Article 2180 Digest

7/29/2019 Article 2180 Digest

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ARTICLE 2180 (VICARIOUS LIABILITY/ IMPUTED ABILITY)DIGESTED CASES:

PART 1 AND 2 (PARENTS AND GUARDIANS):

Basis Bonus Pater Familias

BAHIA v LITONJUA AND LEYNESMarch 30, 1912

FACTS:

Fausta Litonjua purchased an automobile and later turned it over toInternational garage, which is owned and managed by his son Ramon Ramirez.

As part of the daily operations of his business, Ramirez rented the automobiledonated by his mother to Mariano Leynes. Ramirez also supplied Leynes achauffeur and a machinist for the purpose of conveying to and from Balayanand Tuy.

While in Balayan, the automobile refused to obey the direction of the driver inturning a corner due to a defect in the steering gear. As a consequence, it

rammed into the wall of a house against which the daughter of plaintiff Bahiawas leaning at the time. The automobile crushed the child to death.

Bahia then filed an action against the Fausta (donor of auto), and Leynes,underwho was directing and controlling the operation o f the automobile at the timeof the accident. Ramirez was not made a party.

TC found Leynes liable but dismissed complait against Fausta.

ISSUE: Who should be held responsible

HELD:

SC opined that the action as to Fausta was properly dismissed. Although themother purchased the automobile, she turned it over to the garage of her son

for use therein. The establishment belonged to the son, Ramirez, and he hadthe full management and control of it and received all the profits therefrom.

It appears that Fausta was not aware of the contract with Leynes. While shemay have been in one sense the owner of the machine, that fact does not,under the other facts of the case, make her responsible for the results of theaccident.

The judgment against Leynes must be reversed and the complaint against himmust be dismissed.

While is may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who wasdriving the auto was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derivedfrom the trips of the auto belonged to him and the auto was operated under hisdirection, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for

the negligence of the chauffeur or for the defects in the auto itself.

Under Article 1903 of the CC (now Article 2176), 2 things are apparent:

1. presumption of negligence on the part of the employer whenever there isan injury caused by the negligence employee

2. presumption is juris tantum and may be rebutted.

In the instant case, the death of the child caused by a defect in the steeringgear immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligence inselecting a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain it in good conditionafter selection.

As to selection, SC found that defendant had exercised due diligence when heobtained the machine from a reputable garage, which so far as appeared in

good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,were duly licensed, and apparently thoroughly competent.

The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and itis clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual orconstructive of the defective condition of the steering gear. Sufficient time hadnot elapsed to require an examination of the machine by the defendant as apart of his duty of inspection and supervision.

While it does not appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulationsfor the guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions designed forthe protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that thedeath of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules andregulations. It was caused by a defect in the machine as to which thedefendant has shown himself free from responsibility.

____________________

Bahia vs Litonjua and Leynes

FACTS:On May 14, 1911, Leynes rented a car from International Garage owned andoperated by Ramirez. As per the arrangement, Ramirez would also provide forthe driver and a machinist. Leynes was to used the car to transport people


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from fiesta for profit. The car was actually brand new and was only used a fewhours. On May 16, 2011, while driven on the road,the automobile, by reason ofa defect in the steering gear, refused to obey the direction of the driver in turninga corner in the streets, and, as a consequence, ran across the street and into thewall of a house against which the daughterofBahia was leaning at the time. Thefront of the machine struck the child in the center of the body and crushed her todeath.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leynes is liable in the case at bar.

HELD:

No. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, thechauffeurwho wasdriving the machine was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derivedfrom the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the automobile wasoperated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in makinghim responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in theautomobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishesliability incases of negligence, but also provides when that liability shall cease. It says:The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentionedtherein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family toavoid the damages.

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused bythe negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of alaw that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in theselection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after theselection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and notjuris et dejure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if theemployer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervisionhe has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, thepresumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.As to selection, Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligenceof a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from areputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmenwere likewise selected from astandard garage, were duly licensed bythe Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent.The car had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear

from the evidence that Leynes had no notice, either actual or constructive, of thedefective condition of the steering gear.While it does not appear that Leynes formulated rules and regulations for theguidance of the drivers and gave them properinstructions, designed forthe protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that thedeath of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rulesand regulations. It was caused by a defect in the car as to which Leynes hasshown himself free from responsibility.

_________________________

Elcano V. Hill

Case:This case dwells on the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault ornegligence as a source of obligation.

Quasi delicto and Culpa AquilianaFacts:

An appeal from the order of the RTC of QC in a civil case for therecovery of damages for the killing by Reginald Hill of the son of theplaintiffs, named Agapinto Elcano. Of which, when Reginald Hill wascriminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the groundthat his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupledwith mistakeSpouse Elcano moved for an MR and was dismissed by the court, hencethis appeal at the SC.

Issue:W/N the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal ofReginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was notreversed?

W/N art 2180 of the c ivil code be applicable to Atty Hill?

Ruling:The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same actmachinist come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. Theaction of the agent killeth was unjustified and fraudulent and thereforecould have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet it was held tobe also a proper subject of a civil action under art 1902 of the civil code.Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degreeof negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified onlythrough the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.Art 2177 states that, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequentcivil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence but forthe damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Art 2176 states that, where it refers to fault or negligence covers notonly acts not punishable by law but also acts also criminal incharacter, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.It results therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the Criminalcase has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence thatacquittal is not a bar to the instant action.Under Art 2180, it states that the obligation under art 2176 isdemandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those
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persons of whom one is responsible. The Father or Mother is responsiblefor the damages caused by the minor ch ildren who live in theircompany.Atty. Hill is subsidiarily liable to the acts of his son, although Reginald isemancipated and married, the fact that he is still living with his fatherand receives sustenance from him at the time of the occurrence of thecrime.

The order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed inaccordance with the foregoing opinion.________________________________

Elcano vs Hill

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability

from Crimes

FACTS:Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano).Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lackof intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginaldand his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hillargued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case;

and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the factthat his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article

2180.

HELD:

Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of aseparate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender ina criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty oracquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actuallycharged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would beentitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming theawards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability

referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liabilityfounded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability forthe same act considered as a quasi-delictonly and not as a crime is notextinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal actcharged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Brieflystated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may bepunishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of thechild (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes placeby the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant toArticle 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminateparental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administerhis property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate

or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, orguardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SChowever ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age,Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity._________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NOEL DARILAY (NO DIGEST)________________________PAR. 4 & 5 (EMPLOYER)

JAYME vs APOSTOL (NO DIGEST)_________________

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Phil-American Forwarders

Tags: digest,employer, manager,ncc 2180, philippine rabbit v. phil-american forwarders

,torts

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-

AMERICAN FORWARDERS, ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDOPINEDA1975 / Aquino / Appeal from CFI order

FACTSPineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders]along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL busdriven by Pangalangan. As a result,Pangalangan suffered injuries and the buswas damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earningsamounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American

Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda'semployer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on theground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFIdismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground thathe is not themanager of an establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180.

ISSUE AND HOLDING
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WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment orenterprise" embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the recklessoperation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which thedamage arose. NO.

RATIOThose terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered

from the context of NCC 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanishversion) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictualliability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, inconnection with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may beregarded as an employeeor dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.________________

PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AMFORWARDERS63 SCRA 231AQUINO; March 25, 1975NATUREPetition for review of CFI Tarlac decisionFACTS- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint fordamages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICANFORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the driver, PINEDA.- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am,along the natl highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUSdriven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered injuries andthe bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. This deprived thecompany of earnings of about P8,600.- Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was notPineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissedon the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of actionagainst him.- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was notthe manager of an establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC.- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil- Am is merely a business

conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200,Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the veil of corporatefiction should be pierced and that Phil- Am and Balingit and his wife should betreated as one and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged in theircomplaint.*

ISSUEWON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment orenterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of

a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)

HELDNOVicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art.2180uses the term"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer.

- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictualliability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded asan employee ordependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders , Inc.* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow themto do so now. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in thetrial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate anddistinct from that of theBalingit spouses.Dispositive Lower courts order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.--------------------------------

Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. Ago Medical and EducationalCenter-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM)[GR 141994, 17 January 2005]

Carpio (J): 4 concur

Facts:

Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima(Rima) and Hermogenes Jun Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morningover DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI).Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicolareas. In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposedvarious alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against AgoMedical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC) andits administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC andAngelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint fordamages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. The complaintfurther alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposedexposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such,

destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI asdefendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection andsupervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. On 18 June 1990,FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an Answer alleging thatthe broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimedthat they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the goings-onin AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest. Thereafter, trialensued. During the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. EdmundoCea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss on FBNIs


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behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed aseparate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection andsupervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a broadcaster,the broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergoan apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview. FBNI likewiseclaimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to observe truth, fairness andobjectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent

language. Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ngmga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) accreditation test and to secure a KBPpermit. On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNIand Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcastsare libelous per se. The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that theirutterances were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis.

The broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them to showgood faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed toexercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In absolvingRima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only participation waswhen he agreed with Alegres expos. The trial court found Rimas statementwithin the bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press. Bothparties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on theother, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appealsaffirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court madeRima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos

claim for damages and attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directedagainst AMEC, and not against her. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion forreconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000Resolution. Hence, FBNI filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

Held: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because,unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or suchsentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.

The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify theaward of moral damages. However, the Courts statement in Mambulao that acorporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be aground for the award of moral damages is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless,AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the CivilCode. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases

of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualifywhether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical personsuch as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form ofdefamation and claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast islibelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honestmistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only inmitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduceevidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of somedamages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled

to moral damages. However, the Court found the award of P300,000 moraldamages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts werelibelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to itsreputation. Therefore, the Court reduced the award of moral damages fromP300,000 to P150,000.

__________________________

228 UE Vs. JaderFACTS

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 upto 1988. Inthe first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed totake theregular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given anincompletegrade He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student in UEand onFebruary 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of theincomplete gradegiven him by Professor Ortega which was approved by Dean Tiongson

afterpayment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28,1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Ortega submitted his grade. It wasa grade of five(5), a failing grade. In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the Collegeof Law met todeliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed tograduate.The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates forgraduation forthe Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the

following annotation:JADER ROMEO A.Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 tosubmit transcript with S.O. The name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates forgraduation.


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At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appearedhowever thefollowing annotation:This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidateswhosatisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University

Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture andSports The plaintiff attended the grad ceremonies on 16th of April 1988and during theprogram of which he went up the stage when his name was called,escorted by her(sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood,and his Tasselwas turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by DeanCeledonio arolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relativestookpictures of the occasion. He tendered a blow-out that evening which wasattended

by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in theforthcomingbar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took aleave of absencewithout pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 andenrolled atthe pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of thedeficiencyhe dropped his review class and was not able to take the barexamination. Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he sufferedmoral shock,mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded

feelings andsleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 barexaminations arisingfrom the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral andexemplarydamages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N UE liable for damages

oJader: UE misled me through their negligence.o UE: We never misled you. We have good faith.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYES, UE liable for damages.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution,a contract

of education is entered into between said institution and the student.Theprofessors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are consideredmerely asagents and administrators tasked to perform the school's commitmentunderthe contract. Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of theremovalexamination, particularly at a time when he had already commencedpreparingfor the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for asuccessful

prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right underArticle 19of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undueadvantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of thelaw,together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, wouldrender thetransaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those information and it is only theschoolthat can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules,regulations andpolicies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of

grades.Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way aneducational institution should run its affairs, particularly in discipliningitsprofessors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school'srulesand orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school thatexercises


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general supervision and exclusive control over the professors withrespect tothe submission of reports involving the students' standing. The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation ofanacademic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the

supervision offaculty and student services. He must see to it that his own professorsandteachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university,mustcomply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professorwhofails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptlysubmittinga student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act ofthe

school, being his employer. Considering further, that theinstitution of learning involved herein is auniversity which is engaged in legal education, it should have

practiced what itinculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of gooddealingsenshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in theperformanceof his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observehonesty andgood faith.Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligentlycausesdamage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts bygranting adequate legalremedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which isimpossible for humanforesight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilizedsociety, men must

be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury that otherswill commit no internal aggressions upon them; that theirfellowmen, whenthey act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinaryunderstanding

and moral sense of the community exacts and that those withwhom they dealin the general course of society will act in good faith. Theultimate thing in thetheory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions ofcivilized society.9Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted andbe indifferentto them, for without the latter, the former are useless. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the studentsof theiracademic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the

former. Theconscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of theperson/persons who may be affected by his act or omission cansupport aclaim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard ofcivil obligationscoupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturallycalculated toproduce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essencein theperformance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. Itcannot feign

ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the barexams since thatis precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.graduate. Itfailed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out itsstudent's grades at


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any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlinesset by theSupreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking thebar.Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly informrespondent of the

result of an examination and in misleading the latter intobelieving that he hadsatisfied all requirements for the course. It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson thatdefendantappelleeUniversity had been informed during the deliberation that theprofessor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet,defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failuretocomplete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his namefrom the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse,defendantappelleeuniversity, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failedin Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the"tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the

deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement ritesprogram. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name wasallowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation inthehope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in theremaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, didnot explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something tocomplete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exertanyeffort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.___________________

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VASQUEZ JR.GR No. 132266 | December 21, 1999 | Davide Jr., C.J. | Petition forReview on Certiorari of a Decision of the CA

Petitioners: Castilex Industrial Corp.Respondents: Vicente Vasquez Jr., Luisa So Vasquez & Cebu DoctorsHospital, Inc.

Facts:

On August 28, 1988, at around 1:30 to 2 AM, Romeo So Vasquez wasdriving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He wastravelling counter-clockwise, the normal flow of traffic, but without any

protective helmet or goggles. He was only carrying a Students Permit toDrive.

Benjamin Abad, a Production Manager of Castilex Industries Corp, abusiness engaged in the manufacturing and selling of furniture, was thendriving the company-owned Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up.

Abad drove the said car out of the parking lot of Goldies Restaurantwhere he had some snacks after working overtime and had a chat with his

friends. Instead of going around the Osmea Rotunda, he made a shortcut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to general Maxilom St. orto Belvic St.

In the process, a collision occurred between the motorcycle and ToyotaHi-Luz Pick-up. Vasquez sustained severe injuries as a result of thecollision.

Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern islandsHospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital.Abad signed an acknowledgement of Responsible party where he agreed topay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental chargesVasquez may incur.

A criminal case was filed against Abad which was subsequentlydismissed for failure to prosecute.

The Spouses Vasquez instituted an action for damages against Abad and

Castilex. Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance forthe medical expense given to Romeo Vasquez.

TC: ordered Abad and Castilex to pay jointly and severally the spousesand Cebu Doctors Hospital

CA: affirmed the TCs ruling but held the liability of Castilex as vicariousand not solidary with Abad

Issue:1.WON Castilex is vicariously liable with Abad2.WON Abad was performing acts within the range of his employment

Ratio:

1. YES

The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any

business or industry found in the 5th paragraph1 of Article 2180 should beinterpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to beengaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his

employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.

1 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees

and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,

even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.


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Distinctions between paragraph 42and 5

Paragraph 4 Paragraph 5

owners and managers of anestablishment or enterprise

employers in general,whether or not engaged inany business or industry

covers negligent acts ofemployees committed eitherin the service of thebranches or on the occasionof their functions

encompasses negligent actsof employees acting withinthe scope of their assignedtask

expansion of paragraph 4 inboth employer coverage andacts included.

negligent acts of employees,whether or not the employeris engaged in a business orindustry, are covered solong as they were actingwithin the scope of theirassigned task, even thoughcommitted neither in theservice of the branches noron the occasion of theirfunctions.

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer isliable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of hisassigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employeerelationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold theemployer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of hisassigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only thenthat the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of duediligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

2. NO

There is no absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated whichwill furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given

2The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise arelikewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in theservice of the branches in which the latter are employed or on theoccasion of their functions.

moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in theoperation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employerbecause of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varieswith each state of facts.

In Filamer Christian vs. IAC, the SC held that:

acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes"any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the

employer or for the account of the employer at the time of theinfliction of the injury or damages.

The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of theinjurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liabilityfor the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he wasoperating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.

Operation ofEmployers

Motor Vehicle inGoing to orFrom Meals

Operation ofEmployers

Vehicle in Goingto or From Work

Use ofEmployers

Vehicle OutsideRegular

Working Hours

employee is not

ordinarily actingwithin the scopeof hisemployment inthe absence ofevidence of somespecial businessbenefit to theemployer

traveling to and

from the place ofwork is ordinarilya personalproblem orconcern of theemployee, andnot a part of hisservices to hisemployer

employer is not

generally liable forthe employee'snegligentoperation of thevehicle during theperiod of permissive use,even where theemployercontemplates thata regularlyassigned motorvehicle wil l beused by theemployee for

personal as wellas businesspurposes andthere is someincidental benefitto the employer

evidence that byusing the

in the absence ofsome special


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employer'svehicle to go toand from meals,an employee isenabled to reducehis time-off andso devote more

time to theperformance ofhis dutiessupports thefinding that anemployee isacting within thescope of hisemployment whileso driving thevehicle

benefit to theemployer otherthan the mereperformance ofthe servicesavailable at theplace where he is

needed, theemployee is notacting within thescope of hisemployment eventhough he useshis employer'smotor vehicle

special errandor roving

commissionemployee

continues in theservice of hisemployer until heactually reacheshome

employer is notliable, even if theemployee isdeemed to beacting within thescope of hisemployment,when theemployee has leftthe direct route of

his work or backhome and ispursuing apersonal errand ofhis own

Although the aforementioned principles of Americam common

law are based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, they are stillapplicable in this jurisdiction.Before the collision occurred, Abad had snacks and a chat with hisfriends at Goldies Restaurant, which is 7 km away from Castilex. FuenteOsmea is known as a lively place where prostitutes, pimps and drugaddicts littered.At the time of the vehicular accident, Abad was with a woman in his carwho shouted: Daddy, Daddy!.

Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personalpurpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicularaccident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond thenormal working hours.

Hence, Castilex has no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of agood father of the family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.

Dispositive: Petition is granted. CA decision and resolution is affirmed withmodification that Castilex is absolved from liability._____________________

Marquez vs Castillo

68 Phil 568

Torts and Damages Employer Not Liable When Injury Did Not Occur in

the Course of Duty or Service

On April 30, 1937, Mariano Capulong, a chauffeur, without the knowledge of his

employer, Bernardo Castillo, drove hisbosss car. Capulong ran over Fernanda

Marquez thereby killing her. The heirs of Marquez sued Capulong and the latter

wasconvicted. As he was insolvent, the heirs of Marquez sued Castillo for

damages caused by his employees negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Castillo is liable for damages for the negligence of

his chauffeur.

HELD: No. it was established that Castillo exercised due diligence in employingCapulong; that he had no knowledge of the fact that Capulong drove the car

without his permission; that Castillo is not engaged in any kind of business or

industry on or about April 30, 1937, the date of the accident; that Castillo was

not riding in the car at the time of the accident.


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It is clearly shown that the accident did not occur in the course of the

performance of the duties or service for which Capulong had been hired. Castillo

did not hirehim to do as he pleased, using Castillos car as if it were his own. His

duties and service were confined to drivinghismasters car as the latter ordered

him, and the accident did not take place under said c ircumstances. The

subsidiary civil liability of the master, according to the provisions of Article 103 of

said Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only when the servant,subordinate or employee commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual

performance of his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby

rendering him incapable of satisfying by himself his own civil liability, this is not

so in the case at bar.

___________________

(1) MERITT vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part ofCalle Padre Faura, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that itwould be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and

the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long beforereaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, withouthaving sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff,who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post placethere.By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, hewas suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the sameplace and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and hewas entirely unconscious. According to the various merchants who testified aswitnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident wasexcellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed,his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lostthe agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before theaccident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could notnow earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he

had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency.We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to theeffect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance ofthe General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent oremployee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Governmentis legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads: An Act authorizing E. Merritt tobring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing theAttorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. By authority of the UnitedStates, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that: SECTION 1. E. Merritt ishereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manilaagainst the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibilityfor the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General

Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of thePhilippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on thebehalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at thesame.Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunityfrom suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in orderto fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and theambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages,if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." In theUnited States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by itsofficers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so bylegislative enactment, is well settled.As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state

where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract - By consenting tobe sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not therebyconcede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, orextend its liability to any cause not previous ly recognized.In determining the scope of this act - It simply gives authority to commence suitfor the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere inthe act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the dispositionof the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amountof damages is the only question to be settled.It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the PhilippineIslands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the SupremeCourt of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they actas special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, andthat the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such anagent.

__________________

E. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

Facts: When riding a motorcycle, plaintiff E. Meritt, who is a contractor, had acollision with the General Hospital Ambulance without any sound of whistle orhorn. By reason of the collision, the plaintiff was severely injured which resultedhim to be slightly deaf and had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/e-merritt-vs-government-of-philippine.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/e-merritt-vs-government-of-philippine.html


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condition. In addition, the accident affected his work as a contractor because,prior to the collision, the plaintiffs mental and physical condition was excellent.The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanentinjuries and the loss ofwages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. By authority ofthe United States, an Act was enacted in favor of the plaintiff, authorizing thelatter to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands andauthorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court .

Issue: Whether or not the Government is legally liable for damages resultingtherefrom and, if so, could it be extended to any case not previously recognized

Held: According to Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code, in a damage case, theresponsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a specialagent. The evidence showed that the chauffeur, who acted negligently, of theambulance was not such an agent. The court held that the judgment must bereversed and herein case rests solely with the Legislature and not with the Court._____________________________________ROSETE V AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS:

Inside the building used by Emergency Control Administration as a bodega in

which oil and gasoline were stored,Jose Frayno ignited his cigarette-lighter near a 5-gallon drum into which gasolinewas being drained. A fire erupted burning the bodega as well as neighboringhouses including the house and personal property of Rosete.The storing of gasoline and other combustible materials requires the securing oflicense and permit and ECA was not granted such permit.

ISSUE: WON Govt is liable for the damages caused by the fire

HELD: NO

RATIO: Art 1903 par 5 applies in this caseThe State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent but notwhen the damage should have been caused

by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which

case the provisions of the preceding articleshall be applicableThere was no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to ECA wasdone by a special agent. The officers of ECA did not act as special agents ofgovernment within the meaning in Art 1903 when they stored gasoline inthe warehouse of ECA. Thus the Govt is not liable.

DISSENT: Perfecto, J

ECA is a special agent of the Govt since it was organized by the govt for thesame substantial purpose as Phil Relief and Rehabilitation purposes.All persons and entities acting by commission of the govt such as governmentalenterprises and other organs of the govt created for activities ordinarily ofungovernmental nature, are special agents. Thus, the government is liable forthe damages caused by ECA._________________________

193 Fontanilla vs. Maliaman | ParasG.R. No. L-55963, December 1, 1989|FACTS

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickupowned and operatedby respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agencybearingPlate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee ofsaid agencyas its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla,son of hereinpetitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along theMaharlikaHighway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto

Deligo wereinjured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital fortreatment.Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospitalwhere hedied. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National IrrigationAdministrationwho, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver andwhoqualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent afterhaving passedthe written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance ofvehicles given

by National Irrigation Administration authorities. This petition is an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56)instituted bypetitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before thethen Courtof First Instance of San Jose City, for damages in connection with thedeath of their


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son resulting from the accident. The trial court rendered judgment which directed respondent NationalIrrigationAdministration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses topetitioners Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said

decision to theCourt of Appeals Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appealscase,petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the award of moral damages, exemplary damages andattorney's fees islegally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delictwhichresulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYes.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being faultor negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault ornegligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between theparties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions ofthis Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employeesand household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,even the though the former are not engaged in any business orindustry.The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a specialagent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official towhom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is providedin Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortiousacts of special agents only.2. Its private or business aspects (as when i t engages in privateenterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961,Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ). In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for thedamage caused by the

tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State hasvoluntarily assumedliability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if apublic official,must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but thatsuch taskmust be foreign to said o fficial's usual governmental functions. If theState's agent isnot a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmentalfunctions,then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be heldliable assuch for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a privateindividual fora special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent withinthe meaningof the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.) Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by thegovernment,are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character,and so the Stateis immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which mightas well beprovided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collectsrevenues from it,the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may beliability forthe torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the governmentexercisingproprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601 Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridicalpersonality and not

a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate bodyperforming nongovernmentalfunctions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by theaccident resulting from the tortious act of i ts driver-employee. In thisparticular case,the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such,it becomes


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answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, ispredicated uponthe existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. Thenegligence referredto here is the negligence of supervision. It should be emphasized that the accident happened along theMaharlika NationalRoad within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Consideringthe fact thatthe victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there isa strong fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage asabove-described andthe fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite asearly aspossible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumpedas wouldhave been their normal and initial reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver forthe reason thatthey were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet thesupervisor ofthe group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observethe proper andallowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligenceis furtheraggravated by their desire to reach their destination without evenchecking whetheror not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thusshowingimprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and thesupervisor inthe group. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to payhereinpetitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death ofFranciscoFontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of theaforenameddeceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplarydamages andattorney's fees of 20% of the total award._________________

FONTANILLA v MALIAMAN

FACTS:

National Irrigation Administration was created for the purposeof constructing, improving, rehabilitatingand administering all national irrigation systems of the Philippines.NIAs driver caused the death of Fontanilla due to the fault and/ornegligence. His parents fled a suit for damages.

ISSUE: WON NIA is liable

HELD:

YES. NIAs functions are basically proprietary and incidentallygovernmental. RA 3601 and PD 552 provide that NIA is a bodycorporate invested with a corporate personality and distinct from thegovernment. So, it may be sued. At the time, the driver was an agent.Where a private individual is commissioned to do a special task, hemay be considered a special agent within the contemplation of theprovision.

NOTES:

The state agencies or subdivisions, in the pursuance ofproprietary functions, are akin to any other private corporation.They may be sued for:- torts committed by them (art 2176) or- torts committed by their employees (art 2180). As long as it is performing proprietary functions, it can be heldliable for the acts of its employees, both regular and special. Feliciano: State refers to judicial persons meaning the government ofthe Philippines; hence it excludes GOCCs withoriginal functions. The dichotomy makes the law unstable!

_________________________PAR. 7 (TEACHERS / SCHOOL)

Amadora v. CA [1988]Cruz, J.

Facts:


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April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high school graduating student ofColegio de San Jose-Recoletos went to school to finish a Physics experiment.However, while he was in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito Daffon fired agun that hit him. He died at 17. Daffon was convicted of homicide thrureckless imprudence.

Amadoras parents filed a civil action for damages under CC Art. 21803

against the school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher,

plus Daffon & 2 other students thru their parents. Complaint againststudents was later dropped.

CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum of P294,984.00 (deathcompensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,moral damages, exemplary damages & attorneys fees)

CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely.1. As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art. 2180 is not applicable

since the school was an academic institution of learning & not a schoolof arts & trades.

2. Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the incidentsince the semester had already ended.

3. No clear identification of the fatal gun.4. Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury.

Petitioners claim their son was still under schools custodybecause he went to school to comply w/a requirement for graduation.

Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physicsreport & he was no longer in their custody since the semester was over.

A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, fromJose Gumban on April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later onreturned to Gumban w/o reporting such to the principal or taking furtheraction. Gumban was one Daffons companions when the incident happened.Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/c respondentsrebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one and the same.

ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. NO.

Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of BalintawakElementary School & a boy scout attended a Rizal Day parade on city schoolsupervisors instructions. Afterwards, Capuno boarded a jeep & drove itrecklessly that it turned turtle killing 2 passengers. SC exculpated school inobiter dictum (it was not party to the case) since it was not a school of arts& trades. Some justices dissented claiming that liability under CC Art. 2180applied to teachers in general & heads of schools of arts & trades inparticular.

3Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments ofarts & trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils & students

or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. (CC Art. 2180)

Mercado v. CA: a student cut a classmate w/a razor blade atthe Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde ruling reiterated. Custodyrequirement was defined as a situation where student lives & boardsw/teacher such that control, direction & influences on pupil supersede thoseof parents. Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by aclassmate w/fist blows in the lab of Manila Technical Institute. Court ruled

that even if offender was already of age & not boarding in the school, thehead & teacher-in-charge were solidarily liable w/him. Custody was definedas the protective & supervisory custody that school, its heads & teachersexercise over students for as long as they are at the attendance in the schoolincluding recess time. No such requirement as actual living & boarding in theschool before such liability is attached. It set aside Mercado ruling. Evenstudents of age were still covered by provision since theyre equally incustody of school & subj to its discipline.

CC Art. 2180 applies to all schools whether academic or non-academic. In the former, teacher-in-charge of student is the personresponsible (general rule). Whereas in the latter (arts & trades), it is thehead (exception). SC agrees w/dissent in Exconde, saying that while thechild is in school, parent is not supposed to interfere w/discipline of schoolnor w/authority & supervision of teacher. W/o authority, there can be noresponsibility. No reason to differentiate the vigilance expected from

teachers from academic institutions and non-academic ones. History ofdisparity:a. head of school of arts & trades exercised closertutelage over his students who apprenticed to their master, the schoolhead. He was personally involved in teaching his students who usuallyboarded w/him & thus he exercised constant control, supervision &influence.b. Head of academic school: exercised onlyadministrative duties over teachers who were directly dealingw/students. Thus, teacher is liable.

CC Art. 2180s custody requirement is notlimited to boarding w/school authorities. Its not co-terminous w/sem. Itincludes periods of registration or before graduation during w/c, student isstill subj to the disciplinary authority of the school. There is custody for aslong as hes under control & influence of school & w/in its premises

regardless of time and for as long as student can show that he is in school inpursuance of a legitimate student objective, exercise & enjoyment of alegitimate student rt/privilege. It includes relaxing in the campus.

Under similar circumstances, teacher-in-charge should be liable for his students torts. He need not be physicallypresent or in a position to prevent the injury. Custody refers more to hisinfluence on the child & the discipline instilled. Applicable as well to head ofschool of arts & trade. Teacher is liable regardless of students age. Teacher


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should be liable & not school itself unless he can prove that he exercised thediligence of a good father such as by employing sufficient no. of securityguards, etc. This defense is made available to the teacher considering thathis responsibility/influence over the child cannot be equated to that of theparents. Parents can expect more obedience from the ch ild since kid dependsmore on parents. Parent can instill more lasting discipline on child thanteacher & thus, should be held to a greater accountability for tort committed

by kid. WRT liability for kids of the age of majority, leniency should beobserved in assessing teachers responsibility considering that parents are nolonger liable for the acts of their emancipated children.

HOLDING: Petition denied.

1. Rector, principal & dean not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge.They only had general authority over students.2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by evidence. Just because Amadorawent to school in connection w/a physics report doesnt necessarily makephysics teacher the teacher-in-charge. Besides, theres no showing that theteacher was negligent in any manner. He was not even required to report toschool on that day thus, his absence cannot be considered as negligence. Onthe contrary, they have proven that they exercised due diligence.

3. Dean of boys no proof that the gun he released was the same gun thatkilled Amadora.4. School only teacher or head is responsible___________________________

PALISOC VS BRILLANTESG.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971| 41 SCRA 557

FACTS Deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon wereclassmates at the Manila Technical Institute, and on the afternoon of March 10,1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmateDesiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. Desiderio

Cruz and Virgilio L.Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely lookingon at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like aforeman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face.Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which wasfollowed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoidthe fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisocstumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc

became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was notrevived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regainedconsciousness; finally he died. Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of the deceased had filed on May 19, 1966, theaction below for damages. Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are:"Defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave riseto his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute;

the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant SantiagoM. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and thedefendant Virgilio L.Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila TechnicalInstitute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was dulyincorporated." The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delictunder Article2176 of the Civil Code however absolved from liability the three other defendantsofficials of the Manila Technical Institute citing that Article 2180 is not applicablein the case at hand.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the trial court erred in absolving the defendant-school officials.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYES, DEFENDANTS-SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE LIABLE UNDER ART.2180 The lower erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the groundthat they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the studentwhoinflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded withhis teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, thephrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in theircustody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and itsheads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they areat attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the lawthat requires that forsuch liability to attach the pupil or student whocommits the tortious actmust live and board in the school, as erroneouslyheld by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) onwhich it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the presentdecision. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of theschool must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delictoftheir codefendant Daffon in the latter having caused the death of his classmate,the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from thefightbetween the protagonists-students could have been avoided, hadsaiddefendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate


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supervisionover the activities of the students in the school premises toprotect theirstudents from harm, whether at the hands of fellowstudents or other parties.At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of suchliability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family toprevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision,

said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .____________________________St. Marys Academy vs. CarpetanosGR No. 143363, February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. SherwinCarpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, theyrode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to LarayanElementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year oldstudent of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a recklessmanner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 ofthe Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing aminor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in thejeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considerednegligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligenceneeds to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and naturalsequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parentsof the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. Thespouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was notthe reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide ofthe jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minorto drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over whichthe school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the deathresulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, wouldprimarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while itis being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of thevehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.

Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of thedefendants excluding herein petitioner.___________________________

St. Mary's Academy vs. Carpitanos

Efficient Intervening Cause- is one that destroys the causal connectionbetween the negligent act and the injury thereby negates liability

Facts:St. Mary conducted an enrolment drive and as part of this drive, they campaignto different schools for prospective students. On that fortunate day, one namedSherwin Carpitanos--student of St. Mary and part of the campaign group went toa particular school with his classmates riding in a mitsubishi jeepney owned byone named Vivencio Villanueva and driven by his classmate who was a minor.Allegedly the latter droved the jeepney in a reckless manner and as a result thejeepney turned turtle.As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to the injuries he sustained from theaccidentThe lower court held St. Mary solidarily Liable under article 218 and 219 of the

family code and the guardians of the minor driver and the owner of the jeepneyas subsudiarily liable. on appeal to CA the owner of the jeepney was freed fromliabilities.Issue/s: (1) WON St. Mary is liable

(2) WON Vivencio Villanueva is Liable

Held:

SC reversed the decision and did not hold St. Mary liable but instead heldVivencio Villanueva--the owner of the mitsubishi jeep liable.Ratio: In order that St. Mary be liable, there must be a finding that the act oromission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury causedbecause the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shownthat the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequenceof the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury mustbe a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficientcauses. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of theinjury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right ofaction unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And theproximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuoussequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, andwithout which the result would not have occurred.
http://kncolle.blogspot.com/2012/07/st-marys-academy-vs-carpitanos.htmlhttp://kncolle.blogspot.com/2012/07/st-marys-academy-vs-carpitanos.htmlhttp://kncolle.blogspot.com/2012/07/st-marys-academy-vs-carpitanos.htmlhttp://kncolle.blogspot.com/2012/07/st-marys-academy-vs-carpitanos.html


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In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner wasthe proximate cause of the death of the victim.Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate causeof the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving ofJames Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor JamesDaniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched

Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession andcontrol of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, aminor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minordriver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must bepinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. MarysAcademy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote causeand the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or thedetachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

(2) Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehiclewas respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. Wehave held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for publicservice, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons forinjuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or

streets.

Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and therespondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachmentof the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registeredowner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death ofSherwin Carpitanos._________________

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted tojoin a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo andLilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join butmerely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directivethat he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion ofthe teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, oneof the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, includingFerdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself whodrowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner andsome of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaintagainst the school.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING:Petition granted.

RATIO:

Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, theact or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employeewas in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, theteachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks.What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permitfrom the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge bypetitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent tothe holding of the same.No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant theaward of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the sectionwhere Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good fatherof a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students whojoined the picnic.

Philippine School of Business Administration et al vs. Court of Appeals etalDate (4 February 1992) | Ponente: Padilla

Overview: PSBA is being made to account by the parents of its student, CarlitosBautista, who was stabbed to death by assailants from outside the school insidethe school premises. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC decision to deny

the schools motion to dismiss was correct, affirming the order, following the ruleon quasi-delicts (NCC Arts. 2180 and 2176). The Supreme Court, however, ruledthat the law on quasi-delicts does not apply, as there exists a contract betweenschool and student including an obligation to safety; it rules that torts may bethe acts that break a contract and thus liability may still be incurred by theschool following NCC Art. 21.

Topic: Obligations; quasi-delicts; torts

Statement of the Case

- The death of one Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the PhilippineSchool of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted his parents to file asuit for damages resulting from negligence, recklessness, andinsufficiency of safety precautions against said school, specifically itsofficials, at the RTC of Manila, which was presided over by Judge Regina


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Ordonez-Benitez. As defendants, PSBA et al sought the dismissal of thecase on the ground that PSBA, as an academic institution, is beyond theambit of Article 2180 of the NCC, under which they are being sued. TheRTC denied their motion to dismiss, then the subsequent motion forreconsideration.

- Defendants-turned-petitioners assailed the RTCs dispositions before theCA, but the appellate court upheld the ruling given by the RTC, and

denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration, bringing theappellants to the Supreme Court.

Statement of Facts

- 30 August 1985: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed to death on the secondfloor balcony of PSBA. Bautista was a student in said school, a juniorcommerce major. It was established that the assailants were outsiders,not enrolled nor affiliated with the school.

o His parents (the private respondents Segunda [?] and Arsenia),

filed suit for damages against the school and the followingschool officials: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino(Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col.Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and Lt. M. Soriano (AssistantChief of Security). The last, during the proceedings, resignedfrom his position.

- 8 December 1987: The respondent Manila RTC, having overruled instantpetitioners contentions, denies their motion to dismiss the case.

- 25 January 1988: The RTC dismisses the motion for reconsideration aswell.

- 10 June 1988: The CA affirms the trial courts orders; petitioners file amotion for reconsideration.

- 22 August 1988: The CA denies the motion for reconsideration.

Applicable Laws:

- Art. 1157(5), NCC: Obligations arise from:(5) Quasi-delicts

- Art. 1162, NCC: Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall begoverned by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, andby special laws.

- Art. 2176, NCC: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for thedamage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existingcontractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and isgoverned by the provisions of this Chapter.

- Art. 2180, pars. 1, 7, NCC: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 isdemandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also forthose of persons for whom one is responsible.

X X X

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable fordamages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as theyremain in their custody.

- Art. 21, NCC: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to anotherin a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policyshall compensate the latter for the damage.

Issues:1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in affirming the decision of the RTC not

to dismiss the case against PSBA?

Held Rationale:

1. Yes.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court disagrees with the CAs basis for thedecision being anchored on Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the NCC. The SCagrees with the CA that the case must be remanded to the RTC fortrial on its merits. But the reason prov ided by the CA, which is thatin light of previous jurisprudence and the fact that Article 2180 is aholdover from the Spanish era, the school administrators should bemade liable for damages until they prove themselves absolved ofliability in trial by merits, is erroneous. The SC points out that Arts2180 and 2176 establish the rule ofin loco parentis (in place of theparents Mikey) and that in the discussions provided in the cases

cited by the CA, it was clear that the liability of the school existsonly for the acts performed by students while in school custody,something which was established to have not been the case here.Thus the rule on quasi-delicts does not apply.

The SC rules that despite the inapplicability of the rule on quasi-delicts, the school is still liable because all academic institutionsenter into a contract with all its enrollees. Part of the obligations ofthis contract is the providence of an adequate atmosphere of safetyfor its students (x x x no student can absorb the intricacies ofphysics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts andother sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in theair or where there looms around the school premises a constantthreat to life and limb.). Obligations from quasi-delict or tort* donot govern, since these are extra-contractual and a contract has

been made here. However, inAir France vs. Carroscoso, it wasestablished that liability from tort may still exist even if there is acontract, because the act that breaks the contract may also be atort. This rule obeys Art. 21. The SC here dictates that a trial isnecessary in order to determine whether such willful negligencereally lies, in order that liability should be properly determined.

Judgment: Case remanded to Manila RTC, the court of or igin.


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Notes:* tort. 1. A civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form ofdamages; a breach of duty that the law imposes on everyone in the samerelation to one another as those involved in a given transaction. 2. (pl.) Thebranch of law dealing with such wrongs. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed.)

_______________________197 Phil. School of Business Administration v CA | PadillaFebruary 4, 1992 | 205 SCRA 729

FACTS

A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista whileon thesecond-floor premises of the Philippine School of BusinessAdministration (PSBA)prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the RTC fordamages against thesaid PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third yearcommerce course at

the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of theschool'sacademic community Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and its president, VP,treasurer, and Chiefof Security Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought toadjudge them liablefor the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,recklessness andlack of security precautions, means and methods before, during andafter the attackon the victim. Petitioners herein sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that

since they arepresumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaintstates no causeof action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effectthat academicinstitutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit o f the rule in theafore-stated

article The TC overruled the petitioners contention and dismissed theirpetition. This wasaffirmed by the CA The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on thelaw ofquasidelicts,as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the court erred in dismissing the petition.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYes. (But the court did not agree with the premise of the CA forholding such)

Article 2180, in conjunction with Articl

Documents

Article 2180 Digest