Aristotle - On Sophistical Refutations; On Coming to Be and Passing Away; On the Cosmos (Greek - English)

A R IS T O T L EON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS

ON COM ING-TO-BE A N D P ASSIN G -AW AY ON TH E COSMOS

A R I S r J T L E . s i/ / /

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS ON COMING-TO-BE AND

PASSING-AWAYBY

f E . S. FORSTER, M .A .EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF OREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

ON THE COSMOSBY

D . J. FU R LE Y, M .A .LECTURER IN OREEK AND LATIN IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

LONDON

W I L L I A M H E I N E M A N N L T DCAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

H AR VAR D UNIVERSITY PRESSMCMLV

CONTENTS

P r e f a t o r y N o te * f

D e S op h istic is E le n c h is

Introduction & m m Text and Translation *

D e G e n e ra tio n e e t C o rru p tio n s

Introduction m mText and Translation m m

D e M u nd o

Introduction . m m Text and Translation #

I*:

Indices *

To De Sophisticis Elenchis To D e Generatione et Corruptione To D e Mwido m

PAOS\t}

a10

* 159 . 162

383 . 344

H3 . 415

. m

PREFATORY NOTEP r o fe s s o r E. S. Forster completed his versions of De Sophisticis Elenchis and De Generatione et Corruptione before he died. I have checked the proofs and added a brief index.

D. J. F u r le yLondon

January 1955

DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

INTRODUCTION

I . T h e P la c e o f t h e T o p ic a in t i ie O r g a x o x

B o th the Topica and the De Sophisticis Elenchis have always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle. The two treatises are elosely connected ; the De Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises ; indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard the two as forming a single work, since he twice quotes the De Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of the Topica.

It is generally admitted that what we call logic and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early preoccupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted a formal treatment of the subject and the theories put forward, for example, in the Theaetetusy Sophist, Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into a regular system. But while Aristotles systematic treatment of the process of inference and, above all, his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it has been generally recognized that the Platonic dialogues contain some of the germs from which the Aristotelian system was afterwards developed ; for 2

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS

example, in the Theaetetus the doctrine of the categories is already implicit in the recognition of the abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, relation, activity and passivity.

O f the logical treatises of Aristotle, which sincc about a.d . 200 have passed under the title of the Organon or f instrument * of science, the most important are (1) the Prior Analytics, in which he sets forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect without reference to the subject-matter with which it deals, (2) the Posterior Analytics, in which he discusses the characteristics which reasoning must necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific,(3) the Topica, in which he treats of the modes of reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The Categories and the De Interpretation are subsidiary treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the proposition.

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been expended, particularly by German scholars, in an attempt to fix the exact order in which the various treatises which constitute the Organon were composed. The problem is complicated by the fact that the treatises, in the form in which they have come down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which were evidently subjected to a certain amount of revision due to the modification and development of his original doctrines. This process has naturally given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would naturally occur if corrections were made or additions inserted which were not completely adapted to the context in which they were placed.

It has been generally recognized that the whole

3

ARISTOTLE

of the Topica does not belong to the same date.H. Maier holds that the oldest portion consists of Books II-V II. 2 and that it was written under the direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the same period as the Aristotelian Dialogues, which have survived only in fragments ; in particular, he points out that the term o-t>AAoy/.


tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was written in part before his discovery of the syllogism.

II. T h e C o n te n t o f t h e T op ica

The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its author (100 a 18 ff.), to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory * ; that is to say, it aims at enabling the two participants, the questioner * and the * answerer/ to sustain their parts in a dialectical discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may be described as the dialectical syllogism based on premises which are merely probable as contrasted with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based on premises which are true and immediate. The probable premises which make up the dialectical syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as 4 those which commend themselves to all or to the majority or to the wise/ The uses of dialectic are, we are told, three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences, because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con, we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and falsehood, and (b) since the first principles of the sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the approach to them must be through the study of the opinions generally held about them.

After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle, in Books II-V II. 3, gives a collection of the tottol which

5

ARISTOTLE

give their name to the treatise. The term tottoi is somewhat difficult to define. They may be described as 4 commonplaces * of argument or as general principles of probability which stand in the same relation to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the demonstrative syllogism ; in other words, they are4 the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning is to draw its arguments/

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident; Books IV and V with those of genus and property ; Books VI and VII. 1-3 with those of definition. Books VII. 4-5 and Book V III, after giving some additional notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice of dialectical reasoning.

III. T h e D e S o p h i s t i c i s E l e n c h i s

Just as Aristotle treats of the demonstrative and the dialectical syllogism in the Posterior Analytics and the Topica, respectively, so in this treatise, which forms a kind of appendix to the Topica, he deals with the sophistical syllogism. A knowledge of this is part of the necessary equipment of the arguer, not in order that he may himself make use of it but that he may avoid it, and that the unwary may not be ensnared in the toils of sophistical argument; in fact, Aristotle is carrying on the Socratic and early- Platonic tradition by attacking the Sophists, who taught the use of logical fallacy in order to make the worse cause appear the better.

The term Ay\'os is strictly applied to the confutation of an actual adversary, but it is also used more

a \V. D. Koss, Aristotley p. 59.


widely of the confutation of an imaginary opponent. The treatise is, in fact, a study of fallacies in general, which are classified under various headings and fall into two main classes, those which depend on the language employed and those which do not. Some of these fallacies would hardly deceive the most simple minds ; others, which Aristotle seems to have been the first person to expose and define, are capable not only of deceiving the innocent but also of escaping the notice of arguers who are employing them.

After two introductory chapters the work naturally falls into two parts, chapters 3-15, the refutation of fallacies, and chapters 16-33, the solution of fallacies, while chapter 34 forms an epilogue to the work.

IV. T h e M a n u scrip ts

The chief manuscripts Sophisticis Elenchis are :

A Urbinas 35B Marcianus 201C Coislinianus 330D Coislinianus 170u Basileensis F. 11.21C Vaticanus 1024P Vaticanus 207f Marcianus App. IV. 5q Ambrosian us M . 71N Laurentianus 72. 18i Laurentianus 72. 15T Laurentianus 72. 12O Marcianus 204

for the Topica and De

saec. ix-x ineunt.an. 955 saec. xi

saec. xiv saec. xi-xii

satis vetustus ** non recens *

saec. xiv saec. xv saec. xv

saec. xiv saec. xiii saec. xiv

O f these A and B are in a class by themselves.

ARISTOTLE

Bekker preferred A , Waitz B ; the Teubner Editors give a slight preference to B, the readings of whieh are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C sometimes preserves the true reading.

V. S e le c t B ib lio g r a p h y

ed ition s

J. T. Buhle, Text, Latin Translation and Notes, Biponti, 1792.

I. Bekker, Text, Berlin, 1831, Oxford, 1837.T. Waitz, Text and Notes, Leipzig, 1814-1846.Y . Straehe and M. Wallies, Teubner Text, Leipzig,

1923.E. Poste (De Sophisticis Elenchis only), Text, Para

phrase and Notes, London, 1866.

tr a n s la t io n s

T. Taylor, London, 1812.O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), London, 1902. W . A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford Translation),

Oxford, 1928.In Freneh :

J. B. Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1837.In German :

J. H. von Kirchmann, Heidelberg, 1877.E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922.

ARTICLES a n d dissertations

P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristoielischen Logik, Berlin, 1936.

8

H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, Tiibingen, 1900.

F. Solmsen, Die Ejitnicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Leipzig, 1929.

J. L. Stocks, The Composition of Aristotles Logical Works, Classical Quarterly, 1933, pp. 115-124.

In translating the Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis I have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition, and when I translate any other reading this is noted at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable advance on that of Bekker. I have found W aitzs edition of the Organon of great use, and the Latin version of Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently consulted the Oxford translation by W . A. Pickard- Cambridge. For the De Sophisticis Elenchis the notes and paraphrase in Postes edition are often enlightening, though I cannot always agree with his interpretation.

My aim in translating has been to represent Aristotles meaning as closely and faithfully as I can in simple English without resorting to paraphrase or trying to express it in modern terminology.

I have to thank my friend and former colleague Professor W . S. Maguinness, of Kings College, London, for reading through my version and giving me the benefit of lus fine scholarship and accuracy. He has suggested several improvements in the text which I have been glad to adopt.


9

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A R I S T O T L E O N S O P H IS T IC A L R E F U T A T I O N S

I. L et us now treat o f sophistical refutations, that is, arguments which appear to be refutations but are really fallacies and not refutations, beginning, as is natural, with those which come first.

That some reasonings are really reasonings, but in t ao - that others seem to be, but are not really, reasonings, (^ hs? Mi).N is obvious. For, as this happens in other spheres from a similarity between the true and the false, so between it happens also in arguments. For some people an*drefuta- possess good physical condition, while others have tious which merely the appearance of it, by blowing themselves andgthoseC out and dressing themselves up like the tribal ht are^ choruses ; again, some people are beautiful because entf

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ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, i

owing to men's inexperience ; for the inexperienced are like those who view things from a distance. Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements ; refutation, on the other hand, is reasoning accompanied by a contradiction of the conclusion. Some refutations do not affect their object but only appear to do so ; this may be due to several causes, of which the most fertile and widespread division is the argument which depends 011 names. For, since it is impossible to argue by introducing the actual things under discussion, but we use names as symbols in the place of the things, we think that what happens in the case of the names happens also in the case of the things, just as people who are counting think in the case of their counters. But the cases are not really similar ;(Yor names and a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in number ; and so the same expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number of things.S As, therefore, in the above illustration, those who are not clever at managing the counters arc deceived by the experts, in the same way in arguments also those who are unacquainted with the power of names are the victims of false reasoning, both when they are themselves arguing and when they are listening to others. For this reason, therefore, and for others which will be mentioned hereafter, there exist both reasoning and refutation which appear to be genuine but are not really so. But since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and

IS

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ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, i- ii

not real wisdom, and the sophist is one who makes money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear that for these people it is essential to seem to perform the function of a wise man rather than actually to perform it without seeming to do so. To take a single point of comparison, it is the task of the man who has knowledge of a particular subject himself to refrain from fallacious arguments about the subjects of his knowledge and to be able to expose him who uses them. O f these functions the first consists in being able to give a reason, the second in being able to exact one. It is essential, therefore, for those who wish to play the sophist to seek out the kind of argument which we have mentioned ; for it is well worth his while, since the possession of such a faculty will cause him to appear to be wise, and this is the real purpose which sophists have in view.

It is clear, then, that a class of arguments of this kind exists, and that those whom we call sophists aim at this kind of faculty. Let us next discuss what are the various kinds of sophistical arguments and what are the various component parts of this faculty, and into what different divisions the treatment of the subject falls, and all the other elements which contribute to this art.

II. O f arguments used in discussion there are four Four kindskinds, Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments SsJd^diil-and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are cussion:those which reason from the principles appropriate toeach branch of learning and not from the opinions ofthe answerer (for he who is learning must take thingson trust). Dialectical arguments are those which, (2) Dia-starting from generally acccpted opinions, reason to lectlcal-establish a contradiction. Examination-arguments (3) Exami

nation.15

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io Xvtlkols Lp7]Tai, 7rep l 8c tu>v SiaAc/cTt/cajv K al 7Tipa

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ii- iv

are those which are based on opinions held by the answerer and necessarily known to one who claims knowledge of the subject involved (in what manner, has been described elsewhere a). Contentious argu- ^ 9 ^ " ments are those which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, generally accepted. Demonstrative arguments have been treated in the Analytics, and dialectical arguments and examinations have been dealt with elsewhere.6 Let us now deal with competitive and contentious arguments.

III. W e must first of all comprehend the various theper - objects at which those aim who compete and contend tio? of in argument. They number five : refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and, fifthly, the reduction of one's m-xv). opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him Jolftentiou?to say the same thing over and over again ; or, if argument, ,i i , , , ,i n are five innot the reality, at any rate the appearance ot each number.of these things. Their first choice is a plain refutation, their second to show that their opponent is lying, their third to lead him on to a paradox, their fourth to make him commit a solecism (that is, to make the answerer, as a result of the argument, speak ungrammatically), and, lastly, to make him say the same thing over and over again.

IV. There are two modes of refutations ; one has (A) bie- to do with the language used, the other is unconnected fc^h-xi). with the language. The methods of producing a ^ n^ lUa~ false illusion in connexion with language are six in faUaJbs number: equivocation, ambiguity, combination, di- p^ton vision, accent and form of expression. The truth of diction, this can be verified by induction and by syllogistic are proof based on this (thongh some other assumption number,i n being uu6is also possible), that this is the number of ways in to:

17

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v v f i i a v o l to io c S c r c b v X o y c o v , o t o v o n f ia v O a v o v c n v

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v o v c s iv o i y p a f i f i a r i K o i . t o y a p f ia v O a v e iv o f i c b -

v v f i o v , t o r e t jv v i e v a i ;^>o6/ici'ov r f j e m a r r f f i r f K a l

r o X a f i f ia v e iv i m o r r j f i r f v . K a l ira X iv o n r a K a K a

35 a y a d d * tx V arjfiaivei, aAA* o t c fiev o n o vvv Kafivcov,1 o t c S os* eKafive upoTepov.

5 7tArjv v y i a ^ e r o f i e v K a l K a fiv c o v K a l o K a f i v c o v

v y i a l v e i 8 9 o v K a fiv c o v , aAA o K a fiv c o v , o v v v v , a X X 9

o 7 T p oT p ov . 7rapa Sc ttjv d fi< f> ifioX iav o i TOtotSc,

t o f t o v X e o O a i X a fieT v f i e t o v s r r o X e f i i o v s . K a l a p y

o t i s y i v c o o K e i , t o O t o y i v c o o K e i ; K a l y a p t o v y i v c o -

o K o v r a K a l t o y i v c o o K 6 f i e v o v cVSc^CTat co s y i v c b -

a K o v r a crrjfirjv a i t o u t to r e p X o y t p . K a l & p a o o p a

1 Deleting rj KaO-qixevos after Kapvwv with Wallies.

ARISTOTLE

18

i.e. can write or spell. b i.e. ought to be.*

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv

which we can fail to indicate the same thing by the same terms or expressions. Arguments sueh as the following are based on equivocation : Those who know, learn ; for it is those who know the use of letters that learn what is dietated to them. Here learn * is equivocal, meaning * understand by using knowledge * and * acquire knowledge/ Or again,4 Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and evil must exist.* Here * must exist * is used in two senses ; it means what is necessary,* whieh is often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and we also say that good things must exist.* b Or again, the same man is seated and standing and is a sick man and restored to health; for it is the man who stood up that is standing, and it is he who was recovering his health that is restored to health, but it was the man who was seated that stood up and the man who was siek that was recovering.* For that the siek man * does sueh and sueh a thing or has sueh and sueh a thing done to him, has not one meaning only but at one time means the man who is now sick,* and at another time the man who was formerly sick.* But it was the siek man who began to recover his health when he was actually siek, but he is in good health when he is not sick and is not the siek man now but the man who was formerly siek. The following examples are connected with (2) Am- ambiguity : To wish me the enemy to capture, bi8>ty. and * when a man knows something, surely there is knowledge of this *; for it is possible by this expression to signify both the knower and the thing known as knowing/ And 1 what a man sees, surely that

* i.e. knowledge o f this can mean either knowledge on the part o f the knower or knowledge o f the thing known.

19

10 tls, tovto opa; opa Se tov KLOva, ffs elvat, tovto ov

ON* SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv

(he) a sees : a man a pillar sees, therefore the pillar sees/ Again, Surely you insist on being what you insist on being. You insist on a stone being : therefore, you insist on being a stone/ Again Surely speaking is possible of the silent/ * Speaking of the silent * can also be taken in two ways, either that the speaker is silent or the things spoken of are silent. There are three modes connected with equivocation and ambiguity : (1) when the expression or name properly signifies more than one thing, such as aeros b and #aW ,c (2) when we customarily use a word in more than one sense, (3) when a word has more than one meaning in combination with another word, though by itself it has only one meaning, for example, knowing letters ; for it may so happen that taken separately knowing * and* letters * have only one meaning, but taken together they have more than one meaning, namely, either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has knowledge of the letters.

Ambiguity and equivocation then take these (3) Com- forms. The following examples are connected with ofwortis. the combination of words, for instance, * A man can walk when sitting and write when not writing/ The significance is not the same if one utters the words separately d as it is if one combines them, namely, * a man can walk-while-sitting/ e and, similarly, in the other example, if one combines the words and says a man can write-when-not-writing/ for it means that he can write and not write at the same time ; whereas if one does not combine the words it means that, when he is not writing, he has the power to

e In which case the meaning is that it is possible for a man to walk and sit at the same time.

21

ypd(f>LV. Kal, fiavddvei vvv ypafifiara, elirep ifiav- davev a iirlararaL. e n ro iv jiovov Svvdftevov ipLv TToXka hvvaaOai 4peiv.

Hapa Se rrjv Siatpcaiv, o n ra ttvt ear I Svo Kal rpla, Kal nepirra Kal apna, Kal ro jxci^ov lgov

35 rocrovrov yap Kal e n 7Tpos. o yap avros Xoyos Sirjprj/icvos Kal crvyKelfievos ovk del ravro 017/ i a i -

O // f (( I / > Uf\ O a\ V Jveiv av oogeiev, olov eyv iKarov Xl7T 810s 9AxtXXevs

166 b U a p a Se rrjv Trpovcphiav i v jxev r o t s a v e v ypa

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv

write. Again, * He now understands letters, since he has understood what he knows *a ; and further,1 One single thing being able to carry, many things you can carry/ b

The following propositions are connected with divi- (4) Division . _ * i* j j j j.i_ of words,sion : 5 is 2 and 3, 5 is odd and even, the

greater is equal to the less/ for it is so much andsomething more.c For the same sentence dividedwould not always seem to have the same meaningas when taken as a whole, for example,1 Free I madethee a slave *d and 1 goodly Achilles left a hundred(and) fifty men/ e

It is not easy to construct an argument relating (5) Accent, to accent in discussions which are not written down, but it is easier in written matter and poetry. For example, some people emend Homer to meet the objection of critics that his phrase to /ikv ofi Karairv^Tat onppy is a strange o n e / For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent, pronouncing the ov more sharply/ Also in the passage about Agamemnons dream h they say that Zeus himself did not say, * But we grant* him to secure the fulfilment of his prayer * but bade the dream to grant i t / Such examples, then, depend on accentuation.

Refutations which depend on the form of expres- (6) Form ofexpression.

* Probably quoted from some Cyclic poem. The words can mean either * left 150 men * or 4 left a hundred men fifty/

/ II. xxiii. 328 ; 4 part of which decays in the rain/9 i.e. substituting ov, 4 not/ for o5 : 4 and it does not decay

in the rain.* II. ii. 1-35 ; but the actual words quoted occur in II. xxi.

297 and are spoken by Poseidon. For this and the following example see Poet. 1461 a 22-23.

i i.e. hihofiv.1 i.e. 8t86fiv=8t86vat, the infinitive being used as an

imperative.23

166 b o t o v t o f irj r a v r o o j u a v r c o s 4 p f ir)v e v 7 )T a c , o to v t o a p p e v OrjXv rj t o drjX v a p p e v , fj t o f x e r a ^ v O a r e p o vTOVTCOV, fj TTaXcV TO 7TOIOV TTOOOV f j TO 7TO

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv-v

sion occur when what is not the same is expressed in the same form ; for example, when the masculine is expressed by the feminine or vice versa, or the neuter by the masculine or feminine ; or again when a quality is expressed by a quantity or vice versa, or the active by a passive or a state by the active, and so forth according to the distinctions previously made.For it is possible for something which is not of the nature of an action to signify by the language used something which is of the nature of an action ; for example, to flourish * is a form of expression like to * cut * or to build *; yet the former denotes a quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action.So too with the other possible examples.

Refutations, then, connected with language are {b)Byfaj- based on these commonplaces. O f fallacies unconnected with language there are seven kinds : on (1) those connected with Accident; (2) those in These are which an expression is used absolutely, or not abso- ^JSber lutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or depending relation ; (3) those connected with ignorance of the on * nature of refutation ; (4) those connected with the consequent; (5) those connected with the assumption of the original point to be proved ; (6) those which assert that what is not a cause is a cause ; (7) the making of several questions into one.

V. Fallacies connected with Accident occur when (l) Acci- it is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to dent* the thing and to its accident; for since the same thing has many accidents, it does not necessarily follow that all the same attributes belong to all the predicates of a thing and to that of which they are predicated. For example, * If Coriscus is different

Topics 103 b 20 ff.25

dpdtTTOVy avros avrov erepos * eon yap avOpcoiros*

fj el HcoKparovs erepos, o Sc SoiKparrjs avBpcorros,

35 erepov avOpwTTOV cf>aolv cb fioXoyrjKev ai Sta ro ovfi-

jSeflrjKevai, ov erjoev erepov etvai, rovrov etvai

avQpcorrov.

Ot Sc napa ro airXcbs roSc rrrj XeyeoOai Kal firj Kvpicos, orav ro ev fie pec Xeyofievov cos anXcbs

167 a elprjfievov Xrj(f>0fj, olov el ro firj ov io n 8oaorov, on ro firj ov e o n v ov yap ravrov etvai re rt Kal

etvai anXcbs. rj 7raXiv on ro ov ovk eonv ov, el rcbv ovrcov n firj eonv, olov el firj avdpco7ros> ov

5 yap ravro firj etvai n Kal anXcbs firj etvai* alverai Sc Sta to rrapeyyvs rfjs Xeecos Kal fiiKpov 8iacf>e- peiv ro etvai n rov etvai Kal ro firj etvai n rov firj etvai. ofioicos Sc Kal ro rrapa ro rrrj Kal ro arrXcbs.

olov el o IvSoj oAos* fieXas cov XevKos eon rovs oSovras* XevKos apa Kal ov XevKos eonv . rj el

10 afi(f>co rrrj, on afia ra evavrla vrrapxei. ro Sc

roiovrov en evicov fiev rravrl Oecoprjoat pa8iov, otov

el Xafidjv rov AtfltW a etvai fieXava rovs o8ovras epoir* el XevKos' el ofiv ravrrj XevKos, on fieXas

Kal ov fieXas, oioiro SieiXexOai ovXXoyioriKcbs reXeicboas rrjv epcorrjoiv. err* evicov Sc XavOavei

26

ARISTOTLE166 b

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v

from man, he is different from himself, for he is a man *; or if he is different from Socrates, and Socrates is a man,* they say that it has been admitted that Coriscus is different from a man, because it is an accident that the person from which he said that Coriscus is different is a man.

Fallacies connected with the use of some particular (2) The expression absolutely or in a certain respect and not absolutely19 in its proper sense, occur when that which is pre- ^ veIthuali_ dicated in part only is taken as though it was predi- flcation. cated absolutely. For example, * If that-which-is-not is an object of opinion, then that-which-is-not is 1 ; for it is not the same thing * to be something * and 1 to be absolutely. Or again, That-which-is is not, if it is not one of the things which are, e.g. if it is not a man.* For it is not the same thing * not to be something 1 and * not to be * absolutely ; but, owing to the similarity of the language, 4 to be something * appears to differ only a little from to be, and not to be something * from not to be.* In like manner when something is predicated in a certain respect and absolutely ; for example, I f an Indian, being black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then he is white and not white/ Or if both attributes belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases this sort of fallacy can be easily perceived by anyone ; if, for example, after securing an admission that the Ethiopian is black, one were to ask whether he is white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white in this respect, were to think that he had finished the interrogation and had proved dialectically that he was both black and not black. In some cases, on the other hand, the fallacy escapes detection, namely,

27

15 7to\\aais tov avrov Kal evos, fir) ovofiaros aAAa rrpayfiaros, Kal ovofiaros

25 fir) avvoivvfiov aAAa tov avtov, K tcov Sodevrcov, i avayKTfs, fir) avvapiOfiovfievov tov iv dpxfj, Kara ravro Kal rrpos ravro Kal (oaavrcos Kal iv tw avTu> xpovy- t o v avrov Se rporrov Kal to tjsevaaadai rrepl tlvos. eVtot 8c aTroXiTrovres ti tqjv XexOevTCDV alvovrai iXeyx^w, otov ott ravro

30 8t7rAaatov feat ov SirrXdaiov ra yap 8vo tov fiev evos SnrXacna, tcov Se rpiGxv ov SiTrXacria. f) el to avT o tov a vtov SiTrXacriov Kal ov SinXdoiov, aAA ov Kara ravro9 Kara fiev yap to firjKos SirrXdcnov, Kara Se to nXdtos ov SirrXdaiov. fj el tov avrov Kal Kara ravro Kal (vaavrcus, aAA ovx a/xa* hiorrep

35 iarl aiv6fievos eAey^oj. eA/cot 8 av tls tovtov Kal els rovs rrapa rrjv Xeiv.

O t 8e rrapa t o iv dpxfj XafifiaveLV ylvovrai fiev

ARISTOTLE167 a

28


where, when an attribute is ascribed in some respect only, an absolute attribution would also seem to follow, and where it is not easy to see which of the attributes can be properly assigned. An instance of this occurs when both the opposite attributes belong similarly ; for then it is generally held that it must be conceded that either both or neither can be predicated absolutely ; for example, if something is half white and half black, is it white or black ?

Other fallacies arise because no definition has been given of what a syllogism is and what a refutation, 'and there is some defect in their definition. For a refutation is a contradiction of one and the same predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of a synonymous name but of an identical name, based on the given premisses and following necessarily from them (the original point at issue not being included) in the same respect, relation, manner and time. A false statement about something also occurs in the same manner. Some people, however, appear to refute, omitting some of the above-named points, showing, for example, that the same thing is double and not double, because two is the double of one but not the double of three. Or, they show that if the same thing is double and not double of the same thing, yet it is not double in the same respect; for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, if it is double and not double of the same thing and in the same respect and manner, yet it is not so at the same time ; and so there is only an apparent refutation. One might, indeed, force this fallacy also into the category of those connected with language.

Fallacies connected with the assumption of the (4) Petitioprindpii.

29

o v r t o s K a l T o a a v r a )(c o s o cra^cS s* i v S everal t o c

a p X V * CLireicrOai, alvovrat S eAeyêiv Sta t o /X17

Suvaaflat crvvop a v t o TauTov feat t o e r e p o v ,

167 b eO Sc Trapa ro errofievov eXeyxos Sta to olecOai avrtarpeetv rrjv aKoXovdrjcriv. orav yap rovSc ovros i avayKrjs ro8l fj, Kal rov8e ovros otovrai Kal Oarepov etvai i avayKrjs. oOev Kal at 7repl

5 rrjv 8oav iK rrjs aloOrjaews arrarai yivovrai. rroXXaKis yap rrjv xXrjv /^cAt vneXafiov Sta to 7tc- o0at to âvffov x/)a>/xa ra) fieXirr Kal irrel ovfi- fialvei rrjv yrjv vaavros yivecrOai Staj8poxv, Kav fj Staj8poxo$y VTToXajLâvofiev vaai. to S ovk avayKaiov. ev tc Tots* prjropiKois at Kara ro crrj- fieiov a7To8elis iK rwv errofievoiv elalv. /3ovXo-

10 fievot yap Setfat 0Tt fiord s, ro errofievov eXafiov, or 1 KaXXcomorrjs fj ore vvKrwp o par at irXaviofievos- 7toXXols Sc TauTa fiev V7rapxi, to Sc Karrjyopov- fievov ovx virapx^- ofiolws Sc Kal iv rots crvXXo- yioriKois, otov o MeXtcraov Xoyos o n arretpov ro avavy AajScov ro fiev arrav ayevrjrov (ck yap firj

15 ovros ov8ev av y eve ad at), ro Sc yevofievov i apxtfs yevecrOai. el firj ofiv yeyovev, apxrjv ovk c^ct to rrav, war arreipov. ovk avayKrj Sc rovro ovfi- ftaiveiv ov yap el ro yevofievov arrav apxty *Xi> Kal et Tt apxrjv eêt, yeyovev, a>07rep ouS* el o

20 7Tvperra)v Oepfios, Kal rov Oepfiov avayKrj rrvperreiv. 30

ARISTOTLE167 a


original point to be proved arise in the same manner and in the same number of ways as it is possible to beg the original point; they have an appearance of achieving a refutation because men fail to perceive at the same time what is the same and what is different.

The refutation connectcd with the consequent is (5) The due to the idea that consequence is convertible. For conse

167 b* 0 Se napa to firj alriov cos ainov, orav npoo-

Xrj


The refutation connected with taking as a cause (6) Mfe- what is not a cause, occurs when that which is n o ttaken cause' a cause is foisted into the argument as though the refutation were due to it. Such a case occurs in reasonings leading up to an impossibility ; for in these one is bound to destroy one of the premisses.If, therefore, what is not a cause is enumerated among the questions which are necessary for the production of the resultant impossibility, the refutation will often seem to come about as the result of i t ; for example, in the argument that soul and 1 life * are not identical. For if coming-into-being is contrary to perishing, then a particular kind of coming-into- being will be contrary to a particular kind of perishing; now death is a particular kind of perishing and contrary to life ; life, therefore, is a coming-into-being and to live is to come-into-being. But this is impossible ; and so the soul and life are not identical.But this conclusion is not the result of reasoning ; for the impossibility occurs even if one does not assert that life is identical with the soul but merely says that life is contrary to death, which is a perishing, and that coming-into-being is contrary to perishing.Such arguments are not absolutely inconclusive but only inconclusive as regards the point at issue, and the questioners themselves are often equally unconscious of such a state of affairs.

Such, then, are the arguments connected with the (7) Plur- consequent and the falsely imputed cause. Those questions, which are connected with the union of two questions in one occur, when it is not noticed that they are more than one and one answer is given as though there was only one question. Sometimes it is easy to see that there is more than one question and

c 33

drroKpioiv, olov rrorepov rj yrj daXarra eonv fj o ovpavos ; eV* evicov S tfrrov, Kal cos evos ovros rj ofioXoyovoi ra> fir] airoKplveodai ro epwrcofievov,

5 fj iXeyx^adat alvovrai, otov ap' oSros Kal oSros eonv avOpcorros; &or av ris rvrrrrj rovrov Kal rovrov, avdpcorrov aA A o v k avdpcorrovs rvrrrrfoei. ff rraXiv,

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v-vi

that an answer should not be given, for example, when it is asked 1 Is the earth sea, or is the sky ? * Sometimes, however, it is less easy, and thinking that there is only one question, people either give in by not answering the question or suffer an apparent refutation. For example, Is A and is B a man ? ** If so, if a man strikes A and B, he will strike a man, not men ? * Or again, Where part is good and part evil, is the whole good or evil ? * Either answer might possibly seem to involve an apparent refutation or false statem ent; for to say that something is good when it is not good or not good when it is good is a false statement. Sometimes, however, if eertain premisses are added, there might be a genuine refutation. For example, if one agrees that a single thing and a number of things are alike called* white * or 4 naked * or blind/ For if * blind * is used of something which does not possess sight though it is its nature to possess it, it will also deseribe a number of things which do not possess sight though it is their nature to possess it. When, therefore, one thing has sight while another has not, they will either both be able to see or both be blind ; which is impossible.

VI. W e must either divide apparent reasonings [Note (a), and refutations in the manner just described or else feutdes can refer them all to a false conception of refutation, gen{j?dr|re* making this our basis ; for it is possible to resolve all forms of a the kinds of fallaey which we have mentioned into fa"y e/e 1- violations of the definition of refutation. Firstly, we ignoratio must see if they are inconclusive ; for the conclusion dench^ ought to follow from the premisses laid down, so that we state it of necessity and do not merely appear to do so. Next, we ought to see if they aecord with the

35

Siopiofiov, tcov fiev yap iv Trj Xeei ol jiiv eloi 25 7Tapa TO SlTTOV, otoV fj T OflOJVVflia Kal o Xoyos

Kal fj ofioioox^fioovvrj (ovvrjOes yap to iravTa cos to Se t i orjfialveiv), fj 8c ovvOeois Kal Sialpeois Kal TTpooLoSla tco fifj tov avrov etvai tov Xoyov fj Tovvofia Siaepov, eSei Se Kal tovto, KaOamep Kal to rrpayfia, Tavtov, el fieXXei eXeyxos fj crvX-

30 Xoyiofios eoeoOai, otov el Xcottiov, fifj ifidnov ovX- XoyioaoBai aAAa Xcottiov, aXrjOes fiev yap KaKelvo, aAA* ov avXXeXoy lot at, aAA e n epcortffiaTos Set, oti TavTov orjfiaivei, ttpos tov l^rjTovvTa to Sta tL

0 1 Se Trapa to ovfi^eprjKos opioOevros tov ovA- 35 Xoyiofiov avepol yivovrai, tov avrov yap opiofiov

8el Kal tov iXeyxov yiveoOai, ttXtjv TrpooKelodai ttjv dvTL(f>aoLV o yap eXeyxos ovXXoyiofios a vn - aoecj)s. el ovv firj io n ovXXoyiofios rov ovfi- flefSrjKOTOS, ov ylverai eXeyxos ov yap el rovrwv ovtcov avayKrj to8 etvai, tovto S iorl XevKov,

40 avayKrj XevKov etvai Sia rov ovXXoyiofiov, ou8*168 b el ro rpiycovov Svolv opOalv loas exei, ovfiPe^yjKe

S avrcp oxtffian etvai fj TrpdjTco fj apxfj> oti oxfjfid fj &Pxh V TTpcbrov tovto, ov yap fj oxfjfia ovS* fj 7rpcorov, aXX fj rpiycovov, fj airoSeigis,t f \ \ v\\ tf f v\

ofioicos oe Kai e m rcov aAAcov, coot ei o eA eyx o s

6 ovX X oyio fios TiSy o v k av eirj o K ara ovfifJefirjKos

eX e y x o s . aAAa Trapa tovto Kal o l Tc^wTat Kal36

ARISTOTLE168 a

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi

remaining parts of the definition. For of the fallacies illustrations connected with language, some are due to a double faci^de- meaning, for example equivocation and ambiguous pending phraseology and similarity of formation (for it is (l^diction. customary to indicate everything as a particular substance), whereas composition, division and accentuation are due to the phrase not being the same or the name different. For the name also, like the thing signified, ought to be the same, if refutation or reasoning is to result. For example, if the subject is a mantle, you should come to a conclusion about a mantle, not about a cloak ; for the latter conclusion is also a true one, but the reasoning is not complete, and a further question must be asked to prove that words mean the same thing, if the answerer asks how you have refuted him.

Fallacies connected with Accident become obvious (2) Acci- when proof has been defined. For the same en * definition ought to be true also of refutation, except that 1 the contradictory is added ; for refutation is a proof of the contradictory. If, therefore, there is no proof of the accident, no refutation takes place.For if, when A and B are, C is, and C is white, it does not necessarily follow that it is white because of the syllogism. And again, if the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be a figure, element or principle, it does not necessarily follow that because it is a figure, element or principle it has this character ; for the demonstration is concerned with it not qua figure or qua element but qua triangle. And so likewise with the other instances.Thus, if refutation is a kind of proof, an argument depending on an accident could not be a refutation.Yet it is along these lines that specialists and men of

37

oAoos* ot iiriOTTj/loves v no rcov dveniarr] fiovcov iXeyXovrar Kara avfi^e^rjKos yap noiovvrai tovs avWoyujfiovs npos tovs elSoras. ol 8* ov Svva- fievoi Siaipeiv rj ipcorcbpievoi StSoaatv rj ov Sovres

10 oiovrai SeScoKevai.Ot Se napa ro nfj /cat anXcbs, ort ov rov avrov

rj Karaaois Kal rj anocfracns. rov yap nfj XevKov ro nfj ov XevKov, rov S anXcos XevKov to anXcbs ov XevKov anocfraais. el oiv 8ovros nfj etvai XevKov

15 a>s anXa>s elprjfievov Xafifiavei, ov noiei eXeyxov, cf>alverai Se Sta rrjv ayvoiav rov ti iariv eXeyxos

t&avepcoraroi Se navrcov oi nporepov XexOevres napa rov rov eXeyxov Siopiapiov Sto Kal npocr- rjyopevOrjaav ovrcos' napa yap rov Xoyov rrjv

20 eXXeixpiv rj avraala ylverai, Kal Siaipovfievois ovrcos koivov ini naai rovrois Oereov rrjv rov Xoyov eXXeuffiv.

Ot re napa to Xapifidveiv to iv apxfj Kal to dval- riov cos ainov nOevai SrjXoi Sta rov opiofiov. Set yap ro ovpnepaafia tco ravr5 etvai1 vvfifialveiv,

25 onep ovk tfv iv tois avairiois* Kal naXiv firj apiO- fiovfxevov rov i dpxtfs, onep ovk exova iv ol napa rrjv atrrjaiv rov iv dpxfj-

01 Se napa to enofievov fiepos elal tov crvpLpe* fir)kotos* ro yap enojievov avfi^ePrjKe, Siaepei Se

1 Omitting airta tov after ctvai with ABC.

l(>7 a 2 1 ff.b napaXoyiofiol from napa anti Xoyos in the sense of * de

finition.38

ARISTOTLE168 b


science in general are refuted by the unscientific ; for they argue with the men of science with reasonings based on accident, and the latter, being incapable of making distinctions, either give in when questioned, or think that they have done so when they have not.

Fallacies which depend on whether a statement (3) The is made in a limited sense or absolutely occur be- ofDa^ o?ute cause the affirmation and denial are not of the same Qali-nPfi SiiltiP-thing. For * not partly white is the negation of ments.* partly white, and * not absolutely white * of 4 absolutely white/ If, then, one takes the admission that something is partially white to mean that it is absolutely white, he does not cause a refutation but only seems to do so owing to ignorancc of what a refutation is.

The clearest fallacies of all are those already (4) Defec- mentioneda as connected with the definition of t!on.dcfim refutation (hence also their name) b; for the semblance of a refutation is due to the defect in the definition, and, if we distinguish fallacies in this way, we must put down defect of definition * as common to all these cases.

Fallacies due to assuming the original point and (5) Petitw stating as a causc what is not a cause are clearly Prinei^ 1' exposed by means of the definition. For the conclusion ought to follow becausc this and that is so, which is not the case when the alleged cause is not the cause ; and, again, the conclusion should follow without the original point being included, which is not true of arguments based on the begging of the original point.

Fallacies connected with the consequent form part (6) The of those due to accident; for the consequent is an conse(*uent- accident but differs from the accident because the

39

TOV C F V K O T O S y O TI TO fl V O V flfiep rfK O S eO TlV

30 i' evos fiovov Xafietv, olov ravro etvai t o avdov Kal fieXi Kal t o XevKov Kal k v k v o v , t o S c Trap7r6- j j l v o v del ev rrXelooiv T a yap evl ravrco ravra Kal aXXrjXois aiovfiev etvai Taira Sio yiverai napa t o errofievov eXeyxos eo n S ov rrdvTios aXrjBeSy otov av fj XevKov Kara ovfifiefirjKos' Kal

35 yap r j x L^ v K aL k v k v o s t c o X c v k c o ra v t o v . rj rrdXivs cos iv t c o MeXiooov Xoycp, t o avro etvai Xafifiavei t o yeyovevai Kal dpxfjv ex^iv, fj t o 10a1 ylveoOai Kal ravro fieyeOos Xafiftaveiv. o n yap t o yeyovos c^ct dpxtfv, Kal t o exov apX7)v yeyovevai aioi, cos afiavepov o n Kal o Trapa ro

5 errofievov. emoKeTrreov Sc tov to Kal aXXcos.Ol Sc rrapa to ra rrXeico epcorijfiara ev rroieiv ev

rep firj StapOpovv rjfias ff fir) hiaipeiv rov rrjs rrpo- rdoecos Xoyov. r) yap rrporaols eonv ev KaOy evos

1 Reading toa for too is.2 Bekker misprints ireirepaofidvov as ireircpaofievtav.

ARISTOTLE168 b

But it does not follow that because snow is white and swan is white, therefore snow is swan.

* Cf. 167 b 13 f. c Cf. 179 a 26 ff., 181 a 22 ff.

40


accident can be secured in the case of a single thing by itself, for example, a yellow thing and honey are identical, and so is a white thing and a swan, whereas the consequent always exists in more than one thing ; for we claim that things which are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another ; and this is how refutation proceeds when the consequent is involved. It is not, however, always true, for example, in the case of accidental whiteness ; for both snow * and * swan arc the same in respect of whiteness. Or again, as in the argument of Melissus,5 someone takes to have come into being * and 1 to have a beginning * as the same thing, and* to become equal as the same thing as * to take on the same magnitude/ For because what has come into being has a beginning, he claims also that what has a beginning has come into being, on the ground that * having come into being * and * being finite * are both the same thing, because both have a beginning. Similarly, too, in the case of things which become equal, he assumes that, if things which take on one and the same magnitude becomc equal, then also things which become equal take on the same magnitude. In doing so he is assuming the consequent. Since, then, the refutation where accident is concerned depends on ignorancc of the nature of refutation, so also, it is clear, does the refutation where the consequent is concerned. But we must examine this question from other points of view also.c

Fallacies connected with the union of several (7) The questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate several or distinguish the definition of the term * proposi- J}]1^ 0118 tion/ For a proposition is a single predication about a single subject. For the same definition applies

41

0 yap avros opos ivos fiovov Kal anXws rov npay- 10 fiaros, olov avOpconov Kal evos fiovov avOpconov

ofiolws Se Kal enl rwv aXXwv. el ovv fila nporaois rj ev Kad evos a^tovoa, Kal anXws eorai nporaois rj rotavrrj ipwrrjois. inel 8* o ovXXoyiofios k nporaoewv, o 8* eXeyxos ovXXoyiofios, Kal o eXey- Xos ecrrai K nporaoewv. el oSv rj nporaois ev

15 KaO'* evos, avepov o n Kal oSros ev rfj rov eXeyxov ayvoia- aiverai yap etvai nporaois rj ovk oSoa nporaois, el fiev ofiv SeScokcv anoKpioiv ws npos fiiav epwrrjoiv, ecrrai eXeyxos, el Se firj SeSwKev aAAa aiverai, aivofievos eXeyxos. wore navres01 rpoiroi1 nlnrovotv els rrjv rov eXeyxov ayvoiav,

20 ot fiev ofiv napa rrjv Xeijiv, o n aivofievrj rj2avrtyaois, onep rjv iSiov rov eXeyxov, ol 8* aAAot napa rov rov ovXXoyiofiov opov.

V II. *H 8 dnarrj yiverai rwv fiev napa rrjv ofiwvvfii\av Kal rov Xoyov rw firj SvvaoOai Siaipetv ro noXXaxws Xeyofievov (evia yap ovk evnopov

25 SieXeiv, otov ro ev Kal ro ov Kal ro ravrov), rcov Se napa ovvOeoiv Kal Siaipeoiv rw firjSev oieoOai Siacjyepeiv ovvnOejievov fj Siaipovfievov rov Xoyov, KaOanep enl rwv nXeiorwv. ofiolws Se Kal rwv napa rrjv npoowSlav ov yap aAAo SoKei orjfialveiv aviefievos Kal enireivofievos o Xoyos, in ' ovSevos

1 Heading rponoi for roirot with Michael Ephesius.2 Adding 17 with Wallies.

ARISTOTLE169 a

42

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v i - v i i

to * one single thing * and to the thing * simply ; the definition, for example, of * man * and of * one single man * is the same, and so, too, with the other instances. If, therefore, a * single proposition * is one which elaims a single predicate for a single subject, a * proposition,1 simply, will also be a question of this kind. And since reasoning is based on propositions, and refutation is a process of reasoning, refutation will also be based on propositions. If, therefore, a proposition is a single predication about a single thing, clearly this fallacy also depends on ignorance of the nature of refutation ; for what is not a proposition appears to be one. If, therefore, a man has given an answer as though to a single question, there will be a refutation, but if he has not given it but only appears to have done so, there will be only an apparent refutation. Thus all the kinds of fallacy fall under the heading of ignorance of the nature of refutation those connected with language beeause the contradiction, wrhich is a particular characteristic of refutation, is only apparent, and the rest beeause of the definition of reasoning.

VII. In fallacies connected with verbal equivoea- [Note O). tion and ambiguous phrases the deception arises from abowfal- the inability to distinguish the various meanings of a term (for there are some w'hich it is not easy to distin- fused think- guish, for example, the meanings of unity/ being * jjiabiuty^ o and4 identity ). In fallacies connected with combina- make^ dis- tion and disj unction the deception is due to the supposi- inc 10ns tion that it makes no difference whether the term is combined or disjoined, as indeed is generally the case.So, too, in those connected with accentuation ; for it does not seem ever, or seems very seldom, to alter the significance of the wrord whether it is pronounced

43

30 fj o v k errl rroXXcov. tc o v S e Trapa TO o ^ /x a Sta t t jv ofiotoT rjT a t t j s X d g eto s . x a ^ 7r v 7 ^P S ieX eiv

rroia cboavT cos K al rroia cos er ep co s X e y e r a i * a x ^ S o v

y a p o t o v t o S v v d fie v o s Troieiv e y y v s c a r t t o v

Oecopeiv TaXrjOes* /xaAtara S iTTiOTraTai1 o w e m - v e v e iv , OTt rrav t o K a T rjyo p o v jie v o v t i v o s v t to -

35 X a fip d v o fie v roSe rt K al cos ev v r r a K o v o fie v tco y a p i v l K a l t fj o v o i a /xaAtcrra So/cet rrapeTrecjOai t o

/O \ t V J \ \ A \ < \ / >rooe rt /cat ro ov. oio /cat tow Trapa ttjv Ae^iv oStOS o TPOTTOS 0eTOS, TTpCOTOV Jlkv OTI JJL&XXoV fj aTraTrj yiverai f.xer aXXcov OKOTrovfievois fj KaO* avToiis (fj fiev yap /xer* aAAou OKeiftis Sia Xoycov,

40 fj Sc /ca0* avTOv ovx fjTTov Si* avrov rod rrpdy- 169 b fiaTos), etra /cat /ca0* avrov anaTaodai avfifiaivei,

OTaV ini TOV Xoyov TTOlfjTai TTJV GKlf/lV Tl fj flV aTTOLTTJ e/C TTJS OflOlOTTJTOS, fj S OfJLOlOTTJS K TTJS Ae^eajs*. tcov Se Trapa to ovjJipeprjKos Sta ro firj SvvaoOai SiaKpiveiv to ravrov /cat ro erepov Kal

5 ev Kal noXXd, jirjSe tois 7roioiS tcov KaTrjyoprjfjLaTcov Travra raura /cat tco TTpayjian ovfifiefHrjKev. ojjloicos Se /cat tcov Trapa to eirojievov fiepos yap ti tov ovfifiefir)kotos to errofjievov. ert /cat errl ttoXXcov cf>alveTai Kal aiovrai ovrcoSi el roSe a7rd rouSe firj xa>pterat, firjS' a7ro flarepou x

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v ii

with a lower or a higher pitch. In fallacies connected with the form of expression the deception is due to similarity of language ; for it is difficult to distinguish what sort of things belong to the same and what to different categories ; for he who can do this very nearly approaches a vision of the truth. What in particular seduces us into giving our assent to the fallacy is the fact that we suppose that every predicate of something is an individual thing and it presents itself to our ears as a single thing ; for it is to the one and to substance that individuality and1 being are generally held most truly to be attached. On this account also this kind of fallacy must be classed among those connected with language ; firstly, because the deception occurs more commonly when we arc inquiring with others than by ourselves (for an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of words, whereas in our own minds it is carried on quite as much by means of the thing itself); secondly, because, even in solitary inquiry, a man is apt to be deceived when he carries on his inquiry by means of words ; and, thirdly, the deception arises from the similarity, and the similarity arises from the language. In fallacies connected with accident the deception is due to inability to distinguish the identical and the different, the one and the many, and what kinds of predicates have all the same accidents as their subject. So, too, in fallacies connected with the consequent ; for the consequent is a branch of the accident. Furthermore, in many eases it appears to be true and is treated as axiomatic that, if A is inseparable from B, then also B is inseparable from A. In fallacies connected with the defect in the definition of refutation and with the distinction

45

rcbv napa to rrrj Kal arrXojs iv to) Trapa fiiKpov rj anarr) * (Ls yap ovSev TTpooorjfiatvov to ti rj Try fj 77a)s* ^ to vw KaOoXov avyxpodfiev. ofiolcjs Se /cat 7rt tojv to eV apxfi Aafifiavovrwv Kal tcjv avaiTiiov, Kal ocrot Ta TrXeio) epcorrffiara a>s ev

15 7rotovcrtv ev aTraoi yap rj arrarrf Sta to 7rapa puKpov ov yap Sta/cpij8o/xev ovtc rijs Trporaaecos ovre tov ovXXoyicfiov tov opov Sta ttjv elprffievrjv air lav.

V III . sE7Tt S eô/xev Trap* oaa ylvovrat ol (f>at- vo/xevot ovXXoyiofiol, exofiev Kal Trap* OTroo-a ot

20 aoiariKol yevoivr av ai/AAoytcr/xot /cat eAeyôt. Aeyco Se ao^tort/cov eXeyxov /cat avXXoyiofiov ov fiovov tov (fyawojievov avXXoyiofiov rj eXeyxov, /x^ ovra Se, aAAa /cat tov ovra fiev, aivofievov Se ot/celov toO rrpayfiaros. etat S o^rot ot /x^ /card to rrpayfia eXeyxovres Kal SeiKvvvres- ayvoovvras,

25 o77ep tjv ttJs TreipavTiKfjs. ecrrt S ^ rreipaariKr] fiepos rrjs StaAe/CTt/CTj? auV^ Se Suvarat o'l/AAoyt- ea0at ifsevSos St ayvotav tov SiSovtos tov Xoyov. ot Se ooffytaTiKol eAeyôt, av /cat auAAoyt^cavrat t^v avrlcfraatv, ov ttoiovgl SrjXov el ayvoet* /cat yap tov etSora ifiTTohlôvai rovrots tois Aoyoisr.

30 "O n S exofiev avrovs rfj avrfj fieOoSco, 8rjXovm Trap oaa yap alverai rocs aKovovoriv a>s rjpcorrj- fieva ovXXeXoytodat, Trapa ravra /cav ra> aTroKpivo- fievto Soetev, coot* eoovrai ovXXoyiofiol ifjevSeis Sta Toimov 7} Travrojv fj eviW* o yap firj epcorrjOels 46

ARISTOTLE169 b

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vn-vni

between a qualified and an absolute statement the deception is due to the minuteness of the difference ; for we regard the qualification of a particular case or respect or manner or time as having no extra significance and concede the universality of the proposition.So, too, when people assume the original point and when the wrong cause is assigned and when several questions are united in one ; for in all these cases the deception is due to the minuteness of the difference ; for we fail accurately to carry out the definition of * proposition * and reasoning * from the above- mentioned cause.

V III. Since we know the various sources from (e) B y re- which apparent reasonings arise, we also know those { 18 from which sophistical reasonings and refutations would arise. By sophistical refutation and reasoning I to be germane mean not only the seeming but unreal reasoning or re- u^e/dis-01 futation but also one which, though real, only seems cussion. to be, but is not really, germane to the subject in hand.These are those which fail to refute and show up ignorance within the sphere of the subject in hand, and this is the function of examination. Now this is a department of dialectic, but it may reach a false conclusion owing to the ignorance of the person under examination. But sophistical refutations, even if they prove the contradictory of his view, do not make clear whether he is ignorant; for men try to entrap even the man of scientific knowledge by these arguments.

That we know them by the same method is clear ; [Note (a), for the same reasons which make the hearers think refutetVons that a conclusion has been reached as a result of ^ cs^ eon questions, would make the answerer think so too, lines as so that there will be false proofs as a result of all or p ^ f jnt some of these causes ; for what a man thinks he has

47

35 o te r a i SeSoi/ccVat, Kav ipwTrjOels Oelr). nXrjv i n i

y e tivwv dfxa o v fifialv ei n p o o e p w ra v to iv S ees Kal

to ifjevhos ifitfravll^eiv, otov iv to is Trapa ttjv Xeiv

K al tov ooXoLKLGfjiov, e l ovv o l n ap aX o y co fio l TTJS

avTi(f>dows Trapa tov aivofievov eXeyxov e lo i ,8 f j -

Xov oti ir a p a T ooavT a a v K al tu>v i/ievScov e lrja a v

40 ovXXoyiofiol Trap* oaa K al o aivofievos eX eyxos.

170 o 8 e < f> a iv o fiev os T rapa r a f i o p i a tov d X rjO ivov* K a -

otov y a p iKXeiTTOVTOS aveir) a v e X e y x o s , o l o v o

T rapa to fir ) o v f i f i a i v o v Sta tov X o y o v , o e l s to

a S v v a T o v K a l o T a s SiSo i p a jT r jo e i s f i l a v ttolojv T ra p a

ttjv n p o T a o i v t K a l ovtI tov K aO * avto o T ra p a to

5 o v f i ^ e ^ r f K o s , K a l t o to v t o v f i o p t o v , o T rapa t o

i n r o f i e v o v rt t o fir ) i r r l t o v n p a y f i a r o s aAA e n l

t o v Aoyou o v f j b p a l v e i v e W a v r l t o v K a O o X o v t t )v

d vri< f> a o iv K a l K a r a T a v T o K a l n p o s t o v t o K a l

( L a a v r c o s n a p a T e t o e n l Tt rj n a p eKaoTov to v t c v v

Tt n a p a t o f ir ) i v a p i Q f i o v f i e v o v t o v i v a p x f j t o i v

10 a p x f j X a f i f id v e iv . w o t e x o i f i e v a v n a p * oaa y l v o v r a i

o l n a p a X o y i o f i o i n a p a n X e l w f i e v y a p ovk a v e t e v ,

n a p a 8 e T a e lp r f f i e v a e o o v r a t n d v T e s .

"Eart S o oo^ iotlkos eXeyxos ovx anXws eXey-

Xos, aAAa npos Ttva* Kal o ovXXoyiofios (boavTws

48

ARISTOTLE169 b

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, viii

conceded without being questioned, he would grant if he were to be questioned. But of course it sometimes happens that, as soon as we ask the requisite question, we make the falsehood obvious* as happens in verbal fallacies and those due to solecism. If, therefore, false proofs of the contradictory depend on the apparent refutation, it is clear that proofs of false conclusions must be also due to the same number of causes as the apparent refutation. Now the apparent refutation depends on the elements which compose a genuine one ; for, if any one of these is lacking, there would only be an apparent refutation, for example, that which is due to the conclusion not resulting from the argument (the reduction to an impossibility), and that which unites two questions in one and is due to a fault in the proposition, and that which is due to the substitution of an accident for the essence of a thing, and a subdivision of the last mentioned that which is due to the consequent; moreover, there is the case where the result follows in word only and not in reality, and also where, instead of the contradiction being universal and in the same respect, relation and manner, there is a restriction in extent or in connexion with another of these qualifications ; and then again there is the case of the assumption of the original point due to a disregard of the principle of not reckoning it in.Thus we should know the various conditions under which false proofs occur, for there are no further conditions under which they could occur, but they will always result from the above causes.

A sophistical refutation is not an absolute refuta- [Note (*). tion but is relative to some person, and so likewise ^1 rernta- is a sophistical proof. For unless the refutation which tion is not

49

a v f i e v y a p f i r j X a f i r f o r e i r a p a r o o f i w v v f i o v e v

15 o r j f i a l v e i v K a l o n a p a t t j v o f i o L o o x ^ f i o o v v r j v r o

f i o v o v r o S e K a l o l aXXoi w o a v r w s , o v r 9 e X e y x o i o v r e o v X X o y L o p L o i e o o v r a i , o v O 9 a n X w s o u r e t T p o s

r o v e p w r w f i e v o v e a v S e AajScoat, n p o s f i e v r o v e p w r w f i e v o v e o o v r a i , a n X w s S o v k e o o v r a i * o v y a p e v o r j f i a i v o v e l X r f < f > a o i v , aAAa < f ) a i v 6 f i e v o v , K a l n a p a r o v S e .

20 IX . II a p a nooa S eXeyxovrat ol eXeyxofievoi, ov Set neipaoOai Xafifiaveiv avev rrjs rcov ovrwv entorrjfiTjs anavrcov. t o v t o S ovSefitas eorl rex~ v t ] S ' aneipoi yap l o c o s at eniorrjfiai, wore SrjXov o t i /cat at ano8eleis. eXeyxoi S elol Kal aXrjOeZs* o a a yap eon v anoSeZâi, eo n Kal eXeyâi rov

26 Oefievov rrjv avrlcfyaoiv rov aXrjOovs, otov el ovfi- fierpov rrjv Siafierpov eOrjKev, eXeyêiev av t l s rfj anoSelêi o n aovfifierpos. wore navrcov Serfoei emorrjfiovas etvai* ol fiev yap eoovrai napa ras ev yecofxerpla dpxds Kal ra rovrcov ovfinepaofiara, ol Se napa ras iv larpLKjj, ol Se napa ras rcov

so aXXwv emorrfficov. aAAa firjv Kal ol ifjevSeZs eXeyxoi ofiolcos ev aneipois' KaO eKaorrjv yap rexyrfv eorl i/jevSrjs ovXXoyiofios, olov Kara yecofierpiav o yeco- fierpLKos /cat Kara larpiKrjv o larpiKos. Xeyco Se ro Kara rrjv t o Kara ras eKeivrjs apxds.

35 SrjXov ovv o t l ov ndin'wv rcov Xeyx

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, viii- ix

depends on equivocation assumes that the equivocal absolute term has only a single meaning, and unless that which Native depends on similarity of termination assumes that ^JJrer there is only substance, and so on, neither refutation ver r nor proof mil be possible, either absolutely or relatively, to the answerer ; whereas, if they do make these assumptions, they will be possible relatively to the answerer, but not absolutely ; for they have not seeured a statement which has a single meaning but only one which appears to be such, and only from a particular person.

IX . Without a knowledge of everything which [Note (y). A exists we ought not to try and grasp the various ways ^ p le0fcf aii in which the refutation of those who are refuted is brought about. This, however, is not the function sibie, be- of any art ; for the sciences are possibly infinite, and a?e inanfte so clearly demonstrations are also infinite. Now in number.] there are true as well as false refutations ; for wherever demonstration is possible, it is possible also to refute him who maintains the contradictory of the truth ; for example, if a man maintains that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its sides, one should refute him by proving that it is incommensurate. So we shall need to have scientific knowledge of everything ; for some refutations will depend on the principles of geometry and their conclusions, others on those of medicine, and others on those of the other sciences. Moreover, false refutations also are among things which are infinite ; for every art has a false proof peculiar to it, geometry a geometrical proof and medicine a medical proof. By4 peculiar to an art * I mean 4 in accordance with the principles of that art.* It is clear, then, that we need not grasp the commonplaces of all refutations

51

napa tt]v StaAcktiktjv XrjnTeov tovs Tonovs* ovroi yap kolvoI 7rpos anaoav rexvrjv Kal Svvafiiv. Kal tov fiev Ka0y eKaaTrjv emorrifirfv eXeyxov tov cm- cTTrjfiovos eoTi Oecopeiv, ctTc firj tov (f>alveTai ei t OTL, Sta Ti COTr TOV S C/C Ttov KOlVtOV Kal VTTO

40 firjhefilav Texyrjv tcov SiaXeKTiKtov. el yap exofiev aivofievovs 8c oVa>ow aAAa t o i s toioIoSc* aopiora yap eonv, eav tls OKonfj nap* onooa alvovrat Tot? tvxovolv. wore (f>avepov otl tov SiaXeKTiKov eon t o 8vvao9ai XafieTv nap o a a ylverai Sta tcov /cotvah' t) div eXeyxos fj aivo~

10 fievos cAcy^os*, /cat 77 StaAc/CTt/co? t) (fyaivofievos StaAcktlkos f) neipaoTLKos.

X . Ou/c cart Sc 8iaopa tcjv Xoytov fjv Xeyovol TLves, to elvaL tovs fiev npos Tovvofia Xoyovs, ctepovs 8c 7rpo? ttjv 8iavoiav aT0770V yap to vno-

16 XafipavcLV dXXovs fiev etvai npos Tovvofia Xoyovs, erepovs Sc 7r/>o? rqv Siavoiav, aAA o v tovs* a v rov s . Tt yap eoTi to firj npos ttjv Siavoiav aAA fj orav fiTf XPVTat T(p ovofiaTt, c

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ix-x

but only those which concern dialectic ; for these are common to every art and faculty. And it is the function of the scientific man to examine the refutation [Note (). which is peculiar to each science and see whether it is tions of the apparent only and not real, or, if it is real, why it is so ; ^ e^ ^clan whereas it is the function of dialecticians to examine a scientist refutation which depends on common principles which j^hed.] do not fall under any one art. For if we know the sources of generally accepted proofs about any particular subject, we know also the sources of the refutations ; for a refutation is a proof of a contradictory, and so one or two proofs of a contradictory make up a refutation. W e know, then, the various sources of all such proofs, and, knowing these, we also know their solutions ; for the objections to these are the solutions. W e also know' the various sources of apparent refutations apparent, that is, not to everyone but only to a certain kind of mind ; for it w ould be an endless task to examine the various ways in which they are apparent to the man in the street. It is, therefore, clear that it is the function of the dialectician to be able to grasp the various ways in which, on the basis of common principles, a real or apparent refutation, that is, dialectical or apparently dialectical or part of an examination, is brought about.

X . No real distinction, such as some people p ro -[Note (). pose, exists betwreen arguments used against the wrord Unctions?/8 and those used against the thought; for it is absurd

0 ipOJTWfieVOS eh(X)KV; TO 8* CLVTO TOVTO OTl K al

7Tpos T ovvofia. to he npos rr)v h ia v o ia v , ot av *20 4> ehcoKV hiavor)8eis, el hf)1 nXeia) orjfiaivovros

t o v ovofiaros o io ito ev or)f ia w eiv Kal o epcorcov Kal o epcoTcofievos, olov locos t o ov rj t o ev noXXa orjfiaivei, aAAa Kal o anoKpivofievos Kal o epcorwv2 ev olofievos etvai r)pd)rr)oe) Kal eonv o A dyos o t i ev navra, oSros npos Tovvofia c o tai fj npos t t )v

25 hiavoiav to v epcorcofievov hieiXeyfievos; i he ye t i s noXXa oierai or)fiaiveiv, hrjXov o t i ov npos rr)V hiavoiav. npwrov fiev yap nepl to v s to io v to v s eorl Aoyoi;? to npos rovvofia Kal npos rf)v hiavoiav0 0 0 1 nX eiw o rffiaiv o v o iv , e t r a n e p l o v n v o v v i o r i v

ov y a p ev tw Xoycp e o r l to n p o s t r)v h ia v o ia v e tv a i,

30 aAA ev to ) to v anoK pivofievov ex ^iv no)S n p o s r a

h eh o fiev a. e t r a n p o s ro v v o fia n a v r a s e v h e \e T a i

a v r o v s e tv a i. t o y a p n p o s ro v v o fia t o fir) n p o s

Tr)v h ia v o ia v e tv a i e o n v e v r a v d a . e l y a p fir) n a m e s ,

e o o v r a i Tives e re p o i ovT n p o s ro v v o fia o v re n p o s

tr jv h ia v o ia v o i he aoi n a v r a s , K al h ia ip o v v ra i

35 fj n p o s ro v v o fia fj n p o s rr)v h ia v o ia v e tv a i n a v r a s ,

aAAo v s S oi?. aAAa fif)v o o o i ovX X oyiofioi e lo i

n a p a r o nX eovaxcos, r o v r w v e lo i r iv e s o l n a p a

1 Omitting t i s after el S17.* Omitting Zyvwv after epwrwv as a gloss.

ARISTOTLE170 b

54

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x

was being questioned when he made the concession ? And this is equivalent to using it against the word ; whereas to use it against the thought is to apply it to the sense about which the man was thinking when he made the concession. If, then, when the word has more than one meaning, both the questioner and the man questioned were to think that it had only one meaning as, for example, unity * and * being * have several meanings but both the answerer answers and the questioner puts his question on the supposition that there is only one meaning and that the argument is that all things are one will the argument have been directed against the word and not rather against the thought of the man questioned ? If, on the contrary, one of them thinks that the word has several meanings, obviously the argument is not directed against the thought. For application to the word and application to the thought belong primarily to arguments which signify several things ambiguously, but, secondarily, to any argument whatsoever ; for the application to the thought does not depend on the argument but on a certain attitude of mind in the answerer towards what has been conceded. Next, it is possible for all arguments to be applied to the word ; for in the case under discussion * to be applied to the word * means * not to be applied to the thought/ For if all are not applied to the word or the thought, there will be a third class not applied to either ; but they declare that the classification is exhaustive and divide them into those applied to the word and those applied to the thought, and there is no other class. But, as a matter of fact, reasonings dependent on the word are amongst those dependent on a multiplicity of meanings. For it is an

55

rovvofia . aroncos fiev yap Kal eiprjrai ro napa rovvofia aval navras rovs Trapa rrjv Xetjiv aAA*

ofiv eloi rives napaXoyiojiol ov rep rov airoKpivo-

fievov npos rovrovs XLV ncos, aAAa ra> roiovSl 40 ipcbrrjfia rov Xoyov avrov exiv> o nXeico orjjiaivei.

171 wOAa>? re aronov ro nepl eXeyxov 8iaXeyeoOai, aAAa fifj 7rporepov nepl ovXXoyiofiov o yap eXeyxos ovXXoyiofios eon v, diore xpV faivdfievos ovXXoyiofios a vn


absurd statement that 4 dependent on the name * describes all arguments connected with language.The truth is that there are some false arguments which do not depend on a particular attitude of mind on the part of the answerer towards them but are due to the fact that the argument itself involves the kind of question which ean bear more than one meaning.

It is quite absurd to diseuss refutation without (Refutation previously discussing proof; for refutation is a proof, and Proof^ and so we ought to diseuss proof before discussing false refutation ; for such refutation is an apparent proof of a contradiction. Therefore the cause of falsity will lie either in the proof or in the contradiction (for the contradiction must be added), but sometimes in both, if there be a merely apparent refutation. In the argument that the silent speaks/ the refutation lies in the contradiction, not in the proof; in the argument that * a man ean give away what he has not g o t / it lies in both ; in the argument that 4 Homers poetry is a figure * because it forms a cycle/ it lies in the proof. The argument that errs in neither respect is a true proof.

But to resume from the point whence the argument digressed, Are mathematical arguments always applied to the thought or not ? If anyone thinks that the term triangle has several meanings and has granted it in a sense other than a figure which he has proved to contain two right angles, has the questioner reasoned against the answerers thought or not ?

Further, if the name has several meanings but the answerer does not think or imagine that this is so,

170 b 40.57

firjh* oierai, na>s oStos ov npos rrjv hiavoiav Stet- Ae/CTat; f j nebs Set epcorav nXrjv StSovat hialpeoiv,

20 etr ipcorrjoei1 tis et e a rt oiycovra Xeyeiv f j ov, f jv \ t * *t t / ^ /eart fiev cos ov, eon o cos vat; et ot) tis ootTj firfhaficbs, o Se hiaXexOeirj, ap o i 7rpos rrjv hiavoiav StetAe/crat; /catrot o Aoyos* So/cet tcuv 7rapa tou- vofia etvat. ovk apa eart yevos* rt Aoycov to npos rrjv hiavoiav. aAA* oi /xev 77/009 rovvofia eloi* /cat

25 roiovroi ov navres, ovx on oi eXeyxoi, aAA ovS* ot aivofivoi eXeyxoi. etcxt yap Kal firj napa rrjv Aetv (fraivofievoi eXeyxoi, oJov ot 7rapa to ovfi- fieprjKos Kal erepoi.

E t Se/ T t s a t o t hiaipeiv, o n Xeyco S e a t y o u v r a

Xeyeiv T a fiev cbhl ra S a > S t , a A A a rovro y* eorl 30 npcorov fiev aronov, ro a^iovv (eviore yap ov S o / c e t

t o ipcorcbfievov noXXa%a)S e ^ e t v , a S v v a T o v S e

S t a t p e t v o firj oierai)' eneira ro S t S a a / c e t v ri a A A 0 e a T a t ; avepov yap noirjoei cos e ^ e t t o )) / r > s / //) f \ o / v\

e o K e f i f i e v c o f i r j r e i o o n f i r j u v n o A a f i p a v o v n o n aA -

Aojs' A e'yerat. eVet /cat ev Tots* f i f j h m X o i s r i K c o X v e i

3 5 t o v t o n a O e i v ; a p a l o a i at f j i o v a h e s r a i s h v a o i v e v

r o i s r e r r a p o i v ; e l o i Se SvaSes* at f i e v c b h l e v o v o a i

at Se coSt. /cat a p a t o ) v e v a v r l c o v f i l a e m o r r j f i r j f j

o v ; e o n S e v a v r l a r a f i e v y v c o o r a r a S* a y v c o o r a .

1 Reading c?r* epwrrjaei for ttr* cpwrrjoeie,

ARISTOTLE171a

58


has not the questioner reasoned against his thought ? Or how else must the question be asked except by offering a distinction ? In which case one will ask,1 Is it or is it not possible for a man to speak when silent, or is the answer in one sense No/* in another Yes ? * But if the answerer were to refuse to grant the possibility in any sense and the questioner were to argue that it is possible, has he not argued against the thought of his opponent ? Yet the argument is generally regarded as among those connected with the name ; there is not, therefore, any class of argument which is directed against the thought. Some arguments are directed against the name, and such arguments are not all of them even apparent refutations, still less true refutations. For there are also apparent refutations which are not connected with language, for example, amongst others, those connected with accident.

But if one claims to make distinctions, saying, By the silent speaking * I mean sometimes one thing and sometimes another,* this claim is, in the first place, absurd (for sometimes the question does not seem to involve any ambiguity, and it is impossible to make a distinction where no ambiguity is suspccted) ; and, secondly, what else will didactic argument be but this ? For it will make clear the position to one who neither has considered nor knows nor conceives that a second meaning is possible. For why should not the same proccss be used where there is no double meaning ? Are the units in four equal to the twos ? Bear in mind that the twos are contained in one sense in one way and in another sense in another way.* Again, Is the -knowledge of contraries one or not ? Notice that some contraries

59

171 b door* eoiKev ay v o eiv o t o v t o aijicov o t l erep o v t o 8i8a o K e iv t o v 8 ia X e y e o 0 a i9 /cat o t l Set r o v fiev S iS ao K o v ra firj epcorav aAA* a v ro v 8rjXa iro ieiv , ro v S ep co rav .

X I . vE rt to avai fj a7Toavai aiovv ov 8c t - /c iw r o ? ta r iv, aAAa veipav X afifiavovros. ff yap

5 TTeipaoriKTf e o n StaAe/CTt/a? rts* /cat Oecopei ov rov el8ora aAAa r o v ay i'oouvT a /cat 7rpoo7TOiovfievov.o fiev ofiv Kara t o irpayfia Oecopcov r a KOiva Sta - Ae/crt/cos, o Sc tovto c/>aivofievcos 7toicov ooioriKos* Kal ovXXoyiofios epioriK os Kal ooioriKos e o n v els /xcv o aivofievos ovX X oyiofios , 7rcpt cov 17 S ta -

10 AeKTLKTj TreipaoTLKTj e o n , Kav aXrjdes t o ov finepaofia r o v yap Sta r i aTrarTfriKos e a n m Kal o oo i firj

ovres Kara rrjv e /ca o ro v fieOoSov rrapaXoyiofiol 8okovoiv etvai Kara ttjv re^yrfv. ra yap \ftev8oypa- r)fiara ovk epioriK a (Kara yap r a w to rrjv reyyrjv ot irapaX oyiofioi), ovSc y et r i e o n if*ev8oypdrffia

15 Trepl dXrjdeSy olov t o eIrnroKparovs fj o r erp a y to - viofios o Sta tcov firfvioKojv. aAA* cos B pvocov irerpaycovi^e rov kvkXov , ct /cat rerpaycovi^erai o kvkXos, aAA o n ov Kara t o jrpayfia , Sta t o v to oocfrioriKos. cScttc o tc 7Tc/3t tcDvSc cf>aiv6fievos ovXXoyiofios e p io riK o s X oyos, Kal o K a ra t o ir p a y fia

a On the method of squaring the circle by means of hinnies and those employee! by Hippocrates and Bryson see Ivor Thomas, Greek Mathematical HorA** (Loeb Classical Library), vol. I, pp. 234-253, 310-313 (Hippocrates); 314- 317 (Bryson); and E. Poste, Soph, El. pp. 245 ff.60

ARISTOTLE

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x-xi

are knowable, others are not.* Thus the man who (&) Didactic makes this elaim seems not to know that didactic is *ai argu- one thing and dialectic another, and that the man ment* who employs didaetie should not ask questions but himself make things clear, while the dialeetieian asks questions.

X I. Further, to demand that the answerer should (^Exarai- either affirm or deny is not the function of one who contentious is displaying something but of one who is making dialectical* an examination. For the art of examination is a argument, kind of dialectic and has in view not the man who knows but the man who is ignorant and pretends to know. The man, then, who views general principles in the light of the particular case is a dialectician, while he who only apparently does this is a sophist. Now one form of contentious and sophistic reasoning is reasoning which is only apparent, with whieh dialectic deals as a method of examination, even though the conclusion be true ; for it is deceptive in the matter of cause. Then there are those false reasonings which do not aeeord with the method of inquiry peculiar to the subject yet seem to aeeord with the art concerned. For false geometrical figures are not contentious (for the resultant fallacies aeeord with the subject-matter of the art), and the same is the ease with any false figure illustrating something which is true, for example, Hippocrates figure or the squaring of the cirele by means of lunules. On the other hand, Brysons method of squaring the circle, even though this be successful, is nevertheless sophistieal, beeause it does not aeeord with the sub- jeet-matter concerned. And so any merely apparent reasoning on these topics is a eontentious argument, and any reasoning whieh merely appears to accord

61

171 b20 aivojievos ovXXoyiofios 9 Kav fj ovXXoyiofios, epi-

otikos Xoyos * aivofievos yap eon Kara to rrpayfia, wot arrarrjriKOS Kal aSiKos. worrep yap rj ev aywvi aSiKia elSos ti e^et Kal eon v aSiKOfiaxia t i ? , ovtws ev avnXoyia aStfco/xa^ta rj epioriKrj e o n v KL T yap ol ttovtws viKav rrpoaipovfievoi

25 iravrwv arrrovrai Kal evravOa ol epioriKoi. ol fiev ovv rrjs viktjs airrjs X-Plv toiovtoi epioriKoi av- Opwrroi Kal (fxAepihes Bokovoiv etvai, ol Se 8orjs yapiv trjs els XPVf1 UTiofiov ooioriKor rj yap aoiGTiKTf eon v, worrep elrrofiev, xPr)liaTLariKV tis anto oolas aivofievrjs, 8 io aivofievrjs arro -

30 8elews elevrai. Kal rwv Xoywv rwv avrwv fiev eloiv ol iXepiSes Kal ooiorai, aAA ov twv avrwv eveKev. Kal Aoyos* o avros fiev eorai ooioriKos Kal epiGTiKoSy aAA ov Kara ravrov, aAA* fj fiev viktjs aivofievrjs, epioriKoss fj 8e oolas, ooio- tikos' Kal yap rj ooos rw yewfierprj.* aAA* o fiev ovk epioriKos, o n K rwv apx&v Kal

172 a ovjnrepaofiarwv twv into rrjv rexvrjv \jjev8oypaer t < ' ? \ ' V \ ff >o o V7ro rrjv oiaAeKriKrjv rrepi fiev raAAa oti epi-

1 Reading tu> hiaXcKriKip with Wallies for 8iaXctcriicr}.2 Reading rw yeajfierpr) with Poste for rov yewfierprjv.

ARISTOTLE

62165 a 22.

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi

with the subject-matter, even though it be genuine reasoning, is contentious argument; for it only apparently accords with the subject-matter and so is deceptive and unfair. For just as unfairness in an athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an unfair kind of fighting in argument; for in the former case those who are bent on victory at all costs stick at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely M Con- to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious sophistical and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a argument, reputation which will help them to make money are regarded as sophistical. For, as we have said, the art of the sophist is a money-making art which trades on apparent wisdom, and so sophists aim at apparent proof. Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same arguments, but not for the same reasons ; and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious but not from the same point of view. If the semblance of victory is the motive, it is contentious ; if the semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical : for sophistry is an appearance of wisdom without the reality. The () Further contentious arguer bears much the same relation to b ^ eenSnS the dialectician as the draw er of false geometrical andtea-US figures bears to the geometrician ; for he reasons lectical falsely on the same basis as the dialectician, while "S '11611** the drawer of false figures argues on the same basis as the true geometrician. But the latter is not a contentious reasoner, because he constructs his false figure on the principles and conclusions winch come under the art of geometry, whereas the former, arguing on principles which come under dialectic, will clearly be contentious on the other subjects.

63

OTiKOS ecrrai SrjXov. otov o rerpaywvtafios o fiev Sid TCOV flTJVlOKCOV OVK eplOTlKOS, o Se Bpvacovos ipiGTLKOS* /cat TOV /XCV OU/C COTt jLtCTCVCy/CCtV aAA

5 *>) 7TpOS* yix)flTplaV fJLOVOV Sta TO C/C TOJV tSlOJV etvai apx&v, tov S c Trpos* noAAovs, ocrot /x'ty taaat t o SvvaTov iv c/caoraj /cat t o aSuvarov dpfiooei yap. 77 cos1 'Avtk/mjov eVcTpaycuvtfev. ^ ct t i ? p/q alrj fie At tov etvai anto heinvov nepinareiv Sta t o v Ztfvcovos Aoyov, oi/c larpiKos koivos yap- ct /xev

10 oiJv navrrj ofJbolcug efyev o ipiOTiKos npos tov Sta- Acktikov tco i]sevhoypd(f>cp npos tov yecofieTprjv, ovk av rjv nepi e/cetvouv ipioTiKos. vvv S ou/c c o t i v o SiaAeKTiKos nepl yevos ti cbpiofjievov, ouSc Sct/c- tikos ovSevos, ovSe toiovtos otos o KaOoAov, ovre yap car tv anavra iv evl tivi yevei, ovre el eirj, otov

15 t c vno Tas avTas dpx&s etvai Ta ovra. c o c t t* ov- Sc/xta Texyr\ tcov Setkvvovocov Tiva vaiv epcoTT}- TiKTj ecrriv ot; yap eijecrnv onoTepovovv tcov fiopicov Sovvar ovAAoyiofjios yap ov ytvcTat i ajxcf>oiv, rj Sc StaAeKTiKrj ipcoTrjTiKrj iativ. el S eSet/cvvev, ct /cat /Lti7 navra, aAAa Ta yc npcoTa Kal Tas olKeias

2 0 apxeis ovk av ^ p c u T a . /z/q S i S o v t o s 1 yap ov/c av c t i ct^cv e (ov CTt StaAc^CTat TTpos* ttjv evcrracriv. rj

1 Bekkers SiSovras is a misprint for SiSovro?.

B See PAys. 185 a 17; Ivor Thomas, op. ci7. pp. 310-317.6 That motion is impossible ; see Phys. 239 b 10 ff.

ARISTOTLE172 k

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ON SOPHISTICAL

Documents

Aristotle - On Sophistical Refutations; On Coming to Be and Passing Away; On the Cosmos (Greek - English)