Asia Pacific Newsletter 5.2 2014

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:Putzmeister: Chinese Take-OversPerceptions of He Shen and Zhuge LiangThe Question of Chinese Cultural ModernizationThe Challenge of Digital InterceptionChile–Taiwan FTA ProspectsPaiwan Bronze Knives and Igorot Hand DrumsProneness for dialectical thinking in TaiwanMarxism, Capitalism and Democracy

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFLeon van Jaarsveldt

GRAPHIC DESIGNERJonathan Spangler

LOGISTICAL COORDINATORAngel Li

CONTRIBUTORSBernd BurkhardtFabian FoehKevin Wee LinVaclav LinkovFernando SchmidtIgor SitnikovDwi Siska SusantiJanet TanSerafettin Yilmaz

This issue’s cover photographs were taken by Blowing Puffer Fish (top, CC BY), Cipher (middle, CC BY-SA), and Luke Ma (bottom, CC BY). All other photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, attributed appropriately, and licensed as indicated. The text of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter is licensed as Creative Commons BY-NC-SA.

The Asia-Pacific Newsletter is a publication by the student body of the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. It is purely amateur and informal collaboration, and it is a strictly non-commercial publication that is not for sale under any circumstances. We do not derive advertising or sales revenue, or donations of any kind.

Call for PapersThe Asia-Pacific Newsletter publishes a diversity of content created by IDAS/IMAS students and faculty as well as others interested in regional affairs. This content includes original research, opinion and editorial columns, book reviews, conference reports, alumni experiences, brief current events blurbs, photography, graphics, and other creative work. Submissions, including text and images, must not have been previously published in other media, either in print or online.

Text submissions should be sent in an editable format (not .pdf). Endnotes and bibliography should be kept to a minimum and follow the Chicago Manual of Style’s “Notes and Bibliography” system. Please include the citations in brackets directly in the text (i.e., [1]), and do not use the software-based footnote tools. Please also include a brief biosketch and portrait photo.

Submissions, questions, and other ideas for inclusion should be sent to [email protected] and CCed to the current editors: Jonathan Spangler ([email protected]) and Leon van Jaarsveldt ([email protected]).

For complete and updated Submission Guidelines, please visit:

goo.gl/eoVNz2

1 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Contents

LETTERS

3 DAVID HOLMDirector’s Welcome

4 LEON VAN JAARSVELDTLetter from the Editor

FEATURED ARTICLES & REPORTS

5 BERND BURKHARDTPutzmeister: Chinese Take-Overs

8 VACLAV LINKOVPerceptions of He Shen and Zhuge Liang

9 FABIAN FOEHThe Question of Chinese Cultural Modernization

17 DWI SISKA SUSANTIThe Challenge of Digital Interception

19 FERNANDO SCHMIDTChile–Taiwan FTA Prospects

23 IGOR SITNIKOVPaiwan Bronze Knives and Igorot Hand Drums

27 KEVIN WEE LINU.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

31 VACLAV LINKOVProneness for dialectical thinking in Taiwan

33 SERAFETTIN YILMAZMarxism, Capitalism and Democracy

MISSION COMPLETE

36 SERAFETTIN YILMAZ Reflections on Graduation

CONFERENCE REPORTS

38 LEON VAN JAARSVELDTITS 6th Africa-Asia-Australasia Regional Conference

40 JONATHAN SPANGLERInternational Conference on Language and Communication

CULINARY ARTS

41 CHEF TANChinese Meatballs and Cabbage

VOLUME 6 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2014 • 2

Welcome back to NCCU, and to those of you who have been travelling dur-ing the Winter break, wel-come back to Taipei. We had ten days of very nice weather here during the break, warm and dry, but things are now back to normal – cold and wet. Never mind, soon it will be too hot once more, so enjoy it while it lasts!

I am pleased to an-nounce that we have seven new courses on of-fer in IDAS this semes-ter: these are Raviprasad’s course ‘Contemporary India’, Wan-Ying Yang’s ‘Gender Politics’, Pei-Yu-an Tsai’s ‘Social Security

Policy’, Mei-Juan Wei’s ‘Democ-racy and Democratisation in East and South Asia’, Chu-Ing Chou’s ‘Comparative Education’, Tsai-Wen Sun’s ‘Comparative Politics in Southeast Asia’, and ‘Theories of Culture and Society’, which I teach. Some of these will be per-manent additions to the IDAS course offerings, while others will be offered from time to time, so take advantage of these opportu-nities. There are also cross-listed courses, which you will find on the new and improved IDAS web-site. The information on course offerings has just been updated by Leon van Jaarsveldt, who deserves a big thank-you for this. In future, we plan to have an accurate list-ing on the website of all IDAS courses that are actually taught, as well as general information about course offerings.

This semester also sees the first of our advanced students teaching an undergraduate course, a devel-opment that we should also cel-ebrate. Dean Karalekas is teaching a course, ‘Social Development: a Comparative Perspective’, in the Department of Sociology. In the future, I hope that lots more of you will take advantage of such opportunities to gain valuable teaching experience. This also helps the University. In a separate development, Janet Tan is playing a leading role in coordinating dis-cussions on Dean Chuang Yi-Chi’s plan for foundation undergradu-ate courses in English. These are intended to expedite internation-alisation at the undergraduate level in the College of Social Sciences. If you haven’t heard about this, and you are interested, please con-tact Angel or Janet.

Please also keep an eye on Jona-than Spangler’s ASAP Communi-qué, which comes to you by email on a regular basis.

You will also be aware I think that IDAS students and I now hold a monthly meeting. Refreshments provided. These are intended as a forum for raising matters that concern you, discussing matters of general interest, and catching up with old friends. If you haven’t come along yet, please do!

That’s it for the moment.

Kind regards,David Holm

Dir

ecto

r’s W

elco

me

Dr. David HolmDIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

We have seven new courses in IDAS this

semester: Raviprasad’s ‘Contemporary India’,

Wan-Ying Yang’s ‘Gender Politics’, Pei-Yuan

Tsai’s ‘Social Security Policy’, Mei-Juan

Wei’s ‘Democracy and Democratisation in East and South Asia’, Chu-Ing

Chou’s ‘Comparative Education’, Tsai-Wen Sun’s

‘Comparative Politics in Southeast Asia’, and

‘Theories of Culture and Society’, which I teach.


It is a pleasure to once again present to you a new edition of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter. I hope that this edition finds you in good spirits and ready for the coming semester. Many a new development is visible within IDAS. Director Holm has estab-lished weekly meetings to which all are invited to raise concerns and make suggestions for the future of IDAS. Also, seven new courses have been intro-duced to the mix, some of which will become permanent IDAS fixtures. Courses are now added and updated directly to the IDAS website and re-flect only those courses actually available within

IDAS.We would also like to use this

space to congratulate all our new-est graduates, whose hard work serve as a shining example to use all. To Jose Guerra Vio, Serafet-tin Yilmaz, Philipp Klotz, Sabrina Habich, and Juan Uriburu Quin-tana we wish you the very best for the future. Also, as some of you may know, Dean (his name not his title) Karalekas is now teaching a course, ‘Social Development: a Comparative Perspective’ for the department of sociology, setting an example for all fellow IDAS students, who are encouraged to make course recommendations on completion of their qualifica-tion exams. In addition, Janet Tan is working on establishing foun-dation undergraduate courses in English, a project for Dean Ch-uang Yi-Chi, to which all have

been welcomed to participate and share ideas. For more information you can contact Janet directly.

Back to the current newsletter, we are thankful for all the excellent contributions made here by both IDAS and IMAS students, and we would like to encourage you con-tinual participation. As we move forward, we hope to increase the frequency of publication, and we would be glad to see the numbers of editorial staff and submissions increase likewise. We would like to welcome our fellow students to participate, both as editors and authors. We welcome all submis-sions, especially short essays, pho-to essays, term papers, recipes, and anything other submission you think fellow IDAS students may be interested in. For more infor-mation on submission guidelines, please refer to the ‘Call for Papers’ at the front of this issue.

As always, we hope that you will enjoy this edition of the ASAP newsletter, and we thank everyone for their participation and contri-bution: most notably the authors, and a special thanks to Jonathan Spangler for his excellent design-ing and layout skills. For more in-formation on current events, you can also refer to Jonathan’s weekly newsletters, and to the frequently updated conference postings by Dharndhanate.

Until next time,Leon

Lette

r fro

m th

e Ed

itor

Leon van JaarsveldtEDITOR-IN-CHIEF, APN

DOCTORAL STUDENT, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

Jonathan SpanglerGRAPHIC DESIGNER, APN

DOCTORAL STUDENT, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES


TAKEOVERSPutzmeister is just one example among many Chinese takeovers in Europe in recent years. With the onset of the Financial Crisis of 2008, China appeared to be on the brim of making Europe its latest economic conquest: China acquired state bonds of highly in-debted European countries, including Spain, Portugal and Greece. Chinese companies

participated and won tenders for large-scale public infrastructure works in Poland and in the Balkans… and Chinese enterprises start-ed to acquire major European companies like there was no tomorrow- and they still do so. Many observers soon started to fear the sellout of cornerstones of European com-petitiveness, with market leaders in technol-ogy and high-tech know-how crossing the

counter. Subsequently, this rapid increase of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment dur-ing the crisis, led high-profile politicians to issue alarmed statements on the matter. In 2011, EU Commissioner Günther Oettinger made the remark that “China is taking over the European Union- and we Europeans sell our soul”- capturing both notions of fear and helplessness towards these new inves-tors with seemingly unlimited credit lines.

It surely came in handy for the Chi-nese that European companies had been deeply affected by the crisis- indebted, cash-strapped and often defaulting into bankruptcy. In Germany alone, more than 30,000 companies had to make their way to bankruptcy courts in 2008, with many more following in 2009. And the situation ap-peared even bleaker in most other European countries. It was such failures, which for the first time provided Chinese companies ample- and most of all easy- opportunities to access a formerly secluded market. In the past considered outsiders to the European market, Chinese investors came to system-atically outbid others at a critical junction in the crisis, with strong official (as well as un-official) support on the part of the Chinese government.

Putzmeister: Chinese Take-OversChinese acquisitions in Europe may be mutually beneficial arrangements

For most people, the name “Putzmeister” will not ring a bell. In the sophisticated business of concrete pumps, however, the “Mittelstand” company from the South of Germany is a long established household name and truly a global player. Putzmeister has been the market leader in its field for many years – its concrete pumps were used in the construction of the highest building of the world, the Burj Dubai; they were employed to mitigate reactor meltdowns in Chernobyl and Fukushima; and are valued across most large-scale construction sites worldwide. In 2012, Chinese conglomerate Sany Heavy Industries acquired Putzmeister for the astounding sum of €360 million. The acquisition sent shockwaves across the entire industry, though Chinese acquisitions in Europe were by no means a new phenomenon. Yet, the takeover of Putzmeister made clear for the first time the true extent to which Chinese capital was able to penetrate the European market and the increasing clout of Chinese investors in general.

By Bernd Burkhardt

Putzmeister, a German manufacturer of concrete pumps, is but one of many companies that have been taken over by Chinese investors in recent years.

Photo: Putzmeister Solid Pumps GmbH / CC BY-SA 3.0


CHINESE STATE IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTSIn the case of China, the state plays a key role in shaping and encouraging Foreign Direct Investment of Chinese companies abroad. As China entered the World Trade Organiza-tion in 2001, Chinese companies faced much stiffer competition from foreign enterprises that were then able to enter the Chinese do-mestic market. This created the need to also venture abroad to enhance standing vis-à-vis international competition. Accordingly, in the past ten years, the Chinese government has implemented an investment promotion policy known as “Go Global” and actively promotes Chinese companies in their move abroad. However, the Chinese investment regime has taken shape, even before the for-mulation of “Go Global”, with the tenth five-year plan of 2001. It is only one step among many, embedded into a wider frame-work of outward investment reform policies and strategies of China, and it should be understood as a transitional point towards a wider investment regime taking shape. In-deed, official support had almost come to be of prescriptive character, as the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs went so far as to issue country- and industry target lists in 2004. Furthermore, “Go Global” has been backed by a whole set of foreign relations initiatives. This is particularly visible in the case of Chinese investment to Africa, where extensive political and diplomatic overtures have been applied from the Chinese side.

Chinese investment overall, but particu-larly to European countries has increased rapidly in size. Overall these investments have grown by factor 18 since 2003- more than 3 billion US$ have been invested by Chinese companies. Also, the State Fund CIC -China Investment Corporation- has by now already invested in excess of 20 per cent of its holdings in Europe. Though on the rise, Chinese investments are currently still of rather marginal importance to the overall EU economy. Compared to all other non-European investors in 2009, China only ac-tually held 0.29 per cent of all foreign invest-ments in Europe. Adding in the investments

originating from Hong Kong, the total still accounted for only a meagre 1.6 per cent. In a list compiled by the American Heritage Foundation, sampling all Chinese invest-ments above a 100 million US$ threshold, destination Europe also comes in last with only 8 per cent of such investments. Nev-ertheless, their impact on certain countries, and selected industries, is considerable.

ACQUISITIONS AND COOPERATIONIncreasingly, Chinese firms make their entry to the European markets by acquisition and accordingly M&A has become the fastest growing segment of investment flows from China. Such takeovers are critical as they entail widely acknowledged risks for the Eu-ropean market- loss of critical technology, competitive threat, possible state interfer-ence exercised through State-Owned En-terprises and not least fear of outsourcing. The fact that Chinese companies specifically target liquidity troubled enterprises, has seen them carve a reputation of their own. For many, the vulture-like investment behavior has come to symbolize a typical Chinese way of takeover- preying for troubled firms, ac-quiring them at a premium discount price, and ultimately divulging their (material and immaterial) assets.

While it may appear that the aforemen-tioned Putzmeister should be no different than other companies in this regard, it still represents a paradigm shift largely over-looked by those entangled in the panicky hullabaloo of European China critics. There are several facts that set Putzmeister apart from the presumed standard procedure of Chinese acquisitions. Firstly, Putzmeis-ter was acquired at a time when the worst of the crisis had already passed. Surely, the company had been negatively affected, but its revenues and solid number of contracts assured future survival in the market. Sec-ondly, it had been acquired for a compara-tively high price- Sany’s takeover ultimately represents the 8th largest takeover in Europe for the first half of 2012. More importantly however, remains the fact that Putzmeister

In 2011, EU Commissioner

Günther Oettinger made

the remark that “China

is taking over the European

Union – and we Europeans sell our soul,”

capturing both notions

of fear and helplessness

towards these new investors

with seemingly unlimited credit

lines.


FEATURED ARTICLE


was not simply a target in the acquisition, but possessed independent agency in the pro-cess. Although being a global market leader, Putzmeister was still a family enterprise held through a holding. Like many companies in the region, the company was for this fact deemed inaccessible to takeover advances, which was obviously a misconception. Sur-prisingly, the proprietors willingly entered into the takeover for the best of the com-pany and to further its strategic development in various regards.

With China becoming an ever-larger con-struction market, losing out on its devel-opment meant losing out on a window of opportunity for vast future growth. Access to the Chinese market however, could best be ensured by partnering with a local stake-holder like Sany. Furthermore, the Chinese investor would provide much needed access to funds, retain the brand and headquarters for their international operations as well as secure local jobs until 2020. Indeed the deal had been sufficiently sweetened not by money- of which the Putzmeister founder Karl Schlecht and his family surely had quite enough- but by its suitability to the long-term aims of the Putzmeister company.

Preceding cases have already proven that successful cooperation between a Chinese investor and a German target is indeed pos-sible. Putzmeister, nevertheless, is among the first companies to make strategic use their own takeover by a Chinese investor and treat the merger as a step in its long-term objec-tive for global development. By partnering with Sany, Putzmeister will be able to pre-serve and extend its place in the worldwide concrete pump business, a perspective mir-rored by Sany CEO Liang Wengen with sim-ilar fervor: “With this merger, Putzmeister and Sany will create a new and global mar-ket leader for concrete pumps.” Therefore it seems unsurprising that Putzmeister and Sany, only months after the merger, have gone ahead and acquired German truck ce-ment mixer company, Intermix. The take-over will expand Putzmeisters portfolio and better integrate it into Sany’s existing busi-ness, an official statement read.

Indeed, this example can only be de-scribed as a mutually beneficial arrangement. Like any merger, it surely has its difficul-ties, but it represents a new and important lesson to critics of Chinese M&A in the EU: As Chinese in-vestors target increas-ingly valuable and robust enterprises,

the targets are no longer simple objects of desire, instead they are themselves strong agents in a merger with their own ends fur-thered in the process. Takeover by a Chinese investor needs to be understood not under the predicaments of a sellout, but as a deci-sion made out of strategic, long-term con-siderations by the acquisition target, just as much as this notion is ascribed to the Chi-nese investor’s side. APN

Aspects of the construction of the Burj Dubai were the result of Chinese investment overseas.

Photo: Nicolas Lannuzel / CC BY-SA 2.0

As China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, Chinese companies faced much stiffer competition from foreign enterprises that were then able to enter the Chinese domestic market. This created the need to also venture abroad to enhance standing vis-à-vis international competition.

Bernd Burkhardt is a recent graduate of the IMAS program at NCCU. His background is in Sinology and Ethnology, which he studied during his BA in Frankfurt and Vienna. Bernd specializes in economic relations between the PRC and European countries, with his forthcoming Master Thesis critically assessing emerging investments by Chinese companies to the EU. He worked as a Research Assistant at the Center for China Studies in Taipei.



He Shen (1746-1799) was a grand councillor and president of the Ministry of Revenue in the era of Qianlong emperor of Qing dy-nasty. He was responsible for a large scale corruption and after the death of Qianlong he was ordered to commit suicide. He is portrayed as a symbol of corrupt officials. He has also been portrayed as a comic figure in Chinese television dramas. Zhuge Liang (181-234) was a chancellor of state Shu dur-ing the Three Kingdoms period. He was a successful military general and is portrayed as a symbol of loyalty and intelligence.

BIG FIVE PERSONALITY TESTBig Five is a personality theory, which is the most popular in academic research. Accord-ing to Big Five, every human’s personality could be described by five dimensions of personality. These five dimensions are extra-version-introversion, neuroticism-emotional stability, agreeableness-disagreeableness, conscientiousness-disconscientiousness and openness to experience-rigidity.

Subjects of the research were 112 stu-dents met in campus of Central China Nor-mal University in Wuhan. Subjects were asked what they think about Zhuge Liang, He Shen and ideal self and filled a Big Five personality questionnaire for each of these three. I used a questionnaire called National Character Survey, which was originally made by A. Terraciano. This questionnaire con-tains 30 pairs of adjectives, 6 for each Big Five dimension. 6-point Likert type scale was used for answering.

COMPARING THE OFFICIALSZhuge Liang was perceived as a more neu-rotic than ideal self and less neurotic than He Shen, less extraverted as both He Shen and ideal self, less open than ideal self and more open than He Shen, less agreeable than ideal self and more agreeable than He Shen and more conscientious than both ideal self and He Shen. He Shen was perceived as more neurotic and less extraverted, open, agreeable and conscientious than ideal self.

All these differences were statistically sig-nificant (using paired samples t-test) at 0.001 level, with the exception of the difference between ideal and Zhuge Liang’s conscien-tiousness (which was close to 0.05 signifi-cance) and the difference between Zhuge Liang’s and He Shen’s extraversion (which was not significant). Test scores for ideal self and Zhuge Liang’s and He Shen’s personali-ties are in table.

Extraversion is the only Big Five dimen-sion that is usually perceived as neutral by subjects in personality research. All other di-mensions have positive and negative poles. It is better to be emotionally stable, open, agreeable and conscientious than neurotic, rigid, unpleasant and chaotic. Zhuge Liang was perceived as more positive in all these four dimensions than He Shen, which re-sembles his official portraying as being a positive example of man, as compared with He Shen, who is being portrayed as a nega-tive example. We can therefore conclude that opinion about personality of historical fig-ures in Wuhan seems to resemble their por-traying by Chinese media (at least in case of He Shen and Zhuge Liang). APN

Perceptions of He Shen and Zhuge Liang Opinions of Positively and Negatively Portrayed Historical Figures in Wuhan

In this text, I check the difference between viewing personality of positively and negatively portrayed historical personalities among Chinese students in Wuhan. I selected two politicians of imperial China and gave personality questionnaire asking about their personality to students at Central China Normal University in Wuhan. The opinion about personality of both ancient politicians was compared with subjects‘ opinion about the ideal personality.

By Vaclav Linkov

Perception of ideal self, the personality of Zhuge Liang, and the personality of He Shen using a paired samples t-test. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

AcknowledgmentsI thank Guo Yong-Yu, Li Bing-Bing, Liu Yi and Michelle Yik for helping me with this research.

ReferenceTerraciano, A. and other 65 members of

NCS research team, National character does not reflect mean personality trait levels in 49 cultures. Science 310, 7 (Oct. 2005), 96-100.


RESEARCH UPDATE

MODERNISATION AND TRADITIONALISMBenjamin Schwartz, in his article Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism – Further Reflections, defines modernisation as a “Turn which emerges in the history of Western civiliza-tion in recent centuries”. Following this view that modernity is different from tradition, both observable subject to “subsequent on-going evolution”, this paper looks closer at the process of modernization and define its starting point when China found itself con-fronted with Western countries in the 19th century. During this time Western imperial-ism began impacting China after 1840 in the form of exposure to a more superior West-ern military power and the culture that came with it. Experiences gained from the Opium Wars led to big frustration with the status-quo of their own country, which marked the start Chinese political modernization and the century of humiliation.

Thereafter, the debate on China’s national character and its relation to modernization was dominated by the theme of reformation of the national character, as explained by Lin in his book Opening of the Chinese Mind –

Democratic Changes in China Since 1978, which deals with the questions on differences and similarities of Western and traditional Chi-nese values. The notion of the ‘Chinese knowledge as the body, and the Western teachings as the uses’ (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong), stands opposed to the anti-tradi-tional equalization of Western thought and modernization. Such similar underlying top-ics dominated the discourse on moderniza-tion. The view that modernity presented a qualitative break with the traditional Western society of the past, according to Schwartz, stood against the view that the turning point would have been inconceivable without the presence of certain powerful predisposi-tions already present in the Western past. In other words, the question was if there was a dichotomy between traditional and modern society, or an essential cultural difference be-tween the Western world and the rest.

Within the Chinese discourse, the debate on the quality of the national character, and the question on the contrasting elements come up: Is it enough to remodel Chinese values after the Western ones? Or is it maybe possible to transcend those and find a new,

better way to modernity? On the one hand, there is the perception advocating for a lib-eral style-system modelled after the West. According to the research of Geist, this last notion often contradicts the differences be-tween East and West, especially as regards stability and change, morals and laws, de-pendence and independence, collectivity and individualism, harmony and conflict, hierarchy and equality, intuition and rational-ity, and mindfulness and materialism. Here, Chinese tradition is mostly regarded as not useful while the opposing Western values re-ceive mainly positive attributes. Thus, while another group advocates the possibility of a new model, based on Chinese values, the preconditions for this become more impor-tant with the end of the 20th century and the crisis, especially the financial crises, faced by Western societies, which may add a new chapter to understanding modernity and modernisation. Inherent in both discourses is the criticism of the national character and the weakness of Chinese culture as reasons for the failed modernization, as well as to the superiority of Western culture.

CULTURE FEVERThe critics of the Chinese often describe the following weaknesses as characteristic for Chinese culture: inability for cooperation, lack of morals in public, egoism, dependence and submissiveness (“slave character”), a closed mind, linear thinking pattern, and the refusal to learn from others. A difference of the criticism lies in the interpretation of these weaknesses. The official direction of modernization in the 1980s was economi-cally oriented, arguing that primarily for the adoption of economic theories and West-ern technology. In contrast, the discussions by the intellectuals were, above all, culture-based. They saw themselves in the tradition of the May Fourth Movement and called for a New Enlightenment (xinqimeng), and to go beyond May Fourth (chaoyue wusi). This was the first time in PRC-history that critical re-flection could take place. The campaign to promote the idea of ‘practice as sole crite-rion for truth’ (shijian shi jianyan zhenli de wei

The Question of Chinese Cultural Modernization

During the 6th meeting of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the main topic of discussion regarded the cultural development, and the official documents speak of a revival of Chinese cultural values and a need for the channeling of public opinion (yulun daoxiang). Such discussion suggest that CCP leadership has begun to place more emphasis on culture, recognizing it’s potentially important role for politics. This paper emphasises this linkage between culture and the political sphere by looking at events of the 1980s, which proposes a different view on political development, or political modernization, than that which many Western observers often seem to adhere to. The question of Westernization versus Traditionalism is thus part of both the cultural and political movements, and considering the cultural sphere thus leads to a understanding of the ideas of political modernization propagated by the 1989 protest movement, which can also advise us on which approaches to cultural and political modernism the Chinese people prefer.

By Fabian Foeh


yi biaozhun) played an important role in this and encouraged people to break out of their ideological constraint to help change the ex-isting intellectual climate”, as noted by Lin.

After the initiation of reforms, enormous changes in the political, economic and cul-tural realm followed. The consequent feel-ing of cultural loss, the confusion, and the painful choices that each individual had to make in facing the forces of modernization, brought China back to a stage of develop-ment it had faced seventy years earlier. This cultural anomy (wenhua shifan) resulted from modernization and the clash of two differ-ent value systems, and is described by Beate Geist as a typical appearance of a society in transition. Peter Lee, in his paper Social Mal-aise as Reflected in the Literature of the 1980s, notes that “Taboos had been lifted, and writ-ers and intellectuals were probing deeper and deeper into the Chinese condition, each

phase of reflection becoming more exten-sive and creating greater criticism of the fundamental ‘Chinese character’”, leading to the phenomenon of culture fever (wenhuare). Something that had not been possible during the former period.

The traditional structures, habits, and views of the Chinese people collided with the demands of the reforms. Values like egalitarianism and traditional austerity were opposed to the new consumer-based market-economy, and became obstacles for modern-ization. Intellectuals initiated a heated debate on questions about whether to Westernize totally, or partially, and whether Chinese civi-lization was culturally superior to the West and whether science and technology could be used only to materially modernize China, while retaining the Chinese essence.

THE THREE POSITIONSBeate Geist divided these debat-ers into three main groups: culture conservatives, culture critics, and anti-traditionalists. While this simple division might be debatable and without question over-simplifies the issue, it functions well to show the different ways of thinking that are apparent in the discussion. The advocates of anti-traditionalism represent the most radical view of the three groups and ask for a to-tal Westernization or humanization (renhua). For them the traditional values and moder-nity are contradictory and they neglect the value of Chinese tradition. Geist mentions Liu Xiaobo, Bao Zunxin, and Fang Lizhi as representatives of this way of thinking. They advocate for an opening in all domains (quan fanwei kaifang), arguing that Confucianism, an integral part of the traditional culture, cannot be reformed or modernized. Their

thoughts have often been characterized as ‘extreme individualism’ and have been the target of severe criticism.

The group directly opposing the anti-tra-ditionalists is constituted by the culture con-servatives. They are of the view that Chinese and Western values should be connected and that traditional culture can contribute important things to a successful modern-ization, but are divided on how to actually realize this. For the representatives of this group, modernization is not simply Western-ization, but should be done without loosing cultural identity. Probably the most influen-tial movement within this group are the New Confucianists, who want to find elements of Confucian tradition that may have a mean-ing for today’s modern society. For them, Confucianism is defined in universal terms

and is not only of importance for China, but for the whole world. In this value sys-tem tradition is a necessary element, but its idleness has to be overcome. They consider only economy, science and technology as worth adopting, and often do not consider the western values of ideology and culture as useful. Thus, these two directly oppos-ing groups of anti-traditionalists and culture conservatives reflect the two extremes in the historical modernization process of China.

Third group, cultural critics, is not as ex-treme and was very popular throughout the 80s. For this group, tradition and modernity are opposed to each other, but the tradition is not totally neglected. Important represen-tatives of this group are Jin Guantao and Liu

Zaifu, who advocate that in the exercise of building a new culture, one has to rely upon the tradition as starting point. For them ra-tionality and the ability to reflect ones own culture is important and it is necessary to remove the negative aspects of traditional culture and to build a value system based on individuality and subjectivity, but that it is also equally important to criticize Western culture. Li Zehou build a theory on this, in which he plays with the old notion of the catchphrase of the early modernization paradigm “Chinese knowledge as the basis, Western teachings as the uses”, arguing that neither notion is desirable and should be re-placed with the new concept of “Western teachings as the basis, Chinese knowledge as the uses” (xiti zhongyong). The economic utili-tarianism of the open doors reforms seems

On May 4, 1919, Chinese students in Beijing rallied against the Treaty of Versailles. This sparked what is now referred to as the May Fourth Movement. Protests that erupted in the 1980s were seen by intellectuals as in the same spirit as these earlier demonstrations.


FEATURED ARTICLE

Conflict between traditional and modern culture is a common theme throughout the

world, and China is no exception.

Photos: Alberto Carrasco Casado / CC BY 2.0 (top) Aurelio Asiain / CC BY-SA 2.0 (bottom)


to be constructed in this way. Thus both the anti-traditionalists and the

cultural conservatives advocate ideas that tend to make universal claims, with the for-mer stressing liberal-democratic ideas, and the latter, the New Confucianists, a kind of universal Confucianism. In this paper, the distinction between culture conservatives and culture critics are thus mainly based on their differing view of universal values, and the need for the culture critics to question both Western and Chinese values to find the best way to modernization, without adher-ence to a universal claim.

MODERNISATIONThe protest movement that evolved in April 1989, and found its bloody end on June 4, was an important turning point for Chi-nese history in every respect. Within these ‘fifty-six earthshaking days’ there appeared demonstrations in every province of China, including 84 cities and over 600 institutions of higher learning, in which more than 2.8 Million students participated. Li, in his book Culture and Politics in China, describes this movement as “another manifestation of China’s unsuccessful attempt at moderniza-tion” directly connecting the uprising with the issue of modernization. Accord-ing to him, the confrontation in Ti-ananmen Square shows a conflict be-tween the old and the new, the young and the old, and between the Chinese and the West, the adherents of Deng’s Four Cardinal Principles and the prac-titioners of bourgeois liberalism, the authoritarian values of the old and the individualism of the young.

When looking back to the defini-tion of modernization, it becomes clear why this view prevails. The pro-test movement seemed to embrace the perfect preconditions for a new turning point in Chinese history. While the technological realm was in a process of modernization, and different views of cul-tural modernization were hotly debated, the question of political modernization still lacked attention from the authorities. Wei Jingsheng proposed, in his article The Fifth Modernisation: Democracy, that the people were now asking for a ‘Fifth Modernization’, namely a modernization in politics. What I want to look at more closely is the quality of this ‘Fifth Modernization’. Did the people really demand democracy as the fifth politi-cal modernization? Or did their viewpoint of political modernization differ significant-ly from the view of Wei Jingsheng and the Western view of democracy? Here, I chal-lenge some components of this view that

many Westerners take for granted when looking at the protest move-ment, especially that the conflict can be simplified by stating that there was a conflict between the Chinese and the West, or between the authoritarianism of the old order and the individualism of the young order, as Peter Li formulates it. I totally agree with Li’s arguments that China had to modernize its thought and culture at that at times modernization may have been seen as trying to strike a balance between turmoil and harmony but, in contrast to Li and many others, I want to emphasise the fact that the 1989 movement consisted of many different groups, and a lot of people with different views of the modernization and the role of Western values. As I will show, by pointing out similarities in the ques-tion of modernization in both the protest movement and the debate of cultural mod-ernization in the 80s, there was only a small group that truly understood the foundations of Western-style liberal democracy. What most of the students were advocating for was democracy, but most of their definitions significantly differed from those of Western theory. Rather, they were demanding to be heard by their own government and for re-

forms within the one-party system. Following Daniel Kelliher, in his article

Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses: Intellec-tuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement, the Chinese protest movements “rose in three ascending crests in 1978-79, 1986-87, and 1989”. He argues that each protest peri-od brought different groups onto the streets. One of the reasons why the 1989 movement was more important might be seen in the el-evated position of writers and intellectuals in China. Peter Li describe these groups as having much more influence than the intel-lectuals and writers in Western countries. Kelliher also see these groups in a “pivotal role in narrowing down general anti-govern-ment protest into a push for democracy”. They argue that only one of the groups in

society was important enough to lead the movement in a structured way and towards a demand for political change. Contribut-ing to this argument, the term ‘intellectuals’ in China is a very broad term that includes everyone with a higher education. There-fore, students naturally were a part of the movement and contrasted against the less educated protesters like workers, minorities, or peasants. As Zhang Xudong, in his book Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, for-mulates it: “The intellectual elite took on a political importance... as the only players in a cultural national theatre, so to speak, and, by extension, spokespersons for the people and the nation, its culture and its history”. Be-cause they were the only ones able to shape the cultural discourse and had the knowledge to define different directions of the protest movements, they posed a threat to the politi-cal system. No one else was able to define an alternative to the existing order.

But when reports, articles, or books ad-dress the 1989 protests, the Western press and Chinese Dissidents often call it a ‘de-

mocracy movement’. What a lot of people forget is that there is quite a difference in definitions of democ-racy, and in a language like Chinese that is very dependent on context, with words often having several dif-ferent meanings, the direct translation of ‘minzhu’ as ‘democracy’ might too fast be considered the same as a liberal Western-style democracy. The concept of Democracy was very new for the Chinese people. Even though most of the protesters were of the educated elite, most of them had never studied what democracy really

is. So to take a closer at what is meant by de-mocracy, J. Roland Pennock and other theo-rists stress several values as essential, which includes the belief in popular sovereignty, a commitment to the equality of citizens, and the principle of majoritarian decision making with adequate protection of minority rights. In his article, Democracy in Chinese History, Roland Des Forges tried to trace back these democratic values in Chinese history, and found some interesting connections of tra-ditional Chinese values and Western notions of democracy, and concluded that “Chinese democratic tradition shared some basic fea-tures with that of the West, but it also dif-fered from it in significant ways”. He notes that while Europeans have accepted cultural pluralism, political disunion, commercial

This was the first time in PRC history that critical reflection could take place.


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expansion, military conflict, social stratifi-cation, and technological change as natural conditions for the predictable or reasonable development of freedom, liberty, individual-ism, and democracy, the Chinese consider such conditions to be signs of dysfunction, decline, disintegration, and disorder.

A good example comes from Wu’er Kai-xi, as cited in Li’s book Culture and Politics in China, one of the leaders of the student movement who defined democracy shortly after the crackdown on June 4th: “Democ-racy is when the people are in control of the political power, and not political power controlling the people. [Democracy is when] the people can choose their own political and economic life according to their wishes. Democracy is taking these glorious demo-cratic ideas and instilling them in the minds of every citizen of the republic.” In another televised dialogue with premier Li Peng he states, as quoted and translated in Esherick’s article Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China: “On the square, it is not a matter of the minority obeying the majority, but of 99,9 per cent obeying 0,1 per cent.” While the first statement just leaves out im-portant features of democracy, the second clearly shows an opposing view. The eleva-tion of the principle of unity, above that of majority rule, does not fit in the liberal no-tion of democracy as adopted in this paper. As Esherick puts it, it is rather a democratic definition that acts “within the tradition of popular rule (minzhu) thinking in modern China”. Mark Selden, in his article The Social Origins and Limits of the Democracy Movement, states: “In 1989 the most widely shared de-mands emphasized civil rights such as free-dom of speech and the press, a dialogue with the authorities, and the right to organize and protest”, “only a rare few called for free elec-tions, checks and balances, or a multiparty system”. The vision of the students was focused on extending political rights, rather than creating a pluralist system.

ACTIVISTS AND NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACYTo show how the students themselves sys-tematically opposed Western democratic val-ues, I focus here on the excluded aspects of their organizational exercises, which shows how little they have actually embraced the values of democracy. The most obvious vio-lation of the democratic ideas can be seen in the exclusive style of the 1989 protest move-ment. Many of the students and intellectu-als that formed the body of these protests were reluctant to admit in other groups. As Kelliher notes, also indicated by the research of Des Forges, the idea of democracy had

no indigenous tradition in China and there-fore very few sources of tradition to build upon. Unlike in the Western world, modern-ization had come from the outside. There-fore, students like Wu’er Kaixi advocated democracy in the only way that it ever had been embraced in China, and as Sun Yat-sen had done in the early 20th century. The gap between the educated intellectuals and the overwhelming majority of relatively unedu-cated peasants seemed to big for them, and that revitalized Sun’s idea of tutelage, which is that the elite should rule the country until it was mature enough to form a stable de-mocracy.

Then as Kelliher describes the deploy-ment of mass workers as the closest to a mass democracy movement, as these work-ers were the most dissatisfied with govern-ment and therefore its addition would have had the biggest potential for success. How-ever, the fear of violent government sup-pression was raised significantly when the workers joined, as it reminded many observ-ers of the ‘Solidarnosc’ workers movement in Poland. As a result, students and intellec-tuals missed the chance to let them fully par-ticipate, and as Kelliher notes they were only “valued by the educated leaders as cheer-ing onlookers but not as partners”. But not only the workers were intentionally left out. The huge peasant population of China re-ceived basically no attention by the protest-ers, and the educated leaders of the move-ment mostly lived in different worlds from the rural population. A similar situation can be identified for the small, but relatively rich entrepreneurs. The support of this layer of society was substantial, as noted by Perry in his article Introduction: Chinese Political Culture Revisited. Unlike the workers, entrepreneurs were able to participate in political action without being afraid of sanctions from their work units. They were also important for fi-nancial support. Perry notes that they were the ones that made it possible to purchase megaphones for the student leaders, and helped logistically (i.e.. with motorcycles as “Flying Tigers”).

Interestingly, this view that an elite group should take a course of action and rule the mass of uneducated people is a view that actually pretty much resembles that of the communist leaders. This behavior clearly contradicts the basic fundamentals of a Western style democracy. Selden, in his arti-cle The Social Origins and Limits of the Democracy Movement, points out that the students’ main-stream definition of democracy “centered on expanded political rights for the educated elite […] [and] had far more in common with the century long search for national unity

The confrontation in Tiananmen Square shows a conflict between the old and the new, the Chinese and the West, the adherents of Deng’s Four Cardinal Principles and the practitioners of bourgeois liberalism, the authoritarian values of the old and the individualism of the young.


than it did with conceptions of pluralist or participatory democracy”. He also concludes “Most of the democratic activists apparently saw the struggle as one of winning a share of power for intellectuals, certainly not the creation of a democratic system that would empower the unwashed peasantry”. These notions are very important in showing that there were many non-democratic elements in the protest movement, and to de-cloak the common assumption of a democratic move-ment in a Universalist liberal democratic sense. But my aim here is not to debunk the protest movement altogether, or show that it has no contribution for Chinese moderniza-tion, but to note that there were also voices that demanded the establishment of a radical Western-style democracy.

Daniel Kelliher analyzed the protest movements and its notions of democracy, and divided it roughly into two groups. He calls the first one mainstream activists and the other group radical democrats. Following this distinction, the group described above might fit with his label of mainstream activ-ists, who presented the prevailing demands for political modernization. They appeared to be demanding democracy, but in fact were

advocating for a rather conserva-tive reform of politics with most emphasis on the rule of the elite. On the other side, Kelliher posi-tions the radical democrats, which he identi-fies as a minority in the protest group. For him, the mainstream activists are representa-tive of liberalization, which he defines as the “establishment of rights to protect people’s freedoms from government interference”. He argues that only the radical democrats within the protest movement demanded real democratization. Therefore, the values advo-cated by the radical democrats include those of the mainstream activists and go beyond their definition.

I argue that the group of the radical in-tellectuals, identified by Daniel Kelliher, are in many ways identical to the anti-tradition-alists described by Beate Geist above. On June 2, 1989, Liu Xiaobo, Zhou Tuo, Hou Derchien, and Gao Xin published a declara-tion where they provide a much more clear theoretical definition of what democracy is, how it works, and how students have mis-used democratic concepts. They clarified that they were not calling for a reform within the system, but the creation of a new demo-

cratic political culture, as noted in the article by Li. This group was not satisfied with the omission of practical views and suggestions for changes. Liu Xiaobo said: “We appeal to the Chinese people to forsake this tradi-tion of ‘empty democracy,’ a democracy of only ideology, slogans, and [abstract] goals, and begin the construction of the processes, means, and procedures for the operation of democracy”, as Cited in Kelliher’s work. The political modernization they were asking for was totally different than the one posed by the mainstream activists.

Liu thought that the mainstream activists like Li Zehou, were not going far enough in their version of democracy, and used this new term to aim at an old goal and show the weaknesses in the character of Chinese intel-lectuals. For him, as one of the main activists of anti-traditionalism and radical democracy, the traditional Chinese culture has no value for the modernization process, and saw it as a failure to not completely overthrow the Chinese tradition. While for the student

The emergence of a more powerful civil society in mainland China may not reflect the democratic values that many Western observers expect.

Photo: Robert Moposang / CC BY-ND 2.0


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leaders the concept of democracy remained a matter of liberalization, they actually advo-cated for a kind of elite democracy, similar to the concept of ‘New Authoritarianism’ (xin quanwei zhuyi). Perry, in his article Cast-ing a Chinese “Democracy” Movement: The roles of Students, workers, and Entrepreneurs, argues that the “exclusionist style of protest” only “served to reinforce preexisting authority re-lations”. It is important to add here, that the mainstream movement was not totally anti-democratic. As Esherick notes, there were demands for freedom of speech, calls for popular input for government affairs, and other things, but these were not aimed at get-ting the CCP to be more responsive to the ideas of China’s masses, but rather to allow for greater national affairs access to the intel-

ligentsia. Therefore, the definition of this as a democratic movement very much depends on our own definition of democracy, and I think it is eligible to say that for most West-ern observers and media the definition is dif-ferent from what I have described.

CULTURAL HOLISMWe have seen that the most important trends in Chinese modernization have been ques-tions about quality. Repeatedly, there were questions of dichotomy between Western-ization and conservation of Chinese ideas, or between tradition and modernity as the starting point for modernization. As we have seen in the intellectual discourse of the 80s, a majority of intellectuals supported nei-ther of those two extremes, but saw a prag-

matic approach of ‘Absorb the essence and discard the dross’ (qu qi jinghua, qu qi zaopo) as the best way for China’s future. Because the protest movement of 1989 was mostly dominated by intellectuals and students, we find similar tendencies in the documents and statements of the protesters.

In the cultural debate of the 80s we have identified three broad groups with different ideas towards the cultural modernization. Within this debate the anti-traditionalists were the only group that advocated a total Westernization (quan fanwei kaifang), while the cultural conservatives opposed an ex-treme break with tradition and Chinese core values. We can see the same tendency within the protest movement. There was also only a small group that advocated the extreme

Is it necessary to fully Westernize? Or is there a Chinese way to modernization?

Demonstrations in mainland China, such as this one in opposition to environmental pollution, are not synonymous with calls for democracy.

Photo: Robert Moposang / CC BY-ND 2.0


view. In both the cultural and the political sphere, we can find these advocates of a fully embraced Western and liberal democ-racy. In opposition to them, we find other groups like the cultural conservatives or the cultural critics. In both cultural and political realms, it has been objected that the cultural critics were the majority group, and there-fore have been characterized in this paper as mainstream activists. By showing that both the cultural debate and the political protest contained these different groups of people with the same ideas, I believe we can project some of the cultural debates into the politi-cal realm. Both movements were driven by the underlying question that we could identi-fy throughout the history of modernization in China: Is it necessary to fully Westernize? Or is there a Chinese way to modernization? Thus, I believe one can try to use arguments given by the cultural debate and apply them, not only in the cultural, but also in the politi-cal sphere.

What I want to propose here then, draws very much from Benjamin Schwartz, in his article Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism – Further Reflections, who advocates cultural holism. He proposes a somewhat “weaker and more problematic version of both cul-ture and modernity” and criticizes the “ab-solutist dichotomy between ‘individualism and collectivism’”. In other words, he does not think that the antithesis between East-ern and Western culture can function as the central theme of cultural moderniza-tion. We have seen that the Chinese protest movement did not embrace a concept of democracy that promised popular control over government, and that the mainstream activists stayed mostly within Chinese politi-cal tradition. This is reinforced by a survey conducted by Nathan and Shi, presented in their article Cultural Requisites for Democ-racy in China: Findings from a Survey, which finds an overall pattern that political culture may affect democratization in more com-plex ways. This is further supported by the views of many other scholars who note that we can notice different behavior patterns for Chinese and Western developments for modernization. The cultural influence does play a role in shaping the ideas of modern-ization on both sides. But it is of course not the only influence. I thus want to apply the “modest version of cultural holism” of Ben-jamin Schwartz not only to the cultural dis-course, but also to political ideas.

I believe that because both the cultural and the political struggle for modernization in China build upon the same dichotomy, one could take their standpoints on cultural modernization and apply them also to politi-

cal modernization. Of course, this case study of cultural moderniza-tion and the political moderniza-tion in the 1980s can only stand out as one empirical platform in the larger conjunction of history. But I think it gives a good motivation to rethink the development of politics in the context of modernization. What the cultural discourse of the 80s can offer, is a small idea of what the intellectuals could have applied when the protest move-ment developed differently. The mainstream protesters were not drawn to either of the extremes, but adopted a more pragmatic approach. For this we have some evidence in the actions of the protest movement it-self. But it becomes much clearer if we also take the cultural debate into account, which served as a kind of foundation for the think-ing of many protesters.

Therefore, I think it is useful to argue in non-absolute and non-universal terms when talking about the future of China’s develop-ment. Again Schwartz’ “modest version of [cultural] holism” becomes very helpful. Just like in the cultural sphere, I believe that any form of political modernization without un-questionable persistence on universal values, and a more pragmatic approach, often leads to a better result than an idealistic propaga-tion of absolute values. The dependence to necessarily neglect cultural or political values, when relying on a universal system, might well serve as obstacles to improving actual living conditions. A system doesn’t inevita-bly have to present an opposing universal system to lead to a more desirable outcome. Sometimes a more gradual approach, taking into account the distinct cultural-political preferences, can lead to a better result.

Therefore, the debate of modernization, and their argumentation in between the two extremes of anti-traditionalism and cultural conservatism, also reflects upon the politi-cal arena of the protest movement. I believe that especially because the political debate in China was never totally open or free, but rather very much constrained by the ‘Four Basic Principles’ of Deng Xiaoping, that we can also draw upon this cultural discourses in the present where this is more restrained than in the 80s, but still relatively free when with regards to political debate.

As Des Forges notes in his article, Democracy in Chinese History, the Chinese system is “un-likely to be replaced by a completely new kind

of state based on Western models, and with no precedents in the Chinese past “Ameri-cans who favor the growth of democracy in China would do well to remember its check-ered history in their own civilization”. The century old questions of modernization in China, and its development in the 1980s and the Tiananmen protest movement serve as a good case study to show how Western dem-ocratic ideals sometimes rely too much upon a missionary approach, and tends to artifi-cially project their universal ideas into other cultures’ values. If there are actual universal values, there should be no need to promote them actively. Rather, a Daoistic “wu wei, er wu bu wei” (by doing nothing everything will be done) approach, would be much more ap-plicable. In the cultural debate of the 80s, we find this view in the opinions of the cultural critics that advocate a critical approach to Chinese and Western values, and support a more pragmatist point of view. This critical view on Eastern and Western culture should also prevail when analyzing Chinese politics in a scientific way. APN

Fabian Foeh is a graduate of National Chengchi University in Taipei (MA) and Bonn University (BA) in Asia-Pacific Studies / China Studies and currently works as a freelance translator and independent contractor for a US-based compliance agency. After engaging in Chinese cultural and language studies, his research now focuses on business and legal issues in Sino-European relations with a special focus on the influence of and changes in incentive structures. He is currently based in Kiel, Germany, where he is pursuing graduate level studies at Kiel University for Applied Science.


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LAWS OF INTERCEPTIONIn order to protect people from illegal in-terception, many States have enacted legal provision to criminalize cybercrimes; crimi-nal acts dealing with computer networks, and Internet. In terms of electronic communica-tion being accessed legally, each State stipu-lated in its domestic law on how to use inter-ception policy. Justifications for conducting interception by states and its authorities are basically twofold: criminal investigation and national security. Both could be considered as obligations that have to be fulfilled by the State to protect the State security.

Some international standards such as The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cyber-crime, Budapest, of 2001 provide guidelines for States to establish their domestic legis-lation and law enforcement cooperation to fight against cybercrimes. It also enables States to empower its competent authorities for the purpose of specific criminal investi-gation or proceeding to intercept of content

data. The power and procedures for inter-ception shall provide condition and safe-guard that adequate protection of human right and liberty.

In November 2013, The General As-sembly of United Nation reaffirms that the power of States and its authorities to under-take surveillance, interception and data col-lection should not violate or abuse human rights. This United Nation resolution stated the right of privacy in digital age by means that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his/her pri-vacy, family, home or correspondence and the right to the protection of the law against such interferences, and recognizing that the exercise of the right to privacy is important for the realization of the right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions with-out interference, and one the foundation of democratic society”, as seen in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights.

This resolution was initiated by Brazil and

Germany after the leak of mass surveillance that conducted by National Security Agency (NSA) of United States and its allies by Ed-ward J. Snowden - a former NSA contractor. It calls all States to review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding surveil-lance, interception and collecting of person-al data with a view to upholding the right of privacy as human rights.

THE CHALLENGE TO MEETING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDSThe challenge for State and its authorities to meet that international standard is how to balance their responsibility in order to pro-tect security by accessing the power of in-tercepting personal communication and data without abusing human right. To keep the balance in this context is a delicate challenge since it leads to the question of what is most important between the privacy and security? The answer must be varying because each State has its own political, social and cultural

The Challenge of Digital InterceptionIs the acceptability of interception in the digital age at an end?

In the digital age, technologies help people to communicate with partners, families, friends, colleagues, customers or everyone. The use of electronic communications such as telephoning, texting, email, instant messaging, social networking, blogs, videoconference, and other forms enable people to stay connected and interacted with each other even their reside in different geographical location. It enables people to share information in relation to their private, social, and professional life effectively. On the other hand, the use of electronic communication raises a concern of security. Private communication can be intercepted, accessed and used by others illegally (hacked) or even legally (lawful interception).

By Dwi Siska Susanti

The challenge for states in using their power to intercept personal communications and data is figuring how to balance their responsibility to national security without abusing human rights.17 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

interest. The more libertarian the State the more probable that it would set a high stan-dard to protect the right of privacy. On the other hand, the need to protect national se-curity leads to the state increasingly sacrific-ing privacy.

Nothing demonstrates this better than the case Snowden case, where confidential NSA leaks resulted in a lack of trust in Unit-ed States Authorities, affecting both its allies and companies that cooperate with them. This leak went well beyond the US, leading to both foreign citizens and dignitaries to de-mand that the United States and its allies re-spect the right of privacy, made worse by the ruling of the Federal court in New York that the bulk of the NSA’s data is legal. Thusly interpreted as legalised breach of privacy. On January 17th, 2014, President Barack Obama did however take steps to assure that the Unites States will not eavesdrop on its allies, but that they will continue to gather meta-data and information in the interest of

protecting country. A third party overwatch was established. which requires the US Intel-ligence Authorities to acquire approval from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court before using such data. Obama also proposed to establish a panel of independent lawyers to testify before the FISA court if needed. While such actions are not wholly oriented towards privacy protec-tion, they do indicate effort by the United States to try and balance the interception power for security against the right of pri-vacy.

This has however not been that well-re-ceived by United States citizens with a poll, taken after the statement, showing that most Americans oppose the NSA program and prioritize their right of privacy over that of security. Other countries have also respond-ed in a rather skeptical tone to this state-ment, waiting to see further action of how United States (NSA) will enforce their power in the future. Evidently, getting the right bal-

ance between privacy and security in a digital age remains a formidable challenge, but it is of the utmost importance to us all. One possible approach is that each state should have an independent and effective oversight mechanism with clear limitations of the scope and duration of such power, ensuring transparency as appropriate, and account-ability. Its authorities should exercise the power of interception with reasonable cause (not arbitrary), using it as a last resort and consider its impact and effectiveness. APN

Dwi Siska Susanti is a first year student of the Doctoral Program in International Business Law at National Chengchi University. She received her Master of Law from the University of Indonesia and Bachelor of Law from the University of North Sumatera-Indonesia majoring in economic and commerce law. Her research interest is in public/private sector governance and anti corruption policy.

Photo: Altemark / CC BY 2.0


MOTIVATIONS FOR AN FTATo start, it is important to point out what the motivation behind a possible FTA could be for both parties. A concept that underlies the main motivations is that of the competitive state. The concept, as defined by Vincent Cable in his article The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power, refers to that nation that tries to strengthen the relative position of its firms in the in-ternational arena. In this regard, both Chile and Taiwan can be seen as competitive states that are pushed into dialogue by the poten-tial relative economic gains that their firms could obtain from it internationally. In the case of Chile, a Taiwan-New Zealand FTA would strongly damage its gained market po-

sition in agricultural goods, since it is a direct competitor in both products and seasonality. Taiwan has been left behind in the liberaliza-tion process of the past decade, being unable to strike FTAs with any nation due to po-litical reasons. This has generated a relative loss in competitiveness for its firms in rela-tive terms, compared with those from South Korea, Japan, and China. Thus the search for that competitive edge that would give the advantage to national firms is the highest motivation behind the FTA, especially when considering that Chile, a small market per se, could serve as a platform to tap into other Latin American markets thanks to its large FTA web.

Having established this motivation, from

the Chilean perspective if we look at the figures of Chile’s main export products to Taiwan, and its main competitors, we should realize that New Zealand is always among the top market rivals, and has had increas-ing market shares in the past decade. Chile’s main exported products as of 2011, com-prise agroindustrial products and raw mate-rials. For this second category, the tariff rate of most industrialized economies is always 0%, since they are considered inputs for in-dustrial production, needed at the cheapest possible price, in order to retain competi-tiveness. In the case of agroindustrial prod-ucts, however, the tariff rates of Taiwan are generally high, in most cases over 20%, thus establishing a high protection to the local production, be it direct competitors or sub-stitute products.

Chile competes with New Zealand in most of its agroindustrial exports. Of these, the top three are fresh apples, fresh cher-ries, and fish flour. The other competitors are from the northern hemisphere, thus they compete in different seasons, with fish and flour being an exception. As can be ob-served, on average Chile’s landing costs are lower than those of New Zealand. These are products that do not have a strong range of variation in the price ranges, since standard-ization through international certification of production methods have lead to a strong homogenization of production worldwide. In this regard Chile appears more competi-

Chile–Taiwan FTA ProspectsBalancing international competitiveness and political risk

The prospect for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Chile and Taiwan is the story about trying to strike a balance between international competitiveness and political risk, which could eventually harm economic relations. It is important to keep in mind that all the information presented in this case study offers a prospectus for a future situation, and not a current state of affairs. Thus, the approach taken should reflect a policy analysis more than a theoretical or analytical writing. This essay thus analyzes, through different stages, the prospects for Economic Cooperation under a novel framework, since neither Taiwan nor Chile would like to use the existing WTO institutions to negotiate on a multilateral dialogue.

By Fernando Schmidt


tive in its agroindustrial production on aver-age.

Given this above information, local im-porters have been surveyed in order to find out what the main issues were when making a purchasing decision. They can be divided into three areas: Quality, reputation and price. Since quality is standard due to the existence of international certification stan-dards in production, the purchasing decision draws down to the other two factors. Re-garding reputation, New Zealand rises high above Chile. Numerous studies have looked at how New Zealand has managed to trade at premium every single one of its prod-ucts that are covered under the image of a New Zealand national image. Simon Anholt, chief editor of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, as well as lead researcher in the Nation Brands Index research group, has generated yearly surveys that rank nations according to their reputation performance in different areas, and New Zealand has been able to retain a top level reputation for the past decade, which translates into added val-ue for its products. If we were to scale New Zealand’s commercial reputation into a 1 to 5 scale, they would obtain a 5, while Chile would obtain a 3.5. The final element, pric-ing, is where Chile’s competitiveness stands out. Chile’s average price for the same prod-uct tends to be lower than that of New Zea-land. When both countries are faced with the same tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, Chile edges New Zealand, thus allowing it to take the current leading market shares. The ratio of price/quality, thus favors Chile at the current state of affairs.

If New Zealand and Taiwan were to fi-nalize the ongoing negotiations for an FTA, Chile will be faced with much stronger com-petition from New Zealand that would see their tariff and non-tariff barriers reduced as a consequence. Since Taiwan has not signed an FTA with any other economy yet, this would entail that only one of the competi-

tors of the field will be getting such an advantage. Chile’s market share will most probably be reduced in agroindustrial products, even if in absolute terms the total amounts remain relatively unchanged. Even though these products are still a minority in terms of the total trade figures, Chile’s trade policy aims at diversification, and a push away from a com-modity – copper – dependence, which could lead it into complacency and eventually dam-age the competitiveness of the economy as a whole. Chile’s past record of raw material dependence, during the mid 20th century, lead it to a disastrous economic crisis. Even though China has inflated the market price of copper, returning to a mono-export con-dition is not on the mind of Chile’s policy makers.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRSHaving established the motivational ele-ments behind Chile’s push for a possible FTA with Taiwan, it is important to under-stand the current situation of affairs. These negotiations would be carried out under an uncommon circumstance, where both coun-tries negotiate in spite of lack of mutual sovereign recognition. The normal push and block elements that arise in any FTA nego-tiation, therefore, will have to add further difficulties into the political sphere.

The push elements are policy related or market oriented. Since the 1980s, Chile has had a policy of open regionalism with a world-level commercial integration and uni-lateral reduction of trade tariffs, according to the very principles of APEC. Its trade development has lead it to become an ex-port oriented country that aims to become a platform for Asia Pacific countries want-ing to trade with Latin America. A powerful

web of FTAs with over 80% of the world’s GDP, many of which are in Asia Pacific, has been the first building block towards that goal. It is towards this goal that an FTA will be aligned with Chile’s trade policy. As can be appreciated, there has been a clear policy orientation towards trade liberalization. This trend has been further strengthened by the announcement made by the Ministry of Public Finance saying that by 2013, all the tariff barriers for product entry will be re-duced to 0% unilaterally. As of today, Chile’s average tariff payment is 1.5% over F.O.B price. The reduction will only affect Chile’s public earnings by US$ 600 million, which should to be recoverable by increased com-petitiveness in trade, and privatization.

Alongside a clear state policy, the pursu-ing of stronger market shares in Taiwan, a “virgin” market for the reduction of tariff barriers, raises the prospect of pursuing an FTA. Having tariff reductions in the Tai-wanese markets involves relative gains much higher than those expected of any other country that has already signed a number of FTAs, and thus has many different econo-mies facing the same advantages as Chile. In the case of Taiwan, being among the first should mean relative market gains higher than in any other economy. At the same time though, there is one big political item block-ing a potential FTA: Mainland China. Chile had a bilateral trade exchange of almost US$ 30.000 million with China for the year 2011. China has become Chile’s main trading partner, with a very positive trade surplus in Chile’s favor. Not only that, as part of Chile’s Asia Pacific policy, the country has chosen

Santiago, pictured below, will have to follow a similar course of negotiations as New Zealand and Singapore if the government is to sign an FTA with Taipei.

Photo: Michael Ertel / CC BY-SA 3.0


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China as one of its main partners, celebrat-ing on 2010 the first forty years of diplo-matic relations among both countries, with numerous events for the occasion. Lead-ers in Santiago take pride on being the first South American country to switch recogni-tion back to China in 1970, and this stands as a pillar of the bilateral political relations. Strong adherence to the One-China-Policy alongside a strong “legalized” mentality of Chilean policy makers plays out strongly against a Chile-Taiwan FTA, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Following with the political risk and look-ing at it from a Chinese perspective, recent months provided proof that China has no problems in using trade wars to solve politi-cal standoffs. The Philippines saw 200 con-tainers of bananas stuck to rotting at the port of Guangzhou, due to the Scarborough Shoal issue. Alleged infection of the prod-ucts were ultimately proven false, but the damage was already done. Last year, Japan stopped receiving imports of rare earths as a consequence of the capturing of the captain of a Chinese trawler that ran into Japanese Coast Guard Ships near the Senkaku/Daiy-ou islands. China’s expanded economic clout has given it weapons that avoid the need to

bring in the army to defend its political inter-ests. In the case of Chile, even though trade partners are highly diversified, the country is in no position to risk a trade war with its main trading partner.

STAGES FOR PROSPECTIVE FTA NEGOTIATIONSThe current state of affairs reproduces the same first steps taken by New Zealand and Singapore when they approached the issue of attempting to sign an FTA with Taiwan. Since none of them have been completed yet, no other country has been willing to take the risk. The future FTA negotiations should follow these steps:

In the first stage, the Trade Offices po-sitioned in Taipei and Santiago will have to sort out the mechanisms to carry out nego-tiations. In reality, the first contacts do not happen between these offices due to logical physical reasons. The approaches taken starts in an indirect way between the Bureau of Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Eco-nomic Affairs of Taiwan, and the overseas representative of Chile in Taipei. It is these institutions that are in charge of conducting a preliminary approach to analyze the posi-tion of both parties. Here, it becomes neces-

sary to question whether a trade promotion representative is the ideal professional to initiate a trade negotiation. Nonetheless, this is the available communication channel, and it should be expected that professionals in the area of trade negotiations will take over once actual negotiations start. Thus the first main challenge is to ensure an exact flow of communication between the overseas office and the trade negotiators back in Chile. A second step involves the feasibility study. In market terms, there are high compatibilities between Chile and Taiwan. Thus both econ-omies should benefit from trade liberaliza-tion. This study is to be carried out entirely by specialized offices, even though the press claims that the study is done by the represen-tative offices for political reasons. The main obstacle to be expected is the agricultural di-alogue, where a highly protected Taiwanese producer will doubt the benefits of opening up his sector to Chilean produces.

In the Second Stage, a functional cooperation should be established. In order to progress towards an FTA, it is expected that both countries engage in some form of technical cooperation before entering FTA negotiations. New Zealand and Tai-wan signed an investment treaty creating a

Apples are one of Chile’s many exports.

Photo: Mathias Erhart / CC BY-SA 2.0


fund for the development of industrial and agricultural R&D. The same should be ex-pected from Chile and Taiwan, if they were to engage in FTA negotiations. Thus this co-operation on technical elements represents an initial building block, and thus seems to support neofunctionalism. I would disre-gard this final theory for the simple reason that this functional cooperation will not be achieved per se, but rather as a means to-wards a pre-defined goal.

In the third stage, political will should be established. The big question that rises up is: how to deal with China? The chosen strat-egy should be a two-track dialogue approach, where both Taiwan and Chile approach Chinese authorities to make sure that the situation does not involve a political or economic risk. If Taiwan has been able to strike over 14 treaties with China in the past four years, that should be the appropriate communication channel to make sure that a potential FTA does not entail a risk for either of both sides. In ad-dition, there are two other difficulties to be overcome concerning achieving political willingness of both sides to-wards the FTA. The first is the above mentioned fact that Chile will unilat-erally reduce tariffs to 0% by 2013. Given this fact, it may be thought that there is no gain for Taiwan in signing an FTA. This would entail a narrow-minded comprehension of an FTA, since tariff reduction is not the only point covered by Trade Agreements. The second point to consider is the fact that Taiwan has established a workable schedule to join the TPP by the year 2020. Given that Chile is al-ready a founding partner of the TPP, what would be the gains of an FTA? To answer such a question is funda-mental in proceeding with negotia-tions from both sides.

The fourth stage if for Chile and Taiwan to proceed with actual nego-tiations. These should not entail many difficulties, since Chile has been influ-enced by the norms playing out in the Asia Pacific, and has taken an ASEAN way approach to its dealings in trade negotiations with Asian countries. Chile has been very ac-commodative of its Asian partners interests, striking some low quality incremental FTAs that move forward as long as there is con-sensus and consultation mechanisms. In the case of the Chile-China FTA, it was nego-tiated in three stages according to the Chi-nese timetable, with investment and services still being negotiated. In the case of South

Korea, the FTA left out many ag-ricultural products that are being negotiated on a one-by-one basis. Given Chile’s normative influence received from Asia, its negotiators have been able to achieve different quality FTAs that aim to turn into very similar treaties through a flexible timetable.

An FTA between Chile and Taiwan is clearly beneficial to both parties. For Taiwan, it gives it a chance to use Chile as a platform to the rest of South America, and to all the countries with which Chile has already signed FTAs. Chain production cooperation

should pose as a strong incentive to avoid tariff barriers for Taiwanese companies using Chile’s FTA web. In the case of Chile, the motivation is mainly based on the premise of keeping its top level competitiveness in the market keeping its edge over New Zea-

land and other producers of agroindustrial products. The question of how to frame this study relates back to two possible theories. The first one is a clear neorealist perspec-tive where Chile does not move until it sees its relative gains being threatened by a third actor. Thus Chile engages in negotiations to keep these relative gains, which it deems as more important than achieving coopera-tion. Secondly, Vincent Cable’s “competi-

tive state” theory seems more closely suited to understand the situation. A lose in market share might mean a lost in competitiveness for Chile’s firms in the market, since another agroin-dustrial country from the Southern Hemisphere will join the market in better terms of entry, and easier mar-ket access. To keep up the competi-tiveness in the market, and maintain strongly diversified export structure, Chile should look for that FTA. APN

The search for that competitive edge is the highest motivation behind the FTA, especially when considering that Chile, a small market, could serve as a platform to tap into other Latin American markets thanks to its large FTA web.

Fernando Schmidt is a PhD student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University. He received his MA in East Asian Studies from the University of Salamanca, Spain. His research interests revolve around international trade regulations and norms, with a special emphasis on liberalization processes in the Asia-Pacific Region. He is currently working in the Chilean Trade Office in Taipei. He can be reached at [email protected].


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Another interesting puzzle, which seems to be connected with the question of Paiwan bronze knives, is the origin of Igorot bronze drums. I saw these drums in Taipei, but they were brought there by Filipino workers, who use them in their performances at their Sun-day meetings. Igorot is the collective name of several Austronesian speaking ethnic groups from the mountainous area of Northern Luzon in the Philippines, which is called Cordillera. I observed Igorot performances during several Sundays from 2004 to 2009 in one of Taipei’s parks in North Zhongshan Street, the area serving the needs of overseas Filipino workers. Were those bronze drums produced by Igorot themselves? The partici-pants of the performances could not answer this question.

THE PAIWAN AND IGOROT CULTURESThe Paiwan is one among several indigenous

ethnic groups of Taiwan. As Igorot in the Philippines, Taiwanese indigenous peoples speak Austronesian languages, which are spread over the vast area of the Pacific Ocean through all insular South-East Asia, Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia to the Eas-ter Island as a main eastern point, and even into Madagascar in the west of the Indian Ocean. The hierarchical society of Paiwan had the ‘tripartite’ structure similar to that of early Indo-Europeans with the classes of chieftains, nobles, and commoners, which were determined by birth and passed on from generation to generation. Chan says that the Paiwan chieftains and nobles were “hereditary leaders whose genealogies can be traced back more than twenty generations”. Bronze knives were family heirlooms of the upper classes. They played important roles in wedding ceremonies and as a payment of compensation.

There are several dialect clusters in the

Cordillera region of the Philippines; the most important among them are the Ifugao, Kalinga, Kankanaey, Ibaloi, and Bontok. All of them belong to the Malayo-Polynesian branch of the Austronesian languages family. The Ifugao ancestors constructed the fasci-nating rice terraces with the perfect working irrigation systems. The Kalinga are also ex-tensive rice farmers, skilled potters, and ex-cellent in basketry, loom weaving and metal works. They are probably those blacksmiths who produced a specific weapon of many Igorot groups - the head axe. The head axe is named so because Igorot headhunters used it for decapitating their victims. The Bontok perform a circular rhythmic dance imitating certain aspects of the hunting. Exactly such kind of performance as I observed in one of Taipei’s parks. This dance, like always ac-cording to the Bontok tradition, was accom-panied by several hand drums.

Almost all Igorot groups use bronze drums in their spiritual ceremonies. Beside the Cordillera region, bronze drums, until now, are used in the south of the Philip-pines. Drum types are clearly distinguished between northern and southern traditions. Northern traditions relate to various music cultures in continental Southeast Asia, while southern traditions relate to the immediate islands in insular Southeast Asia. Peoples of the Cordillera highlands utilize flat drums, which are called gangsa. In the island of Mindanao, peoples use bossed drums of var-ious profiles. They are played in ensembles, usually led by a row of drums, which are called kulintang, and accompanied by other gongs. The same bossed drums ensembles are found in the Indonesian archipelago.

ORIGIN OF BRONZE KNIVES AND DRUMSTo find traces of the origins of the two ar-tefacts—Paiwan bronze knives and Igorot hand drums—it is reasonable to address the Bronze Age cultures of Southeast Asia. As Hutterer informs the oldest evidence for settled agricultural villages in Southeast Asia, comes from northeastern Thailand (the sites of Ban Chiang, Non Nok Tha) and north-

Paiwan Bronze Knives and Igorot Hand DrumsThe Origins of Two Relict Artifacts from the Asia-Pacific Bronze Age

In 2008 at the ethnology museum of Academia Sinica in Taipei (Taiwan), for the first time I saw bronze knives, which as it was explained on the stand of exposition, are considered one of the three cultural treasures of the Paiwan ethnic group. The two other treasures are ancient pottery vessels and glass beads. These cultural treasures were family heirlooms of the Paiwan upper classes, and they played important roles in wedding ceremonies. The glass beads represented wealth and social status. However, there is no information about the bead-making skills among the Paiwan, or other indigenous peoples in Taiwan. The same is supposed for the bronze knives, with the production techniques and the origin of the bronze knives remaining unclear. Paiwan myths however, suggest that their ancestors brought all these treasures with them when they settled on Taiwan. The origin of Paiwan treasures is an interesting puzzle and in this article I try to find a hypothesis to answer this question.

By Igor Sitnikov


The origins and production techniques of many Paiwan cultural treasures remain unclear.

Paiwan bronze knives, one of the ethnic group’s three cultural treasures, are handed down from generation to generation.

Source: Taiwan Digital Archives, catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/1b/2f/ec.html, CC BY-NC-SA

Glass beads, each with its own unique pattern and legend behind it, are an important aspect of Paiwan culture.

Source: Taiwan Digital Archives, catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/5a/fe/37.html

Paiwan clay pots are used for decorative and ceremonial purposes. Their patterns indicate whether they are considered to be male or female.

Source: Taiwan Digital Archives, catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/5a/fe/35.html


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ern Vietnam (the sites of the Phung Nguyen Period), and dates back to 3000 BC. North Vietnam was the home of a Bronze Age cul-ture called Dong Son. The best-known arte-facts created in this culture are large bronze “kettle drums”. The centre of the Dong Son culture was the region of the Red River ba-sin. Working with bronze was practiced in Vietnam, probably from the second millen-nium BC, and reached its technical and ar-tistic peak around 500 BC – 100 AD. The materials with which bronze drums were made and the skills needed to manufacture

them were such that only the wealthy people would have been able to own them. Dong Son drums were both musical instruments and cult objects. These drums became ob-jects of trade and heirlooms. More than 200 bronze drums have been found across an area from Southern China and Vietnam to eastern Indonesia.

The bronze drums culture were shared by ancient peoples of Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong in China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Ma-laysia, and Indonesia. Did the drums come

to the Philippines by trade routes? Or maybe the ancestors of Igorot migrated to Northern Luzon from somewhere, where a tradition of bronze drums production was flourished? The similar questions appeared in connection to the Paiwan bronze knives. There is a hint: according to some linguists (Austronesian Basic Vocabulary Database: 2008) Paiwan language is more closely re-lated to Malayo-Polynesian groups, than other Formosan languages. This fact sug-gests that the Paiwan chieftains and nobles could have come to Taiwan later than other

The materials with which bronze drums were made and the skills needed to manufacture them were such that only the wealthy people would have been able to own them.

Igorot bronze hand drums share similarities with those of some Southeast Asian cultures.

Source: Yanajin33, CC BY-SA


Formosan peoples, and probably from the South-East Asia, where they used Malayo-Polynesian lin-gua franca. Very possibly, the Qin empire’s (221-207 BC) military activity was a main factor forcing ancestors of the Paiwan ethnic group to migrate to Taiwan from the Asian continent. The fact that only two eth-nic groups (Paiwan and Rukai), among indig-enous peoples in Taiwan, had a class society similar to that of the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BC) in China, supports this hypothesis.

The Igorot flat bronze drums tradition is related to a similar tradition amongst the Mnong Gar in Northern Vietnam. Very probably Northern Vietnam, Thailand and Yunnan were a former homeland of Ig-orot ancestors, who reached the Iron Age in Mainland Southeast Asia and also, were forced to migrate by Qin Dynasty military activity, around 2000 years ago, and then replaced the local Negritos population of hunter-gatherers in the north Philippines. Paiwan bronze knives’ style is very similar to the bronze knives of Dong Son culture of Northern Vietnam. Igorot hand drums are very similar to the drums of the same area in Vietnam. This fact suggests a very high probability of the same area of origin of both artefacts—the Paiwan bronze knives and the Igorot bronze drums, could be dat-ed to around 2000 years ago, when ancestors of nowadays Paiwan nobles and Igorot were forced to leave the Northern Vietnam be-cause of Qin Dynasty military activity. APN

The Kalinga are extensive rice farmers, skilled potters, and excellent in basketry, loom weaving and metal works. They are probably those blacksmiths who produced the head axe, a specific weapon of many Igorot groups. The head axe is named so because Igorot headhunters used it for decapitating their victims. Igor Sitnikov is a PhD candidate in the International

Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taipei, Taiwan.


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LEGAL DILEMMA VS PRAGMATIC CONCERNS IN THE U.S.The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and Ron-ald Reagan’s informal Six Assurances of 1982 provide the framework for how the U.S. should interact with Taiwan. In themselves these documents are not legally binding doc-uments that the U.S. come to Taiwan’s rescue in the event of war; they provide a broader U.S. commitment for the supply of defen-sive arms and even U.S. forces in times of aggression. The legislation allows for arms sales to Taiwan and ensures a U.S. commit-ment to ‘‘resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion’’ against Taiwan.

Nevertheless there are differences in opinions within the U.S. - defense industry, diplomats, scholars - as to whether arms should continue to be sold to Taiwan. These differences arise from political dissent and

domestic pressure. On one hand, the Repub-licans and Democrats cannot see eye-to-eye on how the defense budget should be appor-tioned. On the other, there is the impact on Americans losing their jobs should Taiwan reduce its weapon procurement from the U.S.

Taiwan’s present acquisition of F-16A/B fighter aircraft is a case in point. During the 1992 presidential election campaign, George W. Bush decided to sell 150 fighters to Tai-wan despite objections from Congress and China so as to provide a $4 billion contract and 5,800 jobs to General Dynamics in Tex-as. In 2011, a group of U.S. senators however blocked the upgrade of existing aircrafts to F16C/D which resulted in the loss of 1,300 jobs in 43 states.

Today the U.S. Congress continues to re-main divided over the sale of arms to Tai-

wan. While some senators like Dianne Fein-stein oppose arms sales to Taiwan, others like Richard Lugar and most recently John Cornyn support those sales. The main rea-sons range from diplomatic concerns with China, to the provision of jobs for Ameri-cans. But at the heart of the U.S.-Taiwan policy lies the congressional decision taken in 1979 and that is enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. To undo this commitment would mean President Obama trying to ob-tain a unanimous decision from some 29 senators and 145 representatives.

IS TAIWAN A ‘‘STRATEGIC LIABILITY’’ OR STRATEGIC ASSET TO THE U.S.?The U.S. will face a number of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region as it unfolds its defense strategy. Among these challenges, contending with the growing sophistication of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in terms of anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) technology will probably be the most challenging one. In this regard, Penta-gon has to consider how Taiwan, ‘‘by virtue of its geographic location, can represent a potential strategic threat to China’’ as well as help the U.S. anchor a ‘‘pivot’’ in the Asia-Pacific region for its air-sea battle-related re-quirements.

China recognises that Taiwan could serve as a base for foreign military operations be-cause of its geographic position and this could reduce the sphere of the Chinese naval influence. It is therefore not wasting time to develop its naval power in the Asia-Pacific region. China is not hiding any intentions of extending its maritime capability into East

U.S. Arms Sales to TaiwanMilitarization and the future of cross-strait relations

On April 28th 2012, a lawmaker in the Legislature’s National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees suggested that the military explore the possibility of submitting a ‘‘letter of request’’ to the U.S. for the sale of new fighter aircraft. Four weeks later, on May 20th 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives voted in favour of pressing the Obama administration to sell Taiwan advanced F-16C/D fighter jets. This issue has been discussed before and the verdict is always to wait until the completion of the F16A/B upgrade at the very least. To sell or not to sell the newer F16 C/D is therefore not the issue. At the heart of this issue is perhaps how Taiwan intends to position itself in a changing East Asian security context. The conditions now are more favourable and the timing never more opportune for Taiwan to re-table this issue with the U.S.

By Kevin Wee Lin

To sell or not to sell the newer F16 C/D is not the issue. At the heart of this issue is how Taiwan intends to position itself in a changing East Asian security context. 27 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Asia through the South China Sea. China will also be unabashed to constrain the expan-sion of any foreign power that tries to use Taiwan as its launching board for air and sea dominance.

From historical records, Taiwan played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy as early as 1940, by acting as a buffer against commu-nist expansion from North Korea. In main-taining ties with Taiwan the U.S. can show its allies that it will continue to engage in East Asia and that it can ‘‘balance China’s rising power.’’ Moreover, ensuring peace and secu-rity in the Pacific for the U.S. means that the American values of liberty, democracy, and opportunity will continue to prevail for all of its allies with Taiwan as an example of such a democratic model.

The U.S. has everything to gain from an engagement with Taiwan as no other free and open society understands China as well

as Taiwan. The historical disagree-ments between China and Taiwan, albeit acrimonious at times, do not diminish their cultural affinities or even the present cross-Strait commercial activities. Besides having the opportunity to conduct joint air-sea operations with Taiwan navy or conduct in-country training in Tai-wan, to name but a few examples of pos-sible collaborations, the U.S. can also tap into Taiwan’s defense industry, viz. the Chun-gshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI).

CARPE DIEM: TAIWAN’S BEST OPTION IN THE BEST OF HISTORICALLY POSSIBLE MOMENTSSince President Ma took office in 2008, China and Taiwan have taken a systematic

approach to stabilise their relations and re-duce the level of distrust. There is signifi-cant progress in the economic arena with the most notable achievement being the Eco-nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed on 2010 and that serves as the base for a free trade area between Taiwan and China. Yet, according to the Director for the Northeast Asian Policy Studies, de-spite the improvement in economic relations ‘‘there has been less progress on the political and security side.’’ He comes to this conclu-sion after assessing cross-Strait relations be-fore and after 2008, and specifically at how Ma administration has performed.

For many, the big question is where the current process of stabilisation is heading.

U.S. sales and upgrades of military aircraft to Taiwan, such as the F-16 C pictured above, have long been a sensitive issue in Sino-U.S. relations.

Photo: U.S. Air Force


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From historical records, Taiwan played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy as early as 1940, by acting as a buffer against communist expansion from North Korea.

Taiwanese military police train as part of a counter-terrorism exercise.

Photo: ROC Ministry of National Defense

Many in China believe that unification is in-evitable; others in Taiwan and the U.S. prefer to maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence and non-subordination to the PRC.

In the final analysis, resolving this conun-drum is a long-term proposition. While in office Ma has mentioned before that there will be no discussion of either independence or unification. So far Beijing appears willing to cooperate with the Ma administration in overcoming the short- to middle-term chal-lenges. But long-term challenges still loom in the foreseeable future.

Possibly the greatest fear of China is a Taiwan that relies too heavily on the U.S. militarily just as the greatest fear of the U.S.

is a Taiwan that integrates too closely with the Chinese market. A Taiwan that becomes a U.S. strategic ally to constrain China’s mari-time ambitions in the South China Sea is just as undesirable as an abandoned Taiwan that see a unification with China as not all that bad, and that China is after all a rising power.

Given Taiwan’s present trajectory, its ul-timate outcome is still anyone’s guess. Prob-ably the more immediate concern is how Taiwan intends to capitalise on the current improvement in cross-Strait ties. That deci-sion will have an impact on how the U.S. and China can strike a ‘‘win-win’’ situation with respect to Taiwan. A priori the U.S. should not have any hidden agenda of fostering in-

dependence in Taiwan just as China should not harbour any intention of occupying Tai-wan. A peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Taiwan in East Asian region is of paramount importance for the stability of the East Asian region. Nancy et al (2011) captures well the essence of this prospect when she says that ‘‘Washington cannot sustain the U.S.-Taiwan relationship unilaterally.’’

The Taiwanese lawmaker is right. Taiwan has to make the next move. Negotiating for arms sale from the U.S. is a move in the right direction. It ensures that Taiwan would not be too insecure in military power and too weak in political suavity to negotiate with China. It is neither too early nor too late for


a request. Any results from this request after all cannot be seen until two to three years af-ter making it. In accordance with the spirit of the letter contained in the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, ‘‘Washington ought to reassert its longstanding position to Beijing that sales do not promote Taiwan’s separation from the mainland but, in the current phase of cross-Strait relations, create an environment for improved China-Taiwan relations.’’ Moreover arms sale to Taiwan is naturally attuned to the U.S. ‘‘return to Asia’’ policy. It is acknowledging that Taiwan is a strategic asset in the U.S. ‘‘pivotal’’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. It also serves as a good starting point for future China-Taiwan and China-U.S. relations. APN

This article was previously presented as a discussion paper at AMDaS’ 3rd reunion session on 16 Jun 2012 and later compiled in their magazine.

Footnotes1 The China Post (2012), ‘‘Letter signals US

may sell Taiwan new fighter jets.’’, April 29.2 There is no guarantee that the amendment

to the U.S. 2013 National Defense Autho-rization Act for the sale of 66 F-16C/D as approved by the House of Representatives will survive the U.S. Senate.

3 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, January 1, 1979, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html. For the Six Assurances, see http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/10/president-reagans-six-assurances-to-taiwan-and-their-meaning-today.

4 The U.S. law under the Taiwan Relations Act ensures continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. It stipulates that it is in the U.S. interest ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.’’

5 The U.S. defense budget will be reduced to $78 billion over the next five years and another $350 billion in cuts could be trig-gered over ten years. How this reduction will play out in the light of Hillary Clinton’s manifesto speech about the U.S. pivotal role in Asia Pacific remains to be seen. What is clear though is that there are is-sues that cannot be easily brushed aside, e.g. the status of Taiwan and the competing

maritime claims in the South China Sea.6 Taiwan is one of the largest U.S. Foreign

Military Sales (FMS) customers in the world.

7 The China Post (2012), ‘‘Letter signals US may sell Taiwan new fighter jets.’’, April 29.

8 There are other reasons for dissent, for example, re-arm Taiwan so that it need not always play second fiddle to China’s demands and that Taiwan does not become a ‘‘strategic liability’’ to the U.S.

9 Tucker and Glaser (2011), 29.10 A term that is attributed to Douglas Paul

of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-tional Peace who espouses a re-arming of Taiwan.

11 As an Atlantic and Pacific power, the U.S. remains committed to maintaining a ‘‘forward-deployed’’ diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Clinton (2011).

12 Bruce (2010), 51.13 Clinton (2011), 1.12.14 Tucker and Glaser (2011), 32.15 The ‘‘1992 consensus’’ is used as the

basis for negotiating economic issues as its glosses over the sovereignty issue. Presi-dent Ma also advocates the use of ‘‘mutual non-denial’’ as a norm to reach functional and economic agreements.

16 Bush (2011), 275. Bush paints five pos-sible scenarios (current stabilisation process continues; stalemate in stabilisation; DPP victory and resumption of provocation; unifica-tion; and PRC coercion) that can arise from the present cross-Strait

relations and examines their implications for U.S. interests and policy responses. He highlights Taiwan’s domestic politics as the linchpin that can address the challenge of China and its own future in the middle- to long-term.

17 Bruce (2010), 51. The strategic impor-tance of Taiwan stems mainly from, though not entirely, from its geographical location in the South China Sea.

18 Bush (2011), 283.19 Tucker and Glaser (2011), 35.20 Tucker and Glaser (2011), 34.21 Clinton (2011).

ReferencesBush, Richard (2011), ‘‘Taiwan and East Asian

Security.’’, Orbis, 274-289.Clinton, Hillary (2011), ‘‘America’s Pacific

Century.’’, Foreign Affairs, November/De-cember, 1-12.

Gilley, Bruce (2010), ‘‘Not So Dire Straits. How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security.’’, Foreign Affairs, January/Feb-ruary, 44-60.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf and Glaser, Bonnie (2011), ‘‘Should the United States Aban-don Taiwan?’’, The Washington Quarterly, Fall, 23-37.

Kevin Wee Lin is a former engineer at the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in Singapore with experience in IT operations and support, crisis management, and strategic planning. He is also the former regional manager in Taipei directing education-related NGO projects. He is presently working as a corporate trainer in Singapore. His research interests include IPE and security in East Asia, conflict management, gaming and training strategies.

Today the U.S. Congress

continues to remain divided

over the sale of arms to

Taiwan.


FEATURED ARTICLE

CULTURE DIFFERENCE IN REASONING STYLESAn interesting hypothesis about the origins of cultural differences in reasoning styles, which explains a larger presence of “dia-lectical thinking” in China, was formulated by Michael E.W. Varnum et al. in 2010. Proneness for contradictory thinking may be caused by the need to maintain social cohesion for the in-group, and also seems to be connected with independent or inter-dependent social orientation. People with a higher independent social orientation con-sider themselves as being separated from one social context and emphasize autonomy and independence. Those with a more inter-dependent social orientation, consider social environment and social context to be impor-

tant parts of one’s self, and include group memberships as part of it. Chinese culture is more interdependently oriented than North American culture and differences as report-ed by Peng and Nisbett may be caused by a need to maintain social cohesion in groups in more interdependently oriented culture. Because having a more distinctive opinion could make relationships with people hav-ing different opinions worse. Opinion con-taining mutually contradictory elements may therefore help to maintain good relation-ships with other group members.

We tried to support this hypothesis with a Taiwanese sample. Our sample had 135 peo-ple, 74 women and 61 men, with the average age of 26 years. All subjects were Taiwanese citizens. Subjects filled out the Dialectical

Self-Scale for measuring the proneness for dialectical thinking about oneself. They also filled out four scales measuring variables connected with social orientation: Theodore Singelis’ Independent and Interdependent Self-Construal scales, measuring indepen-dent and interdependent social orientation; David Matsumoto’s Status Differentiation Scale, measuring self-regulation of one’s be-havior in the presence of a person with high-er social status; and Felicia Pratto et al.’s So-cial Dominance Orientation scale, measuring people’s tendency to think that some groups should dominate others. Scores in these four scales together explained 29% of variance in the Dialectical Self-Scale, which provides modest support for Varnum et al.’s hypoth-esis that proneness for dialectical thinking might be caused by social orientation.

DIALECTICAL THINKINGWhile the concept of “dialectical thinking”, as introduced by Peng and Nisbett, was de-fined according to analysis of differences between thinking styles in the United States and China, Spencer-Rodgers et al. define it as being typical for all East Asians. Accord-ing to Spence-Rodgers et al., East Asians, in comparison with Westerners, are more likely to expect phenomena to undergo a change away from the status quo. In addition, they point out that culture and cognition litera-ture characterizes East Asian thought as ho-listic thinking, compared to Western thought being analytical thinking. However, they have provided no analyses of differences between East Asian cultures and no proof of same-ness of these cultures, with regard to rea-soning styles. It is common to think that all people who look like me should have similar thoughts and feelings, and all people who look the same, but different from me, should have similar thoughts and feelings that are different from mine.

There seems to be a basic assumption underlying conceptualization of “dialecti-cal thinking” as defined by Spencer-Rodgers et al.: That is, that all White American re-searchers think that all Asians are the same and assume that other White people possess similar thinking styles as themselves. (Ameri-can) Chinese researchers think that all White people are the same, and they assume that other Asian people should possess similar thinking style as themselves. According to

Proneness for dialectical thinking in TaiwanThinking style and cultural difference between regions and countries

In 1999, Kaping Peng and Richard E. Nisbett published an article where they analyzed ways of thinking in China and in the United States, and defined a style more typical for China – “retaining basic elements of opposing perspectives by seeking ‘middle way’. So-called “dialectical thinking” was then researched by several psychologists, and results were summarized by Julie Spencer-Rodgers et al. in 2010. They defined “dialectical thinking” as a tendency to think about objects in mutually contradictory terms, and to think that the state of things is not stable and may change easily. For example, if I see a person kindly speaking with others I may say, “he is warm”. But I may also say that “he is warm, but also cold”, since I saw him yesterday, refusing to give money to a beggar. The latter description is more self-contradictory than the previous. This example also shows the connection hypothesized by Spencer-Rodgers et al. between a belief in an unstable state of things and a belief that things contain mutually contradictory attributes. If things may change so quickly, it means that they should possess opposing elements at any one time: For example if a person who views his or her own personality as changeable, for example sometimes I am extraverted and sometimes I am introverted, it might be expected to also view it as comprising contradictory elements, as argued by Spencer-Rodgers et al.

By Vaclav Linkov


the review provided by Spencer-Rodgers et al., tasks proving differences between “West-erners” and “Easterners” were given usually to Chinese, also to Japanese and Koreans. However, even if samples from two East Asian cultures were included in one study, they received different tasks. Real proof of sameness is missing as well as thoughtful analysis about East Asian cultures’ differ-ences, as was provided by Peng and Nisbett for China-US differences. For “Western” cultures all theory as provided by Spencer-Rodgers et al. seems to be based on data from North American samples. No analysis of differences in reasoning styles between different “Western” cultures was provided.

DIFFERENCES AMONGST ASIAN CULTURESThe dialectical self-scale used in the research with the Taiwanese sample in this text, was a translation of an English scale based on research that has probably never contained any Taiwanese sample before. Validity of this scale can therefore be challenged. This thread of research also shows the impor-

tance of programs in Asia-Pacific studies like IMAS or IDAS. Cur-rent content of many psychologi-cal journals and articles assumes that there are certain attributes being characteristic for all (East) Asians, and there are no differences between them. Programs like IDAS or IMAS may support higher quality psychological research being able to distinguish between (East) Asian cul-tures, and provide information about differ-ences between these cultures. For research about cultural differences in reasoning styles it means, that researchers being natives in one East Asian culture and having large ex-perience with living in another East Asian culture should analyze differences in reason-ing styles between these cultures and enrich theory as provided by Spencer-Rodgers et al. Even if Taiwanese culture could be con-sidered as being close to mainland Chinese culture, our results about social orientation origin of “dialectical thinking” in Taiwan, based on a mainland Chinese scale, should be viewed as limited until some empirical proof of sameness of this construct in Tai-wan and the mainland is provided. APN

Photo: Dennis Skley CC BY-ND 2.0

Vaclav Linkov received his master’s degree in Discrete Mathematics and Psychology and his PhD in Social Psychology from Masaryk University. He has worked as a mathematics lecturer and a software developer. He is a former PhD student with the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan.

AcknowledgmentsI want to thank to I-Ching Lee and Tsai-Ping Wang for their help and translation of ques-tionnaires into Taiwanese Mandarin. I am also thankful to Theodore Singelis, Julie Spencer-Rodgers and David Matsumoto for sending me actual versions of their questionnaires.

ReferencesPeng, K., & Nisbett, R.E. (1999). Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning about Contradiction.

American Psychologist, 741-754.Spencer-Rodgers, J., Williams, M.J., Peng, K. (2010). Cultural Differences in Expectations of

Change and Tolerance for Contradiction: A Decade of Empirical Research. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 296-312.

Varnum, M.E.W., Grossmann, I., Kitayama, S., & Nisbett, R.E. (2010). The Origin of Cultural Differences in Cognition: The Social Orientation Hypothesis. Current Directions in Psycho-logical Science, 19, 9-13.

Regression coefficients. Dependent Variable: Dialectical Self Scale


RESEARCH UPDATE

MARXIST VIEW ON DEMOCRACYAccording to Engels, “Democracy has be-come the proletarian principle, the principle of masses. The masses may be more or less clear about this, the only correct meaning of democracy, but all have at least an obscure feeling that social equality of rights is im-plicit in democracy.” In reality, however, in

liberal capitalist countries, the interests of the ruling class lie not only in economic op-pression in the form of paid labor but also in political restrictions, alienation, depolitici-zation and exclusion from meaningful par-ticipation. This state of affairs clearly reflects the class nature of capitalist democracy.

In the Communist Manifesto, Marx states

that class antagonism must be abolished by revolution. The function of revolution is to put the proletariat class into the ruling po-sition, thereby enabling the working class majority “to win the battle of democracy.” For Marx, democracy is “the situation where society is dominant over its own productive development. The establishment of such an order is only possible by overcoming eco-nomic obstacles: the contradictions between labor and capital. Having changed their re-lations in the course of a social revolution, society will rid itself of state violence and the corresponding apparatus of coercion by replacing it with a union of free and equal people.” Accordingly, democracy is seen essentially as an economic order and politi-cal equality is strictly conditioned to social equality.

It is observed that this essentially demo-cratic component in the Marxist ideology has often been obscured. As Engels put it, the transition to socialism can occur when

Marxism, Capitalism and Democracy

At the time the repercussions of the collapse of the communist system were still felt, Bertell Ollman optimistically commented that, “a lot of people have taken the wrong lessons from the collapse of so-called socialist systems, and that is propagated by the capitalist-owned media. But it is not a moment to be defeatist. Things can turn around very quickly.” Indeed, the collapse of the socialist bloc offered a new historic opportunity for the realization of Marxist political theory in its true sense. Stalin’s totalitarian order and the Soviet bureaucratic dictatorship had in fact little to do with the political teachings of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Their teachings, as this essay argues, were in essence radically democratic and egalitarian, contradicting not only the liberal capitalist system, but also the Stalinist dictatorship.

By Serafettin Yilmaz

Photo: Manfred Brückels / CC BY-SA 3.0


“the representatives of the people concen-trate all power in their hands, where, if one has the support of the majority of the peo-ple, one can do as one sees fit in a constitu-tional way…” Marx and Engels opposed the limitations on mass participation in politics and rule by force, as well as any attempt to censor criticism or eliminate the alternative media that is not friendly to the state or the monied class. Thus, when Marx spoke of proletarian dictatorship, he suggested the full realization of democratic principles for the working class that composed the majority in any given historical moment.

MARXIST VIEW ON CAPITALISMMarxist theory argues that capitalist systems fail to implement democratic ideals. In other words, democratic choices cannot be fully sustained under capitalism. The primary desire in a capitalist economic model is the concentration of wealth and unlimited pos-sessiveness. A greed-driven oligarchic man is unable to control his passion for acquisitive-ness. He possesses a conviction derived from his most vulgar self-interests. A capitalist so-ciety is animated by profit maximization and wealth.

In a capitalist system, the means of pro-duction (factories, machinery, and tools) and resources (labor, land, and capital) are privately owned and controlled by the few. The privileged few make both political and economic decisions. The ruling economic classes distribute values and decide for the mass. Public policy rarely reflects the will of the masses; rather, it reflects the values and interests of the dominant classes.

As Marxist theory sees it, since the prima-ry goal of the capitalist is to realize surplus value, (defined as the difference between the value of the products made and the wages paid), the capitalist employer has to squeeze wages by negotiating with a pool of un-employed, lower the cost of production by laying off workers and replacing them with automated production technologies. These measures often come at the cost of the worker’s quality of life, the community and the environment.

Right to job and decent living standards is considered a basic human right. Each man is entitled, through his or her labor, to ac-quire the means to live in a manner which strengthens one’s self-sustenance and dig-nity. Yet, the health of a capitalist economy requires a certain level of unemployment, what Marx calls “the reserve army of labor.” In this way, the capitalist is able to pit one man against the other, have an upper hand in collective bargaining and undermine class consciousness in the individual. By consider-

ing labor as a mere component of production, capitalism dehuman-izes humans.

In Arguing for Socialism, An-drew Levine states that “inequality of in-come and wealth is almost certain to pro-mote inequality of political power. Then the better-off are likely to acquire considerable and inordinate power over the less well-off. Both rich and poor,” he maintains, “have only one vote, but the rich have wealth, which allows them to buy access to means of shaping (manufacturing), influencing, and changing opinion. The elite are thus able to change or “define the terms of de-bate.”[1] In a sense, politics remains under the domination of the few, which results in the restriction of democratic rights of those who lack the wealth necessary to buy politi-cal influence. Their power, and consequently choices, is limited. When one’s choices are limited, one is not free.

In their quest to defend the status quo, a group of pluralist democracy theorists ar-gued that inequality in political power and influence in capitalist societies was compensated for by the in-troduction of interest groups. They contended that these groups offset the influence exerted by the rich by virtue of their wealth. But, Marxists argue, the pluralist model ig-nores the fact that the poor do not have the resources (money, time, and education) possessed by the rich. Hence, politics be-longs to the affluent. One can identify a world of difference between those who are able to participate in group politics and those who are not.

In reality, in their fight for meeting their basic needs, the poor mostly remain indif-ferent to politics since it is an irrelevant and meaningless undertaking. Consequently, the masses are unlikely to exercise any compa-rable influence. Furthermore, the standard forms of group politics as referred by the pluralists tend to be conservative. In an ef-fort to preserve the status quo, capitalist pluralism promotes elitism and oligarchism. Apparently, this runs counter to democratic ideals because it excludes meaningful mass-participation in the decision-making pro-cesses.

Andrew Levine argues that “public ques-tions constitute, as it were, the domain of collective choice.” However, under capital-ist rule, such questions are privatized; they are no longer the function of “democratic collective choice.”[2] Accordingly, capitalism

restrains the scope of democratic choice. Under the capitalist model, economic de-cision-making is not only privatized but also takes place mostly, if not always, be-hind closed doors. Consider the TPP nego-tiations. The reason for the secrecy is that public choice and private interest are not congruent. Essentially, capitalism chases away politics from the economic domain, which, as Marxism perceives, is the realm where democratic ideals are realized in civil society. Socialism, inspired by Marx’s radical-democratic ideas, sets out to eliminate such restrictions.

Then the question arises: Now that throughout most of the past century, capi-talism and liberal democracy have existed together in many countries, how has this coexistence been possible, and, more im-portantly, how has democracy been made safe for capitalism? Klaus Offe stresses two

factors that have helped capitalism and de-mocracy achieve compatibility: Competitive party politics and Keynesian welfare state.[3]

Offe maintains that the organization of competitive party politics “contains, per-verts, and obstructs class politics.” This kind of relatively passive and spectator-oriented mass mobilization leads to depoliticization, for it transform class politics into vote-get-ting competitions and coalition building. It integrates competing factions into the exist-ing mainstream political structures, leading to the “erosion of collective identity.”[4] This, in turn, is dissolved into a relatively amorphous electoral base held together by blurring conflicting interests. Competitive party politics thus reduces class tensions by creating a false sense of social compatibility.

The second dynamic, Keynesian welfare state, also lends support to the sustenance of democratic capitalism. It is argued that the

Capitalism, due to its built-in

contradictions, is incompatible with

democracy.


FEATURED ARTICLE

Keynesian model helped expand the basis of economic growth, thereby transforming class conflict into the logic of competition, productivity, and class compromise. Offe emphasizes that the Keynesian welfare state “contributes to the democratic-capitalist congruence by establishing the basis for a viable compact or accord between workers and capitalists premised on demand main-tenance, economic growth, and select pro-grams of redistribution of the ‘tax dividend’ of economic expansion.”[5]

However, Offe argues, these two dynam-ics are in crisis. The Keynesian welfare state, which once successfully accommodated class differences into a relatively harmoni-ous coexistence, was, to a great degree, dis-lodged by neoliberal/neoconservative poli-cies of laissez faire capitalists. Furthermore, popular disillusionment toward competitive party politics has resulted (specifically in the US as well as in several East Asian countries with similar political systems) in the dramatic increase in voter apathy in elections. In the process, governments and political organiza-tions suffered a decline in authority and lead-ership among growing segments of popula-tion. Hence capitalism, due to its built-in contradictions, is incompatible with democ-racy. As was articulated by Marx, the intro-duction of reforms to alleviate the negative implications of the rigid class nature of the capitalist model was largely unable to resolve the system’s inherent contradictions.

Marx sees that although reforms may weaken or conceal political consciousness in the masses, those reforms must still be approached as constructive forces as they may introduce certain elements of socialism into the existing capitalist political structure. However, in the final analysis, unless eco-nomic activities are brought under popular democratic control, neither the built-in con-tradictions of capitalism can be solved, nor a higher democratic order can be realized.

THE MARXIAN ALTERNATIVE: STILL RELEVANT?It is true that the West won the Cold War and the communist bloc was soundly de-feated. Today, NATO has expanded to the doorsteps of Russia and begun to threaten China with encirclement. Both Russia and China are dedicated mar-ket-economies. But still, Marxism carries in itself the seeds of persever-ance and relevancy. Since the Marxian theory is a systemic study of capi-talism’s inherent contra-dictions, the more capi-

talism expands (and the more its negative effects are dispersed across the societies), the more Marxism emerges in response. Given that the global finance capitalism has been in deep trouble for some time, Marx’s class analysis may be more relevant and applicable than ever before.

Furthermore, the Marxists argue that the victory of the West thesis is one thing, the neoliberal ideologies’ claim that liberal democracy represents the end of history is quite another. Today’s capitalist democracy is equally, if not more, bound by the same contradictions that Marx analyzed and criti-cized some 150 years ago. On the one hand, the contemporary capitalist order demands the existence of a small group of people that own and regulate the means of production and make most of major economic and so-ciopolitical decisions.

Democracy, on the other hand, stipulates equality of condition. However, this condi-tion is blatantly rejected by the very nature of capitalism for the masses and is appropri-ated for the dominant classes. Thus, as long as the classes at the top appropriates the values produced by the majority and as long as the state and corporate powers are in col-laboration to control and guide the masses, democratic ideals will fall short of being ful-ly materialized. Accordingly, as some Marx-ists would hold, Democracy sans socialism or socialism sans democracy will only be a perverted form.

The recent US-led financial crisis has shown that those at the top of economic and social policy making often favor autoc-racy over democracy. On the foreign policy front, as is in domestic politics, the struggle is between those who, for the sake of profit maximization and self-realization, advocate the status quo, and those who support equal-ity and more democracy. Marxian theory sees that the solution for many problems the world is facing today, from economic and social inequalities to wars of domina-tion, lies in more democracy. In this context, it is fallacious to declare the end of history and assume that Marxism is obsolete. To the contrary, because it is radically committed to the cause of democratic change as a method and as a goal, Marxism remains both relevant and viable. APN

The reason for the secrecy in the TPP negotiations is that public choice and private interest are not congruent.

Serafettin Yilmaz recently received a doctoral degree from National Chengchi University’s International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) and works as a researcher at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. His research interests include Comparative Regionalism and Critical Theory. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].

Footnotes1 Levine, Andrew. Arguing for Socialism

(London: Verso, 1984), p. 132.2 Levine, pp.180-181.3 Offe, Klaus. “Competitive Party Democracy

and the Keynesian Welfare State: Factors of Stability and Disorganization,” in The Political Economy: Readings in the Politics and Economics of American Public Policy, ed. by Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rodgers (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984).

4 Offe, p. 355 5 Offe, p. 349.


As it was once famously put, “no man is an island, entire of it-self; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” Throughout the two and a half years that I have been a student of IDAS, I received numerous invaluable help from teachers, officials and friends. First and foremost, I am indebted to my advisor, Dr. Liu Fu-kuo, for his patience, incisive feedback, and friendship. I was also lucky to have an outstanding committee, including my supervisor in Aca-demia Sinica, Dr. Lin Cheng-yi. Doubtlessly, I further benefitted greatly from a number of profes-sors inside and outside the de-partment and received construc-tive advice, including the former and current IDAS directors, Dr. Berman and Dr. Holm and for-mer IMAS director, Dr. Kuan. Furthermore, I would say my dissertation process would have been much less efficient had I not had very precious help and support from our dear friend in IDAS office, Angel. Finally, and surely, all the friends, old and new, have been an inspiration and encouragement to move forward at times of crisis and joy alike. In this respect, I feel obliged to men-tion my good friend Janet and her continuous support. In the work-shops that she singlehandedly

brought forth, my dissertation and research was further tested, purged and sharpened.

It is my understanding that ac-complishments are organic phe-nomena. Conjunctures may play a certain role, but without a solid structure, they are poised to suf-fer atrophy once the circumstanc-es are removed. When success is organically constructed, one may be able to execute it regardless of the fact that conjunctures are fa-vorable or not. Obviously, disser-tation research is a milestone in most students’ quest for academic success. The optimum strategy to get to that point is to have a deep insight into the nature of one’s endeavors: Are they structural or conjunctural? Hence, our person-al histories, experiences, and life ideology weigh heavily to deter-mine our strategy and direction for success. Unavoidably, after all the surreal flippancy of post-dissertation self-aggrandizement vapors into thin air, one realizes the lingering question: “what is next?” Granted, this unending chase is what makes getting older exciting and interesting, but, as I feel it, reality remains as solid in post-dissertation as in pre-disser-tation, if not more. Let’s hope the best for each and every one of us. APN

Reflections on GraduationBy Serafettin Yilmaz

Life as a doctoral candidate is not all academic.

Photo: Serafettin Yilmaz


MISSION COMPLETE

Australia is home to over 170 species of snakes.

Photo: Leon van Jaarsveldt

Perth is a city with a rich history.


Summer is warm and sunny on the campus of Curtin University.


Australia’s marine life can be both beautiful and dangerous.



Two things immediately struck me on that first morning. The first was that Perth and its outlying regions were hardly that of a bustling city, as compared to Taipei, but more that of a peaceful suburban environ-ment, where little activity could be seen this early in the morning. Even the bus drivers, relative to Taipei, were very relaxed, taking a 5 minute break at every major bus station. A second point that caught my attention, was the high levels of regional cultural diversity. Two of the drivers were from the Middle East, with many a passenger from different Asian countries.

At the university, this was no different. The conference had coincided with Cur-tin University’s annual Open Day, attract-ing prospective students from all over Asia. While Curtin University specialises more towards the conic sciences, this does cross borders with the ITS conference, which deals mostly with Telecommunication is-sues such as internet bandwidth, spectrum, undersea cables, connection aspects, and of course the economics thereof. There is also a more minor focus on media uses, which at-tracts those researchers dealing with the spe-

cific uses of internet media, such as my own research topic at that time that dealt with social media and nationalism. Australia’s has an established regional role in this telecom-munication field, largely due to its Asian proximity and its underwater geography, which means it both conveniently located as a business hub to Asia, and makes possible safer passage to some of the underwater in-ternet cables to region, especially countries to closer to the southern Asian nations and attracting business from other southern hemisphere countries.

Beyond academics and economics, Perth is also the cite of historical significance, hav-ing once been a sea-lane of communications for Asian trade. This has has left a rich cul-tural and historical heritage as can be seen at the Hillary Boat Freemantle museum of maritime history, where shipwrecks and re-covered treasures can be seen. Wild-life is another attractive tourist attraction, with the Hillary Boat Harbour aquarium introducing the diverse maritime life that frequents the coast line, which includes both beauty and danger, including the Box Jellyfish and the Old Wives, amongst the most venomous in

the world. But beyond this danger is also the beauty of a natural coastline, with sandy beaches and nature reserves providing home to amphibious creatures and Australia’s more famous inhabitants, kangaroos and koalas.

Located in the Caversham Wild Reserve, a smaller part permitted direct access and interaction with docile kangaroos, who likes being fed and petted as much as they do sleeping. Even more sleepy, and less ac-cessible, are the koalas, whose meagre eat-ing habits often leave them with little energy for action. Australian wildlife goes well be-yond kangaroos and koalas though, and also includes wallabies, easily mistaken for kan-garoos, large-ostrich-like, flightless, birds known as emus, and a variety other bird and animal life.

In addition to economic and academic contributions, Perth is centre of cultural di-versity and a gateway to Asia, and home to a rich history and wild life. If not for aca-demic pursuits, Perth makes a fantastic tour-ist destination, offering its visitor great food, diverse culture and hospitality as can only be found in Australia. A truly marvellous expe-rience. APN

ITS 6th Africa-Asia-Australasia Regional ConferenceCurtin University, Perth, AustraliaAugust 4–7, 2013

By Leon van JaarsveldtWelcome to Perth, a city bathed in sunshine, surrounded by a rich variety of wild- and marine life, filled with a cultural and historical diversity, and home to the Curtin University, the host to 2013 regional ITS (International Telecommunication Society) Conference. The sun was already warming the early morning summer surroundings as reached the University for the first time. Navigating the bus system from my hotel to the university had transpired with little trouble as all three drivers were happy to take the time to explain how their different part of the routes worked.


CONFERENCE REPORT

The National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), located in Bangkapi, Bangkok, is one of the Thailand’s premier higher education institutions.

Photo: Jonathan Spangler

Bangkok is a city of contrasts.


The environment at the NIDA campus offers a relaxing .escape from the bustle of the city.



Having spent most of the past decade as an educator working in various disciplines — quantitative reasoning, organic agriculture, English as a foreign language, and interna-tional relations, to name a few — teaching has afforded me the opportunity to under-stand the powerful influence that education can have. Among its myriad potential im-pacts, both positive and negative, education has been a catalyst for change and the gen-eration of social norms throughout history. Gender equality (and inequality) is but one issue that has long been guided by the prac-tice of education.

It is with this motivation that I set forth, hoping to make but a small contribution to the field of gender education. In conducting my research, I sought to share my experi-ence as an educator committed to integrating critical pedagogy into diverse curricula. The research that I presented at the conference proposed critical pedagogy as a course of action for postmodern feminist discourse. It then offered practical approaches for incor-porating postmodern feminism into differ-ent classroom environments. Though a con-ference organizer had previously suggested that I “provide some additional background

… for people who may not be familiar with feminist studies,” I found that many of the two dozen or so participants in the session were quite well versed on the issue. The lively debate and sharing of experiences ig-nited by the presentation became a reminder of the reason that international conferences take place — not just as a platform for dis-seminating academic research but as a forum for discussion on complex and controversial issues that have a real impact on global so-ciety. APN

International Conference on Language and Communication National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)Bangkok, Thailand / August 4–7, 2013

By Jonathan SpanglerOn a hot mid-December morning in Bangkok, academics from twenty-three countries on six continents converged for the International Conference on Language and Communication (ICLC). In its fifth year running, the conference is hosted annually by the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in Thailand. A glance at the year’s theme, “Innovative Inquiries and Emerging Paradigms in Language, Media and Communication,” suggested that the conference could be an arena where anything goes, given that these are three themes that touch on nearly every aspect of human society. In this regard, the conference itself did not disappoint. The research presented featured topics from academic fields across the spectrum, from political leadership to endangered languages to film.

Conference participants begin to filter in early in the morning.



CONFERENCE REPORT


Ingredients for Meatballs

1/2 pound of ground pork

1 egg

3 tablespoon of diced green onion

1 tablespoon of diced ginger

1 tablespoon of diced garlic

1/2 cup of bread crumbs

1 teaspoon of salt

1 teaspoon of pepper

2 tablespoon of soy sauce

1 tablespoon of sesame oil

1/2 cup of water

A dish by

Chef Tan


VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 42

Chinese Meatballs and Cabbage

PHO

TO B

Y G

UY

MO

NTA

G (C

C BY

)

Prepare the Cabbage

1. Clean a full head of Chinese

cabbage by each leaf and

break each leaf in half.

2. Spread 1/2 of Chinese

cabbage into a pot and fill

with 1 cup of water.

3. Set aside.

Prepare the Meatballs4. Mix all the meatball ingredients with your hands and roll the mixture into balls of 1/2 cup each. You can roll the balls any size you like, big or small.5. Put 2 cups of frying oil (vegetable or corn oil) in a frying pan or wok and turn on medium heat.

6. Wait for 1 minute until the oil is heated and fry the meatballs in the oil.7. Turn the meatballs in every 3 minutes once or twice until all sides are brown. Be sure to wait for the bottom of the meatballs to turn brown before turning.

Make the Final Dish

8. Take meatballs out of oil into the cabbage pot prepared earlier.

9. Fully cover meatballs with the remaining cabbage leaves in the pot .

10. Cover the lid with medium heat and start braising for 10 minutes

until steaming and turn to low heat for another 40 minutes until

frequent releases and all cabbage soften up.

11. It is ready to serve with the whole pot or you may transfer them

out into a big bowl for serving.

This dish is excellent served with white rice.


What is IDAS?The International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University, located in northern Taiwan, is the first to offer an English-taught doctoral program in Asia-Pacific Studies in Taiwan. The IDAS program brings an interdisciplinary understanding of the Asia-Pacific region and offers students courses and research related to many aspects of the region.

We offer four tracks – political economy, society and culture, public governance, and international relations – that take advantage of NCCU’s excellent academic talent as one of Asia’s top universities. This program focuses on training professionals and places an emphasis on the combination of theory and practical research.

For students who want to broaden their horizons and stretch their boundaries, we offer a learning environment to equip students with well-rounded research skills and enhance their professional abilities. We are part of NCCU’s College of Social Sciences, and draw on English-speaking faculty throughout the campus. We also offer the opportunity for students to study abroad, and those who come to NCCU can also take advantage of our excellent language center for learning Mandarin.

Our comprehensive, Asia-Pacific Studies program involves:

• Taking a minimum of 33 credit hours• Completing the qualifying exam for the

selected track• Publishing at least one academic

paper in English in an approved peer-reviewed academic journal

• Presenting a paper at an international conference

• Writing a dissertation consisting of original research

• Completing all requirements within 7 years, excluding 2 years for an approved sabbatical


To learn more about IDAS, IMAS, admissions, and the scholarships available,

visit:

asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw



The National Chengchi University campus is a home away from home for many students and faculty.


Send submissions to [email protected]

See inside front cover for submission guidelines.

Documents

Asia Pacific Newsletter 5.2 2014