Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1967

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1967

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION , ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MG Rober t R. W ill iams

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COMMANDANT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCOL M. H. Parson

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFFMAJ L J. He rman Jr ., Ed ito r-In-Ch iefRic hard K. Tierney, EditorWilliam H. Sm ithDiana G. WilliamsTina Johnson

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORTHarold G. LinnHarry A. PickelDoro thy L CrowleyAngela A. Ak in

DIRECTOR, U. S. ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCHCOL Warren R. Williams

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIVPierce L WigginWilliam E. CarterTed KontosCharles Mob ius 48

RMY VI TION1GESJ

APRIL 967 VOLUME 3 NUMBER LETTERSA VIETNAM AFFAIR, LT Richard D. DonicaPARAWING, COL Harry L. Bush and Larry M. HewinCOMMON SENSE VS TOWERING Q CPT James A. HallHELICOPTERS IFR, CPT Wayne W. WrightMOHAWK OUTLOOK, COL E. L. NielsenDEBUT OF SUPER LOU, CPT Gregg S. BondST EEP ANGLE GCA MAJ Charles JolleyTHUNDERSTORMS: WIDELY SCATTERED,CPT Ronald L. VaughnYOU RE THE PILOT, LTC Robert H. WilliamsPROGRESS LTC Clifford S. Athey

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BAWDY LIGHTS, MAJ Paul L. Stansel 3THE TWO MISTAKES, LTC Richard L. Dismuke 3LOOK BACKWARD TO 66, COL Warren R. Williams, Jr. 3CRASH SENSE 3TALES FROM THE TROJAN 4PEARL S 5A FORECAST OF PERFORMANCE-N t OR TORQUE? 6Elton J. SmithSHAWNEE RESCUE MISSION 6NEW Q COURSE GRADUATES FIRST STUDENTS Inside Bac7TH COMMANDANT AT FORT RUCKER Back Cov

Th e mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIA TION DIGE T i to provide information o f an op era t ionafun tional nature concerning saf e ty and aircraft ac c ide nt prevention training maintenance op e ratiresea rch and developm ent av iation medicine. and o th e r re lat ed data.The DIGEST is an official Depar tm ent of th e Army periodical pub lished monthly under the superviof the Commandant U. . Army Aviat ion Schoo l. Views expressed herei n are not necessa ril y th oseDepartment of the Army or th U. S. Army Avia t ion School. Photos are . Army unless otherwspec ifI ed. Material may be reprint ed provided cred it is g iv en to th e DIGEST and to th e author unoth erwise indicated.

Arti cles ph o tos and item s of int e res t on Army Aviation are invited. Direct communication is auti;;ed to: Editor.inChie , U.S. Army A vuuion Digest, Fort Ru cke r Alabama.Use of funds for print ing t his publication has been approved b y Headquarters Depa rt me n t o f

Army 29 De ce mb e r 1964.Act ive Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as ou tli ned in AR 3120 March 62 and DA Circular 310-57 4 March 63. Complete DA Form 12-4 and send di rec tly to AG Publica t ions Ce n te r 2800 Eastern Bo u levard Baltimore Md. 21220. Fo r any change in dis triburequi rements me rely in it iate a revis ed DA Form 12-4 .

ational Guard and Army Re se rve units subm it req u irem ents through thei r s tate adjutants genera lU. S. Army Corps commanders respective l y.F or th ose not el igible for officia l distribu t ion or wh o desire personal copies of the DIGE T paidsc riptions 84.50 domestic and S5 .50 ove rseas are avai labl e from th e uperintendent of Documents UGovernment Printi ng Ofhce Was h ingto n D. C r 20402.


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ISir:I read with interest your article FM. Emergency "Erequency" in the Octoberissue of Anny Aviation Digest. I agreewith the authors that there are manycircumstances under which such a frequency would be of great value, particularly if Army aircraft were equippedto guard it.This problem was recognized in Vietnam and presented to CG, USA CombatDevelopments Command (CDC) in thesummer of 1963, where it was pursuedin the Special Warfare Group, CDC, andcoordinated with the USACDC AviationAgen cy at Fort Rucker.The FM emergency frequency 48.6was coordinated on a worldwide basisby the then Frequency ManagementDirectorate, Office of the Chief SignalOfficer. Although frequency conflictsexisted in some countries, it was approved as a Search and Rescue" frequency in many areas of the world .Records on this should be available atthe Office of the Chief of Communications-Electronics (OCC-E). I do notknow why this information has not beenincluded in present frequency allocationpu blications.Be cause of the expense of adding another radio to Army aircraft, and because the Army had already contractedto purchase a large number of survivalradios which use 243.0 mc, th e programfor development of emergency radioequipment to operate on 48.6 me wasdropped.

LTC H . B BLANCHARD, JR.HQ, 14th Trans Bn (AM&S) (GS)APO 96240 We plan to run an article soon onnew developments in the avionics fi eldwhich, we hope, will cover new proposals on emergency frequency alloca

cation.- The EditorsSir:An officer walked into my office re cently and asked for a checkout in theU-6A. He was from another unit some200' miles north which had no otherU -6A pilots, much less an IP. Ratedofficers are scarce around here. I agreedto begin his checkout the followingMonday. By the way," he remarked,I need a currency ride in the 0-1 bylocal regulation. The officer's unit alsohad several Bird Dogs assigned and noAPRIL 1967

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one to fly them but him and he couldn'tfly them because there wasn't an IPava ilable to give him the checkThis officer had just returned fromRVN where he had put over 1,000 hoursin the 0-1. He and his unit were stymiedby an implementing regulation requiring that all pilots, regardless of howrecent or how much his past flying experience included in a particular aircraft, be checked by an IP before hecould fly The AR of course does notrequire this, and that indicates somegood thinking by someone. It says thecommander will make sure his pilots areproficient before they fly. Now just howpractical can you get? How rewardingthis would be to the commander toknow that he could make such a simpledecision. f he could only do itl tshould be his prerogative to determinewhether or not his pilots need to bechecked by an IP, given a refreshercourse or have any check at all.I recently heard the following conversation and I quote in substance justto demonstrate how ridiculous this situation can get: I had an old friendcome into my unit with whom I hadflown for years and for several hundredhours, side by side, in this particulartype aircraft. As a matter of fact, hechecked me out. He had also spentmany hours in this same aircraft inVietnam, in which he must now take aproficiency checkride. He had moretime in the past six months than I did,and as an IP, and now I had to pass onhis proficiency Now I ask you, who'schecking who for what, and why?"Unquote.I wonder what the total cost is during the couse of a year for useless checkrides? It must be astronomical. I wonder where it all got started. Even worse,where is it going to end?We are tying ourselves up in so manycheckride knots that the unit commander, not to mention the individualpilot, cannot in many cases accomplishhis mission due to the lack of IPs togive useless currency rides. The causeof this of course is the implementingregulations that completely defeats thepurpose of the basic AR, and takes theprerogative out of the hands of the unitcommander where it belongs.Is there absolutely no more faith inthe integrity of the individual aviator?

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I'm certain that the overwhelming majority of all pilots would demand a currency ride if there was the least doubtof his proficiency in his own mind. It'scommonly known as the law of selfpreservation.Any implementing to an AR shouldbe done to resolve administrative differ ences which are necessary, usually dueto geography or organization, not toadditionally and unnecessarily restrict.This is a sign of cold feet or theinability of the implementor to acceptthe fre edom and responsibility givenhim by the individual AR, the same ARwhich basically was designed to give theunit the all-important flexibility to doits job. MAJ STEPHEN FARISHSeventh Army Safety andStandardization DetachmentAPO New York 09029 Currency ride anyon e? We contactedthe United States Army Board for Aviation Accident Research for their evaluation of the situation and their remarksfollow :What looks good on paper may notnecessarily prove adequate in the cockpit. Th ere is no way for a commanderto de term ine pilot proficiency and currency by looking, unless the individualis a personal acquaintance. The toolthat a commander uses to determinecurrency, correct cockpit procedures andpilot capabilities is through his standardization pilot. This does not meanthat the exception should never bemade for individuals whose qualificationsand capabilities are known, or when themission is urgent and of utmost impor-tance. Each ride in an aircraft should bea continued learning process for anypilot, regardless of his total time andqualifications. USABAAR accident filesdo not necessarily back up the writer'sstatement: 'I 'm certain that the overwhelming majority of all pilots woulddemand a currency ride if there was theleast doubt of his proficiency in his ownmind.' In too many cases, rather thanthe law of self-preservation prevailing,the law of egotism is more dominant. Aproficiency checkride given when not required never hurt anyone. Reverse thesituation and you may save lives andmachines. In other words, you haveeverything to gain and nothing to lose.

The Editors


4/68

A VIETN M AFFAIR

HE CLOCK beside the bunkindicated 0315 as the CQ

shook CPT Dan Robin from hisfirst restful sleep in days.Robin was one of the top pilots

in the 75th Aviation Companyst.ationed in Plak Ko, Republic ofVietnam. During his 6Y2 monthswith the company he had loggedover 600 hours and had seen sightsthat would make a veteran surgeon woozy. As a matter of fact,only a few hours earlier he hadcompleted a 7-hour mercy flightinvolving a small girl who was theinnocent victim of a grenade blast.

The CQ shook the captain relentlessly. He finally responded byopening one eye to see who theculprit was. After an exchange ofpleasantries, mostly one-sided, theCQ commenced to tell CaptainRobin that he was wanted in thebriefing room immediately. As theCQ left with a large sigh of relief, Robin hurriedly put on hiswell-worn battle gear.

The night was unusually mug-2

Lieutenant Richard D. Donica

Rain was still falling lightlybut the lightning was increasing

gy as Captain Robin headed forthe briefing room. He noted lightning flashes in the north and west.A light rain had already begunto fall. What a night, hethought to himself.

Upon entering the briefingroom he was met by the tall,husky operations sergeant. Theirensuing conversation was broughtto an abrupt end as the companycommander cleared his throat inone of those unmistakable ways.

Captain, the reason you werebrought in on this is that you areprobably the best qualified aviator in the company. The COspoke slowly, but deliberately.Brigade is planning a full-fledgedairmobile attack on zone E this

morning at 0830. The operationssergeant is heading the advanceparty. t is his ,responsibility to gointo zone E and establish a landing area for the assault. Weatherhas advised us to expect 100 to400 foot overcast conditions at thetime of the assault this morning,

so it is of the utmost importancethat you get him and his nondirectional beacon in location assoon as possible. The sergeant willcontinue your briefing in theflight planning room.

Haze began to clear in Dan'shead as he and the sergeantwalked to the flight planning.room. He suddenly began to realize what he was up against. Herehe was at 0330 in the morning beginning what was probably themost difficult mission he wouldever fly The thought caused anervous feeling to run down hisspine.

On the way to the flight planning room the sergeant briefedCaptain Robin; then, using tactical maps, he pointed to the proposed landing site in zone E. Thesite appeared to be a clearing ap-L T Donica was assigned to theept of Fixed Wing r a i n i n g ~Ft u k Ala } when he wrotethis article

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Vietnam ffairproximately 5,000 meters long and2,200 meters wide, an ideal situa-tion. There was no high terrainin this area, only thick jungle.The rou te to and from the areawould be primarily over this ju n-gle. Dan thought how bad it wasto fly low level over this stuffunder good conditions-but lookat tonight

The captain, the copilot whohad just come in, and the sergeanttediously planned the flight. Firs tthey determined and plotted acourse, then they plotted mileagemarks, and finally computed thetimes. The flight from Plak Ko to

the landing site would only take30 minutes-but oh what a 30minu tesl

Hurriedly, Robin, the copilot,and the sergeant wi th three othermembers of the advance partyheaded for the UR-IB to be usedfor th is all-important mission.R ain was still falling lightly, bu tthose lightning flashes were in-creas ing in number and ferocity .Keeping the weather in the backof his mind for the time being,Dan set about making the pre-flight inspection of his faithfu lb ird. T his ship had seen himthrough over 200 hours since hisarr ival in Vietnam. Dan had greatpr ide in his Huey, and well heshould.

Approaching the briefing room he noted lightning flashes in t he dist nce

It was 0400 hours when thetower operator cleared Saber 1for takeoff. Only 45 minutes hadelapsed since the CQ had awak-ened Captain Robin, and here hewas on his way.The first 20 minutes of the

flight went by almost too easily.They were right on course accord-ing to their charts, and checkpointtimes were perfect. But then it hitthe fan. First, the cockpit lightswent out. Almost instantly theywere in a heavy deluge of rainand getting bounced around mer-cilessly. Dan fought the controlsto keep the aircraft upright as thecopilot peered for a glimpse ofthe ground to check their course.In the back seat the sergeant, aveteran of Korea, sat expression-less. However, the other threemembers of the party were no-tably shaken.Five, then six minutes passedas the heavy downpour continued.Robin s fatigues were soaked withsweat from the physical and men-tal exertion. As if without mercy,Dan began experiencing cyclicbinding. It was all he could doto move the controls, but he de-cided to continue the mission.Only three more minutes re-mained of their estimate, but therain prevented them from observ-ing their checkpoints along theground. Captain Robin becamemore uneasy as the realizationthat he might miss the objectivebecame implanted in his mind.

Using his flashlight, the copilotconstantly illuminated the instru-ment panel for Dan. The altime-ter showed that they were at least100 feet above any charted eleva-tion along the flight route. Butwere they still on their intendedflight ,route?Suddenly, 29 minutes after take-off, the heavy rain stopped 3Squickly as it had begun. At almostthe same time lightning lit up theterrain, and low and behold ap-proximately 2 miles in front of

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them was their objective.Saying a short prayer, Danheaded his crippled bird to theproposed landing site, and at thesame time noted a large increaseon the exhaust temperature gauge.Lightning continued to flashabout them as they headed intothe home stretch, and it looked asif the worst was temporarily over.

According to the sergeant, re-connaissance showed that the pro-posed landin3 site was relativelyfree of any obstructions, but didslope about 4 to the south. Thehe serge nt continued the briefing inthe light pl nning room

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Huey was approaching from thewest in a downwind position.Robin decided to land to the eastand into what little wind existed.

s he crossed the field andturned onto his final approach, ithappened: the engine quit. Usingall the strength and skill he had,Captain Robin demonstrated whyhe was one of the best pilots inVietnam as he put the Huey onthe ground with no damage.

The sergeant wasted no timein getting his party to work pac-ing the field and cutting down the

obstructions that were there. U s-ing the pacer s figures, the veteransergeant determined the center ofthe site and set up his transit.With this, he determined the ap-proach axis and other information that would be used in theassault tomorrow. He then headedfor the downed H uey to get theall-important nondirectional bea-con. En tering the aircraft hesearched extensively, but the NDBwas nowhere to be found.

He had forgotten to bring theNDB

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Too often it is not possible to make jumps withthe conventional parachute due to darkness orpoor visibility. But tram a combat viewpoint thisis precisely the best time to make jumps - espe-cially if you have a device with the capability oftheP R WINGT HE TACTICAL ability toplace an assault force intohostile territory-without the enemy s knowledge - continues torank as one of the most effectivemaneuvers in combat operations.

To take this one step furtherthe ability to quickly supplytroops cut off from their supportuni ts also ranks well upo thelist of critical Army mobility requirements.

Both of these combat situationshave this in common: the need to

move men and supplies, always ina hurry to specific areas wherethe success or failure of the mission can often be measured inhours or even minutes.

Both of the above situationshave been, and are continuing tobe, faced in Southeast Asia. Andboth of these situations may bemet successfully through the useof a remarkable air drop devicecalled the Parawing, which is being tested by engineers at the U.S.Army Aviation Materiel Labora-

Colonel Harry L BushLarry M Hewin

tories (AVLABS), the Army saviation research center, Fort Eustis, Va.The P4rawing has all the stability and reliability of a parachutebut there the similarity ends. Forthe Parawing possesses this dynamic ability: it flies and is accurately controlled like a gliderlA 24-foot, 14-pound ParawingCOL Bush is Commanding Officer and Mr. Hewin is Technica

i r e c t o r ~ U S rmy Materiea b o r a t o r i e s ~ Ft Eustis Va

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has been flown successfully withup to 750 pounds of payload. Thesame size and weight unit is alsoused for man drops. Successfulexperiments have been conductedwith various sized Parawings fordelivery of a range of payloadshapes and sizes.The combat advantages of anair drop device that can beaccurately guided are enormous,A VLABS engineers declare. Theability to steer a deployable device has been proved during hundreds of test drops.I t should be noted tha t theParawing employs two separateguidance systems, depending onits mission. When used by a parachutist,the Parawing can be guided inany direction, either manually orby a radio beacon. When the parachutist s destination is not visiblewhen making a jump from offsetposition, or from conditions oflow visibility such as clouds ornight time, he will be able tonavigate to his target by means ofa miniature radio installed in hishelmet. A ground transmitterguides his descent. The radio willalso permit conversation withother jumpers which will reduceassembly time and permit receiptof instructions from the teamleader. When used for delivery ofsupplies, the Parawing can besteered by a radio remote controlsystem on the ground. The groundtransmitter, which s currently being developed, s smaller than thestandard Army field radio. t canbe used for either direct radiocommand signals, that is, the operator instructs the system whetherto turn ,right or left, or it can beswitched to automatic, which willthen cause the glider to automatically home in on the groundstation. The ground transmitteralso has a voice channel whichwill permit the ground operatorto confirm receipt of the suppliesAPRIL 1967

he arawing can be guidedmanually or by radio beaconto the air-drop aircraft. The airborne receiver weighs about 4pounds.The Parawing has these primeadvantages: I t can be folded, packed anddeployed like a parachute. It performs in virtually anykind of weather, day or night. I t provides a high degree ofcontrol for landing site selections. Its rate of descent can be controlled. It can be dropped offset froma landing site at a distance equalto 4 miles for each 10,000 feet ofaltitude. It will seek its final destination by automatically homingon a radio beacon. By its longglide ratio, it will substantiallyreduce aircraft exposure overenemy territory and thus avoidjeopardizing the goal of an undercover mission. Its fast opening permits it tobe used at low altitudes when required. With various system configurations, drops have been madefrom as low as 150 feet to as highas 30,000 feet. Radio-controlled night dropscan be made. AVLABS engineersnote that personnel air drops mayalso be made at night or in daylight conditions with zero visibility through the use of the specialradio-equipped helmet worn bythe jumper described earlier. Inshort, the parachutist could beguided to a predetermined landing site via the radio beacon usedfor Parawing supply drops.

Although the Parawing soundslike a dramatic new developmentin aerial delivery, actually the concept has been around for sometime.

A radio controlled Parawing comes in fora landing with a SOD pound payload

The Parawing s an offshoot ofthe flexible wing concept originated in 1948 by Francis M.Rogallo, head of the low speedvehicles branch at the LangleyResearch Center of the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration.

In 1961 AVLABS engineers began experimenting with the flexible wing concept-from which theParawing and the Precision DropGlider (both AVLABS projectswere the outgrowths. The 500-pound payload P,recision Drop


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P R WINGGlider (PDG), a device for radiocontrolled air drops of suppliesonly, is now being developed forthe Army by the Ryan Aeronautical Company under a 1,100,000AVLABS contract.

The PDG uses a wing similarto a Parawing, but is more complex since it employs air-pressurized tubes for leading edge andkeel stiffeners. This configurationdoes, however, give a slightlyhigher glide ratio (about 3-1).Due to the development time required for the radio, the PDGwill be ready for service testingin 1968.

The feasibili ty of the Parawing has been demonstrated inAVLABS research and in jointefforts with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.Development of operational sys-tems is dependent on user interest. Due to the simplicity of theconcept, a relatively short leadtime could be anticipated.

The desigr: and construction ofthe Parawing is amazingly simple.v\Then packed on a man's back, itlooks identical to a conventionalparachute. Although it can bemade in almost any size, depend-

ing on payload requirements, the24-foot wing weighs only 14pounds. I t has conventional parachute suspension lines and is constructed of a low-porosity 2.2oz/ sq yd resin-coated nylon fabric.I t has approximately 400 squarefeet of material surface. I t is flownlimp; that is, it has no ribs orstiffeners and can be deployedeither by static-line or ripcord.Initial deployment is attainedwith a standard pilot parachute.For ultra-fast opening, the staticline can be attached directly tothe sleeve, thereby eliminating thepilot parachute.

FIRST T ST JUMPIn the spring of 1966, members

of the United States Army Parachute Team, Fort B.ragg, N. C.,conducted a series of test jumpsto investigate the military worthof the Parawing. The jumps weremade under the direction of ap-tain James M. Perry, Parawingproject officer. Here it must benoted that the Parawings used inthese jumps were hurriedly engineered. And since that time, basedon wha t was learned during thisand subsequent programs, significant additional improvementsha ve been made.

The first live jump was mad,by Sergeant First Class Loy B.Brydon at St. Mere Eglise DropZone, Fort Bragg, N. C., on 27March 1966.

Here is a verbatim descriptionof that jump, included in a report filed by Captain Perry.{{Initial Live Jump The jumper was wearing a standard sportparachute harness with a 32-footparachute pack tray. The IDG(Individual Drop Glider-a 24-

foot Parawing) was packed in astandard Para-Commander launching sleeve to which a high-drag40-inch pilot parachute was affixed. The jumper carried a 24foot emergency parachute attacl1edto chest D-rings.

The only special instructionsgiven to SFC Brydon related tothe 'cutting away of the wingshould it malfunction.' Maneuversand decisions for programmings taIls or for landing the gliderwere left to the prerogative ofthe jumper.

The drop was execu ted froma U-lO aircraft flying at 5,000 feetand 45 knots indicated airspeed.Deployment was immediate andclean and the wing apparentlyHying with 1.5 seconds followingactivation of the pilot parachute.

During the :nitial test the Parawing deploys t 5,000 feet left ) the parachutist ne rs the ground center) nd prepares to l nd right)


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The jumper stated that he executed a 'clear and pull' which istc lltamount to about a 2-seconddelay. The opening shock was notexcessive but was noted as slightlymore than that of a T-IO parachute.Some immediate tail-flaringand tendency t stall was ob

s e ~ v e d However, the jumper declined. to release the glider in aneffort to determine what was causing the difficulty.

After executing several 360-degree turns, both right and leftof the wind line, SFC Brydonturned the Parawing upwind andattempted t penetrate a 25-30knot wind. There was evidence ofconsiderable forward speed butsince this was the initial jump andthere was no experience factor inhow to properly modulate themaximum lift-over-drag, windsaloft caused a drift of approximately 5,000 meters across theground. Touchdown was accomplished without difficulty. I t isnoteworthy that a quick computation of this first jump revealed10-11 feet per second descent ratesand a forward speed of approximately 20 feet per second. Glideratio figures were unattainable.Subsequent jumps have verifiedthese figures as fairly average. The

new method of infiltr tiontest subject in this case weighs225 pounds suspended. Touchdown was a very light, two-legged,stand-up landing. Even thoughthere were ground winds gustingto 20 knots, the Parawing collapsed immediately and the jumper stated that '1 simply steppeddown and got off.'

The report also notes that inits form at that time, the Parawing was extremely sensitive tocontrol and that there were aconsiderable number of things tolearn about proper control.However, in the final summingup of the results of this first testby the Army Parachute Team,this is the potential of the Parawing as Captain Perry sees it:

{{Conclusions The RogalloParawing concept is a feasible andutilitarian personnel carrier. Ithas demonstrated its ability to deploy properly, fly in a fairly stableattitude and the 24-foot gliderwill land loads of up to 250pounds accurately and easily. Ithas vast potential in both militaryand sport parachuting.

Allied to a final guidance system, this particular vehicle presents a new and radical method of

infiltration, utilizing high-altitudeglide-in techniques.The Parawing's unique ability

to glide long distances in any desired direction may also make ituseful as an emergency recoverydevice. I f pilots or crewmen haveto leave an aircraft at low altitude, they can bail ou t as low as150 feet and survive. I f a crippledaircraft has to be abandoned, thecrew would have the distinct advantage of being able to choose alanding site, be it an open fieldor open water, away from hostileforces. Also, a gliding Parawingobviously presents a more difficulttarget than the conventional parachute. In general, survivabilityshould be much higher for theman who can glide several miles,possibly away from the hostileterritory, than it would be forthe man who must, as a rule, descend wi thin a mile of the areav'here he ejected, due to the nature of the conventional parachute.

The Parawing, with its uniqueability t be guided and flown like 'a glider, presents a new dimension in Army mobility.

the parachutist completes a standup landing with ease left) and begins to co apse the Parawing center) which starts to fold right>


12/68

OMMONS NSVS

TOW RING

I T ALL STARTED in a class-,room in 1961, when a groundschool instructor began to try toteach me about weather, and atthis particular time about thun-derstorms. He explained verticalwinds in excess of 65 knots, thetowering Q's (thunderstorm cloudformations) ability to climb to40,000 feet in 30 minutes or less,with hailstones big as baseballs,with shear winds that can snapan aircraft in two, and gusty sur-face winds in the neighborhoodof 60 knots.

The instructor went on to tellof a personal experience that hadhappened a few years ago. Hewas aboard an aircraft at about15,000 feet IFR and all of a sud-den they were in the middle ofan imbedded thunderstorm. Hisaccount was that the aircraft waskicked down to 6,000 feet and

aptain James A Hall

then thrown up to 30,000 feetseveral times. The storm pock-marked the aircraft with hail andthen threw it completely clear ofthe cell. They managed to landthe aircraft but it was damagedso badly that it was never to flyagain.

Well, I had seen summer after-noon buildups and thunderstormsal1 my life, but I had never seenanything worse than a few sur-face gusts and an occasional hail-stone about like a pea, so I justdidn t believe him.

I remembered what he had saidfor test purposes but I would haveto see inside a thunderstorm justfor myself to believe all that hog-wash Well my chance wasn t toolong coming, because I eventuallygot to C (instrument) phase, andit was in the late summer months.

We were returning to Fort

QRucker from New Orleans, sockedin tight and everything was goingfine. But this was just the calmbefore the storm. Then all hellbroke loose. All of a sudden thealtimeter and rate of climb indi-ca tor went wild. The altimeterwas indicating from 6,000 feet to12,000 feet and the vertical veloci-ties we were indicating were ter-rifying. The aircraft pitched,rolled, and yawed, the water hitthe aircraft by the buckets full.\t\ e had entered at 7,000 feet withan outside temperature of about58 F. Wonder what that waterwould have been like had the out-side temperature been 15 F? Allof a sudden we were ou t of it andonce more in field grade weather,CPT Hall is assigned to the V I

r a n c h ~ Flight Training D i v ~Dept of Fixed Wing T r a i n i n g ~ FtR u c k e r ~ Ala

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The storm was now over the field but I was able to stay lined up with Y 24smooth as silk. We were only inthe cell 3 minutes but it seemedlike 3 hours. had learned a reallesson.

This experience had beenenough to suffice for a very longtime bu t as time wen t on andbecame more experienced foundthat maybe weather wasn't sotough after all. Then got a refresher course.

had flown my first student inthe OV-l and was returning toCairns Airfield for the second one.A big black weather cell was sitting about 15 miles SW. had already decided that if hurriedcould get off before it crossed theairfield give the dual period, andland after the thunderstorm hadpassed. Good planning, thought

After about 30 minutes hadAPRIL 1967

the second period student in theaircraft and was cleared to runwayOG the black cloud coming closer.The wind shifted and the runwaywas changed to 24 and the cloudcame closer but still had time tomake it off. Tower cleared me offand away went into the rain.

made a right turn out at thefield boundary to remain VFRand could see only straightdown. Tower called me and advised that had better check withATC for better weather informa-tion. did and the cell was a line150 miles long and 60 miles wide.

changed back to tower frequencyand told them would like tocome right back in. was clearedto land by this time lined upoR Y 24. The storm was just aboutover the field now and the sky

had literally turned to water.\tVith occasional glimpses of RY24 managed to stay lined upwith it. Then there was a periodof time could see nothing, andthe next time could see throughthe rain was over the R Y num-bers at about 50 feet. The towerwas now saying winds at 1800 at35 knots.finally managed to touchdown and stop the aircraft, butthe wind was still trying to blowme off the active. After turningoff the active lost the crosswindeffect and taxied on to the tiedown. From takeoff to touchdownon this flight was 5 minutes.

there is a moral to this Ii ttlearticle it must be that the oddsare against you; don't wager lifeand property against a towering Q.

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Helicopters I Rw MANY LIVES have

been jeopardized or lost orcritical missions delayed becausethe majority of U. S Army rotarywing aviators have had no instru-ment flying capability?

This is not a new problem. Inthe past, helicopter instrumentfiying has been received with littleenthusiasm for primarily tworeasons.

One is the argumen t tha tthere is insufficient need, sincehelicopters can fly below theclouds and accomplish the mission in most cases. Perhaps, butplace this hypothesis in a combatsituation such as we are facedwith in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese terrain can generally begrouped into two categories, delta

flat) and mountainous. In thedelta ,region contour flying, whichbecomes simply low flying due to12

aptain Wayne W Wrightlack of contours, can become ahazardous business. Since the VCnaturally assemble along the frequent treelines and canals, theyhave an opportunity to place horizontally aimed fire on any aircraftwhich comes within their range.With the more frequent appear-ance of 12.7 mm heavy machineguns HMGs) this range is considerable, and more helicoptersplus more HMGs equal more opportuni ties.

In the mountains of Vietnamaviators are faced with flying between mountain ridges, occasionally beneath an overcast, againpresenting a convenient straightshot to insurgents posted on thevalley sides. In the mountain situation there is the additional possibility of being trapped within avalley when clouds descend lowenough to seal off the passes.Lacking an instrument capability

and navaids, a helicopter pilothas no recourse except to waitfor clearing or attempt a low levelflight through passes with visibility dropping occasionally to zero. The other major factor heretofore limiting general use of instruments in helicopters is theattitude of aviators. Most helicopter pilots have only a slightknowledge of attitude instrumentflying and even less knowledge ofen route air traffic control procedures and use of navaids. Everpresent rumors advanced by somefixed wing instrument rated aviators and noninstrument trainedrotary wing aviators concern lackof stability, constant attention re-CPT Wright was assigned to theInstrument Div7 Dept of RotaryWing Training7 Ft Rucker7 Ala 7when he wrote this article He snow serving in Vietnam



15/68

quired, lack of equipment, etc. inhelicopters. These have influencedthe 3-3 aviator to the extent thathe frequently approaches thethought of operating rotary wingaircraft under IFC with less thanenthusiasm. This attitude canlargely be subscribed to a lack offamiliari ty.

Increased activity in the Republic of Vietnam has drasticallypointed out the number of avi ators not capable of using theiraircraft efficiently in all situations.Thus a demand was placed onthose responsible for training newpilots for more instrument ratedrotary wing aviators.

The U. S. Army Aviation Schoolresponded to this request by developing the Tactical InstrumentTraining System as part of a newconcept to turn out initial entrystudents specifically oriented forduty in Vietnam. During thecourse of instruction the studentpilot receives a total of 50 hoursof hood in the TH-13T instrument trainer. This qualifies himfor the pink card, a tacticalrotary wing instrument ticket.

The tactical instrument sys temuses LF nondirectional beaconsand the mobile tactical radar setas aids to navigation. Actual usageis in tended for short dis tance operations using direct routes witha minimum en route altitude of500 feet AGL (above groundlevel). Holding and descents aremade on the beacon in a figureeight pattern accomplished alternately by flying headings fromand homing to the beacon. Aviators are au thorized to descend toa minimum altitude of 200 feetAGL and a visibility of 1/ 2 mile.

An alternate is required for allflights using the tactical system.The mos t efficient means of recovery at the alternate is by usingthe mobile radar set for GCAs(ground control approach) to aminimum authorized altitude andvisibility of 100 feet and 1/4 mile.APRIL 1967

Although a eC may be used ifwarranted by a low ceiling, standard ADF approaches may also beused if established.

The area for an approach ispreselected, and a beacon iserected by a team which alsoclears the highest obstacles in theapproach area if possible. A 2 000'by 4,000 buffer zone is requiredaround the beacon for clearance,and all minimum al titud es aremeasured from the top of thehighest obstacle within the zone .Before beginning an app roach,ground personnel furn ished informat ion concerning ax is of approach, weather, surface win dsenemy activity, and location andcondition of the LZ . Extensiveprep lanning of each fligh t isused to provide pilots all possiblein formation before departure.

Takeoff minimums au th orizedare 100 - 1/ 4. Radar departuresmay be useful to vector aircrafton course or to establish themVFR-on-top in the case of loca lized cloud coverage.Air traffic control and pro ce

dures are kept as simple as possible by prior coordination wi th theflight operations center and other

control agencies as dictated bythe tactical situation.

The tactical in strument systemwas devised to meet the need foran instrument rated aviator inthe present tactical situation, using available aircraft and navigational facilities. The rating provides a basis for later training theaviator to at tain a standard instrument card. At present a standard ticket would be of little usein the tactical zone due to thelack of additional facilities suchas VOR, ILS (instrument landingsystem) and attendant controlsystems.

Rotary wing aviators withoutan instrument capability at present may acquire the tacticalinstrument rating under the authority of AR 95-63, using theprocedures approved in TrainingCircular 1-29.

Acquisition of a helicopter instrument rating will not onlyincrease the effectiveness of helicopter operations, but will addgreatly to the confidence of individual aviators in their ability toaccomplish llssigned missions inmarginal weather and night opera tions .

n Vietn m aviators are flying IR n mountains


16/68


17/68

MOH WK OUTLOOKHE SUCCESSFUL application of the Mohawk surveillance system in Vietnam hasresulted in Department of Defense

approval for further procurementof the aircraft and its ancillaryequipments. Considering that theMohawk is the Army s first venture into development of a systemof this type, its record in Vietnamis a ribute to those who advancedit to its present state.

The Mohawk was conceived toprovide the battlefield commanderwith a highly responsive intelligence gathering capability direct-1) under his control and capableof performing its mission on around-the-clock, all-weather basis.

~ e i r t h of the program has provided a unique opportunity totake a second look at the systemwith an eye toward improving theoveral l effectiveness and maintainability of the complete system.

With announcement of furtherMohawk production in early 1966,Army Materiel Command was directed to prepare recommendations on the .configuration of thenew buy. This was accomplishedby compiling a lengthy list ofdesired improvements, then establishiIig the cost and availabilityof the various items. It was thenpossible to define the precise configuration of each year s production buy and its funding requirement.

The list of improvement itemswas compiled after careful screening of the results of numerous discussions with user activities, theElectronics Command the Aviation Command DA, CDC, the:Mohawk systems contractors andother equipment vendors.

At this point it seems appro-APRIL 1967

olonel E L Nielsen

priate to digress brieHy to mention the Mohawk modernizationprogram now underway. The purpose of the modernization program is to update all deiiveredOV-IB (SLAR) and OV-IC (infrared) aircraft with all outstanding MWOs, AN/APS-94C SLARand AN AAS-14A Infrared. Provisions will be made on the OV-1C for an electronics Hasher anda forward looking panoramiccamera. Because of time and dollar limitations, the FY 66 OV-ICaircraft will be essentially in theconfiguration of the OV-IC modernized aircraft.

The FY 67 OV-IC aircraft willincorporate new communicationsequipments a new ADF, VORIFF, a new heading reference sys-tem, and TACAN. Wing storestations will be opened to accommoda te special pod moun tedequipment items under development by the Electronics Command. The KA-30 camera will bereplaced with a KA-76 havingdata annotation. A new voiceinterrupted priority system isplanned along with a voice re'cording system to facilitate crewdebriefing.

It is also intended that a Hatrated turbo prop version of theT53-L-13 turbo shaft engine willreplace the present T53-L-7. TheL-13 engine will deliver standardpower even under hot day conditions, a boon in areas like SouthVietnam. The long (48 foot) wingpresently employed on the OV-IBaircraft will be on the FY 67OV-IC as well. Better cockpitarrangement will be attained byrelocation of a number of instruments and controls. The use ofcertain TAPE instruments will

provide sufficien t space to makethe rearrangement possible.

At the present time it is intended that FY 67 and FY 68 configurations will be identical.

The next major change to the:Mohawk system presently proposed for later production is identified as the OV-ID productimproved Mohawk and representsthe ultimate improvement to theMohawk system under consideration at this time.Principal feature of the productimproved Mohawk is a multisensor capability which will permit one basic aircraft to be quicklyconfigured in the field as d theJ aSLAR or IR aircraft. The PIl\fohawk incorporates improvedSLAR and IR sensors, a verticalpanoramic camera, a single .da tatransfer system for both SLARand IR a new Doppler inertialguidance heading reference sys-tem, the LOH communications/navigation package and new electronic penetration aids.

The overall Mohawk improvement program has been designedto provide the best possible capability in the field in the earliesttime frame commensurate withthe availability of funding andgood configuration managementpractice.

It is anticipated that the Mohawk will be with us for a longtime. We in AMC intend to makecertain that the Mohawk surveiliance system will continue toadvance as an intelligence gathering vehicle.COL Nielsen is Project anagerMohawk U S. Army aterielCommand Washington D C.

15


18/68

Debut of Super Lou

D AWN IN VIETNAM wouldbe more beautiful, with itsflaming crimson and gold sunbeams radiating widely across themisty, clouded land, i only I hadsomeone with whom I could sharethis glorious sight. Not everyonecan appreciate beauty alone, youknow.

There is even beauty here inTuy Roa, the centerline of thishumid, elongated republic, wherethe towering, rugged mountainranges stretch into flat rice paddieplains and rolling miles of sand.The entire countryside reachesout to touch and blend with the16

Confessions of a Hueyaptain Gregg S ond

tWIstIng, changing shoreline ofthe gigantic South China Sea. If Idid not know better, I wouldassume tha t everything is peaceful, contented, and quiet.

But here I am sitting all alonein this blowing sand, a slight seabreeie sneaking up my tail pipe,within running distance from mycommander s canvas hooch yetfar enough away that both of uswon t get caught in the same suicide attack or mortar barrage.They aren t fooling anyone. Whyelse am I si tting here all alonewhen other UR-ID helicopters arelined up smartly on the asphalt

pads? Do I have to prove myselffirst? Is that it? Sure, I am new tothis game, brand new in fact, butI m smart enough to know thescore.

One glance through my aircraftrecords would reveal that I flewwith some of the best pilots backin the States. Isn t that enough?They called me the hottest Deltain the air. Of course I was freshoff the production line then, butjust give me a chance. Maybe i t sbecause I have only been in coun-CPT Bond s assigned to the thAviation Battalion} Ft Carson}Colo



19/68


20/68

ebutof uper ou

seven; we're up."No time to daydream now. Fullpower, engine and transmission

oil pressures seem fine, temperatures are ok and everyt:i.lingfeels "in the green." Super Lou,don't make a mistake. Don't givethem cause to call you a "sickship" like they do some. Remember, everyone's watching you,especially your crew.

The other ships are lifting off,leaving us. What about SuperLou? There go chalks five and six,but what about sev ahhh, he'spulling in my power. Easy now.Don't let the blowing sand botheryou. He's pulled in sufficienttorque and my tail pipe temperature is about right. I am lightlydancing on my skids, we're picking up smoothly. Give me a littleleft pedal, Boss; not too much.Good, we are off and climbing.N ow we must jockey for positionand hold it steady.I have been so busy that Imissed the ins tructions from ourlead aircraft. Was he talking tome? Wait a minute, we are de-18

scending already Are we abortingthe mission, or was this just atraining fiigh t? I see yellow smokeon the ground and we are dropping directly for it. There aresoldiers in the area who appearto be waiting for pickup. Thismust be the staging area where weload our troops and move ou tsmartly. There will be no training today, Super Lou; only onebig test-actual combat.

Here they come, the ScreamingEagles Heard a lot about them.People say they are real professionals. They better be. I don'twant any amateurs slowing medown on my first combat assault.Gee, if I carried that much gearon my back I would fiameou t unwind, and settle right in. Climbin, boys. I'll get you to your destination, God willing. Just a paintpeeling minute Not all of youI'll fiy like a torque wrench withsix of you on board, includingradios, weapons and packs.

What are doing, Boss,pulling pitch? What about mycenter of gravity? Super Lou, give

it all you have got. These menhave a tough job to do, and youcan't let them down. Like theBoss says, "Get them in and getout." I am learning to speak theirlingo, so now I'd better learn howthey fly.

Our ships are lifting off again.There go chalks five, six, and herecomes Super Lou. Hey, I can't seeThe sand is blinding me and therotorwash from the other helicopters is slapping me in the face.Oh, no Not the rpm warning signal I have got to give morepower. Don't pull so hard, BossThat's it, ease off. Get me backto 6600. Don't stop now .

We are off the ground, butwhere are we? I still can't see.Where are the other helicopters?The sand is finally clearing, butwhat is this? Fifty feet from theground What i I had failed him?I cannot believe we are still information. Thirteen slicks, fourguns, and bellies full of hungryScreaming Eagles climbing together for the cool, thin air anda safe, cruising altitude. I am nolonger alone.

Super Lou, you are doing justfine, so far. At least you aren'tjockeying around like some ofthem ahead of you. Certainly requires a lot of power, though. Myexhaust pipe is almost pooped.Since when do we let gunshipspass us speedy slicks? Now thereis one on each side moving to ourfront with "balls of their feet tothe wall," as we say in fiying circles. There goes the chatter again,everyone transmitting at the sametime. With three different radiosturned on, how do you know whoyou are talking to? It's enough towear a nickel-cadmium batteryout.

Those are fighter planes upahead streaking toward theground. They are actually dropping bombs onto a target. Waittill I tell the gang back homeI have a ringside seat, too. Wait

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/68

a minute We are descendingagain. Do they expect me to landdown there? The A-Is are stillstrafing and smoke is completelysmothering the lima zula-thatmeans "landing zone."Fifteen hundred feet per minute Cheez, that's not Rucker'sway of doing it, especially in formation. We are a little fast, too,a-ren't we? Three hundred feetfrom touchdown and still clocking 80 knots. Wow

The airwaves are dead quietnow, like a flying graveyard. Why?Somebody say something. Radiosout? I feel weak all of sudden.Get ready, Super Lou. Your debuthas arrived.

What was that weird explosion?Something has got to be wrong.t is coming from everywhere.The gunships They are firingrockets and machineguns allall around us. I hope they know

what they are doing. Why didn'tsomeone warn me? Rockets arenow exploding all over the landing zone; I can hear their thundering thump.

Short final now. The lead shipis decelerating too fast. Watchout, Boss Remember our heavyload. Who told my door gunnersto open fire? Scared the spark outof me Everyone now is firing to-

ust a paint peeling minuteward the LZ. The sound is deafening. I can't think.

RPM RPM I am shudderingall over, from chin bubble to taillight. It can't be just fright. Someone just screamed, "Enemy firefrom the flank." Which flank, forcrying out loud? Red smoke hasbeen dropped from the lead ship.I don't have time to look. We aresinking in; Super Lou, powerPull pitch, Boss What are youwaiting for? Hold it, that's notsolid ground beneath us. I am falling into tall grass and swampland. Wish I could close my eyeshields.Hope nobody saw that lousybounce. Go get 'em, ScreamingEagles They're gone; must havejumped before we even landed.'Mell, they are in; let's get out.

Lead ship is pulling pitch, 8seconds since we touched down.We are with him this time. Whata sight Look at those groundpounders move into the woodsHey, Lead, you are receiving fire.I can see the tracers zipping allaround you. Climb, man, climbThirteen slicks in and thirteenslicks out. The guns are still backtbere hitting enemy targets spotted

by the Screaming Eagles. The bossjust told them we would be backwi th more troops, all of theirequipment, and plenty of supplies. Evidently, that was just thebeginning.That was my understatement ofthe year As I remember, we returned to the lima zula threemore times. Then, when theScreaming Eagles began capturingjump seats full of Victor Charlies,we hopped around from craterholes to blasted patches, settlingin and wallowing out each time.I have had my power pulled somuch that my tail is torqued, myrotors are still, and my pedals aresore.I t feels good to si t in the sandagain. Gives a fuselage time to relax, an opportuni y to think.They say I am on standby, so itlooks like you have made thegrade, Super Lou.You know, dusk in Vietnamwould be more breathtaking andbeautiful, with the crimson sunsettling lazily behind the mountains, closing out the world foranother day, if only I had someone with whom I could share thisglorious sight.

oor gunners re ready t return fire as the Hueys make their fin l ppro ch t the Z

APRIL 1967 19


22/68

Steep ngle GCaior harles Jolley

N U MER 0 US investigationshave proved the feasibilityof using helicopters in instrumentflight conditions to provide allweather capabilities. There arepressing requirements to exploitinherent flight characteristics ofhelicopters and future steep gradient aircraft. By using steeperapproach paths, it would be possible to reduce airspace requirements for helicopters at high density terminal areas because of thelower maneuvering speeds and theability to execute steeper descentsthan with conventional airplanes.

From the military standpointthere is a definite requirement todevelop an all-weather capabilityto accomplish routine instrumentapproaches to landing at heliportsas well as newly established frontline landing areas. Slower maneuvering speed and steeper descent capability would permitapproaches to be made closer toa protected landing site. Problemsassociated with surrounding obstructions or terrain hinderancescould be more easily avoided oreliminated.Since the development of helicopters capable of instrument flying, all approach procedures usedare designed for fixed wing aircraft: basically shallow approachesand high airspeed on final. Helicopters can and do use steep angleapproaches under visual flightconditions. Why must we restrictthe approach angle while ininstrument conditions? Majorchanges in terminal procedures toa separate helicopter instrumentapproach criteria would provideall-weather capability to almostany landing site.

IFR criteria oriented to fixedwing performance fail to exploi trotary wing performance capability, and they impose unwarrantedrestrictions on the development ofhelicopter IFR procedure. Inpractice, the helicopter operatingunder IFR in a predominatelyfixed wing environment is regarded as a trespasser by the established user. On IFR routes thehelicopter s slow operating speedfouls up traffic separation. At highactivity terminals, delays resultfor the same reason. The helicopter is sandwiched in between fixedwing aircraft tha t cannot slowdown nor divert from standardprocedures for various reasons.

To formulate criteria permitting maximum use of availableairspace wi thin the performancecapabilities of rotary wing aircraft would create no specialproblems. Such criteria wouldpermit increased flexibility inIFR routing reduce problems inseparating rotary wing and fixedwing aircraft, and result in savings of time and distance for helicopter IFR operations.

Changing approach proceduresto what helicopters need is easilyaccomplished in a tactical environment. Using the mobile GCAunit and increasing the glideslope from the conventional 3 to8 reduces airspace requirementfor descent and approach significantly by limiting the flight pathto the minimum essential grounddistance. Using this system, helicopter instrument flight is possi-M J Jolley is assigned to the In-strument Division} Dept of RotaryWing Training} Ft Rucker} Ala



23/68


24/68

THUNDERSTORMSaptain Ronald L Vaughn

T WAS NIGHT. In the summer, darkness falls with a thudupon South Carolina. It wraps

the woods in black velvet. Thebirds are quiet, streams slow intheir running, and the stillnessbecomes a living presence.

Jim Cantry and I were in themaneuver operations ten t gettinga briefing on our mission for thenight. We were to fly our Mohawk up to Wadesboro and searchthe area for enemy troop concentrations. When the G-2 representative finished with us, ClaudeDavis, the assistant op officer, gaveus our weather briefing.

Weather the rest of the nightlooks pretty good. Ceiling 8,000broken, visibility 5 miles in lighthaze, surface wind light and variable. Should stay that way allnight. You birds have a goodflight.22

widely sc tteredWe took some final sips of cof

fee from our steaming canteencups, grabbed our gear and startedto leave. Just as we opened thetent flap, Claude called to us.

Oh by the way, Major Wilson[our op officer] said be sure totell you there'll be widely scattered thunderstorms in the general area tonight.

Jim gave me a look of So whatelse is new? We headed for ourwai ting bird.We walked through an ocean

of ink. You could count the starson one hand and have fingers leftover for the moon-which wasn'tup yet. Walking toward our plane,we both noted the wet iron smellof rain on the way. The dampnessin the air muffle sounds andheightened smells. Wild garlicgrowing on the parking apronbanged our nostrils with it pun-

gency. Crewchiefs working aroundthe area had the volume turneddown on their voices.She's all ready to go, sir. Carson, our crewchief, stood by thepilot's hatch, holding my seatharness like a new overcoat hewas trying to sell. He was a finecrewchief, but he couldn't stayabove the rank of PFC. He wastoo frank.You think this hunk of ironwill get us off the ground tonight,Carson? I said.

I f you let her sir. He saidit with a smile, I think.Jim and I climbed into thecockpit, strapped in, and ran

through the prestart. The turbines lit off nice and cool. Jimflicked on the commo radios, andCPT Vaughn s Aviation Acci-dent Prevention OfficerJ 9th AvnBnJ9th In DivJ Ft RileY7 Kan



25/68

called the tower for takeoff. Iturned on the nav radios. Whenthe ADF rushed on, I noticedshort bursts of static mingled withthe background noise. I thoughtnothing of it.Flaps down, seat armed, hatchlocked, props max, power stabilized. Ready for takeoff. Fullpower-the Hawk whined into thenight sky. As we climbed over thetall pines, Jim pointed toward thenorthwest. Several miles away, athunderstorm flickered on and off.We'.re gonna get a wet airplane. Jim said.

Not from that thunderbumper,I hope. I didn't like the looks ofthe cloud-to-cloud lightning. Butit was a long way off, never getto us tonight. The ADF sputtered.

We arrived over the town ofWadesboro, S C., at 2,500 feet. Itwas around 2230 when we startedour search pattern, . heading eastand wes t We were going to lookaround for an hour and a half.We were set up; the air wassmooth. I turned on the autopilot,lit a smoke, and sat back to relax.We had been up for about anhour wheri it happened.

It got so dark, so fast I thought1'd gone blind. I guess the cloudsneaked upon us from the north,but wherever i t came from, wewere in t solid. A giant grabbedus by the tail and slammed us intoa solid gushing wall ot water. Theinstrument panel tried to springinto my lap. The stick tried slapping me on both knees at the sametime with a bash in the gu t inbetween. I reduced power. Itdidn't help. The airspeed indicator got tired and took a rest, thevertical velocity nervously chattered between pegs. The artificialhorizon looked like a striped ballrolling downhill. As our seat beltsstrained to keep us from goinginto orbit, things started to getbad. Boss Lightning had arrivedon the scene.You know those expert s who sayAPRIL 1967

gi nt gr bbed us by the t illightning won't hurt an aircraft?VeIl, I wish they had been in myseat that night and I'd been attheir desks where they found itout. The short hairs on my neckstood at a rigid attention. I couldhave driven them in with a hammer. The plexiglass above ourheads turned a crackling shade ofblue as Saint Elmo danced withus. The flashes in front andaround us were utter whiteness.

The giant let us go almost asabruptly as he had grabbed us.We were regurgitated from hisside at about 8,000 feet in a steepbank, steep dive, with no controlpressure. That Grumman IronHussey was still in one piecethough; she just needed something that resembled a pilot atthe controls. I was able to pull outof the unusual attitude with aminimum of skill and a maximumof violent oaths. I had sweat gallons. Most of it was in my eyes,my soggy gloves, and my crotch.For some reason I itched all over.We finally got straight and leveland watched Mr. Storm walkboldly away on his spindly whitelegs. The thunder sounded likehughter.

Tried to kill usl Jim saidwith a whew.Sure did. You OK? I asked,noting that I was still in onepiece.I guess so, but i I was a cat,I'd say I only had 8 of them livesleft.

Me too. I wonder how manyrivets we've got left out of a billion. I tried to clear the danksmell of fear from the cockpit.Well, we still got two thewings are on.I tried to smile, but my eyeswouldn't squint. Since the damage to the aircraft was an unknown quantity, we thought itbest to call out the crash trucksback at the field. We didn't want

to take any more chances thisnight. Jim called the airfield andtold them we had been caughtby a thunderstorm and bangedaround a bit and maybe the airship would fall apart as soon as ittouched the ground. He askedthem in the most calmly professional voice he could muster tohave the crash truck stand by-ifthey had nothing else to do. Iwanted to order a shot of Scotch(neat) to be ready for me, but Ithought twice and didn't.

The Hawk stayed together onlanding. We were on the ground,alive. After shutdown we wentover to operations to report thewhole story and ask the GoodMajor what he meant by, widelyscattered thunderstorms.

Major Bill Wilson was a slowtalking, slow listening Georgiaboy. He was tall as a flag pole andlooked like he was made ofTinker Toys. He was sitting athis desk, size 13 feet crossed, bonyfingers laced behind his head.

Wahl, genelmen, I heah ya'llhad a liddle trouble. Whut happened?

We told him the whole story.At the end, we raised a fuss aboutthe weather forecast. Widely scattered, we said. There was oneright on top of us.

Wilson gazed up at the dustycanvas ceiling, ruminating hisDay's Work chaw. He thoughtlong enough to plan World WarIII. Finally, he fired a bullet-likegob at his tin can spittoon. Hestood all the way up and bent hisback in the wrong direction. Itmade a loud crack.

Wahl, ya'Il only hit onedidn'ya?Jim looked at me to see if Iwas going to have a fast answer.I looked at him to see what hewas going to say. Then we bothwalked out of the operations tent,

quietly into the darkness.23


26/68

YOU RETH

P LOTWhat reYour Limitations

ES YOU ARE THE pilotbut do you know your limitations when it comes to flying?

No matter how good you are-orhow good you think you are-youare not infallible; no human is.And whether you are a fledglingor a master constant vigilance isnecessary i you are to fly safelyfor both humans and equipmenthave limitations.

The first steps in learning tofly are generally mechanical andit is not until the pilot gains several hundred hours experience4

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Williams

that flying begins to seem natural.Unfortunately, this feeling sometimes turns into complacencycarelessness and ultimately intoaccidents.It is true that experience is ateacher-sometimes the best teacher-but it does little good to youas a fatality. One can fly belowbridges and telephone wires between trees buzz favor ite targetsand do all sorts of aerobatics. Andsome are luckier in these exploitsthan others. lust because one pilothas had the training and experi-

ence required to accomplish acertain mission doesn t mean thatyou have that capability-eventhough you might be lucky a fewtimes.In Japan several years ago anArmy Aviator got by with someactual instrument flying withoutever having attended a formalcourse of instrument instruction.This particular pilot would flyCOL Williams is CO th Artil-lery Training Battalion Ft SillOkla.



27/68

south toward Tokyo above thecloud layer, orient himself on MtFujiyama, and without a clearance of any type for an instrument letdown procedure, take upa heading fQr Tokyo Bay anddescend en route. He always brokeout of the overcast over the waterand returned to his destination.

The division to which thisexpert instrument aviator wasassigned returned to Korea. Aftera few months in Korea, this aviator, two other Army Aviators, andthe chief of staff of the divisionwere returning to Japan. Afterflying to the Tokyo area and sight

ing Mt Fujiyama late in the evening, the aviator began an instrument letdown. The flight came toa sudden stop 80 feet below amountain ridge.

This man did not realize hislimitations-which cost his lifeand that of three others. Accidents don't just happen-they'recaused; and you, as the master ofyour own craft who plans andmakes the flight, are the primarycause of all aircraft accidents.Aircraft of today are put together considerably better than

He flew into the side of t uiiyamathey were 50-odd years ago, bu teven today aircraft have theirlimitations, and these you as thepilot must be aware of. Each aircraft is designed within certainspecifications which determinewhat that aircraft is capable ofperforming. f you push the aircraft beyond its limitations, thenyou exceed its safety factors.Army aircraft are not designedto penetrate thunderstorms. On aflight in a U-6A between Cincinnati, Ohio, and Charleston, W.Va., the weather was reported IFRat 7,000 feet with scatte.red showers-no reported thunderstorms.About one hour en route andunder AI conditions at 7,000 feet,the rain kept getting heavier andit was very dark, with moderateturbulence. All of a sudden therate of climb indicator showed theBeaver going up 2,000 feet perminute-and without power. At9,000 feet the bottom fell out andwith maximum power the descent was 2,000 feet per minuteand the aircraft was at 7,000 feet

again. This heavy turbulencelasted another lO minutes. Bylolling along and rolling with,. thepunches, and holding a headingas close as possible, the area wascleared and reported to the nearest FAA radio.

The best way to beat thunderstorms is to stay clear of them.You might not be as lucky asthese U 6 pilots were.Another bit of advice is to stay

oriented in the air at all timesand to know precisely where youare. Two Army Aviators were fly-ing IFR, on top, from Fort Bragg,N C., to Fort Rucker, Ala. It wasa beautiful, smooth flight at 8,500feet-no clouds above but a solidlayer below. The copilot was navigating and knew his exact positionin relation to the ground whenthe engine began to spu tter andsuddenly quit. Changing fueltanks and restarting procedureswere ineffective. The copilot advised the pilot to begin a slowleft turn there was no problemto descend). At approximately

After orienting on Mt Fujiyama he would descend through the clouds without a clearance of ny kind

APRIL 1967 25


28/68

What re Your Limitations7,000 feet the layer of clouds wasentered and when a heading of1000 was reached, the copilot advised the pilot to hold that heading. At 2,500 feet the aircraftbroke out of the overcast-andthere it was, directly to the rightfront, the Fort Gordon airfield.Augusta had been passed a fewminutes earlier but was much toofar away to attempt a glide.You may never have an enginefailure in flight but the odds arepretty good that you will, eventhough our aircraft are becomingmore reliable as science and technology advance.

Not only must the aviator beaware of his training limitationsand the limitations of his aircraft,but he must also be constantlyconcerned with his physical andmental limits. Good physical andmental health are primary requisites for the aviator, and throughout his career he must be vigilantin keeping himself in top condition.

And even the best conditionedpilot can suffer from fatigue,which is sometimes difficult to recognize. An aviator who puts in a

5 or 6 hour day flying, the majority of which is IFR, will not benearly as proficient at the end ofthe flying period as he was at thebeginning. For instance, an IFRapproach made within the first 2or 3 hours flying is generally muchmore accurate than another app ~ o h of the same type at thefifth or sixth hour of flying. Notice it if you have the chance, butdon t get in over your head.

Another point the professionalaviator is concerned with is thatold everyday term courtesy. Asthe master of your aircraft youdo not have the authority or privilege to abuse the rights and wellbeing of other aviators or passengers in the immediate area. Takeyour place in traffic patterns andrespect the position of others inthe same pattern. Plan your landing so that you can safely turn offon the nearest exit taxiway.Helicopters must practice asteady descent and move rapidlyto their parking position and notcause blowing dust or excess windvelocities to interfere with personnel or other aircraft. This alsoapplies to starting, taxiing, or

I departed Cincinnati he d of the rainshowers but heading into building weather

hovering any aircraft. Alwaysmake sure the area is clear, wellclear, of personnel or other aircraft which might be affected byprop blast, rotor wash, or blowingdust. Remember that courtesy inHying in most cases has a directbearing on safety-both in the airand on the ground.You have been taught the finerpoints of flying and the correctuse of navigational aids. You area part of the Army aviation team,with the capability of being professional in every sense of theword. But to become professionalyou must know _ our limitationsand not exceed them. Always flythe aircraft; never let it fly you.Learn all you can from others.Never put yourself in the positionof already knowing everything-you are never too old to learn.Maintain your professional standards a t all times. Do not takechances; know what you are doing.

The future of Army aviationdepends upon the Army Aviator'sachieving and maintaining thehighest standards. Knowing yourlimitations and the limitations ofthe aircraft you are flying-andnot exceeding them-will contribute immeasurably to the goals ofArmy aviation.

' i - _ ~ - - : - . ,

26 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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PROGR SSWhat is new is the use of separate systems anddevices rather than whole aircraft during portions of organizational maintenance training atFort Rucker.

U NIQUE IS perhaps the mostaccurate description of a recently initiated UR-1 67N20)mechanic training program at theU. S Army Aviation School. Theprogram is unique from the standpoint that it has changed thethinking and planning for training all Army organizational aircraft mechanics. Let us call it theconcept of training aircraft mechanics through the increased useof aircraft systems and devices anda decreased use of the whole air-APRIL 1967

Lieutenant Colonel Clifford S Athey

craft. Sound new? It really isn t,but complete implementationacross the board and in depthis new.The concept is not new becausethe U. S Army Aviation School,as well as all other service schools,uses various parts, components,and devices during part of everycourse as a supplement to use ofthe end item aircraft). What isnew is the use of separate systemsand devices rather than the wholeaircraft during portions of the

course, thereby reducing the requirement for expensive wholeaircraft. A reduction in trainingaircraft required obviously will release that number of aircraft tofill shortages in tactical units.

The next question you may askis, I f we can release some ofCOL Athey was Deputy DirectorDept of Maintenance TrainingFt Rucker Ala. when he wrotethis article. He is now serving inVietnam.

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- these quarter million dollar machines by such a concept and theconcept is not new, why thenwasn't t done a long time ago?Before FY 1966, the answer mostoften given was in three parts:

That's the way it has alwaysbeen done, therefore it must bethe best way.Special ~ r i n i n g devices requirelong lead time to build or procure.

Fluctuations in training load,especially rapid buildups, preclude getting additional aids/devices, yet the aircraft are in thesystem and are relatively easy toacquire.

During mid-July 1965 the U. S.Army Aviation School received,as a result of commitments toVietnam, the first of several increases in. the programmed mechanic student inputs. These increases were such that within ninemonths the in-resident load ofstudents doubled and the maintenance training aircraft fleet almostdoubled. When you consider thatthis fleet was composed of from2 to 40 each of every aircraft inthe Active Army inventory, withthe exception of the CH-47, it iseasy to visualize the high value,in dollars alone, tied up just formechanic training.

The Director, Department ofMaintenance Training, had always felt that just because thatwas the way we had always doneit did not necessarily mean itwas the best way. He became extremely concerned over the largenumber of aircraft required fornonflying duty while other unitsand installations were being-stripped. The Assistant Commandant was also concerned and directed that a group be formedand a study made to determine ithere was in fact a bet ter and/orless expensive way to produce8

qualified mechanics. The groupwas to consist of 1 officer and 3civilian education specialists fromDO MT and an officer each fromthe Director of Instruction andDirector of School Support.

The group outlined the study,planned a series of visits to civilian schools, the Air Force Technical Training School at ShepherdAir Force Base, and the Naval AirTechnical Training Center atMemphis Naval Air Station. Allof these institutions were contacted, objectives of the visit explained, and permission for visitsobtained. During October andearly November the group inwhole or in part visited six mechanic producing institutions. Inevery instance, the schools showedcordiality, hospitality, and interest in the project.To make a long story short, allof the schools used generally thesame types of training aids/devices. Differences were primarilyin the degree or extent to whichthese aids/devices were used. Themost startling difference was thatthe Army (aviation and transportation schools) is the only onewhich deliberately uses wholem o ~ e r n aircraft during mechanictraining.

The study group's final conclusion was that the number of aircraft required to support mechanictraining could be materially reduced provided systems, devices,and components in sufficient numbers were substituted therefor, andthat a test should be conductedto determine the validity of theconcept. As part of the study, ananalysis was made of the UH-lP,rogram of Instruction, and substitutions were made whereverthey appeared feasible. The unsupported results indicated thatas much as a 50 percent reductionin aircraft could be realized.

When these resul s were presented to the Commandant, the Department of Maintenance Training was directed to test theconcept as soon as possible. December 1965 through February1966 were spent in writing newlesson plans, acquiring parts andconstructing several new trainingdevices. These new ones, withwhat were already on hand, pro

vided the vehicle for testing theconcept on three successive classes.Random selection of 7 studentsfrom each class provided a testgroup, with the remainder of theclass acting as a control group atthe same level of training.

Final examinations were completed on 1 April 1966 and evaluation of the test program began.1:1 addition to the classes whichfurnished the test groups, examination results from three previousclasses were selected to enlarge thecontrol base. Achievement wasdetermined by using raw scoresobtained on the examinations.The test and evaluation team reported: The achievement of thetest group as shown by averageraw score on tests 2, 3, and 4 inthe 67N Course is not significantly different from achievement bythe control groups. The study, toinclude test results, was then completed and forwarded to CG,USCONARC, for final approval.In the meantime, the Departmentof Maintenance Training was directed to take immediate actionto implement as much of this

new concept as facilities andequipment would permit.

One method used by the department during and immediately following the study was to derivetraining systems and devices fromthe aircraft themselves. By disassembling aircraft into theirmajor components, groups of students using that aircraft increased

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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from one to as many as three orfour. For example, the DH-Ibreaks down nicely into four major assemblies, yet support maintenance can easily restore i t to aflyable configuration i f such isla ter required.

During the entire period of thestudy and test, and as the resultof the increased requirements toproduce mechanics, Departmentof Maintenance Training was alsoconsidering several other innovations which might reduce trainingtime, equipment, and facilitiesrequirements, yet continue to produce a well qualified mechanic.The most fruitful of these wasthe elimination of the Intermediate Observation Helicopter Course5 weeks) as a prerequisite forentry into the MOS 67N20 (UH-1) Course by adding only twoweeks to the UH-l training.A saving of over 200 man yearsof training time was realized overthe remainder of the year and anew concept titled direct flowwas born. It worked so well thataction was taken to study allcourses for the feasibility of elimination of prerequisite courses. Itis expected that by 4th QuarterY 67 all mechanic courses which

now have an intermediate prerequisite course will be revised toeliminate the prerequisite course.

One other method devised toallow for an increase in studentswithout a corresponding increaseill training aids, equipment, orfacilities is the daily flow. fannual student input requirements are relatively small, startinga class once a week, two weeks ormonth is satisfactory. However,when input doubles or triples,facilities and equipment must increase accordingly simply becausea larger number of students arereceiving the same block of instruction at the same time.APRIL 1967

f classes start 8 hours apart(daily), and as much instructionas possible is prepared in 4, 6, or8 hour blocks, a substantial increase in the number of studentscan be realized without a corresponding increase in equipment.Those blocks of instruction exceeding 8 hours will require someincrease in facilities and equipment as student input grows, butstill not to be the extent requiredby previous programs.

We now have the third bigchange in the USAAVNS concept,methods and procedures for producing organizational aircraft mechanics, each of which tends toreduce the cost (time, personnel,facilities, and equipment) oftraining. Put them all togetherand count the savings, observethe efficiency with which the sys-tem works, and total up the utiliza tion of classrooms and equipment. In some instances the in-cre se in use of classrooms andequipment exceeded 150 percent.Compare the present graduatewith a former graduate and youwill find that he has actuallylearned more than his predecessor.

Let me list some actual figuresof the number of aircraft sa.vedby these changes:

DH-l Reduced from 41 to 30O-IA Reduced from 16 to 6U-6A Reduced from 22 to 7As the other programs are con-

verted, savings will occur in allaircraft (for any given number ofstudents that is).

Considerable interest has beengenerated at all levels of command by these innovations. Theenthusiasm of the instructors andacceptance by the students is alsovery gratifying.

The Department of Maintenance Training and the ArmyAviation School are well aware ofand deeply concerned with the assigned mission Df training organizational aircraft mechanics forthe U. S. Army and constantlystrive to improve the product.Any idea presented, method developed or innovation suggestedwill be carefully studied and, i fpromising, will be tes ted and/orincluded in revisions to the programs of instruction. In this wayprogress is assured.

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some aviators h ve come to place morereliance in a red light advertising coming eventsthan in proper planning t prevent these events

W HEN TOM EDISONpushed the switch that illuminated the world s first electriclight bulb, I bet he never wouldhave guessed the way some folkswould come to depend on his invention. It's amazing what folksexpect from a little light bulb.It's supposed t illuminate, advertise, indicate and remind, all inone. This situation causes somestrange reactions at times, and30

when the bulb fails to light, causessome equally strange lack of reactions.The biggest reaction I ve everseen to a single light was causedby a color-blind janitor placing ared bulb in the porch light of the' ' ' 'CTU meeting hall in my hometown. Sadie Bligh, head of theentertainment committee, wasright in the middle of a stirringlove ballard titled Lips That

Touch Wine Shall Never TouchMine when a truck load of itinerant kumquat pickers armed witha crock jug of Panther Pilcherstormed into the hall looking foraction. The resulting riot causedmore damage than Phil Sherman searlier march through town enroute to a Yankee veterans con-lV A] Stansel was assigned to the10th Aviation Group Ft BenningGa. when he wrote this article.



33/68

vention at Jekyll Island.Like the unfortunate kumquatpickers, some aviators have cometo place more reliance in a red

light advertising coming eventsthan in proper planning to prevent these events. This is particularly true in the matter of properfuel management.

How many times have youheard (or said), "So I kept itfeeding from the center tank un tilthe warning light came on, thenI etc." It's a common statement to be heard where flyingstories are being told. I like to refer to this as the "Joe Dumb sys-tem of fuel management." Thissystem is especially effective whencombined with the "hiddengauge" system of aircraft designemployed in some Army aircraft.

In the past five years over 80Army aircraft of various types ranout of fuel in flight. Of these rythroated gliders, 40 became perpetual earthbound monuments attesting to the brilliance of combining these two systems. I wonder how many Joe Dumbs werejust sitting there "feeding fromthe center tank until the warninglight came on when disasterstruck.

Design of the 0-1 aircraft blendswell with this combination. Fuelquantity gauges are located within easy vision range of the pilotif you happen to watch the 'aircraft wing roots as you fly- andthe complicated and highly technical job of installing a simplewarning light was eliminated fromthe design by some unknown disciple of cost reduction worshipping a t the altar of false economy.The results of this combinationare that the O-ID and O-IFmodels of this basic aircraft leadAPRIL 1967

the pack in number of fuel exhaustion cases. The Joe Dumb sys-tem of fuel management will notwork without a warning light totrigger action.The U-6 works well with theJoe Dumb system but it also hasa few design shortcomings. Didyou ever try to check the tip tanksjust beor.= takeoff? After anextensive unsuccessful scavengerhunt for a ladder and a bonejarri,ng tumble from a one-footedbalancing act on a wheel chock,I'm sure you stumbled on the generally accepted method-the run,jump and watermelon thumpNot very accurate, but then againnei ther is the confusing set ofdouble-numbered, eye strainingclusters located on the instrumentpanel for the regular tanks. Tocompensate for these minor shortcomings, Saint de Havilland installed Joe Dumb's old standby,the beady eyed little red light.After it illuminated, Joe has 5whole seconds to take action before the engine quits. f Joe happens to be preoccupied, he's liableto frighten his passengers (perhaps his rating officer amongthem) or risk a vapor lock rendering further power sustained flighthighly improbable.

The U 8 was designed as primetransport for the Army's highestbrass, yet has the same fuel warning devices as the O-I-NONEAgain the "hidden gauge" systemof design was employed with greateffectiveness. Lacking room to install the fuel panel on the instrument panel due to installation ofseldom used circuit breakers, ashtrays and so forth, the designercleverly concealed it under thepilot's left arm pit, being carefulnot to install a warning system

that would draw attention to itunder any circumst::mces. fenough Key Klub members lIsethe loe Dumb" system, promotions to the top could be fas terin the fu ture.

How can future fuel exhaustioncases be prevented? Problems ofdesign were cured in the CH 4 7.Everything is up front, readable,and easy to u n d ~ r s t a n d Now ifwe could modify joe's mental design to think ahead a little, we'dhave it made. Perhaps we couldborrow an idea from the autodealers and install a tape recorder,vith appropriate messages. Approximately 30 minu tes from fuelexhaustion time Joe would hear,"This is the voice of your friendlyaccident board president, Lieutenant Colonel Hangum . f youdon't take appropriate action toswitch tanks or replenish yourfuel supply within the next 30minutes, you shall be talking tome in person-maybel"f Joe failed to get the first message, the second would be evenmore dras tic. "This is the recorded voice of Colonel Pennypincher, your flint-hearted, tightfisted finance officer. In exactly 15minutes your flight pay will terminate unless you replenish yourfuel supply " This second messagewould be recorded against a background of whimpering, candystarved kids, and a wailing wifebemoaning the necessity of wearing last month's gown to thismonth's party.

f both these messages fail tocause Joe to take action, and toperform adequate preflight planning, then I guess we'll just haveto sic the WCTU ladies on him.They sure cured the kumquatpicker's reliance on red lights.

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ittlemistakes don t hurt us too much; it s thebig mistakes that break our backs and kill us.

The wo istakesLieutenant olonel Richard L Dismuke

A N AESOP'S FABLE chronicles the events transpiringas a result of a hunt conductedby a lion, donkey, and fox. Thisunlikely trio was very successfulduring the hunt and returnedladen with a great bag of game.Only one problem remained, howto share the game. With little discussion the lion directed the donkey to divide the game now lyingin a grea t pile. The donkey soondivided the game into threeequal heaps, indicating each hunt-er would take one of these as hisshare.

This mathematical precisionenraged the lion. He roared hisdisdain, fell upon the donkey andkilled him on the spot. Still roaring and grumbling the lion threwall the game into one p i 1 ~ including the deceased donkey. Turningto the fox the lion said, You divide it. The fox quickly anddeftly removed one small fieldnlouse and allowed as to how thefield mouse was his share and theremainder was the lion's. This action greatly pleased the lion. In

fact he was so pleased he exclaimed, "Wonderful WonderfulHow on earth did you learn todivide so well, Mr. Fox? The foxreplied, "I leanied from the donkey, Mr. Lion."Obviously this story gave riseto the .expression "The lion'sshare. The moral of this story isequally obvious: it is a wise person who learns from the mistakescommitted by others. What isn'tso obvious is that this story clearly identifies two mistakes. One isof a staggering magnitude and theother rather inconsequential.'Vhile the inathematics of thedonkey'S action was correct theresults were disastrous, a BIG mistake in psychology, a fatal mistake.The fox, whose math left him onthe short end of the stick gamewise, made a coup in psychologywhich left him sound to retur-nfor another day's hunt. His math-ematical mistake was little, allthings considered, a small thing.Thus, mistakes come in two categories, the big ones and the littleones. Little mistakes don't hurt

us too much; IT IS THE BIGMISTAKES THAT BREAKOUR BACKS AND KILL US;Surely, every military individual who takes the field has onethought in mind: to be successful,to win. Nonetheless, in thi