Armored Battalion Preparedness for Ops Other Than War

7/28/2019 Armored Battalion Preparedness for Ops Other Than War

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A RM O RE D B A T TA .L IO N P R E P A R E D N E S S F O R O P E W t T I O N SOTHER THAN W A R )

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY APX AND SCIENCE

JAMES 2. CASHWELL, KAJ, USAB.S., Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1995

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE I Form ApprovedOM6 No. 0704-01881 2 June 1995 I Master's Thesis, 2 ~ u q4 - 2 ~ u n5

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERSAdequacy of Armored Battalion Preparedness forOperations Other Than War (OOTW)

6. AUTHOR(S)

I Major James E. Cashwell, U.S. Army II7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AN D ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBERU.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeATTN: ATZL-SWD-ODFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

9. SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND AODRESS(ES) 11

11 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

1. SPONSORINGIMONITORlhGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

12a.DlSTRlBUTlONlAVAlLABlllTY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODEApproved for public release, distributionis unlimited.

I13. ABSTRACT (Maxrmum200 words)This study examines historical examples of armored forces conducting OOTW. Fromthese ex2mples the study then examines current training and doctrine to determinetheir adequacy in preparing armored battalions for these diverse missions. OOTWposes numerous challenges for today's armored forces. In times of force reductionsand budget restraints armored forces are attempting to remain at both an acceptablelevel of training for war, and ensure their preparedness for the ever increasingrequirements of OOTW. The added dimension of OOTW and the potential for conductingmissions that are not directly related to war-fighting creates a dichotomy betweentraining for war, and being able to execute non-warfighting missions. The studyconcludes that the current "Battle Focused" approach to training, provides today'sarmored forces with a solid platform from which to launch into both war and OOTW.With respect to doctrine, the study finds that due to recent insertion of OOTW intocurrent army lexicon, OOTW is 'not well reflected. The study does find however,that because a direct correlation exists between training for war and training forOOTw, current war-fighting doctrine supports a units preparation for OOTW.

I Armor in OOTW, Armor in LIC, Armor BattalionTraining for OOTW/Doctrine for OOTW 8016. PRICE COOEI11. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLA SSIFICATION 20. LIM ITA TION OF ABSTRACOF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACTUnclassified I Unclassified I Unclassified I Unlimited

NSN 754041-280-5500 Standard Form 298 Rev 2-89)Pres~llbed y ANSI Sfd 239.18298-102


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHISIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ James E. CashwellTitle of Thesis: Armor Battalion preparedness for Operations Other ThanWar (OOTW)

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee ChairmanLester W. Grau

& x / V ? ! , C . . , MemberGraham H. Turbiville, J~.'P~.D.

Accepted this 2nd day of June 1995 by:

, Director of Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the studentauthor and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.(Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACT

ADEQUACY OF ARiiOFSB BA?TALI?N DREPAFXDNESS FCR OPEPATIONS O T H D THAN WARi.. V ^ 'b I o r E. Cash~ell, SA, 74 pases.

This s5idy examines historical examples of annored forces ondiictingoperations other than war (OCTJ). From these examples the stuey thenexamines current training an2 doctrine to determine their zdeqiacy inprep&-ing annorea battalions for these diverse missions.OOTW pses nuaerous challenges for today's armored forces. In times offorce reductis.-.s id bdget restraints trmored forces =e attempting toremain at Soth an accept&?e level of training for war, and ensure theirpreparedness for t'ne ever increasing requirements of OOTW. The addeddimension of OOTW and the potential for conducting missions that arecot directly related to war-fighting crsates a dichotomy betweenL-,ainizg for wzr, an6 being able to execute con-war-fighting missions.Tne s?~dy concludes that the current "Battle Focused" approach totraining, provides today's aLmore2 forces with a solid platform fromwhich to launch into both war and OOTW. With respect to doctrine, thestudy finds that due to the recent insertion of Wk; into currentmi;iexiccn, OOTW is not well reflected. Tne study does find however, thatbecazss a direct correlation exists between training for w a r andtraining for WTi, current wai-fighting doctrine supports a unit'spreparation for OCITW.

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I would like to thank my committee members, for without themthis project would not have been possible. The committee chairman, LTC(Ret) Les Grau, who ensured I remained on track, on time, and focused.Dr. Graham Turbiville, whose systematic methods provided motive andstability throughout the project, and LTC Jim Bierwirth, who kept mehonest from a tanker's point of view, staying with the project evenafter departing Ft. Leavenworth.

Next, I would like to thank my parents. My father who taught methe meaning of honest hard work, and my mother who ensured I understoodthe balance between work and all of life's other pleasures.

Most importantly I would like to thank my wife Alyson. Forwithout her daily support and encouragement this project would neverhave been completed.


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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IST OF ILLUSTRATIONS "iCHAPTER1 INTROOUCTICN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

?Tnesis Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .hesis question 1Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 2Literature Review/Research Methodology .......................Outline Chapter i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Outline Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5C.Outiine Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Outline Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .COutline Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Xey Terns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ummary 11

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HISTORICAL MALYSIS 14Case Study # 1 . ietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Case Study # 2 . fghanist n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Case Study # 3 - Panama ..................................... 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ase Study # 4 China 26.......................................ise Study # 5 - Haiti 283 TRAINING >JUSIS ..............................................33KETL Development ............................................5Unit KTLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

OOTW Task List .............................................. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .on-METL Task List 46..............................................DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS 48. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .octrine background 48War fighting Fundamentals ................................... 49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ar fighting Doctrine 51General OOTW Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .ALI Publications 50. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .uture Doctrine 51

5. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65..........................................................IBLIOGRliPm 70

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4


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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Fi- P1 METL Development Process ......................................52 . Units and locations ........................................... 6.........................Mission Statement and METL. 1-64 Armor 374 Mission Statement and METL. 2-77 Armor ......................... 7

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mission Statement and METL. 3-37 Armor 38............................. Mission Statement and METL. 1-8 Cav 38.........................Mission Statement and HETL. 3-73 Armor 39.........................Mission Statement and METL. 3-67 Armor 39

..................................... Summary of Armor Unit METLs 4010 MEIZ to training manual reference ............................. 1

...................................1. Armor tasks executed in OOTW 43........................2 OOTW tasks to training manual reference 44

13 Non-METL training tasks .......................................6


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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War United States relies on its armored forces toaccomplish many tasks not associated with war fighting. Annored unitsthat once only trained for large-scale maneuver warfare now conduct arange of missions in peacetime to include show of force and peaceenforcement operations. As missions change, however, a central concernfocuses on the extent to which the respective doctrine and training haskept pace. Efficiently preparing armored forces for operations otherthan war (OOTW) in times of reduced forces and budgets challenges the USAnny as it prepares to enter the twenty-first Century.

Thesis TopicThis thesis assesses US armored battalions conducting operations

other than war. The study begins with the evolution of the tank and itsrole on the battlefield. It analyzes historical cases for OOTWapplications and lessons learned, analyzes armored training and doctrinefor availability and relevance, and draws conclusions.

Thesis questionAre today's armored battalions trained for the challenges of

OOTW? The diversity of these types of operations, the associatedadditional training requirements and extensive mission variations, putenormous pressure on any type of unit. To answer the question of

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whether armored battalions are trained for OOTW, requires the analysisof three supporting questions.

1. Is there a role for armor in OOTW?2. Do armored battalions adequately train for OOTW?3 . Does existing doctrine provide these units with sufficient

information to properly prepare them for such operations?

ScopeThe term "Armored Forces" has many meanings. US armored

divisions are based principally on the firepower and mobility of the M-1tank in a combined role with other lighter armored combat vehicles. Inaddition, today's US Army Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR) have twodistinct organizations. One consists of MI series tanks with N3 BradleyFighting Vehicles (BFV). The other has the high mobility multi purposewheeled vehicles (HMMWV) mounting tube-launched, optically tracked,wire-guided (TOW) missiles and machine guns. This study is limited toarmored units whose main fighting vehicle is the tank. The thesisdefinition of the tank is: an annor-protected, full-tracked enclosedvehicle that mounts a cannon and automatic weapons and has excellentcross-country mobility, firepower, and the capability of shock action.

FH 100-5, Operations, describes thirteen illustrative activitiesdesignated as operations other than war, ranging from noncombatantevacuation to attacks and raids. To further narrow the thesis, and toanalyze only the OOTW most relevant to armor applications, eight of thethirteen activities can be eliminated. They are: Noncombatantevacuation operations (NEO) , arms control, humanitarian assistance and


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disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, combatingterrorism, attacks and raids, and support to counter-* operations.The remaining five activities have varied levels of application toarmored forces and are the subjects of this analysis. These are:support to domestic civil authorities, peacekeeping operations, peaceenforcement, show of force, and support for insurgencies andcounterinsurgencies. By limiting the scope of analysis to the abovedefinition of the tank, focusing on the six most relevant activities ofCOTW, and studying only battalion and smaller sized armored forces, thethesis is more clearly defined and focused.

Thesis HvpothesisArmored battalions are trained for the challenges of operations

other than war ( O O TW ) . Sufficient examples exist to indicate effectiveemployment of armored battalions in OOTW. The current trainingconducted by armored battalions, supported by the training received atthe major training centers, effectively prepares these units for bothoperations of war and OOTW. Current doctrine, however, is outdated andinsufficient for providing WiW-specific tactical and technicalinformation to armored forces preparing for OOTW.

Literature ReviewThere are four major categories of literature this study draws

upon: print media dealing with world events, doctrinal literature,historical literature, and professional dialogue. Recent world eventsprovide the thesis with up-to-date data for current relevancy. Numerousjournals and periodicals provide accurate accounts of OOTW missions.

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Doctrinal literature, which prescribes the tactics and techniques forthe employment of armored units, includes Army field manuals (FMs),training manuals, and lessons learned from recent operations.Historical data provides the base of analysis on which the thesis ismeasured. Numerous historical works provide the insight as to howarmored units were previously employed in operations now referred to asOOTW. Professional dialogue is distilled from staff and commanders ofvarious armored battalions, command and general staff college (CGSC)staff and faculty insight, and from previous masters of military artsand science (XMAS) thesis on related subjects. Together these sourcesprovide the necessary tools to accomplish this study.

Research MethodolawThis thesis is divided into five major chapters. The following

discussion summarizes each chapter, provides a quick synopsis of thechapter, and discusses the chapter's relationship to the primaryresearch question.

Chapter 1 - IntroductionThis chapter addresses background relevant to the thesis. It

analyzes the thesis question from both a current and historicalperspective and provides the thesis hypothesis. The chapter alsooutlines administrative data to include scope of analysis,limitations/delimitations, chapter description and how each chapterworks toward answering the thesis question, and lists key terms.


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Chapter 2 - Historical AnalysisThis chapter centers on historical examples of armored units

conducting OOTW. It begins with the study of the tank's evolution andaddresses its relationship to the current revolution of military affairs( RKA ) . To broaden the analysis, both US and foreign country OOTWexperience is included. By looking at both US and other countriesinvolvement, the thesis gains both a broader range of experiences fromwhich to draw and obtains additional insight into what is a relativelynew field. As the thesis focuses on training and doctrine issues, theanalysis looks primarily at US involvement in OOTW. Specific US areasof interest include operations in Vietnam, Panama, and Haiti. Thisanalysis provides a cross sampling of armor involvement not only indifferent periods of time, but also for varying requirements, countries,geographical conditions, and nationalities. From this historicalanalysis, lessons learned are extracted and applied in order to assesscurrent unit training and preparedness.

Chapter 3 - Traininq AnalysisThis chapter analyzes current armored battalion training forOOTW missions. The study analyzes how and to what degree armored unitsintegrate OOTW into their Mission Essential Task List (MFPL) and howmuch this METL training prepares units for CON. The training analysishighlights current strengths and weaknesses that today's armored unitsface while preparing for operations other than war. The sampling ofarmored battalions includes rapid deployment forces (RDF) and otherunits located in the continental United States (CONUS), and forceslocated outside the continental United States (OCONUS). The chapter

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concludes by drawing an analysis between training for war and preparinga unit for OOTW.

Chapter 4 Doctrinal AnalysisThis chapter evaluates the availability of doctrine which

supports and prepares armored units for OO?W. Because OOTW has onlyrecently found its way into Army capstone manuals, such as FN 100-5,Operations, the study also looks at army manuals that. previouslysupported operations referred to as low intensity conflict (LIC). Thisdoctrinal analysis shows how current doctrine supports armored units,soldiers, and their leaders for their responsibilities associated withm.

Chapter 5 - ConclusionThe concluding chapter assesses armored units' training

preparedness for OOTW. This assessment provides the answers to thefollowing questions:

1. Does a valid role exist for armored units in OOTW?2. Do armored battalions train the tasks required for

successful execution of OOTW?3. Does existing doctrine provide units sufficient information

to prepare for COTW?This concluding chapter does not provide recommendations

for corrective actions, but provides insight into current armored unitpreparedness. Chapter five synthesizes the information of the previousfour chapters in order to present a clear understanding of OOTWrequirements and where US Army armored forces are today in relationship


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to where they need to be.

Key TermsThe nature of warfare, and for that matter the nature of WTW,

require a special understanding of today's doctrine and "lexicon".Thousands of abbreviations, acronyms, key terms, and equipmentnomenclatures exist in manuals, texts, and publications. Listed beloware some of the more critical terms required for an understanding ofthis thesis.

After Action Review (AAR). A review of training that allowssoldiers, leaders and units to discover for themselves what happenedduring the training and why. Used to solicit ideas on how the trainingcould be performed better.

Armored Cavalry Recriment (ACR). A brigade-size armored unitconsisting of three ground squadrons (tanks/Bradleyls), and one aviationsquadron (attack helicopters). The second variant of the ACR is thelight ACR. This unit, although having similar structure, (three groundsquadrons and one air) substitutes HMMWVs for tanks and Bradley's.Basic missions include reconnaissance, security, and economy of force 2

Battle Focus. A training concept used to derive peacetimetraining requirements from wartime missions.3 Since units cannotachieve and sustain proficiency on all possible tasks, the "battlefocus" concept helps narrow the focus to a reasonable, attainable amountof training tasks.

Bradlev Fiqhtinq Vehicle (BFV). The BFV (M-2) is the infantryversion of the Bradley. Designed to provide transportation and armored


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protection for an infantry squad and a crew of three. Armamentincludes: 25 millimeter chain gun, TOW missiles, and a coaxiallymounted machine gun.

Cavalry Fiqhtinq Vehicle (CDJ). The CFV (M-3) is the armoredcavalry squadron's version of the M-2 BFV. It has the same chassis andarmament as the M-2; however, it lacks the side firing ports of the 11-2and only carries two scouts and a three-man crew.

Combined Maneuver Traininq Center (CMTC). Located atHohenfels, Germany, CMTC is the primary training center for allmechanized forces stationed in Germany. US armored and mechanizedinfantry battalions normally train at the CMTC once every twelve-to-eighteen months.

Continqencv Plan (CONPLAN). Existing war plans designed formultiple theaters and potential operations. If necessary to execute,the plans contain sufficient detail, but are normally modified andtailored to specifically identified theater requirements.

Continental United States (CONUSl.FORCE XXI. Concept for the modernization and development of the

US Army of the early twenty-first century. Force XXI is an informationbased era integrating the latest state-of-the-art technology intodoctrine, training, and equipment. It describes how the Army willfunction in the future as the primary land force in both operations ofwar and 00TW.4 Some of the specific tank technology updates include:Inter- Vehicular Information System (IVIS), Positive Navigation systems(POSNAV), Commanders Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV), and future laserdetection systems that provide Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) of

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both air and ground systems.Hiuh Mobility Multipurpose k'heeled Vehicle [HMMWVA. The US

Army's modern four-wheel-drive transport vehicle. Configurations rangefrorr. four seat hard top versions, troop transport, cargo transport, toarmed armored versions found iR combat units.

Joint Readiness Traininq Center (JRTC). JRTC is located at FortPolk, Louisiana. It exists as the primary training center for lightinfantry and cavalry units located within the United States.

M551 Sheridan. A light air-droppable Armament includesthe main gun (152mm) which is capable of firing both conventionalammunition, and the Shillelagh missile, and both a coaxially and turretmounted machine gun.

MI Abrams. US inventory main battle tank. Armament includes a105mm main gun, coaxially mounted, loader and tank commander machineguns.

MlAl Abrams. Currently the primary main battle tank of USinventory. Same armament as above except the main gun is 120mm.

Mission Essential Task List (MFIZ). A non prioritized list oftasks derived from the unit's war time mission requirements. The METLallows commanders from company to corps level to narrow trainingrequirements to an achievable number. The METL should not be restrictedby resource availability 5

M i l i t a m Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUTL. All militaryactions planned and conducted in areas where man-made construction isthe dominant feature. It includes combat in cities which is the portionof MOUT involving fighting from house-to-house and street-by-street.

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National Trainina Center (NTC!. Located at Fort IrwinCdifornia, the hTC is the major training center for heavy armored andmechanized infantry forces located within the United States. The NTCtrains mechanized forces in a realistic, demanding desert environment.Maneuver units rotate to the NTC every twelve-to-eighteen months.

Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS).Operations Other Than War (OOTW). COTW refers to any military

operation to protect and further the interests of the United States athome or abroad in a variety of ways other than war.E

Revolution of Militarv Affairs (RMA) . The product of broadsocial, political, and technological change that affect the military andcause substantial reform to the existing methods of conducting ~arfare.~

Rules of Engasement (ROE). Directives issued by militaryauthority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under whichUS forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces.

Standard Operatins Procedures (SOP). Written operatingprocedures designed to standardize all combat actions for a particularunit.

Applicable OOTW ActivitiesPeacekeepins Operations. Peacekeeping operations are military

actions which support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas ofpotential conflict. Designed to stabilize conflict between twobelligerent nations requiring both of their consents. Participatingmilitary units can function as impartial observers, or part of a


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peacekeeping force.Peace Enforcement. Teace enforcement is a 3iiitary

intervention operation in support of diplomatic efforts to restorepeace. Peace enforcement implies the use of military force to coerce

nhostile factions to cease violent actions.-,Show of Force. A show of force is a military action which

deploys a unit to a region to defuse a situaticn through its presence.These operations can take the form of training exercises, rehearsals,forward deployment, or buildup of military forces l o

Supwrt to Domestic Civil Authorities. Military actionsundertaken when appropriate governmental authority directs the armedforces to assist in domestic emergencies within CON US.^^

Supwrt for Insurqencies and Counterinsurqencies. Support forinsurgencies and counterinsurgencies are military actions to assisteither insurgent movements or host nation governments opposing aninsurgency. In both instances, the military instrument of powersupports political, economic, and informational objectives I 2

SFThe United States Army is experiencing dramatic change in its

structure, size, and mission requirements. Doctrine has been developedand modified to better reflect the more complex, diverse, and oftenundefined roles and missions now referred to as OOTW. Since the end ofthe Cold War many branches of the service, particularly armor, areexperiencing dramatic change as they prepare for a future with varyingand increasing requirements.


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Analysis of RMA, coupled with current security trends, indicatesthat the future miiiL?.ry will have increased responsibilities andmissions which fall under the OOTW umbrella. The question, "Are today's

armored battalions trained for the cnallerges of OOTW?" stands as thecentral question of this thesis. The insiqht necessary to answer thequestion will come from tinree primary sources--analysis of historicalroles of armor, training methodology, and doctrine.

Armored units historically adapt well to change. Now inaddition to major regional contingency preparedness, armored units mustadd 03TW to their range of possible missions. Since American livescontinue to be put on the line for war and OOTW, it is essential thatarmored leaders remain prepared for whatever challenges the future mayhold. Chapter two begins this study with an analysis of historicalexamples of armors participation in previous WlW.


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Endnotes1u.S. Army, m. 25-101, Battle Focused

T r a m- (Washington: Department of the Army, 19901, G-2&I s. l i n y , FN 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department ofthe Army, 1993) , 2-23.

413.5. Army, TRACOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI ODerations (Washington:Department of the A rmy , 1994) , i .

7~ichael azarr, The Revolution of Nilit- Affairs(&lisle: US Army War College, 19941, 2.


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CHAPTER TWOHISMRICAZ, ANALYSIS

This chapter examines the evolution of weapons that led directlyto the conception, design, and integration of the tank into warfare.Additionally, it examines the current Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) to determine the effects of RMA on the development of armored warfighting. Lastly it examines the use of armor in OOTW through severalcase studies.

The Evolution of ArmorFor the purpose of this thesis, the term evolution refers to the

pattern of development of weapons and tactics. RNA is the result of thecombination of social, technological, and political change revising therole of the military and virtually changing how wars are fought.1Therefore, as is the case with the tank, the study will show how theintroduction of such evolving weaponry has revolutionized the way inwhich wars are fought, but does not constitute an entire RM.

The technological age leading to the tank's introduction hadproduced many marked changes. The railroad revolutionized strategicgeography, making armies more mobile while creating a whole new scienceof logistic^.^ Communications became rapid, allowing units to quicklymass, form, receive orders, and fight; and the machine gun brought a newlevel of lethality to the battlefield.


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In order to gain an appreciation of armored warfare, it isimportant to set the stage for its first appearance in battle. Thetank, although a revolutionary weapon, was not introduced to battle in aslow deliberate pace. What made the tank so revolutionary was that itrelied little upon new scientific ideas and technology, and more uponthe proper assembling of technical devices already long in use. Initialtanks were simply armored machinegun carriers powered by the internalcombustion engine. Within a matter of years, the tank was conceived,developed, refined, and inserted into battle changing the way wars werefought.

The interlocking fields of machinegun fire, associated with WI,created a battlefield stalemate. There were only two possibilities: togo over the fields of fire in an aircraft or through them in an armoredvehicle. The tank, equipped by the products of this technologicalrevolution, was introduced both to make full use of the new technology,but more importantly to protect against it. These progressively longer-ranged weapons with improved accuracy required matched improvements inorganization and tactics. Marked improvements in technology, such asthe 1916 tank, could not be simply introduced on the battlefield withoutsignificantly adjusting tactics, training, and complete incorporationinto the larger formation. The lethality of new weapons required unitdispersal for improved protection and survivability. Still,professional soldiers, with rigid ingrained training and discipline, sawdispersion as "a loss of control of both weapons and warfare."3


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This technological era of the industrial revolution, which hadmarkedly improved weapons of war, remained fixed on outdated doctrineand tactics. Despite marked improvements in explosives, machine guns,communications, and transport, +attics reflected past wars and oldtechnology. The result was the stalemate and trench warfare of thewestern front. However, the tank brought mobility back into groundwarfare. In August 1918, British armored units spearheaded an assualtwhich achieved an eight-mile breakthrough at Amiens, killing orcapturing 28,000 Germax, and c?estroying 400 guns. General ErichLudendorff declared it "the blackest day of the German h y n thehistory of war."* The insertion of mobile, protected firepower,overcame the stalemate conditions associated with W W I allowing armor tocome of age and establish itself as a key component of maneuver warfare.

During the next great war--WWII, the tactical methods for thetank's employment would finally catch up with the latest increases intechnology. Tactical concepts of mass, maneuver, and combined armsoperations were refined and inserted into developing maneuver doctrine.Much of this doctrine remains valid today; however, as military forcesundertake more nontraditional roles in nontraditional settings, some ofthis doctrine loses its validity. When tanks are pitted against rebelforces or employed in other non standard combat, typical missions andtraining often do not apply. Recent history shows many examples ofaxnored forces performing other than war-fighting missions. These varyfrom counterinsurgency operations to simple presence in order to keepthe peace. The Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon, and theChinese in Tiananmen Square all used tanks, but the role of the tank in

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each case was dramatically different.New technology continues to improve or discara weapons systems

and, consequently, modifies military applicatio.? of force. The tank, a

product of turn-of-the-century technology, was developed to solve aparticular tactical dilemma. The modern tank incorporates newlydeveloped technology to retain its role as the combat arm of decision.Once introduced into combat, the tank quickly asserted itself as a vitalpiece of the combined arms team. Now against the backdrop of theinformation age, high technology, and evolving threats, the tank'srelative value on the battlefield is challenged. But as army roles andmissions change, the presence of armor continues to qrow both on thebattlefield and within the steadily increasing arena of OOTW.Potentially complex training challenges for the army of the twenty-firstcentury may very well be solved by the current "Battle Focused" trainingconcepts.

It is instructive to examine various case studies involving theuse of armor. These studies examine both US and foreign employment ofarmor to resolve previous OOTW roles and missions. Chapter threeanalyzes these OOTW roles to determine whether the training methodology,currently conducted by armored battalions, is sufficient to prepare themfor CQTW.

Case Study 1 - VietnamAs in Korea, the US Army entered the Vietnam War using WII

doctrine and experiences as the basis for training. Tactics andtechniques, required for success in Southeast Asia, were significantly


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different from those learned during combat operations in WWII. Yet,iaring the Vietnam conflict, the armor ~fficers raining at the "Home ofArmor," Fort Knox Kentucky, continued to train to fight on the plains of

krope, with little attention paid toward Vietnam.When US forces first enter4 the Republic of Vietnam, their

broad mission was to prevent the spread of Communism. But like otherOOTW activities, an unspecified end state and unclear missions led toincreased force deployments without any criteria for victory orwithdrawal. In terms of today's OOlW activities, the Vietnam conflictis best described as "Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies".

The first major ground forces that the US committed in Vietnamwere primarily infantry and cavalry (air mobile) forces. Theirdeployment superimposed a modern army into a region with anunderdeveloped infrastructure. The US forces had to adapt their tacticsand force structure to new and varying requirements.5

The US initially deployed few armored units to Vietnam since themilitary leadership believed that armored units could "play nosignificant part due to the terrain, the enemy, and the nature of

This belief was based on the generally unsuccessful Frenchexperience with armored forces in Vietnam.7 Experience gained by the USarmored divisions in North Africa and Europe during WWII, caused many toconclude that "only in these theaters was warfare with armor possible."8American experience in the Pacific and Korea confirmed the impressionthat although the tank operated well in support of the infantry, it had

9limited use in jungle and mountain terrain.-


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Further the US Army exbbibited a "singular lack of doctrine foraounted combat in areas other K1an Europe and the deserts sf Afr:ca."10Consequently the army leadership was reluctant tc commit armor

elsewhere. In July 1965, a major debate arose concerning the use ofarmor in Vietnam. Discussing the deployment of the 1st InfantryDivision, the Army Staff decided that, except for the division's cavalrysquadron, all the division armored and mechanized units would leavetheir ta&s in the states and fight as light infantry. While discussingtine subject with the Army Chief of Staff General Johson, GeneralWestmoreland declared that "except for a few coastal areas, Vietnam isno place for either tank or mechanized infantry units."ll Even afterthe divisional cavalry squadron arrived in country, it was employeddifferently than they had trained. Cavalry troops were split up amongthe three infantry brigades and sent to three separate locations. TheirH48A3 tanks were consolidated and parked at the Division Headquartersper General Westmoreland's direction.12 The prevailing belief ofservice commanders was that tanks had no role nor place within theSoutheast Asian theater. However, the nature of the war and the enemywas changing from predominantly guerrilla units to increasingly well-trained and equipped North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiments anddivisions.13 These regular forces often used conventional tactics andemployed modern automatic weapons, artillery, and a large number ofmines .I4 Tanks, with their inherent protection against such weapons,caused commanders to finally realize their role in Vietnam combat.


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Vhen hnks were finally used in battle in Vietnam, they quicklyprove? r?.exsee?ve as an integral part of the combined arms tea. Tankunits proved an effective reaction force since fighting was likely tooccur from any direction and at any time. The tanks invulnerability tosmall arms and mines, combined with the tanks mobility and firepower,proved their value in SOUL? Vietnam. All doubts about armor'seffectiveness in Vietnam were dispelled by the large multi unitoperations in January 1965, such as "Cedar Falls" and "Junction City."These large-scale operations destroyed enemy fortifications, capturedmany weapons caches, and resulted in high enemy casualty rates. UScasualties during these operations were comparatively low. Over thenext few years the tank performed many new missions in Vietnam. Inaddition to traditional roles, such as close support, indirect fire, androute security, armored units often operating as individual tanks orsections conducted missions such as convoy escort, bunker destruction,ambush support, base security, and jungle busting.15 As a result of thesuccessful mechanized and armored operations in Vietnam, the USincreased the deployment of armored vehicles to Vietnam. Tanks andmechanized infantry vehicles contributed substantially to the Army'stotal combat power in Vietnam.16

From early March 1965 until the cease fire in January 1973, USarmored forces participated in virtually every type of mission inVietnam. These operations ranged from large-scale offensive actions toguarding local harvests. After eight years of fighting over terrainthat severely hampered the movement of armored forces, in weather thatsupposedly prohibited armored operations, and an elusive enemy, armored

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forces emerged as a powerful, flexible, and essential battle force.17

Case Study 2 - Soviet Army in AfghmistanIn the spring of 1978, Afghanistan President Daoud tried to rid

the country of the Communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan(PDPA). Underestimating the degree of Communist infiltration of hismilitary, government administration, and his own cabinet, Daoud hadzhree of the PDPA's leaders arrested. On 26 April 1978, a PDPA-controlled armored brigade stormed the presidential palace killingeveryone inside. 8 The PDPA s recruitment of Soviet-trained officershad paid off. Three days after the coup, the military withdrew, and thecommunists proclaimed the Communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.Under the leadership of President Taraki, the conditions in Afghanistanworsened causing rebellion to flare across the countryside. BetweenJuly 1978 and the autumn of 1979 the government lost control of 80percent of the country. Hafizullah Amin, a ruthless opportwist andcommunist, became the Prime Minister in March 1979. His bodyguardassassinated President Taraki just days after Taraki returned fromvisiting General Secreiiary Brezhnev in Moscow. Amin became the newPresident, and the situation worsened as his government continued toinfuriate the populace while slipping further out of Moscow's orbit.The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, killed Amin, andestablished a puppet government. 9

The official explanation given by the Soviet leadership forinvading Afghanistan was that they needed to "defend a revolutionarygovernment endangered by a foreign supported insurrecti~n."~~he


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Soviets insisted that a military contingent stationed in Afghanistanwould not get invol-ged in a direct conflict, but merely provide a strongpresence until the "cause of the intervention had di~appeared."~~heystood by this explanation until 1986.

Initial feeling amongst the Soviet leadership was that nothingmore that a show of force was required to restore s+Aility inAfghanistan. But good planninc and superior equipment were soonnullified by the combination of expanding missions, difficult terrain,and a stubborn, increasingly effective enemy .22 Suddenly the Sovietsfound themselves playing a counterifisurgency role for which they werecompletely unprepared.

The primary Soviet force deployed into Afghanistan was neitherspecial operations forces, nor trained counterinsurgency forces. TheSoviets 40th Army contained motorized rifle, airborne, and air assaultforces. Initially, the motorized rifle divisions had their fullcomplement of tanks and air defense artillery. Until 1982, the Sovietstried to wage large-scale operations with armored forces.Approximately twice a year the 40th Army conducted large, offensive,combined-arms operations which were suitable for the European theater,but were ineffective in the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and oftenresulted in heavy Soviet losses.23 The Soviet military fixation on awar against NATO left them ill-prepared for a situation which "posedproblems far removed from those found on the plains of Europe."24

In one of the first major offenses, Soviet tanks attacked arebel-controlled area with supporting artillery, fixed wing aircraft,helicopter gunships, and rockets. They discovered that the rebels would

22


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wait out the assault and infiltrate assembly areas to zttack the Sovie%at night. The Mujahedin csrminders were not imsressed by overwneimis;combat power and considered ?the Soviet leaders to be "inflexible, and

mechanical in their tactical responses, comitted tc cook bookwarfare. "25 Trained for conventional war, Soviet motorized riflecommanders lacked the doctrine, the skill, and the necessary tactics forcounterinsurgency warfare in mountainous terrain. 6

Initially, motorized rifle and tank units performed 50Lisecurity and reaction tasks including: combat reconnaissance patrols,armored support to an ambash, convoy escort, search and destroy, andeven reconnaissance by fire missions. Toward the latter part of theSoviet occupation, armored unit missions became msre defensive innature. What Soviet Com~anders iscovered was +hat heavy armored tanksnot only destroyed the few existing roads, but when attacked from themountain heights were often ineffective due to the limitations caused bygun tube elevation. Tanks were now positioned to secure main supplyroutes, guard garrisons, and defend mountain outposts 27

By 1983 the Soviets clearly realized the serious deficiencycaused by employing such ill-suited forces. Gradually, combat with theMujahedin became the task of airborne, air assault, special forces, andso-called separate motorized rifle brigades--brigades specificallystructured and trained for counterinsurgency. The bulk of the tankswere pulled out due to their unsuitability to the Afghanistan conflict.In over nine years of conflict, they had "failed to strike any decisiveblows, even locally, against the ~ujahedin.28 And although motorizedrifle forces used tanks and mechanized infantry in new innovative ways,

23


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the overriding lesson of the war was the "failxe of the Soviets to- ,~3unt ffective com:erins~urger.ci. warfare."29 LZ xas clear that

,, .motorized rirle forces were not A l e to adapt to the tactical situationin which it found itself. 30

?n the iatter years of Soviet military occupkicr, inAfghanistan, counterinsurgency forces, to inciude special operations,airborne, and air assault, assumed most of the duties previouslyconducted by motorized rifle units. But as the motorized forces re-deployed to pre war locations, many new lessons learned and armoredapplications went with them.

Case Study 3 - Panama, Operation Just CauseThe months leading up to Operation Just Cause were characterized

as stressful, anxious and dangerous. Panama was viewed as unstable, andits leader Manuel Norieqa was suspected of involvesent in illegal &rugtrafficking. The Panama Caal was to pass to Panamaciar~ ontrol at theend of the century, and with 12,000 American military personnel andfamilies living in the country, US-Panamanian relations were strained.31

That was the situation until President Manuel Noriega nullifiedthe presidential elections, after his hand-picked candidate lost toGuillermo Endara. Ensuing beatings, rioting, and protests increased thestrain to US-Panamanian relations. On 16 December 1989, members of thePanama Defense Force (PDF) killed a US lieutenant and assaulted andabused another officer and his wife.32 US growing concern overprotection of US interests, protection of US citizens, and free tradethrough the Canal led to the implementation of the existing COWLAN


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131ue Spoor.." later refined and executed as :3$erstion ;ust Cause. Theseevezts ir.itL-ted unit activatixs and. ar. incr-r-asst eaCiEess 2osture ofboth XVIII Airborne Corps units in the United. States and US forces inPanama.

One of these units, 3-73 o r , as the 82nd Airborne Division'sseparate tank battalion. k5e2 Adnks from 3-73 Armor Battalion(Airborne) &"rived in Pasma, their first mission was to conduct a "Snowof Force." As part of a Joint Task Force, tanks and Marine Corps LAV'smoved across the Panama Canal to predetermined assembly areas.33

Armored history was made with the beginning of combatoperations. On 20 December 1989,four M551 Sheridan tanks parachutedictc combat. Linking up with the tanks pre positioned in country,multiple operations kgan. Initial plans called for six Sheridans,organized in pairs, attached to each of the three infantry battalions.Two additional Sheridans would link up with an engineer squad andestablish blocking positions along highway one which was the maic routerunning from Tocumen-Torrijos ~ i r p o r t . ~ ~he primary missions, given tothe tanks operating in theater, were support dismounted maneuver,protect convoys, reduce buildings and bunkers, establish road-blocks,and conduct mounted patrolling.35 Since the tank's heavy armorprotection and firepower were unmatched by the PDF, the sectors in whichthe tank operated tended to be quieter and easier to control for theinfantry. 6 During MOUT operations, the tank provided security,firepower, and support to dismounted patrols a d conducted these taskswitin relative security, due to its inherent armored protection.37


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7 , .COST.-nostllity oncerns changed to controlling ricting, Looting,an& sstzbliskicq 2 s?c;Le sy-eratinc envircxint. ?? rol? of t5e tankagain focused on a show of force. Locations dominated by mobs andsniper fire were quickly subdued by the appearance of the Sheridan.Movinc back and forth down the city streets at r.ight,the tankssupported infantry patrols lising a seaxhlight to ccntrol crowds andilluminate possible enemy positions.38

By 9 January 1990, the remainder of 3-73 Armor returned fromPanama with all missions accomplished and only one crewman slightlyinjured. This performance of the tank in COT,, operating as part of thecombined arms team, was extremely successful.

Case Study 4 ChinaTiananmen SquzeThe employment of Lhnks at Tiananmen Scpare on 3 June 1989 is

best described as a show of force. The intent of a show of force is todeploy forces to defuse a situation that is det~imental o a country'sinterests or national objectives.39 The resultant slaughter atTiananmen square far exceeded tihe government's intentions.

In 1986, after ten years of economic growth in China, manyuniversity st~dents ocused their energies to attaining politicalfreedom. In 1986, then Communist Party Secretary Hu Yaobang sided withthe student protests .md was subsequently fires from his position.Piee years later on 15 April 1989 Ku Yaobang died. Campus memorialservices all over the country quickly k z e d into government critiquesessions.d0 At Seijing University, the protest march, which had growntoo big for the campus, moved into Tiananmen Square. Word spread

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qdickiy and more than 103,000students from other schools joined in.These students saw themselves as "Patriots trying to reform the,.arty "*I The Zhicese 1i~i.st mng students was characterized bynarchers carrying S a x x s 5eclaring "qive me liberty, or give medeath!"42 For weeks, thousands of stxdents took part in hunger strikes"refusing food to try and force the government to listen to them."43The sight of students risking their lives for the beliefs, won thehearts of a large segment of the nation causing the number ofdemonstrators in Tiananmen to grow in excess of one million.44

Probably the last straw for the government was the formation ofindependent worker unions in cities across the country. This directlychallenged the Communist ?arty's main cleim to legitimacy that itrepresents the workers. The government called the movement a "plannedconspiracy, a rebellion aimed at destroying communism"45 and on 3 Junesent the Peoples Liberation fi-ny into Tiananmen Square. CWer 300,000troops, including more than twenty T-55 Soviet-built tanks, crushedbarricades and drove through crowds of people that stood in their way.46Men, women, and children were machine gunned down. At the days end,over 1,000 people lay dead in the square--the nation was "scared backinto silence. "47

Although the use of force at Tiananmen was overwhelming andbrutal, the destructive role of the tank subsequent to the show of force

stands clear. The infantry forces tbat marched in the square that daywere subject to beating, stoning, and even small arms fire. The tanksand their crews caused both the majority of destruction and casualtiesand demonstrated their role as a weapon of shock.

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Case Study 5 - HaitiOperation 'Jphold Democracy/Restore DemocracyIn September 1994, 3-73 Armor Battalior. (Airborne) pzticipated

in the preparatior. for the planned invasion of Eaiti, Operatim RestareDemocracy. When invasion plans were cznceled. 3-73 Armor received achange of mission. Their new mission was to deploy selected pxtions ofthe battalion to Haiti to assist the peaceful return of PresidenfAristide, under Operation Uphold ~emocracy 48 On 25 September, 3-72h o r eployed tiio id companies and their respective supprt and".ervice suppert ele~er.ts. iwenty-nine M551 Sheridans and over fiftywheeled vekicles off-loadeci at Sowmen Airfield and prepared to supportthe 1Cth Mountain 3ivision.49

Lr?lile attacke2 to the 13th Nuuntain Divisior., Task Force 3-73Amor performed a variety of tactical missions to deter violerce an2protect US and Haitian property and personnel. Initially, as part ofthe main effort, 3-73 conducted screening operations to deter crowdmovement and violence and to protect US and designated Haitianfacilities and residences. 0 Next, serving as the reserve for 1stBrigade, 10th Mountain Division, the battalion conducted searchoperations for weapon's caches and known terrorist and oppositionleaders throughout Port-au-Prince. Later the battalion providedsecurity for cordon and search operations, estdlished road blocks, andconducte2. nounted patrollinq. 1

With the aticipated =rival of President Aristide, Task Force3-73 again changed missions. Focused more on secxrity and protection,the unit now began aggressive mounted and dismounted patrolling, setroadblocks at key intersections, and received a second screening mission


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east 3f the Haitian National Palace to prevent violence that cc-ldr-hinder the Presidents return.--

All the missions assigned to TF 3-73 were again successfullyexecuted. The very nature of the mission changed from forced topeaceful entry. ?he tasks that the battalion conducted ranged formstandard NETL tasks to OOTW specific operations. The BattalionComm~?ier Lieutenant Colnnel Michael J. Lavine stated that: "'rlithrespect to OOTW-specific training, the TF found that its normal (METIfocused) training, adequately prepared the TF a d ompanies for the

r -tactical missiozs performed in Haiti."s'


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l~lichasl lazarr The Revolution of Mi 1itarv Affairs(Cazlis?e: liS Arny War Ccilege, 1994), 2.2gerna.rd and Fawn X . Brodie, Frolr. Crossbow tr,

F a Indiana: University Press, l973>, 48.3~revor . Dupuv, The Evolut& of Weapons and Warfare(Virginia: Hero Books Publishing, 1980) 194.

S ~ o n r ,A. Starry, b n t e d Combat in Vietnam (Battle AnalysisSeries), vol. 11, US Army in Vietnam, (Fort Leavenworth, XS: Combine?Arms Researzh Library, 1989) 2.6Simon Dunstan, h o u r of the Viecham Wars (Loor.5Acre, London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1985), 18.

15~im esko, Armor in Vietnam, A Tictorial Histox (Carrolton,TX: Squadron/Signal hblications, Inc., 1982), 17.

180livier Roy, The Lessons of the Soviet/Afchan War, AdelphiPapers No. 259 (Oxford: Nuffield Press Ltd., 1991), 11.


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223. . Marshall-Hasdeli "Scviet Ti? txi. Reiorrr, and theAfghanistan h.perience." (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Xilitary StudiesCffice, 1992), 12 .

%.oy, 50.243. 2 . Xzsha11-Kasde::. 12.1 C--Scott R. McMichael, Bear - Soviet ElilitaryPerformance in Afqhanistan (New Jersey: Rrasseys Publishing Inc.,lggl), 16.%bid.

31kb Nodward, The Commanders {New York: Pocket Books, 1991)52.

%rank Sherma., "Sheridans in Panama, (March-ApriIWO), 8.

35~nit bservations, 3-73 Armor - Operation Just Cause, Panana(Kay 1992) , 1.361bid.

393. Army, M 100-5, &erations (Washington: Department ofthe Army, 1993), 13-7.- m .%erbert Buchsbaum "China, The Legacy 31 ila mme n Sware,Overview (September 1992) , 2.


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aSUnit obsemations, 3-73 Annor - @eration UpholdDemocracy/Restore Democracy (Decenber 1994) , 1.

511bid. 2.521bid.53~ nit emorandum, 3-73 Armor - OOTW experiences ( J a n u x y 1995),


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CHAPTER THREE:TRAINING ANAZYSIS

This chapter analyzes the way armored forces train for O(TrW. Itexamines units' missions, and the Mission Essential Task List (METL)development process and how OOTW is integrated. Then it analyzestraining trends to determine if and how they apply to OOTW, and what thetraining similarities and differences are.

Training binds the Army into a force capable of decisivevictory. Only by maintaining such a force can the expectationsAmericans have for the Army be met. Tough, realistic, battle-focusedtraining prepares the Army for a wide variety of missions.l

Today's armored forces are faced with a variety of trainingchalienges brought on as a result of the new world order. In times offorce reductions and budget restraints, armored forces are attemptingboth to remain at an acceptable level of training for war and to ensuretheir preparedness for the ever increasing requirements of OOTW. Theadded dimension of OOTW and the potential for conducting missions thatare not directly related to war-fighting creates a dichotomy betweentraining for war and being able to execute non war-fighting missions.

But what tough, realistic, battle focused training should a unitconduct? During the Cold War the mission, the enemy situation, andtheir capabilities were clearly defined allowing units to establish aspecific contingency-tailored METL. This METL provided the unit with an

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unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missionst h t couid be changed or adjusted as wartine missions changed.2 Becauseof the relative "mission stability" providei by the former Sovietthreat, once these METLs were designed and tailored to specificrequirements, they only needed occasional revision. OOTW and associatedrequirements create new challenges for the army and how it trains. Tofully understand the spectrum of war and WTW, FM 100-5,Operations,describes three states of environment as war, conflict, and pea~etirne.~These environments have varying effects on army forces from the type ofunit needed to the degree of potential hostilities. They also could allexist at once within a particular theater of operation. Below is a moredetailed explanation of each.

War. The goal of war is to fight and win. It is characterizedby combat and examples include attack and defend.*

Conflict. The goal of conflicts is to deter war and resolveconflict. It is characterized potentially by both combat and non combatmissions. Examples here include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, andNE0.5 This is the predominant state of environment for the applicationof armored forces in OOTW.

Peacetime. The goal in peacetime is to maintain and promotepeace. Characterized by non-combat operations, examples include:disaster relief, nation assistance, and civil disturbance.6 Units thatsupport such operations are generally combat support and combat servicesupport. In some instances when extensive manpower is required, combatunits are integrated, but usually without their equipment.


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Having established the potential states of environment, andrealizing that armored forces could potentially serve in one or allthree simultaneously, it is important to establish a training philosophythat can meet all these requirements. The Mission Essential Task List(METL) is the process currently used by the US Army to provide trainingfocus. The following information demonstrates the operations of thisprocess.

METL Development Process

The first step in METL development is analysis of the unit'smissions and other external directives which impact on trainingrequirements. The commander must analyze his specific wartime missionto determine the required tasks. Next any external directives that mayimpact on the mission are considered. Examples of these externaldirectives are mobilization plans or contingency operations. Afteranalysis of the mission and external directives, the commanderformulates his initial METL. This initial list, because it is anunconstrained list, is then further refined into an acceptable,trainable, amount of tasks that complement the higher unit's METL.'


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I PLANS II EXTERNAL IDIRECTIVES

Fig. 1. METL development process.(Source: FM 25-101 Battle Focused Traininq, p. 2-2)

Having examined the MMZ development process (fig.l), this studywill now examine specific armor battalion missions and METL. Thisanalysis examines a cross sampling of armored units in the US andGermany, to determine the emphasis placed on OOTU. This samplingincludes units with specific overseas contingency missions and US-basedRapid Deployment Forces (RDF), prepared to deploy within hours ofnotification to any theater in the world for any purposes. These unitsare depicted in figure 2.

LocationFt. StewartFt. CarsonFt. RileyFt. HoodFt. BraggGermany

RI)F CowS/cOwSY cowsN COWSN COWSY cowsY cowsN OCONUS

Fig. 2 . Units and locations.

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Fig. 3. Mission Statement and METL, 1-64 Armor.

Chorder?.-n rmorp-mmbrt radg foren to deploy,

Tmitioo toWarfOOTWperfom,T W .md MurhO f c u p ~ . n - b b hMmeT.e&.q.PetformPuuge d L i mAtkWCatk byfh

Fig. 4. Mission Statement and I?ETL, 2-77 Armor.


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Onorder3-37 Armor+byrith or rilbootquipmml.bull& mmbd power, r r m Wcombatopenchru,ddeploys In supporto f 2nd BdtI d Id* DXsh. (Mcch).


Fig. 6. Mission Statement and METL, 1-8 Cav.

f14 CAVALRY

On orderTP 1.8 depby byair,- or h d t o .

d edod.combd ope-horderto-bdc/di"

mud

~l~ towuDeploythcForceCom+nctoffensive ope-CmdrutM d e pe-Surtdn heForceP d t d hc Foroc


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3-73 ARMOR(


Onordcr 4-67 h r q l qtoaadd combat o p t n t k mh port ofletB*1stArmoredDMs im

i

~ P WPerformT- Rod-ovemmt tocontactAtb f *B d f* Ob'Ms&fed P--k@w op.--op.Camrmndk Cmhd TF



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TASK 1-64- ----77 3-x 1-8 - 4-kTransition to w a r / X I T W XTransition to war Y. XConduct Peacekeeping XDeploy (air/land/sea) X X X XOccupy Assembly Area X XMove tactically (TRN) X X XPassage of lines X XAttack/Catk by fire X X X X XFight a meeting engagement X X X XAssault X X XBreach defended obstacle X X XDefend X X X X X XPerform link up XScreen XCommand and Control X X XPerform CSS X X X X X XProtect the force X

Fig. 9. Summary of Armor Unit MEIZs.

Two major points derive from the data found in Figure 9. First,and with only a few variations, the NET'Ls are somewhat generic. h e tothe lack of specific contingency operations and former General DefensivePlans (GDP), the essential missions are similar. Second, with only twoexceptions (2-77 and 4-67), the METLs do not include OOTW type tasks,rather they consist of armor war-fighting tasks. The important questionis then, whether or not today's armored battalions should include OOTWin their missions and METL. General Franks, Commander of the Trainingand Doctrine Command (TFXXX) from 1992-1994, said this about trainingfor war versus OOTW, "OOTW does not necessarily exclude combat. How tothink &ut planning and executing those operations builds on the skill,toughness, and teamwork gained from the primary focus on war-fighting."8This sends the message that training with a go-to-war focus has directapplication preparing a unit for OOTW.


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A war-fighting approach to training ensures that the armycontinues to stand ready for war--its primary mission--and notoperations other than war. It also indicates training for war is notmutually exclusive from training for OOTW. Most of the tasks associatedwith training for war, are completely interchangeable with conductingoperations other &an war. To highlight this point, the study examinesunit METLs, analyzes the associated training tasks, and conducts acomparable analysis for the WTW tasks to identify which are like,unlike, or unique.

The following chart depicts the consolidated battalion MELT,, andlists both the task number and reference. (Task numbers refer tospecific training tasks which guide the commander in organizing hisunit's training.)

ARMOR BA'ITALION CONSOLIDATED METL

Transition to war/OOTWTransition to warDeploy (air/land/sea)Conduct PeacekeepingOccupy Assembly AreaMove tactically(TRM)Passage of linesAttack/Catk by fireFight a mtng engagementAssaultBreach defended obstacleDefendPerform link upScreenCommand and ControlPerform CSS

ReferenceUnit SOPUnit SOPUnit SOP.- . ..FM 100-23FM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTPFM 71-2 MTP

Fig. 10 . METL to training manual reference.41


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Clearly, ar; the battalion level, training tasks, conditions, andstandards come directly from tne 7M ?1-2 mA The Tank and MechanizedEattalion Task Force Mission Trainins Plan. This training manual listsall possible tasks, establishes the operation-to-collective task matrix,and highlights both leader and critical tasks.9 Using thisstandardized approach to traininq allows units to rate their proficiencyas either "T" for trained, "P" needs practice, or "U" for untrained.Within the training cycle, training strengths are maintained throughsustainment training, and identified training weaknesses receive thenecessary emphasis in order to improve the unit and their rating.

The next step of this training analysis is to examine theconsolidated list of OOTW tasks. Because these task are not foundwithin the MTP , they must be cross referenced or related to standardMLTL tasks in order to determine their training task's conditions andstandards. These training tasks derive from the historical analysischapter which examined case studies to include: US annor in Vietnam,Panama,and Haiti; the Soviets in Afghanistan; and the Chinese inTiananmen Square. Analysis of the case studies confirms that in an OOTWenvironment, units conduct both traditional METL and CGTW tasks.Because the previous list examined the MEIZ tasks and associatedtraining standards, this list will focus only on those OOTW-associatedtasks not found in the mission training plan.


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SUMMARY OF ARMOR TASKS EXECUTED IN OOTWTASK-

Cateqory IConvly escortRoute securityBase defenseRrea securityInfantry supportAmbust support

Cateqoryjungle bustingRoadblock destrHarvest guardingBunkt?r destrBldg entry holesRecon by fireRoad blockCateqorv I11Traffic controlMOUTCordon & Search

Fig. 11. Armor tasks executed in 03TW.

By examining the OOTW task list in figure 11, the tasks fallinto one of three major categories. Category I are tasks that closelyaiign with standard METL tasks having defined conditions and standardsfound in annor doctrine. In the second category are those tasks whichare not unit mission tasks, but tasks executed in support of tacticalmissions at the individual crew and section level. The standards forthese tasks are found in vehicle operator or gunnery manuals. Thethird category are those tasks conducted by annored units, but whoseconditions and standards are found in other-than-annor doctrine. Thesetasks must extrapolate their standards from multiple sources in orderto successfully accomplish them.

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ARMOR CDTW TASKSTASK

Cateqorv IConvly escortRoute securitySase defenseArea securityInfantry supportAmbush supportCatesoryzJungle bustingRoadblock destrHarvest guardingBunker destructionBldg entry holesRecon by fire

Road block

Cateqorv I11Traffic controlMOUTCordon & search

MTF TASK --> TRM/Move tacticallyTRMAssembly area operationsArea defenseOffense/Defense operationsOffense/Defense operations

Drivng taskDriving taskSecurity taskEmploy the Main Gun (FM 17-12)Employ the Main Gun (FM 17-12)Employ the Main Gun and Machine Guns(FM 17-12)Combination of "9ccupy a tankPosition" and "Security operations"

Military Police training taskMOUT OPS (FM 17-30/FM 31-50/FM 90-10)Infantry Task (Also tied to MOUT)

Fig. 12. OOTW tasks to training manual reference.

The next step in the analysis is to identify the trainingrequirements particular to a unit's leadership. First the studyexamines current analytical staff tools to determine their applicabilityto OOTW, and then examines the OOTW particular tasks to determine theirrelationship, if any, to training for war.

Leader and Staff TraininqTactical training that a commander and staff conduct for

operations of war also apply to OOTW. Standard analytical staff toolssolve the complex requirements that arise from any operation's planning.


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An intelligence officer in an 30TW environment describes enemy activityin terms of "gmg activiry" or "reports of gunfire" instead of enemybattalions or chemical strikes. The doctrinal four step IntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield I process provides an analyticai t w lthat is adaptable to both war and OOTW. The osration's officer in waras well as WTW, uses the tactical decision-making process to analyzethe mission, develop a course of action, and .make recommendations to thecommander. He completes the steps of the decision-making processregardless of the theater, culture, tbzeat, or ROE. Leaders and staffoperating ir. an ,SOTW environment must be aware of theater operatingconstraints and limitations, Sut remain versatile by arming themselvesin training with proven comprehensive staff tools. This will ensurethat the commander, the staff, and all unit leaders operate effectivelyin m.y environment.

The final portion of this training analysis is to identify thosetasks not normally trained as a result of the "Battle Focused" IEllapproach to training. These primarily staff and leader tasks range from"Media Interrelations" to "Supervising a Cease fire." Again, many ofthese tasks also apply to both war and OOTW. For example, the skillsassociated with "Media Interrelation" pose similar challenges forcommanders and staff whether operating in war or O(YIW. The followingchart lists these non-METL tasks and also indicates whether they applyto war OOTW or both.


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NON-METL TRAINING TASKSTasks ~ D D ~ Yo: -- > qar-

Regional Orientation/Culture of belligerentsNegotiating skillsZnexploded ordinance trainingCheckpoint operationsInvestigating/reportingMedia interrelationsEstablish a buffer zoneSupervise a tnce or cease fireContribute to the maintenance of law and orderDemilitarize cities or geographical areasMonitor boundariesDART (Downed A C E Recovery Tng)

Fig. 13. Non-METL training tasks

Clearly, these leader tasks have critical bearings to bothoperations of war and OOTW. It is important to note that rarely will abattalion task force find itself in a position where it is the primaryorganization supervising a truce. Many agencies exist to conductnegotiations from division level and higher staffs to political anddiplomatic agencies. The majority of these tasks, like understandingregional customs or the culture of belligerents, require constantconsideration for all operations whether or not the operations involveconflict.

Chapter three indicates a strong correlation between trainingfor war and training for OOTW. Although unit missions and METL do notspecifically address OOTW, the process for preparing for war directlysupports a unit preparing for OOTW. Also, the majority of the tasksspecifically associated with OOTW were found to be tasks that unitsshould consider whether in a state of peace, conflict, or war. US Armydoctrine for OOTW is examined in the next Chapter.

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Endnoteslti.S. Army, Arm-? Focus 93 (Washincton: 3epartment nf the Armk.,1993), 1-3..,LU.S. Army, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Trainina (Washington:

Department of the h y , 990), 2-2.3u.S. Army, a 00-5, Operations (Washingtor.: Department of theArmjy, 1993). Fig. 2-1.4 ~ b i d .

7iJ.~.Army, 25-101, Battle Focused TraininqDepartment of the Army, 1990). 2-2. (Washington:

8Frederick M. Franks, "Full Dimensional Operations, 4 Doctrinefor an era of change," Militarv Review, (December 1993), 10.~u.s. my, FM 71-2 MTF', the Tank and Meciiized Battalion TaskForce Mission Trainino Plan. (Washington: Department of the ?+my.1988), 2-3.


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CHAPTER 4DOCTRINE ANALYSIS

Doctrine is the sktement of how the US h y , ormally as partof a joint team or coalition, intends to conduct war and OOTW. It isthe expression of the fundamental approach to war fighting or methods ofinfluencing events other than war. Doctrine provides the informationfor deterring actions detrimental to national interests. It must bedefined enough to guide actions, yet adaptable enough to address variedand changing situations.l

The focus of this chapter is on the availability and suitabilityof doctrine written for the support of armored units conducting OOTW.

BacksroundAnalysis of doctrinal information concerning the tactical

employment of armored forces relates primarily to their employment inlarge scale warfare. Little is written for the tactical employment ofarmor in OOTW. There are two reasons for this. First, the primarymission of the armed forces is not OOTW, but to deter, and if necessary,fight and win conflicts threatening the national intere~t.~he secondreason is that OOTW was only recently inserted into the US Army traininglexicon. What was previously referred to as Low Intensity Conflict(LIC), in addition to all information concerning peacekeeping,counterinswgency warfare, and subjects such as MOUT, are now all


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included under the encompassing umbrella of COW . The OOTW designationand acronym was only introduced into the h y ' s apstsne manuai,FN 100-5, Operations in 1990.

Current versus Future War Fiqhtins FundamentalsUS Army war-fighting doctrine reflects the nahre of modern

warfare. It applies the principles of war, the dynamics of combatpower, the tenets of operations, and the combat functions tocontemporary and fut-tire battlef ields. Since OOTW creates newchallenges for the Army, there is an atten.pt to develop correspondingdoctrine. But as seen in the previous chapter on training, the majorityof doctrine and training methods focused on war, support the trainingand preparation for WlW . Also highlighted previously was that OOTW-particular tasks had the largest impact on the units'leadership andstaff, and therefore training should focus on that population atprofessional school houses. Leader development programs should includetasks, such as negotiating skills, cultural considerations, and managingrules of engagement 4

Today, the growing concern in the combined arms community is theapplicability of doctrine to meet the needs of the military across thespectrum of peace and war. The question Lhen is whether there exists arequirement to create new fundamentals of war-fighting, or whetherdoctrine as currently written for war will suffice for OOTW. Whatappears as an attempt to "create a new wheel" may possibly best besolved with slight modifications or tailoring of accepted tactics,techniques, procedures, and fundamentals.


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An exanpie ~f doctrine tailoring was conducted by the 10thMountain Division during Operation Restore Hope. As the lead Amy Force(ARFOR) for the operation, the division felt that the currentBattlefield Operating Systems (BOS) did not entirely encompass theirspecific needs in Somalia. Specifically, since no air threat existedthe Division eliminated air defense from the BOS and added externalcoordination, force protection, and information disseminati~n.~External coordination was added due to the large number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), civil military organizations, and townelders in the area. Force protection was added to the planning processto provide b t h an increased focus on ROE and soldier protection.Information dissemination was added because of the need to interact withjournalists and interpreter^.^

Rather than adding force protection to the BOS, anotheralternative could have been to work with the existing BOS combined withthe principles of war and OOTW, of which security is already listed.External Coordination, also added to the BOS, is extensively coveredwithin previous doctrinal manuals to include F'N 100-20, MilitaryOperations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, and FM 7-98,Operations in aLow-Intensity Conflict. Additionally, adding a BOS to deal with NGO'shas little effect on the overall unit and involves only a few key staffmembers.

The foundations of Army operations, found in FM 100-5,Operations, provide a synchronized, time-tested, capstone doctrine forthe direct engagement of an enemy in a large-scale war. Principles,tenets, and dynamics of combat characterize successful conventional

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operations and also apply to OOTW. Therefore, OOTW specific "OperatingSystems" need cot be created. Operators and piamers preparing for anOOTW mission must use several references to discover the techniques andprocedures for OOTW missio1:s.

The following pages anaiyze available material by breaking intofour major categories--three Department of the Army approved doctrinalcategories, and the other lessons learned and publications. The titleof these four categories are: current war fighting doctrine, (to includearmor doctrine), general OOTW doctrine, and future doctrine. Thefourth category is composed of the pdiications found at the Center forArmy Lessons Learned (CALL). Sy breaking the information into thesecategories, it is easier to analyze the relevancy of doctrine and itsapplicability to acmored forces preparing for 33TW.

War Fightinq Doctrine

.cM 100-5 Operations3 4 100-5, Operations, is the Army's keystone war fighting

doctrine. OOTW and thirteen iilustrative activities were integratedinto this capstone manual in 1990. FM 100-5 describes the conduct ofcampaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, and 00TW. Fromstrategic to tactical level, this manual reflects the adaptation oftechnology to new weapon systems and capabilities, organizations,missions, training, leader development, and soldier support.8

Chapter 13, OOTW, and its thirteen mission activities stand asthe foundation for Army planning and its approach to OOTW. The chapterrecognizes that the Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nations

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wars and addresses the implications of its forces operating around the. . ..,-or-on envircrments x h t may not involve conflict.9 The emphasis ofthe chapter is on the six principles of OOTW and descriptions of thethirceen OOTW activities, pointing out that the Army is not limited tothose thirteen.

As the Army's keystone war fighting doctrine, all branches ofthe Army use it to establish the foundation on which they build theirown branch-specific war fighting doctrine. This transference ofdoctrinal thought is well represented within the doctrine governing theempioyment of armor.

Armor War Fishtins DoctrineThe primary sources of doctrine for the employment of armor are

the 17 and 71 series Field Manuals (FMsj. These manuals, combined withtheir respective Mission Training Plans (M'Fs), provide the tactics,techniques, and procedures for armor in combat.. Xeither manual mentions0011r', but OOTW is a relatively new acronym. These manuals deal with theLIC and MOUT aspects of OOTW. Additionally, as seen in chapter three,war fighting skills have direct applicability to OOTW. Clearly theemphasis of armor doctrine is on major regional conflicts, emphasizingheavy-to-medium and not low-intensity conflict. Starting in the 19605,the evolution 3f doctrine with its emphasis on hiqh-to-medium levels ofconhat led directly to the present day scarcity of low-intensity/00TWtype doctrine.


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During the Vietnam conflict, the belief that armor had little or26 role was fueled by the lack of doctrine for mounted combat in areasother than Europe and the deserts of ~frica.10 As late as November1961,a 7-30, The Armored Division ariqade, in a section on combat indifficult terrain, devoted a fourteen-line paragraph to combat in woods,swamp, and lake areas. Here it was stated that armored units shouldbypass, neutralize by fire, or let infantry clear difficult terrain.ll

The basic armored tactical manual of the 1960s. FM 17-1, ArmorOperations, Small Units, devoted only six paragraphs to jungleoperations.!' Dxing the Vietnm era, existing doctrine was modifiedfor that conflict similar to the way doctrine today is modified forOOTW. Tactics set for the employme>t of cavalry in rear area sec~ritymissions proved useful for LIC in Vietnam. Road sec,urity, base defense,reactions forces, and convoy escort were all described.13

FM 17-1 included discussions of base camps, tailoring forces forspecific missions, encirclement, and ambushes. The overriding problemof the Vietnam conflict was that the Army did not foresee a wholetheater of operations without a front line or a secure rear area.14

Following Vietnam, armor doctrine again remained fixed on majorregional conflicts. Examination of armor platoon through divisiondoctrine indicates that the Cold War era priorities ignored LIC doctrineand Vietnam experience.

FM 71-100 Division OperationsThe Army's capstone manual for division operations is designed

to assist division commanders and their staff in planning and conducting


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combat operations from high to low intensity. Compatible with theprevious FM 100-5. based on -he Airland Battle corzepts, it does notentirely reflect all current concepts because it was written before the1994 version of FM 100-5. a 1-100, Division kerations, states thatLIC is the nost likely type of combat to sccur. ar.d high intensity.although potentially catastrophic, the least likely.15

7o:lowing this introduction, the manual devotes entire chaptersto offense, defense, and other large scale operations, but only anappendix to L IC . Within this appendix FM 71-IS0 states that armoredforces are :yo: normally suited for use as a maneuver combat element,because their capabilities decrease and vulnerabilities increase inoperations involving restricted terrain or counterinsurgencyenvironments. 6

Building on the doctrine outlined in FM 71-10C, the Armor Schooldeveloped a series of manuals to provide training guidelines from thebrigade down to the platoon. These include: P. 17-15, Tank Platoon,a71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company, FM 71-2, Tank and MechanizedInfantry Battalion Task Force, and FM 71-3, Armored and MechanizedInfantry Briqade. Together these field manuals describe how the tankplatoon through armored brigade conduct tactical missions.

Each manual, except FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, has seven chapterswhich are introduction, command & control, offense, defense, other largescale operations, combat support, and combat service support. FM 17-15,Tank Platoon, omits the combat service support chapter. FM 71-3 and a71-2 discuss heavy-light imperatives and missions in LIC, but state thatin such environments it is tactically advantageous to use light

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forces. 7 These manuals do discuss LIC operations, Sut ad5ress amoredforces only in the contest of s..ipportinglight ::zxicry.

Respective llission Training Plans (MTF) are tied to these field.

nacuals. Tnesc W?s outline tasks, conalclons, &rd standards for cieryL ^Lactical xission to izclude crltical and leader tasks necessary tosuccessfully execute each mission. %e informtior., outlined in theprevious fie12 mamals, details every collective and individual +askthat an armor unit may conduct. Combined with the precision crew andsection gunnery tables found in FM 17-12-2 . Tank G u i , units areprovided with clearly defined technical +asks, conditions, and standardsthat apply to war and OOTW.

General OOTW DoctrineThe next category of doctrine is that written to support a unit

preparing to conduct arr @ITW mission. Because OOTW is a recentlyupdated acronym, this study also examines documentation supporting LICto include: TRAIX)(: Pamphlet 525-56, Planners Guide for MilitaryOperations Other Than War (m);M 7-98, Operations in a LowIntensity Conflict; FM 100-20. Military Operations in a Low IntensityConflict; FM 90-8, Counterquerilla Operations; and FM 100-23, PeaceOperations.

The emphasis of this examination is twofold: first to determinethe availability of OOTW supporting doctrine, and second to examine thisdoctrine for specific consideration of armored, or heavy mechanizedforce mission employment.


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Tradoc Pamphlet 525-56Planners Guide for Militagv 0wera:jons t h q han WarPublished ir. Septe~ber 9 0 3 , Trr-doc Pamphlet 525-Sf was vritten

LO assist planners at ail levels in identifying the critical factorsthat must be considered in order ks successfully accompiish a militaryoperation other than war (MOOTW')18

Chapter Sne identifies and defines what are termed as"operational categories" which include contingency oserations, combatinqterror is^, support to insurgencyjcounterinswqency,peacekeeping, andsupport to counter-drug operatiocs. Chapter TWO idectifies thefunctional areas and their associated tasks. These are the tasksconsidered to be common to all of the operational categories discussedin chapter one, and are written only in general terms. in addi

Documents

Armored Battalion Preparedness for Ops Other Than War