Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1991

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Professional Bulletin 1-91-2Distribution restriction : This publication approved for pu blic release . Distribution is unlimited .


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Major General Rudolph Ostovich IIIChief, Army Aviation Branch

Aviation's Contribution to the War in the GulfPREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED WERE the threeArmy warfighting qualities-deployability, versatility,

and lethality. I have explained how these qualitiesepitomize current Army Aviation. The Gulf Warprovided Army Aviation the opportunity to showcasethese dynamic qualities. Our contributions to the fightin the Gulf War unfolded before the world 's eyes.

These qualities are not entirely new for Army Aviation. Past commanders envisioned rapid deployment ofhelicopters and battlefield mobility at its greatest withtroop-carrying helicopters. Maneuver, combat support,combat service support, and intelligence operationsdemonstrated versatility. Lethality was clearly evidentin early experiments with armed helicopters thatprovided suppressive fires during air assault operations.Later, air operations in Vietnam exploited thesequalities through the effective use of air cavalry, air assault, aerial rocket artillery, and special electronics mission aircraft.

Army Aviation clearly demonstrated these threequalities in Southwest Asia. Deployability was evidentin the early deployment of AH-64 Apache helicopterunits with the Army's Rapid Deployment Forces-the82d Airborne Division and 101 st Air Assault Division.The combination of ground forces and an organic AH-64 attack battalion formed the division ready brigade"heavy." The 82d, 101st, 24th Mechanized InfantryDivision, 1st Cavalry Division, and XVIII AirborneCorps all deployed with extended aviation organizations. More important, aviation was resident at thedivision level where it was effectively used to achieveoperational objectives. The arrival of the 1-82d early intheater bears testimony to Army Aviation's ability todeploy rapidly around the world.Versatility was demonstrated frequently. UH-60Black Hawk helicopters daily assisted ground units inmoving troops, supplies, and equipment forward to newtactical locations. CH-47 Chinooks moved bulk quantities of all classes of supplies around the battlefield andperformed aircraft and vehicle recovery. Army rotaryand fixed-wing aircraft performed special electronic

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

missions and gathered timely and critical intelligenceinformation for commanders. Army Aviation's widerange of contributions are coming to light in other areasas well. These include command and control, medicalevacuation, and combat search and rescue. DuringOperation Desert Storm, we even witnessed Apachesand OH-58 Kiowa Warriors taking prisoners!

Apache attack helicopters armed with rockets andlaser-guided missiles moved effortlessly under thecover of darkness demonstrating their devastating lethalpower. According -to a Pentagon news media release,Army Apache helicopters were among the first weaponsystems to see battle and to playa vital role in the aircampaign against Iraq. Aviation Forces along with Special Operations Forces combined efforts to blast a holethrough the perimeter of Iraq 's air defense (AD) system.Apache helicopters fired HELLFIRE missiles into twoIraqi AD command centers, knocking out their early ADcapability, which denied Iraqi gunners time to fire antiaircraft missiles and guns accurately. The AD command centers stood between Baghdad and the first waveof attacking fighter-bombers. That hole allowed aircraftto effectively unleash multiple attacks against Iraqimilitary targets in and around Baghdad.

Talk about lethal-the Apache's night vision systemenabled it to destroy targets from 5 miles away. Not asingle Apache employed in Desert Storm was lost tohostile enemy fire. The air bombardment drove theIraqi's Soviet-made T -72 tanks from their defensiveposture; Apache helicopters engaged and destroyedthem with speed, surprise, and standoff while under thecover of darkness or masked behind sand dunes. That'snot even a fair fight and that's what I call lethality.

Our contribution to the fight in the Gulf War was considerable. Army Aviation demonstrated the qualities ofdeployability, versatility, and lethality. These qualitieswere magnified as our capabilities were factored intothe ground war. Often our glory is hidden behind thescenes and unexposed-but that's how we fight.Whatever the situation, Army Aviation remains arelevant force now and for the future. =-=,


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Colonel Patrick J. BodelsonChief of StaffU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, ALCaptain Kevin B. SmithAviation Planning Group

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This article is the first in a series describing the relationship between force design and thewarfighting capability generated by that design. It emphasizes how the design of armies generates tempo, a prerequisite for victory on the battlefield. In view of the imminent force reduc-tion due to budget constraints, it prompts the disturbing question: "Will our habit of designingthe force through consensus-building jeopardize the Army's future overall combat efficiency?"

Much of what constitutes victory is human-fightingspirit, endurance, morale,command style, training, and discipline- and within the influence ofthe commander. Other elementsquality equipment, usable doctrine,and adequate force design- also contribute to victory. While good commanders can do something aboutmorale, training, and discipline, theyare far less empowered to do onewhit about faulty force design.

During the last decade, the U.S.Army managed to field a variety ofnew equipment-equipment that wassorely needed. The U.S. Army alsodeveloped new doctrine- the AirLand Battle (ALB)-and, toward theend of the decade, began the processof revising and updating doctrine toensure its continued relevance intothe next century. Force design isonly now being seriously examinedto see if it has kept pace with thechanges in doctrine and equipment.

To take part in the current debateconcerning the future structure ofthe U.S. Army is certainly beyondthe scope of a single article. Instead,our aim is to try and establish arelationship between an Army 'sforce structure and the warfightingcapability generated by that structure. Whether this relationship and

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

its associated doctrinal impact hasany bearing on the current forcestructure debate is left for the readerto judge.

I f history provides any lessons,one of them is that armies rarely (i fever) enjoy an optimum forcedesign. The few exceptions to thisrule probably occur only when thegeneral and the emperor are thesame-as in the case of Napoleon.Even Bonaparte only briefly possessed the capability to design, field,and then command the' right' army.

Neither of the reputed masters ofmobile warfare in this century-theWehrmacht and the Israeli DefenseForce-had the necessary funds or industrial base to field exactly theforce that they desired. The Wehrmacht conquered Western Europewith an army that was only 20-percent mechanized in its heyday.

Democratic nations still find it almost impossible to arrive at an optimum force design because of funding constraints, the uncertain impactof tremendous technical progress,or, recently, the fortunes of organizational, domestic, and worldpolitics.Force Design

"The purpose of military organization is to so deploy available

human and material resources inorder to produce the greatest possible effectiveness in combat." 1 Thistruism is simple enough to put between quotation marks, but it ismuch harder to live by in peacetime,simply because of a lack of feedback. Without feedback, any forcedesign decision is essentially a shotin the dark. Of course, to avoid thesemistakes, we rely on professionalmilitary judgement, computermodeling, and the different forms ofavailable history. All this has a tendency to remove some of the uncertainty but certainly not all of it.

The world of force design must,therefore, be carefully navigated,since one false turn can spell immediate and irreversible disaster in thefield. Interests external to the pursuitof th e 'greatest possibleeffecti veness' can serve no purposeother than to create error in theprocess.

Warfighting CapabilityWhile many aspects of war arecertainly important, it is the generation of tempo upon which all elseturns. Tempo has been called the'soul of war. ' It is impossible to findan accepted doctrine or theory thatdoes not call for the generation ofhigher tempo in relation to your

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designfortempo

enemy. A superior tempo is the prerequisite for movement, the abilityto concentrate, the ability to generate surprise-the essential abilityeither to conduct maneuver warfareor rapidly add numbers of lethal systems to the decisive point. Thisbeing the case, it makes sense to tryand establish the relationship between force design and the generation of superior relative terppo. Understanding tempo, and its effect ofcombat effectiveness, is easier whenthought of in the following way:o Tactical tempo is the rate of work

within a battle (between engagements).

o Operational tempo is the rate ofwork between battles.2o Strategic tempo is the rate of workbetween campaigns.

All three 'flavors' of tempo areimportant, but their importance isrelative to the' levels' of war. Superior tactical tempo can win a battlebut may be rendered useless by operational defeats. Superior operationaltempo can, to a large degree, offsettactical errors but may have littleimpact on a war dominated by rapidmovement at the strategic level. Any

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force design that ignores this basicrelationship is flawed.

The prime historical example ofthe effect of force design on thegeneration of superior tempo is thebattle for France in 1940. The criticalforce design decisions that affectedthat battle were made years beforethe first shot was fired. Yet these organizational design decisions affected the battle as surely as anytactical de- cis ion made during thebattle itself.Prewar Germany

Between 1935 and 1937 " ... atense struggle was fought out withinthe German General Staff regardingthe future role of armor in battle.General Beck, the Chief of Staff,wished to follow the French doctrineand tie down the tanks to close support of infantry.,,3

Surprisingly, German doctrinewas still under debate, and the" ... Army did not wholeheartedly accept the concept of mechanizedblitzkrieg until the defeat of Francein 1940. Prior to that time, themajority of senior German commanders apparently regardedmechanization as a useful but veryspecialized tool that would notreplace ordinary infantry divisions.In thinking this, they shared much of

the traditional viewpoint that characterized their counterparts inBritain, France, and elsewhere.,,4Prewar France

The glory of France seemed destined to remain with the infantry. Aslate as 1937, the French equivalentto FM 100-5, Operations, stated that" .. .it was the infantry which was tobe entrusted with the principle dutyin battle. Protected and accompaniedby its own guns and by the guns ofthe artillery, an d occasionallypreceded by combat tanks and aviation . .it conquers the ground, occupies it, organizes and holds it...thetask of infantry was particularlydangerous and of outstandingglory.,,5 The French concept wasflawed in two areas as follows:o " ..such a meticulously planned,centrally controlled operation was

unable to react to sudden changes.The German offensives of 1918had already demonstrated that anyenemy action that disrupted thedefender's linear deployments andlockstep planning would catch theFrench headquarters off guard, unable to reorganize a defense againsta highly mobile attacker.,,6

o " .. the French doctrine viewedcombined arms as a process by

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which all other weapons systemsassisted the infantry in its forwardprogress. The alternative of findingways to increase the mobility andprotection of the infantry in order

k h hto eep pace... WIt ot er armswas rarely considered.

The men in control of the FrenchArmy (infantry- and artillery-menwith proponent interests) mistrustedmechanization. Their mistrust wasfueled by a lack of fundamental technical understanding. GeneralGamelin, the ,French chief of staff,once remarked that "You cannothope to achieve real breakthroughswith tanks. The tank is not independent enough. It has to go ahead,but then must return for fuel andsupplies.,,8 Edouard Daladier, theFrench Minister of NationalDefence, declared to a Senate Commission that tanks were too vulnerable. The Spanish Civil War" ... has seen the crumbling of immense hopes based on certainmachines. Outside Madrid the tankslay ... pierced like sieves.,,9 Gamelinechoed Daladier in condemning themechanized fighting vehicle as toofragile-- " .. .inadequately protected,fit only for the scrap heap."IO

Whatever the reasons-improperanalysis of the Spanish Civil War,political dominance of a single


proponent, or the erroneous association of France's armored theoristswith Communist elements ll -thefact remained that France's forcedesign was about to playa major partin losing the war, although her forcewas virtually equivalent to Germany's force.Situation at H-I (Hour-I)

Throughout the 1930's, both nations fielded essentially the samenumbers of divisions, and procuredremarkably similar quantities ofequipment:

"For employment...Hitler couldcount upon 136 out of the Army's157 divisions, of which no more thana third qualified .as first-rate offensive materiel.... France's northeast

front was ... held by ... a total of 136(divisions).12

"By the most accurate of estimates, Germany's ten panzerdivisions had a total of 2,200 tanks.The Franco-British alliance had almost 3,400 tanks of modernd 13eSlgn.

"In artillery, France was numerically superior, with 11,200 guns to7,710.

14"France was at a disadvantage in

terms of aircraft, with 1,729 of alltypes, against 3,242 aircraft available to the Germans." 15

As far as numbers go, the gamecertainly looked even enough. Numbers alone, however, did not not tellthe whole story. Within the FrenchArmy, the " ... tanks were scattered:

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des ignfo rtempo700 to 800 in the cavalry divisions orD.L.M.s, 1,500 to 1,700 dispersed inindependent battalions under the infantry. The remainder belonged tothe three new armored divisions,only formed in 1940, and each contained just half as many tanks as(each of) the ten powerful Panzerdivisions into which was concentrated all the Gennan armour."16In fact, the largest German operational concentration of armor (ArmyGroup A) enjoyed nearly an order of

French 3dArmy Group

magnitude difference in size over thelargest single French operationalconcentration of armor (theStrategic Reserve).

Figure I represents the initial dispositions of each anny before thebattle, and gives a rough indicationof the extent of the mechanization'piecemealing' within the FrenchForce design.

Consciously or not, Francedesigned her force to maximize tactical firepower and tempo to fight a

Reserve

French 2d French 1 st

forward-deployed defense of herown borders (and those of her allies).17 The Germans, perhaps withequal organizational uncertainty,started with the same 'pieces,' andended up with a different forcedesign-one that weakened tacticaltempo slightly but maximized tempoat the operational level.

In all fairness, the Gennan command philosophy18 was certainly amajor factor in the Battle of Franceand, in retrospect, seemed ideally

BEF~ French 7t hC".iUn ~o :DJ mli l I IArmy Group Ar1ny Group Belgiumo : :n : : I ID : I I J I l uOl:J:J:JID 0 0 a:J:D:ll]o:r:o::r::r::l 0:. lIJOlOl:l:lIJJ ~ ~0 0 J i I " ~ ~ NetherlandsClTJJTlTLlJ:JIJ dEEM ~

erman Army Group C c::J.Jm OJ:] ODCJ.J:J:J:lco:a:o a CD::I l I l IXDo:IllJ.II] CJ:o:JO:JID:J

L E G E N Do in fan t ry diviaionI i ainqle t ank batta l ion in in fan t ry d iv is ionm l i q h t mechanized/llotorized or ha l fs t renq th armored d iv is ion Panzer d iv ia ion

[ ) [ l ] ( ] [ ) : l ] ( J German Army[ J J ( ] [ [ ] Group BGerman ArmyGroup A

FIGURE 1: Design of French and German Army Forces at the beginning of World War II

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matched to her force design.Whether th e same commandphilosophy would have worked aswell with a French-style force designis debatable. In fact, evidence ofsuch a potential mismatch betweenGerman doctrine, commandphilosophy, and a piecemealingforce design approach was evident inthe Polish campaign:

" .. . th e German higher commanders had not acceptedGuderian's theories and did no temploy their mobile divisions inmass for deep exploitation. The panzer and light divisions were parceledout among the various armies ... Ingeneral, th e mechanized an dmotorized forces were employed asthe cutting edges of a more conventional advance on a broad front, withrelatively shallow penetrations ofthe Polish defenses. Not until afterorganized Polish resistance collapsed did armored forces exploitinto the rear for any distance." 19Germany probably used the samecommand philosophy in Poland as inFrance; however, th e GermanArmy's force design was apparentlydifferent, and the results were different as well. Piecemealing theirmost mobile assets (although not toas great a degree as the French) cer-


tainly slowed the available operational tempo down.

It is very likely, however, thatboth France and Germany desiredmechanization at both the tacticaland operational levels; however,neither country had enough tanks,trucks, and personnel carriers at thatpoint in time to fill all of their or-. . I d 20 W hgamzatlOna nee s. 1t notenough assets to go around, theFrench decided to distribute (andthereby shackle) their mechanizedelements to the infantry. Thus, theFrench Force design limited their entire army to a tempo of 4 kilometersper hour (km/hr). The Germans keptthe higher tier of mobility concentrated at the operational levelwhere they could exploit the '20km/hr' speed of mechanization.While the greater portion of the German Army was slightly inferior intactical tempo, they retained anoperational force that provided bothmass an d much higher relativetempo.A combination of British andGerman ideas helped create the firstseparate mechanized units. Thereasons for Germany's battlefieldsuccess are perhaps best expressedby the same combination. In a 1985speech to the War College, Generalvon Senger und Etterlin described

the nature of operations with theGerman Force design:

" ... a few remarks on the structureof forces .... I like to call this wholething a two-tiers affair, a two-tiersstructure, a two-level structure ofour armies. Let's be absolutelyaware of this ... A two-tier structureby which I mean there were two different types of armies-completelydifferent types of armies. One was amass army of foot-going and horsedra wn infantry, with 4 km/hrmobility, and the other tier-the otherlevel, a complete army within thearmy-were the mechanized formations ... wi th a 20 km/hr roughlyaverage mobility. This differentialmobility between the two elementsof our armies on both sides is themost significant feature, I think,of .. all Second World War campaigns.,,21

This two-tiered structure owesmuch to British theorist 1.F.C.Fuller. Twenty-five years after theend of the Second World War, hesummarized the modus operandi ofthe two tiers of mobility as follows:

" ... The weapon of superior reachor range should be looked upon asthe fulcrum of combined tactics .. abody of men ..should be arrangedinto two groups, the one offensive,and the other defensive. Th e latter

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designfortempomay be formed into a protected basefor the former to operate from-thatis, a harbor to set out from and returnto. Thus is established the primarytactical di vision between thefighters ... the one hits, the otherholds; the one moves, the otherstands firm.,,22Other Historical Indications

The surface of history does notneed to be scratched deeply at all toreveal other examples of the sameforce design phenomena discussedabove. On September 15, 1916, theBritish introduced the first tanks intothe lethargic Somme offensive. Instead of massing the few vehiclesthey possessed, " ... the tanks weredistributed without regard to organization among nine divisions attacking on a three mile front.' '23The result was easy to predict: everydivision had seven or eight tanks andthese sparsely placed tanks made noimpact at all.

The case of the W orId War II tankdestroyer was a force design disaster. The tank destroyer was initially designed as a lightly armored,rapidly moving antitank system intended to counter the Germanblitzkrieg. The basic tank destroyerdoctrine was for battalions andbrigades of these systems to wait at

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a tactical depth, and then moverapidly en masse to engage anddestroy the spearhead elements ofthe blitzkrieg. The tank destroyerunits never got to apply theirdoctrine because they were quicklypiecemealed, in twos and threes,down to infantry units that neededtank support. And the tank destroyerdid not make a very good tank. Justlike the French Force designprocess, operational tempo providedby the higher tier was sacrificed tomarginally 'beef up ' the tacticaltempo.

Most recently, the field trials ofthe 11 th Air Assault Division, and itssubsequent employment in the Viet-.nam War as the 1st Cavalry Division, produced startling results:

"These tests showed that helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in conventional and counterguerrilla actions would materially enhancecombat effectiveness; or, alternatively, that current tasks could bedone with smaller forces in shortercampaigns. The volume of effectivefirepower which can be accuratelydelivered from aerial platforms withspeed and surprise gives a shock effect previously associated only withviolent armor attacks ... Speedy andaccurate application of reservesgives a higher assurance of success

to the battle.... Tests further indicated that the improved surveillance,surprise attacks, and far-ranging action characteristic of airmobileoperations vastly increase combateffectiveness.,,24

At the request of the Secretary ofDefense, the Tactical Mobility Requirements (Howze) Board, finallyovercame the immense bureaucraticresistance to the concept of ai rmobility. I f this effort had failed, itis not hard to envision the subsequent piecemealing of theserotary-wing assets out to army unitsof all types. In fact, it is important toobserve that the opponents of airmobility eventually won outanyway-successfully dismantlingthe 1st Cav while the war lingered on(1971-72).

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Immediately following the Vietnam conflict, the Army piecemealedits historically significant higher tierdivisions out in small pieces(platoons, sections, etc.) with the Hseries tables of organization andequipment. Looking back, the frantic post-Vietnam piecemealing ofthe higher tier seems counterintuitive based upon the results achievedin both tests and actual combat.

Through most of recent history,various armies have suffered at thehands of force designers who did notunderstand how to exploit thenatural separation between the tiersof mobility. More often than not, thehigher tier was piecemealed out to apredominant arm as a result of organizational compromise, simple ignorance, or worse. Conversely, his-

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

tory is quick to reveal battlefieldsuccesses of armies who could harness and control the complementarydifferentials of mobility. Although itis somewhat hazardous to distill historical 'c onstants,' there is a patternof both organizational behavior andbattlefield efficiency (or lack thereof) that repeats itself and provides uswith useful force design rules:

D Even if an army's doctrine andcommand style enhance th egeneration of superior relativetempo, an improper force designwill hamper the generation of thattempo.

D I f resources are scarce, step one offorce design should be a concentra-

tion of the higher tier of mobility atthe operational level. I f you possessenough of the higher tier to goaround, then place it at the tacticallevel as well. I f his rule is violated,and the higher tier is piecemealedonly to support the lower tier, thenthe entire force will possess thetempo of the lower tier.

D Ensure that the higher tier at theoperational level is a combinedanns force.

D Design doctrine to facilitate the useof the higher tier to exploit, project,disrupt, or quickly react to rapidlychanging battlefield conditions.Design doctrine to facilitate the useof the slower tier to support, consolidate, protect, and withstand.

Do not allow opponents of theformation of high-tier units to citecost, vulnerability, and logistics burdens as the primary reasons whysuch concepts won't work. Forcedesigners must be willing to fullyanalyze a wide variety of structuresin tenns of relative effectiveness ateach level of war.D Do not allow peacetime politics

and proponent struggles to obstructa rational force design change.

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designfortempoImpact on Current and FutureDoctrine

To apply these lessons to thepresent and project them into the future, two qualities of the art muststill exist- (1) A higher relativetempo must remain the key elementat the operational level, and (2) Atleast two readily distinguishabletiers of mobility must still exist between fighting vehicles in the inventory.

The value of higher relativetempo, at least on today's battlefield,is adequately expressed in the U.S.Army's doctrine for fighting at thetactical and operational levels-AirLand Battle. ALB is force-orientedwith combat operations focused ondefeating the enemy, not attacking toseize terrain features. ALB doctrineleans toward neither fires no rmaneuver as a style but requires asituational-dependent mix of thesetwo styles to impose our will on thatof the enemy. It advocates the use ofthe indirect approach-the tacticwhich the enemy expects the leastcombined with a higher relativeforce agility, to strike decisive blowsquicker than the enemy can react.

Th e doctrine recognizes thefutility of attempting to stop a forceof vastly superior numbers with asingle engagement, preferring in-

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stead to extend this engagement intime and space, and provide multiple'culmination points' for an advancing enemy through the use of deepfires and maneuver applied at critical points along the enemy's route ofmarch. ALB recognizes that war is ahuman phenomenon, an d thatweapons are only as deadly as thesoldiers that wield them. Finally, thedoctrine is explicit about maintaining a vigorous offensive spiritthroughout all phases of war.25

Those same traits so often foundin literature on the Germans or Israelis- "force oriented . .indirect approach .. . higher relative forceagility .. quicker than the enemy canreact..."- all appear in the AirLandBattle doctrine. The primary tenetsof ALB-agility, initiative, depth,and synchronization-all of thesewords suggest a battlefield swirlingwith rapid relational movement atthe tactical and operational levels ofwar. Will this battlefield slow downin the future?Probably not. During the next 15years, two major factors will influence the nature of war. First, armies around the world will introducenew materiel, doctrine, and forcestructure changes into their armedforces designed to either parallel orneutralize the implementation of the

u.S. Army's current ALB doctrine.Secondly, technological opportunities will develop that, if exploited, could dramatically increasethe level of violence of conventionalbattles and change the nature of future combat by expanding the depthat which a large number of targetscan be acquired and killed in a short

. d f 26peno 0 time.In this highly lethal battlefield en

vironment, with its collection of allseeing sensors an d long-rangeprecision munitions, it should be intuitive that the less-agile (slowerthinking, slower-moving) combatant would suffer a relativelyhigher portion of casualties. Anarmy may generate a superior forceagility in a number of ways-by theapplication of superior commandand control, superior mobility andcountermobility efforts, or-all otherfactors being equal-by possessing asuperior ability to move across theterrain.

In essence, the concept of superior tempo-at all levels-appears tobe one of the 'timeless' keys to success of the battlefield. Thus, the firstpre-condition to our ability to use theforce design lessons of the Battle ofFrance is met. The second pre-condition-the existence of two distinguishable tiers of mobility between

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fighting vehicles in our inventorymust be satisfied, for the lessons ofthe past to remain valid.

Tiers of Mobility-TodayA ' t ier of mobility ' relatesprimarily to the physical speed of acombat force. Our Anny does indeedpossess not only two distinct tiers ofmobility-just as the French and German Armies did 50 years ago-butvery probably contains threeseparate tiers (foot, track, and rotor).Today's Army inventory containswheeled, tracked, and rotary-wingcombat vehicles. At the risk of oversimplification, I will consider unitsof wheeled and tracked combatvehicles to have essentially the samespeeds-the speed of the ground combat vehicle in the mechanized unit.While the physical speed of the individual vehicle is important, thespeed at which units of thesevehicles move is absolutely critical.Any difference in the tiers ofmobility, therefore, must be understood in terms of how units ofground vehicles, or hour units ofhelicopters, move.

The three basic phases to unitmovements are march, pass, anddeploy. For ground units, none ofthese phases remotely resembles atrip in the family car. In most cases

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

helicopterunit

groundunit

t ime in hoursFIGURE 2: Comparison between the mobility of helicopter and groundunits in march, pass, and deploy times

these movements resemble themovement of a freight train severalkilometers long. The engine may arrive at the same time as the familycar, but the unit cannot fight until thecaboose arrives as well. The numberof suitable routes governs the speedof the ground unit, much as the number of parallel railroad tracks governthe arrival of freight trains at a depot.Helicopters, on the other hand, arefree to use terrain for protection,without being bound to it formobility. Entire battalions ofhelicopters can, in essence, have a'pass ' time of zero. Thisphenomenon, which RichardSimpkin calls the 'linear imperative, ,27 is illustrated in figure 2.

Simpkin also noted that increasing the march speed " ...usuallyleads to disruption of the column by

the slower vehicles and a net loss oftime. Maintaining normal density,let alone increasing it, is tacticallyrisky within artillery range or in anadverse air situation. All in all, novariation in technique can do morethan nibble at the edges of the linearimperative of surface movement.,,28

The heart of the tiers of mobilityis this tremendous difference inmarch times, pass times, and deploytimes between ground units andhelicopter units. The time requiredfor an aviation brigade-moving 200kilometers to attack- " ... to complete, deploy, and engage would bejust under one hour. A tank divisionwith the same run-in on one routewould take rather over 10 hours tocomplete, with running time and. . b I ,,29pass time Just a out equa .Richard Simpkin noted that this

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des ignfo rtempo

order-of-magnitude difference inagility causes the Soviets to regardthe aviation brigade" ... as an operational formation and rate its combatworth...as equivalen t to that of a tankdivision (with over 10,000 men andabout 500 tactical vehicles).,,30 Ahigher relative operational tempo isstill a doctrinal prerequisite for victory.

The next step is to apply the forcedesign rules established earlier inthis article against our own structure-taking into account the imminent force reduction. Our currentforce structure is shown in thediagram in figure 3.

This illustration points outseveral salient features of our current force design. First, a majorityof the Army's divisions moves at thetempo of the tracked or wheeledvehicle. Second, and perhaps moststriking, is that our higher tier of mobility, the helicopter, is piecemealedthroughout the force. Our structurehas inadvertently tied the mobility ofthe helicopter to the slower speed ofthe ground combat vehicle.

Given the above structure, it iscertain that " ...our armies are incapable [of] produce [ing] something which can be called a secondtier .. they are incapable of producing

FIGURE 3:The U.S. Army's current tiered force structure

something which gives higher commanders at the operational level... something to operate with .. our artof war is deteriorating. Something iswrong. We are still in an interimstage which l)1ust be overcome assoon as possible. ,31

Perhaps our force design effortsused the same thought process as theFrench General Staff of the 1930'sbeef up the tactical firepower andtempo-to fight a similar type of forward-deployed defense. At the riskof belaboring a point-not only didthe French force design fail disastrously, but the need for a forwarddeployed defense in Europe has lar-

III Corps[J V Corps[IIXVIII ABNVII ~ r p s CO()S

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1CAV 1AO 1MX 2AO 210 . 3AO 3MX~ (j (j 4MX 5MX 610 710 8MX 9MTZ 10MO[ l l C I ~ ~ ~ ~24MX 2510 2610 2810 2910 35MX 3810 40MX 4210~ ~ (I I Gil (j CII ~ [II

LEG END higher tier (rotary-wing)o mlodle t ier (tracK/wheel)lower tier (boot)

(j [II4710 49AO 50AO 82NO 101 AA[II [II ~

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80 0'0Q.I.r-!6-Q.I(/)Q.I.r-!+J

0(/)II IIU"-I0Q.I

~ ::s

number ofC-5s ininventoryattack 3 attackhel icopter he l icopter

bat ta l ion brigadestank

bat ta l ion3 tank

brigades

FIGURE 4. A comparison between two combat units (attack heli-copter and tank) in the number of sorties required in a campaign

gely passed as well-which raises thedisturbing question:

Why does our doctrine call for thedevelopment of superior relativetempo, and yet our structure looksvery much like the fatal, low-tempoforce design of the French Anny of1940?

Of course, this question has nosatisfactory answer. Should we losethe next war because of inadequateoperational tempo; however, thisquestion will be analyzed and


answered by scores of historians.The postmortem will read quite a lotlike France's-and history will treatour force designers much as it did themyopic Daladier and Gamelin.Strategic Tempo

As mentioned earlier, strategictempo is the rate of work betweencampaigns. The Army increases itsstrategic tempo either by makingdivisions that are more easilytransported by limited Air Force or

Navy assets, or by making units thatcan self-deploy. While sealift is essential to a protracted campaign, airlift is absolutely critical to success ina short-notice, contingency operation. Like operational tempo,strategic tempo is best understood byanalyzing how combat units movebetween campaigns. This is sometimes known as "fighting a war byC-5 loads,,32 since the decisionmaker is usually faced with decidinghow to rapidly get the maximumcombat power to the trouble spotwith the available airlift.

Figure 4 shows a rough comparison of the strategic tempo differential between two different typesof combat units-attack helicoptersand tanks.

This figure shows that the currentAir Force C-5 fleet can airlift nearlythree brigades of attack helicoptersfor the same sortie 'cost' as a battalion of tanks. Does this imply thathelicopters need to replace tanks?Absolutely not. I t means thathelicopters can be deployed in largeunits quickly, and used to generateoperational and tactical tempo earlyin any confl ict-until the "fast sealiftarrives with the heavier units some20 days later. It also means that ahelicopter-based combat unit has ahigher strategic tempo, according to

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designfortempo

the simple math of sortie require-ments. Of course, neither tanks norhelicopters can operate without alogistics tail, but the point is that avery large helicopter unit can beginfighting long before a tank unit canarrive.

No scenario could have il-luminated the need for strategictempo better than Desert Shield"Arriving with the First Tactical AirWing, the paratroopers of the 82ndAirborne hit Saudi Arabia in combatgear outmanned and outgunned ... It

had no tanks of its own, and nonearrived for a week. For the first 100hours of the operation, Army Chiefof Staff Gen. Carl E. Vuonoagonized over the vulnerability ofthe 82nd. I f Saddam had brokenacross the Saudi border ... Theywould have been heroes, but theywould have been dead heroes ....Schwartzkopf had to improvise acredible defense from whatever hecould scratch up.... While he waswaiting, he .. ordered all the tankkillers he could lay his hands on:

.. . more Apache(s) .. . with theirhellfire missiles. ,33

War can identify the flaws in yourforce design, if you survive. Thedeployment to the Middle East re-taught us a valuable lesson about theneed for strategic tempo in an uncer-tain world 'Git thar fustest with themostest-and sealift don't git tharfustest. ,34Tactical Tempo

As I mentioned earlier, all three'flavors' of tempo are important, buttheir importance varies with theirlocation in the spectrum of conflict.Much has already been said aboutstrategic and operational tempo, andthrough the discussion above, itseems as if tactical tempo is reducedto insignificance, but that's not thecase. In the first place, the separationamong the tactical, operational, andstrategic levels of war is fluid. Noone can never say that a division isalways at the tactical level of war.The true separation among the levelsof war is based less upon unit size,and more upon unit mission. "Moreand more, small .. detachments likethe one that...undoubtedly did takeout the Super Etanards on the Argen-tine mainland in the Falklands war,or the Shi'ite fanatic who blew upthe United States Marines' base in

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Beirut, are achieving successes of'operational' and even strategic importance. ,35

Secondly, every division we ownneeds the capability that a higher tierof mobility can provide. In the lightdi vision, helicopters serve as aprimary means of troop transportand direct fires. The recent conflictin Panama served to reinforce whatwe already knew about aviation andlight infantry working together"Aviation was such a relevant forcein Just Cause that it is painful toimagine the operation without it.,,36In the heavy division, helicoptersprovide an extremely mobile forcethat can quickly and decisivelychange the odds during close combat, provide a quick reaction forcefor the rear fight, and fight in depthon a nonlinear battlefield.

These requirements have existedsince the helicopter entered the inventory, and there is no indicationno w they have changed. Thedivisional aviation brigade, as weknow it now," ... evolved from testingth e Howze-Board-created AirCavalry Combat Brigade in the 1stCavalry Division (TRICAP) in1971-73. The TRADOC commander, Gen. William E. Dupuy,stated that the Army should have anaviation brigade in every division,


which resulted in Division 86. Thisplan, the division restructuring studyand other studies of the time, workedon by bright young colonels likeJohn W. Foss, all called for an aviation brigade in divisions. ,37

Tactical tempo is indeed important, and we have every indicationthat the current fonn of the highertier of mobility- the divisional aviation brigade-is well designed andplaced for this task. For aviationbrigades to stay in divisions, however, we must abide by the lessonslearned from the debacle of Franceand field the higher tier in the operationallevel first. If any of the highertier remains, we may then field it atthe tactical level as well.Conclusion

Too often in the past, we havefielded units that are not robustenough, or units that can't maintainthemselves, or don't have enoughtrucks or cooks or enough depth incritical specialties. We also have agood indication that we havehampered the Army with a lowtempo force design. This suggeststhat there is something on our mindsbesides winning the nation's warswhen we sit down to design theforce. In many cases, the decisionsthat led to our current force design

can be traced directly back to theprocess of using organizational consensus as opposed to overall combatefficiency in designing our force. Noone but Fort Sill may seriouslydelve into the requirements for firesupport; Fort Knox alone may determine the design and operation oftanks and tank units- " ...manymilitary forces have been allowed toevolve in relatively fixed compartments and along highly stratifiedbureaucratic lines ... ,,38 and ours, unfortunately, is no exception. Wehave fielded extremely effectiveweapons, recruited the best, mostcapable soldiers in history, andcreated a dynamic new doctrine.Sadly, we have stuck the wholeshootin' match into a low-tempoforce design, which satisfies ourconsensus-building force designprocess, but which may prove inadequate in a war against a similarlydetennined and equipped opponent.

The generation of a superior relative tempo at any level is not alwaysa simple task, especially if opposingannies are similarly equipped andstructured. A majority of our potential foes are motorized ormechanized and possess the sametempo as we do. Only through nearperfect C3I ( command, control,communications, and intelligence),

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des ignfortempo

dazzling execution, or full adoptionof the 'auftragstaktik' can we hopeto generate the required tempo differential with our current structure.A superior operational and strategictempo, on the other hand, requiressomething that we don't yet possess-the willingness to separate and thenexploit the 'tiers of mobility' in thepurest classical sense. f

ENDNOTES1. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power:German and U.S. Army Performance,1939-1945 (Westport, CN: GreenwoodPress, 1982), p. 43.2. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 1-1, Campaigning (Washington , DC,1990), p. 72.3. Major General F. W. von Mellinthin,Panzer Battles (University of OklahomaPress, 1956), p.4. Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20thCentury Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS : U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College,1984), p. 53 .5. Alistar Horne, To Lose a Battle:France 1940 (London: MacMillan Books,1969), p. 106.6. House, p. 60.7. Ibid., p. 60.8. Horne, p. 105.

16

9. Ibid., p. 104.10. Ibid., p. 105.11 . Ibid., p. 106.12. Ibid., p. 217.13. Ibid., p. 217.14 . Ibid., p. 219.15. Ibid., p. 220.16. Ibid ., p. 219.17. Ibid., p. 59.18. The German command philosophy of'Auftragstaktik' was a holistic approachto warfighting. It strove to educateleaders at all levels with a commondoctrinal base, but then required thejunior leader to take his senior's conceptand modify his actions to suit the immediate situation.19. House, p. 80.20. Ibid., p. 46.21 . U.S. Army War College, From theDnepr to the Vistula: Soviet OffensiveOperations - November 1943 - August1944 (Transcript of Proceedings, 1985),p.598.22. J. F. C. Fuller, Armament and History(New Dehli: Sagar, 1971), pp. 21-23.

23. T. N. Dupuy, The Evolution ofWeapons and Warfare (New York: 9a-Capo Press, 1984), p. 221.24. U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, Final Report, Annex 0 -Field Tests (Fort Bragg, NC, 31 July1962), pp. ii-iii.

25. Paraphrased from From ActiveDefense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, aU.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command historical monograph (Fort Monroe, VA, June 1984), pp. 66-74.26. Paraphrased from "Air Land BattleFuture - Heavy," Coordinating Draft, U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Command(Fort Monroe, VA, 21 November 1988).27 . Richard E. Simpkin, Race to theSwift: Thoughts on Twenty-First CenturyWarfare (London: Brassey's DefensePublishers, 1985), p. 119.28. Ibid., p.119.29. Ibid., p. 121.30. Ibid ., p. 120.31. U.S. Army War College, p. 598 .32. Richard Diamond, "Fighting the Warby C-5 Loads," a Martin Marietta conceptbriefing (Orlando: The Martin MariettaCorp., August, 1989.33. Peter Turnley, "The Road to War,"Newsweek (January 28, 1991), pp. 61-62.34. With apologies to Nathan B. Forrest.35. Simpkin, p. 24.36. Major General Benjamin L. Harrison(ret), "Aviation: A Branch DecisionRevisited," Army Magazine (January,1991), p. 25.37. Ibid., pp. 24-25.38. Anthony H. Cordesman andAbraham R. Wanger, The Lessons ofModern War, Volume I: The Arab-IsraeliConflicts, 1973-1989 (San Francisco:Westview Press, 1990), p. 352.

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VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor:The modern Army aviator hascome a long way since Vietnam.Much was learned in that conflict.Not only has technology changed byour experiences there, but so has theindividual aviator.

In the 11 years that I have been apart of Army Aviation, I have hadthe distinct pleasure of observing achange of perception take place, ofwhich I am most proud. Armyaviators were often looked upon byaviators of other services as somehow not quite as professional andcapable as themselves. This ofcourse was not the case. Nevertheless, the perception existed. In theyears since Vietnam, this perceptionha s dwindled and indeed haschanged to professional respect.

This negative attitude wasfostered by the following facts: Army aviators are not required tohave a college degree as are the

aviators of the other militarybranches. This of course isdirected at the warrant officercorps, which constitutes themajority of the Army's aviators.

The majority of Army aviatorsare of a lesser rank than theirpeers in the other services. Again,this addressees the warrant officer. The highest rank he or shecan attain is master warrant officer, which is of a lower rankthan second lieutenant. The other


branches, not having in any greatnumber such a rank, nor any interaction with aviation warrant officers, naturally perceived themselves on a higher station. Indeed,many aviators of the otherbranches had no inkling as towhat a warrant officer was orhow he or she fitted into thescheme of things.

At one time Army aviators werenot all instrument rated. Thiscaused aviators of other branchesto look upon the Army aviator asa fair weather pilot only, unlikethemselves who flew instrumentmeteorological conditions missions routinely.

Until recently the Army had nojet aircraft. This was looked uponas proof that the Army did notoperate on as high a technicallevel as the other branches.

The Army predominately fliesrotory-wing aircraft. No otherbranch uses this machine to theextent that we do. As a result, theother branches are not as wellversed in its capabilities and complexities.

Until the establishment of theAviation Branch, the Army didnot have a cohesive air arm. Itscommissioned aviators weremore or less borrowed from theircarrier branch.

The good news is, this negativeattitude has been virtually abolished.In the past 4 years, I have had the opportunity to interact both professionally and on a personal level withaviators of every branch of service,as well as those with a civilian background. I have learned that their impression of the modem Army aviatoris most positive. Former Armyaviators, as well as those who servein the U.S. Army National Guard andReserve are interwoven into the entire national fabric of aviation. Theyare flying at all levels of the aviationstructure, from commuter airlines tomajor commercial airlines.

Today's Army aviator is oftenpresent or involved with the spaceshuttle program. Yearly, our aviatorsgo to the prestigious Naval Test PilotCourse and complete it successfully.There is no question now as to howwell the Aviation Branch deals withcomplexity. One must only point outthe AH-64 Apache, UH-60 BlackHawk, and other new technology.We have moved into air-to-air research and fly jets at places likeDavison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, VA.We have come a long way. Everyday Army aviators throughout theworld prove their competence andreliability both in the military andcivilian realms of aviation. Othersare finding out that we are indeedcapable professionals on a level withany other branch of service. They arelearning that Army aviators share the

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VIEWS FROM READERSsame attributes as other aviatorsmotivation, competence, love offlying, and spirit of excellence.

Herbert J. McKinleyNorth Carolina ARNG(First OfficerAmerican Airlines)

Editor:Attention UH-60 Black Hawkpilots! The U.S. Army Aeromedical

Research Laboratory (USAARL),Fort Rucker, AL, is in need ofaviators to participate in ongoing research. Presently, we need maleaviators between the ages of 18 and40 with 20/20 vision, and a currentflight physical.

This is a new study open toaviators who have already participated in USAARL research. I f upto 40 UH-60 simulator hours and achance to participate in trials of newequipment would interest you, contact Dr. Caldwell, the USAARLaviator representative at DSN 558-6858 or Commercial 205-255-6858.

CPT Michael H. Hulsey, MSAdjutantU.S. Army AeromedicalResearch Laboratory

Editor:The Army Reserve Officers'

Training Corps (ROTC) Departmentat Worcester Polytechnic Institute(WPI) is establishing an alumni association. The association seeks tosupport the cadets of WPI and affiliated schools, as well as helpalumni maintain contact with thebattalion and classmates.Alumni of the ROTC program atWPI are invited to call Major Sayreor Sergeant Major (SGM) Plant atCommercial 508-752-7209 orTelefax 508-831-5483 or send theirname, address and phone number to:Anny ROTC, Worcester Poly ech-

18

nic Institute, 100 Institute Road,Worcester, MA 01609.

SGM Clarence PlantBattalion Sergeant MajorAnny ROTCWorcester Polytechnic Institute

Editor:From 22 through 24 July 1991,

the International Bird Dog Association (lBDA) will host the L-19/0-1annual fly in at Keokuk, 10. Besidesstatic displays, there also will beflying contests, seminars, and socialevents. The largest gathering ofBird Dogs since the Vietnam conflict is expected to be on displayduring this event. All liaison,primary test pilots, and enthusiastsare invited to stage for Oshkosh.For more infonnation write to theIBDA, 3939 San Pedro NE, Suite C-8, Albuquerque, NM 87110.

Editor:

Mr. Clarence StrancePromotion DirectorInternational Bird DogAssociation

A new course for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) began at theU.S. Army Sergeants Major Acaddemy, Fort Bliss, TX, in January.

Designed at the academy, the Battle Staff NCO Course combines thecurrent operations and intelligencecourse, and the personnel and logistics course. But according to itsdevelopers, the course will be morethan a simple meshing of the two existing courses-it is a completely newcourse designed "to train battalionand brigade staff NCOs to serve asintegral members of the battle staffand to manage the day-to-day operations of battalion command posts."

NCOs were already learning theirspecific duties in existing courses.What wasn't happening, accordingto Sergeant Major (SGM) PhillipCantrell, was an effort to train battle

staff NCOs to fight as an effectiveteam. SGM Cantrell helped developthe Battle Sta ff NCO Course.

"Activities of the battle staff mustbe coordinated and directed towarda common goal," SGM Cantrell said."You can't make a decision in thepersonnel area without affectinglogistics, operations or intelligence,and vice versa. Without a knowledgeof how the staff is interconnected,each section operates independentlyand perhaps at cross-purposes witheach other."Training will begin before theNCO arrives at the school, according to SGM Bill Smolak, chief ofbattle staff course development."We're planning a 6-week course,which is far shorter than the 10-weekoperations and intelligence courseand 2 weeks longer than the personnel and logistics course. With anoverall reduction in course length,some of the material NCOs need toknow will have to be completed bycorrespondence before their arrivalfor the resident phase."

SGM Smolak said the proposedsolution is to select students 6 to 8months before course attendanceand enroll them immediately in theArmy correspondence course program. After completing the requirednumber of lessons, prospective students will receive a certificate,which they will present to anacademy faculty advisor when theyreport to Fort Bliss for the residentphase of the course.All resident training will be performance-oriented, based on theAOmy Training and EvaluationPrograms for a heavy battalion, aheavy brigade, and a light infantrybattalion. The underlying principlesof the course are synchronizationand "train as you fight."

"One of the main reasons whywe've combined the two courses intothe Battle Staff NCO Course is that

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tactical operations centers andadmin-log centers fight as a team,"SGM Smolak said. "If we're goingto fight that way, then we need totrain that way now."

SFC Jack D'AmatoPublic Affairs OfficerSergeants Major AcademyFort Bliss, TX

Editor:The Senior Officer Logistics

Management Course (below) isspecifically designed to update commanders and their primary staff atthe battalion and brigade level in thelogistics arena. The curriculm includes maintenance, supply, andtransportation procedures. The curriculum also includes hands-on experience with vehicles; weapons;ammunition; medical; communications; nuclear, biological, andchemical; and quartermaster equipment.

The course is open to officers inthe grade of major or above in theActive and Reserve Army, U.S.

Class FY 19911 (completed)2 (completed)3 (completed)4 (completed)5 (completed)6 (completed)7 19 through 24 May 19918 9 hrough 14 June 19919 18 through 23 August 1991

Marine Corps, allied nations, andDepartment of Defense civilians inthe grade of GS-ll or above. The 1-week course is conducted 10 timeseach fiscal year (FY) at Fort Knox,KY. Class quotas may be obtained. through normal U.S. Army Trainingand Doctrine Command channels.

For more information contactCPT Hammerle, AUTOVON 464-7133/3411 or Commercial 502-624-7133/3411.Editor:

Once again, the momentum isbuilding toward having an International Bird Dog Association (IBDA)fly-in near the Fort Rucker, AL, areain June or July 1993.

For over three decades, thevenerable Bird Dog served diligently in the United States and international military forces, the Civil AirPatrol, law enforcement, the U.S.Forest Service, missionary work,and in glider and banner tow operations all over the world. Even withthis impressive record of service, theBird Dog was about to become an

FY 199220 through 25 October 19915 hrough 10 January 199226 through 31 January 19928 hrough 13 March 1992

29 March through 3April 19925 hrough 10 April 199226 April through 1May 1992

10 hrough 15 May 199231 May through 5June 1992

10 15 through 20 September 1991 20 through 25 September 1992Senior Officer Logistics.Management Course schedule


endangered species. Fortunately, theBird Dog is back!

What is a Bird Dog? This toughand reliable critter is a very specialaircraft. In response to requests fromthe U.S. Army for an improvedliaison aircraft, the Cessna AircraftCompany developed plans, tooledup, and began manufacturing. Thefirst Model 305 was delivered to theArmy in December 1950. The Armyliked it , designated it the L-19Liaison, and nicknamed it the BirdDog. Many L-19s were deployed immediately to the war in Korea.Others were sent to Army and National Guard units in other areas.Years later, Bird Dogs were sent toVietnam and the Army, Air Force,and Marine Corps used them invarious combat roles. However, bythen th e designation had beenchanged to 0-1 Observation. Theenemy simply called it dirty names!

Over a 10-year period, Cessnabuilt about 3,400 of these little warbirds. Fuji Heavy Industries, Japan,built about 22 to military specifications. Through the Military Assistance Program, other nations obtained Bi.rd Dogs, and actually"copied" and "cannibalized" theaircraft to increase their numbers.More recently, the Ector AircraftCompany, Inc., built civilian versions of the Bird Dog in more up-todate configurations.Many active and former Armyaviators have expressed the desire to"piggy back" various Bird Dog unitreunions with the IBDA event. Wehave heard from "Shotguns,""Swamp Foxes," "Catkillers,""Headhunters," "Black Aces," "SeaHorses," "Pterodactyls," and "NonStops" just to name a few.

In fact, the Army Otter-CaribouAssociation has expressed interest injoining forces with the IDBA for amajor Army aviator reunion nearFort Rucker. Even some of the

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VIEWS FROM READERSformer Air Force FACs have shinedtheir boots and dusted off their flightsuits for this one.The IBDA has grown to over 500members, and we have just begun toaccomplish our missions. We wouldlike to hear from all personnel whoshare an interest in this great little"warbird." Call or mail inquiries tothe IBDA, 3939 Suite C-8 San PedroNE, Albuquerque, NM 87110, CommerciaI505-884-4822.

Our special thanks to the U.S.Army Aviation Digest for all thegreat support since IBDA beganback in 1985.

Editor:

Phil PhillipsPresidentInternational Bird DogAssociation

Just a short note in response toCaptain (CPT) Mark Swanson's interesting and informative article,"Apaches in the Desert," in the September/October 1990 issue of theU.S. Army Aviation Digest.We are learning from our experiences in Saudi Arabia that wefailed to ask a critical question aboutflying in the desert-"what kind ofdesert?" A lot of what we have doneat the National Training Center(NTC), Fort Irwin, CA , is ap-propriate but we were not ready tojump directly into the sand dunes ofDesert Shield /Desert Storm.

Some of the lessons we'velearned from Desert Shield are dis-

LANDING

cussed in our pamphlet, "U.S. ArmyAviation Desert Operations, Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures,"November 1990. I f you are in theDepartment of Defense, you can getcopies of these ideas by writing to:Commander, U.S. Army AviationCenter, ATTN: ATZQ-DOT-DD(Mr. Harry Baldwin), Fort Rucker,AL 36362-5263. Obviously, we aregathering information to assistdeploying units. The units in the"sand box" paid for our admission tothis area of operations and we aretrying to pass the information along.CPT Swanson spoke of the interaction of OH-58D Kiowas,and AH-64 Apaches. These operations aretouchy since there are no 58Ds assigned to Apache battalions, yetthese aircraft work well together. All58D and AH-64 operations requirespecial planning and coordination.Task force standing operating procedures are a must. Examples of "HowTo" are found in the new FieldManual 1-112, "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the AttackHelicopter Battalion."

Heads up. The forward armingand refueling point (FARP), infigure 2 (below), is exactly what wasused at the NTC and that design isproving to be inadequate in DesertShield. The "inverted Y" and theFARP alignment require somemodification. For aircraft withwheels-a "drive-through FARP" isbeing used. Note that a run-on areais provided. Side lights allow pilots

TAKI DF f

Forward Arming and Refueling Point

20

to see even in blowing dust. The runon or roll-on area is prepared. Sometimes it's a short stretch of road or anoiled surface. After landing, theaircraft ground taxis into the F ARPand ground taxis out after rearmingand refueling. A running takeoffsubstantially reduces dirt and dustingested by the aircraft systems andreduces wear on m ~ > v i n g parts.Colonel Thomas A. GreenFormer DirectorDepartment of Tacticsand SimulationFort Rucker, ALCurrently, Deputy CorpsAviation OfficerXVIII Airborne Corps

Editor:I am writing about an article thatappeared in the July/August 1990issue of the U.S . Army AviationDigest. The article, "The Army OilAnalysis Program," written by Mr.Jack Glaeser, prompted me to set therecord straight. "To set the recordstraight" may lead you to think thatI thought the article was deficient insome way. That's only partly right.Owing to the less-than-adequate effort on the part of the author, I wouldlike to pass along the correct information about the origins of the ArmyOil Analysis Program (AOAP).The AOAP had its beginnings in1961 when Major General (MG)Ernest F. Easterbrook was commanding general, U.S. Army Aviation Center, and commandant, U.S.Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker,AL. The Army was having troublewith H-23 Ravens at the time, and350 of them at Fort Wolters, TX,were grounded after a couple ofserious accidents. As it turned out,the crashes were caused by bearingfailures in the transmissions.MG Easterbrook took a hand inthe matter and directed that the folksat Fort Wolters send transmission oil

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samples down to the fledgling V.S.Navy oil analysis laboratory, Pensacola Naval Air Station, FL, foranalysis. The Navy analyzed thetransmission oil samples and identified six transmissions as potentialfailures (the laboratory folks foundhigh concentrations of copper andiron in the samples-indicators ofbearing wear). Subsequent disassembly and inspection of the sixtransmissions revealed that all sixhad excessive bearing wear causedby a poorly designed thrust washer.

That was good enough for MGEasterbrook. He immediately setout, in cooperation with what wasthen the V.S. Army Aviation Systems Command, St. Louis, MO, tobuild a laboratory at Cairns ArmyAirfield, Fort Rucker, AL, thatwould give the Army its own oilanalysis capability. Page AircraftMaintenance, Inc. (PAMI), whichhad the aviation maintenance contract at Fort Rucker at the time, wasgiven responsibility for operation ofthe laboratory, which fell under theoperational responsibility of theV.S. Army Aviation Test Board.PAM I began hiring personnel torun the laboratory. That's when Icame in. A colleague of mine, Charles Adams, and I were employed atthat time by a firm making reactorgrade zirconium. Charlie was approached by Page and offered the jobas laboratory chief of the first ArmySpectrometric Oil Analysis Program(ASOAP) at Cairns Army Airfield.In June 1961, I followed Charlie asthe spectroscopist.

The next few months were awhirlwind of activity, what with allthe VH-l Huey testing going on atthe time, but the laboratory finallywent into operation in September or

October of that year. The month isnot so important; the fact that wefound a defective aircraft engine onour first day of operation is. That setthe stage for the expansion of theprogram.I left Fort Rucker in June 1963 toopen the second ASOAP laboratoryat the V.S. Army AeronauticalDepot Maintenance Center, CorpusChristi, TX. That was the beginningof a condition-monitoring programthat really proved itself during theVietnam era when we fielded a vanoil analysis laboratory to take care ofaircraft support in a theater of operations. That van laboratory served outits time at Cam Ranh Bay.Now some of the names as sociated with that first laboratory atFort Rucker. There was-in additionto MG Easterbrook, Charlie Adams,and me-Eugene Tay lor (civil servicetransferee from the V.S. Air Force,who returned to that service to opentheir first oil analysis laboratory atMacDill Air Force Base, FL, in1962), Captain Robert Erbe(military chief of the laboratory),Lieutenant Colonel Howell (the manat the Test Board who held swayover the laboratory, and a great jobhe did with it too; he once flew President Eisenhower around as part orhis aviator's duties and later workedwith the Fort Rucker museum), andWilliam Oldham (he replaced GeneTaylor as the civil service laboratorymanager and later wrote the firstASOAP Army Regulation (AR.There was, of course, Dick Tierney,from the U.S. Army Aviation Digest,who used to come by regularly togather information about th eprogram and its progress, and MilanBuchan, the PAM I aviation safetyman, who worked at the Safety

Board the last time I talked to him.These are just some of the names ofthose who got the program off theground; there were others and creditis also due them.

The above information was available from the program director,AOAP, V.S. Army Materiel Readiness Support Center, Lexington,KY. The director's staff in theAOAP Branch at the Support Centeris eager to work with any andeveryone on all matters pertaining tothe AOAP. (See AR 750-1, ArmyMateriel Maintenance, Policy andRetail Management Operations.)

In closing, let me make one othercomment. Although the author lefthis article in an unprotected state, hementioned one gentleman who hasbeen a friend and supporter of theAOAP for so many years, goingback to the Vietnam era: Mr. JosephP. Cribbins. Joe, if I may call himthat, in recognizing the value of theAOAP to Army Aviation-and tononaeronautical equipment, for thatmatter-has been responsible for theAOAP gaining international recognition as one of the most effectivearguably th e most effectiveprograms of its kind ever o n c e i v ~ d .Without Joe's support, the programmight have made it . I t would,however, have been one heck of astruggle. As a member of the AOAPteam who retired after 29 years, Iwant to take this opportunity to personally thank Mr. Joe Cribbins forhis help over the years.

Mr. Cyril M. Brown (retired)Chief, V.S. Army Oil Analysis

Program BranchV.S. Anny Materiel ReadinessSupport Activity

Lexington, KY

Readers can obtain copies of the material that is printed in any issue by writing to:Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, ATZQ-AP-AD, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 21


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AVIATION PERSONNEL NOTES

United States Precision Helicopter TeamsAttention all members of the 1981, 1986, and 1989

United States Precision Helicopter Teams! TheA viation Branch chief has authorized wear of yourteam insignia. This patch will be worn over the Nomexflight suit's right breast pocket.

Commissioned Officer Development andCareer Management

Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3,Commissioned Officer Development and CareerManagement, has been revised and forwarded forpublication. The most significant changes concerncompany and field grade branch qualification.

Company grade branch qualification now is definedas the successful completion of Officer Basic Course,Officer Advanced Course, Combined Anns andServices Staff School, and company command.Personnel holding a ISC, 150, or ISE militaryoccupational specialty (MOS) must command either aplatoon or a company.

Field grade branch qualification is attained bysuccessfully completing the U.S. Anny Command andGeneral Staff College (resident or nonresident), FortLeavenworth, KS, and either major (04), battalion orbrigade executive officer, or S3 command. Personnelwith a ISC MOS may serve as a battalion or brigadeS2. An individual with a ISD MOS may serve as abattalion or brigade S4.

22

Security ClearanceOne problem that has continued to plague our

A viation Tactical Operations Centers at all levels is alack of security clearances for our Aviation OperationsSpecialists (Military Occupational Specialty [MOS]93P). Sixty-one percent of the 93P MOS positionsrequires a security clearance. Twenty-four percent oftheir critical tasks requires a security clearance forhandling classified materials.

The problem lies with the governing regulation,Anny Regulation 611-20 I, which does not requireMOS 93P soldiers to have a security clearance. Thisallowed the U.S. Anny Recruiting Command, FortSheridan, IL, to recruit people into the MOS that werenot United States citizens and others that may not beable to obtain a clearance.

During the Aviation Branch NoncommissionedOfficer Symposium in June 1990, this problem wasreferred to Aviation Proponency at Fort Rucker, AL.As a result, we researched the problem, and a proposalwas completed in September 1990. It was staffedthrough the major commands and the U.S. AnnyPersonnel Integration Command, Alexandria, VA, andapproved by the Headquarters, Department of theAnny, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, inMarch 1991. The Recruiting Command had the biggestproblem adapting to this change.

So, what's the impact? All soldiers classified MOS93P will be processed for a secret security clearancebefore I October 1991. All MOS 93P accessions after

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30 September 1991 will be processed for a secretsecurity clearance. Those soldiers who cannot begranted a clearance will be reported for appropriatereclassification action. Reclassification actions will becompleted during 31 May 1991 through 30 June 1992.

Not to worry, this is a personnel action and will behandled through the personnel system. We simplywanted to give you firsthand information. Keep thesoldiers informed. There will be reclassificationactions-maybe in your unit. You may identify some ofyour soldiers who require a clearance-start working onit.

We don't like the idea of reclassifying good,hard-working soldiers. However, to battle-focus ourpersonnel they must be able to transfer to any aviationunit in our great Army and be fully functional in theTactical Operations Center.The Army Aviation Apprentice MechanicProgram

The U.S. Army Aviation Branch constantly reviewsaviation maintenance training to ensure it produceshighly qualified, well-trained soldiers capable of safelymaintaining today's increasingly complex aircraftsystems (figure I). New technology and tactics,

reduced manpower, and a firm belief that yesterday'straining may not support tomorrow's aircraft are someof the factors that playa role in our training reviews.

The Aviation Apprentice Mechanic Program is thelatest initiative for training aircraft mechanics. Indeveloping this program, our objectives were to designa training program that will standardize Active,Reserve, and National Guard training while producingaircraft mechanics capable of repairing bothcomponents and systems.

Essentially, the Aviation Apprentice MechanicProgram will be comprised of 8 to 10 weeks ofadvanced individual training (AIT) followed byassignment to an aviation intermediate maintenance(AVIM) unit only. All AIT graduates will be awardedMOS 67 A. This program does not include avionicsMOSs. On arrival in the A VIM unit, the AIT graduatewill be enrolled in a formal exportable training programthat will document his or her training. Instructors fromthe U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School, Fort Eustis,VA, will be attached to every active duty A VIM toassist the unit commander in conducting this newtraining program. Each 67 A soldier will be required toprogress through all the shops and demonstratetechnical expertise in each shop area before moving on

FIGURE 1: Career Management Field (CMF) 67 projected career pattern

BASICTNG AIT67A10U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

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continuous training AVUMAVIMcommon leader training CREWCHIEFNCOC

technical track MOSI PLDC*

RE-ENLIST I Iunit training ARMAMENT COMPETENCY POWERPLANTplan SHOP TEST AND TRAINSHOP PLDC*~ II R F R A M E AND AVIM ELECTRICALHYDRAULICS SHOPawards MOS basic SHOP

skills and I7A10 AAM BASIC Primary Leadershipknowledges 8 WEEKS COMBAT Development CourseRESIDENT TRAINING. .FIGURE 2: 67A10 Aviation Apprentice Mechanic (AAM) train ing strategy

to the next shop. Current estimates for unit trainingcompletion range from 12 to 18. months. Afterdemonstrating expertise in each shop area, the unitcommander will award the soldiers MOS 67B. ThisMOS signifies a higher level of technical competence.The soldiers will then be eligible for assignment to anaviation maintenance shop unit where they willcontinue to perform maintenance on the airframessupported by their assigned units. MOS 67B20 will beawarded to soldiers promoted to sergeant. Uponreenlistment, the soldiers' wishes and the Army's needswill lead to an aviation MOS for further training at skilllevel 30. As currently envisioned, skill level 30 trainingwill be conducted as an added course immediately aftersuccessful completion of the basic NCO course.

One of the complimentary objectives of thisprogram is to "put stripes on the flight line" as aircraftcrewchiefs. The new generation of advancedtechnology aircraft requires experienced maintainers ascrewchiefs in the flying units. Costly repair parts,difficulty of fault isolation detection, and enhancedbattle damage repair capability demand we also havemaster diagnosticians and experience fOlWard.Enhancing aircraft readiness is essential to successfullyexecute aviation's increasing role in the AirLand Battleof the future.

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Figure 2 shows a composite overview of the pro-posed Career Management Field 67 projected pattern.Program evaluation began March 1991 at the 5thInfantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Order of Daedalians Admits CommissionedWarrant Officers

As a result of official recognition for Armycommissioned warrant officers and at the request ofthe Aviation Branch, the Board of Directors of theOrder of Daedalians recently voted to admit Armycommissioned WOs into the order. The Order ofDaedalians is a U.S. Air Force society that providesrecognition and represents the National Fraternityof Commissioned Military Pilots. A formalannouncement will be made at the nationalconvention in Dayton, OH, in June 1991.

Army Aviation Personnel Plan A2p 2Th e I December 1990 edition of the A2p2 has

been distributed. Any unit that has not received acopy may obtain one from the Aviation PersonnelProponency. The address is Commander, U.S.Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-AP-P, Fort

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PEARJ:SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

Overwater Survival Equipment and TrainingWe hear it all too frequently. There is a mind-set thatArmy Aviation does little or no overwater flying. Nothing could be further from the truth! We all know the 25thInfantry Division does a lot of overwater and open-seaflying, but they're based in Hawaii and are an exceptionto the norm.Attack helicopters often fly right up the middle of ariver when performing nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flights.There is no power off gliding distance to land there! Better have life preserver units and water survival trainingbecause getting out of the aircraft and to shore are notas easy as you may think.A discussion of a couple of Army Aviation units follows. Aviation units of the Missouri National Guardwear flotation equipment when conducting NOE flightsat the Harry S. Truman Reservoir just south ofWhiteman Air Force Base. This area is ideal because itis the very hilly northern edge of the Ozark Mountains.The NOE routes crisscross the reservoir, and somewater crossings are one-third to one-half mile across.Some routes also follow the shoreline for short distances. You can see why flotation equipment is requiredthere. Otherwise you're in violation of Army Regulation 95-1,AviationFlightRegulations. We have all beenaround long enough to know that Murphy's law is aliveand well in aviation. Mechanical problems rarely occurat the airfield; they always occur in the boonies or overwater.How about the Rhode Island National Guard stationed at Quonset Point? Flotation equipment is re-

quired there even if they are staying in the traffic pattern. Also, more and more attack battalions are becoming qualified in assault ship operations. And yes, thelatest move is self-deployment. It's the only move forrapid response.I f you're in an AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk,or CH-47 Chinook outfit, better get ready. Now is thetime to get your overwater equipment and conduct yourtraining. The fixed-wingers have been doing it for a longtime. Now we "rotor heads" will get to do it too.

Escape and Evasion (E and E)In my travels around the Army Aviation community,I see an attitude developing that troubles me a little. Itseems with the 'fielding of the new AN/PRC-112 survival radio and the personnel locator system (PLS),some aircrewmembers are beginning to think that survival, escape, and evasion is, or soon will be, a thing ofthe past! This perception is not entirely true. What istrue, and will be a thing of the past, is extensive searchtime required to find downed aircrews-thus reducingyour time in the survival situation. E and E skills willstill be required in hostile territory. Rescue forces maynot be able to :effect an immediate rescue for manyreasons. There may be heavy enemy antiaircraft andground fire, too much distance from friendly forces, orrescue forces may be engaged in another rescue. So acquire and maintain your E and E skills.For furthur information the point of contact for thisarticle is Mr. Jim Dittmer. Jiijiff

If you have questions about ALSE or rescue/survival gear, write to AMC Product Management Office, ATTN: AMCPM-ALSE,4300 Goodfellow Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63120-1798; or call DSN 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.

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To Fight, Perchance to Sleep"They were dull eyed, bodily worn and too tired to think connectedly. Even a 3D-minute flop on theturfwith the stars for a blanket would have doubled the power of this body and quickened theminds of its leaders to ideas which they had blanked out. But no one thought to take that precaution. The United States Army is indifferent toward common sense rules by which the energy ofmenmay be conserved in combat."

S. L. A . MarshallAmerican military historian

Major Alan L. MaloffChief, Special Operations Forces DivisionAcademy of Health SciencesFort Sam Houston, TX

CURRENT DOCTRINE mandates that a unitmust achieve and maintain the initiative to win thenext battle. The battle, regardless of the spectrumof conflict, must be fought in-depth with continuous and timely combat support. We must trainand prepare to fight and fly safely during both continuous operations (CONOPS) and sustainedoperations (SUSOPS).

This first paragraph initially may appear to beout of place in a medical article, but it is not. Thisdoctrine creates implied missions and operationalrequirements, producing significant human factors

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stressors that aviators, operations officers, andcommanders must understand. For example, theflight surgeon must support the unit 's mission andbe an advocate for aviation safety.

AR 95-3 clearly delineates crew rest guidelines.Correction factors, known as environment-relativefactors, attempt to quantify increased fatigue andstressors that are due to various mission profilesother than standard day flight. This regulation is aguideline for aviators. Fatigue factors for operations, maintenance, and other aviation personnelalso must be considered.

Fatigue can be defined as that state, following aperiod of mental or physical activity, which ischaracterized by a lessened capacity for work andreduced efficiency. Usually, fatigue is accompanied by a feeling of anxiety, sleepiness, irritability, and a need for rest. Fatigue is different

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from sleep deprivation. Sleep deprivation can bedefined as no sleep activity for more than 18 hours.

Stress is the reaction of the mind and body to internal or external events (stressors). Stress isneither good nor bad. Low-intensity or short-duration stressors may produce a positive stress reaction that will improve performance. However, theextended-duration or high-intensity stressors mayproduce adverse stress responses and result in performance decrements.

The U.S. Army Aeromedical ResearchLaboratory, Fort Rucker, AL, conducted aretrospective analysis of aviation accidents (22fixed-wing and 112 rotary-wing) from 1971 to1977. Fatigue was a condition present in 5 percentof the accidents; "fatigue-other" contributed to 7percent of the accidents and was a suspected contributor in 71 percent of the accidents. Sleepdeprivation was listed as a causal factor in 4 percent of the accidents, as a condition present in 8percent of the accidents, and as a suspected contributor in 19 percent of the accidents.Battle stressors intensify fatigue. Increasedfatigue manifests itself as subtle to severe performance decrements. This causes increases in accidents and overall decreases in combat efficiency.

Sleep and rest are difficult to define. Manydescriptions are based on individual perceptions;however, few, if any, are precise and usable definitions. One dictionary defines sleep as a naturally,


regularly recurring condition of rest for the bodyand the mind, during which the eyes usually areclosed and there is little or no conscious thought orvoluntary movement. Rest can be defined asfreedom from activity or labor. A Soviet scientificpaper defines sleep as a process of regulation of themetabolism and the temporal interrelationship inactivities of structures and functional systems.

Many studies have been conducted to quantifydeficits that are due to increased fatigue and sleepdeficits. One early study demonstrated-

There is deterioration in the accuracy of timing thecomponents of skilled tasks with a decrease in thelevel of the skill.

Pilots who are fatigued accept a lower standard ofaccuracy and performance without an appreciationthat they are doing it.

The pilot's range of attention is narrowed so someinstruments or tasks are forgotten or ignored.

There is a disintegration of the perceptual field soreadings from individual instruments are not integrated into an overall pattern.

A study by the Walter Reed Army Institute ofResearch, Washington, DC, postulated-

Sleep-deprived subjects demonstrated brief, intermittent lapses (microsleeps). These lapses increased in frequency and duration as sleep deficitsincreased.

Intense, increased sensory stimulation; physical exercise; shock; change in task; and feedback on performance prevented or shortened these lapses.

Overlearned or automatic task responses are relatively resistant to sleep loss.

Many, but not all, tasks are affected by diurnal(daytime) (circadian) influences; that is, those occurring in about 24-hour periods. Performancelevels decline during the early morning hours.

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AVIA TION MEDICINE REPORTIt is easy to understand how these eight separate

facts relate to aviation mission performance andsafety. These performance decrements, which areextremely insidious, apply to troop leaders, operations personnel, and maintenance personnel as wellas pilots. The affected individual rarely notices hisor her individual performance degradation.

Performance decrements have been noted insubjects with and without sleep deprivation. Performance decrements generally occur between0300 to 0600 and 1600 to 1800 because of complexphysiologic interactions. These two periods areknown as circadian troughs. Another study at theWalter Reed insitute stated that performance on allcognitive tasks deteriorated at the same rate andclosely paralleled the decline in mood, motivation,and initiative. Performance on cognitive tasks declined 25 percent for every 24 hours without sleep.

A Canadian study demonstrated the effect of circadian rhythm and sleep deficit. Participantsdemonstrated stable performance for the first 18hours (the study began in the morning). Performance declined to 70 percent of the baseline performance over the next 6 hours. Performance againremained stable for 18 hours, but declined to 40percent of the baseline during the next 6 hours.Cognitive performance is more sensitive to sleeploss compared to physical performance.

Several simple techniques can be used to minimize the effects of sleep loss, fatigue, and stress:

The higher the overall state of readiness, beforethe application of the stressors or sleep loss, thesmaller the performance decrement.

Overlearned'or automatic responses are lessdegraded than are newly acquired skills andknowledge.

Personnel should be cross-trained to allow maximum rotation of duties.

When receiving a message, personnel should writeand repeat as much of the message as tacticallypossible.

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Personnel should maintain adequate hydration,nutrition, and personal hygiene.

Tasks that require a short-term memory chain aremore sensitive to sleep loss.

Personnel sacrifice speed for accuracy whenfatigued. Self-paced tasks are less sensitive tosleep loss than are forced-paced tasks.

The more complex the mental or physical task, themore sensitive it is to sleep deficits.

All personnel should be "overtrained" in theirprimary tasks. Overtraining is especially importantin aviation units as there are so many routine"checklist" tasks that are critically important.Overtraining must be stressed during all facets ofindividual and unit training.

Pilots must actively train to rotate duties in thecockpit. They must maximize their crew resourcemanagement. A fatigued pilot may not notice subtle instrument variations. He or she may not notefrequency changes or in-flight mission changes.The pilot and the copilot must rotate duties frequently as this maintains a higher relative attentionlevel. Whenever possible, the crewchief or otherpersonnel on board should be used in other appropriate capacities to accomplish the mission andflight safety.

Performance degradation has a greater effect onpersonnel in "passive" positions such as radaroperators and radio monitors. Performancedegradation also affects ground personnel in theoperations and maintenance sections. The greaterthe number of tasks in which an individual soldieris cross-trained, the greater are the number ofduties in which he can be rotated. Here too, a morerapid rotation of duties partially negates fatigueand sleep-induced performance decrements.

Adequate nutrition, hydration, and hygiene improve performance; however, they are not a substitute for sleep. A deficiency in any of these areasmagnifies performance decrements. High levels of

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aerobic conditioning do not reduce cognItIvedeficits, but aerobic conditioning improvesrecovery from those deficits.

During periods of CONOPS and SUSOPS, extratime must be allowed for mission planning. Duringthese periods it is imperative that mission planningbe adequately reviewed and supervised. Mistakesoften are made during the calculations of weightand balance, fuel consumption, and the multitudeof navigation details.

Commanders, troop leaders, and operations officers pose the greatest risks to mission accomplishment because of cognitive performancedecrements. These personnel must respond to therapidly changing battle. They must execute complex planning tasks based on short-term memorydata. Also, these personnel get the least amount ofsleep. Most training exercises are relatively short.The exercises

Documents

Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1991