Aristotle - Fragments on Ethical Subjects (George Grote)

7/28/2019 Aristotle - Fragments on Ethical Subjects (George Grote)

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FRAGMENTSON ETHICAL SUBJECTS.

BY THE LATE

GEOEGE GEOTE, F.E.S.BEING

A SELECTION FROM HIS POSTHUMOUSPAPERS.

LONDON:JOHN MUKEAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1876.

Tlie right of Translation is reserved.


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MR. GROTE'S WORKS.A HISTORY OF GEEECE. From the Earliest Period

to the close of the Generation coiitpmjiorary with Alexandkr the Great.Library Edition. With Portrait, Maps, and Plans. 10 vols. 8vo. 120s.Cabinet Edition. With Portrait and Plans. 12 vols.

Post 8vo. 6. each.*,* Any volume of this Edition may be had separately.

PLATO AND OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKEATES.3 vols. 8V0. 45s.

ARISTOTLE. 2 vols. 8vo. 32s.THE MINOR WORKS OF GEORGE GROTE. With

Critical Remarks on his Intellectual Character, Writings, and Speeches. ByAiEX. Bain, LL.D. With Portrait. 8vo. 14s.

PERSONAL LIFE OF GEORGE GROTE. Compiled fromFamily Documents, Private Memoranda, and Original Letters to and fromVarious Friends. By Mrs, Gbote. With Portrait. 8vo. 12s.

LOKDOK : PRIXTBD BY WILLIAU CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREETAND CHARING CRCSS.


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INTIIOUUCTION.

When Mr. Grote's vast collection of MSS. cameto be thoroughly examined, there were discoveredseveral Essays in Ethics, which appeared to besufficiently consecutive and complete to be given tothe world.The work on Plato afforded him opportunities

for discussing various points of Ethical theory ; andhe turned these opportunities to good account : butin none of his published writings had he treatedsystematically of the questions relating to Morals,in the form that they usually assume in the trea-tises of modern writers.

Ethical Philosophy formed, all through life, oneof his chief lines of study. He had followed itsdevelopment, both as to its theoretical foundationsand as to its practical or preceptive details, inancient and in modern times. His own views maypossibly have been shaped by his early contactwith James Mill ; but they were matured by his


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IV INTRODUCTION.

own independent meditations. Mr. Grote belongedto the Utilitarian school ; and in the statement ofthe doctrines, as well as in the arguments used,there is much that is common to all its disciplesyet his superior erudition, together with his greatpowers both as a reasoner and as a writer, imparta welcome freshness to his handling of the subjectin these papers.The first EssayOn the Origin and Nature of

Ethical Sentimentraises the Psychological ques-tion of Ethics, the mental foundations of the sen-timent of right and wrong. After giving theelements that enter into the sentiment, he definesit generally as a sentiment of regulated social reci-procity, as between the agent and the societywherein he lives. This is the Form^ which itpresents in every grade of its development. Thereare also in the Matter, some points of caj)ital uni-formity, which he enumerates; but account has alsoto be taken of the original and inherent diversitiesbetween one age or country and another. Heurges strongly the bearing of this fact on thetheory of an Instinctive Moral Sentiment ; andmeets the objection, urged against the derivationtheory, that it tends to weaken the authority ofthe ethical motive.


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INTKODUCTION. V

Tbe second Essay Philosophy of Morals isa short discussion of the Moral Standard. Theauthor takes his ground upon the juridical viewof Morality, brought into prominence by Benthamand Austin, and illustrates it with great force. Heenquires into the meaning of the " supremacy ofconscience," and connects it, under all its disguises,with a reference to external authority. He re-urges the essential reciprocity of obligation andright, and criticises Kant's theory of the moralfeelings.The third Essay Ancient Systems of Moral

Philosophygoes no farther than to advert to thedefectiveness of the ancient systems in making theirstarting-point the summum bonum, or the happinessof the individual. The real end of morality being,not to make the individual happy, but to protectone man from another man, the theory of the sum-mum honum had to be stretched and interpreted tocontain a reference to the welfare of others. Theauthor shews that the adherence to this starting-point was the cause of much of the perplexity andconfusion of ideas that we find in the ancientmoralists ; not even excepting Aristotle himself.The fourth EssayIdea of Ethical Philosophy is the fullest in its handling of the several topics


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vi INTRODUCTION.

brought forward. The author repeats the socialbearings of Obh'gation, viewing society as the im-mediate source of the ethical sanction ; but indi-cates that there is a farther enquiry on what doesSociety itself proceed in framing its enactments ?and this conducts to the question of how far utilityor happiness is the ultimate end.

The second part of the Essay is occupied withtracing at some length the growth of ethical ideasin the child ; while, in the third part, the authorgoes fully into the nature and meanings of MoralApprobation and Moral Disapprobation.

The two concluding Essays, had they been dis-covered in time, would have been included in the' Aristotle.' They are the fruit of long and la-borious study, and, so far as they extend, eml)odythe writer's matured views upon the Ethics and thePolitics : the two treatises whose omission from hispublished exposition of the Aristotelian philosophyhas been most regretted.The fifth EssayOn the Ethics of Aristotle

falls naturally into two divisions : the first treatsof Happiness; the second of what, according toAristotle, j.s_.. the chief ingredient of Happiness,namely^ Virtue. On Aristotle's own conception of


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INTRODUCTION. ' V"

Happiness, Mr. Grote dwells very minutely ; turn-ing it over on all sides, and looking at it fromevery point of view. While fully acknowledgingits merits, he gives also the full measure of itsdefects. His criticisms on this head are in theauthor's best style, and are no less important asregards Ethical discussion than as a commentaryon Aristotle.

His handling of Aristotle's doctrine of Virtue isequally subtle and instructive. Particularly strikingare the remarks on the Voluntary and the Involun-tary, and on vrpoatjoecrt?, or deliberate preference.The treatment of the Virtues in detail is, unhappily,more fragmentary ; but what he does say regard-ing Justice and Equity has a permanent interest.The concluding EssayThe Politics of Aristotlemust be studied in connection with the preceding.

Although but a brief sketch, it is remarkable forthe insight which it affords us into the most con-summate political Ideal of the ancient world.

A. B.


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CONTENTS.ESSAY I.

FAQBON THE ORIGIN AND NATUEE OF ETHICALSENTIMENT 1

ESSAY ILPHILOSOPHY OF MOEALS 29ESSAY in.

VANCIENT systems of MOEAL PHILOSOPHY .. 49ESSAY IV.

/IDEA OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 65ESSAY V.

^THE ETHICS OF AEISTOTLE 127ESSAY VI.

5 THE POLITICS OF AEISTOTLE 213


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ESSAY I.ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF

ETHICAL SENTIMENT.


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ON THE OEIGIN AND NATUKE OFETHICAL SENTIMENT.

Of all the remaining productions of the ancientworld, there is nothing which is more characteristicand admirable than the writings of the Greekand Roman philosophers on the subject of ethicaland political science. By them these sciences werefirst created, not only without any particular facili-ties for the attempt, but in spite of a very narrowrange of experience and observationin sjDite ofentire want of intercourse with all nations notHellenicand, what is of still greater moment,without any pre-existing specimens of philosophicalenquiry on that or any other subject to serve themeither as model or incentive.To understand clearly what the Greek and Roman

writers achieved in this department of human know-ledge, two preliminary explanations are necessary.

1. To give a general view of that which consti-tutes ethical sentiment, and the sources from whenceit derives its origin.

2. To present an account of the state of ethicalB 2


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4 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.sentiment as it stood in the Hellenic world prior toSocrates, with whom the day-star of philosophicalenquiries on ethical subjects may be considered tohave arisen.

What is Ethical Sentiment ?The explanations given by different writers of the

nature and origin of ethical sentiment have beenmiany and various ; but every one who has evereither spoken or written upon the subject has agreedin considering this sentiment as absolutely indispen-sable to the very existence of society. Without thediffusion of a certain measure of this feeling through-out all the members of the social union, the caprice,the desires, and the passions of each separate in-dividual would render the maintenance of anyestablished communion impossible. Positive mo-rality, under some form or another, has existed inevery society of which the world has ever hadexperience.

But if we compare one age with another, and onepart of the globe with another, the differences inrespect to ethical sentiment will appear both vastlynumerous and prodigiously important. Some fewleading points of similarity will be found to prevailalways and everywhere ; but the points of differencewill be found to outnumber greatly those in regard


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Essay I.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 5

to which an uniformity of sentiment reigns through-out all the various communities of the world. Anytheory which professes to explain the origin andnature of ethical sentiment must render an account,not merely of the points of resemblance, but also ofthe many and great divergences between one societyand another.No theory can satisfy this condition which repre-

sents ethical sentiment as consisting of inexplicableinstincts, or mental determinations originally arisingwithout any regard to consequences. Those whoadopt this view of the case produce the supposedinstincts for the purpose of explaining those modi-fications of ethical sentiment which are the mostcommon and universalthey do not imagine specialinstincts in this or that age or nation to explainwhat is separate and peculiar. Yet if the theory ofinstinct be applied to the former, consistency im-periously requires that it shall be applied to thelatter ; the more so as the latter includes all that isreally or intrinsically difficult of explanation. Forthe former, or the universal and essential tendenciesof the moral sense, admit of being most satisfactorilydeduced from other elementary principles of ournature.

Ethical sentiment is, in fact, a very complicatedsentiment, presupposing many trains of ideas andfeelings, and deduced from several distinct, and even


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6 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay 1.opposing elements of our nature ; yet so combinedtogether by habitual association, as to affect themind with the rapidity and instantaneousness of asimple feeling, no separate consciousness of the con-stituent items remaining.The elementary tendencies of the mind which

ethical sentiment presupposes, and out of which it ismore or less deduced, are as follows :

1. Our self-regarding tendencies.The whole of every man's comfort and happiness,

from the cradle to the tomb, depends upon the for-bearance, the protection, and the positive help ofothers; and all these consequences, again, dependupon the dispositions which others entertain to-wards him. This dependence is great and com-plete throughout the whole of life ; but is mosturgently felt during the utter helplessness of child-hood, at the time when the first associations areformed.

2. Our sympathetic tendencies.Generally speaking, and leaving out of sight par-

ticular cases of exception, the pains of others are anoriginal cause of pain to ourselves. Several ex-ceptions might be enumerated to this rule, such asthe " Suave mari magno," of Lucretius ; but therule in general holds good.The pleasures of others are frequently a cause of

pleasure to ourselves, but by no means universally.


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The exceptions in this case are very frequent andnumerous.

But the sympathy of others, either with our painsor with our pleasures, is always agreeable to uswant of sympathy on the part of others, or themanifestation of a feeling the opposite of sympathy,is always painful and disagreeable.

3. Otcr betievolent affections.We love those who confer happiness upon us, or

protect us from suffering : we also love those whosepresence is associated with our enjoyments, or withour consciousness of protection.

4. Our malevolent affections.We hate those who are the causes of suffering to

us, or who deprive us of happiness either present orexpected ; also those whose presence is associatedwith suffering or loss of enjoyment.

5. Sympathising with other persons who feel pain,we are disposed to hate those who are the causes ofthat pain, though not with the same intensity as wehate those who are the causes of pain to ourselves.Sympathising with others who feel pleasure, we aredisposed to love those who are the causes of thatpleasure.Amongst all these different affections, the self-

regarding affections are both the strongest, the mostconstant, and the most lasting. The sympatheticand the benevolent affections are capable of becoming


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8 ON THE OKIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.frequent and powerful causes of action under a goodtraining, as the malevolent affections often do underan opposite system. It seems to be by virtue of thebenevolent and sympathetic affections acting con-jointly with the self-regarding affections, that webecome capable of conceiving intense attachment toa common goodthat is, to the idea of the safetyand happiness of others in conjunction with our ownand apprehensions equally intense at the idea of acommon peril or suffering.Every individual person is placed in a double posi-tion in respect to his conduct and sentiments. In

the first place, he is an agent, seeking to satisfyvarious wants, and to gratify various affections inthe easiest manner open to him. In this character,his interests and his feelings stand apart from thoseof other persons, not unfrequently at variance withthem. In the second place, he is a patient, in com-mon with others, from the action of different indivi-duals : in this character his interests and his feelingsare commonly in unison with those of others.Throughout the whole of life he is constantly placedin both of these two positions, and he accordinglyacquires the constant habit of viewing and judgingof the circumstances around him both from the onepoint of view and from the other. When he is aboutto become an agent, he unconsciously passes from thepoint of view belonging to this character to place


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himself by imagination in that of the spectator orpatient ; when he is witness to the agency of others,his fancy transfers him to the position of the agent,and presents to him a conception of the state ofmind which would animate him if he himself were soplaced. The habit of thus changing our point ofview, and conceiving what we should feel if placedin a position different from our own, is necessarilyan acquired habit ; but it is acquired so early, it isso constantly called into exercise, and is so in-dispensably necessary at all times to our comfort andeven our safety, that it becomes at last one of themost rapid and familiar of all the mental processes.We come to perform it not only without any distinctor special consciousness, but also in cases where itcauses us extreme pain, and where we would greatlydesire to escape it. The idea of the judgment whichothers will form becomes constantly and indissolublyassociated with the idea of action in the mind ofevery agent ; this idea being, in fact, the same (withsome differences which shall be touched upon pre-sently) as the idea of that judgment which he him-self would form if placed in the position of others.It is, in fact, the idea of the judgment of others,concurrently with his own as a spectator or patient.

This idea of the judgment of others upon ourconduct and feelings as agents, or the idea of ourown judgment as spectators in concurrence with


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10 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.others, upon our own conduct as agents, is the mainbasis of what is properly called ethical sentiment;which is essentially a social sentiment, conceivableonly by a number of men living in some sort ofcommunion more or less intimate and extensive.

Ethical sentiment is by no means identical eitherwith sympathy or with the benevolent affection,although it is a compound which presupposes boththe one and the other. A man may feel both sym-pathy and benevolence in the most acute degreetowards a being who cannot be an object of ethicalsentimenttowards an iufant, an idiot, or an animalhe may be powerfully restrained by ethical senti-ment in his dealings with a person towards whom heindulges little or no benevolence, or whom he evenregards as a personal enemy. Ethical sentiment isan aggregate of the opinions entertained by eachgiven community, and associated in their minds withvery strong feelingsas to the line of conductwhich entitles any individual agent to their protec-tion, their esteem, or their admiration on the onehandor which exposes him on the other hand totheir displeasure, their contempt, or their indif-ference. It consists of an association in my mindof a certain line of conduct, on the part both ofmyself and of any other individual agent, with acertain sentiment resulting from such conduct, andexcited by it, in the minds of the general public


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Essay I.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 11around us. It is a sentiment of regulated socialreciprocity, as between tlie agent and the societyamongst whom he livessuch and such behaviourto be rendered on his part, such and such sentimentsto be manifested as requital on theirs. It is theopinion which he entertains, and which has beendeeply impressed upon his mind by its connectionwith his most anxious hopes and fears, on the con-ditions prescribed to him for obtaining, first theprotection, next the esteem, and lastly the admi-ration of the societyand for escaping the distressand misery consequent upon his becoming, or evenupon his conceiving himself to be, the object of theiranger, or scorn, or displeasure. All ethical senti-ment, of what kind soever it be, whether perfect orimperfect, well or ill directed, uniformly containsthese three ingredients : 1. The idea of a certainconduct or disposition on the part of each individualagent. 2. The idea of a certain disposition orconduct on the part of other persons towards suchagent, determined by his conduct and disposition asit may have been manifested, or as there may bereason to understand it. These two ideas, intimatelycombined and blended together by association, con-ceived (3), as bound together by a common sanction,and as reciprocating one with the other, seem toconstitute all that is universal, essential, and indis-pensable to ethical sentiment, taken as it exists in


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12 ON THE OKIGIN AND NATURE [Essav I.its lowest and most perverted, as well as in its purestand most correct, varieties. The reciprocity betweenthe agent and the society consists in this, thatalthough he does not expect to receive the protec-tion or favour of society, except upon condition ofcertain conduct and certain dispositions on his part,failing which, he anticipates from them the contrarytreatmentyet, on the other hand, if he has dulyperformed these conditions, he conceives himself tohave earned their protection or favour as a matterof right, and thinks that they would do him wrongif they withheld it.

I say, moreover, these two ideas conceived as houndtogether hy a common sanction. To a certain extentthe sanction thus implied in our moral sentiment isactually exhibited in the positive interference and inthe manifestation of sentiment on the part of society.In most cases, the various acts and forbearanceswhich a man supposes to constitute the sum of hisduty, especially in a rude stage of civilization, areacts and forbearances towards other individualsand here, the body of the society forms the positivesanction on which a man relies for interference andprotection, when he feels that he has performed theconditions M^hich give him a title to claim it. Ifthe social organization be so imperfect as to dis-appoint his hopes of such protectionor if thepersons against whom he requires protection should


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Essay I.j OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 13

themselves chance to be the most powerful portionof societythe agent thus disappointed looks to theGods as a supplementary sanction. The idea of asanction, or of a superior force competent to interfereand prepared to interfere as a guarantee for themaintenance of the connection between the two ideasabove alluded to, forms a constant adjunct of ethicalsentimenthowever imperfectly the reality maycorrespond to this imagination. The intimate con-nection established in the mind by association be-tween good or ill desert and its consequences, drivesus to conceive an ideal vinculum between them,under the form of a superintending and ever-watchful Providence, competent to punish, to com-pensate, and to reward.

These, then, are the constituent elements of ethicalsentiment, which it includes universally and under allcircumstancesthe idea of certain acts and forbear-ances, manifesting particular dispositions, on the partof any given agent, considered as the exciting causeof those dispositions on the part of others uponwhich the safety and happiness of the agent mostvitally dependof their protection or ill-usage, theiradmiration or scorn, their esteem or neglect. Associa-tion knits together the two intimately and indis-solubly in the mind of the agentthe idea of theact or disposition on his own part with that of thecorresponding disposition on the part of othersin


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14 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.such manner that the one cannot be thought of with-out the other, and a compound sentiment is formed,the items of which cannot become subjects of distinctconsciousness. As a cement and guarantee to theconstancy of this union, the idea of an extraneoussanction is superadded, and completes what may becalled the Form of Ethical Sentiment, as distinguishedfrom the Matter.

In regard to the Matter of Ethical Sentiment, thereis in some few capital points a great uniformity ; butthere are also, upon almost all other points, thewidest divergencies^ between different ages and dif-ferent nations. First, Ethical Sentiment alwaysplaces some limit upon the malevolent dispositions ofmankind, and upon the indefinite power which eachman originally possesses of hurting or tormentinghis neighbours. In the very rudest communities,some limitation of this kind is imposed by the generalsentiment ; without it, indeed, no community what-ever could even continue to exist. The association iseverywhere more or less formed, in the mind ofeach individual agent, between acts of intentionalhurt or spoliation of others, and the displeasure orenmity of society. Every member of the societyfeels this sentiment with greater or less force : everyone finds and feels his own protection in it. Thereare great differences between one society and anotherin respect to the faintness or potency of the feeling


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Essay I.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. , 15

the constancy or unsteadiness of its operationthedegree to which it bears equally or unequally uponall the various members, and operates alike for theprotection of all and the restraint of all. But allsocieties agree, so far as the existence of the feelingis concerned, in this portion of the matter of ethicalsentiment, and it forms the indispensable link whichenables them to subsist and move on without dis-solution. The coincidence of interest, or indeed ofnecessity, between one society and another, is in thisparticular so evidently and urgently impressed, thatit would be astonishing if the effects produced werenot uniform.

Again, ethical sentiment tends universally, underall its forms and varieties, to develop and encouragethe benevolent impulses of our nature. It producesthis effect in some communities to a greater degree,in other communities to a less degree : but in all,without exception, it produces an effect in this direc-tion. In the first place, the restraint, before alludedto, which it imposes upon the malevolent and ra-pacious propensities of our nature, is indispensablynecessary to make room for any considerable growthand development of the benevolent impulses. Aman who is perpetually in fear of evil at the handsof others is hardly susceptible of a decided or con-stant feeling of benevolence towards them : it is onlywhen he ceases to be beset with the former feeling


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16 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.that the latter association acquires any forcible holdof his mind. In the next place, over and above theindirect encouragement, thus afforded by clearingthe ground from obstructive and antagonizing feel-ings, ethical sentiment affords further positive en-couragement to the benevolent impulses. The voiceof society is everywhere more or less favourable tothem, even in the least civilized tribes recorded inhistory.

Thirdly, ethical sentiment is also the great gene-rator and supporter of all the virtues included underthe general term of self-command, including pru-dence, temperance, courage, continence, repressionof anger, &c. The constant habit in the agent, ofmaking present to himself the judgment of thepublic, is the grand and effectual curb by which hisselfish and impetuous appetites are kept in reasonablesubjection.

Ethical sentiment, therefore, when viewed withreference not to its Form, but to its Matter, exhibitsa certain general similarity of direction in all timesand places. It tends uniformly and everywhere, ina greater or less degree, to place some limit on indi-vidual malevolence and cupidity; to foster the bene-volent impulses of our nature ; to encourage thehabit of individual self-command ; and to implant thenotion of a certain recognised standard of action, forthe adjustment of each man's behaviour.


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Essay 1.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 17

But when this nniformity of general direction hasonce been stated, we cannot with truth carry theanalogy any farther. In no two countries and in notwo ages is this general effect produced, either to thesame degree or in the same manner. If we makea list of the various actions reputed guilty, disgrace-ful, wrong, or unbecoming, or conversely, of actionsvirtuous, honourable, right, or becoming, in any givenage or country,we shall find that our list will bealtogether inapplicable if we try it with reference toany distant region or anterior stage of society. Thevirtuous man or the vicious man, of our own ageor country, will no longer receive the same denomi-nations if transferred to a remote climate or a dif-ferent people. Though the same terms of praise andblame are employed_, it will be found that in onesociety they are directed towards one class of actions,in another society towards another. If we comparethe positive morality of Japan^ of Hindostan, ofTurkey^ of England^ of Brazil, of the AmericanIndians, of the ancient Greeks, Eomans, and Ger-mans, we shall perceive that amongst any one ofthese nations a man might be exposed to the abhor-rence of society for actions which amongst the restof them would be perfectly innocent. There existamongst each of them, peculiar errors, suj)erstitions,antipathies, and caprices, handed down and cherishedas an integral portion of the national ethical senti-

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18 ON tup: UltiaiN and nature [Essay I.ment, quite as much reverenced as that other portionwhich the nation holds in common with others,inmany cases, indeed, much more reverenced. Whenwe consider ethical sentiment with reference, not toits Form, but to its Matter, we cannot but discernthat the uniformity and similarity, as between varioussocieties, does not extend beyond a few capitalpoints, of obvious and pressing necessity, and in ad-dition to this, a general analogy of aim and direction.The rest is all peculiarity and diversity : on whicheach age and each nation clings to tenets of its own,without recognising any basis of reference commonto itself with others.And it is obvious that such peculiarities would

naturally arise, amongst different societies all rudeand ignorant, in those early processes of associationout of which ethical sentiment is first constituted.To love the causes of their security and happinessto hate the causes of their perils and miseryareuniversal currents of the jorinciple of association,which each of these rude societies would obey on itsown groundthe signs and concomitants of either ofthese important results would also share in the feel-ing more specially belonging to the cause. In so far,then, as the causes of happiness or misery were ob-vious, immediate, not to be overlooked or mistaken,these communities would all form the like judgmentsand attach the like ethical sentiments. But in such a


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Essay I,] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 19rude condition of the human intellect, mistakes as tothe real causes of happiness and misery would beinnumerable, and each society would make a differentmistake : moreover, among the different signs andconcomitants, accident would turn the attention ofeach society upon some in preference to the rest.Differences would hence arise, in the original consti-tution of ethical sentiment, as conceived by eachcommunity : and such peculiarities, when once con-ceived and incorporated with the general bodyof ethical sentiment, would be transmitted fromgeneration to generation, by the omnipotence ofearly habit and trainingthey would be inseparableand incorrigible, except by some greater improve-ment than history has ever yet recorded. Therewould be as much caprice and peculiarity, in thevarious divergences of ethical sentiment, as there isin the choice of particular phenomena as omens andsigns of the future.

In treating of the origin and authority of ourmoral sentiment, many writers have paid moreattention to the Matter of this sentiment than to theForm, and have considered the latter as if it weresomething subordinate to and dependent upon theformer. The idea or the sight of certain actions(they say), without any regard to their consequences,excites in our minds a certain simple and inexplicablefeeling, called ethical ajDprobation or disapprobation.

c 2


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20 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.We pursue the one, and avoid the other, hy virtue ofthis inward and self-arising determination, and quiteindependent of any regard to the feeUngs or opinionsof others. This latter (they say) may indeed appearas an auxiliary and a modifying influence, but it isnot the primary ground of the determination : a manwould find himself even from the beginning thusimpelled and deterred, although there were no otherbeing at hand to contemplate or criticise him.

This method of proceeding with regard to ethicalsentiment appears to me erroneous and unphiloso-phical : Erroneous, because it altogether misconceivesthe actual genesis of the sentiment : Unphilosophical,because it diverts the attention from that which iscommon to ethical sentiment universally, in all timesand places, to that in which it presents endless diver-sities and anomalies. That such diversities exist inrespect to the various actions condemned, tolerated,and applauded, in different countries and ages, is amatter of incontestable notoriety : and he who pro-ceeds to render a general account of ethical senti-ment, taking for his basis of explanation the actionscomprised under it, will find himself compelled toadmit original and inherent diversities between theman of one age or country and the man of another.If this mode of explanation be applied only to thoseactions which are objects of moral approbation or ofmoral disapprobation, in all ages and countries, it


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Essay I.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 21will leave the largest portion of ethical sentiment notaccounted for. If the same mode be extended to allto the peculiar divergences of ethical sentiment aswell as to the points of analogy, a thousand differentcharacteristic instincts must be supposed discoverablesome in one society and some in another. No phi-losopher, so far as I know, has yet contended forthe supposition of all these multiplied and separateinstincts : though it is a necessary and logical conse-quence of adopting the idea of the actions approvedas the starting point of an explanatory theoryand thus rendering the F'orm of ethical sentimentsecondary and subordinate to the Matter.

I believe that those who have represented ourmoral sentiments as an aggregate of original andunaccountable instincts, have clung to this theorymainly from a fear that the ethical motive would bedegraded and enfeebled, if the sentiment out ofwhich it arises were admitted tq be derivative andgenerated by association. The authority of themoral sentiments (they imagined) would not beadequately sustained, unless the belief could beestablished that they were natural and ready-madeinstincts impressed upon the mind directly byNature herself, or by the Divine Author of Natureoriginal revelations, or direct commands and impulses,from the Divinity to man. Such seems to have beenthe idea of those who have insisted upon the doctrine


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22 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.of original and inexplicable instincts in morality.But the idea itself is altogether fallacious : nothingis gained in the way of authority by setting forththe ethical impulse as arising ready-made out of thehands of nature. They have this in common withmany other impulses which carry with them noauthority whatever, and which it is frequentlynecessary to disregard. All our appetites, and allour desires of relief from bodily uneasiness, are aninseparable part of our natural constitution : yetthere is not one of these which we are justified inimplicitly following: each of them must be so re-strained and modified as to fall into harmony withour duty. If it were true, then, that our moralsentiments were implanted ready-made by nature,it would not be legitimate to infer that they oughtimplicitly to be obeyed: since nature implants inlike manner numerous other impulses which it isindispensable often to resist. Nothing is acquired,in the way of authority, to the moral sentiments, byrepresenting them as instinctive : on the contrary,much is lost : for by this supposition, all the separatedivergences of the feeling are placed upon one com-mon level, without the possibility of any standardfor distinguishing fallacy from rectitude.Are we to admit then that the moral sentimentsare factitious f Quite the reverse. They are deriva-tive, and generated by association from other simpler


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Essay 1.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 23and more elementary principles of our nature : butthe process of association by which they are formedis universal and uniform, so far as regards the Formof ethical sentiment: in regard to the Matter, it isto a high degree irregular and anomalous, but theseanomalies are for the most part not factitioustheydo not present the appearance of any separate pre-meditation or design. No instance has ever beenpresented to the actual observation of the historian,of families, previously destitute of all social training,coalescing with each other for the first time, andthus passing into a state of society. But it must havebeen during this period that all the languages nowspoken on the globe must have taken their origin :and when we consider how complicated the me-clianism is, both organical and mental, of the verysimplest of these languages, we shall not be aston-ished that men who could overcome so vast adifficulty for the purposes of mutual communication,should be capable of conceiving in their minds thebenefit of reciprocal help and the necessity ofreciprocal abstinence from injury. If the semi-socialized man were capable of going through, anddisposed to go through, those perplexing intellectualcombinations on which the first construction of alanguage must have depended, a fortiori he musthave been competent to conceive, and disposed toconceive, those simpler moral combinations which go


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24 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay 1.to constitute ethical sentiment : more especially whenwe recollect that the latter process, after all, hasbeen rudely and defectively performed, leaving outmuch, in regard to the Matter, which ought to havebeen taken inand taking in, perhaps, still morewhich ought to have been left out.The real difficulty in explaining ethical sentiment

arises from these very irregularities in which thesentiment differs in one society and in another. Butthose who adopt the theory of instinct are so farfrom explaining such irregularities, that they leavethem altogether unnoticed, and are not very willingto admit them in their full extent. It is quiteimpossible to account for them by any general theory.Each of them has had its special cause, in the earlyhistory of the people amongst whom it is found : butthat cause has not been transmitted in history, andcan very rarely be divined. Again, account must betaken of the connection of the early morality withreligion, the Gods being looked upon as the greatsupplementary sanction for the enforcement of itsobservances. Acts pleasing or displeasing to theGods come thus to be enrolled among the commandsand prohibitions of morality : and this class ofacts, depending entirely upon the temjDer and tasteswhich may happen to be ascribed to the Gods,differ materially when we pass from one peopleto another : they are not determined by human


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Essay I.] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 25interests, and therefore there is no operative causeof uniformity.With regard to the way in which ethical sentimentwas first generated, on the original coalescence ofrude men into a permanent social communion, wehave no direct observation to consult, and musttherefore content ourselves with assigning some un-exceptionable theory. But with regard to the wayin which ethical sentiment is sustained and trans-mitted, in a society once established, we have ampleexperience and opportunity for observing, before oureyes. We know perfectly that children are not bornwith any ethical sentiment : they acquire it in thecourse of early education, and we can trace thevarious stages of the process from its earliest rudi-ments to its complete maturity.

It will be impossible however to comprehend withany exactness either the real character or the truemode of generation, of ethical sentiment, unless wehave previously familiarised ourselves with theprinciple of association in its great and fundamentalmodes of working. Two general truths are indis-putably established and universally manifested in ourvarious associative processes : First, that sensationsand ideas which have been frequently experiencedin conjunction, more especially if any one amongstthem be vivid and interesting, have a tendency torun together into clusters or compounds, of which the


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26 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE [Essay I.separate parts are not subjects of distinct conscious-ness : insomuch that unless we can retain a clearrecollection of some period of our lives when thiscompound was unknown to us, we are apt to supposeit a simple, original, and spontaneous, productionof the mind : Secondly, that sensations or ideas ori-ginally indifferent, when they have been long andfamiliarly known as the causes, precursors, or con-comitants of pleasure or pain, become at last plea-surable or painful in themselves : and that the ideaof what was at jBrst only looked upon as the meansto pleasure or the precursor of pain, will very oftenthus come to be more attractive or more terrible thanthe original end. Many ideas, and many combina-tions of ideas, which originally affected us by a bor-rowed and secondary influence, acquire the powerof acting upon us directly and without any sensibleintermediation. They become magnetised (if onemay be allowed the metaphor) by frequent frictionand contact with the original and self-acting magnet :and the new magnetic force thus created is oftengreatly superior to the primary source from whichit is derived. Any act, or any state of existence,which is profoundly impressed upon our minds asthe producing cause of an indefinite train of pleasuresor of pains, will become far more highly esteemed, orfar more intensely dreaded, than any definite lot ofthe pleasures or pains to which it conducts.


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Essay L] OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT. 27

These are the laws followed by the principle ofassociation, in the generation of all that multiplicityof complex sentiments, opinions, and dispositions,which constitute the mental consciousness, and de-termine the actions, of every adult man. Amongstthese complexities ethical sentiment is oneand onetoo, among the most complex of allrepresentingthe result of many and various trains of emotion,and repeated processes of intellectual comparisonsuperadded.


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ESSAY II.PHILOSOPHY OF MOEALS.


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PHILOSOPHY OF MOKALS.

There are two enquiries which may be pursued withrespect to systems of positive moraHty.

First, we may examine the various systems ofpositive morahty with a view to ascertain whatpoints they have in common, and what are thecharacteristic or distinctive points of eachwhereinthey resemble and wherein they differ : thus de-tecting those principles and distinctions whichbelong essentially to every system of positivemorality, whether rude or refined, well or ill con-structed.

Or, secondly, we may endeavour to determine thestandard to which all systems of positive moralityought to conform, and according to which, in so faras they conform more or less to it, they are betteror worse systems.

These are two distinct lines of enquiry, whichmay be pursued separately, and which ought not tobe confounded ; though they often are confoundedin such a. manner that enquirers pass unconsciouslyfrom the one to the other.


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32 PHILOSOPHY OP MOPALS. [Essay II.

Thus the question What constitutes morality/ ?may be so understood and treated as to belongsometimes to the first of these enquiries, sometimes tothe second. You may either consider it as askingWhat are the points common to all systems of actualpositive morality ? Or as askingBy what test arewe to distinguish right mo7^ality from wrong morality f

But whether we pursue the one line of enquiry orthe other, there is one distinction which is oftenforgotten and which it is of great importance tokeep in mind.

Morality always implies two things : First, anindividual agent supposed to act or to be capable ofacting morally : Secondly, a public composed of spec-tators, or of parties interested in the tenor of hisproceedingsby whose verdict, either really deliveredor apprehended as possible, a rule of conduct isimposed upon the individual, or an artificial invita-tion held out to determine him.

There are thus two distinct points of view fromwhich morality must be looked atas it concerns theindividual agent, and as it concerns the observingand judging public. Society requires from eachindividual person among its members a certain seriesof observances, and inflicts upon him, if he shouldomit them, censure, and refusal of good offices andsympathy, perhaps positive ill-treatment. Eachindividual occupies a double position : as a separate


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Essay II.] PBILOSOPHY OF MORALS. 33

agent, lie is himself under obligation to performthese duties to society : as a constituent member ofsociety, he is engaged in enforcing the performanceof them upon other individuals. Looking at mora-lity from the point of view of society_, it consistsof an aggregate of duties commanded and enforcedupon each individual : looking at it from the pointof view of the individual, it consists of an aggregateof duties which he is bound to perform, whether per-formance be aii'reeable to him or not.

Positive morality, like positive law, always com-prehends the three correlative notions, command,duty, and sanction. Society is the superior by whomcommands are issued, duties imposed, and sanctionsthreatened or executed : the individual person is theinferior, by whom commands are received, dutiesperformed or infringed, and sanctions endured oranticipated to be endured.

Positive morality, like positive law, must there-fore be looked upon from two distinct points of viewaccording as it concerns the superior who issuesorders, or the inferior who obeys them. It is im-possible to resolve these two points of view into one,or to reason upon them as if they were the same.Society is the principal and the commanding party inregard both to positive law and to positive morality :the individual is the subordinate and subject party.

The ancient moralists seem to have more or lessD


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34 PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. [Essay IL

committed the mistake of looking at morality exclu-sively from the point of view of the individual, andnot from the point of view of society. The summumbonuin, which they endeavoured to determine, andwhich some of them determined in one manner, somein another, had reference to individual agency.They tried to instruct each individual agent as tothe object which he ought to aim at in life. Theyestimated different objects as fit to be sought orrejected in proportion to their value as affecting theindividual. They did not distinguish what wasimperative from what was optional : they addressedthemselves to the reason of each individual man, andtried to prove to him that 'his own feelings and theexigencies of his nature would be best satisfied bya certain course of life such as they suggested.

This is undoubtedly one branch, and an importantbranch, of every sufficient theory respecting mora-lity. But it is not the real and genuine view inwhich the theory of morality ought to be presented.It suppresses the interests and feelings of society, inorder to give predominance to the interests andfeelings of the individual agent. Now it is of greatmoment that the interests and feelings of eachindividual agent should be brought to coincide asmuch as possible with the exigencies of society, andany line of argument which tends to this result isuseful. But still this is not the proper and genuine


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Essay II.] PHILOSOPHY OF MOEALS. 35

representation of any system of positive morality.Every system of positive morality involves the ideaof subjection on the part of the individual to theinterests and feelings of society. It supposes thatthe majority of society concur in opinion as tocertain duties incumbent upon each member indi-vidually, and thus constitute an authority competentto impose and enforce those duties. The foundationof morality lies in the collective opinions of thelarger portion of society, not in the separate ojDinionof each individual agent with regard to his owngood^just as the foundation of law lies in the com-mand of the legislator who disposes of the force ofsociety, not in the opinion of each individual as tothe line of conduct which it may suit his views topursue. Positive morality, as well as positive law,is conceived as superseding individual discretion.The idea of obligation or duty implies both a com-mand and a sanction /r(?7?z without, against which theinterior movements of individual inclination are notentitled to contend. This idea of an extraneousforce, overriding the inclinations of the individual,constitutes what is called the supremacy of con-science, or the right of conscience to control thepassions and inclinations of the individual, of whichso much is said by Bishop Butler and Sir JamesMackintosh. The authority of conscience, like theauthority of law, is conceived as residing in a

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superior withoutin the former case, as proceedingfrom the puhlicin the latter case, from the legis-lator. The idea of this authority, emanating fromthe public and extrinsic to the individual, is theparamount element of morality : the part of theindividual is that of subordination or obedience tothis authority.

If then, in any theory of morality, we omit theideas of extrinsic authority, and obedience to suchauthority on the part of the individual, and explainit as only a well-directed choice and discretion on thepart of the individual, we shall fall into a funda-mental mistake. And this is the mistake committedby so many of the ancient moralists, when they laidthe main stress on the ascertaining of the summumbonum, or of that which they would recommend toeach individual as the primary object to aim at.

It may be contended perhaps that the supremacywhich we ascribe to conscience cannot be consideredas the idea of authority emanating from the publicwithout, inasmuch as there are cases in which theconscience of the individual differs from the judg-ment of the public without, perhaps even conflictswith it pointedly.But although individual conscience does thus occa-

sionally conflict with the public judgment, it is notthe less true that the authority which we ascribe to itis originally borrowed from the idea of approbation


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Essay II.] PHILOSOPHY OF MOEALS. 37or disapprobation acting upon us from without. Con-science is the idea of moral approbation and disappro-bation applied to our own actions or intentions : it com-prehends the varieties of self-reproach, self-esteem,and self-admiration. Now this idea is based uponthe actual fact that we find ourselves the objects ofapprobation and disapprobation on the part of others,and that we observe other individuals to be so also.The disapprobation of those around us is productiveof painful consequences of the severest kind, and theidea of such a sentiment being entertained towardsourselves becomes painful in the highest degreebesides that we naturally come to partake, by meansof sympathy, in the feelings which we see manifestedby the persons among whom we are brought up. Itis to be remarked that the feelings of approbationand disapprobation are in their nature essentiallysocial, not personal feelings. They are not confinedto our own bosoms : they essentially imply the con-current sentiment of the public: and even if theactual public around us dissent from our views, wesay that they ought to concur with us, and we carryin our minds the idea of a wiser and more enlightenedpublic who would concur with us. In the largemajority of cases, a man agrees in his particular actsof approbation and disapprobation with the public towhich he belongs : if it were not so, there would beno public verdict on moral subjects. In this wav.


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38 PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. [Essay If.

the idea of approbation and disapprobation becomesinseparably associated witli that of a collective judg-ment pronounced by others as well as by ourselves.And if by virtue of any train of reasoning, or of anyspecial authority, we come to dissent from the generalpublic, and to attach the idea of approbation or dis-approbation to certain acts with which the generalpublic does not connect them, those ideas pass overwith all their associated conjuncts and appendages,and present themselves as the voice of the public asit would be if the public were properly instructed.And in this manner the idea of the public voice as itought to he, will often prevail over the idea of thepublic voice as it is.The feeling of self-reproach, or of self-esteem, is,

in other words, the feeling that we deserve or arelikely to incur the reproach of othersthat we de-serve, or are likely to obtain, the esteem of others.Both the reproach and the esteem, though felt withinthe man's own mind, are imagined as proceedingfrom others.

There is also involved in the moral sentiment afeeling of implied reciprocity. The individual whofeels it his duty to obey the command of the publicwithout, feels himself entitled as one of the public toexact from every other individual the same obser-vance as that to which he is himself submitting.Under the same circumstances as those in which he is


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Essay II.] PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. 89

placed, another man would be bound to perform thesame duty now exacted from him. The order whichthe individual obeys is an order of equal and uni-versal application to every one, given the like cir-cumstances and position. If as an individual he isobliged to obey, as one of the public he is entitled toenforce upon other individuals.

This feeling of reciprocity between the title tocommand as one of the public, and the obligation toobey as an individual, is an essential element of themoral sentiment. You may look at it from either ofthe two points of vieweither from that of thepublic or from that of the individualand accordingas you look at it from the one or the other, it assumes,a different aspect. But any theory which does notembrace botlt the points of view, is necessarily in-complete and erroneous.

In positive law, the mandate is issued by a deter-minate superior : the duty of the individual is toobey. The superior may perhaps be, but is notnecessarily, a many-headed body, including the indi-vidual himself as a member. As an individual, heobeys laws which he has concurred in making andissuing.

In positive morality, the mandate is conceived asemanating from an indeterminate superior, a many-headed body called the 2^ublic, of which the individualhimself is necessarily and essentially a member. He


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40 PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. [Essay II.

obeys a mandate which as a member of this public hewould concur in enforcing upon others. The idea ofan external public concurring in judgment and dicta-tion with himself, is essential : if the actual publicaround him should not partake in his convictions, heimpeaches their verdict, he supposes that they wouldagree with him if they thoroughly meditated thecircumstances of the case, and he imagines a betterpublic concurrent with himself and constituting au-thority. This imaginary public he supposes to be aswell acquainted with all the circumstances of his caseand position as he is himself,in fact much betteracquainted than any real public can ever beandit is to their verdict, thus perfectly instructed andenlightened, that he conforms his conduct.

If then we enquire what are the fundamentalpoints common to all systems of positive morality,apart from the goodness or badness of anywe shallfind them to consist in obedience on the part of anindividual to commands from without, emanatingfrom an indeterminate superior called the public, realor supposed, whereof the individual himself is a mem-ber. The feeling of obligation thus arising is strictlymoral obligation: the command executed is a moralcommand : the sanction by which it is enforced is themoral sanction, consisting in the idea of approval orcondemnation by a public without, concurring withthe individual himself.


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Kant is right in calling the maxim of moral agencyobjective and not subjective. That is, a man, who actsnnder a sense of moral obligation, believes that anyother individual nnder the same circumstances wouldbe under obligation to do the like. The obliga-tion is equally and universally binding, whateverbe the personal or peculiar inclinations of the indi-vidual.Kant says that " Pure Reason is by itself alone

{i. e. without the necessity of any conjunction offeeling or passion, fUr sich allein) practical, andgives to mankind an universal law which we callthe Moral Law." (Prakt. Yern., p. 143.) This isonly true in so far as reason is concerned in sug-gesting to a community of persons what actions theywill forbid and what actions they will encourage.It is not reason which issues or gives the law, itis the community which gives the law, and whichpunishes neglect of the law by condemnation anddisgrace.Kant says farther, that in moral agency the Be-

stimmungsgrilnde of the will are objective, not subjective.This is true in a certain sense, but hardly in the sensein which he means it. When a man, under strongtemptation to act immorally, resists and obeys themoral law, the matter of fact is, that the pain con-nected in his mind with the idea of disobeying themoral law is greater than the pain of resisting temp-


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42 PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. [Essay iL

tation, and thus determines his behaviour. But thissentiment is in every case a subjective sentimentthat is, each individual experiences it in a degreeand manner peculiar to himself. There is indeed ageneral similarity between the sentiment in one manand in another man, which warrants us in callingthem by the same name, just as there is a similaritybetween hunger and feai' and /iO/je in different indi-viduals : but nevertheless each of these is in everyparticular case a subjective affection.Kant seems to think that the pains and pleasures

of the moral sentiments are not to be reckoned aspains and pleasures : for this is what he means whenhe says that morality carries with it no " subjectiveBestimmungsgrundey He thinks that in the case ofthe moral law, pure reason influences our will sepa-rately and by itself, without any admixture of feel-ings of pleasure or painin a manner inexjjlicable,anomalous, and without parallel in our mental con-stitution.

But Kant seems to confound two things whichought to be kept completely distinct. He confoundsthe general painful idea associated in our minds withan act of our own in violation of moral lawwiththe anticipation of subsequent positive pains likelyto come upon us in consequence of such violation :viz., the anticipation of punishment, loss of service,loss of advancement, &c. It is very true that the


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general painful idea, first mentioned, is derived byway of association from actual experience or obser-vation of the positive pains last-mentioned as con-sequent on violations of duty. But still it is afeeling altogether distinct : it is an association whichis formed in some minds and not formed in others :it is an association which when formed and when sofirmly established as to govern the conduct, con-stitutes the truly moral man. A man in whose mindthis association has not been formed, and who performsa moral obligation because he anticipates some posi-tive loss or suffering in the event of his infringingit, cannot be said (as Kant observes) to act in theproper sense morally : his behaviour is pjiichtmdssig,but not aus PJiicht. But when we say that a mantakes trouble or incurs risk or imposes upon himselfprivations because he feels called upon by his senseof dutywhat we really mean is, that the painfulfeeling, associated in his mind with the idea ofviolating his duty, is of greater force with him thanthe idea of the pain which he is to encounter in per-forming it. The ideas of self-reproachof subse-quent mental remorseof the loss of his title to theesteem and confidence of othersof not being ableto hold up his head in the company of others, be-cause he has done what renders him unworthy of theirrespectall these are highly painful. On the otherhand, the ideas of self-esteemof subsequent mental


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44 PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. [Essay IT.

approbationof having acquired increased title tothe esteem and confidence of others, and holding uphis head higher than ever in their presence, becausehe has performed his duty under the most tryingcircumstances and the strongest temptation to evadeitall these are ideas highly gratifying, and at thevery least consolatory under suffering. It is notmeant to say that the performance of duty underthese supposed circumstances will be anything butpainful : the man is placed in a position in whichnothing is open to him except the choice betweentwo modes of conduct both of which are painful.He does not do right because it is agreeable to himto do so : but because the idea of doing wrong ismore painful to him than the idea of the sufferingsconsequent upon his doing right.

Moral action is not to be at all considered as anexception to the general rules of human conduct.The man who acts morally acts just as much underthe influence of ideas of pleasure and pain, as theman who acts immorally : only his pleasures andpains are different. The pleasures and pains of con-science are among the most remarkable and im-portant of all human emotions. Any philosophicalsystem which takes no account, of them or deniestheir existence, must of necessity be very defective.We know that they often amount to torture orextasy" Si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse


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aspici laniatiis et ictus."" Mens sibi conscia facti,Prsemetuens, adhibet stimulos, torretque flagellis."" Yirtus, si videri posset, mirabiles amores sui ipsiusconcitaret." Many other similar metaphors mightbe cited, which illustrate the extent of gratificationas well as of suffering arising out of the conscience.When a man acts morally, the idea of these pleasuresand pains constitutes the Bestimmungsgrund of hisbehaviourwhat Kant calls Achtung fur das Gesetza regard for den Werth seiner Person as contra-distinguished from den Werth seines Zustandes. Hisown sense of self-esteem is inseparably connectedwith his observance of the moral law. But a man'ssense of self-esteem is only another word to expressthe feeling which he has of that esteem which heought to receive from otherswhich the publicwould award to him, if they were perfectly right-minded and thoroughly acquainted with all thecircumstances of the case.

Kant, in speaking of morality, considers it as asingle and anomalous case of what he calls the Auto-nomy of the will, in contradistinction to the Heter-onomy which in every other case of action of thewill is observable. In the sense in which he intendsthis remark, I think it is not correct. He means byAutonomy, that there are in this case no conside-rations of pleasure or pain influencing the willinthis case alone. I do not agree in this opinion. It


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46 PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS. [Essay H.appears to me that the will is in this case as in allothers, determined by the pleasures or pains asso-ciated with our ideas of obeying or disobeying themoral law ; called usually the sense of duty or Con-science.

But there is undoubtedly a sense in which theobservation of Kant is partly true. Under the in-fluence of a sense of duty, my will is determined toaim at the accomplishment of a given object. I em-ploy my most strenuous effortsI do every thingwhich can possibly be expected of mefor the pur-pose of accomplishing it : but I fail. Notwith-standing the failure, the exigencies of the moralsentiment are satisfied. Provided the failure is notowing to any want of prudence, or skill, or per-severing energy, an enlightened conscience findsnothing to disapprove. Though the sense of duty atthe outset commands and determines me to do mybest, it is after all satisfied without the realization ofthe end originally sought. Sincere, hearty, andenergetic obedience to the moral law is all whichis required : what Kant calls ein reiner Wille, ex-plained in the way that he defines it, though theexpression is a very misleading one. My will, ormy desire, is unsatisfied, because the object is notattained : but the sense of duty in which my desireoriginated, is nevertheless satisfied, if every thingwithin the limits of possibility has been done to


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attain it. The pleasures and pains of self-esteem areassociated, not with the attainment of the object, butwith the doing, or omitting to do, every thing whichskill and zeal can suggest for such a purpose.Now it is in this respect that the term Autonomy

of the Will, as contradistinguished from Heteronomy,has a certain application. Our pleasures and painsgenerally are derived from the attainment of variousobjects foreign to ourselves : we desire these objectsand try to attain them : our gratification dependsupon success. The pleasures and pains of the moralsense, on the other hand, are not derived from thepositive attainment of any object foreign to our-selves : they are derived from reflection on our ownconduct in the pursuit of it. The satisfaction of themoral sentiment is independent of the actual resultit is not contingent upon success or failure : no ex-ternal impediments can disappoint it. The will isdetermined, not by the idea of a certain object neces-sary to be obtained, but by the idea of a certain lineof conduct necessary to be pursued by ourselves : itis therefore in a certain sense autonomous, not heter-onomous.

In another sense, also, the expression autonomousmay be used. The moral law is a command which aman in conjunction with the public imposes uponhimself. He acts in obedience to his own sentimentin harmony with what either actually is, or what he


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thinks ought to be, the sentiment of the pubKc. Ifhe obeys the command of the j)ublic simply, his ownsentiment not concurring with it, this is not properlymoral actingit is pjiichtmdssig, but not aus PJiichtit is heteronomy and not autonomy. Properlyspeaking moral acting is both the one and the otherthe man himself, concurring with a public, real orideal.


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ESSAY III.ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL

PHILOSOPHY.


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ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORALPHILOSOPHY.

The ancient systems of Ethics took for their start-ing point mainly, and primarily, the happiness orsummum bonum of the individual. It was assumed,and admitted by each of the dissenting schoolsof philosophy, that every individual would pursuehis own happiness or his own summum bonum :but as different individuals entertained differentviews respecting the summum bonum, the problemfor philosophers was, to determine wherein the realsummum bonum consistedwhat was that End ofEnds which it was best for every individual separatelytaken to aim at, and which if he attained, he was tobe pronounced perfectly happy ?

It is undoubtedly true that the ancients did notadopt this point of view exclusively. They con-sidered the sentiments and actions of each individualto a certain extent as affecting others as well ashimself; as imparting to others enjoyment or misery,and creating in them gratitude or resentment. Butstill in the main, the primary point of view, the

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52 ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. [Essay TII.ethical Standpunkt of the ancients, was the positionand condition of the agent himself. To advise himas to the means requisite for becoming happy, wasthe grand ethical problem.

Nothing can more clearly evince the preponderanceof this point of view than the tenacity with whiclieven the Stoics adhered to it, though it involvedthem in the greatest perplexities and enabled theiropponents to taunt them with glaring contradictions.It was absolutely indispensable, in their opinion, toprove that virtue and nothing else produced a happylife to the individual: if this could not be shewn,they admitted that their whole system was worth-less. Cato is made to say (in Cicero de Fiiiib. iii. 3)" Nam si hoc non obtineatur, id solum bonumesse, quod honestum sit ; nullo modo probari possit,beatam vitam virtute effici : quod si ita sit, curopera philosophice sit danda, nescio : si enim sapiensaliquis miser esse possit, nse ego istam gloriosammemorabilemque virtutem non magni Eestimandamputem."But though the ancient moralists thus selected the

condition of the individual agent as the apx^ of theirvarious ethical systems, they explained it in such away as to alter very materially those conclusionswhich might naturally be expected to flow from sucha principle. The end which each individual bothdid pursue and ought to pursue was admitted to be


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Essay III] ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MOKAL PHILOSOPHY. 53happiness : but different persons took different viewsas to the constituent elements of happiness. Nowthe ancient philosophers did not admit that each manwas the proper judge and measure of happiness inhis own individual case. They maintained that therewas a right and a wrong choice upon this pointthat one man might and did choose better than

; another,and that the wise and virtuous man was{ the only legitimate referee. That man alone wasunderstood to be happy, whom the wise man pro-nounced to be happy, and whose condition he wouldhave been willing to adopt as his own : that manalone was understood to be unhappy, whom the wiseman declared to be unhappy, and whose characterand position he was disposed to repudiate. TheSummum Bonum, or grand end which every manought to aim at, was happiness according to thescheme laid down by the wise man : the Sunimum^alum, or that which it was proper for every manto avoid, was Unhappiness in the sense in which thewise man defined it.

According to the schemes of the ancient moralists,fit seems that a man might be happy or unhappy,though he neither felt nor believed himself to be so.At least the man's own sentiments and belief were

jnot regarded as the proper measure and evidenceof happiness. He might himself be perfectly wellsatisfied and even strongly attached to his condition :


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54 ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. [Essay III.yet the wise man might not recognise him as happy.Or he might be in a state from which he was veryanxious to escape, and yet the wise man mightrefuse to pronounce him unhappy. Seneca indeed(Epist. IX.) seems to say the contrary of this, andto cite both Epicurus and the Stoics as authorities" Non est beatus, esse se qui non putat "andthen he eludes the difficulty by contending" Nisisapienti sua non placent : omnis stultitia laborat fas-tidio sui."

In appreciating the moral systems of the ancients,however, it is of great moment to keep in view theway in which they understood and defined Happiness.The ethical ap^ from which they started was, theinjunction upon every individual to pursue his ownhappiness. But this, if allowed to be interpreted bythe individual himself, would have led to endlesserrors and deviations, accordiug to every man'sdifferent taste. Accordingly they laid down the

^ scheme of one particular state of mind and circum-* stances, as constituting the maximum of individualhappiness, or the only thing which they were willingto call happiness. Each of the philosophical sectsdid this, though all of them did not lay down thesame scheme. To pursue happiness, was to followthe scheme of happiness prescribed by the wise manwhoever did not follow this, whatever his own tastesor inclinations might be, was not allowed to be


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Essay III.] ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 55obeying the natural dictate of pursuing liis ownhappiness.

It is easy to see that when the definition of hap-piness was so restricted as to embrace only thatwhich the wise man would call happiness, the mainobservances of morality would be quite sure to becomprehended in it. The wise and virtuous manwould not esteem any other man happy who wasnot wise and virtuous. He might perhaps notaccount another man happy with wisdom and virtuealone, though accompanied by great external dis-advantages : but the presence of these lofty mentalqualities he would deem absolutely indispensable.The ancient moralists considered the happiness of

the individual agent as the sole and exclusive end :bat they also considered that virtuous conduct wasthe sole and exclusive means to that end. In thismanner the interests and happiness of persons otherthan the individual came to be inseparably inter-mingled in their theories with the interests and hap-piness of the individual himself, although the latteralone formed the original point of departure.

In studying their moral treatises, this confusionwill often be found both very prevalent and veryperplexing. When they speak of good, it is some-times good with reference to the interests and liap-piness of the individual agentsometimes good^ withreference to the interests and happiness of society.


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56 ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, [Essay III.The ancient philosophers pass from the one to theother without any preliminary warning, and seem-ingly without consciousness of any transition what-

soever. If a man has achieved some great andglorious deed, both deserving and obtaining theadmiration of the society to which he belongs, theyconsider him as having attained a considerable goodas having plojced himself in a situation to bemacarised by the wise and virtuouswithout taking

j account of the personal sacrifices which he may havei undergone in the performance, and which may havebeen so intolerably painful as to make the result a

Imatter of no happiness at all, judging by his indi-

Ividual sentiments. Whatever the sentiments of theindividual might be, the moralist ventured to speakfor him, according to a general rule determinedbeforehand, and to vest the decision in the wise andvirtuous man. An indisputable good has been done,looking at the case from the point of view of thesociety : the wise and virtuous man takes upon him-self ,to pronounce, without farther enquiry, that theagent has acquired a portion of good, and that hedeserves to be considered happy.

I do not mean to say that this confusion of ideasis universally obvious throughout the works of theancient moralists. At times they seem to get clear ofit, especially Aristotle : there are occasions on whichthey admit that what is good for the individual


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Essay III.] ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. 57agent may not always be good for others besideshim, and vice versa. But still their ordinary mode ofreasoning is to confound the two, and to employ thewords good and ]iap2?iness as if they neither had norcould have more than one standard of reference.Both Plato and the Stoics must be considered to

Ihave neglected the sentiments of the individual agent,

j when they laid it down in so unqualified a mannerIthat the man who acted virtuously could never

' be miserable, and that the man who acted viciouslycould not be happy. At least they presupposed avery peculiar and a very efficacious training, carried

(so far as almost to efface from the mind the ordinarymeasure of self-regarding sentiment. Aristotle re-quires a certain measure of training and acquiredhabits, as a necessary preliminary to the appreciationof ethical motives : but not to the same extent whichwould be requisite to fulfil the theories of Plato andthe Stoics : who, although professing to adopt fortheir ap^y] or starting point the happiness of the indi-

1 vidual agent himself, ended in taking no account at[ all of his feelings, except in so far as they coincided1 with those of the virtuous and right-minded spectator,i It is altogether impossible to reason correctly uponethical subjects, unless you admit two distinct andindependent ap^al of reasoning. 1. The happiness_of persons other than the agent himself. 2. Thehappiness of the agent individually.


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58 ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. [Essay IILThese two ends of action^ or beginnings of ethical

reasoning, are sometimes found in conflict, but morefrequently in coincidence : but they are by nomeans co-ordinate, or of equal weight and dignity inthe eyes of the moralist. When both cannot beattained, the happiness of the individual must bepostponed, as a general rule, to that of the commu-nity to which he belongs.

A These are the two sole ap^aX of ethical science.] Every action which is wrong or blameworthy, is so

|j because it tends to impair either the happiness of the'I individual himself or that of others, perhaps of bothjat once. Every action which is right or praise-worthy, is so because it tends to promote one or both

' of these ends : an action indeed may have such ten-dency, without being necessarily praiseworthy : butno action can be praiseworthy, unless it conform tovthe condition here described.

Strictly speaking, it is doubtful whether any actionwhatever is a proper subject either of praise orblame. The agent who performs it is the propersubject of praise or blame, according to his intentionand knowledge : the action itself is useful or hurtful,but it cannot be said either to be right or wrong : itis an action such as a virtuous man would do, or suchas only a vicious man would do, but it is not in itselfeither virtuous or vicious.The moralist, or ethical philosopher, who takes


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Essay HI.] ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. 59upon bim to explain and criticise the different tem-pers, dispositions, and capacities which discriminatedone individual from another, must be assumed toaddress himself to the whole society, and not to anyspecial individual exclusively. His business is toconsider the conduct and dispositions of each separateindividual, in so far as that conduct and those dis-positions bear upon the happiness both of the indi-vidual himself and of others. He is therefore calledupon to consider every separate man, on the onehand, as an agent in himself, under the influence ofcertain disjoositions which provoke to action or deterfrom actionon the other hand, as a person affectedby his own actions, either singly or in conjunctionwith other members of the community. Each personseparately and indiscriminately comes before theethical philosopher in these two different points ofview. This therefore suggests naturally the doubleclassification of actions above alluded to

1. Actions which tend to impair, or to promote,the happiness of the publicmeaning by the publicany fraction, large or small, of the society, not evenexcluding the agent himself as one of the number.

2. Actions which tend to impair, or to promote,the happiness of the agent himself separately : Imean permanently and in the long run, as distin-guished from tbe gratification of his immediateimpulse.


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60 ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. [Essay HI.These are the two classifications of actions and

of dispositions which form the canon of criticismin ethical philosophy.The two systems of arrangement may either coin-

/cide or clash, in any particular case. In the long'run, and with reference to the greater number ofactions and dispositions, they do coincide : for it is'obvious that what tends to promote the happinessof the public must tend to promote the happiness ofthe greater number of individuals among the public,separately and indiscriminately taken. One of thesetwo propositions is included in the other.But though generally coincident, the two systems

of arrangement are always liable to clash in par-ticular cases and with regard to any particularindividual. An action which tends to promote thehappiness of the agent may'not\impair that of others :an action which greatly impairs the happiness of theagent may be necessary to prevent that of the societyfrom being impaired in a still greater degree.When the two systems of classification clash, it is

necessary for the ethical philosopher to determinewhich of the two he will prefer : whether he willrather encourage that which tends to the happinessof the agent or that which tends to the happiness ofthe societywhether he will discourage that whichimpairs the former or that which impairs the latter.When the case is thus nakedly stated, there cannot


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Essay III.] ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 61be the smallest hesitation which of the two ends is tobe preferred. It is possible indeed by means of acloud of unmeaning words to perplex the questionand to disguise the real nature of the alternativebut when properly understood, the two things to becompared are the same which have just been stated,and the choice is therefore simple and easy. Whenthe alternative lies between suffering experienced bythe community on the one sideand either sufferingexperienced, or the foregoing of happiness, by anyparticular agent on the otherthe latter must besubmitted to in order to escape the former.Hence is derived the authority of what is called

the moral sensethe force of moral obligation. Theethical philosopher addresses himself to each indi-vidual in the name of the community, and hetherefore speaks to each in a tone of command andsupremacy. When the happiness of the societyrequires that a certain act shall be done or leftundone, he does not leave with the individual agentthe option of performance or omission. The inter-ests of the community are paramount, and the ethicalphilosopher, as representing that community, exactsobedience on the part of the agent, whether suchobedience be easy or painful. This is the source ofthe moral imperative : it is a voice representing theentire community, and addressed to an agent who isone of its members. The right of tlie community to


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C2 ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PrilLOSOPHY. [Essay ITT.exact obedience from each of its own individualmembers, in cases where its serious interests areconcerned, is a matter which the ethical philosopherassumes from the beginning : he never attempts todemonstrate it. Without this right in fact society-could not subsist : positive law is one of the forms inwhich it is exercised, positive morality is another.

If we take the greater number of individual agentsin the greater number of casessaving always par-ticular exceptions both of individuals and of casesit may be said generally that the agent himself feelsin his own bosom the obligation to render obedienceto a command so issued in the name and for theinterests of the community. He is himself one ofthat community, and he has been accustomed inother cases to concur in imposing the like obligationupon others. He cannot fail to apply to himselfmore or less the same remarks which he would havemade upon another agent placed in similar circum-stances. But whether he does so or not, the obliga-tion does not the less exist, in the view of the ethicn 1philosopher : it does not depend upon feeling orabsence of feeling on the part of the agent.The moral imperative,