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The Role of motions in Marketing
Richard P Bagozzi
University o f Michigan
Mahesh Gopinath
Tulane University
Prashanth U Nyer
Chapman University
Emotions are mental states of readiness that arise rom ap-
praisal s of events or one s own thoughts. In this article, the
authors discuss the differentiation o f emotions fro m affect,
moods, and attitudes, and outline an appraisal theory of
emotions. Next, various measurement issues are consid-
ered. This is follo wed by an analysis o f the role of arousal
in emotions. Emotions as markers, mediators, and mod-
erators of consumer responses are then analyzed. The
authors tu rn next to the influence o f emotions on cognitive
processes, which is ollo wed by a study of the implications
of emotions fo r volitions, goal-dire cted behavior, and de-
cisions to help. Emotions and customer satisfaction are
briefly explored, too. The article closes with a number of
questions for fu ture research.
This a r t icle addresses emotiona l behavior in marketing.
In comparison to information processing and behavioral
decision research, we know much less about the role of
emotions in marketing behavior . Much of what we do
know is conf in ed to consum er behavior , as opposed to the
behavior of salespeople or ma rketing managers.
Never theless, emotions are central to the act ions of
consum ers and manag ers al ike. Our goal in this ar ticle will
be to present a f ram ework for thinking about emotions; to
discuss the m easurem ent of emotions; to review how emo-
tions function as causes, effects, mediators, and moderato rs
Journal of the Acade my of Marketing Science.
Volume 27 No. 2 pages 184-206.
Copyright 9 1999 by Academ y of Marketing Science.
in marketing behavior ; and to provide suggestions for
future research.
THEORY ND FUNCTION OF EMOTIONS
Litt le consistency can be found in the use of terminol-
ogy related to emotions. For purposes of organization and
discussion, we begin with a def ini t ion of emotions and
then tu rn to a f r amework fo r in terpre t ing emot ional
behavior.
Definitions
The term affect will be conceived herein as an umbrella
for a set of more specif ic mental processes including em o-
tions, moods, and possibly) att i tudes. Thus, af fect migh t
be cons idered a genera l ca tegory fo r menta l f ee l ing
processes, rather than a par t icular psychologica l process,
per se.
By emotion, we mean a mental s tate of readiness that
ar ises f rom c ognit ive appraisals o f events or thoughts; has
a phenomenolog ical tone; is accom panied by physiologi-
cal processes; is of ten expressed physically e.g. , in ges-
tures, posture, facial features) ; and m ay result in specif ic
actions to aff irm or cope with the em otion, depend ing on
its nature and m eaning for the person having i t . For a s imi-
lar perspective, see Lazarus 1991) and Oatley 1992) .
The l ine between an emot ion and m ood i s f r equen t ly
dif f icult to draw but of ten by convention involves conce iv-
ing of a mood as being longer last ing f rom a few hours up
to days) and lowe r in intensi ty than an emo tion. Yet, excep-
tions to this construal can be found . Still anoth er distinction
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Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 185
between emo tions and m oods is that the former typically is
intentional (i.e. , it has an object or referent), whereas
moods are generally nonintentional and global or diffused
(Frijda 1993). Also, moods are not as directly coupled with
ac t ion tendenc ies and expl ic i t ac t ions as a re many
emotions.
Finally, attitudes, too, are often conside red instances of
affect, with the sam e measures used on oc casion to indicate
emotions and attitudes (e.g., pleasant-unpleasant, happy-
sad, or interested-b ored semantic differential items). How-
ever, some authors take a narrower view of attitudes and
define them as evaluative judgmen ts (measured, e .g. , by
good-bad reactions) rather than em otional states. Cohen
and A reni (1991), for instance, reserve the term affect for
valenced feeling states, with emotions and moods as
specif ic examples. Atti tudes are evaluative judgments in
their view. Nevertheless, other researchers do not make a
distinction betw een affect and evaluative judgments. For
example, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) point out that Fish-
bein and Ajzen (1975) and other social psychologists have
regarded affect as isomorphic with evaluation i tself and
used the terms interch angea bly (p. 12). Still others pro-
pose that attitudes have two distinct, but generally highly
cor re la ted , components : a f fec t ive and cogni t ive (or
evaluative) dimensions. So me empirical support exists for
this interpretation (Bagozzi and Burnkrant 1979; Batra
and Ahtola 1990; Breckler and Wiggins 1989; Crites, Fab-
rigar, and Petty 1994; Eagly, Mladin ic, and Otto 1994).
I t should be recogn ized that the terms
affect emotions
moods and attitudes have frequently been used inconsis-
tently in the literature. We will revisit this issue when we
consider both me asuremen t issues and custom er satisfac-
tion research below. For now, we stress that when reading
the literature, it is important to pay attention to how
authors define affective (and related) terminologies and
how they measure the variables to which the terminologies
refer . One's definit ion of terms permits an interpretation of
their meaning, but equ ally important is how the variables
to which the terms refer are operationalized. Some authors
have defined key variables as emotions, moods, or att i-
tudes but have used operationalizations corresponding to
different concepts. Oth er authors have u sed operationali-
zations for a single variable that cut across two or more
instances of affect. To make clear our definit ion of emo-
tions and ho w it differs from definit ions of mood and att i-
tudes, we present the follow ing point of view.
Organizing ramework
Above we noted that emotions are mental states of
readiness. Bu t so, too, are moods and att itudes. How then
might we distinguish between these affective states? For
one thing, the state of readiness character ized by an em o-
tion tends to be more intense than that character ized by
moods or att i tudes. I t is more intense in the sense of
strength of felt subjective experience, plus magn itude of
physiological response (e .g. , autonomic nervous system
activity) and extent of bodily expression (e.g., facial dis-
plays) , when these latter reactions accomp any an em otion.
Probably the most important factor differentiating
emotions from moods and att i tudes is the way emotions
arise. Emotio ns are said to have a s pecific referen t (e.g., a
consum er becomes pleased when a new detergent removes
grass stains from clothing; he or she is angered by p oor ser-
vice in a restaurant) . Specif ically, emotions ar ise in
response to appraisals one makes for som ething o f rele-
vance to one 's well-being. By appraisal , we mean an
evaluative judgm ent and interpretation thereof . By some-
thing of relevance, we mean an incident or episode that
happens to on eself (e .g., an unp lanned event) ; a behavior
one performs or a result one produces (e .g. , engaging in an
activity or receiving or fail ing to receive a planned out-
come); or a change in an object, person, or thought that has
personal meaning.
I t is important to stress that a lthough categories of
events or physical c ircumstances are frequen tly associated
with particular emotional responses, i t is not the specif ic
events or physical c ircumstances that produce the emo-
tions but rather the unique psycho logical appraisal mad e
by the person evaluating and interpreting the events and
circumstances. Different people can have different emo-
tional reactions (or no emotional reactions at a ll) to the
same event or happening. Note, too, that appraisals can be
deliberative, purposive, and conscious, but also unrefiec-
f ive, automatic, and unconscious, depending on the person
and elicit ing conditions fo r emotional arousal. Th e central
role of appraisals in the formation o f emotions has co me to
define what are aptly called appraisal theories in psychol-
ogy (e.g., Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Ortony, Clore, and
Collins 1988; Roseman 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 1985).
Appraisal theorists maintain that the critical determi-
nant of any em otion is the resultant evaluation and inter-
pretation that ar ise af ter comparing an actual state with a
desired state. Two appraisals are particu larly crucial at this
stage of emotion formation: goal relevance and goal con-
gruence (Lazarus 1991). That is , a necessary condition for
an emotional response to an even t or happening is that a
person has a personal stake in it and at the same time
judges the event or happening to facili ta te or thwart this
stake. Again, the appraisal can occur consciously or
unconsciously.
A distinctive feature of appraisal theories is their speci-
f ication of the conditions leading to discrete emotional
responses. Forced to be brief , we focus on Roseman's
(1991) version of appraisal theories, whic h differs in rela-
tively minor ways from other leading theories. Roseman
hypothesized that particular combinations of f ive apprais-
als determine which o f 16 unique emotions will be experi-
enced in any given situation. Figure 1 summarizes his the-
ory , where the f ive appra isa ls a re labe led mot ive
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186 JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE SPRING 1999
FIGURE 1
Roseman s (1991) Appraisal
Theory of Emotions
PosiuveEmotions
Motive-Consistent
Appetitive [
verslve
ircumstance
caused
unexpected
11riceraila
certain
uncert in
eertam
Other-caused
uncertain
ceruun
u n ~
Self-caused
uncertain
certain
uncertain
c~l tain
NegativeEmotions
Motive-lnconslstent
Appetitive I
versive
Sur~se
Hope
Joy [ Relief Sadnes s
Hope
Joy I Relief
Ldong
Pride
Fear
Distress Disgust
Frustratton
Weak
Strong
Dishke Weak
nger Strong
Shame Guilt
Regret
Weak
Strong
SOURCE: Roseman 1991:193). Reprintedwith permission.
consistent/motive inco nsistent (i .e., positive em otions ver-
sus nega tive emotions), appetitive/aversive (i.e., presence
of a reward vs. absence of a punishmen t), agency (i.e., out-
come is perceived caused by impersonal circumstances,
some other person, or the self), probability (i .e., an out-
come is certain or uncertain), and pow er (i .e., strong ver-
sus weak co ping potential).
For examp le, pride occurs w hen one evaluates his or her
own performan ce of an act ion or achievement of an out-
come in a positive light (e.g., a feeling of having done
well). Here the positive emotion is motive consistent,
either appetitive (e.g., having attained a positive goal) or
aversive (e.g. , having avoided a punishment), self-
produced under weak or low coping potent ial , and ei ther
certain or uncertain, depending on the circumstances. Sad-
ness happens when one experiences a loss for which one
recognizes tha t nothing can b e done to restore it . The loss,
which is of some thing or someo ne valued, is experienced
negat ively and with high certainty under condi t ions of low
coping power. It is perceived to be caused by impersonal
circumstances.
One value of appraisal theories is that it is possible to
account for m ost emotions. Indeed, subt le combinat ions of
appraisals yield discrete emotional responses. Anger and
regret, for example, differ primarily in only one type of
appraisal and sh are in the other four, namely, anger occurs
when a person sees an other person as the source of injury
to onese lf or to another person v iewed as a victim of injus-
tice, whereas regret results when one's negative outcome
is attributed to actions or inactions of the self.
Not every emotion is accounted for by Roseman's
framework (or by any other framework for that matter).
For instance, pride is regarded as a positive emotion in
Rosema n's framework, yet excessive or exaggerated pride
(sometimes termed
hubris
can invite retribution. Like-
wise, shame and gui l t are thought by Ro seman to be pro-
duced by similar appraisals, but other researchers have
found important distinctions between shame, guilt , and
embarra ssment (e.g., Lew is 1993). Like wise, disgust has
been studied extensively and found to differ from distress
(e.g., R ozin, Haidt, and McC auley 1993). Nevertheless, in
contrast to other theories of emotion that conc eive of it in
b ipo lar t erms (e .g . , p leasure-d i sp leasure and h igh
arousal-low arousal [Russell 1980] or high negative
affect-low negative affect and high positive affect-low
positive affect [Watson and Tellegen 1985]), Roseman's
framew ork and other appraisal theories not only allow for
many discrete emotions but specify condi t ions for their
occurrence.
An elaboration of appraisal theories that is especially
relevant for marketing is the treatment of goals, which m ay
be defined as internal representations of desired states,
where states are broadly defined as outcomes, events, or
processes (Austin and Vancouver 1996:338). Oatley and
Johnson-L aird (1987) proposed w hat they termed a com-
municative theory o f emotions wherein events are evalu-
ated in relation to a person's goals. Emotion s are though t
to function to coordinate parts of one 's cognitive syste m so
as to manage responses to events and in so doing change
from ongo ing to new activities or to maintain desired states
or activities. The self-regulation of goa ls is believed to be
the main function of emotions:
Each goal and plan has a m onitoring mechanism that
evaluates events relevant to it . When a substantial
change in probability occurs of achieving an impor-
tant goal or subgoal , the monitoring mechanism
broadcasts to the whole cognitive system a signal
that can set it into readiness to respond to this
change. Humans experience these signals and the
states of readiness they induce as emotions. (Oatley
1992:50)
Accor ding to Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987), emotions
are evoked at a s ignificant juncture of a p la n . . , typi-
c al ly . . , when the evaluat ion (conscious or unconscious)
of the likely success of a plan cha nges (p. 35). Positive
emotions (e.g., happiness, elation, joy ) are associated w ith
the attainment of a (sub)goal, wh ich usually leads to a de-
cision to continue with the plan, whereas negative emo-
tions (e.g., frustration, disappointment, anxiety) result
from problems w ith ongoing plans and failures to achieve
desired goals (see also Stein, Liwag, and W ade 1996).
Emo tions have implications for action and goal attain-
ment . Lazarus (1991) ident i f ies coping responses as
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Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 187
importan t mec hanism s in this regard. When w e experience
a negative emotion (e.g., anger, sadness, fear), we are in
disequilibrium and wish to return to our normal state.
Either one or both of two coping processes are typically
used: problem -focuse d coping, where we attempt to alle-
viate the sources o f distress, or emotion -focuse d coping,
where we ei ther change the meaning o f the source of dis-
tress (e.g., deny that a threat exists, distance oneself from
the source of distress) or avoid thinking about a problem.
By contrast , coping with posi t ive emotions often
involves sharing one's good fo rtune, savoring the experi-
ence, working to continue or increase the rewards, and
increasing phy sical activity. Positive emotions are som e-
times acc ompa nied as well by higher levels of physiologi-
cal arousal , expanded at tent ion, increased opt imism,
enhanced recall, and a shift from self- to other-centered
orientations (e.g., becoming friendlier, caring about oth-
ers), when compared, say, to sadness. Indeed, positive
emotions, part icularly happiness , frequent ly s t imulate
helping or altruistic actions. Why? Schaller and Cialdini
(1990) offe r two explanations: First, we may propose that
positive mood leads to enhanced helping via the more
positive outlook and enhanced activity that appear to
spring automatically from the experience of happiness,
and second, we argue that happiness is associated with a
motivat ion toward disequi l ibrium--toward the possible
attainment of additional personal rewards that transcend
the basic conce rn over one's mo od (pp. 284-285). The
personal rewards referred to here concern such self-
enrichment motives as affiliation, achievement, compe-
tence, and esteem.
Closely related to coping responses are action tenden-
cies. An ac tion tendency is a readiness to engage in or dis-
engage from interact ion with some goal object and
includes (i)mpulses of 'mov ing towards, ' 'mov ing away,'
and 'movin g against ' (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure
1989:213). Som e theorists maintain that emotions are not
merely reactions to appraisals of events but also include
action tendenc ies as part of their mean ing (Frijda 1986).
Others go fur ther and maintain that action tendencies are
automatic, prew ired responses connec ted to emotions
(LeDoux 1996). And in Frijda's (1986) treatment, emo-
tions are conceived as the entire process from stimulus
event to action an d arousal:
Stimulus eve nt~ eve nt coding~appraisal (evaluation of
relevance, context, and urgency/difficulty/seriousnessof
action
event)~ action readiness
arousal
Mu ch as e motion s arise in response to patterns of apprais-
als, Frijda (1986; F rijda et al. 1989) has shown that pat-
terns of action readiness correspond to distinct emotion
categories (e.g., avoidance with fear, helping with caring,
helplessness with sadness, assault with anger, withdraw al
with shame).
Finally, it has been argued that man y coping responses
to emotio ns are volitional (B agoz zi 1992:186-189). The
process begins with outcome-desire units and appraisals
of changes or ant icipated changes in goal a t tainment or
goal progress. Four appraisal classes can be identified.
Outcome-des i re conf l i c t s happen when one fa i l s to
achieve a goal or when one experiences an unpleasant
ev en t . O n e o r m o re em o t i o n a l r eac t i o n s o ccu r t o
outcome-desire confl icts (e.g. , dissat isfact ion, anger,
shame, guilt , sadness, disappointment, disgust, regret),
depending on attributions of the source of goal failure or
the unpleasa nt event (i .e., self, other person, or external
cause). The coping respon se(s) to these emotion s, in turn,
is selected from the following: intent to remove or undo
harm, obtain help or support, decrease outco me, reevalu-
ate goal, or redouble effort, if appropriate, depe nding on
the specific emotion involved.
Outcom e-desire fulfi l lment takes place when one
achieves a goal, experiences a pleasant event, or avoids an
unpleasant event. One or more emotional react ions com e
about when o utcome-d esire fulfillment happen s (e.g., sat-
isfaction, joy, elation, pleasure, pride, relief, caring, love),
again depending on attributions of the source of good for-
tune. The coping responses to these emotions include an
intention to maintain, to increase, to share, or to enjoy the
outcome.
Outcome-desire conflicts and fulfillment refer to out-
comes in the past or present. The following two appraisal
classes go on with regard to planned outcomes. Outcome-
desire avoidances transpire in anticipation of unpleasant
outcome s or goals. Fear o r its variants (e.g., worry, anxi-
ety, distress) are the emotiona l reactions to this appraisal.
The coping responses to these emotions entail either an
intention to avoid undesirable outcomes or to reinterpret
the threat.
The final class of appraisals, outcom e-desire pursuits,
happen in anticipation of pleasant goals or outcomes.
Hope is the emotional reaction to such appraisals. The
coping response(s) to hope include s intentions to realize or
facilitate outcom e attainment and to sustain one's co mmit-
men t and vigilance.
The theory of self-regulation suggests that unique voli-
tional responses underly coping for each particular emo-
tion or class of emotions (Ba gozzi 1992). In addition, the
specific intent ion enacted depends on one's degree of
self-efficacy n executing the coping responses. Some what
analogous (appraisal---~emotional reactions---~coping)
responses occur for outcome-identity conflicts, fulfill-
ments, avoidances, and pursuits in social situations related
to norm ative expe ctation s (B agoz zi 1992:191-194).
Returning to the dis t inct ion between emotions and
mood s and attitudes, we migh t say that in addition to the
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188 JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE SPRING 1999
things mentioned earl ier , emotions differ from moods and
attitudes in the manner in w hich they arise and in their rep-
resentation in memory. Emotions occur in response to
changes in specific plans or goal-relevant events. As O at-
ley (1992) points out, emotions are manife st as transi-
t ions from one sequence of act ion and another, but moods
occur when the cogni t ive system is maintained in an emo-
tion mod e for a period (pp. 64, 91-92). Ind eed, moods are
often resistant to changes in events surrounding them. On e
reason for this is that moo ds depen d on the dissociability
of control emotion s ignals from semantic information
about causation (Oatley 1992:64). In general, moo ds are
elicited by (a) after effects of emotions; (b) organismic
conditions such as illness, fatigue, previous exercise, and
good health, or pha rmaco logical agents; (c) general envi-
ronme ntal cond itions and side-effects of activities: heat,
noise, environm ental variety, stressful conditions (Frijda
1986:289).
Like emotions, attitudes can arise from changes in
events, but attitudes also occur in response to mundane
objects. In addition, arousal is a nec essary part of emotions
but not nec essarily attitudes. Moreover, attitudes seem to
have the capac ity to be stored during long periods of time
and retrieved, whereas emotions are not experienced in
this way (i.e., emotions are ongoing states of readiness;
they are n ot stored a nd retrieved, per se, although it is pos-
sible to recreate the conditions originally producing them
in our mem ory a nd react em otional ly to the thoughts so
generated, at least up to a point; emotio ns can, however, be
classically conditioned, but it is uncle ar whether attitudes
can). Finally, the connection of emotions to volition and
action is stronger an d more direct than it is for attitudes.
Emotions directly stimulate volitions and initiate action,
but attitudes may require an additional motivation impe-
tus, such as desire (Bag ozzi 1992).
ME SUREMENT OF EMOTIONS
The m easuremen t of emotions could focus on a ful l set
of signs or evidence, inc luding evaluative appraisals, sub-
jective feelings, bod y posture a nd gestures, facial expres-
sions, physiological responses, action tendencies, and
overt act ions. Whatever mea surements one uses should, of
course, be t ied to an underlying theory of emotions.
Som e authors (e.g., most appraisal theorists) construe
emo tions as menta l states or processes, and thus it would
be prudent to directly measure the cognitive activities
compris ing the emotional content of these s tates or
processes, fr om this perspective. Self-reports of one's sub-
ject ive experiences const i tute the m ost frequent ly used
procedures in this regard, altho ugh other methods for indi-
cat ing emotional memor y processes might be used as w el l
(e.g., response time, sublimina l priming). From the po int
of v iew of menta l conceptual i za t ions of emot ions ,
physiological, motor, or biological indicators would be at
bes t cons idered corre la tes o r ind i rec t measures o f
emotions.
Other researchers who interpret emotions in broader
terms, as ei ther the whole process from the coding of
events to action responses (e.g., Frijda 1986) or as com -
plex patterns of physiological responses (e.g., Caciopp o,
Bem tson, and Klein 1992 maintain that emotion al experi-
ence is a fun ction of somatoviscerai activation, afferentia-
tion, and cognitive operations; LeDou x 1996 emph asizes
brain processes, especially the role of the amyg dala) stress
the need for measurement processes going be yond self-
reports. Depending on the theorist, overt behaviors or
physiological reactions ma y be considere d either a part of
what i t means to have an em otion or antecedents , concomi-
tants , or possibly even effects of an em otion. More behav-
iorally or physiolog ically oriented researchers obviously
employ measures o f emot ions cons i s ten t wi th these
interpretations.
Marketers have tended to take an empirical approach to
the measurement of emotions and to rely on self-reports
(i.e., either unipolar or bipolar items on questionnaires). In
the typical application, many items cutting across num er-
ous positive and negative emotions are administered to
measu re reactions to a stimulus, and such meth ods as fac-
tor analysis, multidime nsional scaling, or cluster analysis
are used to ident ify the underlying emotional dimensions
for the sample at hand. The number of i tems invest igated in
this regard has been as large as 180 (Aaker, Staym an, and
Vezina 1988), while a paper-and-pe ncil tech nique (basi-
cal ly a s ingle i tem measured cont inuously while viewing
an ad) has even been suggested to regis ter warm th
toward a stimulus ad (Aaker, Stayman, and H agerty 1986;
see also Russell, Weiss, and Me ndelso hn 1989).
Two influential studies in the measurement of emo-
tional responses toward adv ertisements are those by E dell
and Burke (1987) and Holbrook and Batra (1987). Edell
and Burke (see also Burke and Edell 1989) developed a
52-item scale for measu ring emotions towards ads, while
Holbrook and Batra worked with a 94-i tem scale, which
was later reduced to 34 items (Batra and H olbro ok 1990).
With so many i tems measuring emotions, a quest ion
arises whether a small number of basic dimen sions under-
lie people's responses. Edell and Burke (1987) analyzed
the items in their scale and found three factors: upbeat feel-
ings, negative feelings, and warm feelings. Likewise, Hol-
brook and Batra (1987) used factor analysis, but in a
slightly different way. Their 94 items w ere first generated
a priori to measure 29 emotional indices. For example,
joyful , happy, delighted, and pleased w ere hypo thesized to
indicate a joy index, and ashamed, embarrassed, and
humiliated were hypothesized to indicate a shame index.
Then, based on fac tor analyses of the 29 indices, a three-
factor solution for emotions was fou nd: pleasure, arousal,
and domination. Similarly, Batra and Holbrook (1990)
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Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS 189
factor analyzed 12 emotional indices (largely a subset of
those revealed in Holbrook and Batra, with a few excep-
tions) and discovered three factors corresponding closely
to those discovered by Ede ll and Burke. O ther researchers
(e.g., Oliver 1994; Westbrook 1987), also using factor
analysis, have found em otional items to load on two fac-
tors: positive affect and negative affect.
Richins (1997) recent ly argued that consumption-
related emotions are more complex than the two- and
three-factor solutions observed in studies of reactions to
ads or custom er satisfaction. Moreover, because explora-
tory factor analyse s often yield a small numbe r of factors,
she used a multidimensional scaling procedure, in con-
junct ion w ith examinat ion of clusters based on locat ion
and semantic similarity of emotional descriptors in two-
dimensional space. Sixteen clusters of emotions were
identified, each measu red by 2 to 8 indicators (in Study 4):
anger, discontent, w orry, sadness, fear, shame, envy, lone-
liness, romantic love, love, peacefulness, contentment,
optimism, joy, exciteme nt, and surprise.
Although the approaches used by marketers to date
have been largely empirically driven (e.g., Edell and Burke
1987; Holbrook and Batra 1987; Oliver 1994; Richins,
1997; Westbr ook 1987), the y are consistent in certain senses
with leading perspectives on emotions in psychology. Fo r
example , H olbrook and Bat ra s (1987) th ree-fac tor
pleasure-a rousal-dom ination findings are somew hat simi-
lar to R ussel l and Meh rab ian s (1977) th ree-fac tor
pleasure-arousal-dominance model. However, some dif-
ferences can be pointed out. The most important are the
high loadings of sadness and fear on the dominat ion factor
in Holbroo k and Batra s study, in contrast to the more com-
mon outcome o f sadness loading on or near the negat ive
pole of a pleasure-displeasure factor, and fear loading
about 45 degrees away from displeasure and toward
greater arousal (e.g., Russell, 1997).
Similarly, the three factors fou nd in Edell and Burk e s
(1987) s tudy (i.e., upbeat feelings, negative feelings, and
warm feelings), correspond roughly to the high positive
affect-low positive affect, high negative affect-low nega-
tive affect, and pleasantness-unpleasantness dimensions,
respectively, of Watson and T ellegen s (1985) circumplex
mode l ; the posi t ive-affect and negat ive-affect factors
observed by Oliver (1994) and Westbrook (1987) also
align to a great extent with factors on the circumplex
mod el (see also Mano a nd Oliver 1993).
The circumplex structure of emotions is shown in Fig-
ure 2. This representation o f emotions has also been called
the two-factor model, because, based on the techniques
used to generate it (e.g., factor analysis or multidimen-
sional scaling), emotions can be arranged around two
orthogona l axes. Russell (1997) terms the axes pleasure-
displeasure an d arousal-sleepiness, wh ile Watson and Tel-
legen (1985) label them high positive affect-low positive
FIGURE 2
Watson and Tellegen s Two-Factor
Structure of Affect
CONSENSUALMOOD STRUCTURE
~ G t4 pOSItIVE AFF~CCT
kindly
I s t ~ d
warmhearted
lit rlist
rl i~xed
i
o ~ n l
O~ qu~ol
~ 9 111111
a~ve
elaled
e n t h u ~ b c
excited
pepp
1rofl
J
j l
s
J
dull
klepy
r
LOwPOSITIVEAFF~.C~
J
dlstrUSed
hos~ie
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190 JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE SPRING 1999
feeling hostile (see high negative affect in Figure 2).
Then, too, the circumple x contains categories that may not
correspond to em otions. For instance, surprised, drowsy,
and sleepy do not seem to reflect emotions. On the other
hand, the circumplex fails to represent well instances of
emotion im portant in every day life and marketing. It does
not accom mod ate love, disgust, pride, hope, guilt, shame,
or embarrassment very well, to name a few. The various
two- and three-fa ctor summaries o f emotions disclosed in
marketing a lso include variables not reflective of emotions
and exclude instances ge nerally recognized as emotions.
Richins 's (1997) Consumption Emotions Set (CES)
with its 16 descriptors is appealing because it covers most
emotional reactions one encounters in consumption, and
its measures achieved satisfactory reliability (except for
measure of envy, loneliness, peacefulness, and content-
ment). The CES would be best used within the context of a
particular theory of emotions to operationalize specific
categories of emotions hypothesized to serve as antece-
dents, consequences, or moderating variables. The CES
could also be used to operationalize emotions in more
empirically oriented studies, but whether measures of each
dimension would achieve discriminant validity is prob-
lematic. Most studies inco rporating multiple instances of
both positive emotion s and negative emotions find that the
measures load on two factors corresponding to positive
and negative emotions (e.g., Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and
Pieters, 1998; Oliver, 1994).
This raises the question of wh en one can expect discrete
emotional reactions versus amalgamated groupings of,
say, positive emotions and negative emotions (e.g., highly
correlated feelings o f anger, sadness, and fear). The advan-
tage of a theory-based approach to emotions is that spe-
cific conditions can be specified for the occurrence of dis-
tinct emotions, and the se hypothese s can be tested. It is for
these reasons tha t we used appraisal theories as our organ-
izing framework fo r looking at emotions. Discrete emo-
tional reactions are likely to happen wh en one manipulates
conditions produc ing specific appraisals or when natura lly
occurring events correspond to unique appraisal condi-
tions. Gopina th and Bagozz i (1999), for example, were
able to induce independent emotional reactions toward
three targets in a moviegoing context. On the basis of
Roseman's (1991) theory, distinct emotional reactions
were produced as a function of three-way interactions
between motive consis tency-inconsis tency, appet i t ive-
aversive, and self-other agency conditions. For example,
admirat ion, affect ion, dis l ike, and contempt resul ted
toward a group membe r in decis ion making w ith regard to
movie choice, and pride, shame /guilt , and regret resulted
toward the self in group decis ion making, depending on
the three appraisal conditions. Likewise, happiness, satis-
faction, annoyance, or frustration occurred toward the
movie, and pleasure, contentment, irritation, or anger
occurred toward the theater, depending on the three
appraisal conditions. Scenarios were used to create the
appraisal conditions.
By contrast, research not based on manipulations of
appraisal conditions or based on reactions to a single
stimulus frequently finds that emotions cluster in two and,
on occasion, three factors (e.g., Edell and Burke 1987;
Holbroo k and Batra 1987; Oliver 1994; Westbrook 1987).
Furthermore, research exam ining the construct validity of
measures of discrete emotions obtained in nonexperimen-
tal survey settings shows that discrim inant validity is often
lacking among measures of different posi tive or different
negat ive emotions (e.g. , Bagozzi 1993) or between mea-
sures within a particular subcategory of positive or negative
emotions, such as among measures of elation, gladness,
and joy (B agozzi 1991a).
What accounts for the differences in findings between
experimental research based on appraisal theories a nd sur-
vey research or research based on reactions to a single
st imulus measured by inventories of emotional i tems? O ne
possibility may be that discrete emotional reactions are
short-lived or, once activated, stimulate other emotional
reactions closely related to them. C onsider, for example,
sadness: [W] hen we experience loss, we rarely feel a sin-
gle emotion such as sadness. We grieve, are angry, anx-
ious, guilty, envious, even hopeful, and defe nsive (Lazar us
1991:250). A reason why these emo tions ma y go in tan-
dem is that coping processes for sadness may involve
active struggle or even protest against loss, w hich results in
other emotions. Alternatively, the absence of discrete
emotions may simply reflect how difficult i t is to create
them. As Izard (1972) noted, pure emotions are virtually
impossible to obtain in the laboratory or in any research
setting (p. 103). However, as noted above, researchers
have recently found that the use of scena rios in an experi-
mental context can generate discrete emotional responses
(e.g., Gopinath and Bag ozzi 1999; Ro sema n 1991).
Another factor that might account for a coalescence of
multiple positive emotions and m ultiple negative emotions
in two corresponding groupings is the nature of the stimu-
lus under study. Most stimulus ads, products, or brands are
complex, and the appraisals engendered are typically
variegated, but related. Also the way in which items are
presented on some questionnaires makes it difficult to
uncover discrete emotional components . W hen mult iple
measures of a single discrete emotional response (e.g.,
happy, pleased, and joy ful for joy ) are interspersed
throughout a questionnaire, this tends to reduce correla-
tions among items purported to indicate the same respon se
and to increase correlations of these items with me asures
of other responses. The result is predictably a redu ction in
discriminant validity and high correlations among items
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Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 191
measuring posi t ive emotions an d am ong i tems measuring
negative emotions. Th e alternative is to group items by the
emotion al response they are intend ed to tap, which tends to
increase correlations among measures of the same thing
and decrease correlat ions among measures of different
emotional responses. Thus, a tra de-off is entailed by use of
either practice.
An issue that has received little attention in marketing is
whether to use unipolar or bipolar items to measure em o-
tions. The choice ca n influen ce findings and their interpre-
tation in fund ame ntal ways. Some lea ding scholars claim
that emotions are in the final analysis bipolar states or
processes. We are either happy or sad, for example, and
any other pattern (e.g., independe nce or concom itance) is
though t to be an artifact of measu reme nt error. Altho ugh a
numb er of studies have shown that pleasant and unpleasant
emotions are independent (e.g., Bradburn 1969; Diener
and Emmons 1985; Zevon and Tellegen 1982), Green,
Goldman, and Salovey (1993) and Barrett and Russell
(1998) argue and prese nt findings demonstrating that emo-
tions are bipolar, once random or both random and system-
atic errors are taken into account.
Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi (1998) challenge the conclu-
sions made by G reen et al. (1993) and Barrett and Russell
(1998). They hypoth esize that bipolarity, independence,
and conc omitan ce depen d on gender, culture, and the tar-
get of one's emotions. Briefly, Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi
found that positive and negative emotions were highly
negat ively correlated for American women but highly
positively correlated for Chine se wome n. The form er pat-
tern is evidenc e for b ipolarity (i .e., either positive or nega-
tive emotion s occur bu t not both), the latter for concomi-
tance (i .e., both positive and ne gative emotions occur at the
same time). For m en, the correlations between positive and
negat ive emotions were m uch smaller in magnitude but in
the sam e direc tion across ethnicity, that is, slight negative
correlations were fo und for Ame rican men, slight positive
correlat ions for Chinese men. Thus, the relat ionship
between positive and negative emotions for men was
nearly independent. Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi argued that
differences in culture (i .e., a tendency for Americans to
view things in d ichotom ies or discrete categories, i .e., in
opposition; and a te ndenc y for Chinese to view things dia-
lectically, i.e., in balance or ha rmony ) interact with gender
differences (i .e., a tendency for wom en to be more knowl-
edgeable and skilled in the use of emotions than men) to
produce the divergent pat terns. The above findings
resul ted when people were asked to express how they fel t
at the moment according to their idiosyncratic reasons,
which is the standard procedure use d in the literature. That
is, the stimulu s for each person could be considere d het-
erogen eous across individuals. However, when America ns
and Chinese were asked to give their emotiona l reactions
to eating in fast-food restaurants (a common, singular
stimulus), positive and negative emotions were indepen-
dent for men and w omen al ike.
It is perhaps too early to give definitive recom mend a-
tions on which emotional scales to employ in empirical
work, but for now, we think that it is advisable to recom-
mend use of unipolar scales that ask respondents to
express to what extent each emotion describes their own
subjective feelings, rather than bipolar scales that can
obscure differences in emotional responses across the
various dimensions. Also, at least five, preferably sev en to
nine, scale steps should be used for each item to enhance
the chances that optimal distributional properties o f mea-
sures will be achieved. In addition, at least three, prefera-
bly more, i tems should be used for each emotional
subcategory.
A final measure ment issue we wish to raise is the fol-
lowing. To what extent are emotions blends o f categories?
For ease of discussion, we co nsider the categories of emo-
t i o n s p re s en t ed o n t h e c i r cu m p l ex . P l eas an t n es s -
unpleasantness migh t combine, for instance, with arousal
to produce different kinds or intensities of emotion. To take
a particular example, consider happiness, an instant of
pleasantness on the circumplex. Intense forms o f happiness
occur when pleasantness combines with high arousal:
elated, excited, enthusiastic, euphoric, gleeful, joyo us, ec-
static, and exultant are examples. Mild f orms o f happiness
occur when pleasantness combines with low arousal :
peaceful, calm, serene, or quietude of mind are examples.
Happiness, itself, might be at an intermediate level of
arousal. Other perspectives on blended emotions, based
not on a blend of arousal with emotion categories but
rather on combinat ions of basic emotions, can be found
in Izard (1991, 1992) and Plutc hik (1980).
What more general role, if any, does arousal play in
emotions (Bago zzi 1991b)? We turn to this issue next.
ROUS L
An early, influential point of view on em otions was pro-
fessed by James ([1890] 1950) who claim ed that bodily
changes foll ow directly the perception of the exciting fact,
an d.., our eeling o f the same changes as they occur lS the
emotion (p. 449, emphasis in original). For James, differ-
ent stimuli lead to different bodily responses (e.g., sweaty
palms, racing heart, etc.), these physiological responses
are then detected as bodily sensations in our mind, an d the
result is interpreted by us as emo tional experiences. B ut it
is important to note that James reserv ed this interpretation
for what he termed the coarser emotions (e.g., grief, fear,
rage, love ), which involve strong bodily perturbations; he
was less clear about what he termed the subtler emotions
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192 JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE SPRING 1999
(e.g., mora l, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings (James
[1890] 1950:468).
An equal ly influent ial theory of emotions was proposed
by Schach ter and Singer (1962), wh o argued that emotion
is essentially bodily arousal plus a cognitive label one pro-
vides to diagno se his or h er felt arousal, a perspective con-
sistent with James's point of view. The idea is that we first
experience physio logical arousal, and, especially when w e
are unaware or uncertain of the origin of the arousal, we
look for evidence in the physical and social situation
accompanying the arousal to label our emotional state.
Although this theory had considerable impact in psychol-
ogy for nearly three d ecades, it has largely been discred-
i ted and has not received much support ing evidence
beyo nd Schach ter and Sin ger's original experiment (e.g.,
Manstead and Wagner 1981; Reisenzein 1983). One
except ion to the above observat ion is the frequent ly
repeated find ing that arousal misattributed to an extrane-
ous source intensifies emotions (e.g., Cantor, Bryant, and
Zillman 1974; Dutton a nd Aron 1974; Zillman 1971).
An im portant contribution of James ([1890] 1950) and
Schachter and Singer (1962) was the recognition that
arousal plays an essent ial role in emotion. Before we
address arousal mo re fully, we shou ld mention research in
marke ting that addresses the acquisition of affect, without
necessarily involving concepts of arousal or information
processing. Both in the practice of marketing and market-
ing research, considerable emphasis has been placed on
the effects of various stimuli on c onsum er behavior. Retail
store environment cues, advertising, background music,
brand names, packages, celebrity endorsers, and other
stimuli are frequently administered to produce emotional
reactions in consumers. The premise is that emotions or
moo ds trigger buying responses (e.g., Gardn er 1985; Hill
and Gard ner 1987).
If not by appraisal processes or direct arousal, per se,
how doe s presentation o f a stimulus under repetitive con-
ditions induce affect? A seductively simple explanation
was provided by Zajonc, who argued that when objects
are presented to the individual on repeated occasions, the
mere ex posure is capable of makin g the individual 's atti-
tude toward these objects more positive (Zajonc and Mar-
kus 1982:125). This mer e exposure effect has been
found primarily when the stimulus is simple and previ-
ously unknow n or else has l i t tle or no semantic content
(e.g., nonsens e syllables, foreign words o f Chinese char-
acters). One mechanism that has been offered to explain
the mere exposure effect is familiarity: we come to like
things that are familiar to us, perhaps because o f feelings
of security (Zajonc 1968). However, a full theoretical
explanat ion for the mere exposure effect has not been
developed. When a person is exposed to m eaningful s tim-
uli, i t has been m ore difficult o produce the mere exposure
effect (e.g., Obermiller 1985). This is, in part, a conse-
quence o f the cognitive processing that occurs in response
to awareness of the meaningful s t imuli . Repeated expo-
sure to a meaningful stimulus can lead to increased or
decreased positive or negative feelings, dep end ing on its
meaning. Mere exposure, thus, loses its utility in such
cases, both as a theory and a practical tactic.
Based loosely on the not ion that emotions or moods
induced by one s t imulus become at tached to another, some
researchers have investigated the effects of (a) music on
length of stay and money spent in supermarkets and res-
taurants (e.g., Mil lima n 1982, 1986) and (b) affectiv e tone
of stores on purchase intentions (e.g., Don ovan and Rossi-
ter 1982) and evaluations (e.g., Gardner and Simokos
1986). How can the observed at tachment of affect from
one st imulus to another be explained? Shimp (1991)
reviews seven studies in consum er research th at test vari-
ous facets of classical conditioning explanations. The id ea
behind classical conditioning is that the repeated pairing
of a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a new brand na me) w ith an
unconditione d stimulus (e.g., an attractive spokesperson)
will eventually lead to the new brand name, on its own,
stimulating the unconditioned response (e.g., positive
affect) originally induced by the u ncond itioned stimulus.
Very few studies have been performed in m arket ing that
confo rm to the conditions required to test classical condi-
tioning. It is unclear w hether classical condition ing studies
can be designed to rule out such rival explanations as
dema nd characteristics or cognitive interpretations of the
results. Allen and Janiszewski (1989) provide some evi-
dence that at least one type of cognitive med iation is neces-
sary for classical conditioning to occur: namely, subject
awareness of the cont ingency between the condi t ioned
stimulus and unconditioned stimulus. On the other han d,
classical conditioning, particularly for fear responses, has
been shown to involve unconsciou s arousal processes con-
nected with the amygd ala (LeDoux 1996).
Another way to explain the observed at tachment of
affect from one stimulus to another is by Z illman 's (1971)
excitation-transfer model. Briefly, Zillman propo sed tha t
exposure to one stimulus ma y produce arousal. If a second
stimulus is presented close on that also is capa ble o f pro-
ducing arousal on i ts own, the two sources of arousal may
comb ine to produce intensely experienced arousal. Und er
certain conditions (e.g., unawareness of the source of
arousal from the first stimulus, recency o f the second), a
person may attribute the arousal to the second stimulus.
Zillman (1983) interpreted arousal as undifferentiated
sympathe tic activation.
An issue in need of resolut ion is whether em otions can
occur without arousal. Cognitive theories of emotions
(e.g., appraisal theories) seem to allow tha t emotions ca n
be produce d by cognition alone, without arousal (e.g., Par-
rott 1988). But does arousal alway s accom pany the experi-
ence of emotions?
Recent research suggests that arousal is an essential
component of emotion and is manifest in neural systems in
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Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 193
the brain. LeDoux (1996) reviews evidence suggesting
that there are at least five arousal system s in the brain con-
tributing com plexly to emotiona l experience. Four of these
are in regions of the brain stem and rely respectively on
acetylcholine, noradrenaline, dopamine, and serotonin for
activation. A fifth (the nucleus basalis) is in the forebrain
and also relies on acetylcholine to arouse cortical cells.
LeDoux notes that the arousal systems act in nonspecific
way s throughout the fo rebrain to make cells more sensitive
to incoming signals. In a sense, the nonspecific arousal
interacts w ith the information proc essing o f a particular
stimulus. T he am ygdala acts as a kind o f central pro cessor
and interacts with the prefrontal cortex (working memo ry
and attention), hippocampus (long-term explicit memory),
and sensory cortex (perception and short-term storage) to
influence emotional responses. The amygdala not only
influences cortical a reas of the brain but also receives input
from arousal networks (which themselves also influence
the forebrain) and feedback from bodily expression of
em otion s. In addition, signals from th e amygdala are sent to
muscles and internal organs and glands.
Mo st of the research to date into the role o f arousat sys-
tems and the amygdala in emotional behavior has been
limited to a small numbe r of emotions (e.g., fear). B ut it is
believed that each emotional response is mediated by sepa-
rate neural sy stems, although each m ay overlap or resem-
ble each other in many respects. In sum, LeDoux (1996)
and other brain researchers (e.g., Dama sio 1994) construe
emotions as biological functions of the nervous system
(see also Zajonc 1998).
To our know ledge, there has been little work to either
integrate or reconcile cognitive theories o f emotions with
neural and b iological theories. M uch remains to be done in
psychological research before we can make definitive
statements abou t the precise role of arousal in emotional
experience and behavior.
At least three studies have examined limited asp ects of
arousal in marketing-related contexts. Sanbonmatsu and
Kardes (1988 ) found that arousal ma y govern attitude for-
mation in persuasive message settings. Attitudes were
based on peripheral cues wh en respondents w ere highly
aroused but on argument strength when they were moder-
ately aroused. It is unclear whether arousal functioned
here to reduce inform ation-processing capacity of external
arguments or focused attention on internal reactions.
Bagoz zi (1994) found that consisten t with predictions
by knowledge-assembly theory (Hayes-Roth 1977),
arousal t rans formed a two-dimens ional , a f fec t ive-
cognitive representation of evaluations of giving blo od
into a one-d imen siona l, unitized representation. L ikew ise,
arousal increased the association between attitudes and
positive beliefs about the consequences of giving blood
and decrea sed the association betw een attitudes and nega-
tive beliefs. These pre dictions on the associations betwee n
attitudes and beliefs were explained by the implications of
spreading activation effects of arousal and coping
responses, wherein individuals attemp t to avoid negative
and facilitate positive associations of beliefs with atti-
tudes. In another study, Bagoz zi (1996) found that for atti-
tudes toward giving blood, high arousal tend s to enhance a
halo effect from attitudes to positive beliefs and reduce the
halo from attitudes to negative beliefs about the conse-
quences of giving b lood.
Clearly, arousal is a fundamental aspec t of behavior
related to emotions. We must a cknow ledge that appraisal
theories have not done a good, or at least complete, job o f
incorporating arousal into their frameworks. In their
defense, however, we should mention the following.
Appraisal theorists recognize that the intensity of emo -
tional experience consists of two componen ts: arousal and
self-control (e.g., Frijda 1994:120). Lik ew ise, resea rche rs
accept that autonomic nervous system and other physio-
logical processes at least accom pany subjectively felt
emotion s (e.g., Oatley 1992: 21) and that [i]f the criterion
of physiological activity w as eliminated fro m the defini-
tion, the concept of emotion w ould be left without one o f
the important response boundaries with which to distin-
guish it from nonem otion (Lazarus 1991:58-59). Bu t is
there more to arousal in emotion than this?
Some psycho logists and marketers have been quick to
dismiss Zajo nc's (1980) claim that preferen ces need no
inferences (see Cohen and Areni 1991:215-216; Lazarus
1982; Marcel 1983; Zajon c 1984). Howe ver, we be lieve it
is important, at the present, to recognize that emotional
meanings can be processed subconsciously, emo tions can
be activated automatically, and responses to em otions
(e.g., coping, action tendencies, actions) also can occur
automatically. W e leave open the possibility that emotio n
and cognition are best thought o f as separate bu t interact-
ing mental functions mediate d by separate but interacting
brain system s (LeD oux 1996:69; see also Oatley 1992,
chap. I). It appears that arousal is a key part of emotional
functions in the brain that underlies muc h o f its automatic-
ity. Cognitive appraisals and arousal ne ed to be better
incorporated into our theories of emotion.
EMOTIONS AS MARKERS MEDIATORS
AND MODERATORS OF CONSUMER
RESPONSES
Based on content, mo st advertisements can be divided
into two categories: (a) thinking ads, where f ocus is placed
on either factual information (e.g., prod uct attributes) or
utilitarian consequ ences of product/service use (e.g., sav-
ings in time or money) or (b) feeling ads, where conc entra-
tion is placed o n the e motio ns one wiI1 experien ce through
use or ownership o f a product (see Puto and W ells's [ 1984]
s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n f o r m a t i o n a l a n d
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transformationa l advertising). Rather than focu sing on the
stimulus, per se, it is more important to emphasize the
processes and experiences comprising a person's response
to ads, to better understa nd the emotional meaning o f ads
(e.g., Friestad and Th orson 1986).
Paralleling the above differentiation between types of
ads and the emot ional -cogni t ive d iv i s ion in menta l
processes me ntione d earlier, Batra and R ay (1986) devel-
oped a framework and coding scheme for classifying
affective responses to ads, as a com plemen t to cognitive
responses. Specifically, Batra and Ray (1986) identified
three positive affective response categories: surgency-
elation-vigor/activation (SEVA), deactivation, and social
affection feelings. The SEVA feelings refer to upbeat,
happy mood reactions (e.g., the ad's music was 'catchy,'
the ad was 'fun to watch or breezy, ' o r . . . a l ikable use of
humo r ); deactivation includes soothing, relaxing, quiet,
or pleasing reactions; and social affection encompasses
feel ings of warmth, tenderness , and caring (Batra and R ay
1986:241). The three positive affective responses w ere
used along with six cognitive responses (i .e., support argu-
ments, counterarguments, execution discounting, execu-
tion bolstering, neutral distracters, and other reactions) in
a s tudy o f the impa ct of televis ion commercials on con-
sumers. A total of 12 percent o f reactions to ads were clas-
s i fied as posi t ive affect : SEVA (3.7%), deact ivat ion
(2.5%), and social affect (6.1%).
One use of emotional react ions in the above sense
might be as markers or indicators of the effectiveness of
advertising copy, particularly with respect to the overall
persuasiveness of the ad, the appeal of spokespersons,
evaluation of particular product claims, and appraisals of
other aspects of the ex ecution (Wiles and Cornw ell 1990).
Also, the program surrounding an ad (e.g., happy versus
sad content) has been found to have main effects on one's
evaluation of an ad and recall (e.g., Goldberg and Gorn
1987). Future rese arch is neede d to identify how progra m
conten t and advertising appeals interact to influence con-
sumer emo tional responses.
A research question that has received quite a bit of
attention in recent years is how and to what extent emo-
tional reactions to ads influence consume r decision mak-
ing. Most ofte n these reactions have been mea sured as atti-
tudes (e.g., l iking) toward the ad (e.g., Brown and Sta yma n
1992; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Shimp 1981).
Attitude tow ard the ad (A d) is thought to be a function
of feelings (and thoughts) about the ad itself (e.g., Batra
and Ray 1986; Mac Kenz ie, Lutz, and Belch 1986). In fact,
Batra and Ray (1986) found that the three affect ive
responses discu ssed above significan tly predicted A deven
after controlling fo r the effec ts of cognitive responses. A
number of researchers have examined the condi t ions
under w hich em otions influence A~. For instance, under
low-involvement viewing conditions, feelings about the
ad have been found to be more important determinants of
A~ than thoughts (e.g., how informative or useful the ad
is), but under higher involvement viewing, both feelings
and thoughts may be importan t (e.g., Miniard, Bh atla, and
Rose 1990). Presumably, high involvem ent promote s cog-
nitive processing of the usefulness of the ad and its
content.
A majori ty of research has addressed the effects of A~,
especially on attitudes toward the bra nd (Ab). Classic atti-
tude theory maintains that A b s a func tion of beliefs about
brand attributes or consequence s of product use. Mitchell
and Olson (1981) and Shimp (1981) were the first to find
that A~ provided additional explana tory pow er for A b over
and above brand beliefs (see also Edell and Burke 1987).
Batra and Ray (1986) found, however, that affect ive
responses toward the ad in fluenc ed A b only indirectly
throu gh Am.
Some research has addressed the condi t ions under
which Aad nfluenc es A~. For examp le, Brow n and Staym an
(1992) revealed in their meta- analysis that the effects of
Aad on A bare greater for novel than well-know n brands and
for durable and other goods versus nondurables. So me evi-
dence also exists showing that Aad influences A b ndirectly
through its effect on beliefs about the brand (M acKe nzie et
al. 1986). Finally, Staym an and Aaker (1988) showe d that
repetition governs the feelings to Aa~ relationship. U nder
levels of low versus high repetition, feelings have a
stronger effect on Aad. This m ay b e a c onsequ ence of
greater information processing under high versus low
repetition.
In addition to the transfer of affec t from ad emotion s to
A d, research shows that brand names and feelings toward
ads can become l inked in memory. Stayman and Batra
(1991) found that respondents exposed to an affective, as
opposed to an argument, ad w ere able to retrieve brand atti-
tudes faster, when prime d with the brand nam e. In addi-
tion, the positive retrieved affect had a strong er influenc e
on choice in low- than in high -involvem ent contexts. In a
second study, Stayman and Batra dem onstrated that view-
ers of an ad who were in a positive affective state more
strongly evoked the affect when given the brand name as a
subsequent retrieval cue than viewers exposed to the ad
while n ot in a positive affect state.
Olney, Holbr ook, a nd B atra (1991 ) investiga ted a hier-
archical model explaining advertising viewing time. The
effects of ad emotions (i .e., pleasure and arousal) were
mediate d by A d and reactions to a d content. Interestingly,
arousal had both indirect and direct effects on viewing
time, even after co ntrolling for ad conten t and Aad. Arousal
was measu red by self-reports.
Emotions have been found to serve as moderators in
their impact on A b. Batra and Stay man (1990), in one o f the
few studies to examine mood and print ads, found that
positive mood s enhanc e A b hrough the ir interaction with
two cognitive processes: (1) a bias against the generation
of negat ive thoughts (such as evoked by w eak arguments),
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leading to a mo re favorab le evaluation of message argu-
ments, and (2) a reduction in total cognitive elaboration,
making processing more heuristic than systematic (pp.
212-213). An interesting finding was that positive moods
seem to reduce counterargumentation when we ak argu-
ments are use d in ads (see also Worth and Mackie 1987).
Batra and Steph ens (1994) also investigated the moderat-
ing effec ts of m ood on A~. Specifically, they show ed that
mood and motivation (the latter conceived as degree of
relevance of the product category for consumers) inter-
acted to go vern A b when consum ers watche d television
ads. The greatest impact on A~ occurred when positive
moods en sued under conditions of low motivation. The
rationale is that positive moods and lo w motivation sup-
press counterargumentation (and therefore lead to more
favorable Ab) in comparison with high-motivation
conditions.
Following the elaboration likelihood model (ELM)
(e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1986), we might expect emo-
tions to have one or both of two effects. Emotions might
operate centrally to influence cognitive processes (e.g.,
with regard to argumentation), or emotions might function
peripherally (perhaps through associative or affect transfer
mechanisms). Early predictions under the ELM took an
either-or perspective and stressed that when the processing
of information in a comm unication is low (e.g., due to low
motivation, distraction, low need for cognition, w eak argu-
ments), emotiona l content in the comm unication (e.g., an
attractive spokesperson) is processed directly and trans-
fers to, or influences, attitude toward the produc t or mes-
sage. When issue-relevant thinking is high, attitude
change is thought to be a function of the balance of pros
and cons in the commu nication, a largely rational proc ess,
and emoti on ma y not be a factor.
Over time, the role of em otion in persuasive communi-
cation has bee n found to be more com plex than the simple
central versus peripheral pro cessi ng alternatives spe cified
in the ELM (e.g., W egener and Pe tty 1996). For example,
when the likelih ood of information processing is moder-
ate, emotions have b een found to affect the extent to which
arguments in a comm unication b ecom e elaborated. Posi-
tive (versus neutral) moo ds tend to lead to less processing
of arguments (e.g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack
1990; see also discussion below on the effects of emotions
on cognitive processes). By contrast, when peop le process
the arguments in a messag e closely, moo d might bias
information proc essin g or even function as an argument
itself (Forgas 1995). Another explanation for mood effec ts
is that sad or neutral (versus happy) moo ds lead to more
effortful processing, w hich is believed to be do ne sponta-
neously (e.g., Bohner, Chaiken, and Hunyadi 1994). Note
that this prediction seem s to conflict with the observations
made by Schaller and Cialdini (1990), who analyzed
mostly nonpersuasive com munica tion studies. So me clari-
fication for the discrepan cy in interpretations can be seen
in a study by Wegener, Petty, and S mith (1995). W egener
et al. (1995) discovered that happy (versus sad) moods
lead to the processing of more arguments in a message
wh en a proattitudinal/uplifting posi tion wa s taken, but
happy (versus sad) moods lead to less processing of argu-
ments when a
counterattitudinal/depression
position
was taken. Wegener et al. (1995) explain the findings, in
part, by suggesting that when in a happy mo od, peop le try
to maintain their moo d and thus process less of the coun-
terattitudinal/depression content.
In addition, interactions of emotions sometim es occur
with other variables, such as motivational or ability fac-
tors. For instance, W egener, Petty, and Klein (19 94) found
that for people high in need for cognition, messages
framed positively (i.e., good things will happen i f peop le
adopt the advocacy) were more persuasive when the audi-
ence was happy (versus sad), but messages framed nega-
tively (i.e., ba d things w ill happen if peopl e do not adop t
the advocacy) were more persuasive when the audience
was sad (versus happy). Wegener et al. (1994) explained
these findings by claiming that good outco mes seem bette r
and more likely to occur while in a good (versus sad)
mood, and bad outcomes seem wo rse and more likely to
occur while in a sad (versus happy) mood.
Finally, even when the likelihood of information pro-
cessing is low (due, e.g., to low need fo r cognition or low
relevance of a product for a consumer), the moo d o f the
audience can have a direct effect on A b, but w hen th e likeli-
hood of information processing is high, the m ood o f the
audience affected message-generated thoughts consistent
wi th the mood (Pet ty , Schumann, Richman, and
Strathman 1993). Mood w as induced by a television pro-
gram o r music.
THE EFFECTS OF EMOTION 1:
INFLUENCES ON COGNITIVE
PROCESSES
A person's emotional state can influence various
aspects of information processing including encodin g and
retrieval of information, different strategies used to
process information, evaluations and judgm ents, and c rea-
tive thinking. In this section we examine the influence o f
affective states o n various aspe cts of cognitive processe s.
Emotion Mood Effects on Memory
The influence of mood states on memory can be
broadly classified into three categories: retrieval effects,
encoding effects, and state-dependent learning effects. In
the following section, we review s ome o f the studies that
have investigated these effects and discuss the mechanism
by w hich affect influences m emory.
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Retrieval effects. Affec t has been shown to influenc e re-
trieval of informa tion, whereby persons in a positive mood
state at the time o f retrieval have been f ound to show supe-
rior recall of positive material learned during encoding,
relative to neutral or negative material (Isen, Shalker,
Clark, and Karp 1978; Laird, Wagener, Halal, and Szegda
1982; Nasb y and Yando 1982; Teasdale and Russell 1983).
For exam ple, Isen et al. (1978) had respond ents study posi-
tive, negative, and neu tral words. E ither positive, neutral,
or negative mood states were induced in these respon-
dents. Respondents in the positive-mood condition re-
trieved more positive words compared with neutral or
negative words. Isen et al. (1978) suggest that thinking
about mood-incongruent material involves shifting one s
focus, which is cognitively taxing, and therefore people
are more likely to focus on mood-c ongrue nt material. An-
other mec han ism proposed to explain the retrieval effects
of positive affect suggests that positive mood at the time of
retrieval functions as a cue that primes the positive mate-
rial in memory, making these material more accessible
(Isen 1989; Isen et al. 1978; also see Tulving and Pearl-
stone 1966 for a discussion on the effe cts of priming on ac-
cessibility). The easier accessibility of positive material
may then influence other cognitive processes such as
evaluations and decision mak ing, and also subsequent be-
haviors. While retrieval effects have been replicated by
many researchers using different mood induct ion and test-
ing techniques, a few prom inent studies have failed to de-
tect retrieval effects (Bower, Monteiro, and G illigan 1978;
Bower, Gilligan, and M onteiro 1981), leading Isen (1984)
to speculate that this failure may have been c aused by the
specific material and induction methods (such as hypno-
sis) used in these studies.
Encoding effects. Mo od states have also been shown to
exhibit encod ing effects wh ereby the a ffective state at the
t ime of learning is associated with superior memory for
similarly valenced material (Bowe r and Cohen 1982; For-
gas and Bowe r 1987). Nas by and Yando (1982) foun d that
positive mo od a t the time of learning led to an improved re-
call of positive material at a later point in time regardless of
the mood state at the time of recall. Bower et al. (1981)
found evidence for the encoding effect of both posi tive and
negat ive affect. Respondents were made to feel happy or
sad and then read descriptions o f various psychiatric inter-
views. Happy respondents learned many m ore happy facts
than sad facts, while sad respondents learned many more
sad facts than happy facts.
How can the encoding effects of mood be explained?
Bow er and colleagues (e.g., Bow er and Cohen 1982) have
suggested that mood-congruent material is likely to be
m o r e s e m a n t i c a l l y e l a b o r a t e d r e l a t i v e t o m o o d -
incon gruen t material. Forgas and Bow er (1987) found that
in impression formation situations, sad individuals spent
more t ime examining negat ive ra ther than pos i t ive
information, and they subsequently recalled the negative
information better. Conversely, happy individuals spent
more time on the positive information and recalled that
better at a later time. The greater levels of associations
evoked by mood-congruent material may have caused a
more extensive elaboration, which, in turn, requires m ore
time. However, Isen et al. (1978) and Srull (1983) failed to
find any encodin g effects of affect.
State dependent learning effects. A third mem ory ef-
fect of mood is the s tate-dependent learning effect of af-
fect, where any material regardless o f its affective valence
learned under a particular mood state is recalled better
when the p erson is again in that affective state (Bartlett ,
Burleson, and Santrock 1982; Ba rtlett and Santrock 1979;
Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan 1978; Bower, Gilligan, and
Monteiro 1981). Bow er et al. (1978) had resp ondents learn
two sets of words, one while they we re in a positive affec-
tive state and the other in a negative mood . Wh en respon-
dents who learne d the two lists in different moods re called
the words in the wrong mood (e.g., when words learne d in
a positive mood were recalled w hile respondents were in a
negative mood), they experienced interferenc e and the av-
erage recall rate was less than 50 percent. When respon-
dents who learne d two lists in different moods rec alled the
words in the correct mood, the average recall rate was
more than 70 percent. Control respondents who learned
and recalled both lists while in the same m ood showe d an
average recall rate between 50 an d 60 percent. Bow er and
Cohen (1982) suggest that the respondents mood at the
t ime of learning becomes associated with the learned m a-
terial and that these associations facilitate the recall of
learned material when the mood state at recall matches the
moo d state at encodin g (also see Bower 1981 for a descrip-
tion of his semantic-network theory).
Evidence for mood state-dependent learning has been
ambiguous. Many studies have failed to find any state-
dependent effects of mood state (Bow er and May er 1985;
Isen et al. 1978; Laird et al. 1982; Nasb y and Yando 1982).
Eich and Birnbaum (1982) and Isen (1984, 1989) have
suggested that when the material to be learned has sem an-
tic meaning, the stimulus will be enc oded ac cording to this
meaning, and the influence of the mood state in the encod-
ing and subsequent retrieval processes will be minimal.
However, when the stimulus lacks meaning, contextual
cues such as affective states at the time of learning m ay be
more s t rongly encoded with the learned material . At the
t ime of retrieval , these memory i tems, which have few
semantic associations, are more primed by the matching
affectiv e state at recall.
Asymmetric effects of positive a nd negative moods.
While positive affective states have been shown to have
significant influences on recall, nega tive affect has some-
t imes been found to have ei ther no effect or a much smaller
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Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 197
effect on the recal l of negat ive material from m emory.
Asymm etric effects of posi tive and negative moods have
been fou nd for retrieval effects (Isen et al. 1978; Nasby a nd
Yando 1982; Teasdale and Foga rty 1979), enc oding effects
(Nasby an d Yando 1982), and state-depend ent learning ef-
fects (Bartlett and Sa ntrock 1979; Bartlett et al. 1982). Isen
(1984) speculated that positive affect is structured in a
broad and extensive manner (i .e., highly interconnected
with other mem ories), w hile negative affect is more nar-
rowly and less w ell connected with other material, and that
specific negative affective states such as an ger and sadness
may be organized separately in memory. This, in turn,
would ma ke i t difficult for any given negative mood to act
as an effective retrieval cue. It is not readily apparent why
negat ive affect would be less wel l connected in mem ory
and positive affect more widely interconnected as Isen
suggests, conside ring that negative affect usually signals
problematic environmental conditions that may require
problem so lving (Schwarz an d Clore 1983; Wegene r et al.
1995). One of the side effects of this hypothesized in-
terconnectedness of positive mem orie s is the greater crea-
tiveness and cognitive flexibility demo nstrated by people
in positive mood s, a topic we revie w briefly later in this
article.
Mood maintenance and repair have also been put for-
ward as exp lanations for the asym metric effects of positive
and negative moods. Ise n (1984) has suggested that happy
individuals attem pt to prolon g their positive affective state
by foc using on the positive aspects of their stimulus (mood
maintena nce), wh ile individuals in a negative mood try to
improve their situation by not focusing on negative mem o-
ries (mo od repair). Isen (1989) noted that in some of the
studies showing sym metrical effects of positive and nega-
tive mood (Bower et al. 1978, 1981), respondents were
instructed to maintain their induced moods, and this may
have discouraged them from engaging in mood repair
strategies. However, the mood repair explanation is not
without problems. If sad respondents engage in mood
repair, why is there no evidence for mood-incongruent
recall effec ts? After all , an effective strategy to improve a
depressed m ood state is to engage in pleasant thoughts and
memories. Yet, evidence seems to show that negative
moo d inhibits the recall of positive mem ories (e.g., Isen et
al. 1978). The comp eting explanations of memo ry struc-
ture differences and m ood maintenance/repair have also
b een u s ed t o ex p l a i n d i f f e r en ces i n i n fo rm a t i o n -
processing strategies of happy and sad individuals, a topic
we d iscuss later in this article.
Mood C ategorization and Creativity
Various studies investigating the influence of mo od on
categorization have found that people in positive mood
states, compared with those in neutral or negative mood
states, te nd to be better at integrating inform ation, finding
relationships am ong stimuli, and at find ing creative solu-
tions (Isen and Daubman 1984; Isen, Daubman, and
Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, and Rob inson 1985;
Isen, Niedenthal, and Cantor 1992; Murray, Sujan, Hirt,
and Sujan 1990). For example, respondents in positive
mood condi t ions tended to group a wider range of neutral
stimuli together (Isen and Daubman 1984). They also
rated words such as
cane ring
and
purse
as being better
exemplars of the category clothing, than did the neutral-
mood respondents . Murray et al . (1990) found that
positive-mood respondents, compared with respondents
in other mood states, formed broader categories when
focusing on similarities among exemplars and narrower
categories when focusing on differences, prompting them
to suggest that what posi tive mood promotes is not broader
categorization but rather cognitive flexibility. Isen et al.
(1985) found that positive-mood respondents tended to
give more unusual responses to neutral words in word
association tests. For example, in response to the word
house
positive-mood respondents were more likely than
were neutral-mood respondents to mention unusual first
associates such as
security residence
and
apartment
sug-
gesting that positive-mood states may influence cognitive
organization, resulting in more flexible interpretation of
relationships among stimuli. This cognitive flexibility also
results in enhanced creativity. Isen et al. (1987) foun d that
respondents in positive-mood states outperf orme d those in
neutral- and negative-mo od states on tests requiring crea-
tive solutions. These researchers suggest that positive-
moo d respondents were better at creative problem solving
since such tasks required the ability to see relatedness
among seemingly unrelated stimuli, and as we have seen
earlier, positive affect results in mo re fle xible cognitive
organization.
Mood Effects on Evaluation
One of the best-recognized and most robust effects of
mood is i ts influence on evaluat ion. Individuals in
positive-mood states have been shown to evalua te stimuli
more positively than individuals in neutral- or negative-
mood states, whether the stimuli being studied are other
people (Clore and Byrn e 1974; Forgas and Bow er 1987),
consumer goods (Isen et al. 1978; Srull 1983), life satis-
faction (Schwarz and Clore 1983), or past life events
(Clark and Teasdale 1982). The reliability of moo d effects
on evaluation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that
evaluat ions of the pleasantness of neutral /ambiguous
stimuli are used as checks for mood manipulation (e.g.,
Isen et al. 1985, 1987). Isen et al. (1978) fo un d that respon-
dents in whom posi t ive mood was induced were more
likely to rate their cars and televisions more favorably
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compared with respondents in neutral-mood states. In the
case of memory-based evaluations, if the recalled infor-
mation is biased by the mood (as discussed in the follow-
ing section), then evaluations that follow will be biased
too. On-line processing of evaluations can also be influ-
enced by mood states through the retrieval of information
congruent with the mood (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway
1994).
A competing explanation based on the feelings-as-
information model (see Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Bless
1991; Schwarz and Clore 1983) suggests that individuals
may assume that their mood states are affective reactions
to the object being evaluated and thus base their evalua-
tions on their affective states. For example, a happy indi-
vidual when asked to evaluate a painting may ask the ques-
tion, How do I feel? and infer that his or her positive
mood is a reaction to the painting and therefore come to the
conclusion that he or she likes the painting. The feelings-
as-information hypothesis suggests that when individuals
attribute their mood state to something else other than the
object being evaluated, the effect of mood on evaluation
should disappear. Schwarz and Clore (1983) found sup-
port for this hypothesis when they showed that although
people called on sunny days reported more life satisfaction
than people called on cloudy days, the differences disap-
peared when the interviewer casually mentioned the
weather to the individuals.