Aspects of governance and agricultural expansion in tropical Latin America: Jevons paradox or sustainable intensification? Graziano Ceddia – MU Vienna

Aspects of governance and agricultural expansion in tropical Latin America: Jevons

paradox or sustainable intensification? Graziano Ceddia – MU ViennaSabine Sedlacek – MU Vienna

Nicholas Bardsley – University of ReadingSergio Gomez y Paloma – EC JRC IPTS Seville

Outline

Deforestation Trends

Drivers of Deforestation

Agricultural Productivity & Deforestation

The Quality of Governance & Deforestation

The Jevons Paradox

Research, Data & Methods

Results

Conclusions2© 2011 MODUL University Vienna

Deforestation Trends

Subregion

Area (1000 ha) Annual change rate (%)

1990 2000 2010 1990-2000

2000-2010

Caribbean

5,901 6,433 6,932 0.87 0.75

Central America

25,717 21,980 19,499 -1.56 -1.19

South America

946,454 904,322 864,351 -0.45 -0.45

Total Latin America

978,072 932,735 890,782 -0.47 -0.46

World 4,168,399

4,085,063

4,032,905

-0.20 -0.133© 2011 MODUL University Vienna

Source: State of the World‘s Forest Resources 2011 (FAO)

Drivers of Deforestation

Indirect drivers Direct drivers

4© 2011 MODUL University Vienna

Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

Agricultural productivity & Deforestation

World population is expected to reach 9 billion by 2050 Food security requires to increase crop production, without

compromising the environment

Over the past 40 years most of the increase in agricultural output has come from increased yield rather than land expansion (FAO) Wheat yields: +208% Corn yields: +157% Rice yields: + 108%

Yield increase has been associated to both agricultural expansion (Jevons paradox) and contraction (land-sparing)


The Quality of Governance & Deforestation Institutional aspects and the quality of governance

can play a significant role in explaining agricultural expansion and deforestation

Broad governance: measures of the effectiveness of the state to enforce property rights, administer the law etc. Empirically the effect of better governance remain

ambiguous

Environmental governance: measures the effectiveness of the state to protect the environment Empirically better environmental governance appears to

slow down agricultural expansion


What's a Jevons Paradox anyway?

Agricultural intensification would require a smaller area to produce the food necessary to feed the world population… ...distributional issues are neglected and... Jevons paradoxes are ignored!

"It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very

contrary is the truth" (Jevons, 1866 p. 123)


Research question, Data & Methods

We hypothesize that occurrence of land-sparing vs. Jevons paradox, critically depends on the interaction between the quality of governance and agricultural intensification

We also control for a number of socio-economic factors Agricultural trade Service on external debt Per-capita GDP Population


Research question, Data & Methods

FAO and World Bank data for 6 Southern American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) over the period 1970-2006

Broad governance indicators provided by the World Bank over the period 1996-2006: Corruption Control Rule of Law Accountability

Environmental governance indicators: % of the land area under environmental protection, 1990-2006

(WDPA) Environmental Sustainability Index, 2005 (YCELP) Environmental Performance Index, 2000-2006 (YCELP)


Research question and Data Set



Variables Model 1(GOV=CORC)

Model 2(GOV=ROL)

Model 3(GOV=ACC)

Log(AOHA) -0.711***(0.171)

-1.212***(0.163)

-0.971***(0.108)

Log2(AOHA) 0.073***(0.019)

0.149***(0.019)

0.102***(0.011)

Log(POP) 1.406**(0.453)

1.568***(0.381)

3.358***(0.327)

Log2(POP) 0.006(0.016)

-0.0003(0.014)

-0.068***(0.011)

Log(GDPC) 49.804***(7.316)

30.104***(6.904)

4.990(5.754)

Log2(GDPC) -6.596***(0.965)

-3.988***(0.911)

-0.626(0.761)

Log3(GDPC) 0.290***(0.042)

0.175***(0.040)

0.026(0.033)

Log(EX) 0.066(0.044)

0.099*(0.038)

0.054a

(0.028)

Log2(EX) -0.004(0.006)

-0.009a

(0.005)-0.006(0.004)

Log(PEDS) -0.119§

(0.065)-0.157**(0.055)

-0.142***(0.041)

Log2(PEDS) 0.003(0.016)

0.003(0.014)

0.001(0.010)

Log(AVA) -0.029(0.048)

-0.048(0.042)

-0.081*(0.032)

Log(PEDS)×Log(AVA) 0.054**(0.019)

0.067***(0.016)

0.059***(0.012)

GOV×AOHA 0.001***(0.0004)

0.003***(0.0003)

0.004***(0.0003)

Constant -137.592***(17.849)

-88.260***(16.863)

-37.207**(13.690)


Variables Model 4(GOV=PA)

Model 5(GOV=ESI)

Model 6(GOV=EPI)

Log(AOHA) -0.709***(0.154)

-1.780***(0.309)

-1.308***(0.192)

Log2(AOHA) 0.070***(0.016)

0.246***(0.047)

0.168***(0.025)

Log(POP) 0.339(0.410)

0.276(0.426)

0.198(0.400)

Log2(POP) 0.036*(0.016)

-0.009(0.015)

0.026a

(0.015)Log(GDPC) 42.825***

(7.139)47.461***(7.172)

38.492***(7.062)

Log2(GDPC) -5.680***(0.941)

-6.314***(0.944)

-5.115***(0.931)

Log3(GDPC) 0.249***(0.041)

0.278***(0.041)

0.225***(0.041)

Log(EX) 0.082a

(0.042)0.069(0.043)

0.083*(0.040)

Log2(EX) -0.005(0.006)

-0.004(0.006)

-0.006(0.006)

Log(PEDS) -0.123*(0.060)

-0.050(0.060)

-0.100a

(0.058)Log2(PEDS) 0.006

(0.015)-0.002(0.015)

0.006(0.014)

Log(AVA) -0.020(0.046)

-0.009(0.047)

-0.029(0.044)

Log(PEDS)×Log(AVA) 0.052**(0.017)

0.034*(0.017)

0.044**(0.016)

GOV×AOHA -0.00003***(0.000005)

-0.00009***(0.00002)

0.00006***(0.000008)

Constant -110.699***(17.961)

-111.576***(18.824)

-93.523***(18.159)

Results – Broad Governance


Elasticity of Agricultural Area with respect to Agricultural Intensification (AOHA)

GOV=ROLMaxMeanMin

GOV=CORCMaxMeanMin

Results – Broad Governance


GOV=ACCMaxMeanMin


Results – Environmental Governance



GOV=ESIMaxMeanMin

GOV=PAMaxMeanMin

Results – Environmental Governance


GOV=EPIMaxMeanMin


Additional Results

The elasticity of agricultural land with respect to per-capita GDP is highly non-linear but ultimately positive Economic growth per-se is not a solution to further

agricultural expansion

The elasticity of agricultural land with respect to agricultural export is positive and significant

The elasticity of agricultural land with respect to the service on external debt is positive and significant

The elasticity of agricultural land with respect to population is also positive and significant


Conclusions

The results indicate that the interaction between the quality of government/governance and agricultural intensification and the type of governance considered are important to understand the occurrence of Jevons paradox or land-sparing

When considering Broad Governance indicators, a Jevons paradox emerges for high governance scores Polanyi and the relationship between the state and the market?

When considering the environmental governance, land-sparing occurs for high scores of the governance indicators

Agricultural intensification may be necessary to achieve food security, but one must pay attention to its possible interactions with other policies aiming at improving governance/government The introduction of a cap on agricultural land and/or strengthening

environmental protection measures could be more effective


Future Research

The results provide interesting hypothesis.... How does governance quality actually interacts with

intensification to produce the observed results? How do different aspect of governance actually shape

agricultural expansion/contraction? How does inequality in the distrubution of

land/assets/wealth affect such patterns? What is the effect of different land tenure systems?

To answer such questions further research, which incorporates also significant case studies, is needed!


Thank you!


Documents

Aspects of governance and agricultural expansion in tropical Latin America: Jevons paradox or sustainable intensification? Graziano Ceddia – MU Vienna