spot Image-DigitalGlobe,” Air & Cosmos, no. 1828 (1 February 2002), 40. For complementary information on the commercial capabilities now available to military organizations, see: - Theresa M. Foley, “Zooming In On Remote Sensing Markets,” Aerospace America 32, no. 10

(October 1994), 22-27. - Mark Hewish, “Cost Cut for Eyes in Space,” Jane’s International Defense Review 33, no. 12

(December 2000), 32-38. - James Oberg, “Spying For Dummies,” IEEE Spectrum 36, no. 11 (November 1999), 62-69. - Studeman, William O., “The Space Business and National Security: An Evolving Partnership,”

Aerospace America 32, no. 11 (November 1994), 25-29. 33 See: - Thomas S. Moorman, “The Explosion of Commercial Space and the Implications for National

Security,” Airpower Journal XIII, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 6- 20. - Frank Sietzen Jr., “Commercial Space: A Global Commons?,” Aerospace America 39, no. 8 (August

2001), 35-41. 34 See: - J. Todd Black, “Commercial Satellite: Future Threats or Allies?,” Naval War College Review LII, no.

1 (Winter 1999), 99-114. - Glenn W. Goodman, “Hitching a Ride: DoD Seeks to Tap Commercial Space Boom, But So Will

Potential Adversaries,” Armed Forces Journal International, July 1998, 39-41. - Vipin Gupta, “New Satellite Images for Sale,” International Security 20, no. 1, 94-125. - James Oberg, “Spying For Dummies,” IEEE Spectrum 36, no. 11 (November 1999), 62-69. 35 See: - Bruce D. Nordwall, “Natural Hazards Threaten Milsats,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 150,

no. 14 (5 April 1999), 59-60. - William B. Scott, “Space Chief Warns of Threats To U.S. Commercial Satellites,” Aviation Week and

Space Technology 150, no. 15 (12 April 1999), 51.

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the few that remain in a very primitive state, have developed a critical dependence on the

availability and proper operation of space-based systems. The negation of such

systems—whether temporary or permanent—could create immense chaos in societies of

today and tomorrow.36 In that sense, the space-based “global utilities” constitute an

attractive center of gravity for potential adversaries, and one that can be attacked through

asymmetric as well as conventional forms of warfare. For that reason, some favour a

more assertive military presence in space, as a means to offer better protection to satellite

systems or to counter the threats that they face—through the use of force if necessary.37

- William B. Scott, “Space Command Reassesses Threat,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 153,

no. 19 (6 November 2000), 61-62. - Robert Wall, “Intelligence Lacking On Satellite Threats,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 150,

no. 9 (1 March 1999), 54-55. 36 As Jean-Marie Guéhenno explains, chaos will quite possibly be a strong distinguishing feature of conflicts in a globalized world: “Global war resulting from a confrontation of wills between competing communities seems less likely, but global chaos resulting from a general loss of political control over events, with similarly devastating consequences, does not seem impossible.” (Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy,” Survival 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998-1999), 5-19) 37 See: - Bruce Carlson, “Protecting Global Utilities: Safeguarding the Next Millenium’s Space-Based Public

Services,” Aerospace Power Journal XIV, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 37-41. - Simon P. Worden, “Space Control for the 21st Century: A Space ‘Navy’ Protecting the Commercial

Basis of America’s Wealth,” in Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Alan R. Van Tassel and Guy M. Walsh, eds., Spacepower for a New Millenium: Space and U.S. National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 225-237.

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Section 3 – The Strategic Importance of Space for Military Operations

General

This section will address the current importance of space for military operations,

with particular emphasis on treaties and conventions regarding the use of space for

military purposes and the developments that have occurred during and after the 1991

Gulf War.

Historical Highlights

It is a well-known fact that the massive efforts that were dedicated to the

development of space capabilities reflected a fierce competition between the USSR and

the U.S.:

The Soviet Union used the launch of the first two satellites in 1957 and the launch of the first human in 1961 to validate its claims regarding the military, technological, and political superiority of the Soviet system. The United States, after a few years of hesitation under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, accepted both the claim that space achievements were a measure of the strength and vitality of a society, and the challenge of a US-USSR space race.38

In the U.S., the military establishment was very quick to seize and discuss the

potential use of space to acquire and maintain a military advantage, although in practice

the subsequent course of events was marked by caution and a seeming desire to prevent a

space arms race with the USSR.39

38 Houston and Rycroft, op. cit., 2-15. 39 See: - Handberg, op. cit. - David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership ( Maxwell Air

Force Base (Alabama): Air University Press, 1998). - Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space. U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1985).

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International Environment, Treaties and Conventions

The space activities of states are constrained not only by political and funding

considerations, but also by international treaties. Indeed, “[a]ttempts at establishing a

legal regime for space began soon after the first space flights.”40 The treaties and

conventions affecting space activities are sometimes bilateral and sometimes multilateral,

and they address diverse issues.41 Some treaty proposals have proven controversial, thus

illustrating the somewhat tenuous nature of space treaty law.42

Oberg, in his examination of international space law, has assessed that:

[I]n general, long-term reliance on treaties to control behavior in space is problematical due to the still

Handberg has identified four major historical phases in the evolution of U.S. military space policy. (Handberg, op. cit., 2-3) The first one lasted from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, and initially was limited to preliminary discussions and plans regarding military space activities, until the mid-1950s, when the threat of ballistic missiles and then the Sputnik flights created a sense of urgency among U.S. political and military leaders. The second phase, from the mid-1960s to the signing of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, was characterized by marked technological progress. Important debates took place surrounding the deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the concept of ballistic missile defence (BMD). Starting in 1983, the third phase was dominated by the U.S. Strategi

i

unresolved incompatibility between a discipline based on precedent (law) and an unprecedented activity in which most earthside analogies are misleading (space).43

Critics of space law contend that contrary to maritime law with which it is often

compared, “space law is being set in place often prior to the very activities it is intended

to govern.”44 Furthermore, after long debates among legal experts, there is still no

internationally accepted definition of the altitude at which national sovereignty ceases

and space begins.

Of the international space treaties in place, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—adhered

to by 91 countries—is particularly noteworthy, in that it attempts to promote in a very

idealistic manner the peaceful use of space, for the benefit of all of mankind. However,

this does not guarantee that weapons cannot be deployed in outer space:

The main prohibitions of the 1967 outer-space treaty are to ban weapons of mass destruction from both outer space and celestial bodies, and to reserve the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes—meaning no military bases, weapon testing or military maneuvers. Literally interpreted, these prohibitions do not bar conventional or nonnuclear weapons from orbital space. Nor does the 1967 space treaty explicitly prohibit a space-based laser being placed in earth orbit and used against terrestrial targets.45

Some have also highlighted the existence of ambiguities or lack of explicitness in

the Outer Space Treaty and other treaties, the weakening effect that this has on the

43 Ibid., 79. 44 Ibid.45 Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, February 2001), 20.

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concept of space as a sanctuary,46 and the existence of implicit belligerent rights in

space.47

U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

Until the early 1970s, the U.S. military presence in space “had been restricted to

largely passive satellite-borne communications, detectors of different types, along with

reconnaissance satellites and global positioning.”48 Although the use of weapons in

space had been the subject of concept exploration and of some research and development,

presidential administrations were generally quite reserved in regard to a more assertive

use of space for military purpose.49 The ascendancy of Ronald Reagan to the U.S.

presidency in January 1981 was to change this drastically.

President Reagan envisioned that space offered great potential for the future of the

American people and of humanity as a whole.50 Under his two administrations, four

major civilian and military space programmes were initiated.51 Of these, SDI received

46 The expression “space sanctuary” can mean different things to different people. Generally, it is perceived as a refuge that is free from the activities and horrors of war. To some this may imply that space is free from weapons and spacecraft that have a military purpose. Others may find military spacecraft acceptable, provided that they do not in themselves have an offensive capability and that they contribute to achieving an appropriate security balance. 47 See: - Oberg, op. cit., 81-82. - Space Appreciation 2000, F-5 to F-8. 48 Handberg, op. cit., 63. 49 Many reasons have been invoked to explain this relative passivity, including concerns regarding the destabilizing effects that the deployment of offensive weapons might have, the legality of such weapons, their potentially astronomical cost and their technical reliability. 50 Handberg, op. cit., 65. 51 The first program (1982) was aimed at accelerating the commercialization of space activities; the second (1984) at building a space station within the subsequent decade; the third (1986) at developing a hypersonic space vehicle, the “Orient Express;” and the fourth, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—announced in 1983, sought to free the U.S. from the threat of a nuclear attack on its territory. During implementation, these ambitious initiatives were characterized by significant cost overruns and, in the end, uneven success. (Ibid., 66-68)

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the strongest commitment from the Reagan administration, as “[t]he national goal of

achieving freedom from nuclear threat was presumed to have no cost limit.”52

To maximize its effectiveness, SDI was based on a layered-defence53 concept,

whereby successive attacks would be conducted against a missile or its warheads during

the four phases of their flight.54 Evidently, space-based weaponry would be critical in

order to take advantage of the earliest attack opportunities. The incoming missiles could

be attacked using a variety of space-based or space-deployable weapons, including lasers,

particle beams, kinetic energy weapons and nuclear-armed interceptors. Aside from the

cost and technical difficulties associated with SDI, criticism has been expressed regarding

the destabilization that the initiative would engender at two levels:

(1) full deployment cast into direct question the 1972 ABM accord and the implicit understandings that underlay MAD [mutual assured destruction] as a national defense posture; and (2) SDI opened the door again for the issue of deployment of significant assets in space—assets possessing offensive potential regarding both the Earth’s surface and within space itself.55

Despite strong backing by two successive Reagan administrations, wide

differences in perception by Republicans and Democrats regarding U.S. defence policy,

combined with the technical and funding problems that were encountered, progressively

led to the downscaling of SDI and to the postponement of its deployment.56 Although the

SDI program did not change significantly the composition or use of the military assets

that were deployed in space, it forced “greater accuracy and speed upon [existing

applications],”57 and induced an important psychological change:

What really changed was the perception that more military space activities might be possible or must be done. Space was moving psychologically from a preserve sheltered from the harsh realities of war to potentially just another theater of operations.58

Development of Space Weapons As Of The Early 1990s

Some contend that the military application of space began in the late 1950s, with

the test flights of ICBMs.59 With the increasing deployment and use of military satellites

in space, the U.S. and USSR conducted research and development on weapon systems

capable of attacking satellites. By the early 1990s, however, it was believed “that these

programs [had] not yet resulted in deployment of offensive or defensive weapons in

space.”60 Aside from ballistic missiles that briefly travel through space, typologies have

56 Ibid., 166-168. In 1993, under the first Clinton administration, the SDI organization was renamed Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), reflecting a shift from strategic defence—often referred to as ‘National Missile Defense’ (NMD)—to theater-missile defence (TMD). 57 Handberg, op. cit., 82. The then-existing military applications encompassed “communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, warning, navigation, and weather” (Ibid., 81). 58 Ibid., 82. 59 See: - Kheidr K. Al Dahwary, article “Space Weapons,” in Trevor N. Dupuy et al., eds., International

Military and Defense Encyclopedia (Washington: Brassey’s, 1993), Volume 5 (P-S), 2501-2506. - William B. Scott, “U.S. Adopts ‘Tactical’ Space Control Policy,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 150, no. 13 (29 March 1999), 35. 60 Al Dahwary, op. cit., 2502. Note, however, that the U.S. and USSR performed tests against space-based targets. See: - Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Donald L. Hafner, “Antisatellite Weapons,” Scientific

American 250, no. 6 (June 1984), 45-55. - Bhupendra Jasani, ed., Space Weapons and International Security (Oxford (U.K.): Oxford University

Press, 1987), 14-30.

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been proposed to describe weapons that would serve to apply force in space61 and space-

based weapons that would serve to apply force on the Earth.62 A number of reasons have

been proposed to explain the superpowers’ relative self-restraint in developing and

deploying space weapons.63

Impact of the Persian Gulf War

The 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf, opposing a U.S.-led coalition to Iraqi

President Saddam Hussein’s military forces after the latter invaded Kuwait, is generally

61 Al Dahwary has described two weapon concepts that would serve to apply force in space: earth-based anti-satellite (ASAT) systems and satellite-based ASAT systems. With earth-based ASAT systems, “a missile carries an explosive warhead that can be aimed at a satellite, either from the ground or from space.” (Al Dahwary, op. cit., 2502) With satellite-based ASAT systems, “the satellite itself carries either conventional explosives (and acts as a weapon by ramming its prey) or beam weapons.” (Ibid.) Al Dahwary further categorized ASAT weapons in three broad groups: - Kinetic-energy weapons (KEWs), “propelled by either chemical rockets or electromagnetic forces, are

nothing more than objects (such as rockets, homing vehicles, or even pellets) that destroy their targets by impact rather than by means of an explosion, although some may also carry chemical explosives.” (Ibid.)

- Space-based explosives (including space mines) “provide comparatively low-technology alternatives to KEWs and DEWs [directed-energy weapons]. Space mines are devices that would be orbited within lethal range of target satellites, then commanded from the ground to explode and destroy the target.” (Ibid.)

- “Directed-energy weapons (DEWs) can deliver destructive energy at or near the speed of light. They function by depositing on a target an energy impact that creates serious secondary thermomechanical damage in the target material, leading to the object’s malfunction or destruction.” (Ibid., 2503)

62 Watts has identified two generic classes of weapons that could be applied in terrestrial conflicts: - Mass-to-target weapons: “Mass-to-target weapons generate destructive effects through the kinetic

energy produced by the weapon’s mass and velocity—that is, by releasing the stored energy of a warhead (stored chemical energy in the case of nonnuclear warheads).” (Watts, op. cit., 86.) The “space rod,” which would be launched from space against terrestrial targets, is a type of mass-to-target weapons.

- Energy-to-target weapons: “Directed-energy or energy-to-target weapons … use particle or electromagnetic beams to transfer destructive energy directly to their targets.” (Ibid.)

63 These factors include (but are not necessarily limited to) the following: a tacit agreement not to interfere with each other’s means of strategic surveillance; a desire to not destabilize the balance of forces of each other in space; apprehensions about the reliability, dependability and cost of such weapons; perhaps a desire to abide by the letter or spirit of space treaties in place; and possibly also a general and idealistic consensus to free space from the horror of warfare. For excellent discussions of why the U.S. and USSR did not pursue an arms race in space, see: - Paul B. Stares, op. cit., 237-146. - Watts, op. cit., 18-19.

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considered to be “[t]he [f]irst [i]nformation [w]ar”64 and “the first space war.”65 Shortly

after that conflict, future U.S. Defense Secretary William J. Perry observed that “[f]or the

first time in a war the United States effectively used all of its various space satellite

systems to support field commanders.”66 Resulting from many years of concerted effort

within the U.S. DOD community,67 the use of space-based resources during the Gulf War

was indeed multi-faceted and extensive:

Over 60 Western military satellites and more from the commercial sector were directly involved in the Persian Gulf War, connecting over 400,000 troops, aiding weather forecasters, providing detailed images of Iraqi targets, passing Scud warnings, providing location accuracies in dozen of feet to pilots, truck drivers and special forces, and for the first time ever, carrying the war—instantly, live and color—to over 100 nations.68

That said, Handberg characterizes the Persian Gulf War as a “primitive space

war”69 that did not involve space-borne weapons and where space-based activities were

concentrated in “five broad operational areas.”70 Handberg and others have also

64 Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax (Virginia): AFCEA International Press, 1992). 65 See: - Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf

War,” The RUSI Journal 136, no. 4 (Winter 1991), 45-53. - Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf

War,” in Campen, op. cit., 121-133. 66 William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 66-82. 67 The successful use of space assets during the Persian Gulf War owed much to the renewal of and new spirit of cooperation between the U.S. military services after the Vietnam War, and to a little-known program, the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP), which had been authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1977 and whose “intention was to influence the design and operation of national satellite assets so as to better support the warfighter.” (Handberg, op. cit., 156-157) 68 Campen, op. cit., xviii. 69 Handberg, op. cit., 88. 70 Ibid., 94. These five areas are: - Intelligence operations: These “included both traditional forms of reconnaissance surveillance (remote

sensing) through imagery and electronic intelligence collection.” (Ibid.) - Weather information: This relied primarily on a military system, the Defense Meteorological Satellite

Program (DMSP) system, but also on U.S. and international civilian weather satellite systems. It is

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highlighted that insofar as the use of space-based resources is concerned, special

circumstances account for the stellar success of the coalition forces during the Gulf

War.71 In a 1995 article with a particularly evocative title, Bruger effectively

summarized the overall impression of many in the U.S. defence community: relief for

how well Gulf War space operations unfolded; concern regarding space support

operations in future war; and conviction that the U.S. must develop a space control

strategy and better prepare itself “to extract the maximum possible from the vast potential

of space.”72

Handberg has aptly summed up the significance and implications of the use of

space-base assets during the Gulf War:

noteworthy that total denial of weather information could not be imposed on the Iraqi military, due to the availability of multiple commercial sources. (Ibid., 98-99)

- Navigation services: For Handberg, “[t]he Gulf War did conclusively demonstrate the unique military usefulness of GPS capability, supporting extension of GPS coverage globally.” (Ibid., 101)

- Command and control: Here, Handberg notes that the availability of multiple U.S. and NATO military SATCOM systems considerably facilitated communications within the theater of operations and between the theater and the national command authority in Washington. (Ibid., 101-102)

- Ballistic missile detection, warning and interception: On this aspect, Handberg notes that “[t]he actual success of the Patriot batteries has become a source of contention retrospectively” and that “[t]he Gulf War again in this area of military space proved most useful as a demonstration of concept than as a totally successful operationalization.” (Ibid., 103)

71 First and foremost, when considering the availability of space-based assets, the allied forces—and principally the U.S.—enjoyed an overwhelming superiority at the beginning of the conflict. Secondly, through diplomatic means, allied forces were able to negate the Iraqis access to and use of key international satellite systems. And thirdly, even though they apparently had at least a limited technical ability to do so, Saddam Hussein’s forces apparently did not attempt to neutralize or damage space-based systems that had a military value for the coalition. For complementary information, see: - Anson and Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War,” The

RUSI Journal 136, no. 4 (Winter 1991), 45-53. - Handberg, op. cit., 89, 93, 105-106. - Steven Lambakis, “Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond,” Orbis 39, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 417-

433. For Handberg, despite the overwhelming coalition success in the Gulf War, the use of space-based military assets suffered from two major problems during that conflict: the long time required to deploy additional resources in orbit; and the lack of a wide and immediate distribution process for information collected or relayed by space-based resources. (Handberg, op. cit., 104-105) 72 Steven J. Bruger, “Not Ready for the First Space War: What About the Second?,” Naval War College Review XLVIII, no. 1 (Winter 1995), 73-83.

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Space-based military assets contributed mightily to that victory but demonstrated in that success even greater potential for the future and foreshadowed the need for serious rethinking, both operationally and organizationally, regarding the role of space assets during the war. Truly the Gulf War was the first space war albeit still a primitive one. It is likely that future wars will involve combatants on both sides whom [sic] will possess routine access to space-based military assets. Coping with that more realistic but dangerous scenario has become a major part in the military’s consideration of the future of warfare.73

Key Points and Implications

From the 1950s to the 1980s, military activity in space was heavily influenced by

the Cold War and dominated by the two superpowers. Soon after the first space flights,

there were attempts to create an international legal regime for space, but the resulting

treaties are sometimes ambiguous and do not explicitly ban all weapons from space.

While striving to exploit the potentialities of space—including military ones, the U.S. and

USSR were ultimately cautious about destabilizing the strategic order and exerted self-

restraint with respect to the deployment of weapons in space. In the 1980s, President

Ronald Reagan’s SDI vision shattered the tacit agreement between the two superpowers

and led to an increased perception that space could be “just another theater of

operations.”74 Generous SDI funding enabled advances in ABM weaponry but could not

match the formidable challenge posed by the massive Soviet ICBM arsenal. Ultimately,

the urgency of SDI was undermined by the collapse of the USSR.

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 marked the culminating point of a long effort by

the U.S. to enable effective use of national strategic space assets at the tactical and

73 Handberg, op. cit., 106.

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operational levels of war. Facing an Iraqi adversary who did not control any important

space asset and somehow did not attempt to attack or neutralize the allies’ satellites, the

U.S. and its allies were able to make extremely effective use of their space-based

resources. This led to a better awareness and understanding of the considerable potential

of space in the conduct of warfare, and also to the realization that a determined and

technologically sophisticated enemy could neutralize or destroy space assets and in so

doing thwart a space-dependent military campaign.

74 Ibid., 82.

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Section 4 – Some Recent Developments and Their Implications

General

This section will highlight some recent geopolitical, commercial, technological

and doctrinal developments affecting space, and their implications in terms of the

continued militarization of space and perhaps its weaponization.

Geopolitical and Commercial Factors

Handberg has aptly described the new interaction between the political, military

and commercial facets of national space policies:

The changes affecting military space policy development are no longer simply only political and military in nature (the traditional space policy drivers) but also incorporate the major changes occurring in the commercial space sector. As commercial space expands, it makes available to all capabilities once restricted to the military.75

Today, space is no longer the exclusive preserve of the U.S. and USSR. In the

past three decades, other states have become active in space and it is clear that emerging

regional powers seek an even greater presence there, whether it be for economic or

political-military reasons. The pressure to provide space access to non-state commercial

actors will remain, provided that there is a clear prospect of economic benefits. The

proliferation of space-related technological know-how will also continue, spawned by

such factors as commercial technology transfers and the growth of dual-use

technologies.76

75 Ibid., 110. 76 These are technologies that can have both civilian and military applications, therefore complicating proliferation control.

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Technological Factors

The considerable innovation and dynamism that has marked the development of

space technologies should continue in the future, largely as a result of the commercial

potential of space. In the U.S., much attention has been dedicated to the reduction of

launch costs, which are seen as a major impediment to further exploitation of space.77

Clearly, launch technologies constitute one area where national competitiveness overlaps

both the commercial and the military realms.78

Satellite technology progresses constantly as a result of multi-faceted research

efforts. Communication satellites (including military ones) have much greater capacity

and enhanced functionality as a result of a variety of factors.79 Another remarkable

accomplishment is the extreme miniaturization of satellite components and the

introduction of micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS), which are currently under

development and experimentation.80 This will lead to “miniature satellites that >will be @

77 The DOD leads the way in the development of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs), which may yield launch cost reductions of 25 to 50 percent over the next two decades. NASA is exploring the more ambitious and economical concept of Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs), which is seen as the probable successor to the Space Shuttle. In cooperation with NASA, the USAF is also investigating hypersonic aerospace vehicle technologies that could ultimately lead to a military spaceplane. See: - David Baker, “Global Hyperstrike,” Air International 61, no. 4 (October 2001), 208-212. - Craig Covault, “‘Global Presence’Objective Drives Hypersonic Research,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 150, no. 14 (5 April 1999), 54-55. - Jeffrey Mason, “Space: Battleground or Frontier of the 21st Century.” Available from Center for

Defense Information web site, <http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/missiledefense/> [Accessed 13 October 2001].

- Bill Sweetman, “Space Giants Step Up Efforts to Win Low-Cost Launch Race,” Jane’s International Defense Review 33, no. 3 (March 2000), 30-35.

78 Jim Courter, Dave McCurdy and Loren B. Thompson, “Military Space Policy: the Critical Importance of New Launch Technology,” Strategic Review XXII, no. 3 (Summer 1994), 14-23. 79 These include improvements in modulation and on-board signal regeneration techniques, a migration towards higher frequencies and higher bandwidths, and the incorporation of highly directional antennas. See: Mark Hewish, “Switchboards in the Sky,” Jane’s International Defense Review 34, no. 7 (July 2001), 28-37. 80 See:

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lightweight, mass produced and able to fly in clusters,”81 and that will have potential

revolutionary applicability.82

U.S. Policy, Doctrinal and Technology Developments

To military thinkers worldwide, the Persian Gulf War provided a showcase

demonstration of the force-multiplying effect of space and brought attention to the

potentialities of its untapped capabilities. Many also became preoccupied with the

vulnerabilities of existing space systems and the consequences that this might have in

future conflict. In the U.S., analysts in the DOD and think tank organizations drew a

number of technological, organizational and doctrinal lessons.83 In that sense, the Gulf

War was an effective catalyst for a well-needed doctrinal debate within the DOD

community.

In 1988, three years prior to the Gulf War, a USAF officer, Lieutenant-Colonel

David Lupton, had published a seminal paper on space power doctrine.84 Lupton

identified four distinct space doctrines: the sanctuary,85 survivability,86 control87 and

- Stephen Cass, “MEMS In Space,” IEEE Spectrum 38, no. 7 (July 2001), 56-61. - Mark Hewish, “In Space, Smaller Is Beautiful,” Jane’s International Defense Review 34, no. 1

(January 2001), 47-52. 81 Hewish, op. cit. 4. Hewish states that these miniature satellites can be categorized as follows: minisats (100-1,000 kg); microsats (10-100 kg); nanosats (1-10 kg); picosats (less than 1 kg); and (potentially) femtosats (less than 0.1 kg). 82 Particularly in earth observation, photoreconnaissance and signals intelligence (SIGINT). 83 Handberg, op. cit., 114-118. 84 For complementary information on Lupton’s paper, see: - Handberg, op. cit., 119-120. - Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Alan R. Van Tassel and Guy M. Walsh, “Spacepower for a New

Millennium: Examining Current U.S. Capabilities and Policies,” in Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Alan R. Van Tassel and Guy M. Walsh, eds., op. cit., 3-4.

85 The sanctuary doctrine “builds on President Dwight Eisenhower’s concepts of ‘open skies’ and space for peaceful purposes by emphasizing that space systems are ideal for monitoring military activity, providing early warning to reduce the likelihood of surprise attack, and serving as NTMV [national technical means

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high-ground doctrines.88 The latter two doctrines are much less restrictive than the first

two in regard to offensive military operations conducted in or from space, and they would

allow the deployment of weapons in space. Thus far, the military use of space has been

within the realm of the sanctuary and survivability doctrines. In the 1980s, the U.S. DOD

had adopted a typology of military space missions that largely correspond to Lupton’s

four space doctrines.89 This typology, which was subsequently reflected in USAF and

Joint Forces doctrine,90 comprises four elements: Space Force Support;91 Space Force

Enhancement;92 Space Force Application;93 and Space Control.94

of verification] to enable and enforce strategic arms control.” (Hays, Smith, Van Tassel and Walsh, op. cit., 3-4) 86 The survivability doctrine “emphasizes broad utility for military space systems, not only at the strategic level emphasized in the sanctuary doctrine, but also at the tactical level of support to the warfighter.” (Ibid.) 87 The control doctrine “is analogous to military thinking about about sea or air control and asserts the need for control of space in order to apply spacepower more effectively.” (Ibid.) 88 The high ground doctrine “argues that space is the dominant theater of military operations and is capable of affecting terrestrial conflicts in decisive ways.” (Ibid.) 89 See: - Handberg, op. cit., 120-124. - Hays, Smith, Van Tassel and Walsh, “Spacepower for a New Millennium: Examining Current U.S.

Capabilities and Policies,” in Hays, Smith, Van Tassel and Walsh, eds., op. cit., 4-6. 90 See, for example: - USAF Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space Operations, (Maxwell Air Force Base

(Alabama): Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, 23 August 1998), 7-13. Hereafter referred to as “AFDD 2-2 (23 August 1998 Version).” Note that the typology referred to in the text is not explicitly used in the current version of AFDD 2-2, dated 27 November 2001. For a copy of the current version, see web site of the Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC), <http://bbs.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/ACP/Doctrine/doctrine.en.html>. [Accessed 18 March 2002].

- Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Space Operations, First Draft, Version 1.4 (January 1999), III-4 to III-12.

91 Space Force Support “is carried out by terrestrial-based elements of military space forces to sustain, surge and reconstitute elements of a military space system or capability.” (AFDD 2-2 (23 August 1998 Version), 12) 92 Space Force Enhancement encompasses “those operations conducted from space with the objective of enabling or supporting terrestrial-based forces.” (Ibid., 11) 93 Space Force Application “would consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapons systems operating in space.” (Ibid.) 94 Space Control is “the means by which space superiority is gained and maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy.” (Ibid., 8)

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During the 1990s, the U.S. DOD and the USAF sponsored or facilitated a number

of important studies that focused on future aerospace capabilities and technologies that

would enhance U.S. security. Keys among those were the Air University’s SPACECAST

2020 study95 and the U.S. Space Command’s Vision for 2020 document96 and its sequel,

the Long Range Plan (hereafter referred to as LRP).97 The notions of space control and

95 SPACECAST 2020 is the result of a 10-month study that the Air University undertook in 1993-1994, to “envision the possibilities, capabilities, and technologies the United States will require to exploit the space high ground in pursuit of national security objectives.” (Jay W. Kelley, in Foreword to SPACECAST 2020 Executive Summary (Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama): Air University, 22 June 1994), 1. Available from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/exec.html>. [Accessed 7 April 2002]. USAF Lieutenant General Jay W. Kelley wrote this Foreword in his capacity of Commandant, Air University.) 96 Vision for 2020, which was issued by the U.S. Space Command in 1997, was reportedly “developed in response to and in conjunction with Joint Vision 2010, a process that occurred across the other services and unified command.” (Handberg, op. cit., 206). The Joint Vision 2010 concept, which was championed by General John M. Shalikashvili (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997), emphasizes the theme of “full spectrum dominance” resulting from the application of four new operational concepts: dominant maneuver; precision engagement; full dimensional protection; and focused logistics. The two principal themes articulated in Vision for 2020 “are dominating the space medium and integrating space power throughout military operations.” (United States Space Command, Vision for 2020 (Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado): United States Space Command, February 1997). Available from <http://www.spacecom.mil/>. [Accessed 7 April 2002] ) Last but not least, Vision for 2020 identifies four operational concepts that are deemed necessary to attain the U.S. Space Command vision: - Control of space “is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space

medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required.” (Ibid.) - Global engagement “is the application of precision force from, to and through space.” (Ibid.) - Full force integration “is the integration of space forces and space-derived information with land, sea,

and air forces and their information.” (Ibid.) - Global partnerships “augment military space capabilities through the leveraging of civil, commercial,

and international space systems.” (Ibid.) For complementary information, see also: - Handberg, op. cit., 197-201. - Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington: Brookings

Institution Press, 2000), 2, 18-19. 97 The LRP, which was issued by the U.S Space Command in March 1998, elaborates on the themes and ideas contained in Vision for 2020. The LRP is based on the prediction that an explosion of commercial activities in space is imminent and that “[i]n 2020, if not sooner, adversaries will essentially share the high ground of space with the United States and its allies.” (United States Space Command, Long Range Plan Executive Summary (Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado): United States Space Command, March 1998), 2. This brochure is available from <http://www.spacecom.mil/>. [Accessed 7 April 2002] ). An example of the Plan’s optimistic view regarding the expansion of space activities is the following statement: “Within the next decade, there are projections that as many as 1,800 new satellites will orbit the earth. That’s four times more active satellites than on orbit today.” (Long Range Plan Executive Summary, 2) For the first three of the four operational concepts identified in Vision for 2020, the LRP presents a rationale, the end state that should be sought for 2020, and an explanation of associated objectives: - Control of space has five objectives: assured access; surveillance of space; protection; prevention; and

negation. (United States Space Command, Long Range Plan (Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado):

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space force application (or space high ground) are in evidence in these documents. In

particular, in its discussion of space control and global engagement, the LRP mentions

the possibility of applying weapons in space or using space-based weapons, although it

clearly acknowledges that this would require important policy changes that can only be

directed by the National Command Authority.98

Beginning in 1997, the debate on the need for ballistic missile defence was

revived by indications that the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass

destruction—now accessible to “rogue states”—had considerably increased the security

risk incurred by the U.S., its deployed military forces and its allies.99 The Clinton

Administration’s approach to national missile defence was the subject of vigorous

criticism, particularly after the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the

United States100 reported to the U.S. Congress that the threat was more immediate than

previously assessed by intelligence authorities. Although the current U.S. plans for

United States Space Command, March 1998), 19. Available from <http://www.spacecom.mil/>. [Accessed 7 April 2002])

- Global engagement has three objectives: integrated focused surveillance; missile defence; and force application. (Ibid., 49)

- Full force integration has four objectives: policy and doctrine; people; information; and organization. (Ibid., 73)

- For global partnerships, roadmaps are proposed so as to facilitate “leveraging civil, commercial, non-US intelligence, national and international space systems.” (Ibid., 99)

98 Ibid., 46, 65 and 69. 99 See: - Robert Braham, “Ballistic Defense: It’s Back,” IEEE Spectrum 34, no. 9 (September 1997), 26-27. - David E. Mosher, “The Grand Plans,” IEEE Spectrum 34, no. 9 (September 1997), 28-39. - J.R. Wilson, “NMD: The New Debate,” Aerospace America 36, no. 10 (October 1998), 41-48. 100 This commission, which was sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was chaired by the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld. Mr Rumsfeld was previously the 13th Secretary of Defense, from 1975 to 1977 (under the Gerald R. Ford Administration) and, following the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States, Mr Rumsfeld was appointed 21st Secretary of Defense. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States is commonly referred to as the “Rumsfeld Commission.” It is noteworthy that Mr. Rumsfeld subsequently chaired another commission, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, until his

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ballistic missile defence appear less ambitious than President Reagan’s SDI proposal,

many of the themes being debated are common.101 The U.S. intention to abrogate the

1972 ABM Treaty, announced by President George W. Bush on 13 December 2001, has

been especially controversial. The George W. Bush Administration has used the

increased terrorist threat to partly justify this radical policy change, but partisans of the

status quo argue that this change will ultimately be “upsetting the nuclear balance of

power.”102

In 1999, Operation Allied Force, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the

Former Republic of Yugoslavia, reconfirmed the growing importance of space systems

for modern military operations.103 Based on an analysis of that operation, it has been

estimated that military use of space systems—including commercial ones—will further

expand in future conflicts, and that the need for space system protection will become

more acute.104

nomination as Secretary of Defense on 28 December 2000, only a few days before this commission submitted its report to the U.S. Congress (11 January 2001). 101 Three themes that stand out are the gravity of the threat, the financial and technical feasibility of the weapon systems envisioned, and compliance with international treaties. See: - “Ballistic Missile Defense: Readers Respond,” IEEE Spectrum 34, no. 11 (November 1997), 70-75. - Mosher, op. cit. - David E. Mosher, “Treaty Constraints and Complaints,” IEEE Spectrum 34, no. 9 (September 1997),

32. - Wilson, op. cit. 102 Manuel Perez-Rivas, “U.S. Quits ABM Treaty,” CNN.com/inside politics web page. Available from <http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec.bush.abm.index.html>. [Accessed 3 May 2002]. 103 Richard B. Myers, “Space Superiority is Fleeting,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 152, no. 1 (1 January 2000), 54-55. When this article was published, U.S. Air Force General Richard B. Myers was commander-in-chief of the U.S. Space Command and he has since become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 104 Theodore R. Simpson, “Using Space to Win Wars,” Aerospace America 38, no. 2 (February 2000), 28-31. In fact, based on his examination of Operation Allied Force, Simpson has predicted three long-term trends. Firstly, the use of space systems will continue to increase in military operations, and more protagonists will employ them. Secondly, there will be increasing dependence on commercial systems in future military operations. Finally, it will become more and more important for the U.S. and its allies to

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The second half of year 2000 was marked by the deliberations of the Commission

to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization.105 This

commission had been mandated to “assess the organization and management of space

activities that support U.S. national security interests,”106 in regard to “changes to be

implemented over the near-term, medium-term and long-term that would strengthen

United States national security.”107 The Space Commission “unanimously concluded that

the security and well being of the United States, its allies and friends depend on the

nation’s ability to operate in space,”108 and that

it is in the U.S. national interest to … [p]romote the peaceful use of space[, u]se the nation’s potential in space to support its domestic, economic, diplomatic and national security objectives[, and d]evelop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interest.109

While the Space Commission’s report recognizes the importance of promoting the

peaceful use of space, it leaves no doubt as to the need to preserve U.S. superiority in

space, particularly in the military realm:

[W]e know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be

provide adequate protection for their space assets and to prevent enemies “from using space systems for hostile purposes during a crisis or conflict.” (Ibid., 31) 105 This commission was appointed by the U.S. Congress and chaired by Donald H. Rumsfeld until a few days prior to the submission of its report. This commission is commonly referred to as the “Space Commission.” 106 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington: Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001), “Executive Summary,” 2. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/>. [Accessed 14 April 2002]. 107 Ibid., “Executive Summary,” 1. 108 Ibid., “Executive Summary,” 7. 109 Ibid.

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no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities. Thus far, the broad outline of U.S. national space policy is sound, but the U.S. has not yet taken the steps necessary to develop the needed capabilities and to maintain and ensure continuing superiority.110

The Space Commission’s report has had a resounding effect in the U.S. aerospace

and defence community.111 Senior U.S. military leaders now feel less inhibited about

initiating and taking part in “a dialogue about the previously taboo subject of the

militarization of space.”112 In addition, the George W. Bush Administration has already

taken steps to implement many of the commission’s recommendations.113 Furthermore,

the U.S. and allied intervention in Afghanistan, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist

attacks in New York and Washington, has once again highlighted the increasing

110 Ibid., “Executive Summary,” 10. 111 Following is a sampling of relevant articles, presented in chronological order: - William B. Scott, “Commission Lays Foundation For Future Military Space Corps,” Aviation Week

and Space Technology 154, no. 3 (15 January 2001), 433-435. - Paul Mann, “Bush Team Rethinks Strategic Doctrine,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 154, no.

4 (22 January 2001), 26-27. - William B. Scott and Paul Mann, “USAF Warned To Bolster Or Lose ‘Space Force’ Franchise,”

Aviation Week and Space Technology 154, no. 5 (29 January 2001), 55-56. - William B. Scott, “USAF Gives Nod To Space Report,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 154,

no. 7 (12 February 2001), 63. - Frank Morring, “NASA Eyes Military Role in Aerospace Push,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 154, no. 17 (23 April 2001), 36-37. - John G. Roos, “Militarizing Space: One >More@ ‘Giant Step’ Appears Inevitable,” Armed Forces

Journal International, September 2001, 30-36. - “Strategic Dominance From Air and Space: Air Force Association Statement of Policy,” Air Force

Magazine 84, no. 11 (November 2001), 54-57. This is the Statement of Policy of the United States Air Force Association for year 2002, adopted by its National Board of Directors in September 2001.

112 Roos, op. cit.113 The following articles, listed in chronological order, give an idea of recent and possible future changes resulting from the Space Commission report: - Robert Wall, “Rumsfeld Revamps Space, Pushes ‘Black’ Projects,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 154, no. 20 (14 May 2002), 30-31. - William B. Scott, “USAF Plots New Course for Space,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 156,

no. 14 (8 April 2002), 83-84. - Robert Wall, “Space Reformers Juggle War, Acquisition Demands,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 156, no. 14 (8 April 2002), 80-81.

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importance that space systems have in supporting tactical- and operational-level

operations.114

Recent Developments in Other Countries

Europe’s military presence in space is less visible than that of the U.S., but it is

not a negligible entity in that arena.115 Until recently, military space programmes have

retained a quasi-exclusive national focus,116 but there is now a growing determination to

implement future military systems through multinational European programs.117 Some

believe that Europe urgently needs to debate its strategic vision of space and to adopt a

114 See: - Craig Covault, “Naval Space Ops Crucial to Afghan War,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 156,

no. 14 (8 April 2002), 86-88. - Craig Covault, “Navy Enlists NASA In the War on Terror,” Aviation Week and Space Technology

156, no. 14 (8 April 2002), 30-31. - William B. Scott, “Milspace Comes of Age In Fighting Terror,” Aviation Week and Space Technology

156, no. 14 (8 April 2002), 77-78. This article gives an idea of the order-of-magnitude difference between the transmission capacity (“throughput”) required by this conflict and that of the Persian Gulf War.

115 For McLean, “ there already exists a considerable military space infrastructure within Europe.” See: Alasdair McLean, “European Exploitation of Space: When Rather Than If,” RUSI Journal 144, no. 5 (October 1999), 47-50. 116 Europe’s entry in space was accomplished through national programs whose motivation was at least partly military. As early as the 1960s, concerted efforts were made to harmonize scientific and civilian programs, through the European Space Agency (ESA). However, national military programs were generally excluded from these harmonization efforts. For a brief historical overview of the European presence in space, see: Pierre M. Gallois and Daniel Pichoud, article “Europe,” in Michael John Rycroft, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space (Cambridge (U.K.): Cambridge University Press, 1990), 346-347. 117 This parallels the development of a European security and defence identity and is motivated in good part by an increasing consensus on the need to reduce European dependence on U.S. space-based assets, and by the realization that deployment of systems comparable to those of the U.S. will necessitate multinational funding. See: - McLean, op. cit. - Michael A. Taverna, “Europeans Pursue New Research Alliance,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 154, no. 22 (7 May 2001), 22-23. - Michael A. Taverna, “Spanish, Belgian Plans Boost Europe’s Milsats,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 155, no. 4 (23 July 2001), 36. - Michael A. Taverna and Robert Wall, “Europe Advances Recce Satellite Plan,” Aviation Week and

Space Technology 155, no. 14 (1 October 2001), 73. - Michael A. Taverna, “French Brass Urge Milspace Teamwork,” Aviation Week and Space Technology

156, no. 10 (11 March 2002), 49-50. - Michael A. Taverna, “France Moves To Cement Ties In Space, Defense Research,” Aviation Week

and Space Technology 156, no. 12 (25 March 2002), 42-43.

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common military space policy.118 Interestingly, it has been assessed that the George W.

Bush Administration’s stated position on a number of international issues (including the

military use of space) is prompting Europe to develop its own space strategy.119

Following the demise of the USSR, the Russian space program has been plagued

by serious budgetary crises.120 Notwithstanding these problems, the Russians still have a

potent rocket launch capability and the will to remain competitive on the world market.121

In the military arena, the country’s considerable spaced-based intelligence resources have

dwindled in the past decade, but in light of Russia’s precarious geopolitical situation,

President Putin has recently called for that capability to be reinvigorated.122

China is secretive about many aspects of its civilian and military space programs,

but there is no doubt that it has made great strides in the last three decades and is very

118 For McLean, Europe needs to focus on the development of “a coherent European policy in relation to the military use of space.” (McLean, op. cit.) Nardon believes that Europe needs a debate to clarify its vision of the strategic nature of space, but she does not think it is advisable for Europe to follow what she perceives as a U.S. move towards a more assertive military presence in space. She also sees hope in an ESA ministerial meeting that took place in Edinburgh in November 2001, during which three projects with important military repercussions were discussed. These are: public funding for the Ariane V launcher; funding for the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System program; and the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program, which seeks to coordinate all European Earth-observation systems. See: Laurence Nardon, “Espace militaire : les débats aux Etats-Unis, les avancées de l’Europe,” Politique étrangère 67, no. 1 (January-March 2002), 189-198. 119 Michael A. Taverna, “Europeans Use Bush’s Position To Promote New Space Strategy,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 154, no. 25 (18 June 2001), 88-89. Strangely, this is somewhat reminiscent of Europe’s reaction to President Reagan’s announcement of the SDI program, which began with “concern, disbelief and confusion” (Jasani, op. cit., 46) and evolved towards discussion about a European Defence Initiative (EDI) and the creation of a European Research Co-ordination Agency (Eureka) whose research elements partly overlapped those of the SDI program. (Ibid., 46-50) 120 James Oberg, “Russia’s Space Program: Running On Empty,” IEEE Spectrum 32, no. 12 (December 1995), 18-35. 121 See: - Dave Dooling, “Launcher Without a Country,” IEEE Spectrum 33, no. 10 (October 1996), 18-25. - Anatoly Zak, “Rockets ə Us,” IEEE Spectrum 39, no. 2 (February 2002), 52-58. 122 Craig Covault, “Putin Airs Military Space Concerns,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 156, no. 9 (4 March 2002), 47.

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ambitious about the future.123 In the U.S., allegations that China has acquired a

significant portion of its space technology through spying have caused great controversy

and speculations regarding that country’s ultimate motivation for its space program.124 In

May 1999, the Cox Commission125 reported, among other things, that “>t@he PRC

>People’s Republic of China@ has stolen U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct

applicability to the >Chinese army’s@ ballistic missiles.”126 Notwithstanding the fact that

reality may have been more complex than depicted in the Cox report,127 this investigation

123 See: - Baker, op. cit., 5-8. - Craig Covault, “China, Iran Pursue Imaging Spacecraft,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155,

no. 14 (1 October 2001), 45. - Craig Covault, “China Seeks ISS Role, Accelerates Space Program,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 155, no. 20 (12 November 2001), 52-55. - Craig Covault, “Chinese Plan Aggressive Satellite Development,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 155, no. 20 (12 November 2001), 56-57. - Chen Gengtao, article “China,” in Rycroft, op. cit., 337. 124 In particular, allegations of improper dealings between U.S. satellite manufacturers and China, compounded by the discovery of a major Chinese espionage operation conducted against U.S. nuclear armament facilities, prompted an important investigation by U.S. authorities and the tightening of U.S. technology export controls. For an overview of these incidents and their aftermath (including commercial repercussions in the U.S.), see the following: - Joseph C. Anselmo and James R. Asker, “U.S. Broadens Probes of China Tech Transfer,” Aviation

Week and Space Technology 148, no. 26 (29 June 1998), 24-26. - Joseph C. Anselmo, “Satellite Builders Fear Export Nightmare,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 150, no. 8 (22 February 1999), 24-25. - Joseph C. Anselmo, “U.S. Denial of China Satcoms Echos ’Round the World,” Aviation Week and

Space Technology 150, no. 9 (1 March 1999), 26-27. - Joseph C. Anselmo, “China Critic Condems ‘Overzealous’ Export Controls,” Aviation Week and

Space Technology 150, no. 13 (29 March 1999), 36-37. - Joseph C. Anselmo, “New U.S. Export Restrictions Reach Far Beyond Satellites,” Aviation Week and

Space Technology 150, no. 21 (24 May 1999), 29-30. - Paul Mann, “Lawmakers Clobber Satellite Exports,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 150, no.

26 (28 June 1999), 30-31. 125 A commission of U.S. representatives led by Republican Representative Christopher Cox. 126 U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People’s Republic of China, Report 105-851 (Declassified Version, 25 May 1999), House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 172 (Volume 1, Chapter 4/Summary). Available from <http://www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html> [Accessed 14 April 2002]. 127 Some later questioned the credibility of that assertion and of the Cox Report generally, on the basis that it contains a number of factual errors and may have diagnosed spying where there was in fact simply scientific or industrial cooperation. See: James Oberg, “Year of the Rocket,” IEEE Spectrum 38, no. 5 (May 2001), 62-68.

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casts serious doubts on the ends and means of the Chinese space program.128

Furthermore, experts on China’s defence and security matters have observed that some

influential Chinese military thinkers envision offensive action against space assets and

perhaps even the weaponization of space as unavoidable.129

Not surprisingly, the proliferation of space rocket technology is often linked to

that of ballistic missiles and nuclear weaponry. For Oberg, the continued growth of the

“missile club,” which now also includes problem-ridden and potentially unstable or

aggressive countries like Iraq and North Korea, is not surprising:

For many Third World nations, the powerful appeal of rockets lies in their combination of three impressive functions. First is the obvious military value of dropping warheads on enemies hundreds of kilometers away, or threatening to do so. Second, military rockets can be easily be adapted toward space applications, both for launching satellites and for threatening attacks on other nations’ satellites. Third, having rockets is widely considered by both political leaders and the general public to be the admission ticket to world-power status.130

128 See: - Joseph C. Anselmo, Robert Wall and James R. Asker, “Spying Debacle for U.S., But Great Leap for

China,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 150, no. 22 (31 May 1999), 26-29. - Joseph C. Anselmo, “Cox: Companies Broke Law—And Knew It,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 150, no. 22 (31 May 1999), 30-31. - Robert Wall, “Panel Says Spying Aided Conventional Weaponry,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology 150, no. 22 (31 May 1999), 31-32. 129 See: - Paul Beaver, “China Develops Anti-Satellite Laser System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 30, no. 22 (2

December 1998), 18. - Wu Guoqing, “Future Trends of Modern Operations,” in Michael Pilssbury, ed., Chinese Views of

Future Warfare (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1998), 343-354. At the time of writing, Major General Wu Guoqing was Director, Department of Operations and Tactics, Academy of Military Science, Beijing. His paper was originally published in China Military Science ( Summer 1994). Pages 344, 347 and 352-353 are of particular interest for the discussion here.

- Michael Pilssbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000), Chapter 6 (Forecasting Future Wars), 259-304 (in particular: 263 and 284-285).

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Key Points and Implications

The trend towards an increased commercial exploitation of space, which has been

significant in the past decade, should continue in the future. Technical innovations will

likely enable a considerable reduction in launch costs and the development of new

applications based on space technologies. These factors, combined with the phenomenon

of dual-use technologies, will contribute to the proliferation of space know-how and

technologies throughout the world.

With the collapse of the USSR, the U.S. has for more than a decade enjoyed a

position of clear military dominance in space. While the U.S. government still officially

favors the peaceful use of space, influential policy and doctrine analysts now advocate a

more assertive U.S. posture with respect to both the commercial and military use of

space. This in large part reflects a desire to assure commercial and military security to

the U.S., in the face of perceived threats from emerging space powers. On the military

side, because of the great dependence of the U.S. economy and military on space

systems, there is significant apprehension of a “space Pearl Harbor” that would catch the

country by surprise and lead to its demise. Consequently, within defence circles, there

have been calls for the U.S. to take means to retain the “high ground,” in case potential

opponents decide to resort to the use of force against its space assets. The George W.

Bush Administration’s decision to endorse many of the recommendations of the 2000

Space Commission, and to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty, may signal a move in that

direction.

130 James Oberg, “Missiles for All: The New Global Threat. More Missiles Flood the World and Reach Farther Than Ever,” IEEE Spectrum 36, no. 3 (March 1999), 20-28.

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Throughout the world, the Persian Gulf War has led to a better understanding of

the military importance of space. Europe in recent years has seen many calls for more

concerted efforts regarding the military use of space. Russia’s military space program is

in shambles, but the country’s leadership is attempting to revive it. The propensity of

some Chinese military thinkers to see space as another “theater of war” has spawned

Western preoccupations towards the long-term objectives of China’s space program.

Similarly, there is great concern regarding the proliferation of space and missile

technology among countries with a history of political instability or regional conflict, or

among influential non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups) that are active in such countries.

Due to the exceptional contribution of space-based systems in recent conflicts, it

is perfectly understandable that existing and emerging space powers strive to deploy

systems in support of their communication, navigation, weather forecasting or

intelligence requirements. Furthermore, for states that have apprehensions or a lack of

confidence regarding the intentions of potential adversaries with respect to the use of

force in or from space, there will be an enticement to deploy—whether overtly or

covertly—defensive or offensive capabilities in space. In addition to ASAT weapons,

there may be a temptation—particularly if this enables cost-effective and risk-free power

projection—to deploy offensive weapons that can be used against terrestrial objectives.

Once the deployment of offensive weapons in space has taken place, the preservation of

peace in that medium will depend on the self-restraint of the space powers that will have

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an offensive capability at their disposal, and on their ability to prevent non-state actors

from acquiring and using such capabilities.

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Section 5 – Conclusion

Over the past four decades, humanity has developed a critical dependence for the

services provided by satellite systems. Consequently, space systems have become

attractive targets for attacks—whether conventional or asymmetric—whose effects could

range from temporary disruption of a capability to the generation of social chaos. In that

sense, space systems constitute a potent center of gravity. This situation will likely be

exacerbated in the future, as the exploitation of space resources expands and competition

among state and non-state actors also increases.

The space legal regime is characterized by treaties that are somewhat ambiguous

and do not explicitly ban all weapons from space. Until the late 1980s, the primary

influence on the military use of space was the U.S.-USSR rivalry and the Cold War.

Early in that period, the use of weapons—such as ASAT and ABM weapons—in or from

space was considered. Although limited development and experimentation of such

weapons was conducted, none was deployed for long-term operational use. This apparent

self-restraint stemmed largely from the relative simplicity of the geopolitical situation

during that period, and from pragmatic considerations by the two superpowers—

including a desire for stability, as well as technical and cost issues.

During the 1980s, the U.S. SDI program accentuated the perception that space

could be a “theater of war” like any other. At the same time, there were sustained efforts

in the U.S. to enable tactical use of national strategic space assets. The benefits of these

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efforts were reaped during the Persian Gulf War, when space assets—used essentially in

a support role—gave a decisive advantage to the U.S. and its allies. Subsequently,

concerns were expressed about U.S. dependence on space and how future adversaries

could exploit the vulnerabilities of space systems.

More recently, the borders between the political, commercial and military facets

of space have become increasingly porous, a trend that is expected to last. Advances in

technology will facilitate access to space and enable new applications—both commercial

and military. Although the U.S. now has clear military dominance in space, the key role

played by satellites during the Gulf War and subsequent conflicts has been well noticed

by other states. Among existing or emerging space powers, some—notably China—

appear determined to tailor their military doctrine accordingly. Conversely, many U.S.

military thinkers are convinced that their country must retain the “high ground” in space.

Consequently, they place added emphasis on two concepts—space control and space

force application—that may necessitate the use of weapons in or from space.

Therefore, there is a multi-faceted trend towards further militarization and

possibly the weaponization of space. Space assets in general, in their role of “global

utilities,” constitute an appealing center of gravity and may become the target of Earth- or

space-based aggressor forces. At the same time, having considered the lessons of the

Gulf War and subsequent conflicts, states and alliances that seek to have global influence

have a powerful incentive to make use of space systems to achieve military superiority.

This in turn enhances the value of space systems as potential targets. Finally, the sole

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remaining superpower—the U.S.—is well aware of its critical dependence on space

systems and determined to retain its military lead in space. This could lead the U.S. to

consider innovative ways—including some that involve space warfare—to protect its

homeland and global interests, provided that the means being used are seen as cost-

effective and balanced in light of the applicable threats.

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