IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

A R L E N E M . C A R E L L A ,P l a i n t i f f

- a g a i n s t -

C H A R L E S E . C O L L I N S , I I I ,A p p e l l a n t

E L I N O R S . K I N G ,A p p e l l a n t .

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * « r - AGEORGE A. RAY, CferkA L B A N Y

S T A T E O F N E W Y O R K )C O U N T Y O F R E N S S E L A E R ) s s . :

ELINOR S. KING, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1 . T h a t I a m t h e A p p e l l a n t i n t h i s m a t t e r a n d a s s u c h I a m

fu l ly fami l iar wi th the facts and c i rcumstances here in .2 . Tha t on November 26 , 1996 Ch ie f Judge Jud i th Kaye den ied

my right and Mr. Collins' right to appeal pursuant to New YorkS t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e V I , S 3 [ b ] [ l ] a n d C P L R § 5 6 0 1

[b][ l ] [2] to the New York State Court of Appeals and for

permission to appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals

pursuant to the New York State Constitut ion, Art icle VI, § 3

[b][6] and CPLR § 5602 [a][l][ i ] for those issues which are basedu p o n a q u e s t i o n o f l a w ( E x h i b i t 1 ) .

3 . T h a t n e i t h e r t h e N e w Y o r k S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h e

C i v i l P r a c t i c e L a w a n d r u l e s r e q u i r e s a " s u b s t a n t i a l "

const i tut ional quest ion to be ra ised. Certa in ly a person beingd e n i e d h i s m o s t b a s i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a p u b l i c t r i a l , a

j u r y t r i a l , r i gh t aga ins t se l f - i nc r im ina t i on and a cou r t o f p rope r

96 -CV-2020

d rhREQUEST TOF I L E A P P E A L

U. S. DISTRICT COURTA F F I D A V I T O P N . Y -

O R I G I N A L F I L E D

KCZo 1S96

jur isdict ion are certainly substant ial const i tut ional r ights.4 . Appe l l an t has ra i sed the i ssues tha t :

a) the fami ly Court lacked both personal and subjectmat ter ju r isd ic t ion to depr ive her o f her rea l p roper ty

b) that appel lant has been for the past ten (10) years

deprived of possession of her real property and continues tobe deprived of her real property based upon Family Courto r d e r s t h a t t h e C o u r t h a d n o a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e i n a c l o s e d

c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g .

c ) t ha t t he f am i l y cou r t o rde rs con t i nue to dep r i veher of possession of her real property and while packing

personal jur isdict ion over her and subject matter

j u r i s d i c t i o n .5 . U.S. D is t r i c t Cour t Judge McCurn in h is MEMORANDUM-

DECISION AND ORDER dated November 29, 1991 (Exhibit 2) held that

Mrs King had the right to appeal Judge James' Decision and order

a s o n e a g g r i e v e d b y t h e o r d e r s t a t i n g :

. T h a t i s s o b e c a u s e e v e n t h o u g h p l a i n t i f f w a s n o t aparty to those various state court proceedings, she did havestanding to appeal as one "aggrieved by the judgments whicha f f e c t e d h e r p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . T h e g e n e r a l r u l e u n d e r N e wYork l aw i s t ha t on l y an "agg r i eved pa r t y " may appea l . SeeN .Y. C i v. P rac . L . & R . § 5511 (McK inney 1978 ) . Tha t s t a tu tehas been ex tens i ve l y i n t e rp re ted by New Yo rk cou r t s , howeve r,under § 5511 a non-party may appeal when that party may bebound by a judgment if he or she does not take affirmativea c t i o n i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t h i s o r h e r r i g h t s .A u e r b a c h v . B e n n e t t , 6 4 A . D . 9 8 , 4 0 8 N . Y. S . 2 d 8 3 ( 2 n d D e p ' t .1978) , mod 'd on o ther g rounds , 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d9 2 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) S i m i l a r l y , i n T r i a n g l e P a c i fi c B l d g .Produc ts Corp . v. Nat . Bank , 62 A .D.2d 1017, 404 N.Y.S.2d 121( 2 n d D e p ' t . 1 9 7 8 ) , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t w h e r e a t u r n o v e r o r d e rwould consume an ent i re bank account , the person who c la imedan in teres t in the account and who was presumpt ive owner o fone -ha l f o f t he accoun t p roceeds was "agg r i eved " by t he o rde rand had s tand ing to appeal there f rom, even though she was notn a m e d i n t h e s p e c i a l p r o c e e d i n g . I d . a t , 4 0 4 N . Y. S . 2 d^t 122. Surely, plaintiff K^ng w^s aggrieved by the statecourt decisions p^ptaining to i:lie residency in which she has

a p a r t i a l o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t . P l a i n t i f f K i n g w a s p a r t i c u l a r l ya g g r i e v e d b y t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g M s C a r e l l a " e x c l u s i v epossession" of property in which she [Ms. King] has a partialownersh ip in te res t . Thus as one aggr ieved by such an adverseorder, Ms . K ing cou ld have appea led .

6 . J u d g e A u s t i n i n h i s O r d e r o f D e c e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 4 c o n t i n u e d

the o rder o f Judge James g iv ing Ms Care l la possess ion o f the non-

mar i t a l rea l p rope r t y owned by the Ms K ing .

7 . M s K i n g a p p e a l e d J u d g e A u s t i n ' s O r d e r a s i t c o n t i n u e s

t h e o r d e r o f J u d g e J a m e s a n d t h e s t a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t r e f u s e d t o

a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r J u d g e J a m e s h a d t h e r i g h t t o a w a r d M s

C a r e l l a p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e n o n - m a r i t a l r e a l p r o p e r t y w h i l e l a c k i n g

p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a p p e l l a n t .

WHEREFORE, your deponen t , E l ino r S . K ing , respec t fu l l y

r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s C o u r t a l l o w h e r a n d C h a r l e s E . C o l l i n s , I I I t ofi l e A p p e a l s w i t h t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t f r o m t h e O r d e r d a t e d

November 26, 1996 o f Ch ie f Judge Jud i th Kaye deny ing them the i r

r i g h t t o a p p e a l a n d r e f u s i n g t o g r a n t t h e m p e r m i s s i o n t o a p p e a l

a n d f o r s u c h o t h e r , d i f f e r e n t a n d f u r t h e r r e l i e f a s t h i s C o u r t m a y

deem jus t and p roper.

, tL L ( A ^ / / i C/E l i n o r S . K i n g1 0 8 B r u n s w i c k R o a dT r o y, N e w Yo r k 1 2 1 8 0( 5 1 8 ) 2 7 4 - 1 4 1 8

S w o r n t o b e f o r e m e t h i s2 6 t h d a y o f D e c e m b e r , 1 9 9 6 .

N O T A R Y P U B L I C

DORIS G. LEIGHNotary Public. State of New Yortc

Qualified In Albany CountyReg. No. 01LE5056038

Commission Expires L? •

3tatt of HetB gork,Court of Appeals

©rtscnt,

At a session of the Court, held at Court ofAppeals Hall in the City of Albanyo n t h e d a yo f N Q y e m b e r 1 9 9 6

HON. JUDITH S. KAYE, ChieJ Jwdge, jyresiding.

M o . N o . 1 0 0 1I n t h e M a t t e r o f A r l e n e M .C a r e l l a ,

R e s p o n d e n t ,V .

C h a r l e s E . C o l l i n s , I I I ,A p p e l l a n t ,

E l i n o r S . K i n g ,A p p e l l a n t .

T h e a p p e l l a n t s h a v i n g fi l e d n o t i c e s o f a p p e a l i n t h e

a b o v e t i t l e a n d m o t i o n s f o r l e a v e t o a p p e a l t o t h e C o u r t o f

A p p e a l s i n t h e a b o v e c a u s e a n d p a p e r s h a v i n g b e e n s u b m i t t e d

t h e r e o n a n d d u e d e l i b e r a t i o n h a v i n g b e e n t h e r e u p o n h a d , i t i s

O R D E R E D , o n t h e C o u r t ' s o w n m o t i o n , t h a t t h e a p p e a l s

b y a p p e l l a n t s C o l l i n s a n d K i n g b e a n d t h e s a m e h e r e b y a r e

d i s m i s s e d , w i t h o u t c o s t s , u p o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t n o s u b s t a n t i a l

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n i s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d ; a n d i t i s

O R D E R E D , t h a t t h e s a i d m o t i o n s f o r l e a v e t o a p p e a l

b y a p p e l l a n t s C o l l i n s a n d K i n g b e a n d t h e s a m e h e r e b y a r e

d e n i e d .

A/.S t u a r t M . C o h e n

C l e r k o f t h e C o u r t

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

P l a i n t i f f ,

9 1 - C V - 9 5 2

L . F O S T E R J A M E S , e t a l . ,

D e f e n d a n t s

A P P E A R A N C E S ;

E L I N O R S . K I N GP l a i n t i f f , P r o S e1 0 8 B r u n s w i c k R o a dT r o y , N Y 1 2 1 8 0

H O N . R O B E R T A B R A M SA t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o f t h e

S t a t e o f N e w Y o r kA t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t sT h e C a p i t o lA l b a n y, N Y 1 2 2 2 4

O F C O U N S E L ;

' > J j I

MARY ELLEN CLERKINA s s t . A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l

N E A L P. M c C U R N , C . J .

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I n t r o d u c t i o n

P l a i n t i f f E l i n o r K i n g i s p r o c e e d i n g p a g e

complaint, with attached exhibits totalling approximately 200additional"pages, plaintiff alleges 29 causes of action' and is

^ Many of those so-called "causes of action" clearly arenot- they are simply statements of the alleged facts. Forexample? in her "third cause of action," plaintiff recites fronselected portions of her son's separation agreement and divorce'decree. Complaint at 5, KH 21 and 23. Plaintiff then goes on tostate that she and her husband are the owners of certain realproperty. Id. at 24-25. Those are the only allegations inthat purported "cause of action." Plaintiff does not even

! Z -

s e e k i n g $ 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 i n d a m a g e s a g a i n s t s i x d e f e n d a n t s .

D u r i n g t h e r e l e v a n t t i m e f r a m e , fi v e o f t h o s e d e f e n d a n t s w e r e

j u d g e s i n t h e N e w Yo r k S t a t e c o u r t s y s t e m , a n d o n e w a s a f a m i l y

c o u r t h e a r i n g e x a m i n e r . I t i s e x t r e m e l y d i f fi c u l t , i f n o t

i m p o s s i b l e , t o d i s c e r n t h e e x a c t n a t u r e o f t h e s e n u m e r o u s c l a i m s .

T h e c o m p l a i n t d o e s e x p r e s s l y s t a t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s

c l a i m i n g a v i o l a t i o n o f h e r d u e p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n

r i g h t s . C o m p l a i n t a t ^ 1 4 . I n a d d i t i o n , a l t h o u g h n o t e x p l i c i t l y

s t a t e d , i t c e r t a i n l y m a y b e i n f e r r e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s a l l e g i n g a

c o n s p i r a c y t o d e p r i v e h e r o f h e r p r o p e r t y u n d e r 4 2 U . S . C , § 1 9 8 3 .

S e e i d . a t 5 1 3 .

B e f o r e a n s w e r i n g , d e f e n d a n t s h a v e m o v e d t o d i s m i s s t h e

c o m p l a i n t o n fi v e s e p a r a t e g r o u n d s ; ( 1 ) l a c k o f s u b j e c t m a t t e r

j u r i s d i c t i o n ; ( 2 ) f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a c l a i m ; ( 3 ) s t a t u t e o f

l im i ta t ions ; (4 ) e leven th amendment immun i ty ; and (5 ) abso lu te

i m m u n i t y . I n a d d i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d

a b s t a i n d u e t o a n o n g o i n g s t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g . L a s t l y ,

d e f e n d a n t s a r e s e e k i n g s a n c t i o n s , a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s a n d c o s t s . A s

w i l l b e s e e n , p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t i s s u b j e c t t o d i s m i s s a l o n

a n y n u m b e r o f t h e s e v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t e t h e o r i e s .

Backaround^

a t t e m p t t o a s s e r t a n y l e g a l c l a i m b a s e d u p o n a n y o f t h o s e f a c t u a la l l e g a t i o n s .

^ Defendants* recitation of the facts was rather terse ando f l i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e c o u r t . T h e c o m p l a i n t i t s e l f i s n o th e l p f u l i n o u t l i n i n g t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s . S o , t h e c o u r t w a s l e f tw i th the task o f recons t ruc t i ng the fac tua l backg round andp r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y o f t h i s c a s e f r o m t h e n u m e r o u s e x h i b i t sa t t a c h e d t o t h e c o m p l a i n t . T h o s e e x h i b i t s c o n s i s t o f , f o r t h e

I T h i s l a w s u i t h a s i t s o r i g i n s i n t h e d i v o r c e o f p l a i n t i f f ' sI

son, Charles E. Col l ins, I I I , f rom Arlene Carel la. DivorceI^ proceedings began some time in 1980 when Mr. Collins and Ms.i

i Care l la en tered in to a separa t ion agreement . Mr. Co l l ins and Ms.' Carella were legally divorced on August 3, 1981. Thereafter, Mr.

i 'C o l l i n s a n d M s . C a r e l l a w e r e i n v o l v e d i n a n u m b e r o f s t a t e c o u r t

i• •

proceedings, resulting in a host of orders, decisions, and

judgments. For example, Mr. Collins brought an action to modifyy the judgment of divorce, seeking custody of their three children.a

I n add i t i on , ove r t he yea rs Ms . Ca re l l a b rough t seve ra l v i o l a t i on

pet i t ions against Mr. Col l ins for his fai lure to comply withc o u r t o r d e r e d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s .

A l though the spec i fics o f t hose va r ious p roceed ings a re no t

necessary to an understanding of this case, one order is ofI

p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i fi c a n c e . S e v e r a l y e a r s a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e w a s

fi n a l , i n 1 9 8 4 , w i t h t h e h e l p o f p l a i n t i f f a n d h e r h u s b a n d , M r .I j

Col l ins bought a house in Saratoga County and turned possession

o v e r t o h i s e x - w i f e t o r e s i d e i n w i t h t h e i r t h r e e c h i l d r e n .

Complaint, Ex. 27 thereto at 4. Ms. Carella and the children1

h a v e c o n t i n u e d t o r e s i d e t h e r e s i n c e t h a t t i m e . O n A p r i l 2 2 ,

198 6, defendant James, a New York State Family Court Judge,

g ran ted Ms . Ca re l l a " exc l us i ve possess ion " o f t ha t p rope r t y.

i l I d . , E x . 1 2 t h e r e t o a t 5 , ^ 1 . T h e r e a f t e r o n N o v e m b e r 6 , 1 9 8 6 ,i

M r . C o l l i n s t r a n s f e r r e d h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y t o

J ?

m o s t p a r t , c o p i e s o f o r d e r s a n d p o r t i o n s o f t r a n s c r i p t s i nv a r i o u s s t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s .

3

plaint i ff . Id. , Ex. 6 thereto. As a resul t of that t ransfer,plaintiff and her husband became the sole owners of the subjectp r o p e r t y. T h e g i s t o f p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t h e r e i n s e e m s t o b ethat the effect of that order by defendant James was to deprive

plaintiff of her property without due process of law.On approximately July 13, 1989, plaintiff and her husband

commenced a real property proceeding in state court, essentiallyseeking to evict Ms. Carella from the house. Id., Ex. 40thereto. That action has been proceeding along, albeit slowly.In February, 1990, defendant Plumadore, a New York State SupremeCourt Justice, denied the motion by plaintiff and her husband for

summary judgment therein. Id., Ex. 47 thereto. The recordbefore this court does not establish what has transpired sincethen, except that on January 23, 1991, the court noted that basedupon his answer, Mr. Collins was no longer a party to thataction. Id., Ex. 55 thereto. What is clear, however, is thatthat state court action is still pending.

Plaintiff and her family are no strangers to litigation, infact, in 1990, plaintiff's son attempted to remove the familycourt proceeding to federal court. Mr. Collins was unsuccessfulin that effort; Judge Howard G. Munson remanded the matter backto state court. Mr. Collins then eventually commenced three

separate actions in federal court, all assigned to Judge ThomasMcAvoy. Judge McAvoy dismissed all three actions and awardedsanctions against Mr. Collins in one of the suits, finding thathe had "engaged in vexatious and baseless litigation fully aware

4

I

I t h a t h i s c l a i m s a r e d e s t i n e d t o f a i l . " A f fi d a v i t o f M a r y E l l e nC l e r k i n ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1 9 9 1 ) , E x . A t h e r e t o a t 4 . A s p r e v i o u s l y

■ m e n t i o n e d , p l a i n t i f f i s a p a r t y t o t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y s t a t e c o u r ti

a c t i o n ; b u t s h e w a s n o t a p a r t y t o a n y o f t h e p r e v i o u s f e d e r a l

c o u r t c a s e s .

D i s c u s s i o n

I I . Sub jec t Mat te r Ju r i sd ic t ion

A l though no t the fi rs t a rgumen t ra i sed by de fendan ts , t he

c o u r t w i l l a d d r e s s l a c k o f s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n a t t h e

ou t se t , because i f de fendan t s a re co r rec t i n t ha t r ega rd , t he

c o u r t n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e o t h e r r e a s o n s f o r d i s m i s s a l a d v a n c e d

b y t h e m .

The complaint is very difficult to understand, but i t appears-

that plainti ff is challenging a number of prior orders and

decisions made in various state court proceedings, all of which

pe r ta i n t o t he d i vo rce o f he r son . De fendan ts con tend , unde r

what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that,

t h i s c o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o r e v i e w t h o s e s t a t e c o u r t

d e c i s i o n s . I n R o o k e r v. F i d e l i t v Tr u s t C o . . 2 6 3 U . S . 4 1 3 , 4 1 5 -

16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), the Supreme Court

he ld that an appeal through the s tate cour ts to the Supreme Cour t

of the United States constituted the exclusive procedure by which

the cha l lenged s ta te cour t judgment might be rev iewed for

j constitutional error. The Court then explained that under the

5

p r e d e c e s s o r t o 2 8 U . S . C . § 1 2 5 7 : . *

I f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s s t a t e d i nt h e b i l l a c t u a l l y a r o s e i n t h e c a u s e , i twas the province and duty of the statec o u r t s t o d e c i d e t h e m ; a n d t h e i rdecision, whether right or wrong, was ane x e r c i s e o f j u r i s d i c t i o n , i f t h edecision was wrong, that did not make thejudgment void, but merely left it open tor e v e r s a l o r m o d i fi c a t i o n i n a nappropriate and t imely appellateproceeding, . . Under the legis lat ion ofC o n g r e s s , n o c o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e so the r t han t h i s Cou r t cou ld en te r t a i n aproceeding to reverse or modify thejudgment for errors of that character. .. • To d o s o w o u l d b e a n e x e r c i s e o fa p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n .

I d . a t 4 1 5 - 1 6 , 4 4 S . C t . a t 1 5 0 . I n C o a s t L i n e R . C o v .

Brotherhood of X^ocomotive Enainee jg^ 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739,26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Rooker

d o c t r i n e , s t a t i n g ;

Again, lower federal courts possess nopower wha teve r t o s i t i n d i r ec t r ev i ew o fstate court decisions, if [the partyseeking the injunction] was adverselyaffected by the state court's decision.I t w a s f r e e t o s e e k v i n d i c a t i o n o f i t sfederal right in the [state] appellatecourts and u l t imate ly, i f necessary, int h i s c o u r t .

Id. at 296, 90 S.Ct. at 1748. And more recently, in District nfpo].U|nl?U Cpurt of Apnftals v. 450 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct.

That statute provides, in relevant part:Final judgments or decrees rendered by

the highest court of a State in which adecision could be had, may be reviewed bythe Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.

• • •

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (West Supp. 1991).

o

1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), the Court recognized the continuing

T h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t p r o p e r l yacknowledged that the Uni ted StatesDis t r ic t Cour t is w i thout author i ty tor e v i e w fi n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f t h eDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals injudicial proceedings. Review of suchdeterminations can be obtained only int h i s C o u r t . . . .

I d . a t 4 7 6 , 1 0 3 S . C t . a t 1 3 11 .

In Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986),rev'd on other grounds. 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1

(1987), the Second Circuit offered the following summary of theR o o k e r - F e l d m a n d o c t r i n e :

I n s h o r t , a n i n f e r i o r f e d e r a l c o u r tes tab l ished by Congress pursuant to Ar t .I l l , § 1, of the Constitution may not actas an appe l l a te t r i buna l f o r t he pu rposeo f o v e r r u l i n g a s t a t e c o u r t j u d g m e n t ,even though the judgment may rest on ane r r o n e o u s r e s o l u t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o rf e d e r a l l a w i s s u e s . T h e e x c l u s i v eprocedure for federal review is thatspecified by 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Id. at 1142. It should be noted that there is no requirementthat a state court judgment be fully appealed through the state

system as a condition precedent to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See lexaco, 784 F.2d at 1142-43.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally arises in a situationwhere a plaintiff seeks to collaterally attack, in a federalaction, an adverse judgment rendered against him or her in statecourt. In other words, the plaintiff is usually attempting toconvert the appeal of a state court judgment into a federal

a c t i o n u n d e r 4 2 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 3 . A t f i r s t g l a n c e , t h i s d o e s n o t

s e e m t o b e t h e s i t u a t i o n h e r e , b e c a u s e , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e

r e a l p r o p e r t y p r o c e e d i n g , w h i c h w i l l b e f u l l y d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n ,

p l a i n t i f f K i n g w a s n o t a p a r t y t o a n y o f t h e s t a t e c o u r t

p r o c e e d i n g s w h i c h s h e n o w s e e m s t o b e c h a l l e n g i n g . A n d ,

t h e r e f o r e , a r g u a b l y , s h e i s n o t t r y i n g t o c o n v e r t t h e a p p e a l o f a

s t a t e c o u r t j u d g m e n t i n t o a § 1 9 8 3 a c t i o n .

C l o s e r a n a l y s i s r e v e a l s , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e R o o k e r - F e l d m a n

d o c t r i n e i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . T h a t i s s o b e c a u s e e v e n t h o u g h

p l a i n t i f f w a s n o t a p a r t y t o t h o s e v a r i o u s s t a t e c o u r t

p r o c e e d i n g s , s h e d i d h a v e s t a n d i n g t o a p p e a l a s o n e " a g g r i e v e d "

b y t h e j u d g m e n t s w h i c h a f f e c t e d h e r p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . T h e

' I g e n e r a l r u l e u n d e r N e w Y o r k l a w i s t h a t o n l y a n " a g g r i e v e d p a r t y "

m a y a p p e a l . S e e N . Y . C i v . P r a c . L . & R . § 5 5 1 1 ( M c K i n n e y 1 9 7 8 ) .

T h a t s t a t u t e h a s b e e n e x p a n s i v e l y i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e N e w Yo r k

c o u r t s , h o w e v e r , a n d u n d e r § 5 5 1 1 a n o n p a r t y m a y a p p e a l w h e n t h a t

p a r t y m a y b e b o u n d b y a j u d g m e n t i f h e o r s h e d o e s n o t t a k e

a f fi r m a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t h i s o r h e r

r i g h t s . A u e r b a c h v . B e n n e t t . 6 4 A . D . 2 d 9 8 , 4 0 8 N . Y. S . 2 d 8 3 ( 2 d

D e p ' t 1 9 7 8 ) , m o d ' d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s . 4 7 N . Y. 2 d 6 1 9 , 4 1 9 N . Y. S . 2 d

9 2 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . F o r e x a m p l e , i n P e o p l e v . D o b b s F e r r v M e d i c a l

P a v i l l i o n . 4 0 A . D . 2 d 3 2 4 , 3 4 0 N . Y . S . 2 d 1 0 8 ( 2 d D e p ' t ) , a f f ' d . 3 3

N . Y . 2 d 5 8 4 , 3 4 7 N . Y . S . 2 d 4 5 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t n o n p a r t y

d o c t o r s h a d s t a n d i n g t o a p p e a l f r o m a n i n j u n c t i o n b a r r i n g t h e

p e r f o r m i n g o f a b o r t i o n s a t c e r t a i n p r e m i s e s , b e c a u s e t h a t

i n j u n c t i o n , b y i t s t e r m s , e x t e n d e d t o a l l p e r s o n s h a v i n g

8

i C : : a

! k n o w l e d g e t h e r e o f . I d . a t 3 2 5 , 3 4 0 N . Y. S . 2 d a t 1 1 0 . S i m i l a r l y ,iI i n T r i a n g l e P a c i fi c B l d a . P r o d u c t s C o r p . v . N a t . B a n k , 6 2 A . D . 2 d1

I 1017, 404 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2nd Dep't 1978), the court held that

j where a turnover order would consume an entire bank account, thep e r s o n w h o c l a i m e d a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c c o u n t a n d w h o w a s

j presumptive owner of one-half of the account proceeds wasI

" a g g r i e v e d " b y t h e o r d e r a n d h a d s t a n d i n g t o a p p e a l t h e r e f r o m ,

e v e n t h o u g h s h e w a s n o t n a m e d i n t h e s p e c i a l p r o c e e d i n g . I d . a t

, 4 0 4 N . Y. S . 2 d a t 1 2 2 . S u r e l y , p l a i n t i f f K i n g w a s

a g g r i e v e d b y t h e s t a t e c o u r t d e c i s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e

r e s i d e n c e i n w h i c h s h e h a s p a r t i a l o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t . P l a i n t i f f

K i n g w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y a g g r i e v e d b y t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g M s . C a r e l l a

"exc lus ive possess ion" o f proper ty in wh ich she [Ms. K ing] has a

par t i a l ownersh ip i n te res t . Thus , as one aggr ieved by such an

adverse order, Ms. K ing could have appealed. She d id not .

T h e r e f o r e , t h e R o o k e r - F e l d m a n d o c t r i n e p r e c l u d e s p l a i n t i f f f r c n

now coming in to th i s federa l cour t and essen t ia l l y seek ing rev iew

of s ta te cour t j udgments , dec is ions and /o r o rders , wh ich she

could have appealed through the s ta te system, and, i f necessary,

to the Supreme Cour t o f the Un i ted Sta tes . Consequent ly,

d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k o f s u b j e c t m a t t e r

jurisdiction must be granted insofar as the complaint is based

upon p r i o r s t a te cou r t dec i s i ons , j udgmen ts , and /o r o rde rs , by

w h i c h t h i s p l a i n t i f f w a s a g g r i e v e d .

T h e c o u r t m a k e s o n e fi n a l o b s e r v a t i o n . I t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o

t h e c o u r t t h a t p l a i n t i f f K i n g i s a l s o s e e k i n g t o a t t a c k a n yI

i

i 9

o r d e r s o r d e c i s i o n s a l r e a d y r e n d e r e d i n t h e s t a t e c o u r t r e a l

p rope r t y p roceed ing , t o wh ich she i s a pa r t y. To the ex ten t t ha tshe may be, however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would clearly

preclude the exercise of this court 's jur isdict ion in that regarda s w e l l .

I I . A b s t e n t i o n jWith respect to any claims arising out of plaintiff's pending

s ta te cour t p roceed ing , de fendan ts a rgue tha t the cour t shou ld

abstain under Younger v. Harris. 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 1L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). While recognizing that abstention from the |exerc ise of a federal court 's jur isdict ion is rare, Colorado

96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.£d.2d 483 (1976), nonetheless, this court |iconcludes that Younger abstention is proper here/ As the Second j

Circuit explained in Cecos Int'l. inc. v Jorling. 895 F.2d 66 (2d IC i r . 1 9 9 0 ) : I

Abstent ion under Younger is fue led byt h e n o t i o n t h a t c o u r t s o f e q u i t y s h o u l dnot intervene where a party has anadequate remedy at law, . . . , and byconcerns of comi ty and federa l ism expressi n ' t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e N a t i o n a l

^ Although Younger involved an ongoing state criminalp r o c e e d i n g , a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s e n u n c i a t e d t h e r e i nbeen ex tended to s ta te c i v i l p roceed ings and s ta te admin i s t ra t i vep r o c e e d i n g w h e r e t h e r e i s a m e a n s a v a i l a b l e t o r e v i e wc o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s . S e e N e w O r l e a n s P u b l i c S e r v i c e , i n c . v .Council of New Orleans. 491 U.S. 350, , 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2516, !1 0 5 L . E d . 2 d 2 9 8 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; O h i o C i v i l R i g h t s C o m , v . D a v t o nChristian Schools. Inc.. 477 U.S. 619, 626-28, 106 S.Ct. 2718,2 7 2 2 - 2 3 , 9 1 L . E d . 2 d 5 1 2 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; M i d d l e s e x C o u n t v E t h i c s C o n i n . v.Garden State Bar Ass'n. 457- U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521,73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd. . 420 U.S. 592, "5S . C t . 1 2 0 0 , 4 3 L . E d . 2 d 4 8 2 ( 1 9 7 5 ) .

1 0

G o v e r n m e n t w i l l f a r e b e t t e r i f t h e S t a t e si a n d t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e l e f t f r e e t oi p e r f o r m t h e i r s e p a r a t e f u n c t i o n s i n t h e i rj s e p a r a t e w a y s . '

at 70 (quoting Younger. 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750).1

More recent ly, in Temple of Lost Sheep Inc. v. Abrams. 930 F.2d

178, 183 (2d Cir. 1991) , quot ing f rom Steffe l v. Thompson. 415

: U.S. 452, 460-61, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1216, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974), the

Second Circuit explained the underlying purpose of Younger

I abstention as follows;[ t ] h a t a p e n d i n g s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g , i n a l lbut unusual cases, would prov ide thef e d e r a l p l a i n t i f f w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r yv e h i c l e f o r v i n d i c a t i n g h i sc o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , a n d , i n t h a tc i r c u m s t a n c e , t h e r e s t r a i n i n g o f a n

, o n g o i n g [ s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g ] w o u l d e n t a i la n u n s e e m l y f a i l u r e t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h ep r i n c i p l e t h a t s t a t e c o u r t s h a v e t h es o l e m n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y, e q u a l l y w i t h t h efede ra l cou r t s t o gua rd , en fo r ce , andpro tec t eve ry r i gh t g ran ted o r secu red byt h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

Id. at 183. Younger abstention, involving as it does two pending

proceed ings , g ives r i se to confl ic t ing ju r i sd ic t iona l du t iesbetween the state and federal tr ibunals, "[w]ith the attendant

p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e f e d e r a l a c t i o n w i l l e i t h e r

result in dupl icat ive legal proceedings or a disruption of the

s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g s . " J d . a t 1 8 2 . T h u s , Yo u n g e r a b s t e n t i o n

" ' c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e o u t r i g h t d i s m i s s a l o f t h e f e d e r a l s u i t , a n d

t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a l l c l a i m s , b o t h s t a t e a n d f e d e r a l , t o t h eif

s t a t e c o u r t s . ' " I d . ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ( Q u o t i n g G i b s o n v.i; Berryhl l l , 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697, 36 L.Ed.2d 483

I (1973).I

1 1

1

I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h e t h e r t o r e f u s e

t o a s s u m e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r Yo u n g e r d e p e n d s u p o n a fi n d i n g t h a t

( 1 ) t h e r e i s a n o n g o i n g s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g ; ( 2 ) a n i m p o r t a n t s t a t e

i n t e r e s t i s i m p l i c a t e d ; a n d ( 3 ) t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s a n a v e n u e o p e n

f o r r e v i e w o f h i s o r h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s i n t h e s t a t e

c o u r t . C E C O S , 8 9 5 F. 2 d a t 7 0 ( c i t i n g M i d d l e s e x C o u n t y E t h i c s

C o m m . V . G a r d e n S t a t e B a r A s s ' n . 4 5 7 U . S . 4 2 3 , 4 3 2 , 1 0 2 S . C t .

2 5 1 5 , 2 5 2 1 , 7 3 L . E d . 2 d 1 1 6 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . S e e a l s o C h r i s t t h e K i n g

R e g i o n a l H i g h S c h o o l v . C u l v e r t . 8 1 5 F. 2 d 2 1 9 , 2 2 4 ( 2 d C i r . ) ,

c e r t , d e n i e d . 4 8 4 U . S . 8 3 0 , 1 0 8 S . C t . 1 0 2 , 9 8 L . E d . 2 d 6 3 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .

T h e c o u r t w i l l c o n s i d e r e a c h o f t h o s e e l e m e n t s i n t u r n .

C l e a r l y t h e r e i s a n o n g o i n g s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g h e r e . I t i s

u n d i s p u t e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s r e a l p r o p e r t y p r o c e e d i n g i s s t i l l

pend ing i n s ta te cou r t . The second requ i remen t f o r t he p rope r

i nvoca t i on o f Younge r abs ten t i on i s a l so p resen t he re ; t ha t i s

i m p o r t a n t , v i t a l s t a t e i n t e r e s t s a r e i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e s t a t e

p roceed ing . The a rea o f domes t i c r e l a t i ons l aw, wh i ch i s pa r t o :

t h e s t a t e c o u r t r e a l p r o p e r t y p r o c e e d i n g b y v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t

t h a t t h e c u r r e n t o c c u p a n t o f t h e p r e m i s e s i s t h e r e b a s e d u p o n a

c o u r t o r d e r e n t e r e d i n a f a m i l y c o u r t m a t t e r , i s c e r t a i n l y a n

a r e a o f i m p o r t a n t s t a t e i n t e r e s t . S e e . F a v v . S o u t h C o l o n i e

C e n t . S c h o o l D i s t . . 8 0 2 F. 2 d 2 1 , 3 2 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) ( d o m e s t i c

r e l a t i o n s l a w m a t t e r o f i m p o r t a n t s t a t e i n t e r e s t ) . L i k e w i s e , i t

i s d i f fi c u l t t o c o n c e i v e o f a n a r e a i n w h i c h t h e s t a t e h a s a r . c r o

s u b s t a n t i a l , l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n r e g u l a t i o n , t h a n i n t h e a r e a

o f s t a t e r e a l p r o p e r t y l a w . A c c o r d . N e w O r l e a n s P u b l i c S e r v . v

1 2

A O * : A ! T A

I Council of New Orleans. 491 U.S. at , 109 S.Ct. at 2516-17i (Focus of inquiry in determining whether state had a substantial,!

, legitimate interest in pending proceeding for purposes of Youngeri

a b s t e n t i o n , i s w h e t h e r s t a t e h a d s u b s t a n t i a l , l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t

: i n r e g u l a t i n g c e r t a i n a c t i v i t y ) .

I Finally, there is an avenue open for review of plaintiffI Kings' constitutional claims in the state court real property

proceeding. There is nothing in the real property law indicating

I that such a proceeding is not the appropriate means by which to

raise a const i tut ional claim relat ive to such property.^ And, as

th e Fo u r t h C i r cu i t so a r t i cu l a t e l y s t a t e d i n C i n e ma B l u e o f

Char lot te. Inc. v. Gi lchr ist . 887 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1989), cert .

denied, 110 S.Ct. 1479, 108 L.Ed.2d 616 (1990):

I n t h i s , as i n such ma t te r s gene ra l l y, wei n d u l g e t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e s t a t ec o u r t s a r e w i l l i n g a n d a b l e t o v i n d i c a t ef e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . T h ea b s t e n t i o n c o n d i t i o n i s m e r e l y t h a t t h e r ebe a pending state proceeding in which ano p p o r t u n i t y t o r a i s e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a lc h a l l e n g e w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e t o t h ef e d e r a l p l a i n t i f f . . . . T h o u g h w e m a yn o t b e s u r e e x a c t l y w h a t p r o c e d u r a lm e c h a n i s m f o r d o i n g s o w i l l b e m o s ta p p r o p r i a t e , i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t w eb e . I t s u f fi c e s t o b e c o n fi d e n t t h a t i tcan be raised in some appropriate way,a n d t h a t w e a r e .

X d . a t 5 4 ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . I n s h o r t , b a s e d u p o n t h e

f o r e g o i n g , t h i s c o u r t m u s t d e c l i n e t o e x e r c i s e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n

^ Indeed, the scope of the state court action has alreadywide ly broadened beyond that o f a s imple ev ic t ion proceeding.M s . C a r e l l a i s a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e 1 9 8 6 c o n v e y a n c e b y M r . C o l l i n s

I to his mother was fraudulent. In addition, Ms. Carella isj seeking to impose a constructive trust.

1 3

o v e r p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s b e c a u s e t h e p e n d i n g s t a t e

c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g p r o v i d e s t h i s p l a i n t i f f w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y

v e h i c l e f o r v i n d i c a t i o n o f h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . T h u s , t h e

c o u r t m u s t a l s o g r a n t d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s p l a i n t i f f ' s

c o m p l a i n t , w i t h r e s p e c t t o a n y c l a i m s a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e o n g o i n g

s t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g , o n t h e b a s i s o f Yo u n g e r a b s t e n t i o n .

I I I . F a i l u r e t o S t a t e a C l a i m

I n l i g h t o f t h e f o r e g o i n g , p l a i n t i f f ' s o n l y r e m a i n i n g c l a i r .

i s a c o n s p i r a c y u n d e r 4 2 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 3 . T h a t c l a i m t o o c a n n o t b e

a l l o w e d t o s t a n d . A s t h i s c o u r t r e c e n t l y s t a t e d i n U p p e r H u d s o n

P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d . I n c . v . D o e . 1 9 9 1 U . S . D i s t . L E X I S 1 3 0 6 3

( N . D . N . Y. S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 9 1 ) :

T h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t " [ h ] a s r e c o g n i z e d

t h a t c e r t a i n c l a i m s a r e s o e a s i l y m a d ea n d c a n p r e c i p i t a t e s u c h p r o t r a c t e dp roceed ings w i th such d i s rup t i on o fg o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s t h a t , d e s p i t e t h eg e n e r a l r u l e o f C o n l e v v . G i b s o n . 3 5 5U . S . 4 1 ( 1 9 5 7 ) , d e t a i l e d f a c t p l e a d i n g i sr e q u i r e d t o w i t h s t a n d a m o t i o n t od i s m i s s . " . . . . T h u s , t h e S e c o n dC i r c u i t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a tc o m p l a i n t s c o n t a i n i n g o n l y " c o n c l u s o r y, "" v a g u e , " o r " g e n e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s " o f aconsp i racy to depr ive a person o fc o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s w i l l b e d i s m i s s e d .O s t r e r v. A r o n w a l r f . 5 6 7 F. 2 d 5 5 1 , 5 5 3 ( 2 dC i r . 1 9 7 7 ) ( a n d c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n ) . I nO s t r e r t h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t f u r t h e re x p l a i n e d t h a t " [ d ] i f f u s e a n d e x p a n s i v ea l l e g a t i o n s [ o f a c o n s p i r a c y ] a r ei n s u f fi c i e n t , u n l e s s a m p l i fi e d b ys p e c i fi c i n s t a n c e s o f m i s c o n d u c t . " I d .( c i t i n g B u i l d o f B u f f a l o . I n c . v . S e d i t a .4 4 1 F. 2 d 2 8 4 , 2 8 8 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) ) . T h u s ,i n O s t r e r t h e C o u r t h e l d : [ a j p p e l l a n t s •u n s u p p o r t e d a l l e g a t i o n s , w h i c h f a i l t os p e c i f y i n d e t a i l t h e f a c t u a l b a s i sn e c e s s a r y t o e n a b l e a p p e l l e e s

i n t e l l i g e n t l y t o p r e p a r e t h e i r d e f e n s e ,w i l l n o t s u f fi c e t o s u s t a i n a c l a i m o fgovernmental conspiracy to depriveappe l lan ts o f the i r cons t i tu t iona lr i g h t s . I d . ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .

Id. at *33 - *34 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).

Applying those standards to the present case, it is clear tha^plaintiff has not adequately pled a conspiracy to deprive her ofher constitutional rights. In her complaint, plaintiff makes

only the vague, conclusional allegation that;Judges James, Ferradino, Simone,

Austin, Plumadore and Hearing ExaminerWa r n e r h a d a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h e a c h o t h e ra n d w i t h M s C a r e l l a a n d h e r a t t o r n e y s , .. . t o r u l e f a v o r a b l y o n M s C a r e l l a ' spe t i t i ons , to depr i ve P la in t i f f o f he rp r o p e r t y . t o f o r c e P l a i n t i f f t o s u p p o r tM s C a r e l l a a n d t o f r u s t r a t e a n y a c t i o n b yP l a i n t i f f a n d h e r s o n , . . .

Complaint at f 13 (emphasis added). She does not specificallyplead any overt acts; nor does she provide a basis in fact forthis claim. Apart from that one allegation, there are no other

allegations in the complaint pertaining to this allegedconspiracy. Indeed, there are not even any allegations fromwhich it can be inferred that such a conspiracy existed. Thus,

without more, plaintiff's conspiracy claim cannot be allowed tos tand . Po lu r v. Ra f fe , 912 F.2d 52 , 56 (2d C i r. 1990)

("vague, prolix allegations of a conspiracy without pleading anyovert acts or providing a basis in fact" insufficient to state a

conspiracy cause of action); Riabv v. Couahlin. 730 F.Supp. 1196,1200 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing conspiracy claim were plaintiffs"simply allege[d] that the defendants 'conspired together', and

1 5

i O 7 2 Ai 8 2 >

' k n o w i n g l y a c t e d i n c o l l u s i o n ' . . . D e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n t o

d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t , i n s o f a r a s i t a l l e g e s a c o n s p i r a c y c l a i m ,

t h e r e f o r e i s a l s o g r a n t e d .

I V . O t h e r B a s e s f o r D i s m i s s a l

B e c a u s e t h e c o u r t h a s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t d i s m i s s a l o f t h e

c o m p l a i n t i s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e r e a s o n s j u s t d i s c u s s e d , i t i s

n o t e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r t h e o t h e r g r o u n d s o f f e r e d

b y d e f e n d a n t s a s a b a s i s f o r d i s m i s s a l . P r i m a r i l y f o r t h eb e n e fi t o f p l a i n t i f f , h o w e v e r, w h o i s p r o c e e d i n g w i t h o u t c o u n s e l ,

t h e c o u r t w i l l b r i e fl y a d d r e s s t h o s e o t h e r g r o u n d s . F i r s t , w i t h

r e s p e c t t o t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , d e f e n d a n t s a r e c o r r e c t

t h a t a § 1 9 8 3 a c t i o n i s g o v e r n e d b y t h e t h r e e y e a r r e s i d u a l o r

g e n e r a l p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s . S e e O w e n s v .

O k u r e , 4 8 8 U . S . 2 3 5 , 1 0 9 S . C t . 5 7 3 , 1 0 2 L . E d . 2 d 5 9 4 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . I n

t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f fi l e d h e r c o m p l a i n t o n A u g u s t 2 2 ,

1 9 9 1 . T h e r e f o r e c l e a r l y i n s o f a r a s h e r c o m p l a i n t s t a t e s c l a i n s

b a s e d u p o n e v e n t s w h i c h h a p p e n e d p r i o r t o t h a t t h r e e y e a r t i m e

f r a m e , s u c h c l a i m s a r e t i m e b a r r e d .

S e c o n d , d e f e n d a n t s r i g h t l y c o n t e n d t h a t a n y c l a i m f o r

mone ta ry damages aga ins t t he de fendan ts i n t he i r o f fic ia l

^ See also Sommer v. Dixon. 709 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir.1 9 8 3 ) , c e r t , d e n i e d . 4 6 4 U . S . 8 5 7 , 1 0 4 S . C t . 1 7 7 , 7 8 L . E d . 2 d 1 5 3( 1 9 8 3 ) ( a f fi r m i n g d i s m i s s a l o f c o m p l a i n t w h e r e " a l l e g a t i o n s a s t oa c o n s p i r a c y [ w e r e ] . . . v a g u e a n d u n s u p p o r t e d b y d e s c r i p t i o n o fpa r t i cu la r ove r t ac ts . " ) ; Powe l l v. Workmen 's Compensa t ion Bd . .3 2 7 F . 2 d 1 3 1 , 1 3 7 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 6 4 ) ( a f fi r m i n g d i s m i s s a l o fc o m p l a i n t w h e r e p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o " [ a ] l i e g e w i t h a t l e a s t s o r . Gd e g r e e o f p a r t i c u l a r i t y o v e r t a c t s w h i c h d e f e n d a n t s e n g a g e d i nw h i c h w e r e r e a s o n a b l y r e l a t e d t o t h e p r o m o t i o n o f t h e c l a i m e dc o n s p i r a c y . " )

1 6

capacities is barred by the eleventh amendment. TekknoT.;.hnr;. tor ie'^- Tnc. V. Perales. 933 F.2d 1093, 1097 (2d Cir. 1991)

(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). Nowhere in her complaint did plaintiffspecifically state whether she is suing defendants in theirofficial or in their personal capacities. Presumably it is theformer because all of the allegations against these defendantspertain solely to acts performed by them in their capacity asjudicial officers. Thus, the eleventh amendment is a bar to allof plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against thesedefendants in their official capacities. It should be noted that

plaintiff is only seeking to recover monetary relief; she is notseeking injunctive relief of any kind. See Complaint at 163-1 6 6 .

Third, in a similar vein, defendants argue that they areabsolutely immune from liability here because the allegationsagainst them arise out of events which occurred while they wereacting as judicial officers. In determining whether a judge isabsolutely immune from civil liability, the focus is on thenature of the act performed. The Second Circuit in Maestri v.Jutkofskv, 860 F.2d 50 {2d Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S.

1016, 109 S.Ct. 1132, 103 L.Ed.2d 193 (1989), held that "[a]judge who performs a judicial act in excess of his or herjurisdiction is immune to civil suit; a judge who acts in theclear absence of jurisdiction is not." Id. at 52. The Court inMaestri explained that a "[j]udge will be denied immunity only

!l

W h e r e i t a p p e a r s , fi r s t , t h a t t h e j u d g e a c t e d i n t h e c l e a r

absence of ju r isd ic t ion, and second, that the judge must have

k n o w n t h a t h e o r s h e w a s a c t i n g i n t h e c l e a r a b s e n c e o f

jurisdiction." Id. at 53. This test, as articulated by the^ S e c o n d C i r c u i t , i s t h u s c o m p r i s e d o f t w o e l e m e n t s - o n e

^ o b j e c t i v e , t h a t i s " [ t j h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n i s c l e a r l y a b s e n t , i . e . .that no reasonable judge would have thought jurisdiction proper,

. . and t he second sub jec t i ve , t ha t i s " [ t ] ha t t he j udge

whose actions are questioned actually knew or must have known of

t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t . . . . " i d . A p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t t e s t

in Maestri resulted in a finding that the judge was not entitledto immunity because he knowingly acted in the clear absence of

ter r i tor ia l jur isd ic t ion, when he s igned arrest warrants

r e s u l t i n g i n t h e i n c a r c e r a t i o n o f t w o i n d i v i d u a l s .

I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , a t o r a l a r g u m e n t p l a i n t i f f s t r e s s e d t h a t

defendant James acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction in

awarding Ms. Carella exclusive possession of the subject

property. I t is c lear f rom her complaint , however, that

plaintiff is also making that argument with respect to defendants

James, Ferradino, Simone, Austin and Warner. See. Complaint at

3, 5 11.' To support her argument, plaintiff is apparentlyre l y i ng upon a l e t t e r by Jus t i ce P lumadore i n wh i ch i t i s s ta ted

%

' Given the fact that plaintiff did not allege thatde fendan t P lumadore ac ted in the absence o f j u r i sd i c t i on , the

^ c o u r t a s s u m e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s n o t c h a l l e n g i n g h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n .The re fo re de fendan t P lumadore i s c l ea r l y en t i t l ed t o abso lu teimmunity in that the allegations against him relate only tojud i c i a l ac t s pe r fo rmed by h im .

1 8

>1

t h a t , " [ F ] a m i l y C o u r t h a s n o j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t i t l e , m a r i t a l o r

o t h e r w i s e ; . . . C o m p l a i n t , E x . 4 5 t h e r e t o a t 2 ( e m p h a s i s i n

o r i g i n a l ) . A s s u m i n g a r g u e n d o t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s c o r r e c t ( t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t s o t h e r t h a n d e f e n d a n t P l u m a d o r e a c t e d i n t h e c l e a r

a b s e n c e o f j u r i s d i c t i o n ) , a n d a c c e p t i n g a s t r u e , a s t h e c o u r t

m u s t o n t h i s m o t i o n , t h e a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s k n e w t h e y

w e r e s o a c t i n g , t h e c o u r t i s n o n e t h e l e s s c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e

c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e s e d e f e n d a n t s i s p r o p e r l y d i s m i s s e d , b a s e d

u p o n t h e o t h e r g r o u n d s f o r d i s m i s s a l d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n . T h u s , i n

c o n c l u s i o n , d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d a n d

p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t i s d i s m i s s e d .

V , S a n c t i o n s

W h i l e d e f e n d a n t s ' f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h t h i s l i t i g a t i o n i s

c e r t a i n l y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , s a n c t i o n s a r e n o t a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t w o

r e a s o n s . T h e fi r s t i s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s s e e m t o b e b a s i n g t h e i r

r e q u e s t , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e h a v e b e e n o t h e r

f e d e r a l a c t i o n s a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e s e f a c t s . Ye t d e f e n d a n t s a r e

i g n o r i n g t h e o b v i o u s : t h i s p l a i n t i f f w a s n o t a p a r t y t o t h o s e

o t h e r a c t i o n s . S h e s h o u l d n o t b e p u n i s h e d f o r h e r s o n ' s a p p a r e n t

a b u s e o f t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . M o r e o v e r , p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m s

h e r e i n a r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h o s e a s s e r t e d b y h e r s o n a n d d e e m e d

" b a s e l e s s " b y J u d g e M c A v o y .

S e c o n d l y , p l a i n t i f f i s a p p e a r i n g p r o s e , a n d w h i l e t h a t i n

a n d o f i t s e l f w o u l d n o t e x c u s e a n a b u s e o f t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s ,

i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r , a t l e a s t a t t h i s p o i n t , t h a t s h e h a s e n g a g e d

i n s a n c t i o n a b l e c o n d u c t . P l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t h a s b e e n

1 9

d ismissed , i n pa r t , based upon lega l p r inc ip les , wh ich even fo r

lawyers are not a lways easy to understand and apply. I t would be

unduly harsh to sanct ion a layperson under these c i rcumstances.T h e m o t i o n f o r s a n c t i o n s b y t h e d e f e n d a n t s i s t h e r e f o r e d e n i e d .

V I . C r o s s - M o t i o n f o r P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n

O b v i o u s l y, p l a i n t i f f ' s c r o s s - m o t i o n f o r a p r e l i m i n a r y

in junct ion has been rendered moot by the d ismissal o f the

c o m p l a i n t .

I T I S S O O R D E R E D .

DATED: November'—'^/ , 1991S y r a c u s e , N e w Yo r k

N e a l P . M c C u r nC h i e f , U . S . D i s t r i c t J u d g e