Aristotle, Montaigne, Kant and the Othersubir.bolton.ac.uk/2058/1/Stern-Gillett Aristotle... · Loyalty, Montaigne, Particularism, Pleasure, Rome, Universalism, Utility INTROdUCTION

DOI: 10.4018/IJT.2019010105

International Journal of TechnoethicsVolume 10 • Issue 1 • January-June 2019

Copyright©2019,IGIGlobal.CopyingordistributinginprintorelectronicformswithoutwrittenpermissionofIGIGlobalisprohibited.

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Aristotle, Montaigne, Kant and the Others:How Friendship Came to be Conceived as it is Conceived in the Western TraditionSuzanne Marie Stern-Gillet, University of Bolton, Bolton, UK

ABSTRACT

Concepts of inter-personal relations are most elusive. They conceal assumptions, norms, beliefsandvariousassociatednotions,andbecomeevenmoreopaqueandpotentwhentheytranscendthelanguageinwhichtheyareusedandcometoreflectacultureoratradition.Escapingthecriticalgazeofthose“in”thetradition,theseconceptsandtheirtheoreticalbaggageremainlargelyalientothoseoutsideit.Thisgapfostersasenseofalienation,ifnotofexclusion,onthepartofthoselivingoutsidewhattheyoftenregardasacharmedcircle.Nodoubt,friendshipisunlikelytofigureonthedangerlistofsuchconcepts.Yet,theconceptisnotinnocent.Itreflectsphilosophicalandsocialpresuppositionsaccumulatedinthecourseofitslonghistoryandbearstheweightoftheparadigmshiftsitunderwent.Thisessayidentifiessomeofthesepresuppositionsbuiltintoit,outlinesmajorstepsinitsdevelopment,andoffersreasonswhythisparticulateinter-personalrelationcametobeconceivedthewayitisconceivedin“theWesterntradition”.

KeyWORdSAffection, Aristotle, Care, Choice, Christianity, Derrida, Eudaimonia, Friendship, Greece, Kant, Kierkegaard, Loyalty, Montaigne, Particularism, Pleasure, Rome, Universalism, Utility

INTROdUCTION

Friendshipisafamiliarnotionandacommonexperience;sofamiliarandcommonisitthatmostpeoplehardlyeverbothertogiveitanythought.Thenegligence,aswillbearguedinthefollowingpages,restsonamistake.Onceonebeginstogobeyondthebanalitiesandcommonplacesthatalltoooftenpassforthinking,friendshipshowsitselftobeahighlycomplexphenomenon.Becauseitismulti-facetedandmulti-layered,itresistseasyconceptualisation.Becauseitcanbeengagedinatvariouslevelsofdepth,ithasethicalaswellaspsychologicalnormsbuiltintoit.Becauseitinvolvescommitmentsandmakesclaimsuponthosewhoengageinit,itcangiverisetoconflictsofinterestsandmoralvalues.

Itisunsurprisingthereforethatfriendshipshouldhaveattractedmuchphilosophicalattentionoverthecenturies.IntheWest,writersandphilosophersstartedtowriteaboutfriendshipinGreeceatthebeginningofthefourthcenturyBCE,bywhichtimeithadalreadybeenstudiedforseveralcenturiesinclassicalIndianthoughtaswellasinChina.Sincealmostallofthesewritingshavebeen


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preserved–whichisasuresignthattheywerevaluedlongafterthetimetheywerewritten-friendshipasweunderstandit,orfailtounderstandit,haslongrootsintherespectivetraditionstowhichreadersofthisjournalbelong.Itspasthasweighedheavilyuponitssuccessivepresents.Floutingusagebyputting“present”inthepluralisjustifiedinsofarasthefirstwritingsonfriendshiphavecontinuedtobeinfluentialuponlatergenerationsofthinkersandphilosophers.Sinceitisacharacteristicofphilosophyasadisciplinetoincludeareflectionuponitspast,laterphilosophersfoundthemselvesstudying,commentating,interpretingandre-interpretingthewritingsoftheirforebearssoastomakethemapplicabletotheirowntimeandchangedcircumstances.Intheprocessofstudyingwhathadrapidlybecomelayersofcanonicaltexts,successiveschoolsofphilosophyaddedtheirownviewstothevolumeofexistingreflectionsandaltered,eversosubtly,theconcepttheyhadreceivedfromthetradition.Everylayerofreflectionsonthesubjecthasyieldedrichsedimentsthathave,inturn,nourishedthenextgenerationofthinkersandwriters.Andsoitisthatthemodernconceptionoffriendshipisthelatestadditiontoagreatmanylayersofpastreflectionsonthesubject.Itisthelatest,butitwillnotbethelast.

Sincefriendshipasatopicfortheoreticalreflectionisaprimeexampleofthewayinwhichhistoryandphilosophyinteract,allthatcanbeachievedinanessayofthissizeistopinpointsomeofthemostsalientaspectsofthephilosophicalwritingsthathavebeendevotedtofriendshipoverthecenturies,bringingthemtobearonsome“reallife”issuesthatfriendshipraisesforusatthepresenttime.ToborrowFoucault’sexpression,thetaskisarchaeologicalinnature.

Theessaywillbestructuredasfollows.Thefirstsectionwillbegivenovertoabroad-brushexaminationoffriendshipasitisnowcommonlyconceived-broadbrushbutsufficientlydetailedallthesametopermitoffruitfulcomparisonwiththetwophilosophicalaccountsthathaveshapedthetradition,namelythoseofAristotle(384-322BCE)andKant(1724-1804).Inthesecondsection,theirrespectiveviewswillbetestedforapplicabilitytopresent-daysituations.Inthethirdandlastsectionofthepaper,themainparadigmshiftthathasaffectedtheconceptwillbedocumentedandanexplanationattemptedastowhyChristianwriters,fromtheFathersoftheChurchonwards,preferredtodissociate themselvesfromClassicalwriters. Inconclusion,somespeculativeremarkswillbeofferedonthereasonswhichcausedthetopicoffriendshiptogointoeclipseaftertheReformation,beforespringingupagain,phoenixlike,inthephilosophicaldebatesthathavetakenplaceinthecourseofthelastfiftyyearsorso.

defining Friendship – The Modern ConceptFriendship is an interpersonal relationship between human beings; it is subject to choice and itbelongstotheprivatesphere.Letustakethesethreedefiningpropertiesinturn.Thatfriendshipisaninterpersonalrelationislargelyuncontentious–onlyinametaphoricalsensecanonebesaidtobefriendswithoneself.1Whetheronecanbefriendswithanimalsand,ifso,whichones,isacomplexissue,whichwillbeignoredforthepresent.2So,withoutfurtherado,letusturntothesecondcharacteristic,whichraisesmoredirectlyrelevantissues.

Friendshipissubjecttochoiceintwoways.First,itisnotnecessaryforsurvival-onecanchoosetoattempttosurvivewithoutit.Second,itissubjecttochoiceinsofarasitisnotarelationshipintowhichoneisborn,asoneisbornintoafamily.Asawell-knownsayinghasit,wechooseourfriends,butdonotchooseourrelatives.Whileonecanneverceasetobesomeone’sdaughter,nepheworcousin,onecandecidetobreakone’sfriendshipwithaparticularotheror,moresimply,letitrunitscoursewithoutregret.

Letustakethesepointsfurther.Iffriendshipisnot,strictlyspeaking,necessaryforsurvival,doesitfollowthatitisanexpendablebonus,asuperfluity,aluxuryeven,whichonecanchoosetodowithout?Strictlyspeaking,theansweris“yes”-onecanchoosetoleadafriendlesslife,althoughveryfewpeopledo.Tochoosetodispensewithfriendshipaltogether,oneeithermustbeblessedwithararelevelofself-sufficiency,sorareastobepracticallyawe-inspiring,oronehastobesosingle-minded in thepursuitofanoverarchinggoalas tosee thedeliberate formationofhuman


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bondsasanobstacletotheaccomplishmentofthatgoal.However,ifitisjustaboutpossibletoleadafriendlesslife,someonemightask,woulditbegoodtodoso,taking“good”hereinthesenseof“psychologicallyhealthy”oreven“morallysound,”whatever“moral”mayturnouttodenote?Mostpeoplebelievethatitwouldnotbe.Whiletheymayadmiretheself-sufficiencyof,say,ahermitoracloisteredcontemplativenun,theytendtoregardthosewhoarefriendlessbychoiceassociallyinadequate,embittered,terminallystand-offishorjustplainmisfits.WetendtoendorseAristotle’sviewthathumanbeingsaresocialbynatureandagreewithhisconclusion,that,althoughitispossibletoleadasolitarylifefromadulthoodonwards,suchalifewouldbecomparabletothatof“anisolatedpieceofdraughts(orchesspiece)”(Aristotle,Politics,1253a)Asherepeatedlyargued,afriendlesslifewouldnotbethebestlifeforahumanbeingtoleadsinceitcouldnotsecureforthemtheultimategoalofeudaimoniaorwell-being:“noone”,hewrote,“wouldchoosetolivewithoutfriends,evenifhehadalltheothergoods.”(Nicomachean Ethics,VIII1,1155a5).Aristotle’spositiononthatpointhasneverbeenfundamentallychallenged.Montaigne(1533-1592),whoseownessayonfriendship,writtensometwentycenturieslater,becamecanonical,echoedAristotle’sviewwhenhewrote:“Thereisnothingtowhichnatureseemssomuchtohaveinclinedus,astosociety.”(Montaigne,Essays,XX).Demandingasfriendshipoftenprovestobe,itmeetsadeep-seatedneedinhumannature.

If friendship is freely chosen while family ties are imposed upon us, and if love cannot becommanded,itfollowsthatfamilyloveneedbenomorethanamatterofconventionorindeedexistatall.Tobesure,inthebestofcases,conventionandinclinationgohandinhand,buttheyneednotdoso.Whiletherewouldbenothingconceptuallyoddinclaimingthatonedislikessuchandsucharelative,itwouldbeparadoxicalintheextremetoprofessadislikeforone’sfriends.Tosay,forinstance,“JimmyismyfriendbutIdon’tlikehim”wouldalmostbeself-contradictory–exceptpossiblyononeparticularconceptionoffriendship,whichwillbeexaminedlater.Thissuggeststhataffectionor,atleast,somedegreeoffondness,isbuiltintotheverydefinitionoffriendshipwhileitisnotassumedtobesoinfamilyrelationships:welove/likeourfriends,notbecausetheyarerelatedtous,butforwhatwevalueinthemor,betterstill,forwhattheyareinthemselves.AsMontaignewrote:byhowmuchthesearefriendshipsthatthelawandnaturalobligationimposeuponus,somuchlessisthereofourownchoiceandvoluntaryfreedom;whereasthatvoluntarylibertyofourshasnoproductionmorepromptlyandproperlyitsownthanaffectionandfriendship.(Montaigne,Essays,XXVII)

Torecap:asopposedtorelationshipsgovernedbylawandnaturalties,friendshipisarelationshipenteredintoandsustainedbychoiceandinvolvingavariabledegreeofreciprocalaffectionandcaring.Acorollaryofthedefinitionisthatfriendshipcannotbeforced:nobodycanbemyfriendunlessIfreelywelcomethemassuchandIcannotbefriendswithanyonewhodoesnotfreelyconsidermeassuch.Friendshipisbynaturereciprocalandconsensual.

Moral Norms and ValuesInthebackgroundofthedefinitionalissuesandconceptualclarificationthathavesofartakencentrestageinthediscussionlurkassumptionsovernormsandvalues.Theseoughtnowtobeidentified,tracedbacktotheirsourceandanalysed.Whatarethemoralnormsandsocietalvaluesinscribedinfriendship?Togetagriponthequestion,letusturnfirsttoAristotle’sdistinctionbetweenthreekindsoffriendshipandtoKant’scontrastbetweenmoralandempiricalfriendship.

deFINING FRIeNdSHIP PHILOSOPHICALLy: ARISTOTLe

Itwouldbenoexaggeration tosay that friendshipasaphilosophical topicowes itsexistence toAristotle’sanalytictreatmentofitinhisethicaltreatises.3Somuchsoisthisthecasethathiswritingsonthesubjectconstituteaveritablephilosophyoffriendship,fromwhichallsubsequenttreatmentsoffriendshipderive.


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TheancientGreekconceptof friendship(philia)wassemanticallymuchwider thanours; itencompassedalargeanddiversefieldofpersonalandsocialrelationshipscomparedtowhichthesemanticextensionofthemodernconceptisrestricted.Followingamethodthathadservedhimwellinother,morescientific,subjects,Aristotle(384-322BCE)tookcareofthisdimensionofthesubjectbyfirstdescribingthevariouspracticesoffriendshipheobservedamongsthiscontemporaries.Heexplainedhowandwhytheychosetheirfriends,identifiedthevaluestheyinvestedinthebondanddetailedtheobligationstheytookittoentail.Havingdescribedwhathecalledthe“viewsofthemany,”heturnedtotheproperlyphilosophicaltaskofclarifying,refininganddevelopingtheconceptionoffriendshiphefoundexemplifiedinhissociety,allthewhileprovidingacarefullyarguedjustificationforthenewandvastlymoresophisticatedconceptionthathewasintheprocessofworkingout.Philos(friend),hepointedout,coulddesignatethemembersofone’sfamily,one’sfellowcitizensaswellasallthosewhomwe,moderns,mightnotcall“friends,”eveninaveryextendedsenseoftheword.Excessivelybroadashisdefinitionappearstous,ithelpfullysituatestheconceptwithinthewidespectrumofcommunity:

Men address as friends their fellow travellers on a voyage, their fellow soldiers, and similarly also those who are associated with them in other kinds of communities. Friendship is present to the extent that men share something in common, for that is also the extent to which they share a view of what is just. (Nicomachean Ethics, VIII 9, 1159b27-31)

IntheselinesAristotleblendsdescriptiveandevaluativenotions:havingnotedthatfriendshipflourishesinallsortsofcommunities,hedrawsattentiontoitspotentialtocontributetothepoliticalstability and well-being of the city-state. Accordingly, he complemented his analysis of privatefriendshipwithargumentsdestinedtohighlightthefunctionthatfriendship,conceivedasapoliticalconcept,fulfilsinthecity-state:

Itisclearthenthatastateisnotameresociety(koinōnia),havingacommonplace,establishedforthepreventionofmutualcrimeandforthesakeofexchange.Thesearetheconditionswithoutwhichastatecannotexist;butallofthemtogetherdonotconstituteastate,whichisacommunityoffamiliesinwell-being,forthesakeofaperfectandself-sufficinglife.Suchacommunitycanonlybeestablishedamongthosewholiveinthesameplaceandintermarry.Hencethereariseincitiesconnexions,brotherhoods,commonsacrifices,amusementswhichdrawmentogether.Butthesearecreatedbyfriendship,for to choose to live together is friendship.Theendofastateisthegoodlife,andthesearethemeanstowardsit.Andthestateistheunionoffamiliesandvillagesinaperfectandself-sufficinglife,bywhichwemeanahappyandhonourablelife.”(Politics,III9,1280b33-40)

Asforhishighlysystematicaccountoffriendshipintheprivatesphere,itenabledhimtoaddressinadvance,sotospeak,someoftheproblemsthatwouldbedevillaterphilosophers.Hisfirststepwastodistinguishthreekindsoffriendship,thefriendshipofpleasure,thefriendshipofutilityandthefriendshipofvirtue,whichwillnowbebrieflytakeninturn.

Thefriendshipofpleasure,heuncontentiouslynoted,isguidedbythepursuitofwhatispleasanttooneselfandreadilytohand.Sinceitrequireslittleeffort,itisquicktoformandequallyquicktodissolvewheneitherorbothpartiestakeupdifferentinterestsormovetoothersourcesofpleasure.Itisaninferiorformoffriendshipsincethefriendisnotlovedinandforhimself,butforsomesuperficialpropertythathehappenstopossess,andwhichmatchesanequallysuperficialpropertyintheother.Aristotleconcludes, this timesomewhatcontentiously, that sucha friendship is characteristicoftheyoungandimmature.Whetherheisrightinthisopinionisamootpointsincetheyoungdonothaveamonopolyonsuperficialityandrapidlyshiftingpastimes.Asfortheallegedinferiorityofthatformoffriendship,onecouldretortthat,althoughsuperficial,itisnonethelessharmless.Thereisnoreason,therefore,toavoiditprovidedthatifitdoesnottaketheplaceofmoredemanding,hencemorefulfilling,relationships.Althoughofrestrictedscope,thefriendshipofpleasureexcludesneithermutualgoodwillnorequalitybetweenthepartners,whicharetwodefiningcharacteristicsoffriendship.


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Thefriendshipofutilityisadifferentmatter.“Thosewholoveeachotherforutilitylovetheothernotinhimself,”Aristotlewrites,“butinsofarastheygainsomegoodforthemselvesfromhim...Hencethesefriendshipsarecoincidental,sincethebelovedislovednotinsofarasheiswhoheis”(Nicomachean Ethics,1156a10-16).Toourmodern,post-Kantianminds,thisfriendshipseemslessharmlessthanthefriendshipofpleasureinsofarasitislikelytoinvolvetreatingtheotherasameanstoone’sownendsratherthanapersonwhoisanendinhimselfandhasgoalsofhis/herown.However,ifrelationshipsofutilityareoftenone-sided,theyneednotbe.Whilethecultivationofinfluentialfriendswhoareinapositiontoadvanceone’scareerisclearlyone-sided,theexchangeofusefulskillsandcompetenciesisamoreacceptablewayofsecuringbenefits.Itismoreacceptablebecauseitisreciprocal.Inthefirstcasethepartiesarenotequal,onepartybeingmorepowerfulthantheotherwhile,inthesecondcase,themutualusevaluethateachpartyhasfortheotherensuresequality,albeitatasuperficiallevel.Furthermore,althoughthefriendshipofutilityneednotexcludegoodwillandmutualregard,itdoesexcludebothwhen,asnotinfrequently,itisaone-sidedwayofobtaininggoodsandadvantages.Asinthefriendshipofpleasure,eachpartnerischosen,notforhimself,butforhispossessionofsomepropertyorgoodusefultooneself.Suchfriendshipisunlikelytolastsinceusefulness,beitone-sidedormutual,isgenerallyoflimitedduration.Lastly,thefriendshipofutility,asthatofpleasure,isopentothewickedaswellastothegood.

Notsothethirdkindoffriendship,namelythefriendshipofvirtueorprimaryfriendship,whichAristotleregardsastheyardstickbywhichallotherkindsoffriendshiparetobemeasured.Itbondstogethervirtuousmenwhohaveenjoyedalongacquaintancewitheachother,inthecourseofwhichtheyhavebecomefamiliarwitheachother’sinterestsandachievements.Asaresult,thetwopartieshavecome to love/likeeachother forwhat theyare.4Soconversantwitheachother’smindandcharacteraretheythatitwouldbenoexaggerationtosaythattheyareastransparenttoeachotherastwohumanbeingscaneverbe.Such,atleast,isthepointthatAristotlemeanttoconveywhenhedescribedthemas“otherselves”toeachother.Althoughthephraseispuzzling,ifnotoxymoronic,tomodernminds,itwasnotsotoAristotle,whouseditrepeatedly.Sincethereisnoevidencetoshowthat itpuzzledhiscontemporaries, the reasoncannotbutbe that theirconceptofselfhoodradicallydifferedfromours.Wetaketheselftobe,bydefinition,uniquetothepersonwhoseselfitis,sothatnoonecouldhaveanotherselfapartfromtheirown.Thisbeingso,readersofAristotleinevitablyaskthemselveshowonepersoncanbecometheselfofanotherandhowtwopeoplecanbeeachother’s“otherself.”TheproblemiscomplexandrequireslengthyinvestigationsintoearlyandclassicalGreekliteraryandphilosophicaltraditionaswellascomparisonwithlaterconceptsofselfhood,notablythoseofAquinasandDescartes.Detailedinvestigationsonsuchissueswerecarriedoutearlierandelsewhere(Stern-Gillet,1995)andcannot,forreasonsofspaceconstraintsbereproducedhere.Brieflysummarised,theirresultsareasfollows.InAristotle’sphilosophyofmind,self-awarenessisgeneratedindirectly,throughtheactivitiesofsensingandthinking.Usingone’ssenseorganstoperceiveandone’smindtothink,onebecomesindirectlyawareofoneselfasperceiverandthinker.Whileself-awarenessissatisfyinginitself,thelevelofself-fulfilmentthatonederivesfromone’smentalactivitiesisdirectlyproportionaltothequalityoftheseactivities.Itismorefulfilling,forinstance,toapprehendoneselfasengagedinskilledprofessionalworkthaninmundanedomestictasks.Themorecomplextheactivityandtheobjectapprehendedasaresult,themoreself-fulfillingtheapprehensionofone’sownselfassoengagedis.TheprinciplethatJohnRawlscalled“Aristotelian”becauseitechoesviewsexpressedintheNicomachean Ethics,runsasfollows:

... other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their rational capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and their enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity.5 (Rawls, 1971: 426)

Primaryorperfectfriendshipisafriendshipthat,unlikethefriendshipsofmerepleasureorutility,engagesthebeingsofthefriendsatadeeplevel.Theclosenessbetweenthefriendsandthe


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frequencyoftheirinteractionensurethateachpartyhasoccasionstobeacquaintedwith,orevenparticipatein,hisfriend’shigherlevelmentalactivities.Tobeawareof,ortoparticipatein,one’sprimaryfriend’shigherlevelmentalactivities,therefore,provideseachpartywithauniquesourceofself-actualisation.

InsofarasAristotle’sphilosophyoffriendshiphasnoneedtoinvokethe“mysterious”forcesand“unfathomableattraction”thatlaterbecamethebreadandbutterofwritersseekingtoidentifythecauseoffriendship,itcarriesconsiderableexplanatorypowerandisopentofewerobjectionsthanothertheoriesthatweretobeformulatedlater.Evenso,ithashaditscritics.Itispronetoseemhighlyorevenoverly“intellectualized” tomodernminds, themost frequently levelledobjectionagainstitbeingthatitis“elitist”insofarasprimaryfriendshipisconfinedtoamoralandintellectualelite.Whilesuchanobjectionisnotgroundless,itmaybecounteredbypointingoutthatprimaryorvirtuousfriendshipisademandingrelationshipandthatnoteveryoneiscapableofit.Furthermore,wemayreflectthatifourintuitionsinmattersoffriendshipsomewhatdifferfromAristotle’sown,thereasonmaybethat,intheinterveningcenturies,wehavebecomeheirstoadifferenttradition,Christianity,whichhadadifferentwayofconstruingfriendship.Weshallreturntotheissue.

deFINING FRIeNdSHIP PHILOSOPHICALLy: KANT

Kant’s writings on friendship are modest in size and lack the philosophical weight of his greatworks,buttheyarenonethelessimportantinsofarastheycalledattentiontoaspectsoffriendshipthathadremainedimplicitinAristotle’sethicaltreatises.Hismaincontributiontothesubjectwastocontrastfriendshipas“anideaofpracticalreason”andfriendshipasan“empiricalphenomenon”(or“friendshipofdisposition”).AshewroteinThe Metaphysics of Morals:

Friendship(consideredinitsperfection)istheunionoftwopersonsthroughmutualloveandrespect.Itiseasytoseethatthisisanidealofeachparticipatingandsharingsympatheticallyintheother’swell-beingthroughthemorallygoodwillthatunitesthem.6(Metaphysics of Morals,II,para.46)

AsKantrecognised,thedefinitionsetsanidealunattainableinpractice.Itismeanttoconstituteamodelorarchetypebycomparisontowhichallformsof“empiricalfriendship”aretobeassessed.Inspiteofbeinginevitablydefective,“friendshipsofdispositions”aresubjecttonormsinsofarasthepartiesinvolvedhave“adutysetbyreason”toaimattheidealor“tostriveforfriendship(asamaximumofgooddispositiontowardeachother).”KantfurtherintroducedtwonotionsthatareforeigntoAristotle,namelyduty,asseenintheabove-quotedlines,andself-disclosure,astrikinglymodernconceptwhoserelevancetofriendshipmodernreadersimmediatelyrecognise.

HowapplicableinpracticeareAristotleandKant’srespectiveaccountoffriendship?Letusexaminetwo“reallife”situations.Ifitisassumedthatfriendshipisareciprocalrelationbetweenequals,doesitfollowthatmedicalpractitionerscannotbefriendswiththeirpatients,professorswiththeirstudents,andlawyerswiththeirclients?Thequestionarisesbecausetherelationshipishierarchicalandhencenotfullyreciprocal.Thebalanceofpower,whichisalwaystippedonthesideoftheprofessionalperson,generallyrulesoutfulldisclosureofinformationandconfinesonepartytobesubjecttotheadviceand/orthedecisionsoftheotherwho,inturn,issubjecttoarule-governedcodeofpractice.Themutualityconditionisnotfullymeteithersinceneitherpartyischoseninandforthemselves,eachpartyhavingadifferentreasonforchoosingtheother.Theassociationbetweenprofessionalsandthosewhoputthemselvesintheirhands,whichisaclearexampleofwhatAristotlecalledafriendshipofutilityorofneed,cannot,therefore,beconsideredtobefriendshipinthefullsenseoftheterm,although,asAristotlerecognised,itdoesnotruleoutthedevelopmentoffriendlyrelations.

The equality condition would appear also to stand in the way of the development of inter-generationalloveandaffectionintofullfriendship,especiallywhenthepartiesarecloselyrelated.Parentscanbefriendswiththeirchildrenonly“inasense.”Therearetworeasonsforthis.First,theverynatureoftherelationshiprendersitnecessarilyunequalforanotinconsiderablepartofitsduration;parentsbringupchildrenandchildren,intheirturn,supportelderlyparents,ifandwhen


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theneedarises.Fromthestartandowingtoitsclosenature,therelationshipisdefinedintermsofprotection,duty,care,andrespect,allofwhichspellinequality.Furthermore-andthepointiscrucial–inter-generationalfriendshipislikelytobehamperedbyreticenceonbothsidestosharearangeoffeelingsandemotions.Fullself-disclosureisrarebetweenparentsandchildren.

Theconceptofself-disclosureandtherolethatitplaysinfriendshiprepaycloseattention.Kanttookittobehallmark,mainmotiveandbonusofthebestformofempiricalfriendship.Thenotionispost-medieval,makingafirsttimidappearance,sofarasIknow,inthewritingsofMarsilioFicino(1433-1499).7Itisathoroughlymodernnotion,whichcloselycorrespondstoacommonintuition,according towhich the truefriend is therecipientofourconfidences, thespringboardonwhichwefirstsoundourideasandtheshoulderonwhichwecryintimesofsorrow.ToappreciatethesignificanceofKant’sviewsofself-revelation-tellingthetruthaboutoneself-requiresplacingtheminthecontextofhisrigorousviewsontruth-telling.Lying,inthesenseofmakingfalsedeclarations,hefamouslyargued,ismorallywrongper se,evenifthelieistoldtosavealifeortoachievesomeulteriorgood.AlthoughthemanycriticismsthathisuncompromisingviewsontheissueattractednevercausedKanttochangehismind,theyinducedhimtoreflectonarangeofconceptsassociatedwithtruth-telling,particularlysincerityandcandour.

Candour,understoodasthereadinesstodiscloseone’sthoughtstoothers,wasofparticularinterestforhim.TheworditselfcomesfromtheLatinfor“white”(candidus)andinitiallymeantwhite,hencepure,henceinnocent,aninnocenceoftentakentobechild-likeincharactersincechildrenareoftenthoughttobeguileless.Howthewordevolvedsemantically,frombeingwhiteincolourtobeingopenandfrankinone’sdealingswithothers,iseasytounderstand.BythetimeKantcametowriteaboutfriendship,candourdenotedthedispositionofcharacterthatleadspeople,notonlytobefrankandhonestwitheachother,butalsotobereadilydisposedtoappriseothersoftheirfeelings,viewsorstatesofmind.Insofarascandourprecludeslying,Kantclassifieditasaduty.However,unlikethedutynottomakefalsedeclarations,whichadmitsofnoexceptionsandthusbindsusabsolutely,candourisadutyofwideobligation.Assuch,itadmitsofexceptions,onesuchbeingintheinterestofconfidentiality.Althoughoneshouldbecandidasamatterofprinciple,heexplained,oneneedsnotbecandidtotheextentofdivulginginformationlikelytocausepainorembarrassment.

Candouristhequalityofmindthatmakestruefriendshippossible.Itisso,Kantheld,becausetherearetwocontradictoryimpulsesinhumannature,theonetoshareone’sthoughtsandfeelingswithothers,theotherbeingtokeepthemsecretforfearofbeingbetrayedortakenadvantageof.Onlyintheclosestoffriendships,heconcluded,canthetwocontradictoryimpulsesbereconciled.Truefriends,hewrote,letoneanotherintotheirinnerself;withaspecialother,theycandroptheirguard,overcometheirnaturalpropensitytokeepprivatetheirthoughts,feelingsandemotionsandthusgivewaytotheirneedofcommunionwithanotherhumanbeing.Onlyintruefriendship,whichmakesself-disclosurepossible,canhumanbeingsenjoytheintrinsicgoodofacommunionofminds:

... if we can free ourselves of this constraint [our distrust of others], if we can unburden our heart to another, we achieve complete communion. That this release may be achieved, each of us needs a friend, one in whom we can confide unreservedly, to whom we can disclose completely all our dispositions and judgments, from whom we can and need hide nothing, to whom we can communicate our whole self. On this rests the friendship of dispositions and fellowship.8 (Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Enfield, pp. 205-206)

Afriendshipwhichmakessuchcommunionpossible,heconcluded,“isman’srefugeinthisworldfromthedistrustofhisfellows.”(ibid.)Inthistouchinglyrevelatorypassage,Kantdescribesthehumanyearningtobebothknownandloved,tobelovedforwhatonetrulyisratherthanfortheprotectiveveneerbywhichoneispronetoclotheone’svulnerability.Onceachieved,suchabondrunsdeepandplaysacentralroleinthelivesoftheindividualsconcerned;itistheshieldthatprovidesbothpartieswiththesafehaveninwhichtoretreatintimesofvulnerability.


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However,itmightbepointedout,Kant’smodelofself-disclosureinfriendshipwouldnotbetoeveryone’staste.Therearemanywho,whilstnotobjectingtotheKantianmodelitself,wouldnotwishittobeappliedtothemselves.Thismighttaketheformofacceptingtheconfidencesoftheotherwhilstnotreciprocatingthecompliment,notindeedoutofmistrustbutoutofnaturalreticence.Althoughtheobjectionisnotwithoutstrength,itiseasilycountered.NotonlydidKantnotmakeself-disclosureasine qua nonconditionoftruefriendship,buthealsopepperedtheabove-quotedlineswithoccurrencesof“can”:“ifwecanfreeourselves”,“ifwecanunburden,”“afriendfromwhomwecanandneedhidenothing.”Hisrepeateduseofthemodalityofpossibilityshowsthathewasawarethatself-disclosureisnotpartofeveryone’smodeloffriendship.Lastly,hemightwellhavethoughttoreassurethereticentfriendwhenhewrote,somewhatarchly, thatself-disclosureshouldneverbetotalsince“wehavecertainnaturalfrailtieswhichoughttobeconcealedforthesakeofdecency,lesthumanitybeoutraged.”(ibid.,206)ThebestretorttotheobjectorwouldbethattheyearningKantdescribesisverywidelyshared.

Kant’saccountof thebestkindofempiricalfriendship,forall itsvirtues,hasproblematicalimplications.Toseewhattheyare,acircuitousroutewillnowbetaken.

Insofarastheforgingofsoprofoundabondrequiresfrombothpartiesexceptionalpowersofintrospectionandempathy,itislikelytobearareachievement,restrictedtoanelitepossessingsufficientleisure,moralinterestandpsychologicalresources.Afirstreasonforuneaseisthat,onceformed,suchabondmightlesseneachfriend’scapacityforindividualself-sufficiency.Providinga“refuge”fromaworldinwhichdistrustisthemorecommoncoinage,Kantianfriendshipmightlockthefriendsinarelationshiplikelytobeachievablewithoneor,possibly,twofriendsatatime,andresultintheformationofisolatedpocketsofintimacy,whichmightbeopentothechargeofbeingexamplesofégoïsme à deux.Consistingofenchantedenclavesofcandourandtrust,mostlyconfinedtotheprivatesphere,thesewouldbelikelytorelegatetotheperipheryofpeople’slives,ifnotconflictwith,moreopentypesofrelationshipssuchasprevailbetweencompatriots,fellowreligionistsandmembersofrestrictedcommunities.

Anobverseproblemmightariseforthefriendsthemselves.Howimmunewouldtheirsecretsbe,notonlytopossibleindiscretionsonthepartofthefriend,butalsotoclasheswithdutiesprescribedbytheprincipleofuniversalizability,asenshrinedinthecategoricalimperative?Iffriendshipentailsdutiesofwideobligation,doesitnotfollowthatempiricalfriendshipatitsbestprovidesexceptionstotheprincipleofuniversalizability?MayInotlietokeepthesecretsofmyfriend?“Youmaynot,”Kantwouldreply,whohadtakencaretobuildsafeguardsaroundtheprinciple.IntheGroundwork,heruledoutanyconditionthatwouldlimittheapplicationofthecategoricalimperativeinfavourofinclination(Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals,4:421).Whilefriendshipisthesourceofdutiesofwideobligation,itcannot,therefore,conflictwiththestrictdutythatenjoinseveryrationalbeingto“Actonlyonthatmaximthroughwhichyoucanatthesametimewillthatitshouldbecomeauniversallaw.”(Ibid.)

InThe Metaphysics of Morals,havinganticipatedtheaboveobjection,hesoughttocounteritbyarguingthatfriendshipcannotgenerateprecisedeterminantmaxims:

... pragmatic friendship, which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of love, can have neither the purity nor the completeness requisite for a precisely determinant maxim; it is an ideal of one’s wishes, which knows no bound in its rational concept but which must always be very limited in experience. (The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 472)

Conflictsofdutiesmaywellbeavoidedthatway,butwheredoesthatleavethepersonwhohasrevealedhissubversivepoliticalleaningstohis(Kantian)intimatefriendwhoisabouttobeinterrogatedbythepolice?“Alwaysinquireaboutthephilosophicalcommitmentsofyourfriendsbeforeconfidinginthem”maybesoundpracticaladvice.Or,asKantputthematter:“ajudiciousandtrustedfriendbealsoboundnottosharethesecretsentrustedtohimwithanyoneelse,nomatterhowreliablehe


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thinkshim,withoutexplicitpermissiontodoso.”(Ibid.).ItisdifficultnottoconcludethatKantmayhavefailedtorealisethattherearecircumstancesinwhichdutiesofwideobligation(friendshipandconfidentiality)willhavetogivewaytodutiesofstrictobligation(truth-telling).

Theproblemwouldnotariseinthecontextofadifferentconceptionofmoralreasonsandagency,suchasparticularism,accordingtowhichmoralreasonsaretoberesponsivetotheparticularitiesof agents andcircumstances.According to those conceptions, the statusof someoneas a friendentitleshim/hertoadepthofmoralconsiderationthatisnotduetothosewhoarenotfriends.Moralparticularistswould allow that humanbeings are under a greater obligation to their nearest anddearest,genuinefriendsincluded,thantheyaretothoseunconnectedtothembyparticulartiesandobligations.Ontheirconception,thecloserthetie,thegreaterthemoralobligationinvolved.(Dancy,1983and2004)

INTeRLUde: deRRIdA ANd THe ABSeNT-MINded COPyIST

Howmanyfriendsshouldonehave?Commonintuitionandphilosophersmostlyagreeinholdingthatthefewerfriendsonehas,thedeeperandmorefulfillingtherelationshipislikelytobe.Anancientdoxographer,DiogenesLaertius,reportsAristotletohavesaid:‘hewhohasmanyfriendshasnofriend.’(DiogenesLaertius,Lives of Eminent Philosophers,V.21)9.Theepigramwasdestinedtohavealongandfarfromillustrioushistory.Atsomepointinthemiddle-ages,ithad,almostcertainly,themisfortuneofbeingmisreadormisunderstoodbysomemedievalcopyist,whoputasoftbreathinginsteadofaroughoneontheomegaonthefirstwordandtherebytotallychangedthemeaningofthesentence.Insteadofreading“Hewhohasmanyfriendshasnofriend,”itread“Omyfriend,thereisnofriend,”whichisbothself-contradictoryandinconsistentwithgenuinelyAristotelianviews,asexpressedintheethicaltreatises.Unfortunately,thisparticularmanuscriptsurvivedandbecamethesourceoffurthercopies.Asaresult,theabsent-minded(orignorantor,indeed,inane)copyist’stextualcorruptionwasreproducedinlatermanuscriptsandeventuallyfounditswayintoaprintedtext,whichMontaignereadanddiscussedinhisownessayonfriendship.SometwocenturieslaterKant10and,followinghim,Nietzsche,uponreadingMontaigne,gavefurthercurrencytothecorruptedversionoftheAristoteliantag.ThestorydidnotendtheresincethesameerroneousversionprovidedJacquesDerridawithanoccasiontowritehis2005longandponderousmonographonThe Politics of Friendship.9

Friendship and Other LoyaltiesKantmayhavebeenabletoeliminatethepossibilityofconflictsbetweenthe(imperfect)dutiesoffriendshipandthe(perfect)dutyofactinginconformitywithmaximssanctionedbythecategoricalimperative.Whathecouldnotdowasobliteratethepossibilityofconflictsbetweendutiesofwideobligation.Thesearetheconflictsthathavereceivedthemostattentionintheliterature,thefavouredexamplebeingconflictsbetweenprivateobligations,ontheonehand,and,ontheother,commitmentstoacauseortothestateofwhichoneisacitizen.Inmostofthecasesdiscussedintheliterature,theresolutionappearstoowemoretothewriter’stemperamentorpoliticalleaningsthantofinelyarticulatedarguments.

InSartre’swell-knownexample,ayoungmanistornbetweenhisobligationtolookafteranageddependant,whosesolesourceofsupportheis,andhisdesiretoservehiscountrybyjoiningtheresistancemovementinoccupiedFrance.Tohelpwiththedecision-makingprocess,theyoungmanconsultsSartre,whowiselypointsoutthatinchoosinghisadvisor,theyoungmanhasalreadymadehisowndecision.Thiscasenotwithstanding,thereappears,overthefastfewcenturies,tohavebeenatendencytoresolvesuchconflictsinfavourofprivateattachmentsoverpubliccommitments.

InancientRome,inthelastyearsoftheRepublic,Cicero(106-43BCE)hadcomefirmlyinfavouroftheviewthatthatdutiestotheStateoughtalwaystotakeprecedenceoverdutiestoparticularothers:


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Let this law be established in friendship: neither ask dishonourable things, nor do them, if asked. And dishonourable it certainly is, and not to be allowed, for anyone to plead in defence of offences committed in general and especially of those against the State, that he committed them for the sake of a friend. (De Amicitia, XII, 40)

WiththegrowthofindividualismintheWest,theoppositeviewbeganprogressivelytomakeitselffelt.Dante(1265-1321),forexample,placedinthelowestcircleofhellthosewho,likeJudasIscariotandBrutus,hadbetrayedtheirfriend:

“That soul there, which has the worst punishment,Is Judas Iscariot,” my master said,“With his head inside, and kicking his legs.”Of the other two, who hang upside-down,The one who hangs from the black face is Brutus;See how he twists and says not a word. (The Divine Comedy, Inferno, canto XXXIV: 61-66)).

Somesevencenturieslater,in1938,justbeforetheoutbreakofWW2,E.M.Forstermadeitavirtuetochoosefriendshipovercountry:“IfIhadtochoosebetweenbetrayingmycountryandbetrayingmyfriendIhopeIwouldhavethegutstobetraymycountry.’12(Forster,1952,p.66)Evenso,Forsterdidnotconsiderthattheoppositeviewhadbythenaltogetherbeensilencedsincehefeltitappropriatetoadd:“Suchachoicemayscandalizethemodernreader,andhemaystretchhispatriotichandtothetelephoneatonceandringthepolice.”

Christian Friendship: A Shift of ParadigmChristianitybroughtaboutprofoundchanges in theconceptionof thenatureandmoralvalueofinterpersonalrelationships.Whileancientpaganthinkersregardedfriendshipassecularandselectivebydefinition,theChristianphilosophersoflateantiquityandtheMiddleAges,havingstrippedtheconceptofvirtue(aretē)ofitsaristocraticandintellectualistconnotations,groundedfriendshipanditsassociatedexcellencesinthecreaturelystatusofhumanbeings.TeachingthattheloveofGodoughttosupersedeindividualchoiceandinclination, theseauthorsunderstoodfriendshipanditsobligationsinrelationtothevirtueofcharity(caritas).Sincethesoul’srelationtoChristwastheonlyfriendshipworthytobecalledperfect,humanfriendshiptookonamorecomplexcharacter.SomeChristianphilosophers,Augustinemostnotably,regardeditasapossibleobstacletothedevelopmentofmoralreasoning.OtherssuchasAquinasreinterpretedClassicalfriendshipascaritasandincludedbenevolenceandcommunion into theAristotelianmodelofprimary friendship soas tomake itcompatiblewiththeteachingsofScripturewhichenjoinusto“lovethyneighbourasthyself.”Havingarguedthat“neighbour”coversallthosewhoareequalsintheeyesofGod,Aquinaswasabletoconcludethatitappliedalsotoone’senemies.TheChristiandoctrinalenlargementofClassicalphilia(friendship)constitutednothinglessthanaradicalshiftofparadigm.Whilefriendship,asconceivedby philosophers in the Classical tradition, was fundamentally particularistic, Christian love andfriendshiphadtobedirectedatallhumanbeings.Nolongeraquestionofinclination,achievements,meritandcompatibilityoftemperaments,asithadbeeninAristotle,friendshipbecameadutyofbenevolence;nolongerconstrainedbyrivalcommitmentstothestate,asithadbeeninCicero,itwasenlargedsoastoincludeallnations.

NobodybetterdescribedtheparadigmshiftintroducedbyChristianitythanKierkegaardinWorks of Love.Inthefollowinglines,whicharealmostincantatoryintone,Kierkegaard’smaintargetisAristotle’sconceptionof“primaryfriends”asotherselvestoeachother.Thatmodeloffriendship,Kierkegaardargued,oughttobereplacedbytheChristianunderstandingofloveasdirectedateverysinglehumanbeinginhis/herqualityaschildoftheCreator:


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The neighbour is your equal. The neighbour is not your beloved for whom you have a passionate partiality. Nor, if you are an educated man, is your neighbour the one who is educated, with whom you are equal in education – for with your neighbour you have equality before God. Nor is your neighbour the one who is more distinguished than yourself, that is, he is not your neighbour because he is more distinguished than yourself ... Nor is your neighbour one who is inferior to you, that is, insofar as he is humbler than yourself, he is not your neighbour ...The neighbour is every man; for he is not your neighbour through the difference, or through the equality with you as in your difference from other men. He is your neighbour through equality with you before God, but every man unconditionally has this equality, and has it unconditionally. (Kierkegaard, Works of Love: 50)

While the universalistic conception of love and friendship that the Christian thinkers hadintroducedarguablyrepresentedashifttoahigherandnoblerideal,italsoleftinatheoreticalvacuumtheparticularisticbonddescribedbyAristotleandhisfollowers.Christianuniversalisticteachings,bolsteredbyKantianarguments,largelyshapedthemannerinwhichthemoralityofinter-personalmoralitycametobeconceivedintheWesterntradition.Becausefriendship,byitsverynature,doesnotreadilyfittheuniversalisticmodelofmorality,iteventuallyfelloffthephilosophicalagenda.

UNFATHOMABLe FRIeNdSHIP

Friendship,onceitwasnolongertiedtomoralworthandintellectualachievements,becamehardertodefineandtotheorize.Intheindividualisticclimateofpost-ReformationEurope,questionssuchas“Howisthetruefriendfound”?“Howisthebondoffriendshipsustained”?becamewell-nighimpossibletoanswer.Iffriendshipisadeeperandmorerewardinginter-personalrelationshipthanalmostallothers,itwouldseemtomeritanequallysignificantbeginning,suchastheinstantaneousmutualrecognitionofsimilaritiesoftemperamentorintellectualdispositions.Yet,disappointingly,therealityofordinarypeople’slivesmeansthatone’sclosestfriendoftenturnsouttohavebeenthecolleagueonesharesanofficewith,thewomanwhowasinthematernityhospitalatthesametimeasoneself,theneighbourwhosharesone’spassionformountainbikingetc.Chanceplaysagreaterroleinthedevelopmentoffriendshipthanweoftencaretorecognise.

Montaigne,asthegreatwriterhewas,gaveahighlyliteraryaccountofthenatureofhislifelongfriendshipwithafellowwriter,EtiennedelaBoétie,byascribingittotheoperationofother-worldlyforces,suchasfateandpre-determination,inwhichreasonplayednopart.Ashewroteinanoftquotedpassage:

If a man should importune me to give a reason why I loved him, I find it could not otherwise be expressed, than by making answer: because it was he, because it was I. There is, beyond all that I am able to say, I know not what inexplicable and fated power that brought on this union. (Essays, I, XXVIII)

But if these lines are beautiful, they are also theoretically sterile; rather than providing anexplanation,theyarebutanelegantwayofside-steppingthequestion.Andyet,noonesinceMontaigneseemstohavecomeupwithabetterexplanation.Modernfriends,ourselvesincluded,arepronetoascribethedeepfriendshipthattheyhavewithafewotherstothepresenceof“electiveaffinities”13betweenthem,affinitieswhicharetakentoaccountbothforinitialchoiceandenduringaffection.Modernfriendstendtoviewtheirpersonalitiesasakinincrucial,thoughoftendisappointinglyminor,ways.Ifpressedtheywouldbelikelytosaythattheyloveorlikeeachotherfortheiruniqueness.IsthatabetterexplanationthanMontaigne’s?No.Itisunsurprising,therefore,thatthepartiesaregenerallycontenttoleavetheirbondunexaminedonthegroundthattheoriginofloveandfriendshipisnotamatterforcloseanalyticalscrutiny.Becausetheyarecapriciousinoriginandspontaneousintheirdevelopment,modernrelationshipsoffriendshiparemostlytakentobeasfundamentallynon-rationalastheyareprecious.14


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ReFReNCeS

Aquinas,T.(1981).Summa Theologica.Oxford:Transl.FathersoftheEnglishDominicanProvince.Blackwells.

Aristotle.(1996).ThePoliticsandTheConstitutionofAthens(B.Jowett,Trans.andS.Everson,Ed.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Aristotle,.(1999).Nicomachean Ethics.UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:PrenticeHall.

Aristotle,.(2013).Eudemian Ethics(B.Inwood&R.Woolf,Trans.&Eds.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Cicero,.(1990).On Friendship and the Dream of Scipio: Laelius de Amicitia and Somnium Scipionis(J.G.F.Powell,Trans.).Warminster:Aris&Phillips.

Dancy,J.(1983).EthicalParticularismandMorallyRelevantProperties.Mind,92(368),530–547.doi:10.1093/mind/XCII.368.530

Dancy,J.(2004).Ethics without Principles.Oxford:ClarendonPress;.doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001

Dante,A.(2008).The Divine Comedy (D.H. Higgins(C.H.SissonTrans.&Ed.).Oxford:OxfordWorld’sClassics.

deMontaigne,M.(1927).The Essays(E.J.Trechmann,Trans.).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Derrida,J.(2005).The Politics of Friendship(G.Collins,Trans.).London:VersoBooks.

Ficino,M.(2002).Commentarium in Convivium Platonis De Amore.Paris:LesBellesLettres.

Forster,E.M.(1952).Two Cheers for Democracy.London:EdwardArnold.

Kant,I.(1963).Lectures on Ethics(L.W.Beck,Trans.).NewYork,Evanston:Harper&Row.

Kant, I. (1996).MetaphysicsofMorals. InPractical Philosophy (M.J.Gregor,Trans.&Ed.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Kant,I.(1997).Lectures on Ethics (P. Heath Ed. & J.B. Schneewind Trans.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.10.1017/CBO9781107049512

Kierkegaard,S.(1949).WorksofLove(D.F.Swenson,andSwensonTrans.).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Laertius,D.(1966).Lives of Eminent Philosophers(D.D.Hicks,Trans.).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

Rawls,J.(1971).A Theory of Justice.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.

Sartre,J.-P.(2007).Existentialism is a Humanism.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.

Stern-Gillet,S.(1995).Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship.Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

Stern-Gillet,S.,&Gurtler,G.S.J.(2014).Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship.Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

Veltman,A.(2014).AristotleandKantonSelf-DisclosureinFriendship.InS.Stern-Gillet&G.Gurtler(Eds.),Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship.Albany,NJ:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

eNdNOTeS

1. This is so, itwouldappear,even in thecaseofpatientssuffering fromschizophreniaandothersplitpersonalitydisorders.The issue is,however, toocomplexandcontentious tobeexaminedwithin thescopeofthisessay.

2. WithapologiestoLydia,thecatwhohasdoneherbesttoslowdowntheprocessofwritingthisessay.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCII.368.530

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCII.368.530

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199270023.001.0001


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3. Theyare,inchronologicalorder,theNicomachean EthicsandtheEudemian Ethics.Athirdandshortertreatise,Magna Moralia,isunlikelytohavebeenwrittenbyAristotlehimself.

4. Tomodernminds,Aristotle’sdefinitionofprimaryfriendshipissexist,butsexismwasnotanoffenceinhistime.Inthisinstance,wemustbecontentwiththeassurancethat,hadAristotlebeenalivetoday,hewouldhaverealisedthatgoodwomenarejustascapableofprimaryfriendshipasgoodmenare.

5. Rawlsarguedthataperson’sgoalsinlifeareformulatedintermsoftheexerciseoftheirnaturaloracquiredabilitiesandskills:thegreaterthescopetoexercisethem,themoreself-fulfilledapersonwillbe.HisreasonsforcallingtheprincipleAristotelianarespelledoutinsection65.

6. AsimilardistinctionisdrawnintheLecture on Ethics.7. SomuchisclearinFicino’sDe Amoreandhisvoluminouscorrespondencewithfriends.Beitnoted,

however,thatheispronetofollowmedievalusageincallingfriendship“caritas.”8. ThepassageisdiscussedinVeltman(2014,p.279)towhomIamhereindebted.9. ForAristotle’spassage,seeEudemian Ethics,1245b20-2110. ItmayamusetolearnthatKanthimselfmisquotedthetaginthemedievalmanuscript.IntheLectures on

Ethics,hewrote“When,therefore,Socratesremarks:‘Myfriends,thereisnofriends,’heimpliestherebythatthereisnofriendshipwhichfullyconformstotheIdeaofFriendship.Andheisright.”Itishighlyunlikelythat,evenintheLysis,Socratessaidanythingofthekindinpropria persona.

11. InfairnesstoDerrida,itoughttobepointedoutthathewasawareofthetextualcorruption,astestifiedbyp.208ofhisPolitics of Friendship.

12. TheessaywasfirstpublishedinThe Nationin1938.13. NotquiteinGoethe’ssensethough.14. Thepaperwasfirstreadin2015attheUniversityofCalcuttaand,aweeklater,attheUniversityofDelhi;

Iammostgratefultomembersofbothaudiencesfortheirquestionsandcomments.ThanksareduealsotoPeterHerissone-KellyfordiscussionsonKantianmattersovertheyears.

Stern-Gillet studied Philosophy and Classics at the University of Liège in Belgium, graduating with a Licence en Philosophie and a Candidature en Philologie Classique in 1965. In 1977 she was awarded a doctorate in Philosophy for a thesis on Métaphysique et Histoire: Essai sur la Philosophie de R.G. Collingwood. This was followed by some ten years or so of teaching and research in modern analytic philosophy, after which she happily returned to Classics, having taken an MPhil in Greek and Latin at the University of Manchester in 1987. Dr. Stern-Gillet held appointments at the University of Liège (assistant lecturer), the Connecticut State University (Visiting Professor), the University of Bolton (Senior lecturer in Philosophy, then Professor of Ancient Philosophy), and Villanova University (Augustinian Chair). She also had a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Yale.

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