ARLINGTON CENT. SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC. v. MURPHY 2455 · L.Ed.2d 68, a cost- or fee-shifting provi-sion will not be read to permit recovery of expert fees without explicit statutory

2455ARLINGTON CENT. SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC. v. MURPHYCite as 126 S.Ct. 2455 (2006)

548 U.S. 291

548 U.S. 291, 165 L.Ed.2d 526

ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOLDISTRICT BOARD OF EDU-

CATION, Petitioner,

v.

Pearl MURPHY et vir.

No. 05–18.

Argued April 19, 2006.

Decided June 26, 2006.

Background: Parents of disabled student,having prevailed in Individuals with Dis-abilities Education Act (IDEA) suit againstschool district, 297 F.3d 195, moved torecover expert consultant’s fees. The Unit-ed States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of New York, Charles S. HaightJr., J., 2003 WL 21694398, awarded fees.The United States Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit affirmed, 402 F.3d 332.Certiorari was granted.

Holdings: The United States SupremeCourt, Justice Alito, held that:

(1) Spending Clause legislation that at-taches conditions to state’s acceptanceof federal funds must provide clearnotice of conditions, and

(2) non-attorney expert’s fees for servicesrendered to prevailing parents inIDEA action are not ‘‘costs’’ recovera-ble from state under IDEA’s fee-shift-ing provision.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Ginsburg filed opinion concurringin part and concurring in the judgment.

Justice Souter filed dissenting opinion.

Justice Breyer filed dissenting opinionjoined by Justices Stevens and Souter.

1. United States O82(2)When Congress attaches conditions to

state’s acceptance of federal funds, in leg-islation enacted pursuant to SpendingClause, conditions must be set out unam-biguously, i.e. legislation must provideclear notice of conditions in order for stateto knowingly accept and be bound bythem. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.

2. Schools O155.5(5)Non-attorney expert’s fees for ser-

vices rendered to prevailing parents inIDEA action are not ‘‘costs’’ recoverablefrom state under IDEA’s fee-shifting pro-vision, regardless of legislative history ar-guably stating intent to include such feeswithin recoverable costs; provision itselfcontains no hint of state’s responsibility forexpert fees, ‘‘costs’’ as term of art general-ly does not comprise expert fees, and re-coverable costs and witness fees in federalcourts are strictly limited by statute. In-dividuals with Disabilities Education Act,§ 615(d)(2), (i)(3)(B), 20 U.S.C.A.§ 1415(d)(2), (i)(3)(B); 28 U.S.C.A.§§ 1821, 1920.

S 291Syllabus *

After respondents prevailed in theirIndividuals with Disabilities Education Act(IDEA) action to require petitioner schoolboard to pay for their son’s private schooltuition, they sought fees for services ren-dered by an educational consultant duringthe proceedings, relying on an IDEA pro-vision that permits a court to ‘‘award rea-sonable attorneys’ fees as part of thecosts’’ to prevailing parents, 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(i)(3)(B). The District Court grant-ed their motion in part. Affirming, theSecond Circuit noted that, under CrawfordFitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385, and

* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinionof the Court but has been prepared by theReporter of Decisions for the convenience of

the reader. See United States v. Detroit Tim-ber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct.282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

2456 126 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 548 U.S. 291

West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Ca-sey, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113L.Ed.2d 68, a cost- or fee-shifting provi-sion will not be read to permit recovery ofexpert fees without explicit statutory au-thority, but concluded that a congressionalConference Committee Report relating to§ 1415(i)(3)(B) and a footnote in Caseyreferencing that Report showed that theIDEA authorized such reimbursement.

Held: Section 1415(i)(3)(B) does notauthorize prevailing parents to recover ex-pert fees. Pp. 2458 – 2464.

(a) The resolution of this question isguided by the fact that Congress enactedthe IDEA pursuant to the SpendingClause. While Congress has broad powerto set the terms on which it disbursesfederal money to the States, any conditionsit attaches to a State’s acceptance of suchfunds must be set out ‘‘unambiguously.’’Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531,67 L.Ed.2d 694. Fund recipients arebound only by those conditions that theyaccept ‘‘voluntarily and knowingly,’’ ibid.,and States cannot knowingly accept condi-tions of which they are ‘‘unaware’’ or whichthey are ‘‘unable to ascertain,’’ ibid. Thus,the question here is whether the IDEAfurnishes clear notice regarding expertfees. Pp. 2458 – 2459.

(b) The Court begins with the IDEA’stext, for if its ‘‘language is plain,’’ thecourts’ function ‘‘ ‘ ‘‘is to enforce it accord-ing to its terms.’’ ’ ’’ Hartford Underwrit-ers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147L.Ed.2d 1. While § 1415(i)(3)(B) providesfor an award of ‘‘reasonable attorneys’fees,’’ it does not even hint that acceptanceof IDEA funds makes a State responsiblefor reimbursing prevailing parents for theservices of experts. ‘‘Costs’’ is a term ofart that does not generally S 292include ex-pert fees. The use of ‘‘costs’’ rather than

‘‘expenses’’ strongly suggests that§ 1415(i)(3)(B) was not meant to be anopen-ended provision making States liablefor all expenses. Moreover,§ 1415(i)(3)(B) says not that a court mayaward ‘‘costs’’ but that it may award attor-ney’s fees ‘‘as part of the costs.’’ Thislanguage simply adds reasonable attor-ney’s fees to the list of recoverable costsset out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the generalstatute covering taxation of costs, which isstrictly limited by § 1821. Thus,§ 1415(i)(3)(B)’s text does not authorize anaward of additional expert fees, and itcertainly fails to present the clear noticerequired by the Spending Clause. OtherIDEA provisions point strongly in thesame direction. Of little significance hereis a provision in the Handicapped Chil-dren’s Protection Act of 1986 requiring theGeneral Accounting Office to collect dataon awards to prevailing parties in IDEAcases, but making no mention of consul-tants or experts or their fees. And thefact that the provision directed the GAO tocompile data on the hours spent by consul-tants in IDEA cases does not mean thatCongress intended that States compensateprevailing parties for fees billed by theseconsultants. Pp. 2459 – 2461.

(c) Crawford Fitting Co. and Caseystrongly reinforce the conclusion that theIDEA does not unambiguously authorizeprevailing parents to recover expert fees.Crawford Fitting Co.’s reasoning supportsthe conclusion that the term ‘‘costs’’ in§ 1415(i)(3)(B), like ‘‘costs’’ in FederalRule of Civil Procedure 54(d), the provi-sion at issue there, is defined by the cate-gories of expenses enumerated in 28U.S.C. § 1920. This conclusion is but-tressed by the principle, recognized inCrawford Fitting Co., that no statute willbe construed to authorize taxing witnessfees as costs unless the statute ‘‘refer[s]explicitly to witness fees.’’ 482 U.S., at445, 107 S.Ct. 2494. The conclusion that


548 U.S. 294

the IDEA does not authorize expert feeawards is confirmed even more dramatical-ly by Casey, where the Court held that 42U.S.C. § 1988, a fee-shifting provision withwording virtually identical to that of 20U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), did not empower adistrict court to award expert fees to aprevailing party. 499 U.S., at 102, 111S.Ct. 1138. The Second Circuit misunder-stood the meaning of the Casey footnoteon which it relied. That footnote did notstate that the Conference Committee Re-port set out the correct interpretation of§ 1415(i)(3)(B) or provided the clear noticerequired under the Spending Clause. Itsthrust was simply that ‘‘attorneys’ fees,’’standing alone, is generally not understoodas encompassing expert fees. Pp. 2461 –2463.

(d) Respondents’ additional argu-ments are unpersuasive. The IDEA’sgoals of ‘‘ensur[ing] that all children withdisabilities have available to them a freeappropriate public education,’’§ 1400(d)(1)(A), and of safeguarding par-ents’ right to challenge adverse school de-cisions are too general to provide muchsupport for their reading of the IDEA.And S 293the IDEA’s legislative history isinsufficient help, where everything otherthan that history overwhelmingly suggeststhat expert fees may not be recovered.Pp. 2463 – 2464.

402 F.3d 332, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion ofthe Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., andSCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ.,joined. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinionconcurring in part and concurring in thejudgment, post, p. 2464. SOUTER, J.,filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 2466.

BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, inwhich STEVENS and SOUTER, JJ.,joined, post, p. 2466.

David B. Salmons, for the United Statesas amicus curiae, by special leave of theCourt, supporting the petitioner.

Raymond G. Kuntz, Counsel of Record,Jeffrey J. Schiro, Mario L. Spagnuolo,Jensen Varghese Kuntz, Spagnuolo, Scapo-li & Schiro, P.C., Bedford Village, NY, forpetitioner.

Peter L. Strauss, New York, New York,Brian Wolfman, Scott L. Nelson, Washing-ton, DC, David C. Vladeck, Counsel ofRecord, Jillian M. Cutler, Washington, DC,for Respondents Pearl and Theodore Mur-phy.

For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:2006 WL 448205 (Pet.Brief)2006 WL 838890 (Resp.Brief)2006 WL 993343 (Reply.Brief)

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion ofthe Court.

The Individuals with Disabilities Edu-cation Act (IDEA or Act) provides that acourt ‘‘may award reasonable attorneys’fees as part of the costs’’ to parents whoprevail in an action brought under the Act.111 Stat. 92, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).We granted certiorari to decide whetherthis fee-shifting provision authorizes pre-vailing parents to S 294recover fees for ser-vices rendered by experts in IDEA ac-tions. We hold that it does not.

IRespondents Pearl and Theodore Mur-

phy filed an action under the IDEA onbehalf of their son, Joseph Murphy, seek-ing to require petitioner Arlington CentralSchool District Board of Education to payfor their son’s private school tuition forspecified school years. Respondents pre-vailed in the District Court, 86 F.Supp.2d354 (S.D.N.Y.2000), and the Court of Ap-


peals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 297F.3d 195 (2002).

As prevailing parents, respondents thensought $29,350 in fees for the services ofan educational consultant, Marilyn Arons,who assisted respondents throughout theIDEA proceedings. The District Courtgranted respondents’ request in part. Itheld that only the value of Arons’ timespent between the hearing request and theruling in respondents’ favor could properlybe considered charges incurred in an ‘‘ac-tion or proceeding brought’’ under the Act,see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 2003 WL21694398, *9 (S.D.N.Y., July 22, 2003).This reduced the maximum recovery to$8,650. The District Court also held thatArons, a nonlawyer, could be compensatedonly for time spent on expert consultingservices, not for time spent on legal repre-sentation, id., at *4, but it concluded thatall the relevant time could be characterizedas falling within the compensable category,and thus allowed compensation for the full$8,650, id., at *10.

The Court of Appeals for the SecondCircuit affirmed. 402 F.3d 332 (2005).Acknowledging that other Circuits hadtaken the opposite view, the Court of Ap-peals for the Second Circuit held that‘‘Congress intended to and did authorizethe reimbursement of expert fees in IDEAactions.’’ Id., at 336. The court began bydiscussing two decisions of this Court hold-ing that expert fees could not be recoveredas taxed costs under particular cost- orfee-shifting provisions. S 295See CrawfordFitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987)(interpreting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d)and 28 U.S.C. § 1920); West VirginiaUniv. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991)(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 ed.)).According to these decisions, the courtnoted, a cost- or fee-shifting provision will

not be read to permit a prevailing party torecover expert fees without ‘‘ ‘explicit stat-utory authority’ indicating that Congressintended for that sort of fee-shifting.’’ 402F.3d, at 336.

Ultimately, though, the court was per-suaded by a statement in the ConferenceCommittee Report relating to 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(i)(3)(B) and by a footnote in Caseythat made reference to that Report. 402F.3d, at 336–337 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep.No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986), U.S.Code Cong. &Admin.News, 1986, p. 1807). Based onthese authorities, the court concluded thatit was required to interpret the IDEA toauthorize the award of the costs that pre-vailing parents incur in hiring experts.402 F.3d, at 336.

We granted certiorari, 546 U.S. 1085,126 S.Ct. 978, 163 L.Ed.2d 721 (2006), toresolve the conflict among the Circuitswith respect to whether Congress author-ized the compensation of expert fees toprevailing parents in IDEA actions. Com-pare Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416F.3d 70, 73–77 (C.A.D.C.2005); Neosho R–V School Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315F.3d 1022, 1031–1033 (C.A.8 2003); T.D. v.LaGrange School Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d469, 480–482 (C.A.7 2003), with 402 F.3d332 (C.A.2 2005). We now reverse.

II

Our resolution of the question presentedin this case is guided by the fact thatCongress enacted the IDEA pursuant tothe Spending Clause. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 1; see Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.49, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005).Like its statutory predecessor, the IDEAprovides federal funds to assist state andlocal agencies in educating children withdisabilities ‘‘and conditions such fundingupon a State’s compliance with extensivegoals and procedures.’’ Board of Ed. ofHendrick S 296Hudson Central School Dist.,


548 U.S. 297

Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,179, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).

[1] Congress has broad power to setthe terms on which it disburses federalmoney to the States, see, e.g., South Dako-ta v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–207, 107 S.Ct.2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), but whenCongress attaches conditions to a State’sacceptance of federal funds, the conditionsmust be set out ‘‘unambiguously,’’ seePennhurst State School and Hospital v.Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531,67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Rowley, supra, at204, n. 26, 102 S.Ct. 3034. ‘‘[L]egislationenacted pursuant to the spending power ismuch in the nature of a contract,’’ andtherefore, to be bound by ‘‘federally im-posed conditions,’’ recipients of federalfunds must accept them ‘‘voluntarily andknowingly.’’ Pennhurst, 451 U.S., at 17,101 S.Ct. 1531. States cannot knowinglyaccept conditions of which they are ‘‘un-aware’’ or which they are ‘‘unable to ascer-tain.’’ Ibid. Thus, in the present case, wemust view the IDEA from the perspectiveof a state official who is engaged in theprocess of deciding whether the Stateshould accept IDEA funds and the obli-gations that go with those funds. Wemust ask whether such a state officialwould clearly understand that one of theobligations of the Act is the obligation tocompensate prevailing parents for expertfees. In other words, we must ask wheth-er the IDEA furnishes clear notice regard-ing the liability at issue in this case.

III

A

In considering whether the IDEA pro-vides clear notice, we begin with the text.We have ‘‘stated time and again thatcourts must presume that a legislaturesays in a statute what it means and means

in a statute what it says there.’’ Connecti-cut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,253–254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391(1992). When the statutory ‘‘language isplain, the sole function of the courts—atleast where the disposition required by thetext is not absurd—is to enforce it accord-ing to its terms.’’ Hartford UnderwritersIns. Co. v. Union S 297Planters Bank, N. A.,530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1(2000) (quoting United States v. Ron PairEnterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989), in turnquoting Caminetti v. United States, 242U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442(1917); internal quotation marks omitted).

[2] The governing provision of theIDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), providesthat ‘‘[i]n any action or proceeding broughtunder this section, the court, in its discre-tion, may award reasonable attorneys’ feesas part of the costs’’ to the parents of ‘‘achild with a disability’’ who is the ‘‘prevail-ing party.’’ While this provision providesfor an award of ‘‘reasonable attorneys’fees,’’ this provision does not even hintthat acceptance of IDEA funds makes aState responsible for reimbursing prevail-ing parents for services rendered by ex-perts.

Respondents contend that we should in-terpret the term ‘‘costs’’ in accordancewith its meaning in ordinary usage andthat § 1415(i)(3)(B) should therefore beread to ‘‘authorize reimbursement of allcosts parents incur in IDEA proceedings,including expert costs.’’ Brief for Respon-dents 17.

This argument has multiple flaws. Forone thing, as the Court of Appeals in thiscase acknowledged, ‘‘ ‘costs’ is a term ofart that generally does not include expertfees.’’ 402 F.3d, at 336. The use of thisterm of art, rather than a term such as‘‘expenses,’’ strongly suggests that§ 1415(i)(3)(B) was not meant to be an


open-ended provision that makes partici-pating States liable for all expenses in-curred by prevailing parents in connectionwith an IDEA case—for example, traveland lodging expenses or lost wages due totime taken off from work. Moreover, con-trary to respondents’ suggestion,§ 1415(i)(3)(B) does not say that a courtmay award ‘‘costs’’ to prevailing parents;rather, it says that a court may awardreasonable attorney’s fees ‘‘as part of thecosts’’ to prevailing parents. This lan-guage simply adds reasonable attorney’sfees incurred by prevailing parents to thelist of costs that prevailing parents areotherwise entitled to recover. This list ofotherwise recoverable costs S 298is obviouslythe list set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, thegeneral statute governing the taxation ofcosts in federal court, and the recovery ofwitness fees under § 1920 is strictly limit-ed by § 1821, which authorizes travel re-imbursement and a $40 per diem. Thus,the text of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) doesnot authorize an award of any additionalexpert fees, and it certainly fails to providethe clear notice that is required under theSpending Clause.

Other provisions of the IDEA pointstrongly in the same direction. While au-thorizing the award of reasonable attor-ney’s fees, the Act contains detailed provi-sions that are designed to ensure thatsuch awards are indeed reasonable. See§§ 1415(i)(3)(C)-(G). The absence of anycomparable provisions relating to expertfees strongly suggests that recovery ofexpert fees is not authorized. Moreover,the lack of any reference to expert fees in

§ 1415(d)(2) gives rise to a similar infer-ence. This provision, which generally re-quires that parents receive ‘‘a full expla-nation of the procedural safeguards’’available under § 1415 and refers ex-pressly to ‘‘attorneys’ fees,’’ makes nomention of expert fees.

B

Respondents contend that their inter-pretation of § 1415(i)(3)(B) is supported bya provision of the Handicapped Children’sProtection Act of 1986 that required theGeneral Accounting Office (GAO) to collectcertain data, § 4(b)(3), 100 Stat. 797 (here-inafter GAO study provision), but this pro-vision is of little significance for presentpurposes. The GAO study provision di-rected the Comptroller General, actingthrough the GAO, to compile data on,among other things: ‘‘(A) the specificamount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and ex-penses awarded to the prevailing party’’ inIDEA cases for a particular period of time,and (B) ‘‘the number of hours spent bypersonnel, including attorneys and consul-tants, involved in the action or proceeding,and expenses incurred S 299by the parentsand the State educational agency and localeducational agency.’’ Id., at 797–798.

Subparagraph (A) would provide somesupport for respondents’ position if it di-rected the GAO to compile data on awardsto prevailing parties of the expense ofhiring consultants, but that is not whatsubparagraph (A) says. Subparagraph (A)makes no mention of consultants or ex-perts or their fees.1

1. Because subparagraph (A) refers to both‘‘costs’’ and ‘‘expenses’’ awarded to prevailingparties and because it is generally presumedthat statutory language is not superfluous, itcould be argued that this provision manifeststhe expectation that prevailing parties wouldbe awarded certain ‘‘expenses’’ not includedin the list of ‘‘costs’’ set out in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920 and that expert fees were intended tobe among these unenumerated ‘‘expenses.’’This argument fails because, whatever expec-tation this language might seem to evidence,the fact remains that neither 20 U.S.C. § 1415nor any other provision of the IDEA author-izes the award of any ‘‘expenses’’ other than‘‘costs.’’ Recognizing this, respondents argue


548 U.S. 301

Subparagraph (B) similarly does nothelp respondents. Subparagraph (B),which directs the GAO to study ‘‘the num-ber of hours spent [in IDEA cases] bypersonnel, including TTT consultants,’’ saysnothing about the award of fees to suchconsultants. Just because Congress di-rected the GAO to compile statistics on thehours spent by consultants in IDEA cases,it does not follow that Congress meant forStates to compensate prevailing parties forthe fees billed by these consultants.

Respondents maintain that ‘‘Congress’direction to the GAO would be inexplicableif Congress did not anticipate that theexpenses for ‘consultants’ would be recov-erable,’’ S 300Brief for Respondents 19, butthis is incorrect. There are many reasonswhy Congress might have wanted the GAOto gather data on expenses that were notto be taxed as costs. Knowing the costsincurred by IDEA litigants might be use-ful in considering future proceduralamendments (which might affect thesecosts) or a future amendment regardingfee shifting. And, in fact, it is apparentthat the GAO study provision covered ex-penses that could not be taxed as costs.For example, the GAO was instructed tocompile statistics on the hours spent by allattorneys involved in an IDEA action orproceeding, even though the Act did notprovide for the recovery of attorney’s feesby a prevailing state or local educationalagency.2 Similarly, the GAO was directed

to compile data on ‘‘expenses incurred bythe parents,’’ not just those parents whoprevail and are thus eligible to recovertaxed costs.

In sum, the terms of the IDEA over-whelmingly support the conclusion thatprevailing parents may not recover thecosts of experts or consultants. Certainlythe terms of the IDEA fail to provide theclear notice that would be needed to attachsuch a condition to a State’s receipt ofIDEA funds.

IV

Thus far, we have considered only thetext of the IDEA, but perhaps the strong-est support for our interpretation of theIDEA is supplied by our decisions andreasoning in Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S.437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385, andCasey, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113L.Ed.2d 68. In light of those decisions, wedo not see how it can be said S 301that theIDEA gives a State unambiguous noticeregarding liability for expert fees.

In Crawford Fitting, the Court rejectedan argument very similar to respondents’argument that the term ‘‘costs’’ in§ 1415(i)(3)(B) should be construed as anopen-ended reference to prevailing par-ents’ expenses. It was argued in Craw-ford Fitting that Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 54(d), which provides for theaward of ‘‘costs’’ to a prevailing party,

not that they are entitled to recover ‘‘ex-penses’’ that are not ‘‘costs,’’ but that expertfees are recoverable ‘‘costs.’’ As a result, thereference to awards of both ‘‘expenses’’ and‘‘costs’’ does not support respondents’ posi-tion. The reference to ‘‘expenses’’ may relateto IDEA actions brought in state court,§ 1415(i)(2)(A), where ‘‘expenses’’ other than‘‘costs’’ might be receivable. Or the referencemay be surplusage. While it is generally pre-sumed that statutes do not contain surplus-age, instances of surplusage are not unknown.

2. In 2000, the attorney’s fees provision pro-vided only an award to prevailing parents.See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In 2004, Con-gress amended § 1415(i)(3)(B) to include twoadditional awards. See § 101, 118 Stat.2724. The amendments provided awards ‘‘toa prevailing party who is a State educationalagency or local educational agency’’ wherethe complaint filed is frivolous or presentedfor an improper purpose, such as to harass,delay, or increase the cost of litigation. See20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III) (2000ed., Supp.V).


authorizes the award of costs not listed in28 U.S.C. § 1821. 482 U.S., at 439, 107S.Ct. 2494. The Court held, however, thatRule 54(d) does not give a district judge‘‘discretion to tax whatever costs mayseem appropriate’’; rather, the term‘‘costs’’ in Rule 54(d) is defined by the listset out in § 1920. Id., at 441, 107 S.Ct.2494. Because the recovery of witnessfees, see § 1920(3), is strictly limited by§ 1821, the Court observed, a broader in-terpretation of Rule 54(d) would mean thatthe Rule implicitly effected a partial repealof those provisions. Id., at 442, 107 S.Ct.2494. But, the Court warned, ‘‘[w]e willnot lightly infer that Congress has re-pealed §§ 1920 and 1821, either throughRule 54(d) or any other provision not re-ferring explicitly to witness fees.’’ Id., at445, 107 S.Ct. 2494.

The reasoning of Crawford Fittingstrongly supports the conclusion that theterm ‘‘costs’’ in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B),like the same term in Rule 54(d), is definedby the categories of expenses enumeratedin 28 U.S.C. § 1920. This conclusion isbuttressed by the principle, recognized inCrawford Fitting, that no statute will beconstrued as authorizing the taxation ofwitness fees as costs unless the statute‘‘refer[s] explicitly to witness fees.’’ 482U.S., at 445, 107 S.Ct. 2494; see also ibid.(‘‘[A]bsent explicit statutory or contractualauthorization for the taxation of the ex-penses of a litigant’s witness as costs, fed-eral courts are bound by the limitations setout in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920’’).

Our decision in Casey confirms evenmore dramatically that the IDEA does notauthorize an award of expert fees. InCasey, as noted above, we interpreted afee-shifting proSvision,302 42 U.S.C. § 1988,the relevant wording of which was virtual-ly identical to the wording of 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(i)(3)(B). Compare ibid. (authoriz-ing the award of ‘‘reasonable attorneys’

fees as part of the costs’’ to prevailingparents) with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 ed.)(permitting prevailing parties in certaincivil rights actions to be awarded ‘‘a rea-sonable attorney’s fee as part of thecosts’’). We held that § 1988 did not em-power a district court to award expert feesto a prevailing party. Casey, supra, at102, 111 S.Ct. 1138. To decide in favor ofrespondents here, we would have to inter-pret the virtually identical language in 20U.S.C. § 1415 as having exactly the oppo-site meaning. Indeed, we would have togo further and hold that the relevant lan-guage in the IDEA unambiguously meansexactly the opposite of what the nearlyidentical language in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 washeld to mean in Casey.

The Court of Appeals, as noted above,was heavily influenced by a Casey foot-note, see 402 F.3d, at 336–337 (quoting 499U.S., at 91–92, n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 1138), butthe court misunderstood the footnote’smeaning. The text accompanying the foot-note argued, based on an analysis of sever-al fee-shifting statutes, that the term ‘‘at-torney’s fees’’ does not include expert fees.Id., at 88–91, 111 S.Ct. 1138. In the foot-note, we commented on petitioners’ invoca-tion of the Conference Committee Reportrelating to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), whichstated: ‘‘ ‘The conferees intend[ed] thatthe term ‘‘attorneys’ fees as part of thecosts’’ include reasonable expenses andfees of expert witnesses and the reason-able costs of any test or evaluation whichis found to be necessary for the prepara-tion of the TTT case.’ ’’ 499 U.S., at 91–92,n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (quoting H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 99–687, at 5, U.S.Code Cong. &Admin.News, 1986, pp. 1807, 1808; ellipsisin original). This statement, the footnotecommented, was ‘‘an apparent effort todepart from ordinary meaning and to de-fine a term of art.’’ 499 U.S., at 92, n. 5,111 S.Ct. 1138. The footnote did not statethat the Conference Committee Report set


548 U.S. 304

out the correct interpretation of§ 1415(i)(3)(B), much less that the Reportwas sufficient, despite the lanSguage303 ofthe statute, to provide the clear noticerequired under the Spending Clause. Thethrust of the footnote was simply that theterm ‘‘attorneys’ fees,’’ standing alone, isgenerally not understood as encompassingexpert fees. Thus, Crawford Fitting andCasey strongly reinforce the conclusionthat the IDEA does not unambiguouslyauthorize prevailing parents to recover ex-pert fees.

V

Respondents make several argumentsthat are not based on the text of theIDEA, but these arguments do not showthat the IDEA provides clear notice re-garding the award of expert fees.

Respondents argue that their interpreta-tion of the IDEA furthers the Act’s over-arching goal of ‘‘ensur[ing] that all chil-dren with disabilities have available tothem a free appropriate public education,’’20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), as well as thegoal of ‘‘safeguard[ing] the rights of par-ents to challenge school decisions that ad-versely affect their child.’’ Brief for Re-spondents 20. These goals, however, aretoo general to provide much support forrespondents’ reading of the terms of theIDEA. The IDEA obviously does not seekto promote these goals at the expense ofall other considerations, including fiscalconsiderations. Because the IDEA is notintended in all instances to further thebroad goals identified by respondents atthe expense of fiscal considerations, thegoals cited by respondents do little to bol-

ster their argument on the narrow ques-tion presented here.3

S 304Finally, respondents vigorously arguethat Congress clearly intended for prevail-ing parents to be compensated for expertfees. They rely on the legislative historyof § 1415 and in particular on the follow-ing statement in the Conference Commit-tee Report, discussed above: ‘‘The confer-ees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees aspart of the costs’ include reasonable ex-penses and fees of expert witnesses andthe reasonable costs of any test or evalua-tion which is found to be necessary for thepreparation of the TTT case.’’ H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 99–687, at 5, U.S.Code Cong. &Admin.News, 1986, pp. 1807, 1808.

Whatever weight this legislative historywould merit in another context, it is notsufficient here. Putting the legislative his-tory aside, we see virtually no support forrespondents’ position. Under these cir-cumstances, where everything other thanthe legislative history overwhelmingly sug-gests that expert fees may not be recov-ered, the legislative history is simply notenough. In a Spending Clause case, thekey is not what a majority of the Membersof both Houses intend but what the Statesare clearly told regarding the conditionsthat go along with the acceptance of thosefunds. Here, in the face of the unambigu-ous text of the IDEA and the reasoning inCrawford Fitting and Casey, we cannotsay that the legislative history on whichrespondents rely is sufficient to providethe requisite fair notice.

* * *

We reverse the judgment of the Courtof Appeals for the Second Circuit and re-

3. Respondents note that a GAO report statedthat expert witness fees are reimbursable ex-penses. See Brief for Respondents 19 (citingGAO, Briefing Report to Congressional Re-questers, Special Education: The Attorney

Fees Provision of Public Law 99–372 (GAO/HRD–90–22BR), p. 13 (Nov.1989)). But thispassing reference in a report issued by anagency not responsible for implementing theIDEA is plainly insufficient to provide clear


mand the case for further proceedings con-sistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice GINSBURG, concurring in partand concurring in the judgment.

I agree, in the main, with the Court’sresolution of this case, but part ways withthe Court’s opinion in one respect. TheCourt extracts from Pennhurst StateSchool and HospiStal305 v. Halderman, 451U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694(1981), a ‘‘clear notice’’ requirement, anddeems it applicable in this case becauseCongress enacted the Individuals with Dis-abilities Education Act (IDEA), as it didthe legislation at issue in Pennhurst, pur-suant to the Spending Clause. Ante, at2459. That extraction, in my judgment, isunwarranted. Pennhurst’s ‘‘clear notice’’requirement should not be unmoored fromits context. The Court there confronted aplea to impose ‘‘an unexpected conditionfor compliance—a new [programmatic] ob-ligation for participating States.’’ Bell v.New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790, n. 17, 103S.Ct. 2187, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). Thecontroversy here is lower key: It concernsnot the educational programs IDEA di-rects school districts to provide, but ‘‘theremedies available against a noncomplying[district].’’ Ibid.; see post, at 2466 – 2468(BREYER, J., dissenting).

The Court’s repeated references to aSpending Clause derived ‘‘clear notice’’ re-quirement, see ante, at 2458 – 2459, 2460,2461, 2463, and n. 3, are questionable onother grounds as well. For one thing,IDEA was enacted not only pursuant toCongress’ Spending Clause authority, butalso pursuant to § 5 of the FourteenthAmendment. See Smith v. Robinson, 468U.S. 992, 1009, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d

746 (1984) (IDEA’s predecessor, the Edu-cation of the Handicapped Act, was ‘‘set upby Congress to aid the States in complyingwith their constitutional obligations to pro-vide public education for handicapped chil-dren.’’). Furthermore, no ‘‘clear notice’’prop is needed in this case given the twinpillars on which the Court’s judgment se-curely rests. First, as the Court explains,ante, at 2459 – 2460, the specific, attor-neys’-fees-oriented, provisions of IDEA,i.e., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(G);§ 1415(d)(2)(L) (2000 ed., Supp.V), ‘‘over-whelmingly support the conclusion thatprevailing parents may not recover thecosts of experts or consultants,’’ ante, at2461. Those provisions place controls onfees recoverable for attorneys’ services,without mentioning costs parents mightincur for other professional services andcontrols geared to those costs. Second, asthe Court develops, prior S 306decisionsclosely in point ‘‘strongly suppor[t],’’ even‘‘confir[m] TTT dramatically,’’ today’s hold-ing that IDEA trains on attorneys’ feesand does not authorize an award coveringamounts paid or payable for the services ofan educational consultant. Ante, at 2462(citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gib-bons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96L.Ed.2d 385 (1987), and West VirginiaUniv. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991)).

For the contrary conclusion, JusticeBREYER’s dissent relies dominantly on aConference Report stating the conferees’view that the term ‘‘attorneys’ fees as partof the costs’’ includes ‘‘expenses and feesof expert witnesses’’ and payments fortests necessary for the preparation of acase. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).1

notice regarding the scope of the conditionsattached to the receipt of IDEA funds.

1. The relevant statement from the ConferenceReport reads in its entirety:

‘‘The conferees intend that the term ‘attor-neys’ fees as part of the costs’ include reason-able expenses and fees of expert witnesses


548 U.S. 308

Including costs of consultants and tests in§ 1415(i)(3)(B) would make good sense inlight of IDEA’s overarching goal, i.e., toprovide a ‘‘free appropriate public edu-cation’’ to children with disabilities,§ 1400(d)(1)(A). See post, at 2468 – 2470(BREYER, J., dissenting). But Congressdid not compose § 1415(i)(3)(B)’s text,2 asit did the texts of other S 307statutes toonumerous and varied to ignore, to alter thecommon import of the terms ‘‘attorneys’fees’’ and ‘‘costs’’ in the context of ex-pense-allocation legislation. See, e.g., 42U.S.C. § 1988(c) (added in 1991 specificallyto ‘‘include expert fees as part of the attor-ney’s fee’’); Casey, 499 U.S., at 88–92, andn. 4, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (citing variously com-posed statutes that ‘‘explicitly shift expertTTT fees as well as attorney’s fees’’). Giv-en the constant meaning of the formulation‘‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’’ infederal legislation, we are not at liberty torewrite ‘‘the statutory text adopted byboth Houses of Congress and submitted tothe President,’’ id., at 98, 111 S.Ct. 1138, to

add several words Congress wisely mighthave included. The ball, I conclude, isproperly left in Congress’ court to provide,if it so elects, for consultant fees and test-ing expenses beyond those IDEA and itsimplementing regulations already author-ize,3 along with any specifications, condi-tions, or limitations geared to those feesand expenses Congress may deem appro-priate. Cf. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(G);§ 1415(d)(2)(L) (listing only attorneys’fees, not expert or consulting fees, amongthe procedural safeguards about whichschool districts must inform parents).

In sum, although I disagree with theCourt’s rationale to the extent that it in-vokes a ‘‘clear notice’’ requirement tiedS 308to the Spending Clause, I agree withthe Court’s discussion of IDEA’s terms,ante, at 2459 – 2460, and of our decisions inCrawford and Casey, ante, at 2461 – 2463.Accordingly, I concur in part in theCourt’s opinion, and join the Court’s judg-ment.

and the reasonable costs of any test or evalua-tion which is found to be necessary for thepreparation of the parent or guardian’s casein the action or proceeding, as well as tradi-tional costs incurred in the course of litigatinga case.’’ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5,U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1986, pp.1807, 1808.

Although the Conference Report goes on toconsider other matters, including controls onattorneys’ fees, nothing further is said on ex-pert witness fees or test costs.

2. At the time the Conference Report was sub-mitted to the Senate and House, sponsors ofthe legislation did not mention anything onthe floor about expert or consultant fees.They were altogether clear, however, that thepurpose of the legislation was to ‘‘reverse’’this Court’s decision in Smith v. Robinson,468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746(1984). In Smith, the Court held that, underthe statute as then designed, prevailing par-ents were not entitled to attorneys’ fees. See132 Cong. Rec. 16823 (1986) (remarks of Sen.Weicker) (‘‘In adopting this legislation, we are

rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Courtin Smith versus Robinson.’’); id., at 16824(remarks of Sen. Kerry) (‘‘This vital legisla-tion reverses a U.S. Supreme Court decisionSmith versus Robinson[.]’’); id., at 17608–17609 (remarks of Rep. Bartlett) (‘‘I supportthose provisions in the conference agreementthat, in response to the Supreme Court deci-sion in TTT Smith versus Robinson, author-iz[e] the awarding of reasonable attorneys’fees to parents who prevail in special edu-cation court cases.’’); id., at 17609 (remarksof Rep. Biaggi) (‘‘This legislation clearly sup-ports the intent of Congress back in 1975 andcorrects what I believe was a gross misinter-pretation of the law. Attorneys’ fees shouldbe provided to those individuals who are be-ing denied access to the educational sys-tem.’’).

3. Under 34 CFR § 300.502(b)(1) (2005), a‘‘parent has the right to an independent edu-cational evaluation at public expense if theparent disagrees with an evaluation obtainedby the public agency.’’


Justice SOUTER, dissenting.

I join Justice BREYER’s dissent andadd this word only to say outright whatwould otherwise be implicit, that I agreewith the distinction he draws between thiscase and Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181,122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002).See post, at 2471 (citing Barnes, supra, at191, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (SOUTER, J., concur-ring)). Beyond that, I emphasize the im-portance for me of § 4 of the HandicappedChildren’s Protection Act of 1986, 100 Stat.797, note following 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988ed.), which mandated the study by what isnow known as the Government Accounta-bility Office. That section, of equal dignitywith the fee-shifting provision enacted bythe same statute, makes Justice BREY-ER’s resort to the related Conference Re-port the reasonable course.

Justice BREYER, with whom JusticeSTEVENS and Justice SOUTER join,dissenting.

The Individuals with Disabilities Edu-cation Act (IDEA or Act), 20 U.S.C.§ 1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp.V), saysthat a court may ‘‘award reasonable attor-neys’ fees as part of the costs to theparents’’ who are prevailing parties.§ 1415(i)(3)(B). Unlike the Court, I be-lieve that the word ‘‘costs’’ includes, andauthorizes payment of, the costs of ex-perts. The word ‘‘costs’’ does not defineits own scope. Neither does the phrase‘‘attorneys’ fees as part of costs.’’ ButMembers of Congress did make clear theirintent by, among other things, approving aConference Report that specified that ‘‘theterm ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’include[s] reasonable expenses and fees ofexpert witnesses and the reasonable costsof any test or evaluation which is found tobe necessary for the preparation of theparent or S 309guardian’s case in the action

or proceeding.’’ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986), U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-min.News, 1986, pp. 1807, 1808, AppendixA, infra, at 2475–2476. No Senator orRepresentative voiced any opposition tothis statement in the discussion precedingthe vote on the Conference Report—thelast vote on the bill before it was sent tothe President. I can find no good reasonfor this Court to interpret the language ofthis statute as meaning the precise oppo-site of what Congress told us it intended.

I

There are two strong reasons for inter-preting the statutory phrase to include theaward of expert fees. First, that is whatCongress said it intended by the phrase.Second, that interpretation furthers theIDEA’s statutorily defined purposes.

A

Congress added the IDEA’s cost-shift-ing provision when it enacted the Handi-capped Children’s Protection Act of 1986(HCPA), 100 Stat. 796. Senator LowellWeicker introduced the relevant bill in1985. 131 Cong. Rec. 1979–1980 (1985).As introduced, it sought to overturn thisCourt’s determination that the then-cur-rent version of the IDEA (and other civilrights statutes) did not authorize courts toaward attorney’s fees to prevailing parentsin IDEA cases. See Smith v. Robinson,468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d746 (1984). The bill provided that ‘‘ ‘[i]nany action or proceeding brought underthis subsection, the court, in its discretion,may award a reasonable attorney’s fee aspart of the costs to a parent or legalrepresentative of a handicapped child oryouth who is the prevailing party.’ ’’ 131Cong. Rec.1980; see S.Rep. No. 99–112, p.2 (1985).

After hearings and debate, several Sena-tors introduced a new bill in the Senate


548 U.S. 311

that would have put a cap on attorney’sfees for legal services lawyers, but at thesame time would have explicitly authorizedthe award of ‘‘a reasonable attorney’s fee,reasonable witness fees, and other reason-able S 310expenses of the civil action, in addi-tion to the costs to a parent TTT who is theprevailing party.’’ Id., at 7 (some empha-sis deleted). While no Senator objected tothe latter provision, some objected to thecap. See, e.g., id., at 17–18 (additionalviews of Sens. Kerry, Kennedy, Pell, Dodd,Simon, Metzenbaum, and Matsunaga) (ac-cepting cost-shifting provision, but object-ing to cap and other aspects of the bill). Abipartisan group of Senators, led by Sena-tors Hatch and Weicker, proposed an al-ternative bill that authorized courts toaward ‘‘ ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee in ad-dition to the costs to a parent’ ’’ who pre-vailed. Id., at 15–16 (additional views ofSens. Hatch, Weicker, Stafford, Dole, Pell,Matsunaga, Simon, Kerry, Kennedy,Metzenbaum, Dodd, and Grassley); 131Cong. Rec. 21389.

Senator Weicker explained that the bill‘‘will enable courts to compensate par-ents for whatever reasonable costs theyhad to incur to fully secure what wasguaranteed to them by the [Education ofthe Handicapped Act]. As in other feeshifting statutes, it is our intent thatsuch awards will include, at the discre-tion of the court, reasonable attorney’sfees, necessary expert witness fees, andother reasonable expenses which werenecessary for parents to vindicate theirclaim to a free appropriate public edu-cation for their handicapped child.’’Id., at 21390 (emphasis added).

Not a word of opposition to this statement(or the provision) was voiced on the Senatefloor, and S. 415 passed without a recordedvote. Id., at 21393.

The House version of the bill also re-flected an intention to authorize recoveryof expert costs. Following the House

hearings, the Committee on Education andLabor produced a substitute bill that au-thorized courts to ‘‘ ‘award reasonable at-torneys’ fees, expenses, and costs’ ’’ to pre-vailing parents. H.R.Rep. No. 99–296, pp.1, 5 (1985) (emphasis added). The HouseReport stated:

S 311‘‘The phrase ‘expenses and costs’ in-cludes expenses of expert witnesses; thereasonable costs of any study, report,test, or project which is found to benecessary for the preparation of the par-ents’ or guardian’s due process hearing,state administrative review or civil ac-tion; as well as traditional costs andexpenses incurred in the course of liti-gating a case (e.g., depositions and inter-rogatories).’’ Id., at 6 (emphasis added).

No one objected to this statement. By thetime H.R. 1523 reached the floor, anothersubstitute bill was introduced. 131 Cong.Rec. 31369 (1985). This new bill did notchange in any respect the text of the au-thorization of expenses and costs. It didadd a provision, however, that directed theGeneral Accounting Office (GAO)—nowknown as the Government AccountabilityOffice, see note following 31 U.S.C. § 731(2000 ed., Supp.IV)—to study and reportto Congress on the fiscal impact of thecost-shifting provision. See 131 Cong.Rec.31369–31370. The newly substituted billpassed the House without a recorded vote.Id., at 31377.

Members of the House and Senate (in-cluding all of the primary sponsors of theHCPA) then met in conference to work outcertain differences. At the conclusion ofthose negotiations, they produced a Con-ference Report, which contained the textof the agreed-upon bill and a ‘‘Joint Ex-planatory Statement of the Committee ofConference.’’ See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.99–687, at 5, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-min.News, 1986, pp. 1807, Appendix A,infra, at 2475. The Conference acceptedthe House bill’s GAO provision with ‘‘an


amendment expanding the data collectionrequirements of the GAO study to includeinformation regarding the amount of fundsexpended by local educational agencies andstate educational agencies on civil actionsand administrative proceedings.’’ Id., at 7,Appendix A, infra, at 2477. And it accept-ed (with minor changes) the cost-shiftingprovisions provided in both the Senate andHouse versions. The conferees explained:

S 312‘‘With slightly different wording, boththe Senate bill and the House amend-ment provide for the awarding of attor-neys’ fees in addition to costs.

‘‘The Senate recedes to the House andthe House recedes to the Senate with anamendment clarifying that ‘the court, inits discretion, may award reasonable at-torneys’ fees as part of the costs TTT’This change in wording incorporates theSupreme Court[’s] Marek v. Chesny[,473 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 L.Ed.2d 1(1985),] decision.

‘‘The conferees intend that the term‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ in-clude reasonable expenses and fees ofexpert witnesses and the reasonablecosts of any test or evaluation which isfound to be necessary for the prepara-tion of the parent or guardian’s case inthe action or proceeding, as well as tra-ditional costs incurred in the course oflitigating a case.’’ Id., at 5, 105 S.Ct.3012, Appendix A, infra, at 2476 (em-phasis added; citation omitted).

The Conference Report was returned tothe Senate and the House. A motion wasput to each to adopt the Conference Re-port, and both the Senate and the Houseagreed to the Conference Report by voicevotes. See Appendix B, infra, at 2478(Senate); Appendix C, infra, at 2479(House). No objection was raised to theConference Report’s statement that thecost-shifting provision was intended to au-thorize expert costs. I concede that‘‘sponsors of the legislation did not men-tion anything on the floor about expert or

consultant fees’’ at the time the Confer-ence Report was submitted. Ante, at2465, n. 2 (GINSBURG, J., concurring inpart and concurring in judgment). But Ido not believe that silence is significant inlight of the fact that every Senator andthree of the five Representatives whospoke on the floor had previously signedhis name to the Conference Report—aReport that made Congress’ intent clearon the first page of its explanation. SeeAppendix A, infra, at 2475. And everySenator and Representative who took thefloor preceding the votes voiced his strongsupport for the Conference Report.S 313132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825 (1986)(Senate); id., at 17607–17612 (House).The upshot is that Members of both Hous-es of Congress voted to adopt both thestatutory text before us and the Confer-ence Report that made clear that the stat-ute’s words include the expert costs herein question.

B

The Act’s basic purpose further sup-ports interpreting the provision’s languageto include expert costs. The IDEA guar-antees a ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘appropriate’’ publiceducation for ‘‘all’’ children with disabili-ties. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000 ed.,Supp.V); see also § 1401(9)(A) (defining‘‘free appropriate public education’’ as one‘‘provided at public expense,’’ ‘‘withoutcharge’’); § 1401(29) (defining ‘‘special ed-ucation’’ as ‘‘specially designed instruction,at no cost to parents, to meet the uniqueneeds of a child with a disability’’ (empha-sis added)).

Parents have every right to become in-volved in the Act’s efforts to provide thateducation; indeed, the Act encouragestheir participation. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (IDEA‘‘ensur[es] that families of [disabled] chil-dren have meaningful opportunities to par-ticipate in the education of their childrenat school’’). It assures parents that they


548 U.S. 315

may question a school district’s decisionsabout what is ‘‘appropriate’’ for their child.And in doing so, they may secure the helpof experts. § 1415(h)(1) (parents have ‘‘theright to be accompanied and advised bycounsel and by individuals with specialknowledge or training with respect to theproblems of children with disabilities’’);see generally Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.49, 53–54, 126 S.Ct. 528, 532–533, 163L.Ed.2d 387 (2005) (detailing Act’s proce-dures); Board of Ed. of Hendrick HudsonCentral School Dist., Westchester Cty. v.Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205–206, 102 S.Ct.3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (emphasizingimportance of Act’s procedural guaran-tees).

The practical significance of the Act’sparticipatory rights and procedural protec-tions may be seriously diminished if par-ents are unable to obtain reimbursementfor the costs of S 314their experts. In IDEAcases, experts are necessary. See Kuriloff& Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way toResolve Special Education Disputes?First Empirical Findings, 2 Harv. Negotia-tion L.Rev. 35, 40 (1997) (detailing findingsof study showing high correlation betweenuse of experts and success of parents inchallenging school district’s plan); Kuri-loff, Is Justice Served by Due Process?:Affecting the Outcome of Special Edu-cation Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48 Law &Contemp. Prob. 89, 100–101, 109 (1985)(same); see also Brief for National Disabil-ity Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae6–15 (collecting sources); cf. Schaffer, su-pra, at 66–67, 126 S.Ct., at 540 (GINS-BURG, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he vast majori-ty of parents whose children require thebenefits and protections provided in theIDEA lack knowledge about the education-al resources available to their child and thesophistication to mount an effective caseagainst a district-proposed,’’ individualizededucation program (IEP) (internal quota-tion marks and brackets omitted)).

Experts are also expensive. See Brieffor Respondents 28, n. 17 (collecting Dis-trict Court decisions awarding expert costs

ranging from $200 to $7,600, and notingthree reported cases in which expertawards exceeded $10,000). The costs ofexperts may not make much of a dent in aschool district’s budget, as many of theexperts they use in IDEA proceedings arealready on the staff. Cf. Oberti v. Boardof Ed. Clementon School Dist., 995 F.2d1204, 1219 (C.A.3 1993). But to parents,the award of costs may matter enormous-ly. Without potential reimbursement, par-ents may well lack the services of expertsentirely. See Dept. of Education, M. Wag-ner et al., The Individual and HouseholdCharacteristics of Youth With Disabilities:A Report from the National LongitudinalTransition Study–2 (NLTS2), p. 3–10(Aug.2003) (prepared by SRI Internation-al), online at http://www.nlts2.org/reports/2003 08/nlts2 report 2003 08 complete.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June23, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’scase file) (finding that 25% of disabledS 315children live in poverty and 65% live inhouseholds with incomes less than$50,000); see Dept. of Education, M. Wag-ner, C. Marder, J. Blackorb & D. Cardoso,The Children We Serve: The Demograph-ic Characteristics of Elementary and Mid-dle School Students with Disabilities andTheir Households 28 (Sept.2002) (preparedby SRI International), online at http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELSChildren We Serve Report.pdf (findingthat 36% of disabled children live in house-holds with incomes of $25,000 or less).

In a word, the Act’s statutory right to a‘‘free’’ and ‘‘appropriate’’ education maymean little to those who must pay hun-dreds of dollars to obtain it. That is whythis Court has previously avoided interpre-tations that would bring about this kind ofresult. See School Comm. of Burlingtonv. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S.359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985)(construing IDEA provision granting equi-table authority to courts to include thepower to order reimbursement for parents


who switch their child to private schools ifthat decision later proves correct); id., at370, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (without cost reim-bursement for prevailing parents, ‘‘thechild’s right to a free appropriate publiceducation, the parents’ right to participatefully in developing a proper IEP, and all ofthe procedural safeguards would be lessthan complete’’); Florence County SchoolDist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (holdingthat prevailing parents are not barredfrom reimbursement for switching theirchild to a private school that does not meetthe IDEA’s definition of a free and appro-priate education). In Carter, we ex-plained: ‘‘IDEA was intended to ensurethat children with disabilities receive aneducation that is both appropriate andfree. To read the provisions of§ 1401(a)(18) to bar reimbursement in thecircumstances of this case would defeatthis statutory purpose.’’ Id., at 13–14, 114S.Ct. 361 (citation omitted).

To read the word ‘‘costs’’ as requiringsuccessful parents to bear their own ex-penses for experts suffers from the sameproblem. Today’s result will leave manyparents and guardians ‘‘without an expertwith the firepower to match the opSposi-tion,’’316 Schaffer, 546 U.S., at 61, 126 S.Ct.,at 536, a far cry from the level playingfield that Congress envisioned.

II

The majority makes essentially three ar-guments against this interpretation. Itsays that the statute’s purpose and ‘‘legis-lative history is simply not enough’’ toovercome: (1) the fact that this is a Spend-ing Clause case; (2) the text of the statute;and (3) our prior cases which hold that theterm ‘‘costs’’ does not include expert costs.Ante, at 2463. I do not find these argu-ments convincing.

A

At the outset the majority says that it‘‘is guided by the fact that Congress enact-ed the IDEA pursuant to the SpendingClause.’’ Ante, at 2458. ‘‘In a SpendingClause case,’’ the majority adds, ‘‘the keyis not what a majority of the Members ofboth Houses intend but what the Statesare clearly told regarding the conditionsthat go along with the acceptance of thosefunds.’’ Ante, at 2463. Thus, the statute’s‘‘conditions must be set out ‘unambiguous-ly.’ ’’ Ante, at 2459 (citing PennhurstState School and Hospital v. Halderman,451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d694 (1981), and Rowley, 458 U.S., at 204, n.26, 102 S.Ct. 3034). And ‘‘we must ask’’whether the statute ‘‘furnishes clear noticeregarding the liability at issue in thiscase.’’ Ante, at 2459.

I agree that the statute on its face doesnot clearly tell the States that they mustpay expert fees to prevailing parents. ButI do not agree that the majority has posedthe right question. For one thing, wehave repeatedly examined the nature andextent of the financial burdens that theIDEA imposes without reference to theSpending Clause or any ‘‘clear-statementrule.’’ See, e.g., Burlington, supra, at 369,105 S.Ct. 1996 (private school fees); Car-ter, supra, at 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (same);Smith, 468 U.S., at 1010–1011, 104 S.Ct.3457 (attorney’s fees); Cedar Rapids Com-munity School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S.66, 76–79, 119 S.Ct. 992, 143 L.Ed.2d 154(1999) (continuous nursing service); butsee id., at 83, 119 S.Ct. 992 (THOMAS, J.,S 317joined by KENNEDY, J., dissenting).Those cases did not ask whether the stat-ute ‘‘furnishes clear notice’’ to the affirma-tive obligation or liability at issue.

For another thing, neither Pennhurstnor any other case suggests that everyspending detail of a Spending Clause stat-


548 U.S. 318

ute must be spelled out with unusual clari-ty. To the contrary, we have held thatPennhurst’s requirement that Congress‘‘unambiguously’’ set out ‘‘a condition onthe grant of federal money’’ does not nec-essarily apply to legislation setting forth‘‘the remedies available against a noncom-plying State.’’ Bell v. New Jersey, 461U.S. 773, 790, n. 17, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 76L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (emphasis added) (re-jecting Pennhurst-based argument thatElementary and Secondary Education Actof 1965 did not unambiguously providethat the Secretary could recover federalfunds that are misused by a State). Wehave added that Pennhurst does not re-quire Congress ‘‘specifically’’ to ‘‘identify’’and ‘‘proscribe each condition in [SpendingClause] legislation.’’ Jackson v. Birming-ham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 183, 125S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) (empha-sis added; internal quotation marks andbrackets omitted) (rejecting argument thatPennhurst precluded interpreting TitleIX’s private cause of action to encompassretaliation); see also Bennett v. KentuckyDept. of Ed., 470 U.S. 656, 665–666, 105S.Ct. 1544, 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985). And wehave denied any implication that ‘‘suitsunder Spending Clause legislation aresuits in contract, or that contract-law prin-ciples apply to all issues that they raise.’’Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 188–189,n. 2, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002)(emphasis added).

These statements and holdings are notsurprising. After all, the basic objectiveof Pennhurst’s clear-statement require-ment does not demand textual clarity inrespect to every detail. That is becauseambiguity about the precise nature of astatutory program’s details—particularlywhere they are of a kind that States mighthave anticipated—is rarely relevant to thebasic question: Would the States have ac-cepted the Federal Government’s fundshad they only known the nature of the

accompanying conditions? Often, S 318thelater filling-in of details through judicialinterpretation will not lead one to wonderwhether funding recipients would haveagreed to enter the basic program at all.Given the nature of such details, it is clearthat the States would have entered theprogram regardless. At the same time, toview each statutory detail of a highly com-plex federal/state program (involving, say,transportation, schools, the environment)simply through the lens of linguistic clari-ty, rather than to assess its meanings interms of basic legislative purpose, is torisk a set of judicial interpretations thatcan prevent the program, overall, fromachieving its basic objectives or that mightwell reduce a program in its details toincoherence.

This case is about just such a detail.Permitting parents to recover expert feeswill not lead to awards of ‘‘indeterminatemagnitude, untethered to compensableharm’’ and consequently will not ‘‘pose aconcern that recipients of federal fundingcould not reasonably have anticipated.’’Barnes, 536 U.S., at 190–191, 122 S.Ct.2097 (SOUTER, J., joined by O’CONNOR,J., concurring) (citation and internal quota-tion marks omitted). Unlike, say, punitivedamages, an award of costs to expert par-ties is neither ‘‘unorthodox’’ nor ‘‘indeter-minate,’’ and thus does not throw intodoubt whether the States would have en-tered into the program. Id., at 188, 122S.Ct. 2097. If determinations as to wheth-er the IDEA requires States to providecontinuing nursing services, Cedar Rapids,supra, or reimbursement for private schooltuition, Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct.1996, do not call for linguistic clarity, thenthe precise content of recoverable ‘‘costs’’does not call for such clarity here a fortio-ri.

BIf the Court believes that the statute’s

language is unambiguous, I must disagree.


The provision at issue says that a court‘‘may award reasonable attorneys’ fees aspart of the costs’’ to parents who prevail inan action brought under the Act. 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(i)(3)(B). The statute neither de-fines S 319the word ‘‘costs’’ nor points to anyother source of law for a definition. Andthe word ‘‘costs,’’ alone, says nothing at allabout which costs fall within its scope.

Neither does the statutory phrase—‘‘aspart of the costs to the parents of a childwith a disability who is the prevailing par-ty’’—taken in its entirety unambiguouslyforeclose an award of expert fees. I agreethat, read literally, that provision does notclearly grant authority to award any costsat all. And one might read it, as the Courtdoes, as referencing another federal stat-ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which provides thatauthority. See ante, at 2459–2460; seealso § 1920 (federal taxation of cost stat-ute). But such a reading is not inevitable.The provision (indeed, the entire Act) saysnothing about that other statute. And onecan, consistent with the language, read theprovision as both embodying a general au-thority to award costs while also specifyingthe inclusion of ‘‘reasonable attorneys’fees’’ as part of those costs (as saying, forexample, that a court ‘‘may award reason-able attorneys’ fees as part of [a] costs[award]’’).

This latter reading, while linguisticallythe less natural, is legislatively the morelikely. The majority’s alternative reading,by cross-referencing only the federal gen-eral cost-awarding statute (which appliessolely in federal courts ), would produce ajumble of different cost definitions applica-ble to similar IDEA administrative andstate-court proceedings in different States.See § 1920 (‘‘A judge or clerk of any courtof the United States may tax as costs thefollowing TTT’’ (emphasis added)). Thisresult is particularly odd, as all IDEA

actions must begin in state due processhearings, where the federal cost statuteclearly does not apply, and the overwhelm-ing majority of these actions are neverappealed to any court. See GAO, Reportto the Ranking Minority Member, Com-mittee on Health, Education, Labor andPensions, U.S. Senate, Special Education:Numbers of Formal Disputes Are General-ly Low and States Are Using Mediationand Other Strategies to Resolve Conflicts(GAO–S03–897),320 p. 13 (Sept. 2003), onlineat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03897.pdf (approximately 3,000 administrativehearings annually; under 10% appealed tostate or federal court); see also Moore v.District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 166(C.A.D.C.1990) (en banc) (joining otherCircuits in holding that IDEA authorizesan ‘‘award of attorney fees to a parent whoprevails in [IDEA] administrative proceed-ings’’). And when parents do appeal, theycan file their actions in either state orfederal courts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)(2000 ed., Supp.V).

Would Congress ‘‘obviously’’ have want-ed the content of the word ‘‘costs’’ to varyfrom State to State, proceeding to pro-ceeding? Ante, at 2460. Why? At most,the majority’s reading of the text is plausi-ble; it is not the only possible reading.

C

The majority’s most persuasive argu-ment does not focus on either the Spend-ing Clause or lack of statutory ambiguity.Rather, the majority says that ‘‘costs’’ is aterm of art. In light of the law’s longpractice of excluding expert fees from thescope of the word ‘‘costs,’’ along with thisCourt’s cases interpreting the word simi-larly in other statutes, the ‘‘legislative his-tory is simply not enough.’’ Ante, at 2463.

I am perfectly willing to assume that themajority is correct about the traditionalscope of the word ‘‘costs.’’ In two cases


548 U.S. 322

this Court has held that the word ‘‘costs’’is limited to the list set forth in 28 U.S.C.§ 1920 and does not include fees paid toexperts. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494,96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987) (interpreting Fed.Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d)); West VirginiaUniv. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991)(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 ed.)).But Congress is free to redefine terms ofart. See, e.g., Casey, 499 U.S., at 88–90,111 S.Ct. 1138 (citing examples of statutesthat shift ‘‘ ‘costs of litigation (includingTTT expert witness fees)’ ’’). And we havesuggested that it might well do so througha statutory provision worded in a mannersimilar to S 321the statute here—indeed, wecited the Conference Report language hereat issue. Id., at 91–92, n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 1138(characterizing language as an ‘‘apparenteffort to depart from ordinary meaningand to define a term of art’’ and notingthat Congress made no such ‘‘effort’’ inrespect to 42 U.S.C. § 1988).

Regardless, here the statute itself indi-cates that Congress did not intend to usethe word ‘‘costs’’ as a term of art. TheHCPA, which added the cost-shifting pro-vision (in § 2) to the IDEA, also addedanother provision (in § 4) directing theGAO to ‘‘conduct a study of the impact ofthe amendments to the [IDEA] made bysection 2’’ over a 31/2-year period followingthe Act’s effective date. § 4(a), 100 Stat.797. To determine the fiscal impact of § 2(the cost-shifting provision), § 4 orderedthe GAO to submit a report to Congresscontaining, among other things, the follow-ing information:

‘‘Data, for a geographically representa-tive select sample of States, indicating(A) the specific amount of attorneys’fees, costs, and expenses awarded to theprevailing party, in each action and pro-ceeding under [§ 2] from the date of theenactment of this Act through fiscal year

1988, and the range of such fees, costsand expenses awarded in the actions andproceedings under such section, catego-rized by type of complaint and (B) forthe same sample as in (A) the number ofhours spent by personnel, including at-torneys and consultants, involved in theaction or proceeding, and expenses in-curred by the parents and the Stateeducational agency and local educationalagency.’’ § 4(b)(3), id., at 797–798 (em-phasis added).

If Congress intended the word ‘‘costs’’ in§ 2 to authorize an award of only thosecosts listed in the federal cost statute, whydid it use the word ‘‘expenses’’ in§ 4(b)(3)(A) as part of the ‘‘amount TTT

awarded to the prevailing party’’? Whenused as a term of art, after all, ‘‘costs’’does not cover expenses. Nor does thefederal costs statute cover any exSpens-es322—at least not any that Congress couldhave wanted the GAO to study. Cf. 28U.S.C. § 1920 (referring only once to ‘‘ex-penses,’’ and doing so solely to refer tospecial interpretation services provided inactions initiated by the United States).

Further, why did Congress, when askingthe GAO (in the statute itself) to study the‘‘number of hours spent by personnel,’’include among those personnel both attor-neys ‘‘and consultants ’’? Who but ex-perts could those consultants be? Whywould Congress want the GAO to studythe hours that those experts ‘‘spent,’’ un-less it thought that it would help keeptrack of the ‘‘costs’’ that the statute im-posed?

Of course, one might, through specula-tion, find other answers to these questions.One might, for example, imagine that Con-gress wanted the GAO to study the ex-penses that payment of expert fees engen-dered in state-court proceedings wherestate, but not federal, law requires that


‘‘ ‘expenses’ other than ‘costs’ might bereceivable.’’ Ante, at 2460, n. 1; but seesupra, at 2472. Or one might think thatthe word ‘‘expenses’’ is surplusage. Ante,at 2460, n. 1; but see Duncan v. Walker,533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (expressing Court’s‘‘ ‘reluctan[ce] to treat statutory terms assurplusage’ in any setting,’’ but especiallywhen they play ‘‘so pivotal a place in thestatutory scheme’’). Or one might believethat Congress was interested in the hoursthese experts spent, but not in the feesthey obtained. Ante, at 2460–2461. Butthese answers are not necessarily consis-tent with the purpose of the GAO studyprovision, a purpose revealed by the lan-guage of the provision and its position inthe statute. Its placement and its refer-ence to § 2 indicate that Congress orderedthe study to help it keep track of themagnitude of the reimbursements that anearlier part of the new statute (namely,§ 2) mandated. See 100 Stat. 797 (statingthat purpose of GAO study was to deter-mine the ‘‘impact’’ of ‘‘section 2’’). And theonly reimbursement requirement that § 2mandates is the payment of ‘‘costs.’’

S 323But why speculate about this? Weknow what Congress intended the GAOstudy to cover. It told the GAO in itsConference Report that the word ‘‘costs’’included the costs of experts. And, notsurprisingly, the GAO made clear that itunderstood precisely what Congressasked it to do. In its final report, theGAO wrote: ‘‘Parents can receive reim-bursement from state or local educationagencies for some or all of their attorneyfees and related expenses if they are theprevailing party in part or all of adminis-trative hearings or court proceedings.Expert witness fees, cost of tests or evalu-ations found to be necessary during thecase, and court costs for services renderedduring administrative and court proceed-ings are examples of reimbursable ex-

penses.’’ GAO, Briefing Report to Con-gressional Requesters, Special Education:The Attorney Fees Provision of PublicLaw 99–372 (GAO/HRD–90–22BR), p. 13(Nov.1989) (emphasis added), online athttp://archive.gao.gov/d26t7/140084.pdf.At the very least, this amounts to someindication that Congress intended theword ‘‘costs,’’ not as a term of art, not asit was used in the statutes at issue inCasey and Crawford Fitting, but ratheras including certain additional ‘‘expenses.’’If that is so, the claims of tradition, of theinterpretation this Court has given otherstatutes, cannot be so strong as to pre-vent us from examining the legislativehistory. And that history could not bemore clear about the matter: Congressintended the statutory phrase ‘‘attorneys’fees as part of the costs’’ to include thecosts of experts. See Part I, supra.

IIIFor the reasons I have set forth, I can-

not agree with the majority’s conclusion.Even less can I agree with its failure toconsider fully the statute’s legislative his-tory. That history makes Congress’ pur-pose clear. And our ultimate judicial goalis to interpret language in light of thestatute’s purpose. Only by seeking thatpurpose can we avoid the substitution ofjudicial for legislative will. Only by read-ing S 324language in its light can we maintainthe democratic link between voters, legis-lators, statutes, and ultimate implementa-tion, upon which the legitimacy of our con-stitutional system rests.

In my view, to keep faith with thatinterpretive goal, we must retain all tradi-tional interpretive tools—text, structure,history, and purpose. And, because faith-ful interpretation is art as well as science,we cannot, through rule or canon, rule outthe use of any of these tools, automaticallyand in advance. Cf. Helvering v. Gregory,69 F.2d 809, 810–811 (C.A.2 1934) (L.Hand, J.).


548 U.S. 326

Nothing in the Constitution forbids us togive significant weight to legislative histo-ry. By disregarding a clear statement in alegislative Report adopted without opposi-tion in both Houses of Congress, the ma-jority has reached a result no Member ofCongress expected or overtly desired. Ithas adopted an interpretation that under-cuts, rather than furthers, the statute’spurpose, a ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘appropriate’’ publiceducation for ‘‘all’’ children with disabili-ties. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133, 121 S.Ct. 1302,149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001) (STEVENS, J.,joined by SOUTER, GINSBURG, andBREYER, JJ., dissenting) (‘‘A method ofstatutory interpretation that is deliberatelyuninformed, and hence unconstrained, mayproduce a result that is consistent with acourt’s own views of how things should be,but it may also defeat the very purpose forwhich a provision was enacted’’). And ithas adopted an approach that, I fear, di-vorces law from life. See Duncan, supra,at 193, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (BREYER, J.,joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

S 325APPENDIX A TO OPINIONOF BREYER, J.

A

99TH CONGRESS 2d Session

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REPORT 99–687

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN’SPROTECTION ACT OF

1986

JULY 16, 1986.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. Hawkins, from the committeeof conference, submitted the

followingCONFERENCE REPORT

[To accompany S. 415]

The committee of conference on the dis-agreeing votes of the two House on the

APPENDIX A TO OPINION OFBREYER, J.—Continued

amendments of the House to the bill (S.415), to amend the Education of the Hand-icapped Act to authorize the award of rea-sonable attorneys’ fees to certain prevail-ing parties, and to clarify the effect of theEducation of the Handicapped Act onrights, procedures, and remedies underother laws relating to the prohibition ofdiscrimination, having met, after full andfree conference, have agreed to recom-mend and do recommend to their respec-tive houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its dis-agreement to the amendment of the Houseto the text of the bill and agree to thesame with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to beinserted by the House amendment, insertthe following:

[Text of Act omitted.]JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

OF THE COMMITTEE OFCONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the Houseand the Senate at the conference on thedisagreeing votes of the two Houses on theamendment of the House to the bill (S.415) to authorize the award of attorneys’fees to certain prevailing parties, and toclarify the effect of the Education of theHandicapped Act on rights, proceSdures,326

and remedies under other laws relating tothe prohibition of discrimination, and forother purposes, submit the following jointstatement to the House and the Senate inexplanation of the effect of the actionagreed upon by the managers and recom-mended in the accompanying conferencereport. The differences between the Sen-ate bill and the House amendment and thesubstitute agreed to in the conference, arenoted below, except for clerical correc-tions, conforming changes made necessaryby agreements reached by the conferees,and minor drafting and clarifying changes.

1. The Senate bill provides for ‘‘a rea-sonable attorney’s fee.’’



The House amendment provides for‘‘reasonable attorneys’ fees.’’

The Senate recedes.

2. With slightly different wording, boththe Senate bill and the House amendmentprovide for the awarding of attorneys’ feesin addition to costs.

The Senate recedes to the House andthe House recedes to the Senate with anamendment clarifying that ‘‘the court, inits discretion, may award reasonable attor-neys’ fees as part of the costs TTT’’ Thischange in wording incorporates the Su-preme Court Marek v. Chesny decision (87L. Ed. 2d 1).

The conferees intend that the term ‘‘at-torneys’ fees as part of the costs’’ includereasonable expenses and fees of expertwitnesses and the reasonable costs of anytest or evaluation which is found to benecessary for the preparation of the parentor guardian’s case in the action or proceed-ing, as well as traditional costs incurred inthe course of litigating a case.

3. The Senate bill provides for theaward of attorney’s fees ‘‘to a parent orlegal representative.’’

The House amendment provides for theaward of attorneys’ fees ‘‘to the parents orguardian.’’

The Senate recedes.

4. The Senate bill limits the amount ofthe fee awarded whenever a parent orlegal representative is represented by apublicly funded organization which pro-vides legal services.

The House amendment provides that feeawards shall be based on prevailing ratesin the community.

The House recedes to the Senate andthe Senate recedes to the House with anamendment clarifying that ‘‘fees awarded


under this subsection shall be based onrates prevailing in the community in whichthe action or proceeding arose for the kindand quality of services furnished.’’ See,Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);Marek v. Chesny, 87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); andBlum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984).However, no such awards of attorneys’fees shall be calculated by using bonusesor multipliers. The conferees want to makeit clear that the inclusion of the prohibitionagainst calculation of fees using bonusesand multipliers is limited to cases broughtonly under part B of the Education of theHandicapped Act. The conferees do notintend in any way to diminish the applica-bility of interpretation by the U.S. Su-preme Court regarding bonuses and multi-pliers to other statutes such as 42 U.S.C.1988. See, Hensley v. Eckerhart, Blum v.Stenson, Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S.Ct. 1531(1986). In addition, several new sectionswould be added to clarify that under partB of the Education of the HandicappedAct, S 327no award of attorneys’ fees andrelated costs subject to the provision of theact may be made for services performedsubsequent to the time a written offer ofsettlement is made to a party (if the offeris made at least 10 days prior to the dateof the action or proceeding) if the offer isnot accepted within ten days and a courtor administrative officer finds that the re-lief finally obtained by the party is notmore favorable to the parent or guardianthan the offer of settlement. However, at-torneys’ fees may be awarded to a prevail-ing parent or guardian who was substan-tially justified in rejecting the settlementoffer. Furthermore, the court shall reduceaccordingly the amount of attorneys’ feesand related expenses otherwise allowableif they determine that:

(1) the parent or guardian, during thecourse of the action or proceeding un-


548 U.S. 328


reasonably protracted the final resolu-tion of the controversy;

(2) the amount of attorneys’ fees oth-erwise authorized to be awarded unrea-sonably exceeds the hourly rate prevail-ing in the community for similar servicesby attorneys of reasonably comparableskill, experience and reputation; or

(3) the time spent and legal servicesfurnished were excessive considering thenature of the action or proceeding.

Finally, the preceding situations inwhich the court reduces the amount of feesand related expenses otherwise allowableshall not apply if the local or state edu-cational agency is determined to have un-reasonably protracted the final resolutionof the action or proceeding or if a violationof section 615 of the Education of theHandicapped Act is found.

The conferees intend that this provisionclarify the application of the Marek v.Chesny decision to the Handicapped Chil-dren’s Protection Act. One exception ismade to the applicability of the Marek v.Chesny decision. When the parent orguardian is substantially justified in reject-ing the settlement offer, the Marek v.Chesny decision would not apply. Substan-tial justification for rejection would includerelevant pending court decisions whichcould have an impact on the case in ques-tion.

In enumerating three conditions underwhich the amount of attorneys’ fees wouldbe reduced, the committee intends to pro-tect against excessive reimbursement. Thesecond condition is a codification of thepolicy for awarding fees in footnote 11 ofBlum v. Stenson.

5. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, specifies that fees, expenses,and costs awarded to the prevailing partymay not be paid with the funds provided


under part B of EHA. The report accom-panying the Senate’s bill restates existingpolicy that bars the payment of such feesand the costs under part B.

The House recedes. The conferees wishto emphasize that existing law bars pay-ment of attorneys’ fees with funds approp-riated under B of EHA.

6. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, provides for a GAO study ofthe impact of the bill authorizing theawarding of fees and costs.

The Senate recedes to the House withan amendment expanding the data collec-tion requirements of the GAO study toinclude inforSmation328 regarding theamount of funds expended by local edu-cational agencies and state educationalagencies on civil actions and administrativeproceedings.

7. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, sunsets the court’s authority toaward fees at the administrative level aftera period of time specified in the legislation.

The House recedes.

8. With slightly different wording, boththe Senate bill and the House amendmentauthorize the filing of civil actions underlegal authorities other than part B of EHAso long as parents first exhaust adminis-trative remedies available under part B ofEHA to the same extent as would berequired under that part.

The House recedes. It is the conferees’intent that actions brought under 42U.S.C. 1983 are governed by this provi-sion.

9. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, requires public access to hear-ing decisions.

The House recedes. The conferees wishto emphasize that public access to hearingdecisions is existing law.



10. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, requires that the public edu-cational agency provide parents with anopportunity to meet informally in an at-tempt to resolve a complaint.

The House recedes.

11. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, includes an anti-retaliation pro-vision.

The House recedes. It is the conferees’intent that no person may discharge, in-timidate, retaliate, threaten, coerce, or oth-erwise take an adverse action against anyperson because such person has filed acomplaint, testified, furnished information,assisted or participated in any manner in ameeting, hearing, review, investigation, orother activity related to the administrationof, exercise of authority under, or rightsecured by part B of EHA. The term‘‘person’’ the first time it is used means astate educational agency, local educationalagency, intermediate educational unit orany official or employee thereof.

12. The House amendment, but not theSenate bill, makes retroactive its provisionregarding the effect of EHA on other laws(section 3).

The House recedes.AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS,

MARIO BIAGGI,

PAT WILLIAMS,

CHARLES A. HAYES,

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ,

DENNIS E. ECKART,

Managers on the Part of the House.

ORRIN HATCH,

LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR.,

DON NICKLES,

TED KENNEDY,

JOHN F. KERRY,Managers on the Part of the Senate.

S 329APPENDIX B TO OPINIONOF BREYER, J.

B

Excerpts from Congressional Record

132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825(1986) (Senate)

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN’S PRO-TECTION ACT—CONFER-

ENCE REPORT

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I sub-mit a report of the committee of confer-ence on S. 415 and ask for its immediateconsideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The re-port will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the dis-agreeing votes of the two Houses on theamendments of the House to the bill(S.415) to amend the Education of theHandicapped Act to authorize the award ofreasonable attorneys’ fees to certain pre-vailing parties, and to clarify the effect ofthe Education of the Handicapped Act onrights, procedures, and remedies underother laws relating to the prohibition ondiscrimination, having met, after full andfree conference, have agreed to recom-mend and do recommend to their respec-tive Houses this report, signed by a major-ity of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, the Senate will proceed to theconsideration of the conference report.

[Floor statements omitted.]

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I moveadoption of the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thequestion is on agreeing to the conferencereport.

The conference report was agreed to.

2479RANDALL v. SORRELLCite as 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006)

548 U.S. 230

APPENDIX B TO OPINION OFBREYER, J.—Continued

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I moveto reconsider the vote by which the confer-ence report was agreed to.

S 330APPENDIX C TO OPINIONOF BREYER, J.

C

Excerpts from Congressional Record

132 Cong. Rec. 17607–17612 (House)

CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 415,HANDICAPPED CHILDREN’S

PROTECTION ACT OF 1986

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I callup the conference report on the Senate bill(S.415) to amend the Education of theHandicapped Act to authorize the award ofreasonable attorneys’ fees to certain pre-vailing parties, and to clarify the effect ofthe Education of the Handicapped Act onrights, procedures, and remedies underother laws relating to the prohibition ofdiscrimination.

The Clerk read the title of the Senatebill.

[Floor statements omitted.]

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I yieldback the balance of my time, and I movethe previous question on the conferencereport.

The previous question was ordered.

The conference report was agreed to.

,

548 U.S. 230, 165 L.Ed.2d 482

Neil RANDALL et al., Petitioners,

v.

William H. SORRELL et al.

Vermont Republican State Committee,Et Al., Petitioners,

v.

William H. Sorrell et al.

William H. Sorrell, et al., Petitioners,

v.

Neil Randall et al.Nos. 04–1528, 04–1530, 04–1697.

Argued Feb. 28, 2006.

Decided June 26, 2006.

Background: Voters, candidates, and or-ganizations brought action challenging con-stitutionality of various provisions of Ver-mont Campaign Finance Reform Act. TheUnited States District Court for the Dis-trict of Vermont, William K. Sessions, III,Chief Judge, 118 F.Supp.2d 459, enjoinedthe enforcement of Act’s limitations onexpenditures, gifts by non-resident con-tributors, and contributions by politicalparties to candidates, and upheld all of theAct’s other contribution limitations, andparties cross-appealed. The United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit,382 F.3d 91, affirmed in part, vacated inpart, and remanded, and certiorari wasgranted.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, JusticeBreyer, held that:

(1) Vermont campaign finance statute’sexpenditure limits on amounts candi-dates for state office could spend ontheir campaigns violated First Amend-ment free speech protections, and

(2) statute’s contribution limits onamounts individuals, organizations, andpolitical parties could contribute tocampaigns of candidates for state office

Documents

ARLINGTON CENT. SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC. v. MURPHY 2455 · L.Ed.2d 68, a cost- or fee-shifting provi-sion will not be read to permit recovery of expert fees without explicit statutory