as.2008.48.6.889.pdf

Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of PanglongAuthor(s): Matthew J. WaltonSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 6 (November/December 2008), pp. 889-910Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2008.48.6.889 .

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Asian Survey, Vol. 48, Issue 6, pp. 889–910, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2008by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2008.48.6.889.

889

Matthew J. Walton is a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the Uni-versity of Washington in Seattle. He wishes to thank Ian Holliday, Charles Keyes, John B uchanan, Vince Rafael, Christoph Giebel, and an anonymous reviewer for their detailed comments on this article. He is grateful for comments on a paper presented to a workshop on “Political Development in Burma/Myanmar” held in Bangkok on March 2–3, 2007. The workshop was sponsored by the Asian Political and International Studies Association and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Email: <[email protected]>.

ETHNICITY, CONFLICT, AND HISTORYIN BURMA

The Myths of Panglong

Matthew J. Walton

AbstractThe effects of the 1947 Panglong Agreement on Burma’s ethnic minority

groups can still be seen today in calls for a return to the spirit of Panglong, but

there are confl icting versions of this event and its legacy. In order to grasp the

prospects for ethnic unity in Burma, it is necessary to deconstruct the various

“myths” of Panglong.

Keywords: Burma, Myanmar, Panglong, ethnic, confl ict

In 1947, General Aung San, the young military leader who was quickly becoming the hero of the Burmese independence move-ment, met with leaders of the country’s various ethnic minorities in the Shan town of Panglong to discuss their status within a soon-to-be inde-pendent Burma. Their meeting concluded with the signing of the Panglong Agreement on February 12, an accord that was to pave the way for a new constitution and, eventually, independence. Over 60 years later, the prom-ises of the Panglong Agreement remain unfulfi lled and ethnic confl ict continues to plague the nation, but the elusive “spirit” of Panglong still af-fects Burmese of every ethnicity. Multiple and confl icting interpretations of this event echo the confl icts that face this ethnically divided nation



890 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVIII, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008

today, yet the uniting potential of Panglong remains. In this article, I in-vestigate the effects of the Panglong Agreement on Burma’s ethnic minor-ity groups and argue that an understanding of ethnicity and the prospects for ethnic unity in Burma can be best achieved by a thorough examination of the “myths” of Panglong.

While some studies reach back to the earliest of the Burmese kings to examine the impact of ethnicity on the nation, I believe that the best place to begin discussions of national unity is in the modern event that (despite its shortcomings) remains the most salient example of the possibility of ethnic unity—the Panglong Conference. In a 1989 article, Shan writer Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe calls for “scholars and students to dissect the myths surrounding the political history of Burma.”1 Panglong has impacted Burmese politics through its potential, its failures, and the various perceptions of it held by opposing groups; therefore, it is an appropriate topic for such dissection.

My concern is not with specifi c proposals for democratic governance in Burma that deal with ethnic identity and representational arrangements.2 Instead, I wish to explore the impact that participation in or exclusion from the Panglong Conference had on various ethnic groups. By extension, I highlight the vital place that a critical examination of Panglong must play in discussions of national unity in Burma, following Robert Taylor’s frequently quoted remark that “ethnic politics is the obverse of the poli-tics of national unity in modern Burma.”3 An understanding of the rela-tionship between ethnic identity and national identity (particularly when the two are not necessarily one and the same) is necessary in identifying why national unity remains an elusive concept in multi-ethnic nations like Burma. This relationship can be understood by studying the dominant myths in a given society and determining the points at which they fail to resonate with certain groups and individuals.

I will begin with a brief theoretical discussion of ethnicity, nationalism, and the role of myths and memory in nation-building. It is through this lens that the confl icting perceptions of Panglong assume a position of primary importance. Next, I provide a brief history of Burma since the colonial era, highlighting events that were signifi cant in the creation or perpetuation of inter-ethnic tensions. This history provides a setting for

1. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, “The Burman Military: Holding the Country Together?” in Joseph Silverstein, ed., Independent Burma at Forty Years: Six Assessments (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cor-nell Southeast Asia Program, 1989), p. 101.

2. See, for example, the federal constitution proposed in Ethnic Nationalities Council (Union of Burma), “Federal Constitution (Draft),” 2006, <http://www.encburma.org/fcdcc/Data/constitution/Federal_Constitution_(Draft)_Burmese.pdf>, accessed March 14, 2007.

3. Robert Taylor, “Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 10:1 (1982), p. 8.



MATTHEW J. WALTON 891

the unfulfi lled promises that characterized Panglong and the period im-mediately following independence. I then present an overview of the events surrounding the conference itself and examine the roles of various ethnic minorities at Panglong and how the agreement affected their perceptions of the event and also subsequent rebellions. Finally, I look at three differ-ent versions of the myth of Panglong, pointing out limitations of each and suggesting some ways in which a reappraisal of Panglong could pro-vide a vehicle for more effective discussions of national unity in Burma.

Ethnicity, Nation, and Myth

The very notion of ethnicity remains a contested topic within the social sciences. While recognizing that ethnic groups do not necessarily retain a constant, stable culture over time, scholars such as Clifford Geertz explored the contemporary salience of the primordial attachments and characteris-tics that are constitutive of ethnicity.4 More-recent perspectives have dem-onstrated the utility in understanding ethnicity as a relational concept, not built on specifi c, permanent cultural traits but rather constructed and changed over time as a result of interactions with different groups and in-dividuals. Charles Keyes has pointed out that ethnicity becomes salient in the modern world when politics coincides with cultural differences, partic-ularly when articulated with reference to a national ideology.5 Key to under-standing ethnicity, then, are cultural differences that are identifi ed through repeated interactions and gradually perceived as politically important. This is the point at which a discussion of nationalism and its founding myths be-comes relevant for ethnic identity and confl ict.

Each group within a nation needs to be able to identify with cultural symbolism and ideology. Thus, a prerequisite for national unity is under-stood to be the acceptance of common history and myths. While these com-mon beginnings are often at least partially constructed, their resonance with the identities of individuals and groups is crucial in determining the degree to which the national identity will be accepted and internalized.6 Anthony Smith cites the importance of collective history in nation-building, particularly the indirect infl uence of “myths and symbols of community” that it invokes.7 History both defi nes the national unit and directs that unit

4. Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

5. Charles Keyes, “Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity,” in Thomas J. Barfi eld, ed., The Blackwell Dictionary of Anthropology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997).

6. Eric Hobsbawm, “The Nation as Invented Tradition,” in Nationalism, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

7. Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986), p. 200.




toward a goal. Although this means that historical events are frequently altered in order to be more effectively used for nationalist purposes, a dominant version persists and guides the people of the nation toward their collective goal, reminding them of their shared future via their common past. Myth is thus a necessary component of the nation, something that tells us who we are and where we are going.

But the persistence of a myth can also limit the autonomy of both groups and individuals. If myths are necessary to the development of na-tions, they also constrain the development of individuals and groups within those nations, particularly when national myths confl ict with local histo-ries and perceptions of identity. Prasenjit Duara argues that although the nation is “contested and contingent,” it nonetheless seeks to project the “false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time.”8 In addition, when history is “altered” in the service of national myth, it cre-ates the possibility for dissonance and confl ict with other aspects of identity, particularly ethnicity. This second possibility is particularly relevant with re-gard to the usage of national myths as a source of national unity in Burma.

Maurice Halbwachs built on the theories of Emile Durkheim to dem-onstrate how collective memory, far from being a given, is actually a con-structed concept.9 Our past is continually reshaped as we see it differently based on our present needs or understandings. This can have an integrat-ing purpose, helping to foster the common recollections that serve as the basis for a community or a nation. But in the process, collective memory is often used as an oppressive tool to legitimize dominant state power, or at least to legitimize the position of a particular group. The dominant myth of Panglong presents an example of how collective memory can be manip-ulated to promote an offi cial version of history. But the analysis of confl ict-ing versions of this myth undermines the hegemony of the dominant myth and creates the possibility for contestation and inclusion.

Colonization and Burma’s Struggle for Independence

Burma under British RuleThe British conquered Burma in stages, beginning in 1824 and fi nally ousting the Burman King Thibaw in 1886.10 They sought to control the

8. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 4.

9. Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser, tr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

10. It is important to make the distinction between “Burman” or “Bama,” which is used to refer to the majority ethnic group in Burma, and “Burmese,” which is a more contested




territory through a combination of direct and indirect rule, relying on im-ported Indian offi cials in the central region and administering through traditional leaders in the outlying areas. The result of this policy was the offi cial division of the colony into Ministerial Burma (the central area, con-trolled from Rangoon) and the Frontier Areas (the Shan States and the areas primarily inhabited by the Chin and Kachin).11 The administrative division between these two areas signifi cantly affected the relationships that their inhabitants subsequently developed with the British and deter-mined in large part how the negotiations at Panglong were conducted and how independence was achieved.

Although it is true that Burma’s struggle for independence was marked by divisions that existed long before British rule began, these confl icts were no doubt exacerbated not only by British territorial divisions but by colo-nial military recruitment policies as well.12 Although Martin Smith notes that “many important details of Burma’s ethnic past are still conjecture,” it is known that throughout the pre-colonial period there were frequent wars between nominally independent kingdoms that would eventually be con-solidated by the British.13 It was British geographical divisions and colo-nial policies, however, that would solidify ethnic identity and have the greatest effect on the negotiations at Panglong and future ethnic relations in Burma.

After annexation at the start of 1886, the British gradually began ex-cluding ethnic Burmans from the armed forces.14 The practice of privileg-ing Chin, Kachin, and particularly Karen soldiers would have severely

term, used to designate an institution of the Burmese state or the people contained within its borders. This article will also discuss various other ethnic groups in Burma, including the Karen, Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Mon, Arakanese, Naga, and Wa. For an overview of the histories of these various groups, beyond the scope of this article, consult Martin Smith, Ethnic Groups in Burma (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1994).

11. At this time, the Karenni State was offi cially considered to be an independent territory, although it was subordinate to the British in certain respects.

12. For a skeptical view on the degree of pre-colonial ethnic confl ict in Burma, see Victor B. Lieberman, “Reinterpreting Burmese History,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29:1 (January 1987). It is probably incorrect to classify these confl icts as having been based on ethnicity. Identity was constructed primarily around political entities that only later would coalesce into ethnic groups. Even then, these “ethnic” distinctions were signifi cantly more fl uid than they are today. See, for example, Edmund R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

13. Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1999), p. 33.

14. The British Army in Burma was actually the British Indian Army until 1937, when Burma was offi cially separated from India and the British began constructing a specifi cally Burmese army.




deleterious effects on the prospects for ethnic integration in the military after independence. In the eyes of the Burmans, ethnic minorities came to be associated with colonial rule. This perception was only exacerbated by the fact that predominantly Karen troops were used in the bloody sup-pression of Burmans in the Saya San rebellion of the 1930s. Andrew Selth points out that before World War Two, the British viewed the Burmese military primarily as a tool to maintain internal security.15 Consequently, the Burman majority saw it as an instrument to facilitate their oppression at the hands of ethnic minorities, particularly when, in 1925, the British for-mally adopted a policy of recruiting only Chins, Kachins, and Karens.16

The Japanese OccupationA small group of Burmans opposed to colonial rule—including the young Aung San, who would soon become Burma’s independence hero—began to establish contact with the Japanese in 1939. They were trained by the Japanese and collaborated in the Japanese invasion of 1941, successfully ousting the British from Burmese territory by the beginning of 1942. This initial salvo of World War Two in Burma set the Japanese and their pre-dominantly Burman allies against the British and their forces, made up almost entirely of Indians and Burmese ethnic minorities. One Shan com-mentator notes that under these circumstances, it was impossible for the ethnic minorities to see the Burmans as a legitimate nationalist movement; instead, they were viewed as collaborators with an occupying power.17

The Burmese Independence Army (BIA) that was subsequently formed by the Japanese was as ethnically imbalanced as the British military forces in Burma, but this time the shift was in favor of the Burmans. Since the Japanese occupation never effectively stretched into Chin, Kachin, or Shan territory, these ethnicities were severely under-represented.18 Despite a declaration of Burma’s “independence” on August 1, 1943, it did not take long for Burman nationalists to become disillusioned with their de facto role as a Japanese colony, and a new, anti-Japanese resistance was quickly formed.

Despite the fresh sources of confl ict that arose from the Japanese occu-pation, British offi cers and ethnic minority troops reluctantly agreed to co-

15. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory (Norwalk, Conn.: East-bridge, 2002).

16. This policy most likely resulted from the greater success that Christian missionaries had among the non-Burman ethnicities. The British would have preferred to work with the graduates of Christian schools, and this group was overwhelmingly non-Burman.

17. Yawnghwe, “The Burman Military,” p. 86.18. Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, N. Y.:

Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 67.




operate with these new Burman belligerents in driving the Japanese out. The resistance campaign took place from 1942– 45 and resulted in the Brit-ish regaining control of Burma. Immediately, though, they were forced to deal with an armed, organized contingent of Burman war leaders who were eager to gain true independence. With the expulsion of the Japanese as the most immediate goal, very little attention was paid to discussing what a future Burma would look like, in particular how and by whom it would be governed. As a consequence, the Japanese were defeated by “networks of armed guerillas and soldiers fi ghting against the same enemy but fi ghting for very different visions of the future.”19

By the end of 1946, it was clear to both the Burmese and the British that Burma would soon gain its independence. Despite emphatic warnings from Winston Churchill and others about the reckless nature of the colo-ny’s drive toward freedom, the British government seemed ready to work with Aung San and his party, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL).20 The most pressing question at this time was whether or not the Frontier Areas would be associated with Ministerial Burma and if so, in what way.

The Road to Panglong

The First Panglong ConferenceThe famous conference of 1947 was actually the second meeting to take place at Panglong. An earlier gathering in March 1946 brought together leaders of the Shan, Chin, Kachin, and Karen in what was primarily a cel-ebration of ethnic diversity. This meeting also had a political agenda; dis-cussions were held regarding the future status of the people of the Frontier Areas after independence. One of the highlights of this fi rst conference was a proposal by H. N. C. Stevenson (the British director of the Frontier Areas) that would create a United Frontier Union consisting of Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen territory.21 Although the AFPFL mem-bers present spoke strongly against such an arrangement, it appears to have been relatively well received by delegates of the minority groups. Steven-son was one of several British offi cials who worked tirelessly in the year leading up to independence to ensure that ethnic minority concerns were addressed both by the British administration and the AFPFL.

19. Ibid., p. 85.20. Churchill’s comments are cited in Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of

National Unity (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980).21. Lian H. Sakhong, In Search of Chin Identity: A Study in Religion, Politics, and Ethnic

Identity in Burma (Copenhagen: Nias Press, 2003), p. 209.




Preparations for the Second Panglong Conference

The British White Paper of 1945 (a document discussing the future status of Burma) stated that no decision would be made on behalf of the people of the Frontier Areas without their consent. They were to be placed under a “special regime under the Governor until such time as their inhabitants signify their desire for some suitable form of amalgamation of their terri-tories with Burma proper.”22 Despite the frustration of many minority groups at not having been involved in those discussions, this clause seemed to indicate that they would have to be involved in future talks regarding their status. Indeed, on February 2, 1947—only a few days before the Pang-long Conference—Aung San reinforced his views supporting autonomy for the hill peoples: “As for the people of the Frontier Areas, they must de-cide their own future. If they wish to come in with us we will welcome them on equal terms.”23

In actuality, Aung San went into the Panglong Conference viewing it simply as an informal discussion; he was apparently not very optimistic about the results.24 First of all, as will be seen in the following sections, the positions of the ethnic minority leaders were by no means consistent on the question of independence or federation with Ministerial Burma. In ad-dition, the AFPFL was suspicious of the British and believed that regional authorities and soldiers sympathetic to the minorities were spreading dis-sension among the hill people in the hopes of derailing the Burman-led drive to independence. While there is evidence to suggest that British offi cers were discussing plans for independence with at least the Karen leaders, this does not seem to have been part of a concerted British effort to under-mine the AFPFL’s efforts at Burmese independence. Rather, it points to the relatively common colonial phenomenon of signifi cant disconnect between local offi cials and offi cers in the colony, and the policy makers back home.

The Second Panglong ConferenceThe second Panglong Conference was convened on February 6, with Shan and Kachin delegates initially in attendance. They agreed on several foun-dational principles for federating with Burma, including internal auton-omy, the desire for a Kachin state, and the right to secession. They were joined on February 7 by the members of the Chin delegation, who suggested

22. Hugh Tinker, ed., Burma: The Struggle for Independence 1944–1948, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce, 1984), p. 262.

23. Quoted in Maung Maung, Aung San of Burma (The Hague: Martinus Nighoff, 1969), p. 188.

24. Tinker, Burma, pp. 397, 395.




the addition of several clauses dealing with revenue sharing as well as the formation of a Supreme Executive Council of the United Hill Peoples.

Aung San and Tin Tut, representing the AFPFL, arrived on February 8 and—given the mixed signals they had been receiving—were “agreeably surprised” at the desire expressed by the three delegations to proceed with some type of union with Burma.25 The next few days consisted of speeches, meetings, and negotiations among the various groups. It was reputedly at Panglong that Aung San made his famous promise to the hill tribes: “If Burma gets one kyat [of currency] then you will get one kyat.” This prom-ise has been subsequently cited by many ethnic minority organizations in criticizing economic inequality and discrimination on the part of the Bur-mese government.26

Finally, the Panglong Agreement was signed by all of the delegates in attendance on February 12.27 The British had insisted that the inhabitants of the Frontier Areas state their willingness to join a union of Burma, and Panglong had effectively satisfi ed that requirement. Having theoretically addressed the issue of the Frontier Areas, the AFPFL continued to orga-nize throughout Burma for the upcoming elections to the Constituent As-sembly. Tragically, Aung San was assassinated on July 19, throwing the country and the fl edgling government into confusion. Rebellions by various communist factions in the months prior to independence overshadowed efforts to continue to address complaints from ethnic groups, particularly the Karen, leading to several ethnic revolts in the months following inde-pendence on January 4, 1948. Whatever spirit of unity might have existed at Panglong was already in tatters at independence and would be com-pletely extinguished by the time of the second military coup in 1962.

The Role of Aung SanBefore turning to a closer examination of the participation of different ethnic groups at Panglong, it is useful to study the role of Aung San in the conference, as well as his views on ethnicity in Burma. The standard myth of Panglong positions Aung San as possibly the only Burman fi gure to enjoy the trust of the ethnic minorities, and thus, the only man who could conceivably unite all of Burma. It is true that the young leader of the AFPFL went to great lengths to take his party’s message of Burmese unity

25. John Leyden, quoted in Tinker, Burma, vol. 2, p. 294.26. See, for example, Ethnic Nationalities Council (Union of Burma), “Unity in Diversity

(60th Anniversary of the Panglong Agreement),” 2007, <http://www.encburma.org/enc/enc_statements.htm#The_Panglong_Agreement>, accessed March 14, 2007.

27. The full text of the agreement is cited in many sources, including Tinker, Burma, pp. 404–05.




to the people of the Frontier Areas, traveling to Chin and Kachin territory and to the Shan states in November and December 1946.28 In speeches Aung San repeatedly stressed the need for all of the nationalities of Burma to work together in achieving independence. In his negotiations with the British, he demanded the same rights for the people of the Frontier Areas as for those who lived in Ministerial Burma.29 The good standing he re-portedly enjoyed among many ethnic minority communities is apparent in the following comment by Saw San Po Thin, a Karen who initially fought against Aung San, then joined forces with him during the campaign against the Japanese: “He had a magnetic personality, and one could not help fol-lowing him.”30

But Aung San’s legacy regarding ethnicity in Burma appears to be more mixed than his defenders choose to acknowledge. He insisted on abiding by Stalin’s famously exclusive defi nition of the nation, even going so far as to suggest that only the Shan were numerous enough to warrant the label of nationality.31 During his campaigns to garner support for the AFPFL, he also spent a good deal of time debating with leaders of ethnic minority groups over their future status in the union. In a letter to Karen leaders on March 3, 1947—less than a month after Panglong—he refused to consider ethnic quotas to address Karen concerns about representation. He also gave no guarantee on a future Karen state.32

After the expulsion of the Japanese, Aung San was justifi ably concerned with the treatment that his (mostly Burman) soldiers would receive in a newly reconstituted Burmese Army that had mostly Karen in the top lead-ership positions. He and other military leaders suggested that the new army maintain ethnically separate units, creatively using the British notion of “class” battalions in an effort to protect his Burman troops from dis-crimination that was expected at the hands of British and Karen offi cers.33 This strategy underscored the lack of trust between Burman and Karen troops, and created ethnic divides within the Burmese armed forces that would explode into violence in the months following independence.

28. Union of Burma, The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities: Vol. 1 (Rangoon: Innwa Publishing House, 1999), p. 145.

29. Tinker, Burma.30. Quoted in Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win (Bombay: Asia Publishing

House, 1962), p. 149.31. Josef Silverstein, ed., The Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell South-

east Asia Program, 1993), especially pp. 96–97. Stalin’s frequently cited essay restricts a nation to a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psycho-logical make-up manifested in a community of culture.” The full text can be found in Joseph Stalin, “The Nation,” in Nationalism, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 18–21.

32. Tinker, Burma, p. 446.33. Callahan, Making Enemies, p. 95.




The Ethnic Minorities’ Experiences of Panglong

Having given a brief overview of the situation leading up to Panglong and the proceedings of the conference itself, I will now address the individual experiences of each minority group at Panglong, as well as those groups that were not involved. This will help to situate Panglong within the col-lective histories and identities of these various groups, facilitating an under-standing of how Panglong continues to function as a national myth, while also identifying some of its limitations in this respect. At the same time, it is vital to stress that these histories remain incomplete. Not only have the perspectives of many ethnic minority groups been ignored in constructing and maintaining the “offi cial” history of Panglong but the diversity within each of those oppositional perspectives has also been disregarded in the struggle to maintain a unifi ed stance against government hegemony. Part of my argument is that it is necessary to recover these alternate histories in order to recognize the exclusionary nature of modern Burma’s founding myth. Thus, it is important for scholars of contemporary Burmese history and politics to continue to uncover more perspectives on a formative his-torical event like the Panglong Conference.

The Participants at Panglong: Shan, Kachin, and Chin

Shan. Only the Shan, Kachin, and Chin were offi cially represented at the Panglong Conference. Although the offi cial history of Panglong portrays their participation as motivated by patriotism and a desire for indepen-dence, their actual positions were much more complex and varied. Far from representing the unifi ed voice of the ethnic minorities, the delegates at Panglong themselves only spoke for a certain portion of their ethnic kin. For example, the Shan saophas (traditional hereditary leaders) were the offi cial representatives of the Shan people at Panglong. However, their leadership in the Shan states was being increasingly challenged by various organizations agitating for democratic reforms. One of these, the Shan State Freedom League (SSFL), was even an ally of the AFPFL but was bypassed at Panglong in favor of the saophas for reasons of political expediency. In the months leading up to Panglong, the Shan leadership continued to send mixed signals, probably a result of the considerable internal political change occurring in the Shan states.34

Kachin. As they had with the Shan, the AFPFL initially turned to a younger generation of Kachin, establishing an alliance with the Kachin

34. Union of Burma, The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities, pp. 120– 44.




Youth League (KYL). For the Panglong Conference, however, the AFPFL returned to working with the duwas (traditional leaders) because they could provide the legitimacy the AFPFL needed. Robert Taylor also suggests that at a time when the AFPFL was concerned with working quickly to se-cure at least the appearance of unity in the struggle for independence, rely-ing on the traditional power of the duwas was easier than muddling through the democratic processes demanded by the KYL and the SSFL.35

Chin. Many commentators have attributed the hesitation and indecision of the Chin delegation at Panglong to their inability to understand the po-litical concepts being discussed. While some of this uncertainty can be at-tributed to confusion over the still rather foreign concept of federalism, it seems that the Chin delegation was also hindered by translation diffi cul-ties. The Chin leaders were expecting H. N. C. Stevenson to be in attendance at Panglong, because he was apparently fl uent in their dialect. However, he resigned one week before the conference and they had to rely on an-other interpreter who spoke a different dialect. According to Lian Sakhong, this disadvantage led to several signifi cant discrepancies in the subsequent agreement.36 These translation diffi culties are merely one example of the circumstances that weakened the position of the minority delegates at Panglong and allowed the AFPFL to proceed with creating a Burmese na-tion essentially on their own terms.

Despite their disillusionment at the failure of the 1947 Constitution to fully realize the promises of Panglong, members of the three participating ethnic groups remained mostly loyal to the Burmese government through-out the initial communist revolt and rebellions by the Karen and other ethnic groups.37 But tensions continued to grow between the military and ethnic minority groups: by the end of the 1950s, there was serious discus-sion regarding the right to secede that the minorities had been promised in the Panglong Agreement. The later wave of ethnic rebellion began in the Shan state in 1959 and spread to the Kachin state in 1961.38 After General Ne Win’s second coup on March 2, 1962 (ostensibly a reaction to threats of secession), it was clear to the ethnic minority groups that the promises of Panglong had been all but forgotten.

35. Taylor, “Perceptions of Ethnicity.”36. Sakhong, In Search of Chin Identity.37. A small contingent of Kachin Rifl es did defect from the Burmese Army in early 1949

to join the Karen uprising, but it met with only limited support from the general population and did not trigger a more widespread rebellion among the Kachin at that time.

38. The Chin rebellion did not become organized as such until the mid-1960s, but many ethnic Chin participated in the insurgencies of various groups in the neighboring state of Arakan, as well as with the communists.




The Karen and PanglongThe experience of the Karen at meetings leading up to Panglong and at the conference itself provides an excellent example of the seemingly in-tractable nature of ethnic divisions in contemporary Burma. A combination of false British promises, sustained Burman hostility toward the Karen, and the refusal of the Karen leadership to compromise when faced with the loss of British support led to the Karen rebellion that broke out imme-diately following independence and has continued to this day.

As early as September 1945, there had been renewed calls for an inde-pendent state from the Karen leadership; they had reason to believe that their British patrons would support them.39 British offi cers in Burma had, in many cases, developed close relationships with their Karen protégés and were quick to assure the Karen that their loyalty and service would be rec-ognized by the British government. Unfortunately, the men in charge of Burma policy in London were more concerned with reaching a quick set-tlement, and after the Japanese were defeated, the AFPFL rapidly became the dominant group in negotiations with the British.

The Karen leadership sent a goodwill mission to England in 1946, hop-ing to make the case for an independent Karen state. British offi cials, on the other hand, either accidentally or intentionally misconstrued the pur-pose of this visit, believing that the question of a separate Karen state had already been decided in the negative. It seems that by this time the British had chosen to stand by the AFPFL, requiring only the token declaration of minority support that the Panglong Agreement would provide.

As representatives of other ethnic minorities were preparing for negoti-ations with the AFPFL at Panglong, the Karen leaders were also meeting, and on February 5, 1947, the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed. The Karen were, admittedly, in a very diffi cult negotiating position, pri-marily because of geographic contingencies. The various ethnic groups claimed under the Karen label were split between Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas, and both the British and the AFPFL insisted that they were unable to consider Burma as a whole until these two regions had been offi cially united. Of course, this disadvantaged the Karen, whose population would surely be misrepresented if they were forced to be recog-nized separately as parts of both territories.

The Karen role at Panglong also remains somewhat confusing. Al-though several Karen delegates attended, their position was apparently only as observers. According to one explanation from some Karen leaders,

39. Books like Donald Smeaton, The Loyal Karen of Burma (London: K. Paul, Trench, and Co., 1887), added to Karen beliefs that they enjoyed a privileged position within the British colonial state and would be rewarded for their service.




the four delegates, after arriving and realizing that “certain saophas” had signed the agreement, decided not to take an “active part” in the negotia-tions.40 Karen refusal to participate in Panglong put them at a disadvan-tage in negotiating with the AFPFL, which by this time dominated the political stage in Burma. The subsequent KNU boycott of the Constitu-ent Assembly elections meant that there was no Karen representation in-dependent of the AFPFL in the government. Even though all avenues to a political settlement seemed to be closed, Karen troops in the army re-mained loyal through independence and even played a vital role in repuls-ing a communist attack on Rangoon at the end of 1948. But atrocities committed by Burman army units and irregular militia units that Decem-ber pushed the Karen into open rebellion. The KNU revolted in January 1949, and Karen militias occupied several critical cities before being slowly driven back as the Burmese military regained ground.

Absent from Panglong: The Mon, Arakanese, Wa, and Naga

Mon. The Mon are a people who have been territorially and (to some degree) culturally intertwined with the Burmans in central Burma for hun-dreds of years.41 Since the conference at Panglong was specifi cally called to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Frontier Areas, the Mon were excluded because they lived primarily in what was then Ministerial Burma. In the months prior to independence, many Mon were beginning to build alliances with the Karen, both groups having been either excluded from or disadvantaged with regard to Panglong as a result of geographical conditions. In 1947, Prime Minister U Nu rejected Mon demands for self-government and the Mon Freedom League (MFL) was born, an orga-nization that would join the Karen in armed insurrection soon after independence.42

Arakanese. Like the Mon, the Arakanese (inhabitants of the Arakan Hills region on Burma’s western border) were considered part of Ministe-rial Burma and were thus not invited to Panglong. Their leaders, although initially allied with the AFPFL, harbored strong doubts about the ability of the Burmans in that organization to represent their interests; splits

40. Tinker, Burma, p. 438.41. This analysis certainly does not exhaust the list of ethnic groups that have grievances

as a result of exclusion from Panglong. Although the present article is limited by both space and sources, a more complete study would include the perspectives of the Lahu, Palaung, Pao, and other smaller groups that are often subsumed under more dominant ethnicities.

42. Ashley South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma (New York: Routledge Cur-zon, 2003).




quickly developed in the leadership. Divisions within Arakanese commu-nities often occurred along religious lines; the Buddhists were sometimes allied with the AFPFL, while the Muslim Rohingya have repeatedly been excluded from membership in the Burmese nation-state.43 As a result, Ara-kanese concerns were almost completely unaddressed, and instability and rebellion plagued the region even before independence was achieved.

Other Groups. The Wa, Naga, and various other smaller ethnic groups, although resident in the Frontier Areas, were denied the right to partici-pate at Panglong. The report of the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE)—a followup to Panglong that conducted interviews in March and April 1947 to determine the best method for associating the Frontier Areas with Ministerial Burma—demonstrates the disdain that residents of the more central regions (and even sometimes, the dominant ethnic groups of the Frontier Areas) had for these groups living on the periphery. In ex-plaining why they saw no need for representation from these groups, the report cited “the primitive nature of their civilization and the impossibil-ity of their fi nding persons who will be able to assist in the drawing up of Burma’s future constitution.”44

The Karenni and PanglongThe FACE report affi rmed the historical independence of the Karenni people, citing their 1875 treaty between the British and Burmese govern-ments. And although the Karenni state had been offi cially incorporated into Burma during the Japanese occupation, Japanese control never effec-tively extended into the region. Even though it is clear from the FACE re-port that the Karenni requested representation in the future Constituent Assembly without committing to a federation with Burma, the Karenni state was incorporated into the Union of Burma on August 9, 1948. Sig-nifi cant dissatisfaction with this affront to their sovereignty resulted in many Karenni joining the Karen revolt in January 1949.45

Three Myths of Panglong

Having provided an overview of Panglong, I will now examine three dif-ferent versions of the myth held by various groups regarding this event. Both the differences and the similarities in the three myths are important in determining the signifi cance of Panglong in ethnic group identity formation

43. Human Rights Watch, Burma: The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus? (New York: Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1996).

44. Quoted in Tinker, Burma, p. 487.45. Jean-Marc Rastorfer, “The Development of Kayah National Identity,” in Tradition

and Modernity in Myanmar, Uta Gardner and Jens Lorenz, eds. (Hamburg: Munster, 1994).




and opposition, as well as its potential as a vehicle for promoting national unity. I wish to stress that these three versions of the myth are broadly at-tributed, and there are of course many variations within each category. However, these distinctions are analytically and comparatively useful be-cause they map onto what are commonly seen as the three primary actors within contemporary Burmese politics: the government/military, the dem-ocratic opposition, and the ethnic minorities.

Panglong Myth #1: The GovernmentFor the purposes of this essay, I am attributing the dominant myth of Panglong (briefl y described at the beginning of the article) to the (pre-dominantly Burman) government of the Burmese state, which has been the strongest force in institutionalizing the myth. This myth highlights the unity of the ethnic groups of Burma in the struggle against the Japanese, as well as the harmonious spirit in which the groups’ representatives gath-ered at Panglong to sign the historic agreement. Prominent in the govern-ment myth is the adversarial role of fi rst the Japanese, then the British, in attempting to thwart the unifi cation of all the peoples of Burma. It was only through the peerless leadership of Aung San and the wise decisions of the leaders of the ethnic minorities that Burma was able to free itself of its colonial shackles. The government (ably assisted by the military) has struggled in the years since the agreement to protect the unity of the na-tion. It has had to defend the integrity of Burma against both foreign at-tacks on national sovereignty and against internal elements attempting to dismantle the union through separatist politics. Yet, all of its actions have been in the spirit of Burmese unity, the spirit of Panglong.

Of course, this myth conveniently ignores the fact that only three of the main ethnic minority groups were in attendance at Panglong and that there was still signifi cant dissension within those groups. The AFPFL—in an effort to fulfi ll its promises of achieving complete independence as quickly as possible—was willing to forego some of its more democrati-cally inclined allies and work instead with the signifi cantly less democratic traditional leaders. There was virtually no attention given to the status of minority groups within Ministerial Burma, and the ethnic minorities’ util-itarian (particularly economic) reasons for signing the agreement have been glossed over in favor of the preferred nationalistic language of “unity” and “independence.”

Panglong Myth #2: The Democratic OppositionThe second myth of Panglong, which I will be broadly attributing to the democratic opposition (dominated by the National League for Democracy or NLD) is similar in many ways to the fi rst. It also reifi es Aung San’s role




in the conference and stresses the unity of the groups involved. In fact, the only signifi cant difference between these two versions of the myth is the contrasting perspective regarding what happened subsequent to the Pang-long Conference. The fi rst myth highlights the role of the government in protecting the unity enshrined at Panglong. The second myth names the government (and the military that controls it) as the institution that has betrayed the spirit of Panglong, beginning with the rewriting of the Con-stitution in 1947 in a way that limited the sovereignty of ethnic minorities and threw the country into civil war.

In this version of the myth, the “spirit of Panglong” is something that needs to be recaptured, and this can only be done by recognizing the rights of the minority peoples that were agreed to on February 12, 1947. Fre-quently, these sentiments are captured by the call for another Panglong, a contemporary conference that would look back to the time in Burma’s history when all of the people were united and shared similar goals in working toward fi rst, independence, and then, prosperity.46 Not surpris-ingly, this would require recognition of the results of the 1990 election, which would place political power in the hands of the NLD and its allies.

This account of Panglong—while adhering more closely to historical reality than the fi rst—is still problematic. While its criticism of govern-ment and military policies is important, it too ignores the historical ten-sions both between the minority groups and the AFPFL and also among the minority groups themselves. Although she has repeatedly denounced the oppression of minority groups, Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD and guiding light of the democracy movement, disregards the exclu-sion and deception that characterized Panglong as well as the complexity of Burma’s recent ethnic history with statements such as, “We won our in-dependence through the unity of the various nationalities.”47 The NLD myth assumes that as long as government policies can be changed, a spirit of Burmese unity will be attained. Indeed, the myth often insists that unity will be attained in this way. One cannot help but be suspicious of state-ments such as, “All the nationalities of the Union are members of the same family. . . . They should live together in peace and harmony having permanent unity.”48

Panglong Myth #3: The Ethnic MinoritiesThe third version of the myth of Panglong will be broadly attributed to the ethnic minorities. This account is signifi cantly more skeptical of the

46. NLD Policy Statement, “NLD Policy on the Nationalities of Burma,” 1996, <http:// www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199610/msg00282.html>, accessed July 3, 2006.

47. Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1995), p. 223.48. NLD Policy Statement, “NLD Policy on the Nationalities of Burma,” n. p.




actual events of Panglong, recognizing not only the ways in which its prom-ises were betrayed by the government but also the limited nature of those promises to begin with. From ethnic minority accounts of Panglong, we begin to get a picture of the primarily economic motives that prompted the three signatory groups to join the union. The cynical, often hostile quotes from minority leaders regarding Burmese unity present an unapol-ogetically honest view of the challenges of ethnic unity in a country deeply scarred by its colonial years. In fact, it is in this side of the myth that we see the truth in one British operative’s comment that minority resistance during the independence struggle against the Japanese “was based as much on hostility to the Burmese of the plains as on loyalty to the British regime.”49

At the same time, this version of the myth falls short in refusing to ac-knowledge the inconsistencies in the positions taken by various ethnic mi-nority and insurgency groups. In a 2003 article, Christina Fink reminded observers that “there is no unity of opinion on political strategy within minority communities” and even within groups representing minority inter-ests, “unity has been created through coercive mechanisms: by marginaliz-ing or removing dissenters.”50 Jessica Harriden explores these coercive mechanisms in a 2002 article on the politicization of Karen identity. Ac-cording to Harriden, “Karen identity as espoused by KNU leaders is sin-gular and exclusive, with an emphasis on pan-Karen solidarity in opposition to other ethnocultural, politico-ideological, and religious movements.”51 Because this version of Karen identity is only representative of a minority of Karen people, it ignores the diversity within its own community, thus weakening the movement overall. Harriden’s analysis can be applied to other organizations representing ethnic minorities that are often guilty of generalizations of unity and homogeneity that strongly resemble those made by the Burmese government.52 It is absolutely necessary that, when evaluating the myth of Panglong, ethnic minority groups recognize the

49. Charles Cruickshank, quoted in Andrew Selth, The Anti-Fascist Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945: The Racial Dimension, Occasional Paper 14, Center for Southeast Asian Studies (Townsville, Qld.: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1983), p. 16.

50. Fink, “Ethnic Politics at the Periphery,” 2003, <http://www.burmadebate.org/burma View.php?article_id=26&page_no=2>, accessed July 9, 2006.

51. Jessica Harriden, “Making a Name for Themselves: Karen Identity and the Politiciza-tion of Ethnicity in Burma,” Journal of Burma Studies 7 (2002), p. 86.

52. Other analyses of factionalism within ethnic insurgency groups are Ashley South, “Karen Nationalist Communities: The ‘Problem’ of Diversity,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29:1 (April 2007); and Desmond Ball and Hazel Lang, “Factionalism and the Ethnic Insur-gent Organizations,” Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Working Paper, no. 356 (Can-berra: The Australian National University, 2001).




presence of similarly dominating and exclusionary myths within their own histories.

Rethinking the Myth of Panglong

Despite the betrayal by the military government of most—if not all—of the key components of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, the calls for a return to the “spirit of Panglong” still occur; they are becoming more prevalent in writings about the prospects for federalism in Burma.53 This implies that, even as various “offi cial” histories continue to delude with regard to participation and motivation at the conference, the vision of ethnic and national unity that Panglong represents (or at least suggests) remains com-pelling. Similarly, contemporary ethnic identity in Burma has been funda-mentally shaped by the legacies of Panglong.

The initial circumstances of participation in or exclusion from the agree-ment played a prominent role in determining how different ethnic minority groups chose to demonstrate their opposition to the Burmese government. The three participants in the conference were all among the last to rebel, staying loyal to the government and even fi ghting other ethnic insurgen-cies as members of the armed forces. The Shan and Kachin rebellions did not begin in earnest until it became clear that the military government under Ne Win had no intention of honoring the promises made at Pang-long. All those groups that were not party to Panglong rose up almost im-mediately following independence, and despite a series of ceasefi res signed throughout the 1990s, some are still engaged in active confl ict with the central government. Yet, even as this essay and several others have docu-mented the limitations of claims to Burmese unity via Panglong, the confer-ence, the agreement, and the myths retain a strong pull on the consciousness of Burmese of every ethnicity.

In the years following the conference, ethnic minority groups (the Karen in particular) did not hesitate to express their skepticism at the shortcom-ings of the Panglong gathering. Yet, as demands for secession fade and the reality of the Burmese nation-state becomes more entrenched, even ethnic minority voices are calling for a return to the “spirit of Panglong.” Martin Smith notes the shift among many ethnic minority groups to a focus on in-clusion in politics rather than opposition.54 When some of the primary

53. See, for example, The New Panglong Initiative, 2001, <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/ RationalePanglongInitiative%5B1%5D.htm>, accessed July 16, 2006; and Khin Maung Win, “Federalism and Burma,” Legal Issues on Burma Journal (Bangkok), no. 9 (August 2001).

54. Martin Smith, “Ethnic Confl ict: The Challenge of Civil Society in Burma,” in Strength-ening Civil Society in Burma, Burma Center Netherlands and Transnational Institute, ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), p. 39.




opposition groups (including the Democratic Alliance of Burma and the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma [NCGUB]) dropped their demands for independence, appeals to Panglong began ap-pearing in their work.55

Allusions to Panglong can also be seen as attempts to refer to what is likely the only event in Burmese history that retains some degree of legiti-macy with regard to ethnic unity. The myths of the conference, the agree-ment, and the vague “spirit” of this event are fundamental elements of the identities of all ethnic groups in Burma, whether as participants or as op-position. Any discussion of national unity must acknowledge the effects that Panglong has had, and continues to have, on ethnic politics in Burma.

Constructing a New History of Panglong

What are the necessary steps in reassessing Panglong and its consequences? In the following section, I offer fi ve suggestions for historians and students of Burma interested in uncovering more of the complicated history of this formative event.

First and foremost, more of an effort needs to be made to gather indi-vidual and collective remembrances of Panglong and of the meetings that occurred between and within ethnic groups both before and after the con-ference. Burmese history generally addresses pre-independence ethnic issues through the lens of Panglong, and while it was likely the most defi nitive event, similar discussions and negotiations were occurring within ethnic groups at the time. It is among those groups that were not invited to Pang-long (either because of their geographical location within Ministerial Burma or because the participants considered their input to be inconse-quential) that the most historical research needs to be conducted.

Second, a reappraisal of Panglong must also recognize the limited na-ture of the promises that were part of the agreement. Although Aung San made signifi cant concessions to the minority leaders such as granting full autonomy in internal affairs, the negotiations did not take place with all parties on an equal footing. The motivations for participation varied among the ethnic minority signatories, yet economic concerns were of pri-mary importance. Recognition of this fact is necessary in breaking though false claims of “ethnic unity” that are attributed to Panglong.

Third, the complicated and often contradictory roles of the participants in the conference need to be critically examined. I recognize that in the

55. See, for example, NCGUB Statement, “Statement on Occasion of 51st Anniversary of Union Day,” 1998, <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199802/msg00239.html>, accessed July 17, 2006.




case of Aung San this is a particularly diffi cult task because of the near-mythical status he has assumed as the “father” of modern Burma. In this article, I have given a very brief account of his complex views and actions with regard to ethnicity and the Burmese nation, but this topic must be addressed in far more detail. The positions of the ethnic minority leaders at Panglong must also be reviewed, as well as the dynamics that led the AFPFL to work mainly with traditional leaders at Panglong, disregarding their more democratically inclined allies.

Fourth, scholars must engage in a critical study of the formation of he-gemonic identities among ethnic minority groups. Works by Jessica Har-riden, Christina Fink, and Ashley South are notable in this regard, but for the most part this diffi cult and complex aspect of the history of ethnic confl ict in Burma remains untouched. Granted, the illusion of unity and solidarity is often vital when a group is engaged in a struggle for survival against a more powerful enemy (as most ethnic minority opposition groups have been against the Burmese government for 40–50 years), but the reap-praisal of founding myths must occur at every level of this confl ict. Recog-nizing exclusion can be a painful process, but it is necessary in order to redress the wrongs of the past and create a more inclusive community for the future.

Finally, all the people within the borders of the Burmese state (and the many who have been exiled both voluntarily and involuntarily) must engage with diffi cult questions: What does it mean to speak of the Burmese na-tion? Who is included or excluded from this entity? These questions must be answered so that the ethnic and religious exclusion that marred Pang-long is not repeated. Ethnic confl ict exists in every society and its visible presence often depends less on the existence of true ethnic harmony and more on the ability of a dominant central power to impose a hegemonic identity. Although the space for critical discussion remains severely lim-ited within Burma itself, it will be necessary for the Burmese people to col-lectively discover a meaningful foundation for a national community, a task that seems monumental in a country whose very name remains con-tested to this day.56

Conclusion

Both history and the collective memory on which history is founded are constructed concepts. National myths are not unchanging entities; even

56. Although the government offi cially changed the name to “Myanmar” in June 1989, most people outside of the country continue to use the name “Burma” either in solidarity with the democratic opposition, as a form of protest against the illegitimacy of the present govern-ment, or simply as a matter of convenience and continuity.




dominant, hegemonic narratives of a nation are contested and reshaped, sometimes subtly, sometimes drastically. Can we engage in a collective reap-praisal of Panglong, constructing an “alternative history which emphasizes the dynamic, multiple, and contested nature of historical identities”?57

Burma (and indeed, any multi-ethnic nation) faces the dilemma of at-tempting to build national unity on a myth that is perceived in drastically different (often exclusionary) ways by the different groups it seeks to in-corporate. In this essay, I have attempted to present a history of Panglong that goes beyond the offi cial account and to identify the different ways the conference and its effects are mythologized by the various confl icting groups in Burma. As a national myth, Panglong is crucial to deciphering the persistent ethnic confl ict that has plagued Burma since independence, but it is also necessary to reinterpret this “common history” in a way that recognizes ethnic diversity and even ethnic confl ict, particularly if the “spirit of Panglong” is to have any resonance in fostering national unity.

Is it possible to acknowledge a nationalist founding mythology that is basic enough to be effective in inspiring loyalty to the nation while simul-taneously being fl exible enough to allow individuals and groups the free-dom to respond to, contest, and reshape those myths when necessary? The Panglong Conference is the event that came closest to embodying ethnic unity in Burma, and it remains a compelling image of the possibility of ethnic unity. But calls for a return to the “spirit of Panglong” will remain ineffective unless the event and its consequences are understood. The reas-sessment of modern Burma’s founding myth will be a necessary step in the struggle for national unity.

57. Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, p. 16.



Documents

as.2008.48.6.889.pdf