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Bottom Line Up FrontOSD I—dHBHMfi
As the war in Afghanistan ends, we can begin to reduce the size of our Army- No longer sizing for prolonged stability operations- Smaller budget mandates a smaller force that we can keep ready andmodern
We value the operational contributions of all components in the Army— Our response to crises has been and will be a Total Force response— We looked at our needs with the Total Force in mind
We also looked to protect the National Guard from cuts as much as possible— They do cost less when we don't use them—They provide support to state governors daily
From a state perspective, the force is going down—we have no choice- Insulating the National Guard from cuts means less active force- Less active force also impacts state jobs and homeland response
Sizing the Army—Basis for NumbersOSD
Began with expected post-Afghanistan demands on Army- Demands articulated by QDR
• Future, potential contingencies; global presence; homeland missions• No longer sized for large, long-term stability operations
Other key assumptions- Future conflicts occur with little or no notice—requires ready forces torespond on short timelines
- Immediate mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) elements neededto augment Active Component (AC)
Strategically Informed analysis of Total Force requirement
Sizing the Army—the NumbersOSD
Based on dennands and assumptions, we estimated the followingsize force meets strategic needs with some risk:_ 440-450K AC (13-15% cut relative to today's force)— 335K National Guard (5% cut)
Pre 9/11, AC was about 480K; National Guard about 350K- AC grew to ~ 570K during the war; National Guard to '"360K
At sequester, can support only 420K AC, 315K National Guard
Risks: shorter dwell times for units if:— Major combat operations are more demanding- Follow-on stability operations exceed planning estimates
Larger cut to AC than to RC
Implications of National Guard Force CutOSD
• Reduction to 335K means, on average, every state would lose about 300Guardsmen
- Reducing further to 315K would mean a loss of 700 Guardsmen
• At today's end strength of about 350K, average state allocation is 7,000Guardsmen
- Loss of 300 is about 5% cut; loss of 700 is about 10% cut, on average- In addition, most Guardsmen will not be deployed
• Available pool will be much larger than what states have today
• Number of Guardsmen (Air and Army) on state active duty (SAD)nationwide:- Average per day in 2013: about 600 nationwide- Maximum during 2013: 1,822 nationwide- Any one state/territory has a small number of activated Guardsmen
100s needed daily, 1000s available
Other considerations for state responseOSD
States/territories have sufficient Guardsmen \A/ithin their states to meetthese needs- Both from Army National Guard and nearly 100,000 Air Nationai Guard- Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) provide a regionai Nationai
Guard force for governors to draw upon- Recent legislation makes accessible hundreds of thousands of federal reserve forces
from all services for such missions
Major disasters (e.g., Hurricane Sandy) result in governors requestingfederal assistance- in these cases, SECDEF brings a Total Force response under Title 10 authorities- National Guard likely still provides preponderance of forces, under Title 32 authorities- Duai-status commander authorities make for more efficient application of Totai Force
response
National Guard and the rest of theTotai Force wlulmSeet state needs
National Guard State Response ActivityOSD
Security & Support N
KeyAsset Protection• Southwest Border• Special Events
^ • ... more JDay-to-day need: 500-1,000 daily nationwideSourced by 350K Army NG, lOOK Air NG
Total Man Days
Severe Weather & Natural Disasters• Fires
• Flood• Hurricanes & Tropical Storms• ... more
Major crises need: 1000sSourced by over 2M AC and RC
4.000
2.000
Hurricanes
Gustavandnes Iid Ike 1
Flood
<s^Drv.r«»r*.f^f^f^f^'^OOooooooOOoocoOOqOOOOOOOOOOoOOQ
Hurricane
IreneInauguration
[ Supportlood^JSpring Flood
Ice Storm
00 a>
W 00 Ot
Security and Support Severe Weather and Natural Disasters Other
Hurricane
Hurricane
Sandy
Aviation RestructureOSD
Fundamental realignment of Army's aviation force- Reduce number of aircraft types from 7 to 4 through retirement of Kiowa Warrior, Kiowa
Scout/trainer, and Jet Ranger trainer helos- Fewer types to recapitalize, maintain, spare, and train on- Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) becomes new trainer—requires increase of 100 LUHs in AC force- Savings go, in part, toward Apache and Blackhawk upgrades/recap
Elimination of Kiowa fleet results in roughly 40% decrease in Army'sattack/reconnaissance battalions (37 to 22)- Makes these units a low density/high demand capability
Restructure thus proposes moving all Apaches from National Guard to AC- In return, AC moves about 100 Blackhawks to National Guard- Net loss in National Guard inventory is about 100 helicopters (8%)- By contrast, AC inventory reduced by about 700 helicopters (23%)
Resulting National Guard force is still highly capable combat complement to AC- Additional Blackhawks also well suited to state missions and requirements in areas like disaster relief
and emergency response
Budget-driven reductions and need-based realignment
Army HelicoptersKeeping 4 types
Apaches
Blackhawks
m
Chinooks
OSD
Losing 3 types
Bell Rangers
L.
Klowa WarriorsKiowa Scouts
10
Basis for Restructure
Factors considered in deciding restructure mix- Operational tempo- Training complexity- Training time
- Mission alignment
0 S D — mmn—rtl
11
Operational TempoOSD
Apaches already established as low-density, high-demandasset over past decade- Every AC Apache battalion deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan at leastfour times—two deployed six times
- AC units experienced 1:1.5 ratio of time deployed (Boots on theGround or BOG) to not deployed (Dwell)—below desired ratio of 1:2
- RC Apache units also deployed almost every company one or twotimes, with slight majority deploying only once
12
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Apache Deployment HistoryFyi3 MTOE
1-501
4-501
1-227
2-159
10l« l-lOl
lS9th 3-101 3-101ATK
NovOO
1-229
2810 1-104
1-285
1-183
35-0 1-135
3610 1-149
1-130
1-211
4210 l-lSl
2910 8-229
2810 1-158
Legend0^
Off
0 0 0
OND
KFOR
Re-riaiiedCo She
Elamcnt
AH-640 ncldlncCompltte
Unit FleldlnfindTriintfx PfQifJirTT
1-229ATK
1-501 ATK
14 ATK
1-227 ATK
2-eCAV
6-6 CAVasia
1-101 ATK
3-lOlATK
2-101 ATKaxas1-3 ATK
iiii-tw r
3-6 CAV it
1-227ATK
SSS^TK
2-fiATK
6-6 ATK
Active Component4-4^ 4-4 ATK
14ATK
4 K <>I <•
1-101 ATK
3-101 ATK
1-227 ATK
4-227aS^
2-6 CAVtt
6-6 CAVOSS
1-101 ATK
•227 ATK
4-227 ATX
3-lOlATK
1-1 ATK1MM44A
2-101 ATK FB 1-lATK
U U4-3 HAS
Korea
1-3 ATK
CTTT4-3 HASccsn
1-104 ATK
m-lSlATK
1-3 ATK
mi*
4-3 CAV
ArmyNational Guard
^-149/H3S{-) !iuaitmd
1-130ATX
Army Reserve
MAT*
1-4 ATK
I B»-flMI«4t01AO
I rm
101ATK
3-101 ATK
1-1 ATK
1-3ATK
1-10ATX
1-229 ATK
;.2-159ATIC
2il-101 AT
1-2 ATK
40) CABAalvatktn
nsnmi
l^nund te t-2S A1K
U l-lATKjJ
1-10 A1K
ll»nMtt4le«-2An
1-82ATK
I l-UMA
1-2UATK
0B/1-149
13
Reasons for Lower NG OPTEMPOOSD
In early 2007, SECDEF Gates instituted BOGiDwell policy of 1:5 for RC units- "...to distribute more fairly, and more effectively, the burdens of way among our active
and reserve components, while providing a more predictable schedule of mobilizationsand deployments for troops, their families, and civilian employees."
- RC Apache units recapitalized earlywith newer models adhered to this rotation policy
Deploying National Guard units fill out end strength by cross levelingpersonnel from other states—usually by calling for volunteers- A strength of RC- However, for Apaches, this means cross-leveling personnel from other National GuardApache units, which erodes the readiness of those other units, making them lessavailable
National Guard units had to upgrade their equipment to most modern andsurvivable model before deploying to both wars
14
Training ComplexityOSD
Recent experience suggests units requiring high degree of collective trainingshould reside generally reside in AC- Collective training =Training to achieve proficiency in large-unit combinedarms maneuver and cross-service integration
- Apaches fall into this category
AC Apache units train about 200 days/year- Maintain battalion/brigade level proficiency- Collocated with ground units
RC Apache units train 39 days plus extra training days to maintain individualflight proficiency- Will, in post-war, occasionally rise to company level proficiency- Limited training opportunities with both ground units and other aviationbattalions
- Not suited to collective-skill development
Low supply/high demand and mission complexity argue for Apaches to be irj^
Mission DifferencesOSD
One way this collective-training readiness difference betweenAC and RC Apache units manifested itself was in the way unitswere used in the wars
Army made 76 deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan withApache battalions- 75% of deployments were in support of combined-arms maneuver(CAM) or counter-insurgency (COIN) missions
- The balance were security missions—escorting logistics convoys,command groups, or transport aircraft—which require less trainingthan CAM/COIN
Table shows percentage of missions assigned to AC and NGActive Component National Guard
100% 0%
89% 11%
49% 51%
16
Training TimeOSD
Time to ready NG aviation units for deployment differeddepending on degree of collective training required
Table below shows the range of pre- and post-mobilizationtraining times for helos in NG combat aviation brigades
Training time (days)
Chinook 75-100
Medevac ^ 80-110Blackhawk | 120-140Apache 150-180
Other helos can be readied faster to meet warfighting needs17
Mission AlignmentOSD —••
"Fight tonight" reality means we need low-density, high-demand assets inthe active force
- Must be ready to go quickly to the fight
Apaches don't have a state mission- Blackhawks do
Based the mix on what's needed18