Article III - Bill of Rights Digests Part 1

Article 3, Primacy of Human Rights

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO

GR 104768, July 21, 2003 This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Sandiganbayan resolution dismissing petitioners amended complaint and ordering the return of the confiscated items of Elizabeth Dimaano Facts: 1. President Cory Aquino issued EO No. 1 after the EDSA revolution

x EO 1 created the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies. The PCGG then created the AFP Anti-graft Boad to investigate corrupt AFP Personnel.

2. The AFP Board investigated the unexplained wealth of Josephus Ramas x Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of former

President Ferdinand Marcos. 3. Pursuant to said investigation, the constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on

Dimaanos premises. x The search warrant was for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition but the team

confiscated firearms and ammunition, along with items not included in the warrant such as monies of P2.8M and $50,000, jewelry and land titles.

4. The AFP Board then recommended that Ramas be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan x The case was for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act and RA 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. Accordingly, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against Ramas and Dimaano before the Sandiganbayan.

5. Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of merit x The grounds for the dismissal were: (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private

respondents and (2) the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 6. Petitioner appealed before the SC arguing that the search was conducted during a revolutionary

government bound by no constitutional limitation. x During the interregnum, the exclusionary right from illegal seizure granted to the respondents

by the Bill of Rights was inoperative. Issue: W/N the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible as evidence. Held: No. 1. Although the Bill of Rights was inoperative during the interregnum, as the de jure government, the

Philippine revolutionary government was still bound by treaty obligations under the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his property. Although it is not intend as a legally binding document, the court has interpreted the Declaration as a part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

2. While conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, the sequestration orders remained valid as they were expressly recognized upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.

3. During the interregnum, the directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as they did not exceed the authority granted by the revolutionary government and did not violate the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since they did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specifically stated the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items in the warrant. However, the constabulary seized items not in the warrant.

4. The warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The raiding team thus had no legal basis for the seizure of the items. Such actions amounted to warrantless search and seizure, exceeding its authority. The seizure was therefore void and the items must be returned to Dimaano.

Article 3, Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement

MIJARES vs. RANADA G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005

This is a petition for certiorari to reinstate a dismissed civil case filed by the petitioners in the RTC of Makati. The case was initially a prayer to enforce the awarded damages given by the US District Court in Hawaii against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. The Respondent Judge moved to dismiss the case because of a procedural flaw in the payment of filing fees. Facts:

1. Petitioners are victims of human rights violations during the Marcos regime. They filed a civil case against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos to claim for damages as a result of the abuses (arbitrary detention, torture, rape in the hands of police or military forces) during his presidency.

2. May 9, 1991 - A complaint was filed with the US District Court, District of Hawaii. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts jurisdiction over

the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law. It was an action for and on behalf of a class of individuals who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups.

February 3, 1995 - The US District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the petitioners a total of $1,964,005,859.90 against the estate of Marcos.

The Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 3. May 20, 1997 - Petitioners filed a Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the

Final Judgment. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.

The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410.00 as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees.

Respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money. According to the Judge, the estimated proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472,000,000 which obviously had not been paid.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Judge Ranada denied. From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the civil case by the Respondent Judge was proper because of the petitioners failure to pay the proper filing fees

Held: NO. The petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Respondent Judge are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. A new order REINSTATING the civil case is issued. No costs. The relevant question related to the issue is whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money claim against an estate not based on judgment" The Court ruled in the negative and said that:

Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.

A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. In special proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the property. The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.

Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos estate.

Relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. To further answer the issue, the Court discussed the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in within our jurisdiction:

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations in international law have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries (Hilton v. Guyot, Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.)

Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

The applicability of Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was called upon by the Court to emphasize on the effect of foreign judgment being enforced in our land. However, it also asserts that the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

There is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the "presumptive evidence of a right." Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a

quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.

The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property." Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint. OTHER THINGS DISCUSSED IN THE CASE (Dean or Atty. Ingles might ask these other details to know if you really read the case) Petitioners invokes Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty," a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust. Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right. It is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds or unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case. The Commission on Human Rights, as an intervenor, urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights. On what court has jurisdiction over the money claim - If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of (like the enforcement of a foreign judgment), the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Article 3, Section 1 !PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING

MILLS CO. INC. G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973. !

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which dismissed the motion for reconsideration for being late by 2 days as well as the decision of the lower court deciding in favor of the company in accordance with Article 3 Section 1. !Facts

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) a union of workers held a strike in front of Malacanang against the abuse of the Pasig police.

Before such strike, some of the petitioners, Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Pacientee, Bonifacio Vacuna Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod, had meetings with Phil Blooming regarding the coming strike

The first meeting occurred where the company asked the representatives of PBMEO to cancel the strike because it would interrupt the normal course of business of the company where in the representatives contended that the strike was their constitutional right to freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances and stressed out that the strike is not against the company but rather against the Pasig police

A second meeting occurred where the company allowed such strike to ensue on the condition that the first shift of employees would not continue with the strike and come to work, without which such workers would be terminated by the company on the basis of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides a clause of No Strike, No Lockout.

The Company terminated the heads of the PBMEO union. The lower court decided in favor of the company where the petitioners were found guilty

of bargaining in bad faith and that their motion for reconsideration was late by 2 days submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations. !

Issue 1) Whether or not Phil Blooming validly terminated the petitioners on the basis of a violation of the CBA of the company and 2) Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations dismissal of the motion for reconsideration is to be reversed. !Held No, the petitioners were not validly terminated and the Supreme Court may set considering the circumstances involving the case at bar, the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration by the Court of Industrial Relations on the basis of being late be set aside. The primacy of human rights is above property rights and such human rights do not prescribe. Also the strike was not in violation of the CBA of the company because it was not against the company. The company must be the protectors of their employees but rather in the case at bar, it seemed like they were looking for a chance to reduce such personnel. They are guilty of unfair labor practice. The dismissal of the Court of Industrial Relations of the motion for reconsideration because of the prescription of 5 days upon the notice and 10 days to arguments that support such motion was the reason. Considering the nature of the offense the Supreme Court allowed such negligence to prosper hence the reversal of the decision and the reinstatement of the petitioners with the proper pay from the moment they were dismissed minus the one day of strike as well as the earnings which they might have earned during their separation from other sources. !WHEREFORE, the primacy of human rights over property rights may be considered in lieu with the enforcement of the due process of the law, as seen in this case, with regard to the tardiness of the submission of the motion for reconsideration.

Paula TantocoHighlight




Paula TantocoUnderline



!DISSENTING by Barredo, J !Barredo argues that such negligence of the submission of the motion for reconsideration is right to be dismissed. He says that the petitioner with the help of his counsel had the proper number of days to submit such motion. Barredo argues with proof of previous jurisprudence. Added to this argument is that the constitutional right is not what is being tackled in the case at bar, according to Barredo. The errors is said to be in the interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept and not a denial of due process. All of these must first comply with the rules of procedure and overpowering a final and executory decision of the Court of Industrial Relations devoids them of power and renders them useless hence the dissenting opinion of Barredo. !SEPARATE by Teehankee, J !Teehankee restates the reasons of the decision of the majority of the court in the primacy of human rights over property rights are to be considered and are considered imprescriptible.

Article 3 Section 1| Due Process: In General

TUPAS V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 89571. February 6, 1991

Facts:

1. October 12, 1989 a. court denied petition for certiorari for failure to show CA (respondent court) committed

reversible error in its resolution dated May 31, 1989. 2. November 23, 1989

a. petitioner filed motion for reconsideration to which SC required a Comment followed by a Reply and a Rejoinder

3. After examining the issues and arguments, SC affirmed the decision of CA. a. petitioners received copy of the Pasay RTC decision on April 3, 1989 b. motion for reconsideration was filed on April 17, 1989 c. such motion for reconsideration was denied by RTC on May 3, 1989 but only received by

the petitioners counsel on May 9, 1989 d. petition for review with CA was done only on May 23, 1989 which was clearly outside

the 15-day reglementary period Issue: W/N the petitioners were denied of procedural due process after they fail to comply with the 15-day prescription for appealing Held/Ratio NO. Records showed that the petitioners counsel did not file petition for review within the remaining period which he should have known was only one day.

x The tardiness of the petitioners to file an extension for review has forfeited their right to appeal. Therefore, they cannot claim that they have been denied of due process.

x Observance of both procedural and substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process and must be followed whatever the source of such rights.

x Petition for certiorari cannot be a remedy if the reason behind the lost of the right to appeal is due to the petitioners inexcusable negligence.

x Lacsamana V. CA o If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the

movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review

x Petitioners argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistake of their counsel was not acceptable especially that their counsel is equipped with impressive credentials.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It is so ordered.

Article III, Section 1

ASILO, JR. V. PEOPLE G.R. Nos 159017-18, March 9. 2011

Quick Digest: This is a case to petition for review of certiorari the decision of the Sandiganbayan re:

Finding petitioners Comendador and Asilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)

Dismissing the case against accused Alberto Angeles Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs now respondents spouses Bombasi Dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza and Benita and

Isagani Coronado. Facts (relevant to the due process issue):

1. MARCH 15, 1978: Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract

Municipality allowed Marciana Vda. De Coronado the use and enjoyment of property of a lot and store for a period of 20 years beginning on March 15, 1978

Lease contract: Respondent can build firewall In case of modification of the public market, respondent or her heirs

would be given preferential rights 2. SOMETIME IN 1986: A fire razed the public market

Engineer Marcelino Gorospe inspected the store of Visitacion Declared that the store remained intact and stood strong

The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until October 15, 1993 3. SEPTEMBER 1, 1993: Visitacion received Resolution No. 156 to from Mayor

Comandador; Visitacion wrote a reply letter Resolution:

Demolish her store within 5 days of notice File an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses

incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronados continuously resists the order

Letter: The lease contract was still existing and binding She was willing to vacate provided that the same place and area be

given to her If Mayor Comendador will not accept the proposal, he should file the

appropriate action to court 4. OCTOBER 11, 1993: The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution

No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store occupied by Visitacion 5. OCTOBER 14, 1993: Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. sent a letter to

Visitacion about the demolition of her store the next day; Visitacion wrote a reply letter Letter:

There is no legal right to demolish without a court order The resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only

the filing of an unlawful detainer case against her














If the demolition will take place, administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the demolition

6. OCTOBER 15, 1993: Mayor Comendador authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.

Issue: W/N due process was accorded to spouses Bombasi when Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles demolished the store relying on the authority of the Sangguniang Baranggay resolution. (In relation to the issue of the case of W/N the court should find Comendador and Asilo Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019) Held: No there was no due process. Yes Comendador and Asilo, Jr. are guilty of RA 3019, Sec. 3(e). There was no due process:

Abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is allowed if it is a nuisance per se o In this case, the market stall cannot be considered a nuisance since it was not

affected by the 1986 fire Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. The Local

Government Code does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.


Art III Section 1

EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO V. VICENTE PALANCA

G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918

Quick Digest PortionThis is a petition to set aside the judgment of the lower court (Court of First Instance) involving the foreclosure of the mortgage due to a supposed irregularity made by the clerk of the court of first instance.

Facts:

1. Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco (Engracio Palanca) mortgaged various parcels of land in June 1906.

x The real property is situated in Manila. x Estimated value at the time: P292,558

2. Engracio Palanca went back home to China. x He went to China, his native country, after he executed the mortgage. x He never went back to the Philippines. x He died in China at January 29, 1910.

3. Upon March 31, 1906 the debt amounted to P218,294.10 x The parcels of land is about P75,000 pesos in excess of the debt. x Drawing interest at 8% per annum. x Payable at end of each quarter.

4. Upon March 31, 1908 El Banco Espanol-Filipino (Bank) instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage upon the parcels of real property.

x Engracio Palanca is not a resident of the Philippines when the action was instituted. He was somewhere in China.

x Engracio Palancas last known place of residence was in Amoy, China. 5. An order of publication was obtained by the court and was made in due form in a newspaper

of Manila. x Engracio Palanca was not a resident at the time of the institution of the action, the

plaintiff (Bank) has to give notice to the defendant BY PUBLICATION (Engracio Palanca) in accordance with section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

x Section 399 says that in case of publication, if the non-resident/absent defendants place of residence is KNOWN (in this case Amoy, China is the last known place of residence) the judge must send a copy of the complaint and summons to be deposited by the CLERK in the post-office.

x It is not clear whether or not the clerk complied with this order. However, there is an affidavit signed by Bernardo Chan, an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that he had deposited such documents in the post-office.

6. Engracio Palanca did not appear and lost by default. A decision was made ordering Palanca to pay on or before July 6, 1908 and in case of failure the mortgaged property will be auctioned.

x The property was bought by the bank for P110,200. (Note: the value of the property at the time of the mortgage was P75,000 pesos in excess. So in a sense Palanca was prejudiced.)

7. 7 years later, Vicente Palanca, the administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca filed a motion to set aside the order. It was denied.

Issue:

W/N the failure of the clerk to mail the notice to Amoy, China amounts to a denial of due process of the defendant.

Note: It is not clear whether or not the clerk complied. There is just a lack of proof that there is compliance so the Court assumes here that it was not complied with for the sake of argument.

Ruling:

No, it does not amount to a denial of due process.

The law only requires the mailing of the notice if the defendants residence is known. The law generally requires the publication and the mailing of the notice is simply an addition if his residence is known.

The owner of the mortgaged property must take the risk of a possible failure to deliver the notice for various reasons. Moreover, the notice was published in the newspaper.

4 requisites of due process:

(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;

(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding;

(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. All of these were complied with. The irregularity is not fatal.

Article 3 Section 1 Mortel vs Kerr G.R.No. 156296(Nov 12, 2012) Quick Digest Portion The client seeks the reversal of a decision, where by the Court of Appeals denied his petition for review on certiorari, the client should not be bound my the negligence and errors of his previous counsels that deprived him the due process of law. Facts: On July 19, 2000, respondent Salvador E. Kerr (Kerr) instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage, docketed as Civil Case No. 279-0-2000, against Dennis Q. Mortel (Mortel) through Atty. Leonuel N. Mas (Atty. Mas) of the Public Attorneys Office. The pre-trial was re-set four times for various reasons, but on the fifth setting on December 7, 2000, Mortel and Atty. Mas were not around when the case was called. On motion of Kerrs counsel, the RTC declared Mortel as in default and allowed Kerr to present evidence ex parte.On December 28, 2000, Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak (Atty. Tumulak) filed a notice of appearance in behalf of Mortel, but the RTC did not act on the notice of appearance On May 4, 2001, Mortel, this time through Atty. Tumulak, filed a verified petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

On August 20, 2001, the RTC denied the verified petition for relief from judgment on the ground that the petition for relief had been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days. On November 14, 2001, Mortel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his petition for relief from judgment

On September 5, 2002, the CA issued a resolution dismissing Mortels petition for review for failing to state the specific material dates showing that the petition had been filed within the reglementary period, in violation of Section 6(d), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It observed that Mortel thereby resorted to the wrong remedy considering that he was assailing the propriety of the RTCs order declaring him in default, against which the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari. On November 18, 2002, the CA denied Mortels motion for reconsideration for lack of merit because the defects of the petition for review were not corrected, and for availing himself of the remedy of petition for review when he should have filed a petition for certiorari instead.

On December 23, 2002, Mortel, by himself, sought an extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. On January 27, 2003, the Court granted Mortels motion for extension with a warning that no further extension would be given. Issue: W/N the negligence of Mortels counsels was so gross and palpable as to deprive him of his property without due process of law. Held: Yes. As a rule, a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case. To allow a client to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. But the rule admits of exceptions. The negligence and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They thereby prevented him from presenting his side, which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being plausible and seemingly meritorious.Court litigation is primarily a search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules that gives to both parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out such truth.36 Thus, a court may suspend its own rules or except a case from them in order to










Paula TantocoSticky Note3 LawyersMasTumulakLa Cambra

Paula TantocoSticky Notewhen the incompetence is so great and the resulting error is so serious that the client who otherwise would not have good cause is prejudiced... the client deserves another chance to present his case.

Paula TantocoSticky Note- Kerr instituted a claim for forclosure of mortgae.- Atty. Mas = Did not appear with Mortel, thus they were decalred in default and the court allowed the presentation of the evidence.- Atty. Tumulak = Filed an appearance in behalf of Mortel.-The RTC did not act on the notice of appearance- MOrtel through Atty. Lacambra, filed a motion for a new trial (denied)- RTC granted the withdrawal of Mas and Lacambra, thus tumulak was the lawyer.-

serve the ends of justice; or, it may altogether disregard the rules in a proper case.37 To cling to the general rule of having the ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client is only to condone rather than to rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his cause to his counsel.

Webb v. de Leon G.R. 121234, August 23, 1995

Quick Reference: Peititions are filed to annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued by respondent Judge de Leon of the Paraaque RTC against petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, and Antonio Lejano Facts:

a. On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Webb, Gatchalian, Lejano, and 6 others with the crime of Rape with Homicide of Carmela Vizconde, her mother (Estrellita, 51y/o), and her sister (Anne Marie Jennifer, 9 y/o) in their home at 80 Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paraaque in June 30, 1991. The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation.

During preliminary investigation, Webb claimed that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the US (New York) on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992.

He submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the US, and was issued a State of California Drivers License. In addition, he submitted a letter of Robert Heafner, Legal Attach of the US Embassy to confirm his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger of US Airlines Flight No. 808.

Other petitioners likewise have alibis stating that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime as they were engaged in something else.

b. On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution finding probable cause to hold Webb and company for trial upon which, an information was filed with the Paraaque RTC, and was raffled to Branch 258, as presided by respondent Judge Escano. It was, however, respondent Judge Raul de Leon who issued the warrants of arrest. Judge Escano inhibited himself from the case due to possible partiality as he was formerly engaged with the NBI.

c. Webb and Co. voluntarily surrendered at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., after filing their separate petitions, which primarily entail that the (1) DOJ Panel denied them of their constitutional right to due process during preliminary investigation, (2) respondent judges committed grave abuse of discretion due to the attendance of prejudicial publicity and a hasty/malicious prosecution by the NBI and DOJ Panel.

Issue (in re. Due Process and Prejudicial Publicity): W/N prejudicial publicity denied them of their right to due process. NO. Held (in re. Due Process and Prejudicial Publicity): Petitions are dismissed.

SC found no procedural impediment while undergoing preliminary investigation; There must be a balance in the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the

press, the publics right to information, and an accused right to a fair and impartial trial. While history has shown that commentators bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime, in the case of Martelino, it was said that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be ALLEGATION AND PROOF that the judges have been unduly influenced by the tone and content of such publicity.

o Petitioners cannot merely rely on the subconscious effects of publicity, as these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

Paula TantocoSticky Note(+) iconsistency of testimony of Alfaro:- says she did not see dead bodies, then all of a sudden she did- did not enter the promises, then later on entered the premises.- did not see the act of rape, then later on saw hubert web on top of carmela.- said web was a blondie

Paula TantocoSticky NoteRe: Prejudical publicity- the DOJ did not commence the investigation with haste.- The petitioners were given fair and reasonable ground to prove the lack of probable cause- Petitioners = given all the opportunities to be heard.- Even if the DOJ said it would terminate the investigation after prelim hearing, it still investigated.

Paula TantocoSticky Note- There is a conflicting area in the consti = Right to a fair and impartial trail, and also freedom of media coverage.- Even with the threat of media abuse, the judiciary can not set a bar to the public.- added is the fact that the ivestigating panel is composed of the assistant state prosecutor and the senior state prosec. thus they are experienced and are not susceptible to bias.


Paula TantocoSticky NoteCarlos Cristobal = Witness for the UA 808 flight. He said that he saw Sen. Webb bring a son to the airport. But the son that the senator brought was fair in skin, and upon seeing Hubert, he said that that could not have been him because Hubert is moreno.

He arrived at this conclusion from the TV show Dong Puno Live.

Paula TantocoTypewritten TextTo the aspect of publicity = there was no petition from the petitioners to disqualify any member of the DOJ panel on the basis of bias resulting from their bombardment with publicity.

Article III Section 1 PEOPLE vs TEEHANKEE

G. R. No. 111206-08 | October 6, 1995

Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.: murder for the killing of Roland John Chapman, frustrated murder for the shooting and wounding of Jussi Leino and murder (initially frustrated murder but she died eventually) for the killing of Maureen Hultman. Facts: 1. July 13, 1991 order of events:

x after a night-out with their friends, Hultman asked Leino to take her to Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati and Chapman tagged along.

x Upon entering the village, Maureen asked them to stop a block away from her house, and walked the rest of the way with Leino while Chapman waited in the car.

x While walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car driven by the accused (Teehankee) stopped them, asked for their IDs, and grabbed and pocketed Leinos without looking at it

x Upon seeing the incident, Chapman stepped down and asked why the accused was bothering them. Accused pulled out his gun and shot him.

x The shooting shocked Maureen and she started screaming hysterically. x Accused asked them to sit at the sidewalk. Leino obeyed. After trying to run away from the

accused, Maureen obeyed as well. x Accused turned his back on them, and then faced them again then shot Leino, then Maureen, then

the accused left. x Leino struggled to ask for help and saw atleast 3 people who saw the incident: Florece (private

security guard) , Mangubat (driver) and Cadenas (private SG). 2. Leino and witnesses Cadenas and Mangubat identified Teehankee as the gunman. The

witnesses also confirmed that the accuseds car was the car they saw during the incident. 3. Separate criminal cases were filed against the accused. The trial court convicted him because

of the strength of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses through positive identification. 4. Accused interposed the present appeal and gave reasons why the trial judge erred in his ruling,

one of which is that the publicity given to the case impaired his right to an impartial trial: x that the trial judge was pressured because of high-ranking individuals (Estrada and Drilon) who

followed the developments of the case. x Trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity x He claims that placards were displayed in the courtroom, spectators clapped their hands, and

people gave him the finger sign. Issue: Whether or not the publicity given the case against the accused-appellant was massive, overwhelming, and prejudicial as to effectively deprive him of his right to impartial trial. Held: NO

x It is natural for media to give high profile and high stake criminal trials pervasive publicity. x Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact of

pervasive and overwhelming publicity does not in itself prove that the said publicity permeated the mind of the judge and impaired his impartiality.

o It is impossible to seal the judges from publicity. News is everywhere o Our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not one who is detached from the world o Judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-cam

performances of parties to litigation. x There must be allegation and proof that the judges have unduly been influenced by the publicity

and not merely a possibility. The records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant. Appellant himself relied heavily on selected portions of 7 newspaper reports for his defense.






Paula TantocoSticky NoteThe judge in the courtroom showed reluctance to be swayed. this is due to the times where he ordred the expulsion from the courtroom of rowdy individuals and also for calling for order when there would be applause and heckling.



Paula TantocoSticky NoteThere was also no allegation by the defense that the judge cradled a bias.

It can be seen from the acts of the judge that he took steps to remove the bias from the trial- ordered the removal of signs-ordered the exclusion of the media from the trial after taking pictures. (upon the request of the defense.)- He admonished the act of the public's clapping of hands.- Media was allowed to participate, but they were not allowed to do live reporting, and also they were not allowed to take pictures during the trial proper.

Article III Section 1 Publicity and TV Coverage

Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

Pres. E. Estrada was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan and petitioners have requested to televise the hearing but were denied by the Sandiganbayan. Issue contemplates on the conflict between the right to public information & freedom of press and the right of the accused for a fair trial. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to have an audio-visual recording and not live telecast of the hearing. Facts:

1. Former Pres. E. Estrada is charged with a plunder case in the Sandiganbayan o Estrada was ousted and the press requested for a live telecast of the plunder case in the

Sandiganbayan o KBP (Kabisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas), the organization of the press in the

Philippines, together with Cesar Sarino, Renato Cayetano, and Atty. Ricardo Romulo, requested for a live telecast

2. The Sandiganbayan denied the request of the press for a live telecast of the case 3. Sec. of Justice Hernando Perez, one of the petitioners, filed a motion of reconsideration on

the denial for a live telecast of the plunder case o They argue that:

There is no real conflict of right to public information & freedom of press and the right of the accuse for a fair trial

If there was a clash, the right to public information and freedom of press would be favored for they (the people) are the source of the sovereignty

4. Estrada restates that TV and Radio coverage would violate the sub judice rule or under judicial consideration

o Sub judice rule: Courts role should not be usurped by others making public statements about how these issues should be dealt with

o live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other.

Issues: x W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the request x In denying the request, does this mean that the Sandiganbayan can disregard the right to public

information & freedom of press over the right to fair trial? Ruling:

x Court finds no reason to alter or modify the resolution of the Sandiganbayan o 9:6 members of the Court voted

x Not necessary o In lieu of the TV or Radio coverage of the trial, 8 voted to order an audio-visual

recording of the case Ratio:

x Purposes for Audio-visual recording o Historic Significance; the King is under no man, but he is under God o Involves vital concern of the people on the fundamental right to know o Essential for education and civic training of the people

x Considered serious risks as stated by Paul Freund (Harvard Law School)






Article 3, Section 1 !PEOPLE VS ROXAS

G.R. No. 172604 August 17, 2010 !This is an appeal by way of automatic review on the Decision dated 13 January 2006, affirming the judgement of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting appelant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles for the crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder of Agnes Gurindola, Violation of R.A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft. !Facts:

1. On or about 12 January 1994, accused-appellant Venancio Roxas, conspired with another Roberto Gungon, to take away and kidnap Agnes Guirindola. a. On January 12, 1994, Agnes Guirindola was flagged down by a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest.

Agnes was driving her mothers car, a RED NISSAN SENTRA SEDAN with plate TKR 837, along Panay Avenue in Quezon City.

She was flagged down by a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest and was asked to make a U-turn, alleging that the street was a one-way street.

The man, later identified as Venancio Roxas (Roxas), proceeded to the RIGHT SIDE/PASSENGER SIDE of the car and informed Agnes that the street she entered had been made into a one-way street because of an accident that occurred two days ago.

Roxas asked for Agness license and gave her a paper to sign. Agnes PRETENDED to sign the paper, placing a CHECK MARK instead. Roxas asked Agnes to open the door so he could show her the one-way sign and the other traffic

aide and instructed her to drive to the corner of the street. The other traffic aide was not at the corner so Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him off,

to which he instructed her to make a left turn from the corner so he could alight somewhere along MOTHER IGNACIA.

Agnes handed Roxas a P50, assuming he was waiting for a bribe, after which Roxas returned her license. !

b. Agnes was held at gunpoint after receiving her license. Roxas switched off the engine of Agness car after returning her license. Roxas poked a gun at Agnes, telling her, Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo. Agnes begged Roxas to just take the car. !

c. Agnes was taken along with her car and was shot in Baranggay Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas. Roxas opened the rear door and a second passenger, later identified as Roberto Gungon

(Gungon), entered the car and pulled Agnes towards the back seat, where he held her shoulder and leg.

Roxas took the drivers seat, while Gungon suggested that they bring Agnes to Philcoa but after checking his beeper, Gungon suggested, Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon na nation siya i-s.

Roxas stopped along the way where he bought Agnes a bottle of soft drinks and SKYFLAKES biscuit and asked Gungon to feed her. Agnes refused after seeing TWO TABLETS FLOATING inside the bottle.

Agnes attempted to escape but Gungon poked the gun at her whenever she made the slightest movement.

They reached the South Superhighway at around 5 PM, where Roxas and Gungon took turns urinating.

Agnes took a PRAYER LEAFLET from her wallet when Gungon asked her if she was the girl in the picture in her wallet. Upon informing Gungon that it was her sister, Gungon got his own wallet and showed Agnes THREE PICTURES one of his niece, her girlfriend, and Roxas and a lady with a little child.








Agnes planned to escape again but they were running at around 80-100 KPH so she continued praying instead.

Gungon offered her the soft drinks again, which she refused but upon seeing how mad Gungon was, she was forced to drink it. Roxas instructed Gungon to give her TWO MORE TABLETS because she was big.

Agnes took the tablets but HID THEM UNDER HER TONGUE and SPAT IT OUT INTO HER HANDKERCHIEF when Roxas and Gungon were not looking.

Agnes requested for a MCDONALDS SANDWICH but Gungon said that they were in the province and that there was no McDonalds there. Roxas stopped by a bakery and bought Agnes a TAISAN CAKE. This is where Agnes saw the signboard that read Sto. Tomas or San Jose, Batangas.

Agnes felt dizzy and fell asleep. When she woke up, she found herself lying at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. All of her jewelry (bracelets, earrings, necklace, and watch amounting to P30,000 to P40,000) and shoes were gone. A CHECK in the amount of P3,000 and P1,000 in cash were also missing from her wallet. Gungon said they were keeping it for her.

Agnes noticed from the cars clock on the dashboard that it was about 9:30 or 10:00 PM already. She also noticed that a third passenger had entered the car, sitting on the passenger seat while Roxas was still driving.

She asked if she could relieve herself to which Roxas said yes. She fixed her hair and Gungon put her shoes on her feet. He alighted first, leading Agnes to a nearby grassy area where she urinated.

When Agnes was about to stand up, she saw white sparks and fell down. When she regained consciousness, the three men and car were gone. Agnes followed a light which led her to a small house. She saw TWO CHILDREN and a TEENAGER singing inside but upon seeing her, they ran away. A LADY CARRYING A BABY AT THE STAIRS was also scared and locked herself in the room. Agnes followed her and knocked at the door, asking for help but she did not respond.

Agnes went back downstairs and lied down on the sofa when she noticed blood oozing from her face and there were holes in the LEFT SIDE of her NECK and RIGHT CHEEK.

Agnes heard a vehicle and voices saying there was a blood woman who needed help. She was carried into a Fiera and brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital where a DR. LAURO R. SAN JOSE, captain of the neurosurgery department, attended to her. !

d. Agnes was transferred from Batangas Regional Hospital to V. Luna General Hospital. Agness family arrived at the hospital at around 3 AM of 13 January 1994. She was transferred to V. Luna General Hospital (now AFP Medical Center) where she stayed

for 43 DAYS. Upon her transfer to V. Luna General Hospital, Agness parents immediately reported the

incident to the NBI. NBI agents visited Agnes on 17 January 1994 for the cartographic sketches of Roxas and

Gungon. e. Suspects were arrested.

NBI agents showed 3-4 pictures of Gungon to Agnes on 19 January 1994. GUNGON was arrested in DAVAO CITY.

Agnes positively IDENTIFIED Gungon in a line up consisting of 5-6 MEN on 1 February 1994. Roxas was eventually arrested on 11 September 1995 inside the municipal hall of Taysan,

Batangas under the Office of the Mayor, where he used the aliases JOE VILLAMOR and MARIANITO VILLAMOR.

Agnes positively IDENTIFIED Roxas in a line up as the other perpetrator. !2. On 5 September 2002, the Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty of Kidnapping with

Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder, Violation of R.A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft. !


3. Roxas moved for the reconsideration of the decision dated 5 September 2002 and the inhibition of the Honorable Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr.

Roxas argues that the presence of then Justice Secretary Hernando Perez showed the courts predisposition to convict him.

He also argues that he was DENIED DUE PROCESS because Judge Demetrio Macapagal Sr. had lost his ability to try and resolve the case with an impartial judgement. !

4. The RTC denied appellants motions for inhibition and reconsideration on 8 October 2002 but the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. !

5. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC on 13 January 2006. !Issue: W/N the accused-appellant was DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS when the judge lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. !Held: No. There is no basis for the appellants allegation that he was deprived of due process nor that the trial conducted was not fair or impartial. Believing the evidence of the prosecution is not a sign of bias. Furthermore, the presence of the then Justice Secretary is not enough proof to show that the judges decision was influenced by it. Substantial proof, not merely suspicion, is needed to prove that the appellant was prejudiced by the Justice Secretarys presence.


Paula TantocoSticky NoteBecause Hernando perez was in the trial, the petitioner alleged that the judge was led to have a bias.

Article III, Section 1, B-1 !ANG TIBAY V. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)

G.R. 46496. February 27, 1940 !Decision on the motion on reconsideration from the CIR on the judgment of the Court; and, from

the National Labor Union, the motion to remand the case to the CIR for a new trial !Facts:

1. Respondent CIR, through the Solicitor-General, filed a motion for reconsideration for the following legal conclusions (which were in favor of the Petitioner) of the majority opinion of the Court:

i. That a contract of employment, ends or by will of either party or illegal whenever the deadline for the payment of wages according to custom locally or finish the work in-law;

ii. Let the workers of a manufacturing firm, having concluded contract, individually and collectively , with ell , no fixed time , and have been forced to cease their tarbajos for having declared lockout at the factory in which tarbajan , leave be employees or workers of the same ;

iii. That an employer or company has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with its osbreros no fixed time duration without determiminada be for a work and refuses to reinstate those workers who resigned following a layoff , not guilty of incurs unfair practices in the criminal sanction of Article 5 of Law No. 213 of the Commonwealth , but his refusal to readmit be because these workers belong to a particular agency worker, since such employees have already left his desertion by termination of contract under arrest (translation based on that by Google Translate :P) !

i. That a contract of employment, individual as well as collective, without fixed term of duration, ends or by will of either party or when the deadline for the payment of wages according to custom in the town or brother-in-law is completed the work;

ii. To workers at a manufacturing firm, which has held contract, already already collectively, ell, no fixed time, and who have been forced to cease in their tarbajos by declaring unemployment forced in the factory in which tarbajan, cease to be employees or workers of the same;

iii. That an employer or partnership that has entered into a collective labour agreement with its osbreros without duration fixed time and without being for a work determiminada and refuses to reinstate these workers who had ceased as a result of a forced strike, is not guilty of unfair practices in incur the criminal sanction of the article 5 of Act No. 213 of the Commonwealth, even if its refusal to readmit due to these workers to belong to a particular worker body, since such have already left ofto be used theirs for termination of the contract under the unemployment. (translation based on that by Babel Fish :P) !

*MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION NOT GRANTED. Court deemed it unnecessary due to the Motion for a New Trial !

2. Respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the court and the remanding of the case to the CIR for a new trial and avers that: !

1. Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the NLU, is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather

Paula TantocoTypewritten TextCIR = Court of industrial relations

2. The claim was but a scheme to systematically discharge all members of the NLU 3. Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay

of leather soles from the States) was part of his scheme 4. The National Worker's Brotherhood (another union in ANG TIBAY) is a company or

employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which is illegal 5. Majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable in the

exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining 6. The Civil Code (Spanish origin, source of continuous civil war) should not be used to

interpret modern labor legislations (American origin ruled by industrial peace) 7. Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice, unjustly favoring the National Workers'

Brotherhood over NLU 8. The exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the

exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the CIR

9. The attachments are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein !

Issue: W/N the guiding principles of administrative due process were observed and if the case should be remanded to the CIR !Held: No, due process was not followed; and yes, the motion for a new trial in the CIR is granted. Except as to the alleged agreement between Ang Tibay and the Union, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. The interest of justice would be better served if the respondent-movants are given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in this motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements but it must comply with the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character, which are: !

(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy) (4) Substantial evidence (meaning such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion, or evidence having rational probative force) to support a finding (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered

Paula TantocoSticky NotePowers of the CIR are the FF:- cognizance for the purposes of prevention, arbitration, decession, and settlement of any agricultural dispute s/c would lead to a lockout. - When directed by the Pres. it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned to determine the necessity and fairness pf fixing and adopting minimum wage, etc/ - even if it is an admin agency, it does not mean that due process should not be followed.



Paula TantocoSticky NoteEssential req. of Due process1. Right to a hearing2. Party must be given the right to present his side3. There must be basis for the decision of the case.4. There must be substantial evidence to support a claim5. Decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing6. Judges must act independently7. In all controversial questions decisions should give the reason for deciding so.


Art III, Sec 1 (Aspects of the Proceeding: Fact-Finding and Joint Committee) !Arroyo vs. Department of Justice G.R. No. 199082 Sept 18, 2012 !

This is a petition to assail the validity of 1) Comelec Resolution No 9266 creating a joint DOJ-Comelec Investigation and Fact-finding team on the 2004 and 2007 Election fraud 2) Joint Committee Rules of Procedure on the Alleged Election Fraud. !Facts:

1. The Comelec created committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ constituted a Joint Committee and Fact-finding team on the 2004 and 2007 elections electoral fraud composed of Comelec and DOJ officials.

The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team.

Resolutions finding probable cause (Omnibus Election code/other election laws) shall be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

2. The Fact-Finding Team recommended GMA, Abalos and others be subjected to preliminary investigation for conspiring to manipulate/manipulating the election results in North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao. Mike Arroyo was also recommended to be charged administratively.

Comelec en banc adopted the resolution and ordered Comelec legal officers to file the necessary informations before the appropriate courts.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) filed a Complaint-Affidavit18 for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others

Issue: I. W/N the creation of a Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee and

Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation Cases is constitutional.

II. W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with the DOJ. !Held:

I. (Constitutional.) It is not a violation of the equal protection clause. equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be

treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Not all respondents therein were linked to GMA. Private individuals

were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee !

It is Not a violation of due process there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself made biased

statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a particular party.

Comelec is a collegial body. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself

therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge(Fact-finding and joint committee have different mandates)

Paula TantocoSticky NoteJoint comittee = Preliminary investigationFact FInding Team = Gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be used by the JC in the prelim. investigation

It does not violate the Independence of the Comelec. Petitioner: The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly

surrendered its independence to the DOJ. As pointed out by the Court in BANAT Party-List v. Comelec, the grant of exclusive

power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.

the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. !

II. (Comelec has Jurisdiction.) Publication Requirement The assailed Joint Committees Rules of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors

of the DOJ and the Comelec but also the conduct and rights of persons, or the public in general. The publication requirement should, therefore, not be ignored.

Nevertheless, even if the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure is ineffective for lack of publication, the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee are not rendered null and void for that reason, because the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Joint Committee pursuant to the procedures laid down in Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Validity of the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation GMA claims her right to due process was violated when her request to require Pimentel

to furnish her the documents used as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. o Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads: The respondent shall

have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense

o Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure: Conduct of preliminary investigation: The respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report.130 Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Anyway, the failure of the complainant to submit documents supporting his allegations in the complaint may only weaken his claims and eventually works for the benefit of the respondent as these merely are allegations unsupported by independent evidence.

It is well settled that the absence [or irregularity] of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective. !

DISSENTING; J. BRION Concurrent jurisdiction has been defined as equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter The Comelec and DOJ can have equal jurisdiction while maintaining the INDEPENDENCE of the Comelec. In order not to trample the mandate of the Constitution, the DOJ should be a mere deputy ot delegate of the Comelec and not a co-equal partner in the investigation and prosecution of election offense. !!

Article III, Section 1 GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v OLALIA JR

GR No. 153675 April 19, 2007 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: Quick Digest: This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify two Orders of RTC Manila Judge Felixberto Olalia Jr (respondent)

1) Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz (private respondent) to post bail

2) Order dated April 10 2002 denying the motion to vacate said Order (1) filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKAR) represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner

The petition alleges both Orders were issued by Olalia with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. Petition was dismissed. Facts

x Muoz was charged before the HK court with 3 counts of offense of accepting an advantage as agent (bribery). He also faces 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued against him.

x DOJ then received from the Hong Kong a request for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The National Bureau of Investigation then filed in with the RTC an application of provisional arrest of Muoz. RTC issued an order of arrest. NBI agents then arrested and detained him

x In the same case that the HKAR filed a petition for extradition of Muoz, he files a petition for bail. Judge Ricardo Bernardo Jr. denied the petition for bail holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muoz is a high flight risk. Thereafter, Judge Bernardo inhibited himself from the case and Judge Olalia (respondent judge) presided.

x Muoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. It was granted by Judge Olalia (Order dated December 2001).

x HKAR filed urgent motion to vacate such decision. It was denied by respondent judge Olalia (Order dated April 2002). Hence, the instant petition.

x Petitioner alleges that Judge Olalia acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction granting the said Orders as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee

Issue Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail (Topic on Extradition Proceedings under Procedural Due Process) Held/Ratio A prospective extraditee can be granted bail.

x In USA vs Purganan, the Court held that the exercise of right to bail is limited to criminal proceedings and not to extradition. However in light of the various international treaties and also the modern trend in public international lawgiving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and libertya reexamination of the Courts ruling in Purganan was made.




Paula TantocoSticky NoteOlaia was not the first judge, bernardo was the frist judge, who ordered the warrant of provisional arrest, then he inhibited, then olaia took over the case.

Olaia also denied the motion for bail of Juan Antonio Munoz.

o The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed, is recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.

o The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified also upholds the rights of every person to life, liberty and due process.

o The Philippines as member of the family of nations has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedingsto make available such remedies which include the right to bail.

x If bail can be granted in deportation cases (Mejoff v Director of Prisons considered the Universal Declaration on Human Rights), it should also be allowed in extradition cases. Both are administrative proceedings where the innocence and guilt of the person detained is not an issue.

x Although there is no law providing bail to the extraditee, there is also no prohibition from exercising his constitutional right to post bail.

o The right of the extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the Philippine treaties concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.

o According to Justice Puno is Purganan case, only clear and convincing evidence will be considered. Private respondent did not yet show evidence to show that he was not a flight risk.

WHEREFORE,we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. .

Article III Section 1 Arbitration RCBC v. Banco de Oro

G.R. No. 196171 and G.R. No. 199238, December 12, 2010 Quick DigestRCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 2010 one of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in vacating the second partial award on the basis of Chairman Barkers alleged partiality Facts:

1. RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) (2000)

2. There was dispute between the parties when RCBC informed EPCIB and the other selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to P478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty under the SPA (2003)

3. As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in accordance with Section 10 of the SPA (2004)

i. Section 10. Arbitration: Should there be any dispute arising between the parties relating to this Agreement which cannot be resolved by agreement of the parties within 15 days after written notice by a party to another, such matter shall then be finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules. The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the parties hereto and the expenses of arbitration shall be paid as the arbitrators shall determine.

ii. In its Request for Arbitration, Claimant RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from and contravening generally accepted accounting principles and practices and resulted in the overpayment of P556 million. For this violation of sellers representations and warranties under the SPA, RCBC sought its rescission, as well as payment of actual damages

4. In their answer, EPCIB, Go and the other selling individual shareholders denied RCBCs allegations contending that RCBCs claim is one for overpayment or price reduction under the SPA which is already time-barred. A counterclaim for litigation expenses and costs of arbitration as well as moral and exemplary damages, was likewise raised by the Respondents (2004)

a. Subsequently, the Arbitration Tribunal was constituted where Sir Ian Barker was appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman.

5. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are required to pay US$350,000 as advance on costs pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) (2004)

a. RCBC paid its share while Respondents share of the advance on costs was thus fixed at US$175,000

b. Respondent filed an Application for Separate Advances on Costs stating that it is improper for them to share equally on the advance cost of Claimants (RCBC) claim since the total amount of RCBCs claim is substantially higher more than 40 times the total amount of their counterclaims

c. Respondents refused to pay their share in the advance cost fixed by the ICC-ICA d. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that if Respondents still failed to pay its share in the

advance cost, it would apply the ICC Rules and request the Arbitration Tribunal to suspend its work and set a new time limit, and if such requested deposit remains unpaid at the expiry thereof, the counterclaims would be considered withdrawn

6. The ICC-ICA notified the parties of its decision to increase the advances on costs from US$350,000 to US$450,000 subject to later readjustments (2005)

Paula TantocoSticky Note226.46 million shares were the subject of a share purchase agreement. - which was 67% of the capital stock of bankcard

-payment for the shares was Php1.78 B

-Upon evaluation - RCBC came up that is overpaid 556M

-Kapunan, Barker and Kaplan constituted the tribunal.

-BDO claims 300K USD, RCBC claims 556M PHP.

-Shares, increased from 350 to 450 to 580.

-Filing Fees was

a. The ICC-ICA again invited the Respondents to pay the US$100,000 increment. Respondents, however, refused to pay the increment, insisting that RCBC should bear the cost of prosecuting its own claim and that compelling the Respondents to fund such prosecution is inequitable. Respondents reiterated that it was willing to pay the advance on costs for their counterclaim

b. In view of Respondents continuing refusal to pay its equal share in the advance on costs and increment, RCBC wrote the ICC-ICA stating that the latter should compel the Respondents to pay as otherwise RCBC will be prejudiced and the inaction of the ICC-ICA and the Arbitration Tribunal will detract from the effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settling disputes

c. Chairman Ian Barker, in a letter stated in part (2006): i. The Tribunal has no power under the ICC Rules to order the Respondents to pay

the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against the Respondents refusal to pay.

d. RCBC paid the additional US$100,000 under the second assessment to avert suspension of the Arbitration Tribunals proceedings

e. Meanwhile, EPCIBs corporate name was officially changed to Banco De Oro (BDO)-EPCIB after its merger with BDO was duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. As such, BDO assumed all the obligations and liabilities of EPCIB under the SPA.

7. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial Award and makes the following declarations (First Partial Award) (September 2007)

a. The Claimants claim is not time-barred under the provisions of this SPA b. The Claimant has established the following breaches by the Respondents of the SPA

i. The assets, revenue and net worth of Bankard were overstated c. Subject to proof of loss the Claimant is entitled to damages for the foregoing breaches

8. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm the First Partial Award, while Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same (October 2007)

a. The Makati City RTC issued an order confirming the First Partial Award and denying Respondents separate motions to vacate. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied

9. ICC-ICA by letter increased again the advance on costs. Respondents declined to pay its adjudged total share and the ICC-ICA then invited RCBC to substitute for Respondents in paying the balance. RCBC complied with the request (October 2007)

10. RCBC filed an Application for Reimbursement of Advance on Costs Paid, praying for the issuance of a partial award directing the Respondents to reimburse its payment representing Respondents share in the Advance on Costs (2008)

a. Respondents filed their opposition arguing that in issuing the award for advance cost, the Arbitration Tribunal will be deciding an issue beyond the terms of the Terms of Reference (TOR)

11. In his letter, Chairman Barker advised the parties, as follows (2008): a. The Tribunal notes that neither party has referred to an article by Matthew Secomb on the

very subject of the case at bar. To assist both sides (later the court will decide that the Secomb article was evident partiality of the Tribunal for RCBC) and to ensure that the Tribunal does not consider material on which the parties have not been given an opportunity to address, Chairman Barker attached a copy of the article

i. Secomb is the ICC Secretariat 12. RCBC contended that based on Mr. Secombs article, the Arbitration Tribunal is vested with

jurisdiction and authority to render an award with respect to said reimbursement of advance cost paid by the non-defaulting party.

a. Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that RCBCs application for reimbursement of advance cost has no basis under the ICC Rules

13. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award as follows (2008): a. Respondents are forthwith to pay to the Claimant the sum of US$290,000

14. EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award in the Makati City RTC while RCBC filed in the same court a Motion to Confirm Second Partial Award (2008)

15. The Makati City RTC issued the Order confirming the Second Partial Award and denying EPCIBs motion to vacate the same (2009)

a. Said court held that since the parties agreed to submit any dispute under the SPA to arbitration and to be bound by the ICC Rules, they are also bound to pay in equal shares the advance on costs

b. It noted that RCBC was forced to pay the share of EPCIB in substitution of the latter to prevent a suspension of the arbitration proceedings, while EPCIBs non-payment seems more like a scheme to delay such proceedings

16. EPCIB filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 113525) in accordance with the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules) (2010)

a. EPCIB assailed the Makati City RTC in denying its motion to vacate the Second Partial Award despite the fact that it was issued with evident partiality

17. The Arbitration Tribunal issued the Final Award (2010) a. BDO filed in the Makati City RTC a petition to vacate final award b. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm final award

18. The CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113525 (found in no. 14), the dispositive portion of which reverses (December 2010):

a. The Second Partial Award dated May 28, 2008 issued in International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration

19. RCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 2010 one of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in vacating the second partial award on the basis of Chairman Barkers alleged partiality

Issue: W/N there was evident partiality which is a legal ground to vacate the Second Partial Award Held: There was evident partiality and therefore constitutes as a legal ground for vacating the Second Partial Award

1. Special ADR Rules sets forth that evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral tribunal or any of its members is a ground for vacating an arbitral award

a. The failure of the CA to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial review prescribed in the Special ADR Rules may warrant the exercise of the Supreme Courts discretionary powers of judicial review

b. Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the PhilippinesAs a general rule, the court can only vacate or set aside the decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear showing that the award suffers from any of the infirmities or grounds for vacating an arbitral award

2. Evident partiality is not defined in our arbitration laws. As one of the grounds for vacating an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the United States (US), the term "encompasses both an arbitrators explicit bias toward one party and an arbitrators inferred bias when an arbitrator fails to disclose relevant information to the parties."

a. In the Court of Appeals of Oregon, evident partiality in its common definition implies "the existence of signs and indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of partiality

b. In Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, they stated that evident partiality will be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration

3. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of partiality standard, which requires a showing that a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration.

a. Such interest or bias must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative

b. When a claim of arbitrators evident partiality is made, the court must ascertain from such record as is available whether the arbitrators conduct was so biased and prejudiced as to destroy fundamental fairness

4. CA found factual support in BDOs charge of partiality a. Chairman Barkers furnishing the parties with a copy of the Secomb article. This article

ultimately favored RCBC by advancing its cause. Chairman Barker makes it appear that he intended good to be done in doing so but due process dictates the cold neutrality of impartiality

i. By furnishing the parties with a copy of this article, Chairman Barker practically armed RCBC with supporting legal arguments to deal with the situation when one of the parties to international commercial arbitration refuses to pay its share on the advance on costs

b. Applying the foregoing standard, we agree with the CA in finding that Chairman Barkers act of furnishing the parties

Documents

Article III - Bill of Rights Digests Part 1