ASEAN and the Creation of a Regional Community

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ASEAN and the Creation

of a Regional Community

MIE OBA

After the ASEAN Concord II called for the building of an ASEAN Community in

2003, the creation of an ASEAN Community became a concrete part of the

political agenda for the nations of Southeast Asia, and an ASEAN Community

is scheduled to be created in 2015. However, it will all be for naught if the

ASEAN Community that is established does not truly contribute to the stability

and prosperity of the region. From this point of view, the article will attempt

to evaluate the development of an ASEAN community concept and efforts to

create it. To clarify the ideal of a true community, this article will take up

Karl Deutsch’s concept of “pluralistic security communities” and reconsider

what a community requires. The article will state that the efforts to create an

ASEAN Community should not be underestimated, and the blueprints for the

creation of the ASEAN Community outline the formation of a true regional

community. It will, however, conclude that in reality there exist factors within

the ASEAN region that may shake the development of an ASEAN Community.

It has to be said that the fostering of a sense of community at the level of

ordinary people, as well as the creation of a community in which fundamental

values and norms are shared, are distant propositions.

Introduction

The ASEAN countries have been calling for the creation of a regional commu-

nity ever since the First ASEAN Summit in 1976. The “Declaration of

ASEAN Concord” adopted during that summit announced: “Member states

shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts

to create a strong ASEAN community.”1 This call for the creation of an

ASEAN community at the summit—which was held just a year after Indochina’s

fall to communism—was little more than a political slogan. In 2003, however, a

second Declaration of ASEAN Concord—adopted at the Ninth ASEAN

Summit—called for the building of an ASEAN community by 2020. After that

point, the creation of an ASEAN Community became a concrete part of the pol-

# 2014 Institute for International Policy Studies 63

Asia-Pacific Review, 2014

Vol. 21, No. 1, 63–78, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2014.925200

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itical agenda for the nations of Southeast Asia. Subsequently, the establishment of

the ASEAN Community was brought forward, with the intention that it be

achieved by 2015.

Since the association’s founding in 1967, ASEAN has increased its presence

within East Asia and the international scene. This has been due to progress in

regional cooperation that has exceeded the initial expectations of those both

within the area and outside it, as well as due to the economic success of some

of the ASEAN countries. To the present day, the ASEAN countries have put

their group to good use as an organization and have sought to maintain stability

and prosperity within the Southeast Asian region. While strengthening the organ-

ization, they have continued to build relations with important extra-regional

powers in a manner that benefits ASEAN countries, and they have sought to

create environments in the wider region and internationally that are favorable to

them.

The creation of an ASEAN Community has now become more than a mere

political slogan. However, it will all be for naught if the ASEAN Community

that is established does not truly contribute to the stability and prosperity of the

region. This raises the question of what is required for the creation of a true com-

munity within the broader international society. The perspective one has on that

question leads to the further query of how one should evaluate the hypothetical

“ASEAN Community” that can be inferred from the various blueprints for it

that have been presented so far. This article will first examine the concepts for

communities that exist within the broader international society, relying on Karl

Deutsch’s concept of “pluralistic security communities” and reconsider what a

community requires. Secondly, it will review the process of the development of

the concept of an ASEAN community and the progress of actual efforts to

create it, which is scheduled in 2015. Thirdly, it will clarify the factors that jeo-

pardize the building of an ASEAN Community in at least the short- to mid-

term. Finally, this article will investigate the following question: How can one

evaluate the specifics of the ASEAN Community, based on the perspective of

creating a true community? Besides, the author will make a brief attempt to con-

sider the types of tasks that remain to be carried out if the ASEAN Community of

the future is to contribute to the stability of both Southeast Asia and the wider

regional environment of East Asia.

What is a “community” within the internationalsociety?

To begin, the author will briefly consider, from a theoretical perspective, the for-

mation of communities within the broader international society. During the 1950s,

European integration continued to advance through developments such as the

64 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V MAY 2014

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establishment of the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM. It was during this period

that Karl Deutsch proposed his concept of a “security community.”2 The security

community that he proposed was a “group of people [that] has become ‘inte-

grated.’” Deutsch did not consider being integrated as merely being unified in

one political unit. The integration to which he referred was the state in which a

“sense of community,” as well as its institutions and practices, had been attained

to such an extent that the people within the integrated area could reasonably expect

that “peaceful change”— through institutionalized procedures instead of through

the use of armed force—would resolve disputes. By the existence of a sense of

community, Deutsch meant that—at the very least—it had been agreed that

common social problems ought to and could be resolved through the process of

peaceful change.3

Deutsch organized conditions according to two criteria: First, multiple politi-

cal units could either become unified or not. Second, the people in those political

units could either share values and norms sufficiently with one another, or they

could not. Combining these two criteria, Deutsch proposed four possible con-

ditions. He defined an “amalgamated security community”—in which the states

are politically united and their societies share values and norms—as well as a

“pluralistic security community”—in which political units co-exist independently,

yet their populations share the same or similar values and norms.4

Regardless of whether there exists an amalgamated security community or a

pluralistic security community, the dynamic involved is one of resolving conflicts

that arise through peaceful means rather than through the use of force. That is, in a

pluralistic security community, sovereign nation-states continue to co-exist as sep-

arate units politically, and yet the people of those states share values and norms to

such a degree that, if some sort of dispute or conflict of interest were to arise

between the nations, there would be no possibility of a resolution through the exer-

cise of armed force. This is distinct from another current of regional integration

theory in vogue at the time of Deutsch’s writing, “neo-functionalism,” which

focuses on political integration and the consequent formation of supranational

entities.

It would seem that the concept of the pluralistic security community—

suggesting that the creation of communities was possible and that regional inte-

gration could be achieved even without the existence of supranational entities—

was the concept that conformed to Europe’s reality, where the actual delegation

of sovereignty proceeded with considerable deliberation. On the other hand, it

cannot be denied that even that concept presents an extremely high threshold

for its attainment, as it encompasses the sharing of values and norms not just

among the elite but also among the general populace. This is all the more true

when sovereign states endowed with many different political systems and econ-

omic structures, varying levels of economic development, and distinct social,

ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 21, NUMBER 1 65

ASEAN and the Creation of a Regional Community

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cultural, and historical backgrounds all jostle with one another. This also suggests

that it would be difficult to achieve a Deutsch-style pluralistic security community

within Southeast Asia, a diverse region in many respects.

That said, Deutsch’s argument for a pluralistic security community demon-

strates that, even if a collection of states fails to bring about political inte-

gration—that is, to unify as one state—there may still be an option for

achieving peace and stability within the region. Furthermore, the “peace” that

today’s international society seeks refers to something more than merely a lack

of war breaking out between states. The present global standard holds the achieve-

ment of a “positive peace” as important. This means removing, within individual

countries, conditions such as those in which some individuals are subjected to

social oppression, perhaps due to ethnic conflicts or religious strife; those in

which some people monopolize the fruits of economic prosperity and progress;

or those in which some of the country’s citizens fall into extreme poverty. In

that sense, one of Deutsch’s perspectives has become all the more important

today: In creating a community, it is essential to share values and norms not

just at the level of the elites but also among the general populace.

Adler and Barnett are generally regarded as having re-evaluated and devel-

oped Deutsch’s argument. Within these two scholars’ theory of the concept, secur-

ity communities are considered an evolved form of cooperative security in which

systems for confidence-building, conflict prevention, and the like function

reliably, and in which peace is maintained between multiple states.5 However,

their argument minimizes the importance—stressed by Deutsch—of sharing

values and norms not just among elites but also at the level of the general popu-

lation. Acharya, who considers the development of ASEAN to have been part of

the process of creating a security community within Southeast Asia, essentially

builds his argument while relying on the concept of such a community in the

sense that Adler and Barnett intend when they use this term.6

However, if the idea is to create a true community, then it will not be enough

to make the community’s major theme the removal of conflict between nations,

based solely on agreements among the elites of each nation. In the event of any

attempt to create a community within Southeast Asia, it will indeed prove

crucial to achieve the pluralistic security community that Deutsch proposed, or

something cohesive that is close to that—at least in the end. It is clear and signifi-

cant that the ASEAN countries are striving to create a community while taking the

requirements of forming a true community into sufficient consideration, at least

within their discourse, as will be explained in the following section. One piece

of evidence in support of this is the fact that these countries have made the spread-

ing of “universal values”—including the protection of human rights, democracy,

and the establishment of the rule of law—one of the goals of the ASEAN Political

Security Community (APSC). Moreover, it is of interest that, in recent years,


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ASEAN has been touting the phrase “people-oriented.” In the next section, the

author will outline the existing developments towards the creation of an

ASEAN community and investigate the degree to which these developments

can be evaluated as efforts towards the creation of a true community.

The emergence and development of the idea of an“ASEAN Community”

The author does not deny that the attainment within Southeast Asia of cooperative

security that is intended to eliminate conflict on the basis of agreement between

national elites has been a great challenge. As is well known, the “hot war” in

Vietnam—which was a result of the Cold War between East and West, and

which was also linked to nationalism—was not the only conflict to break out in

the Southeast Asia of the 1960s. Even in the non-communist areas of the

region, there was no end to the conflicts that arose, including the disputes over

the Sabah issue and the formation of the Malaysian federation, Indonesia’s

policy of confrontation towards Malaysia regarding those disputes, and Singa-

pore’s breakaway from the Malaysian federation. The point of departure for

ASEAN lay in the question of how the non-communist nations of Southeast

Asia would achieve good-neighbor diplomacy and stabilize national boundaries

within the region—in spite of the deep-seated antagonism and mutual distrust

between them. This antagonism and mutual distrust could not be easily brushed

aside. However, the ASEAN countries agreed upon one thing at a bare

minimum: It was essential for the stability of the region that this enmity not be

allowed to come to the fore. Precisely because this agreement existed, ASEAN

has endured as an organization, and it has fostered good-neighbor diplomacy

over the decades of its existence.

The First ASEAN Summit of 1976—as well as the Declaration of ASEAN

Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC),

which were both adopted at that meeting—clearly demonstrated the direction

that the group would take: Its members would conduct good-neighbor diplomacy

while containing their enmity and mutual distrust. The Declaration of ASEAN

Concord explicitly mentioned political cooperation alongside cooperation

between ASEAN members in the economic, social, and “cultural and information”

fields. Specifically, the document stipulated, inter alia, that the signatories would

hold summits as required, sign the TAC, ponder the next steps towards the early

establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and

shore up ASEAN as an organization conducive to political cooperation. It also

declared: “Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional iden-

tity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community.”7



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The TAC is a treaty expressly stating that, for the stability of Southeast Asia,

each nation should cooperate based on principles such as respect for national

sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic politics, and the peaceful resolution

of conflicts. This treaty can be interpreted as stating the fundamental principles

of ASEAN cooperation. It should be noted that the TAC was a treaty for amity

and cooperation in Southeast Asia, rather than simply within ASEAN. It was

hard to imagine this actually occurring, given the situation in the region when

the treaty was signed in 1976. However, the title of the agreement thus included

the nuance that the principles outlined within it were not merely agreed upon

by the ASEAN member states but ought instead to be eventually extended

throughout all of Southeast Asia. This was out of political consideration, in the

short term, towards Vietnam and the other nations of Indochina, and represented

an attempt to avoid friction with them. Looking at the long term, however, one

could also interpret this as ASEAN, at the time, demonstrating its orientation

towards the region, which transcended the confrontations of the Cold War.

Amid the acceleration of East Asia’s economic development and interdepen-

dence following the 1985 Plaza Accord, the ASEAN countries, too, achieved

economic growth. However, the stature of the Chinese economy had grown,

and the ASEAN countries saw it, in threatening terms, as a competitor for invest-

ments. These nations thus began cooperation aimed at achieving the intra-

regional economic integration that had until then been stalled, including, in

1992, agreeing to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Against the

backdrop of a changing regional environment following the conclusion of the

Cold War, Southeast Asian countries that had formerly been outside ASEAN

achieved accession: Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and, finally,

Cambodia (1999). This brought the establishment of “ASEAN 10” and cleared

a path towards the creation of a community encompassing the whole of Southeast

Asia—the community that had been proposed in the Declaration of ASEAN

Concord and the TAC.

The Asian financial crisis—which began with the collapse of the Thai baht in

the summer of 1997—struck a sharp blow to the economies of Southeast Asia, and

it also provided a great shock to countries with authoritarian developmentalist

regimes that had ensured their legitimacy by achieving economic growth. In Indo-

nesia, for example, economic collapse provided the impetus for the fall of the

Suharto regime, which had survived for approximately three decades. However,

the ASEAN countries were able to achieve economic recovery earlier than

expected by receiving assistance—from the IMF and via the New Miyazawa

Initiative in Japan, for example—and by making efforts to change their domestic

political and economic regimes. Furthermore, although cooperation aimed at

achieving regional integration within ASEAN temporarily stalled, it did continue

at a fundamental level.


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It was during these developments that, at the October 2003 ASEAN Summit,

the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) was adopted. This docu-

ment declared that an ASEAN Community—consisting of the three pillars of an

ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and

an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)—would be established by

2020.8 Several decades after the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord had

called for the establishment of an ASEAN community, there was now a proposal

for the creation of a regional community that was imbued with some kind of

specific vision. While this was in part due to a strong initiative by Indonesia, it

was also an extension of the developments towards ASEAN integration that had

begun in the 1990s and which has been described above.

Subsequently, at the 12th ASEAN Summit of January 2007, it was decided to

bring forward the establishment of the ASEAN Community by five years, to 2015.

January 2008 then saw the submission of the AEC Blueprint, followed by the

APSC Blueprint and ASCC Blueprint in June 2009.9 These three Blueprints,

along with a fourth document, the IAI Work Plan (2009–2015), together

formed “the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009–2015).” The decision

was thus taken to replace the Vientiane Action Plan—which had been adopted

in 2004 as the roadmap for the creation of the ASEAN Community—with this

new set of documents.10

ASEAN also made progress in efforts to reform itself organizationally, pre-

mised upon the creation of the ASEAN Community. At the 37th ASEAN Minis-

terial Meeting of June 2004, ministers discussed the necessity of establishing a

charter for the organization, and the Vientiane Action Plan—adopted at the

Tenth ASEAN Summit at the end of the same year—ranked the enactment of a

charter as a task that would aid the building of the ASEAN Security Community.

Furthermore, at the end of the following year (2005), the Kuala Lumpur Declara-

tion on the drafting of the charter was adopted at the 11th ASEAN Summit; thus,

for the second time it was decided to formulate a charter. This declaration also

explicitly mentioned agreement on an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) that was

to be composed of ten experts, one from each of the ASEAN member countries.11

A report by the EPG was submitted at the 12th ASEAN Summit in December

2006, and this was adopted as a set of guidelines for drafting the charter. At the

same meeting, it was decided to establish a High-Level Task Force (HLTF) com-

prised of representatives of the member countries. Subsequently, the HLTF sub-

mitted a draft ASEAN Charter to the 13th ASEAN Summit in December 2007,

at which all the member states signed the document, which would thus come

into force in December of the following year (2008).12

In recent years, ASEAN has repeatedly affirmed that the creation of the

ASEAN Community is the organization’s highest priority, and it has been

calling for cooperation in regional integration that is intended as a stepping-



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stone towards the creation of the community. An example of this is its appeal for

enhancing “ASEAN Connectivity.” At the October 2013 ASEAN Summit, it was

agreed that discussions would begin that would set forth a vision for what was to

be done after the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015.13

From the standpoint of creating a true community, it is crucial that the

ASEAN Community be formed from three pillars: political and security, econ-

omic, and socio-cultural. Of these three pillars, it is cooperation in the field of

economics—aimed at creating the ASEAN Economic Community—that has

gained the most attention and which is also said to have produced the most con-

crete achievements. AFTA is the core of the AEC; in January 2010, the first six

(and more economically advanced) ASEAN countries eliminated tariffs among

themselves, thus bringing AFTA to completion. These six ASEAN nations have

eliminated duties on 99.65% of all items on a tariff-line basis, and even the

four countries that have joined ASEAN more recently have reduced duties to

between 0% and 5% on 98.96% of all items. Furthermore, in accord with these

developments, each country’s usage of AFTA has greatly increased.14 That

said, the argument that the creation of regional communities—both in Southeast

Asia and throughout all Asia—cannot realistically be expected to achieve much

other than economic integration is highly influential. However, if economic inte-

gration is to make progress, then political stability in the region will be essential;

this will absolutely require both the maintenance of domestic security and the

stabilization of relationships between nations. Moreover, if each country’s citizens

hold to values and notions of conventional wisdom that differ too much from those

of other countries’ citizens, and if the domestic systems based on these ideas exist

as inviolable, then it will be difficult to aspire to further development of trade in

services or the liberalization of investment.

In other words: economics, on one hand, and politics and security, on the

other, are inextricably linked. Moreover, if one’s goal is to attempt to bring

about a regional community amid continuous globalization and a growing

cross-border linkage of the various activities in which people engage, then, ulti-

mately, one will have to face head-on the problem of sharing values and norms.

In this sense, it is extremely important to heed Deutsch’s argument that it is

crucial to share values and norms when forming a security community. That

the ASEAN Community is composed of these three pillars can be taken as evi-

dence that those attempting to create this community are undertaking this task in

earnest.

Particularly crucial among these pillars are the specifics of what the APSC

is aiming to achieve. While continuing the strengthening of cooperative security

that has been mentioned previously, the APSC is endeavoring to complete tasks

that go beyond that. According to the APSC Blueprint that was adopted in 2009,

the three largest pillars of the APSC are as follows: First, the APSC is to start


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with a foundation of shared values and norms. Second, the APSC is to strive for

the achievement of comprehensive security, encompassing cooperative secur-

ity—replete with, among other things, systems for confidence-building, preven-

tive diplomacy, and conflict resolution—as well as elements of non-traditional

security, which includes measures to deal with terrorism and crimes that cross

national borders. Third, the APSC is to aim to create an outward-facing commu-

nity while gaining the cooperation of countries outside the region and yet still

ensuring “ASEAN centrality.”15

What deserves particular attention is that the APSC attempts to create a com-

munity based upon a bedrock of shared values and norms. The Blueprint further

indicates that the values and norms that are to be shared consist of the universal

values that—within the international community as it has existed since the end of

the Cold War—have particularly grown in their legitimacy as global standards.

These include democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Previously,

the ASEAN countries had mutually opted not to involve themselves in one

another’s affairs in terms of democracy or human rights problems, based upon

the notion that these were under local jurisdiction. Around 2003, however, the

members changed their stance. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II states:

“The ASEAN Security Community [ASC] is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s

political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in

the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just,

democratic, and harmonious environment.” This was the first time that the term

“democratic” was used in an official ASEAN document.16 Furthermore, the

ASEAN Charter that was adopted in 2007 expressly listed “to...live in peace

with the world at large in a just, democratic, and harmonious environment” as

one of the organization’s purposes. Another of the purposes listed was “to

strengthen democracy, to enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to

promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.”17 Moreover, the

ASEAN Charter provided for the establishment of a human rights body,

leading to the 2011 creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on

Human Rights (AICHR).18

The actual degree of democratization—or its maturity—differs considerably

between the ASEAN countries, and there has been strong criticism of the com-

position of the membership of the AICHR, who are government representatives,

not private experts. However, if one looks at the treatment of the above-listed

universal values—including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—in

the Blueprints of the ASEAN Community, they indicate that the ASEAN

countries aspire to create a community that goes beyond a mere extension of

the pursuit of economic benefits and the good-neighbor diplomacy that have

been present from the association’s beginning.



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Factors that jeopardize the ASEAN Community

As has been demonstrated, the Blueprints for the ASEAN Community contain all

the elements necessary for the creation of a true community. However, despite the

considerable virtues of the Blueprints, one can see, among the conditions inside

and outside ASEAN, numerous factors that could possibly jeopardize the solidar-

ity and cohesiveness of the ASEAN Community.

To start with, values and norms clash within ASEAN. As mentioned in the

previous section, ASEAN now sets out universal values, such as democracy,

human rights, good governance, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms, as

among its aims. That ASEAN has come to emphasize these universal values

means that its member states must, in their cooperation and activities within the

organization, loosen their interpretation of the principle of non-intervention in

domestic politics, which has thus far been upheld to what might be deemed an

excessively strict extent. The essence of the “ASEAN Way,” which is the set of

operational norms that have formed from the years of practices accumulated

since the establishment of ASEAN, is in clear tension with this: It consists of

strictly interpreting respect for national sovereignty and non-intervention in dom-

estic politics, as well as of cooperating while staying out of matters under national

jurisdiction as much as possible. However, the universal values mentioned above

clearly concern the ways that domestic regimes within countries are organized.

Logically, at least, if ASEAN is to set a new course towards being able to

touch upon such issues, devising particular standards, and aiming for their attain-

ment, then the body will have to strive for cooperation that includes reforms to the

domestic regimes of ASEAN members. This suggests implementing changes to

the old ASEAN Way itself. These developments can be taken as a search for a

“new ASEAN.”

Thus, a new direction for ASEAN has emerged—one in which the body sets

forth universal values that impinge upon the ways that domestic regimes are orga-

nized, and, moreover, one in which a partial reconsideration of the ASEAN Way is

required. One underlying factor is the advance of democratization—albeit

uneven—among the ASEAN countries. This advance has primarily occurred

among the early members of the body, including Indonesia, and was spurred by

the Asian financial crisis. Another factor among the early members of ASEAN

has been the emergence of the idea that the ASEAN Way itself should be

changed to stimulate effective progress in cooperation. A report by the Eminent

Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter has asked that the consensus-based

decision-making that is a crucial component of the ASEAN Way be reconsidered.

This reflects the views of those ASEAN countries that hold to this idea.19

However, although it is largely the more economically advanced and earlier-

joining countries within ASEAN that are seeking a new ASEAN, the countries late


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in joining the body—namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (collec-

tively designated as the CLMV countries)—have been less receptive to both the

attainment of universal values and the loosening of the ASEAN Way. It would

seem that these countries wish to maintain the “traditional ASEAN.” The

ASEAN nations that acceded in the 1990s joined the body under the precondition

that they would not be subject to pressure of any kind from ASEAN itself or from

other member states concerning matters such as human rights and democracy.

Therefore, the change of direction towards a new ASEAN that has been proposed

since the turn of the millennium does not match the basic orientation of the CLMV

countries. Within ASEAN, Myanmar’s domestic regime had come to be seen as

particularly problematic. However, Thein Sein was elected Myanmar’s president

in its 2011 general election, thus ushering in the end of military rule. Under the

new civilian-led government, liberalization has been proceeding at a rapid pace,

including a significant expansion of political freedoms as well as economic

reforms.20 These developments in Myanmar could even be interpreted as pro-

motion of the new ASEAN by one of its newer members. However, there are

still various limitations in regard to these developments (including Myanmar’s

democratization itself) as well as to the governmental system, in which fully

one-quarter of the members of the Assembly of the Union (the national parlia-

ment) are appointed by the commander of the nation’s military. In evaluating

the effect of Myanmar’s democratization on ASEAN, it will be necessary to

pay attention to how the country leads the ASEAN Summit that it is hosting

this year.

There is also a country in which the ultimate fate of democracy remains

unclear: Thailand. Compared to the other ASEAN countries, democracy had

progressed well in Thailand, and it had been a country that actively pressed

for democratization within ASEAN. For example, in the latter half of the

1990s, it was Thailand that took the stance that a more proactive response

was required vis-a-vis the junta in Myanmar, as well as concerning Cambodia

after its coup. However, the opposition between the Red Shirts, who supported

Prime Minister Thaksin—ousted in 2006—and the Yellow Shirts, who sharply

criticized the prime minister and his supporters, has destabilized democracy

within the country, as well as disrupting the political situation in Thailand

ever since.

In October 2009, the AICHR was established.21 However, the AICHR is

composed of government representatives, and the body has been criticized as

not necessarily possessing the authority to correct violations of human rights

within particular countries, or as being otherwise deficient. Then, in 2012, the

ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was adopted. However, this declaration

stated that guarantees of human rights should be granted after consideration of

each country’s particular situation and differing cultural, geographical, and his-



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torical backgrounds. For reasons such as these, it has been noted that it provides

only a low level of human rights guarantees.22

In other words, there is overall agreement between the ASEAN countries con-

cerning the general idea that democracy should be achieved and that human rights

protections should be strengthened. However, in the end, each nation has wide

latitude as to how, and to what degree, it will go about this, and the reality is

that there is considerable variation between them. For the time being, preserving

ASEAN unity will require that this variation be permitted. However, because of

this, it is predicted that there will be significant limits to the actual degree to

which values and norms will be shared within the ASEAN Community, at least

in the short to medium term.

There is one thing that may determine whether divisions will form between

the ASEAN countries concerning values and norms, as well as whether such a

development will jeopardize the unity of ASEAN as it attempts to create its com-

munity: ASEAN’s dealings with extra-regional countries. Within East Asia—of

which ASEAN is a part—there is a mismatch between the regional structure in

terms of security and the areas that are bound together by economic interdepen-

dence. That is, the hub-and-spokes system of East Asian security (with the

United States as the hub) excludes China—an indispensable nation when it

comes to economic interdependence in the region. This situation differs entirely

from, for example, that of Europe, in which the respective borders of NATO

and the EU do not give rise to any fundamental contradictions.23 Furthermore,

the ASEAN countries differ in terms of their respective closeness to the United

States and China, and this exacerbates the mismatch.

Moreover, China has not only been rising and increasing its influence among

the ASEAN countries in recent years, it has also been hardening its diplomatic

stance towards its neighbors, including those that are members of ASEAN.

China is said to be shoring up the impression that it holds an unspoken veto

power within ASEAN. Frequently noted as an example of this is that during the

July 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the host country of Singapore

took Chinese pressure into consideration when it rejected a Filipino-Vietnamese

proposal to deal with territorial issues in the South China Sea. The final conse-

quence was that a joint communique was not issued.

The United States on the other hand—under the Obama administration’s

rebalancing policy—has continued its active engagement in multilateral regional

frameworks in East Asia, all of which are institutionalized with ASEAN at the

center. This was demonstrated by the fact that the United States signed the

TAC in 2009, as well as by the fact that it participated in the expanded ASEAN

Defense Ministers’ Meeting, known as ADMM+, and in the East Asian

Summit (EAS).24 As the United States and China each attempt to extend their

influence on the ASEAN countries, the differences between the latter in their


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stances towards the two great powers are threatening ASEAN unity to a greater

and greater degree.

The CLMV countries—particularly Cambodia—have taken diplomatic

stances that are closer to China’s than to those of the other ASEAN countries.

Certainly the CLMV countries are close to China geographically (all except

Cambodia border it), and, within ASEAN, they are relatively behind in terms

of economic development. Thus, the reality is that they have come to rely on

China for a great deal in terms of the growth of their economies from the

bottom up and of the building of social infrastructure, as well as other areas.

Domestically, China must contend with human rights issues that stem from

ethnic tensions, and it has benefited from adhering strictly to the principle of

non-intervention in domestic politics. Because of this, China and the CLMV

countries—which support the traditional ASEAN—are also in step when it

comes to taking a less-receptive stance on the way forward on regional

cooperation and the spreading or strengthening of universal values such as democ-

racy, human rights, and the rule of law. However, one must pay attention to the

fact that the CLMV countries are not monolithic. For instance, many people in

Vietnam have complex feelings towards China, a country with which historically

they have fought countless wars. The two countries are also in conflict over the

disputed Spratly Islands, which are located in the South China Sea. Myanmar,

too, has been making progress in terms of democratization, as well as in rapidly

improving its relations with Western countries. This is serving to offset the

close relationship with China that Myanmar has maintained to date. However, it

is still certain that, compared to the other ASEAN countries, the CLMV countries

are closer to China economically as well as in terms of their perspectives on values

and norms.

Conclusion

The establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015 looms large. The 2011 Bali

Declaration on the ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali

Concord III) announces that the ASEAN Community will, via engagement with

global issues, also contribute to the creation of a global community.25 As

described above, in October 2013, the 23rd ASEAN Summit in Bandar Seri

Begawan saw the decision to discuss a post-2015 vision for the ASEAN Commu-

nity. At the same summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) resolved that

a working group at the senior-official level would be established to direct the

vision-drafting process over the next four years in the run-up to the 27th

ASEAN Summit.26 Thus, ASEAN documents are being released under the

premise that a regional community will be built in 2015, and the quest for a

way forward after that has begun.



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However, although the Blueprints for the creation of the ASEAN Community

outline the formation of a true regional community that fulfills all the requirements

of such a community—as suggested by Deutsch several decades ago—in reality

there exist elements within the ASEAN region that may harm ASEAN unity.

Moreover, it has to be said that the fostering of a sense of community at the

level of ordinary people, as well as the creation of a community in which funda-

mental values and norms are shared, are distant propositions.

At present, there are significant preconditions that must first be fulfilled if

people are to be able to enjoy their lives and livelihoods as individuals: There

must be stable order among and within nations; there must be a sufficient mech-

anism in place to resolve disputes peacefully and without resorting to force; and

there must be no possibility that people will be subjected to warfare. On this

account, there has been a minor border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand,

but, overall, since the establishment of ASEAN, countries have reined in armed

conflict among them. It would seem that, among the national elites, there is

nearly complete agreement over the peaceful resolution of conflicts—the conse-

quence of years of good-neighbor diplomacy via the ASEAN Way. Today,

however, for the people who reside in the region, enjoying peace in the true

sense of the word would mean that their fundamental human rights and rights

as citizens are guaranteed; that conditions are created in which they will never

know human rights violations or persecution; and that they will never suffer

from extreme poverty but will have a genuine opportunity to lead their lives

with the dignity that human beings deserve—lives that are culturally enriched.

Furthermore, the ideal is that all who reside in Southeast Asia—and not just

some people in some countries—should be able to enjoy these benefits.

The slogan “people-oriented ASEAN” suggests that the ASEAN Community

is aimed in the direction not of mere attainment of the common interests of the

elite but instead towards the creation of an ASEAN in which the general populace

can participate and which is based upon “a sense of we-feeling” that comes from a

common destiny. A point of interest for the future is the pace at which ASEAN,

which proclaims such high goals, will achieve the creation of a true community

of that kind.

Notes1 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, Indonesia, February 24, 1976.2 Deutsch, Karl, Political Communities and the North Atlantic Area,

Princeton University Press, 1957.3 Ibid, p. 5.4 Ibid, p. 7.


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5 Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998.

6 Acharya, Amitav, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, Routledge, 2001

7 Declaration of ASEAN Concord.8 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, Indonesia, October 7,

2003.9 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Jakarta ASEAN

Secretariat, January 2008.ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security CommunityBlueprint, Jakarta ASEAN Secretariat, June 2009, ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, Jakarta ASEAN Secretariat, June 2009.

10 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community(2009–2015), Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, March 1, 2009.

11 ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEANCharter, Kuala Lumpur, December 12, 2005 http://www.aseansec.org/18030.htm (Accessed May 30, 2009).

12 ASEAN, Press Statement by the Chairman of ASEAN on the Special ASEANForeign Ministers’ Meeting, ASEAN Secretariat, December 15, 2008http://www.aseansec.org/22114.htm (Accessed May 31, 2009).

13 Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on the ASEAN Community’s post-2015vision, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 9 October 2013.

14 Shimizu, Kazushi, “The World Economy and ASEAN RegionalIntegration,” Ishikawa Koichi, Shimizu Kazushi, and Seiya Sukegawa,eds., An ASEAN Economic Community and Japan, Bunshindo, 2013, p.8.

15 APSC Blueprint, 2009.16 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, Indonesia, October 7,

2003. In addition, the word “democratic” was subsequently usedrepeatedly in ASEAN-related documents.

17 ASEAN, Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Chapter 1,Article 1, 4., 7.

18 ASEAN, ibid, Chapter IV, Article 14.19 The report of Eminent Persons’ Group on ASEAN Charter, 2006.20 Clapp, Priscilla, and Suzanne DiMaggio, Sustaining Myanmar’s

Transition: Ten Critical Challenges, Myanmar Challenge Report, AsiaSociety, June 24, 2013, pp. 3-5.

21 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Inauguration of the ASEANIntergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 23 October 2009.Also, for a work that critically analyzes the activities of the AICHR throughconsideration of the more long-term process of acceptance of human-rights norms by ASEAN, see: Tan Hsien-Li, The ASEAN IntergovernmentalCommission on Human Rights: Institutionalizing Human Rights inSoutheast Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

22 “The First ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Criticized” Jakarta Post, 29October 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/29/first-asean-human-rights-declaration-criticized.html.

23 On this point, see: Shiraishi, Takashi, “The Rise of China and the Shifts in



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http://www.aseansec.org/18030.htm



http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/29/first-asean-human-rights-declaration-criticized.html

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/29/first-asean-human-rights-declaration-criticized.html

East Asia,” nippon.com, May 7, 2012 http://www.nippon.com/ja/in-depth/a00801/.

24 For the details of, and background to, the rebalancing policy of theObama administration’s first term, see: Bader, Jeffery A., Obama andChina’s Rise: An insider’s account of America’s Asia strategy, BrookingsInstitution Press, 2012.

25 Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations,“Bali Concord III,” Bali, Indonesia, 17 November 2011.

26 Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on the ASEAN Community’s post-2015vision, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei.

About the author

Mie Oba is a Professor at Tokyo University of Science. She obtained her M.A. and

Ph.D. at the University of Tokyo. Her major is International Relations and the poli-

tics in Asia-Pacific/East Asia. She is the specialist of the development of regionalism

in this region as well as theories of regional integration and regionalism. She has a

lot of articles including “The New Japan-ASEAN Partnership: Challenges in the

Transformation of the Regional Context in East Asia” in Kojima, Takaaki and

Takashi Shiraishi eds., Japan-ASEAN Relations, ISEAS, 2013, “Northeast Asia

After the Global Financial Crisis: Power Shift, Competition, and Cooperation in

the Global and Regional Arenas,” Pempel, T.J., ed., The Economic-Security

Nexus in Northeast Asia, Routledge, 2012, “ASEAN’s External Relations and the

Changing Regional Structure in East Asia: Can ASEAN Stay in the “Drivers’

Seat”?” ASEAN Study Group Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs,

March 2010, “Regional Arrangement for Trade in Northeast Asia” in Aggarwal,

Vinod, and Min Gyo Koo, eds., Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving

Structures for Managing Trade, Financial and Security Relations, Springer, 2007

pp. 89–119, “Japan’s entry into ECAFE,” in Tomaru, Junko, Makoto Iokibe, Caro-

line Rose, eds., Japanese Diplomacy in 1950s, Routledge, 2007, Ajia Taiheiyo

Chiiki Keisei heno Dotei: Kyokai-Kokka Nichi-Go no Aidentiti Mosaku to Chiiki-

Shyugi (The Invention of the Asia Pacific Region: A History of Regionalism and

Search for Identity by Japan and Australia as Liminal Nations), Minerva Shobo,

2004.


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http://www.nippon.com/ja/in-depth/a00801/

http://www.nippon.com/ja/in-depth/a00801/

Documents

ASEAN and the Creation of a Regional Community