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Article 15

COUNTER-REVOLUTION? ~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiTOULON, 1793 William S. Cormack

and Michael Sydenham

William s. Cormack is a postgraduate research student at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

Michael Sydenham is Professor of modern history at Carleton University, Ottawa, and author of The First French Republic (Batsford, 1974).

ON AUGUST 27TH, 1793, WHEN THE revolutionary republican government )f France was struggling desperately

to defend the frontiers against the armies of the First Coalition, the great naval base of Toulon was suddenly surrendered to the British. Accepting an offer of military alliance from

Admiral Hood, the commander of the British fleet which was blockading the port, the Toulonnais also accepted a restoration of the monarchy, formally recognising Louis XVII, an impris­oned child, as their king. Thus at one stroke the Republic lost its principal naval base and the bulk of its naval forces in the Mediterranean.

This event, which has been called the greatest single disaster to befall France in the whole course of the Revolutionary War, came at a time when the Republic was in imminent danger of defeat and disintegration.

In March, social and religious tension in western France had already led to a savage civil war in which the republi­can armies were repeatedly routed by 'The Royal and Catholic Army of the Vendee'. Moreover, even committed republicans were deeply divided throughout the rest of the country. Where some relatively moderate men held it imperative to maintain order and legality, others believed that the emergency demanded extraordinary and even violent action.

Although there were infinite varia­tions in this widespread conflict, the

'Blowing up the French Ships of War' - a scene fram thesiegej Toulon by the revolutionary government in December 1793, after the port had been surrender to the British four months earlier.

First published in History 1od8»: October 1987, pp. 49-55. Reproduced by kind permission of History Today, Ltd., 83-84 Berwick Street, London WW 3PJ England. 75

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2. RATIONALISM, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND REVOLUTION

moderates were generally strong in "<e Sections, the urban electoral

semblies, whereas the extremists usually dominated the political clubs, the Popular or [acobin Societies. As the military situation deteriorated, as prices soared and food became scarce, this dissension deepened, becoming a struggle to secure or maintain control of the local administrative councils; and a further civil war began in the early summer of 1793, when the more extreme revolutionaries in Paris, notably the Montagnard deputies, seized control of the National Convention. Since this new phase of revolution coincided with the acquisi­tion of power by the moderates in such great cities as Bordeaux, Lyon and Marseille, their attempt to sup­press extremism was easily rep­resented as 'federalism', a repudiation of national authority and national unity, the cardinal revolutionary crime. Furthermore, since men of property, conservatives and even reactionaries were naturally attracted to the side of moderation, the 'Federalist Revolt' was believed by Uontagnards and Jacobins to be the

tcome of a great counter­revolutionary conspiracy.

This whole situation indeed seemed to afford the Royalists and the Allies a wonderful opportunity to act decisively against the Revolution. More particularly, the revolt of Toulon and its subsequent surrender to the British could have provided the Allies

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.. ~ Theexecution of 11/; Louis XVI in

; January 1793 (from a .. contemporary print) . - the signalfor the ~ unleashing of the

most extreme phase of the Revolution,

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Committees during the Reign of Terror (belaw).

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15. Counter-Revolution? Toulon, 1793

The spectacular defection of France's principal

naval base to the British should be seen less as a

master-stroke byforces of reaction and more as the anguished response of local moderates to the Revolution's extremes.

with a strategic foothold in southern France. Admiral Hood certainly felt that he had a tremendous chance, and the British Minister at Genoa, Francis Drake, wrote: 'No event of this war has so much tended to bring about a safe and honourable peace: Conversely, the news from Toulon had immediate repercussions in Paris, where it was one direct cause of the decision of the National Convention to declare Terror to be 'the order of the day'. Used as a dramatic justification

)f the suppression of all opposition .0 the Revolutionary Government, the surrender was seen as a classic example of treasonable reaction. Thus on September 10th [eanbon Saint­Andre, the cold and enigmatic naval expert in the Committee of Public Safety, attributed the disaster to a vast and sinister conspiracy. Linking the treason at Toulon to the Widespread 'Federalist Revolt', and associating this with the activities of those out­lawed deputies whom the Montag­nards had expelled from the Conven­tion, he sawall as allied to Royalist Counter-Revolution.

This contemporary [acobin expla­nation has had great influence on subsequent historical writing. Ultra­royalist historians have seen Toulon's revolt solely in terms of royalism, and the conspiracy thesis has been incor­porated into the standard 'revolutio­nary' accounts of the surrender. Thus a royalist coup is seen as following a 'federalist' rising; with counter­revolution finding willing allies among the officers of the French fleet. .fuch of this is evidently illusory.

There was no connection between the Revolt of the Vendee and the resis­tance of the cities to extreme [acobin­

ism. The complete failure of the royal­ists and the allies to exploit the situa­tion either in western or in southern France is in itself conclusive evidence of the absence of any master-pian, plentiful though incoherent plotting may have been. Moreover, 'royalism' acts as a smoke-screen through which the local conflict that actually led to revolt in towns like Toulon can be seen only in hazy and distorted form. A bitter internal struggle for control of Toulon lay behind its revolt, and it was the interaction of that conflict with parallel divisions in the naval forces, not a 'royalist conspiracy', which explains the surrender to Hood.

In Toulon, positions of local power had been acquired during the Revolu­tion of 1789 by an elite of notables which included wealthy property­owners, merchants and lawyers. Before long, however, the influence of these notables was challenged by elements espousing more radical social and political ideas. If the not­ables initially controlled the Munici­pality of Toulon and the Departmental Administration of the Var, their opponents' power was based in the Club Saint-Jean, the popular society which was affiliated with the [acobins in Paris.

In 1791-92 the situation changed dramatically, for the Jacobins of Toulon won control of the municipal­ity and gained the support of the National Guard. Strife between mod­erates and extremists then focused on a struggle between the Club and the Municipality on the one side and the Departmental Administrators, together with the Judges of the Crim­inal Tribunal, on the other. This con­flict reached a frightful climax in July 1792. The [acobins gathered support from nearby villages and, on July 28th, surrounded the hotel du Depariemeni with an armed force. A contemporary who witnessed the event, Louis Richard, described the appalling massacre which ensued: some administrators were hung from lamp-posts; others were cut to pieces as they fled through the streets; and half the people of Toulon cowered in fright behind closed doors. The kil­lings continued that night and the following day. Then, to fill the vacan­cies in the Department and the Crimi­nal Tribunal, the Municipality named men of its own choice. Thus the Club

came to control all the authorities in Toulon. Yet its victory was not simply one of local [acobins over local offi­cials, for the whole town was deeply divided. July 1792 should be seen as the date upon which Revolutionary extremists won political control of Toulon by violence.

In 1793, however, the extremists' monopoly was broken. In May grow­ing pressure from Marseille, where the moderates' power was increasing steadily, combined with awareness of feelings of outrage in Toulon to move the extremist administration to make a concession. Seventy-three notables, including priests, ex-nobles and many naval officers who had been arrested as counter-revolutionary 'suspects', were released. This at once led many Toulonnais to express the hope that the city's electoral assemblies, the Sections, which had not met since September 1792, would be reopened. The authorities in Toulon, however, were determined not to allow this, being well aware that the assemblies would be a power-base for their opponents. Events at Marse­ille, where the resurgent Sections had first defied the [acobins and then, in June, closed down their Club, well showed what would happen. The Toulon administration therefore announced that the penal ty of death would be exacted of anyone who called for the reopening of the Sec­tions, and on July 12th the [acobin Club staged an armed procession through the city to end all such demands. This march of intimidation proved to be the catalyst for a revolt by the Sections.

Violence and arbitrary measures had characterised the extremist regime in Toulon-and it was the threat of further violence which prompted the [acobins' opponents to act. The evidence strongly suggests that it was a coalition of moderates, both royalist and republican, who engineered the opening of the Sections. Fear of a repetition of the horrors of the previ­ous summer forged this alliance, and its goal was to overthrow the [acobin Club and regain control of Toulon: it was not, as both Montagnards and ultra-royalists later claimed, intended to effect a royalist counter-revolution.

On the evening of July 12th a large group of Toulonnais, fearful of immi­nent violence, gathered at the Church

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2. RATIONALISM, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND REVOLUTION

: the Minimes. A petition demand­ing that the Sections be opened was sigried and presented to the Munici­pality. To the chagrin of the [acobins, the National Guard, which they had

formerly been able to dominate, was virtually unanimous in its support of the demand. The character of the Guard had indeed changed, for many sailors and arsenal workers had been pressed to return to their work in the dockyard, and the shopkeepers and artisans who remained were appar­ently as fearful as anyone of a new round of disorder. Thus, with the support of the National Guard, the Sections were reconstituted, and de­clared themselves permanent,

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entrusting executive decisions to a General Committee of the Sections.

The attitude of the National Guard was but one manifestation of the extent to which extremism had lost popular support. When, expressing the ideas of popular democracy, the [acobins had seized power in 1792, they had been supported by artisans, shopkeepers, sailors and, most importantly, workers from Toulon's Arsenal, the naval base. Soon, how­ever, the new regime had begun to suppress popular effervescence and to demand a return to strict discipline in the dockyards to expedite the mobilisation of the Fleet, which was becoming more vital as war escalated. The alienation of the workers which resulted was then aggravated by a general decline in the standard of living. Furthermore, the regime in Toulon became politically isolated. The triumph of the Sections in Marse­ille, a city with which the people of Toulon had close links, had given the moderates great encouragement; but the Jacobin Municipality, which was also critical of the government of France by a minority of the Conven­tion in Paris, could not afford to dis­avow that government. Having alien­ated its own people by its violence, it had only the backing of a remote national authority, itself of dubious legality.

The first acts of the new Sectionary regime were meant to consolidate its power and to crush opposition. Measures were immediately taken to suppress the [acobin Club. The National Guard was reorganised and the Criminal Tribunal was replaced. Further, the Sections purged the Administrations in Toulon, naming a new Municipality and suspending the Departmental Directory. Yet republi­can forms and institutions were main­tained, and this in itself is an indica­tion that at this time moderates, both republican and royalist, were working together to re-establish regular and responsible government.

Having celebrated their unity with their brothers in Marseille, the men of the Sections in Toulon refused to obey a decree from the Committee of Public Safety ordering the naval embargo of that 'rebellious' city. The Gerieral Committee of the Sections considered the orders to blockade Marseille both illegal and 'contrary to the sacred interest of the Republic',

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15. Counter-Revolution? Toulon, 1793

Dedicated interventionist or pragmatic

ortunist? .miral Sir

Samuel Hood, commander of the British fleet at Toulon.

and it asserted that Toulon had united with Marseille to save France from anarchists. These sentiments, which had- motivated the Sectional revolt and over which Toulon broke with National Authority, were elaborated in an Address to all Citizens of the French Re publtc.' The Address denounced the [acobins in Toulon and presented a tableau of their crimes, which had culminated in their violent opposition to the reopening of the Sections. The Address, however, went beyond the local situation to express the Sections' repudiation of the Revolutionary Government in Paris as illegitimate and bloodthirsty, and to state their devotion to the ideal of a constitutional republic:

Wedesire a republic one and indivisible, and this they have never wanted to organise. We desire a constitution, fruit of wisdom and reflection, and they

propose to us only a phantom of gov­ernment which will propagate factions and anarchy, and leave the ship of State tossed ceaselessly by the tempestuous seas of popular insurrections.

On July 27th, the Marse il la is Departmental Army was routed at Avignon by the troops of the Conven­tion under General Carteaux, who had been sent to crush the rebels. Desperate for supplies and threatened by the approach of the avenging forces of the Revolutionary Government, Marseille dispatched deputies to Admiral Hood, the British naval commander. Hood had been sent into the Mediterranean with a formidable Battle squadron and had been operating off the French coast since mid-July. His mission was to co-operate with Allied forces in the Mediterranean theatre, principally coming to the aid of the Sardinians

and the Kingdom of Naples, and to blockade or defeat the Toulon Fleet. Co-operation with French rebels was an unforeseen possibility. Ostensibly sent to procure free passage for food supplies, the true purpose of the Marseillais delegation to the British fleet was to negotiate for military support. Marseille also encouraged the Toulonnais to enter an alliance with the British, and on August 24th Hood delivered a Proclamation and a Preliminary Declaration to the Gen­eral Committee in Toulon. Although the Admiral was prepared to support the rebel cities with his fleet, his offer was conditional upon their declaring for a restoration of the monarchy:

If a candid and explicit declaration in favour of monarchy is made at Toulon and Marseille, and the standard of roy­alty hoisted, the ships in the harbour dismantled, and the port, and forts [put] provisionallyat my disposition, so as to allowof the egressand regress with safety, the people ofProvenceshall have all the assistance and support his Britannic Majesty's fleet under my command can give.

Hood, like the British Government, saw the restoration of some sort of reformed monarchy as essential to securing a peace settlement. Although it is likely he could not conceive of the option of moderate republicanism, he did not seek to impose a return to the ancien regime, as is shown by his later approval of Toulon flying the Tricolour.

On the night of August 24th the General Committee called an extraor­dinary session of the Toulon Sections to reach a decision on Hood's proposi­tion. A heated debate ensued, great resistance being voiced to the idea of an alliance with the English. How­ever, sentiments of national antipathy and distrust were outweighed by rec­ognition of Toulon's dangerous posi­tion. Food supplies were low. Refugees from Marseille, which would fall to Carteaux the following day, were streaming into Toulon, bringing stories of Republican atrocities which seemed to show what the Toulonnais could expect from a vengeful Convention. Moreover, the Sectionary regime was threatened by internal enemies. Since July Uth and 13th the extremists had been subdued but not eliminated. The danger of a [acobin resurgence in a time of crisis was evident in an abortive uprising by

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2. RATIONALISM, ENLIGHTENMENT. AND REVOLUTION

arsenal workers on August 20th which occurred during the execution ,f two prominent [acobins. The

orkers' Committee in the arsenal, established under the previous regime and deeply suspicious of the Sections, instigated a riot in an attempt to prevent the executions. The significance of the uprising, which was frustrated by the firm stand taken by the National Guard and marine troops, was recognised by the contemporary witness M.Z. Pons: 'How can a city, stripped of every­thing and racked by internal war, withstand a siege?'

Thus the acceptance of British sup­port and the proclamation of the Monarchy should not be seen as a successful Royalist coup. Toulon was isolated and the Sectionary regime was threatened from within by its extremist rivals who were in sym­pathy with the forces of the Conven­tion marching against the city. Adop­tion of the monarchy was conditional on entering into an alliance with Hood, which was the only alternative to submission to the Montagnard government. Moreover, in the Decla­

-'ion accepting Hood's offer, Toulon Jclairrted the constitutional monar­

chy, not a restoration of the ancien regime. Thus it was not ultra-royalists who had prevailed, but the same coalition of moderates, both republi­can and royalist, who had dominated Toulon since July 13th.

The negotiations with Hood, how­ever, encountered a formidable obsta­cle: resistance to the 'treason' from the French fleet. Since the early period of the Revolution the naval base at Toulon and the ships of the French navy at anchor in the harbour had been an arena for the local struggle, in which control of the Mediterranean fleet was one of the highest stakes. Extremists had sought support among sailors and arsenal workers. Moreover, they saw the officers of the navy, most of whom were nobles, as enemies of the Revolution and sup­porters of their moderate rivals. Not only was insubordination encouraged among crews of the squadron, but more direct assaults were made against naval commanders. In r 'ember 1789, the commanding

.er at Toulon, comte d'Albert de \Rions, was threatened by an angry crowd and then arrested by the INational Guard. His successor,

~o .

Jean-Baptiste de Glandeves, was also seized by extremists in 1790, being accused of counter-revolutionary sen­timents. Finally in 1792, following the massacre of Departmental adminis­trators, the naval commander, Joseph, marquis de Flotte, was murdered along with several other officers. Using such violent intimidation, the extremists came to dominate Toulon's naval establishment just as they had the civil authorities.

As well as undermining discipline and attacking officers' authority, the Jacobin regime tried to control all aspects of naval operations in Toulon. In June 1793, they demanded a fleet sortie to challenge Spanish warships, and even urged French sailors to force their commanders into accepting such an operation. The precedent of local interference in the navy was thus set by the [acobins: the Sectionary regime merely continued the pattern, the defiance of the Revolutionary gov­ernment's orders to quarantine Marseille being the principal example of this local interference. When the General Committee was formed it was affiliated with the chiefs of the navy in Toulon: contre-amiral Trogoff, commander of the squadron; contre­amiral de Chaussegros, commandant d'armes: and l'ordonnateur civil Puis­sant. The General Committee claimed that naval officers would not comply with the embargo on Marseille; yet the commanders, whose correspondence was being opened, were apparently under pressure from the Sectionaries. The moderate regime was seeking to control the naval establishment, which had been receiving little sup­port or guidance from Paris.

The defiant opening of the Sections on July 12th and 13th was accepted by the French squadron: by not interven­ing, the navy implicitly supported the coup. This was another indication of how isolated the previous regime had become. However, neither the crews nor all the officers were solidly behind the new one. Recognising its tenuous hold on the Fleet, the General Committee drew up an 'Address to the French Squadron' to try to head off resistance to Hood's offer. The Address stated the necessity of adopt­ing the monarchy and assured the fleet of the generous assistance of the English admiral.

However, this Address and the news that the Sections had agreed to

surrender the fleet to the English was received with shocked indignation. Petitions demanding defence of the port were soon circulated among most of the warships. Moreover, while Admiral Trogoff was in conference ashore, the squadron declared his second-in-command, contre-amiral Saint-Julien, to be commander-in­chief. Saint-Julien then called for the capture of key harbour fortresses held by the Sections. Alarmed by the escalating resistance, the General Committee sent proclamations to the new Admiral and to the entire fleet. The proclamation to the fleet ex­pressed both the justifications for ally­ing with Hood and the ideological motivations behind the moderates' break with the Convention. It stated that Toulon would always hope to take the part of France:

But, citizens, part of the Nation aban­dons us at this moment; they leave us lacking supplies, funds, support of all kinds; armies menace us; and what would be the result of the success of their attacks? Our return under the shameful yoke of the factious and of the assassins.

The document addressed to Saint­Julien informed the admiral that Toulon had made peace with the Engl­ish under honourable conditions for the good of the city and all of France. Furthermore, he was warned that if the Fleet opposed the will of the Sections, 'force would be repelled with force:

Saint-Julien was outraged by this ultimatum and declared that he would bombard the Cityifit attempted to impede his defence against the English. Displaying his determina­tion, he ordered the squadron to anchor in line-of-battle, in position to sweep the harbour entrance. In Toulon, preparations were made in deadly earnest for what appeared an inevitable confrontation.

Yetthe Fleet was still deeply divided and, despite Saint-julien's bellicose manoeuvre, it was not firmly resolved to give battle. Many historians and contemporaries have alleged that this division occurred along regional lines, the crews from Toulon and Mediter­ranean ports supporting the Sections and the English alliance while those from Atlantic ports were prepared to fire on the city. Other accounts suggest that the fleet was divided by political affiliation, with republicans

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15. Counter-Revolution? Toulon, 1793

pitted against royalists, and this interpretation usually portrays loyal republican sailors in conflict with

inter-revolutionary commanders. 10 fact, despite the obsession of the

Montagnard government and many historians with Royalist conspiracy, the divisions in the fleet were not clear-cut. The schisms, which were not fundamentally between officers and men, had been produced by Toulon's indigenous conflict and its continual intrusion into the affairs of the squadron. Moral anguish led to the dispatch of a message to the Gen­eral Committee which illuminates the terrible dilemma in which the Sec­tions had placed the fleet. The crews had sworn never to bear arms against Frenchmen:

But never will we consent to dishonour ourselves by allowingour enemies entr­ance to Toulon so long as we will be present. To reconcileour oaths with the honour which is precious to us and which we desire to preserve untar­nished at peril of our lives, this is what we propose to you.

The truly divisive question was not acceptance or rejection of the monar­chy, but whether or not to follow

.-ulon in its planned surrender to the

.ational Enemy. Saint-Julien attempted to reopen

negotiations, but the General Committee was more determined than ever. The admiral knew while most of the Fleet could be ordered to engage the English, few ships would obey a command to fire on Toulon. As a last expedient to preserve the squad­ron, Saint-Julien proposed that his ships demand from the Toulonnais a safe-conduct to sail to another French port. When this was not accepted unanimously, Saint-Julien personally visited the ships-of-the-line, striving to inspire the crews to fight to the death rather than to allow the enemy to enter the harbour.

But the admiral's time had run out and resistance in the fleet was collaps­ing. During the night of August 27th desertion aboard the French ships became general, so that by dawn sev­eral vessels were almost completely abandoned. As the British fleet off­shore prepared to come into port, Admiral Trogoff raised his command 'lag aboard a frigate in Toulon's inner harbour and signalled the French squadron to rally to him. Saint-Julien made his own signal, ordering the

fleet to clear for action and prepare to repel the enemy. However, the will to resist had evaporated and the war­ships soon Obeyed Trogoffs signal. leaving only three or four deserted vessels in the great harbour. Hood's ships were thus able to drop anchor without firing a shot.

Despite the tremendous strategic opportunity offered by the surrender of Toulon, the British, and the allied troops who supported them, would occupy the port for less than four months. Co-operation between the member states of the coalition against Revolutionary France was never great and the Toulon campaign was no exception. There was constant friction and little co-ordination between Brit­ish, Sardinian, Neapolitan and Span­ish forces. More seriously, the British Government, always reluctant to interfere directly in French internal affairs, vacillated over whether to commit itself fully to the endeavour, with the result that Hood never received necessary reinforcements from England. As for the French army besieging Toulon, it was strengthened considerably in October when the rebellious city of Lyon fell to Republi­can forces: this freed much-needed troops for the struggle to the south.

On December 17th the French, led in part by a young artillery officer named Napoleon Bonaparte, launched a decisive assault on the fortress dominating the high penin­sula which separated the two road­steads to Toulon's harbour. The fleet being vulnerable to Republican can­non fire, Hood was forced to evacuate on December 19th, and he ordered that the French ships be burned before departure. Over seven thousand Toulonnais supporters escaped with the allies, while those remaining faced the terrible ven­geance of the Convention. Perhaps eight hundred 'federalists' perished in mass firing squads between December 20th-23rd, and another three hundred were later tried and executed by a Revolutionary Commission. Toulon itself was given a new Republican name: Port-Ia­Montagne. Thus apart from the long­term consequences of the destruction of the warships (a matter of consider­able complexity) the revolt of Toulon did not prove so disastrous for France as had been feared. There, as else­

where, national unity was reestab­lished by violence and terror.

The story nevertheless illustrates an important and ill-appreciated aspect of the times. Ever since the Revolutio­nary government's condemnation, most accounts of the surrender have portrayed the naval commanders at Toulon (aside from Saint-Julien) as confirmed counter-revolutionaries. In particular, Admiral Trogoff has been charged with obeying secret Royalist orders. The Admiral's anguished correspondence with the Minister of the Navy, however, suggests that the Government was losing control of the navy and that Trogoff was desperate for direction. Since the early days of the Revolution, Paris had neglected the navy in Toulon and had continually upheld the [acobin Club in its conflicts with naval commanders. Trogoff's letters to the minister were not answered and the admiral was left to cope as best he could with the local political situation. He had asked to be replaced - hardly the action of a royalist conspirator ­but carried on in his command despite difficult circumstances and the threat of a superior enemy. Until shortly before the surrender to Hood, Admiral Trogoff hoped to preserve the fleet for France.

As the Revolutionary government's control over the fleet slipped away, local influence had increased. The squadron and naval base at Toulon became a battleground in the city's internal struggle between Revolutio­nary extremists and political moder­ates. Reluctantly, officers and men were drawn in and forced to take sides. Yet the situation involved more than a municipal power struggle; it had become a manifestation of the nation-wide conflict over what France was to become.

This conflict had direct implications for individual loyalty. The Montag­nard government, having rejected legitimacy in favour of authority based upon naked power, had pre­sented the Mediterranean fleet with a dilemma: how to reconcile a sense of' national loyalty to the absence of a consistent or recognisable focus for this loyalty. When faced with their ultimate crisis, both Admirals at Toulon acted from devotion to France. The opposing courses they chose reveal the tragedy of this dilemma.

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