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Assessing the Effects of Advanced Placement Policies

Lauren Linzmeier

May 2012

Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences Northwestern University

Advisor: Professor Kirabo Jackson

Abstract This thesis investigates whether Advanced Placement policies achieve their goals of increasing AP enrollment and improving college outcomes. Using aggregate longitudinal data on AP exam taking, college enrollment, and college graduation rates from all 50 states, I find that very few types of AP policies work to increase AP exam taking or improve college outcomes. However, two of the most costly AP policies, financial incentives for exam performance and national AP incentive grants, do seem to increase AP exam taking. Several sources of bias in the college graduation rate data prevent me from drawing decisive conclusions regarding the effect of AP policies on college graduation rates, but I find little evidence to suggest that any AP policies work to increase college persistence.

Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the support of several outstanding faculty members. I would like to thank Professor Jackson for serving as my advisor and helping me through the conceptual and analytical portions of this project. Professor Canay provided invaluable econometric guidance, and Professor Witte sacrificed countless hours to help me see this thesis to its conclusion. I would also like to thank Professor Figlio for his guidance, inspiration, and mentoring throughout my time at Northwestern.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Expanding access to advanced placement programs would provide more disadvantaged high school students the opportunity to take challenging courses so that they will enter college or the global marketplace ready to excel. — U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, February 2006

Since its inception in 1955, the Advanced Placement (AP) program has captured the

attention of policymakers who believe exposing students to rigorous Advanced Placement

classes will increase high school achievement and college success. State education policies

since the 1980s have focused on expanding access to AP coursework, especially among

disadvantaged students, and improving AP course quality and exam performance. In the 1980s,

some states began mandating AP offerings, tied accountability incentives to AP participation

rates, and subsidized student test fees. More states followed suit in the 1990s and 2000s, and

President Bush in his 2006 State of the Union Address pledged to expand the Advanced

Placement program as a key component of his American Competitiveness Initiative.

Various state and national polices aim to increase participation in the Advanced

Placement program in the hopes that the program will prepare students for advanced coursework

and increase college success. While some of these policies require no additional funding, others

are quite expensive. In 2011, the United States Department of Education spent over $23 million

funding its Advanced Placement Test Fee Program, and yearly appropriations for the National

AP Incentive Program have ranged between $18 and $31 million. The high costs of some of

these policies and programs beg the question: which, if any, effectively increase participation on

the AP program? More importantly, do any of these policies work through the AP program to

better prepare students for college and increase college enrollment or graduation rates?

This thesis investigates whether cohorts of high school students in states subject to AP

policies increase their AP exam taking, perform better on AP exams, and ultimately have higher

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college enrollment and graduation rates using a differences-in-differences approach. Using

aggregate data from 1994-2009, I find that having financial incentive programs funded either by

the state or national government increases AP exam taking and AP exam performance, indicating

that AP polices can successfully increase AP participation, but I find little evidence these AP

policies successfully increase college enrollment and graduation rates.

The paper proceeds as follows. The following section (II) reviews prior literature on the

effects of the AP program and AP policies on college outcomes. Section III provides some

background on the AP program and state and national AP policies. Section IV describes the data,

while section V presents the empirical approach and results. Section VI summarizes the key

findings and discusses their implications.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Due to the popularity of the AP program, many researchers have been interested in the

effects of AP participation on high school and college outcomes. Some literature links success in

the AP program with improved college outcomes. Even after controlling for high school rank,

SAT score, and pre-college criteria, students with advanced placement credit earn higher first

semester college grades than students without advanced placement credit (Keng & Dodd, 2008;

Hargrove, Godin, & Dodd, 2008; Scott, Tolson, & Lee 2010). Taking AP courses also increases

the likelihood that a student will graduate from a four-year college or university within six years

(McCauley, 2007; Hargrove, Godin, & Dodd 2008) and earn a graduate degree (Bleske-Rechek,

Lubinksi, & Benbow 2004).

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However, a few researchers question the benefits of AP participation. Klopstein &

Thomas (2009) find that after controlling for a student’s non-AP curricular experience, AP

participation does not predict college grades or persistence. Geiser & Santelices (2004) find that

while satisfactory performance on AP exams predicts improved college outcomes, merely taking

an AP course has no effect on college performance. This is likely because students who do not

feel prepared to take the AP exam have not mastered the course material or significantly

improved their academic abilities in the course. Hallett & Venegas (2011) suggest that

expanding access to the AP program is not sufficient to improve college outcomes of

disadvantaged students if students do not perform well in the courses. Johnson (2004) argues

that allowing promising high school students to use Pell grants to take actual college courses

would be a more cost-effective way to increase college level opportunities for low-income

students than AP incentive policies.

Very few studies have looked at the effects of state Advanced Placement policies

directly. Of the two recent studies that have, each has adopted a different approach than this

analysis. Jackson (2010) uses high-school level data, urbanicity data, college enrollment data,

and a listing of schools participating in the Texas Advanced Placement Incentive Program by

year in order to evaluate the effects of the Texas Advanced Placement Incentive Program. He

finds that the program, which pays students and teachers for passing grades on AP exams, results

in more AP course and exam taking, increases SAT/ACT scores, and promotes college

matriculation. His more recent NBER working paper analyzes longer-term outcomes. In this

paper, Jackson (2010) finds that the incentive program increases college GPAs, increases college

persistence, and increases college graduation rates for black and Hispanic students.

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By contrast, another study considers AP policies across all states. Jeong (2009) analyzes

microdata from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 2002 to determine whether test

fee waivers or performance-based incentives increase AP participation and success. He

concludes that test fee subsidies successfully increase the probability that a student will take an

AP exam while performance-based incentives have little or no effect. This seems to conflict

with Jackson’s findings that performance-based incentives are quite effective. Because Jeong

(2009) only has data points from 2002, he is unable to control for state fixed effects, though he

does control for regional effects. Moreover, he only investigates the effect of fee waivers and

performance incentives on AP exam taking and performance in four popular AP subjects rather

than long-term college outcomes.

The analysis in this paper uses aggregate statistics on AP performance by state for 1994-

2009. Analysis of this panel data avoids some the problems Jeong (2009) encountered.

Dramatically different trends between neighboring states with similar policy profiles suggest that

state level fixed effects are necessary for valid identification, and this analysis controls for state

fixed effects. Moreover, this data set allows for an examination of more than just test fee waivers

and performance-based incentives. In fact, this analysis considers ten different types of

Advanced Placement policies. Finally, looking at data on college enrollment rates and college

graduation rates provides useful insight about the long-term effects of AP policies.

III. BACKGROUND

Description of the Advanced Placement Program

Educators widely praise the Advanced Placement (AP) program for giving students the

opportunity to take advanced coursework. The Advanced Placement program has become

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increasingly popular over the past several decades and consists of 34 courses and corresponding

exams. The College Board, a not-for-profit organization, regulates the Advanced Placement

program by publishing course descriptions, approving audits from AP instructors, and creating

and scoring AP exams. Though it is possible for students to prepare for an AP exam on their

own, most students take an AP course at their local high school prior to taking the corresponding

exam in May. The College Board charges $87 for each exam but offers a partial test fee waiver

for low-income students.

Overview of State Policies1

In response to the perceived benefits of Advanced Placement, some states have

implemented a wide range of policies to support the program’s growth and encourage student

participation. These policies can be roughly divided between those that target schools and

districts and those that appeal to students directly. Policies targeting schools and districts include

mandating the offering of AP courses, financial exam performance-based incentives,

accountability incentives, offering funds for teacher training, mandating teacher training, and

policies to encourage collaboration between colleges and universities and K-12 districts. Policies

targeting students include AP exam fee subsidies and guaranteeing credit at state colleges for

qualifying AP scores.

The policies targeting districts and schools mandate the expansion of the AP program,

offer financial assistance, or create financial or accountability incentives. For instance,

Arkansas, Indiana, West Virginia, and South Carolina mandate that all high schools offer a

minimum number of AP courses in an effort to expand access to low-income and minority

                                                                                                                         1 Based on the Education Commission of the State’s State Notes Advanced Placement Report 2  See the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended, Title I, Part G, Sec. 1704-05  

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students whose schools tend to offer fewer AP courses. Other states offer financial assistance for

AP development at low-income and small schools. This assistance usually consists of grants to

purchase textbooks and classroom materials. Additionally, some states offer rewards to schools

with high numbers of students who complete AP courses and/or receive at least a 3 on the exam.

Some states also hold schools accountable for their AP performance. Colorado and Michigan tie

AP offerings to accreditation while fifteen other states include AP participation as part of the

district, school, or state’s report cards and accountability ratings. Meanwhile, some states

require schools and districts to publish statistics on AP performance.

States have also enacted measures to improve the quality of the AP instruction. Eleven

states have adopted policies to encourage collaboration between higher education institutions and

K-12 schools in offering AP courses. Twenty-seven states make funds available for AP teachers

to attend summer institutes and other AP or pre-training programs while five states mandate that

AP teachers complete AP training.

The remaining policies appeal to students directly. In addition to the fee reduction the

College Board makes available to free and reduced price lunch students, states use additional

U.S. Department of Education funds to subsidize AP exams. In some states, these subsidies are

available to low-income students only while other states allow higher income students who are

taking multiple AP exams to benefit from the funds. Moreover, the amount of the subsidy varies

between states. Finally, some states guarantee college credit at in-state institutions to any student

who scores a three or higher on the AP exam for a subject.

Overview of National Policies

The national government has also implemented policies to support the expansion of the

Advanced Placement program. These policies generally involve grants to individual states. For

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instance, Congress authorized the federal AP fee assistance program in the 1992 Higher

Education Act. However, the program was not funded until the 1998 fiscal year when thirty-two

states received federal monies. This program continued until 2007 when it was replaced by the

Advanced Placement Test Fee Program2 which awards grants to state agencies for the purpose of

reimbursing low-income students enrolled in AP courses who take AP exams. This program

granted awards starting in 2008 and appropriations have increased over time from $11,507,910

in 2008 to $23,343,981 in 2011. Meanwhile, the Advanced Placement Incentive Program

provides three year competitive grants to State educational agencies, local educational entities, or

national nonprofit educational entities to increase the participation of low-income students in the

AP program. Entities must use the grants to fund professional development for teachers, develop

curriculums, purchase books and supplies, or “develop, enhance, or expand” AP or pre-AP

courses. Preference is given to entities that demonstrate a “pervasive need for access to advance

placement programs,” “assure the availability of matching funds,” and “provides for the

involvement of businesses and community organizations.” This program has granted new awards

or continued awards every year since 2001 with yearly appropriations ranging between

$18,410,799 and $31,573,442.

Two Dimensions of Policy Variation: Content and Timing

This analysis exploits variation in the timing and content of Advanced Placement policies.

States without particular policies in particular years serve as controls. Among states who have

implemented AP policies, there is substantial variation in the timing of the policies and their

content. See Appendix A for a summary of variation in the timing and content of AP policies.

                                                                                                                         2  See the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended, Title I, Part G, Sec. 1704-05  

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Coding State Policies

While there are subtle variations even among policies of a given type, drawing any

conclusions requires roughly categorizing AP policies. For the purposes of this analysis, I code a

policy as one of ten policy types: (1) equipment or instructional grants to establish AP courses,

(2) mandating AP course offerings, (3) accountability incentives, (4) subsidies for AP exam fees,

(5) mandating or funding teacher training and professional development, (6) mandating credit for

passing AP exam scores at in-state institutions, (7) collaboration between K-12 and higher

education institutions, and (8) financial incentives for AP exam performance. I code the two

national policies as (9) test fee reductions funded by the U.S. Department of Education or (10)

AP incentive grants. States in a particular year are coded as having a particular policy if the

policy was in effect during that exam year or if they received grant money under one of the two

national policies in that exam year.3 For example, if a particular policy began in 2001-2002, it is

coded as beginning in 2002 since we would expect the policy to have an effect on the 2002 AP

exam period in May, not during the AP exam period of the previous school year when the policy

was not in effect.

IV. DATA

This analysis uses four datasets in addition to the dates of implementation for various AP

policies. The first dataset consists of Advanced Placement data. This panel of data, constructed

from aggregate totals in publically available College Board state summary reports, gives the

number of students who took AP exams and the total number of AP exams taken for every year

                                                                                                                         3  Determining the date of implementation for these policies is sometimes quite difficult. The Education Commission of the States database on AP policies was used whenever possible. When the ECS sources provide no date, Lexus-Nexus or U.S. Department of Education data was used.  

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between 1994 and 2009, inclusive, by state. Note that these data cannot be used to determine

how many students took AP courses but did not take any AP exams. Consequently, this data can

only be used to investigate whether particular policies increased AP exam taking, not whether

they increased the number of students enrolling in Advanced Placement. However, given that

prior research finds that only students who opt to take the exam benefit from AP participation

(Geiser & Santelices 2004), this exam taking data is of the most interest.

The second dataset from the Common Core of Data and the National Center for Education

Statistics consists of educational statistics for state/year cohorts between 1994-2009. These data

give the number of 11th and 12th grade students, the number of black students in 12th grade, the

number of white students in 12th grade, the number of Hispanic students in 12th grade, average

expenditure per student, and number of students eligible for free lunch. I use these totals to

construct controls for each cohort and variables that give the number of AP students and AP

exams per 1,000 high school juniors and seniors for 1994-2009.

The third dataset provides information on AP exam performance. The National Center for

Higher Education Management Systems constructed a dataset from the College Board state

summary reports which gives the number of AP exams scores at 3 or above per 1,000 high

school juniors and seniors by state for 1998-2003. Since it may be that some AP policies

improve AP course quality (and thus increase the number of AP exams scored three or higher)

but do not increase the number of students choosing to take an AP exam, this dataset will capture

different effects than the first AP dataset.

Finally, a fourth dataset consists of three different college outcomes by state and year: the

enrollment rate, the three-year graduation rate for associate’s students, and the six-year

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graduation rate from bachelor’s students.4 The enrollment rate for state X is defined as the

number of first-time freshman who graduated from high school in the past year in state X

enrolled anywhere in the U.S. This reflects the college going rate of graduating high school

seniors in a particular state and year. The three-year graduate rate of associate’s students is

defined as the percentage of first-time full-time associate degree-seeking students earning any

formal award (certificate or associates degree) within three year at a Title IV degree-granting

institutions between 1997 and 2009 inclusive. Thus, these data correspond to the 1994-2006

high school senior cohorts in each state, assuming that all the first-time associate’s degree

seeking students enrolled in the fall immediately after their high school graduation. The six-year

graduation rate of bachelor’s students is defined as the percentage of first-time full-time

bachelor’s degree-seeking students earning any formal award (certificate, associate, or bachelors

degree) within six years at a Title IV degree-granting institution between 1997 and 2009,

inclusive. Thus, these data correspond to 1991-2003 high school senior cohorts in each state,

assuming that all the first-time bachelor’s seeking students enrolled in the fall immediately after

their high school graduation.

In the analysis that follows, I attempt to estimate the effect of an AP policy on the

eventual college graduation rate of a cohort of high school seniors subject to that policy. To do

this, I look at the graduation rates of the college cohorts in the state and year the fall after that

senior cohort graduated. There are three obvious problems with this approach. First of all,

neither of these graduation rates account for transfers across institutions. If one state has a larger

percentage of students transferring than another, all else equal, this state will have a lower

graduation rate in this data. Moreover, this data may suffer from systematic reporting bias.

                                                                                                                         4  The National Center for Higher Education Management Systems compiled this data from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Graduation Rate Survey.  

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Anywhere between 33% and 100% of the institutions in a particular state responded to the

IPEDS Graduation Rate Survey. It may be that institutions with the highest graduation rates are

those most likely to respond to the survey. In this case, the data may not accurately reflect actual

college graduation rates. Finally, using this graduation rate data to evaluate the effects of AP

policies on the eventual graduation rates of particular cohorts relies on two strong assumptions. It

assumes that seniors enroll immediately in the fall after their high school graduation and attend

an institution in the same state as which they attended high school. Obviously, many students

take a gap year between high school and college or choose an out of state institution. I include

estimates for the effect on graduation rates for illustrative purposes, but due to the problems

outlined above, these results should be interpreted cautiously.

Before presenting my empirical results, I discuss possible trending in my AP and college

outcomes data.

Trends in the National AP Data

Nationally, the number of students taking at least one AP course has increased

exponentially since 1973 when the College Board began reporting enrollment data. The number

of students who took at least one AP exam ranges from 53,902 in 1973 to 1,802,144 in 2010. The

total number of schools with students who took AP exams has also increased every year from

3,114 in 1973 to 16,699 in 2010. The number of AP exams scored 3 or higher per 1,000 high

school juniors and seniors has also increased every year between 1997 and 2007, the years for

which data is available.

Trends in National College Enrollment and Graduation Rate Data

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College enrollment rates have been generally increasing over time as shown in figure 2.

In 1992, the college enrollment rate was 52%. The rate increased until 2000 and then slipped

slightly before increasing monotonically to 62.5% in 2008. Graduation rates have fluctuated over

time nationally, though they seem to be generally increasing as shown in figure 3. The 1992 and

1993 high school senior cohorts had the lowest graduation rates during the thirteen-year period

with 52% of the cohort earning a bachelor’s degree within six years. Very few states had any AP

policies during this period. Whether due to the expansion of the AP program or other factors,

graduation rates increased in the following period. They peaked at 56.4% for the 2000 cohort,

but declined for each of the three subsequent cohorts.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

I. Effect of an AP Policy

The first part of this empirical analysis compares states with no Advanced Placement policies

to states that have at least one AP policy in order to determine whether Advanced Placement

policies successfully increase the number of students who participate in the AP program,

improve AP exam performance, and ultimately increase college going or college graduation

rates. A state is considered to have an AP policy in a given exam year if they have any of the

eight state AP policies or receive grant money under either national AP policy.

Before presenting the results of more rigorous regression analysis, I present a few illustrative

figures. Figure 1 examines the relationship between number of states with AP Policies and

number of AP students. First, I plot the number of students who took at least one AP test per

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1,000 high school juniors and seniors for 1991-20035. Below this, I plot the number of states

with any AP policy in those years. While the number of states with AP policies fluctuates

somewhat, over the entire period, the number increases from 7 to 42. Meanwhile, the number of

AP students per 1,000 high school juniors and seniors increases monotonically. At first glance,

this figure suggests that AP policies may increase the number of students who take AP exams.

However, it is notable that the number of students who take AP exams does not decrease when

the number of states with AP policies decreases in 2001 and 2002. It could be that AP exam

taking is increasing over this period for reasons other than AP policies.

In figure 2, I plot the number of states with AP policies against the college enrollment rate. A

drop in the number of states with AP policies corresponds to a drop in the college enrollment rate

between 2000 and 2002, but in all other years in the 1992-2008 period, both are increasing

monotonically. This figure associates greater AP policy implementation with increases in the

college enrollment rate. Of course, rigorous regression analysis with some identifying

assumptions will be needed to test a casual claim.

In figure 3, I plot the number of states with AP policies against the college graduation rate

nationally. During the period 1991-2000, both the number of states with AP policies and the

college graduation rate is increasing. Then in 2001-2002, both drop. In 2003, the number of

states with AP policies increases again, but the college graduation rate continues to fall. Once

again, it is hard to draw a definitive conclusion regarding the relationship between the two

variables, but overall, both seem to be increasing during this time period.

Finally, I break down the data by state. For figure 4, I compute the change in the college

enrollment rate from 1996 to 2008 for each state as well as the number of years during the period

that each state had at least one AP policy in effect. For figure 5, I compute the change in the                                                                                                                          5  I  present  the  1991-­‐2003  time  period  so  that  this  figure  can  be  directly  compared  with  figure  3.    

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college graduation rate from 1991 to 2003 for each state as well as the number of years during

the period that each state had at least one AP policy in effect. Figures 4 and 5 present

scatterplots of these relationships. If AP policies increase college enrollment or graduation rates,

there should be evidence of a positive correlation. Figure 4 shows a positive correlation, which is

consistent with the idea that AP policies increase college enrollment. By contrast, figure 5

shows no correlation; the best fit line is horizontal. This suggests that AP policies do not

increase college graduation rates.

Of course, these figures make no effort to control for differences between states with and

without AP policies along other dimensions. Perhaps states who pass AP policies tend to be

states with student populations more or less amiable to the AP program or states with student

populations more or less able to take AP exams and perform well. In order to control for

differences along other dimensions, I estimate two regression model specifications using OLS:

1  𝑦!" =  𝛽!𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!" + 𝛿!"𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼! +  𝜀!"

2  𝑦!" =  𝛽!𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!" +  𝛿!"𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛾! + 𝛼! +  𝜀!"  

The dependent variable is 𝑦!" denotes an AP outcome or college outcome for state s in year t.

The AP outcomes I investigate are APstudents, APexams, and exams3above. APstudents denotes

the number of students who took at least one AP exam per 1,000 high school juniors and seniors.

APexams denotes the total number of AP exams taken per 1,000 high school juniors and seniors.

Exam3above denotes the number AP exams scored 3 or above per 1,000 of high school juniors

and seniors. Additionally, I investigate several college outcomes: the percentage of graduating

high school seniors that enroll immediately in college the following fall (enrollrate), the

percentage of first-time associate’s degree-seeking students earning a degree within three years

(gradrate3year), and the percentage of first-time, full-time bachelor’s degree-seeking students

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earning a degree within six years (gradrate6year). These models include one explanatory

variable: 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!". This explanatory variable is equal to 1 if state s had any one of eight

state AP policies or received grants under either national AP policy in year t and 0 otherwise.6 In

all specifications, I include the following controls for the year/state cohort: percent black, percent

white, percent Hispanic, percent eligible for free lunch, and average educational expenditures per

student. In all these models, 𝜀!" is the idiosyncratic error for state s in year t.

In the first specification, I include year fixed effects (𝛼!) to control for factors affecting AP

or college outcomes across all states in a particular year. These fixed affects should capture the

general trending upward in the AP outcomes data as well as more complicated trends in the

college outcomes data. Then in the second specification, I also add state fixed effects (𝛾!) to

control for differences between states during the time period. There are several reasons to

include a state fixed effect. First of all, states have different high school student populations that

may vary by ability, initial willingness to participate in AP, and familiarity with the AP program.

States also have different teacher populations that may vary in their willingness to teach AP

courses, ability to teach AP courses, and enthusiasm for the AP program. This specification

assumes that all of the factors captured by the state fixed effect are roughly constant over the

time period of analysis.

Table 1 displays the estimates for these two regression models with six different dependent

variables: APstudents, APexams, exams3above, enrollrate, gradrate3year, and gradrate6year.  

I code 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!" as 1 if the policy was in effect when students the year t and state s cohort

                                                                                                                         6  A  state  is  considered  to  have  an  state  AP  policy  if  it  has  any  one  of  the  following  eight  state  AP  policies:  equipment  or  instructional  grants  to  schools  or  districts,  mandates  for  AP  course  offerings,  accountability  incentives,  state  AP  test  fee  subsidies  (independent  of  those  funding  by  national  test  fee  reduction  grants  from  the  U.S.  Department  of  Education),  mandating  or  providing  funds  for  AP  teacher  training  or  professional  development,  financial  incentives  for  AP  exam  performance,  guaranteeing  college  credit  at  public  in-­‐state  Institutions  for  passing  AP  exam  scores,  and  collaboration  between  K-­‐12  and  higher  education  systems  regarding  the  AP  program.    

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were seniors. Then, I estimate outcomes for that year/state cohort of seniors. Table 1 shows that

point estimates for the effect of 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 is positive for all three AP outcome variables in

specification 1, and 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 has a significant effect for both APexams and exams3above.

There seems to be no effect on any college outcomes. Including state fixed effects generally

decreases the magnitude of the point estimates, but now the point estimates for APstudents and

APexams are positive and significant at the 5% level. The estimate for exams3above is positive

but insignificant. There is a surprisingly large and significant effect for the college enrollment

rate, but there is no significant effect for college graduation rates. These point estimates imply

that all else equal, states with at least one AP policy have 8.1 more AP students and 15.8 more

total AP exams per 1,000 high school juniors and seniors and college enrollment rates 2.5%

higher than states without.

In order to test the validity of these results, I run a falsification test. I estimate effects for

cohorts two years before the state’s first AP policy. (I replace  𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!" with

 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!! in my regression specifications.) Since this is two years before the real

treatment, I should detect no effects as long as there is no trending in the data that state and year

fixed effects fail to capture. The table below table 2 shows that the data passes this falsification

test. There are no significant effects on AP outcomes or college outcomes in either specification

(1) or (2).

Additionally, I probe the robustness of the finding that AP policies increase AP outcomes

and possibly college enrollment by dropping particular years from the regressions. The size and

significance of the resulting estimates are sensitive to what years are included, though the

estimates are always positive. For example, dropping data from 1994-1997 dramatically reduces

the size of the estimates and makes them insignificant. This is likely because one or two salient

  18  

AP policies drives the result that AP policies increases AP outcomes and enrollment, and this

particular policy was turning on or off in several states during this 1994-1997 period.7

Next, I move beyond a simple pre/post analysis to investigate the cumulative effects of these

policies. To specification 2, which already includes state and year fixed effects, I add four pre-

policy explanatory variables

(𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!  , 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!  ,  𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!  , 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!) as well 3 post-policy

explanatory variables (𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!  , 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!  , 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!!)  to trace the number of

years before or after the state implemented its first AP policy. The base case is five or more

years before the policy. For example, the coefficient 21.9 on 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦!"!! in column (1) means

that a cohort of high school juniors and seniors subject to an AP policy in its third year had on

average 21.9 more AP students than five years before an AP policy, all else equal.

I plot the point estimates for effects on the number of AP students and the college enrollment

rate over time in a graph below table 2. Since none of the coefficients are significant, one should

be wary of drawing sharp conclusions from table 2 or the corresponding graph. However, the

positive and increasing point estimates for third and fourth year of the AP policy suggest that

states may see an increase in number of AP students and college enrollment rates a few years

after AP policy implementation. This is consistent with policy lags, which in the context of state

AP policies seem quite likely. This graph also shows that increases in college enrollment rates

generally correspond with increases in the number of AP students. This suggests some effect on

enrollment rates after several years of AP policies, but since the estimates are not significant,

these results do not provide strong evidence for such a relationship.

                                                                                                                         7  Later  in  the  paper  when  I  break  down  the  results  by  particular  AP  policies,  I  find  evidence  that  financial  incentives  and  national  AP  incentive  grants  drive  this  result.    Of  the  only  five  states  that  have  ever  implemented  financial  incentives,  3  began  in  the  1994-­‐1997  time  period  (Arkansas  (1995),  Texas  (1996),  and  Oklahoma  (1997)).  The  other  two  began  shortly  after  (Florida  (1998)  and  Colorado  (1999)).    

  19  

II. Effects of Particular State AP Policies

Up until this point, I have lumped all AP policies into a single category. Of course, not all

policies are created equal. Some focus on expanding access to AP; some focus on increasing AP

exam taking, and the remaining policies focus on improving AP quality. For example, national

AP incentive grant recipients must use the funds to increase participation of low-income students

in the AP program, expanding access. Some states provide AP exam test fee waivers to

encourage AP students to take exams at the conclusion of their AP courses, hoping that this will

cause students to work harder to learn the material and earn college credit. Finally, states that

offer funds for teacher training and professional development strive to better equip AP

instructors to offer quality courses.

Various types of incentives may make some policies more effective than others. In the table

below, I list various aspects of AP policies and their corresponding goals. In the analysis that

follows, I attempt to evaluate how well each of the ten types of policies are at achieving the three

AP-related goals of (1) expanding access, (2) increasing AP exam taking, and (3) increase AP

exam performance. In addition, I assess how well each type of policy works to increase college

enrollment and graduation rates.

  20  

Goal Policies Targeting Schools and Teachers

Policies Targeting Students

Primary AP Outcome of

Interest Encourage

Participation Broadly/Expand

Access (1)

- Reward schools with higher AP enrollments - Include AP enrollment percentages as an accreditation factor - Equipment grants to schools - Require schools to publish AP enrollment statistics - Equipment grants to low-income schools - Mandate course offerings

- Offer weighted grades for AP courses - Offer distance learning and online AP courses - Require parental and student notification of AP offerings

APStudents

Increase AP Exam Taking

(2)

- Require schools to publish rates of exam taking in accountability reports

- Mandate that students take exams to earn course credit - Test fee waivers

APExams

Increase AP Exam Success

(3)

- Require schools to publish AP exam results in accountability reports - Provide funds for teacher training - Mandate teacher training - Financial incentives for teachers - Collaboration between K-12 and higher education

- Guarantee college credit for passing scores at state institutions - Make state scholarships dependent on AP exam performance

Exams3Above

In order to investigate the effects of particular AP policies, I estimate a model very similar to

the specification 2 from part I, except I replace 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝐴𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 with 8 variables for the eight types

of state AP policies and 2 variables for the two types of national AP policies. As before, I

include a state and year fixed effects, the model is as follows:

𝑦!" =  𝛽!𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠!" +  𝛽!𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟!" +  𝛽!𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!"+  𝛽!𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠!"

+  𝛽!𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛!" +  𝛽!𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑐!" + 𝛽!𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" +  𝛽!  𝑘12!"

+    𝛽!  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" +  𝛿!"𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝛾! + 𝛼! +  𝜀!"

Table 4 presents OLS estimates of this model. Most policies seem to have no effect, while

some stand out as quite effective. Equipment/instructional grants, accountability incentives,

mandating AP offerings, collaboration between K12 schools and higher education, and national

test fee reductions have no significant effects on 𝐴𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 , 𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠 , 𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠3𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 ,

𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒3  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, or    𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒6𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟. State test fee reductions have no effect on

  21  

AP outcomes or college graduation rates but have a negative and significant effect on the college

enrollment rate. This seems to be a statistical anomaly because the same effect does not persist

when I use data from a narrower time period or omit particular years from the dataset.

Financial incentives have a large and highly significant positive effect on 𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠 and

𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠3𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 . Meanwhile, the estimate for 𝐴𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 is relatively large, positive, and

marginally significant at the 10% level. There is a large, positive effect on the two-year

graduation rate that is marginally significant at 10% level. Financial incentives seem to have no

effects on the other two college outcomes. In results not shown here, I probed the robustness of

this result by re-running the regressions with some years omitted. Qualitatively similar results

emerged. Effects on the AP outcome variables were positive, large, and highly significant in all

regressions. The effect on the two-year graduation rate was always positive but its significance

varied. National AP incentive grants also seem to have a positive and significant effect on

𝐴𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 and 𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚, though not college enrollment or graduation rates. The effect on

𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠3𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 is positive but not significant. This finding was also robust to changing the time

period of consideration. Financial incentives and national AP incentive grants seem to be the

only two policies that effectively increase AP exam taking.

Funding or mandating teacher training has an unexpectedly large and highly significant

effect on college enrollment rates and six-year college graduation rates, but no effect on any of

the AP outcomes. Guaranteeing minimum college credit for passing AP scores also has a

positive and highly significant effect on the six-year college graduation rate but no effect on any

AP outcomes. These two findings are fairly robust to changing the exact years of data included

with the exception that minimum credit no longer has a significant effect if I use data from 1998-

2009 rather than 1994-2009.

  22  

To further test the robustness of these findings and to see if there are cumulative effects

of the seemingly effective policies, I run some additional regressions whose results appear in

tables 5 and 6. I code two new variables: 𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒. 𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

indicates whether a state had a policy that seems to affect AP outcomes while 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

indicates whether a state had a policy that seems to affect college graduation rates. 𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

takes the value 1 in a given year if that state had financial incentives based on exam performance

or received a national AP incentive grant. 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 takes the value 1 if in a given year

that state guarantees minimum credit for passing AP scores or funds AP teacher training. Then, I

code variables to trace the first four years of the policy. Finally, I regress each AP outcome and

college outcome on these 4 variables.

The results presented in table 5 indicate that the two policies that have a large, significant

effect on AP outcomes (financial incentives and national AP incentive grants) do not have a

large and significant effect on 𝐴𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 , 𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠 , and 𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠3𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 immediately.

Rather, it takes several years to detect their effects. Large, significant treatment effects appear

four or more years after the state began implementing one of these policies. The effects on

𝐴𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 and 𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠3𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 are large in magnitude and significant at the 5% level. The

effect for 𝐴𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠 is also quite large, but it is only marginally significant at the 10% level. The

point estimates imply that states with financial incentive programs or that receive and use a

national AP incentive grant experience an increase 2.5% increase in the number of students

taking AP exams, a 4.8% increase in the number of exams taken, and a 2% increase in the

number of AP exams passed if the program has been in place for four or more years. Notably,

there are no cumulative effects for any of the college outcomes, which suggests that while these

  23  

policies may successfully encourage AP participating and exam taking, they may not increase

college preparation or encourage college going.

Table 6 presents similar results for the two policies that appeared to increase college

outcomes, though not AP outcomes, in table 4. The estimates suggest that funding teacher

training or guaranteeing credit for passing AP scores leads to a large increase in six-year college

graduation rates immediately, and the magnitude of the effects increases over time. However,

there are several reasons to be skeptical about these results. First, the effects seem implausibly

large, ranging from 1.5% to 3.1%. It is hard to believe that training a few AP teachers or simply

guaranteeing AP credit at in-state colleges would have such a dramatic effect on the six-year

college graduation rate. Secondly, they are accompanied by no increases in any of the AP

outcomes or other college outcomes.

In the section that follows, I discuss whether these and the other empirical findings are

plausible in light of the design of particular AP policies. On the whole, implementation and the

strength of incentives can account for the empirical results in table 4. It is not surprising that

many AP policies fail to increase AP outcomes or college graduation rates because most policies

offer few strong incentives for students, schools, or districts to change their behavior. For

example, it is not surprising that accountability incentives seem to have no effect on AP

outcomes or college graduation rates. Most states with AP accountability policies require

districts or schools to report AP enrollment numbers, AP exam pass rates, and the number of AP

courses offered. Of the 19 states with some form of accountability incentives, only three (West

Virginia, Oklahoma, and Kentucky) consider AP performance in a school’s academic

performance index or rating. While schools and districts in the remaining 16 states may want to

  24  

improve their AP statistics, the lack of obvious sanctions or rewards probably fails to create

incentives to encourage more AP exam taking.

Collaboration between K-12 and higher education institutions may not be efficacious

because most of this legislation offers vague promises but little specific action. For example,

according to Florida’s legislation, “the levels of postsecondary education shall collaborate in

further developing and providing articulated programs in which students can proceed toward

their educational objectives as rapidly as their circumstances permit.” However, how the levels

of education will collaborate remains unspecified. Similarly, Kentucky’s 2002 legislation directs

the state board to identify "resources at the secondary and postsecondary levels that can be

directed toward advanced placement or dual enrollment instruction,” but the legislation lacks an

explanation of how these resources will be used. Given the vague nature and limited scope of K-

12 collaboration legislation, it is unsurprising that these policies have little or no effect on AP

exam taking.

Most equipment and instructional grant policies, though well intentioned, are not

adequately funded or comprehensive enough to generate significant increases in AP offerings

and consequently AP enrollment or AP exam taking. Policies in most states offer a few hundred

dollars for instructional materials, but much more support is needed to establish an effective AP

program. In the absence of well-trained teachers and a school culture that promotes the AP

program, this money will not go very far towards increasing AP enrollment and AP exam taking.

At first glance, it may seem odd that mandating AP offerings does not increase the

number of AP students or number of AP exams taken, especially since this policy has the

primary goal of increasing access to AP. However, expanding AP course offerings at schools

that would not otherwise offer AP courses may fail to increase AP exam taking because the

  25  

courses may be of such low quality that students decide they are not prepared to take the AP

exam at the conclusion of the course. This is especially likely at lower quality schools with less

prepared teachers and students who do not perceive great value in the AP program.

A somewhat more puzzling result in table 4 concerns AP exam fee waivers for free and

reduced price lunch students funded by the U.S Department of Education and state exam fee

subsidies. Since these policies have the primary goal of increasing AP exam taking by decreasing

the cost of taking exams, it is surprising that they do not have a significant effect. However, the

fact that AP exam fee waivers took effect in more than half of all states in the same year and was

expanded almost every state by 2003 may explain why there is not enough variation to detect

strong effects in the data. State exam fee subsidies differ from reductions funded by the U.S.

Department of Education in that they began prior to the national program and included higher

income students. The demand for AP exams among high-income students may be relatively price

inelastic, which would explain why these policies do not increase the number of AP students or

AP exams taken.

While eight of the policies have little to no effect on AP outcomes, two stand out as quite

effective. Financial incentives and national AP incentive grants have large effects on the number

of AP students, AP exams taken, and AP exams passed. Given that state financial incentives

programs and national AP incentive grants focus both on expanding AP access and increasing

test taking and performance, this is what one would expect. Financial incentives for exam

performance have strong effects on the number of AP students, exam taking, and exam

performance. This is what would we expect based on the design of these policies in the five

states that implemented them. Texas, Arkansas, and Florida offer cash bonuses to teachers for

each student who earns a 3 or higher. Texas, Oklahoma, Florida, and Colorado also offer cash

  26  

bonuses (generally $100 or more per student) to schools for each student who earns a 3 or higher.

Texas gives large cash bonuses to students who pass the exam. Under these policies, teachers

and schools have strong incentives to offer high quality AP courses that will enable students to

pass the AP exams, and in Texas, students themselves have an incentive to work hard to learn

course material so that they can perform well on the AP exam. Anecdotal data from these

schools also suggests that these policies changed the school culture.8 Guidance counselors were

more likely to recommend AP courses to able students. This practice may have addressed some

students’ suboptimal decision making. Finally, most of these incentive programs concentrated

their efforts in disadvantaged schools with students who were previously unaware of supposed

financial and academic benefits of the AP program.

National AP incentive grants have also been incredibly successful in achieving the goal

of increasing AP access and AP success. Point estimates from table 4 imply that a having a

national AP incentive grant increases the number of students taking at least one AP exam in that

year by 26 students and the number of exams taken by 13 per 1,000 high school juniors and

seniors. The 2% change in AP students and 1.3% change in AP exams are fairly large immediate

effects, but as table 5 suggests, these effect likely increases over time. There is also a smaller

and slightly less significant effect on 𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑠3𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒, indicating that new students are not only

taking AP exams, but many are also passing. All these results support the claim that certain

policies at the state and national level can effectively encourage AP participation.

Of course, regression results suggest that only two policies effectively increase college

outcomes. Oddly, this effect does not seem to work through an AP channel since these two

policies (teacher training and guaranteeing minimum AP credit) do not increase AP outcomes.

It is quite plausible that these two policies would not have an effect on AP outcomes. Most AP                                                                                                                          8  See  Jackson  (2012)  

  27  

teacher training policies fund travel and enrollment expenses for AP summer institutes or AP

workshops. These events last only a few days, so they may not provide enough training to

dramatically change AP course quality. If course quality does not change much, there will be no

change in the number of AP students, AP exams taken, or AP exam pass rates. Meanwhile, we

would expect college graduation rates to remain unchanged.

Similarly, guaranteeing credit for passing scores on AP exams at colleges and universities

within the states creates no new incentives for students. With the exception of the most elite

private colleges and universities, virtually every college and university grants credit for passing

scores on all AP exams. Thus, it is not surprising that mandating minimum credit has no effect

on AP exam taking. Most states passed these policies not to change the status quo with regards to

AP, but because they wanted to guarantee credit for more contested forms of “college-level”

work like online coursework, dual-credit classes, technical programs, and other forms of credit

by examination; the Advanced Placement program was simply listed along with other programs

in the formal declaration of the guaranteed credit policies numerous states adopted.

While I cannot definitely say why teacher training and guaranteeing minimum credit

appear to increase the six-year graduation rate, there are several plausible econometric

explanations. First of all, looking at educational policies that tended to coincide with the

introduction of guaranteeing minimum AP credit may explain the weird result. As discussed in

the previous paragraph, most minimum credit policies were included in legislation that addressed

other contested forms of credit. If these accompanying policy changes increased college

graduation rates, estimates in my regressions will be biased upwards, perhaps so much so that

they are positive and significant.

  28  

It is also possible that states without teacher training and minimum credit policies had

many transfer students or students who chose colleges out of state. Since transfers are dropped

from the graduation rate data, states with many students transferring will have artificially low

graduation rates. If states with teacher training and minimum credit policies are especially

proactive states better able to retain students, estimates of the effects of these policies will be

biased upwards. In addition, the college graduation rates are distorted because they do not

account for students that attended high school in one state and attended college in another. If

even a small percentage of students choose out of state colleges and universities, these data

cannot be used reliably to estimate the effects of AP policies on college graduation rates. Finally,

the graduation rate data rely on accurate reporting from all colleges and universities in the state.

However, rates of reporting vary dramatically between states, so there may be systematic

reporting bias. For example, in some states, all institutions report their graduation rates. In

others, only 33% report, so in these under-reporting states, perhaps only the institutions with the

highest graduation rates report. This would inflate the graduation rates for these states and lead to

biased estimates as long as which states have inflated rates is correlated with the adoption of AP

policies. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to determine which, if any, of these econometric

issues is responsible for implausible estimates. Better graduation rate data or an improved

source of identifying variation is needed to accurately evaluate the effect of AP policies on

college graduation rates. Future research will certainly improve on the approach adopted in this

analysis and hopefully offer more conclusive answers. Analysis of panel micro-data that tracks

individual students might be best suited to this task.

  29  

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of various state and national

Advanced Placement policies. Using aggregate panel data, I find that some AP policies

effectively increase the number of students taking AP exams, the number of AP exams taken,

and the number of exams passed. Financial incentives based on exam performance and the

national AP incentive grant program have large, significant effects on AP exam taking.

According to my results, the eight remaining policies (accountability incentives, guaranteeing

minimum credit, K-12/higher education collaboration, national exam fee waivers, state test fee

subsidies, mandating AP offerings, equipment and instructional grants, and funds for teacher

training) have little to no effect on AP outcomes.

Though the results of this analysis should be interpreted cautiously, they can inform the

design of AP policies. There is strong evidence that individual cash incentives, either at the

school, teacher, or student level can work to encourage AP participation and improve AP

performance. These cash incentives can increase school, teacher, and student effort, improving

course quality and learning. Changing the school culture and providing students with more

information about the potential benefits of AP may also influence student decision making.

Similarly, several key aspects of the national AP incentive program likely make it more

successful than other policies with the same goals. Because grants recipients must demonstrate a

“pervasive need for access to advance placement programs,” only schools and districts that

would otherwise not offer AP but truly desire to offer the program receive funding. Moreover,

grant recipients must “assure the availability of matching funds” and “provide for the

involvement of businesses and community organizations.” This emphasis on partnership with

other organizations guarantees multiple stakeholders to hold schools accountable for their use of

  30  

the funds. Although the most of the funding is ultimately used for instructional materials or

teacher training, these two elements of the national AP incentive grant program probably make it

more successful than funding for teacher training and instructional materials provided by states

individually.

While these two policies are the most effective, they are also the most costly. In the 2010-

2011 school year alone, the U.S Department of Education spent over $23 million on the

Advanced Placement Incentive Grant program, and AP exam performance incentives programs

are quite costly at the state level. More reliable estimates of longer-term effects on college

outcomes would go a long way towards making a cost-benefit analysis possible. Only after

additional studies establish whether the social benefits of these programs outweigh the costs will

policymakers know whether these programs are truly beneficial.

  31  

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http://www.ecs.org/ecs/ecscat.nsf/WebTopicView?OpenView&count=-

1&RestrictToCategory=High+School--Advanced+Placement

Dounay, J. (2011). Recent Policies/Activites: High School—Advanced Placement.

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1&RestrictToCategory=High+School--Advanced+Placement

Dounay, J. (2000). Advanced Placement Courses and Examinations—State Level

Policies. Education Commission of the States. Retrieved from  

http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/15/04/1504.htm

Hargrove, L., Godin, D., & Dodd, B. (2008). College Outcome

Comparisons by AP and Non-AP High School Experiences. CollegeBoard

Research Report No. 2008-3.

http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/08-

1574_CollegeOutcomes.pdf  

Geiser, S., & Santelices, V. (2004). The role of Advanced Placement and honors courses

in college admissions (Research & Occasional Paper Series: CSHE.4.04).

Berkeley: University of California.

Hallett, R, E,. & Venegas, K. M. (2011). Is Increased Access Enough? Advanced

Placement Courses, Quality, and Success in Low-Income Urban Schools. Journal

for the Education of the Gifted, 34(3), 468-487.

Jackson, Kirabo C. (2010). A Little Now for a Lot Later: A Look at a Texas Advanced

Placement Incentive Program.  The Journal of Human Resources.  45(3), 591.

Jackson, Kirabo C. (2010). Effects of an Incentive-Based High School Intervention on

  32  

College Outcomes. National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper

15722. http://www.nber.org/papers/w15722

Jeong, D.W. (2009). Student Participation and Performance on Advanced

Placement Exams: Do State-Sponsored Incentives Make a

Difference?  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis.  31(4), 346-366.

Johnson, Kirk. (2004). Expanding opportunity for Low-Income High School Students:

Pell Grants vs. Advanced Placement Classes. The Heritage Foundation.

Keng, L. & Dodd, B. G. (2008). A comparison of college performances of AP® and

non-AP student groups in 10 subject areas (College Board research report no.

2008-7). New York, NY: The College Board.

Klopfenstein, K., & Thomas, M. K. (2009). The link between advanced placement

experience and early college success.  Southern Economic Journal,  75(3), 873-

891.

McCauley, David. (2007) The Impact of Advanced Placement and Dual Enrollment

Programs on College Graduation.  Applied Research Projects, Texas State

University-San Marcos.  Paper 206.

http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/206

Scott, P., Tolson, H., & Yi-Hsuan, L. (2010). Assessment of Advanced

Placement Participation and University Academic Success in the First Semester:

Controlling for Selected High School Academic Abilities. Journal of College

Admission, (208), 26-30.

-----. (2010). Number of Eleventh and Twelve Grade Students by State, Number of

Black, White, and Hispanic Students, Number of Free Price Lunch Students,

Average Expenditure Per Student. Common Core of Data. National Center for

Education Statistics.

-----. (2010). Number of AP Exam Scores at 3 or Above Per 1,000 High School Juniors

and Seniors: Advanced Placement Data 1997-2003, 2005, and 2007.

National Center for Higher Education Management Systems.

-----. (2009). College-Going Rates of High School Graduates – Directly from High

School. National Center for Higher Education Management Systems.

-----. (2009). Progress and Completion: Graduation Rates Data 1997-2009. National

  33  

Center for Higher Education Management Systems.

-----. (2011). State Notes: Advanced Placement. Education Commission of the States.

Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=922

-----. (2011). U.S. Department of Education, Office of Academic Improvement and

Teacher Quality Programs: Advanced Placement Incentive Program Grants.

Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://www2.ed.gov/programs/apincent/index.html

-----. (2011). U.S. Department of Education, Office of Academic Improvement and

Teacher Quality Programs: Advanced Placement Test Fee Program.

  34  

FIGURES  AND  TABLES:  

0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  

0  

20  

40  

60  

80  

100  

120  

140  

160  

180  

1991   1993   1995   1997   1999   2001   2003  

Figure  1:  Relationship  between  Number  of  States  with  AP  Policies  and  Number  of  AP  

Students  

Number  of  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  that  Took  at  Least  One  AP  Exam  

Number  of  States  with  AP  Policies  

52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  

0  

10  

20  

30  

40  

50  

60  

1990   1995   2000   2005   2010  

Figure  2:  Relationship  Between  Number  of  States  with  AP  Policies  and  the  College  

Enrollment  Rate    

Number  of  States  with  At  Least  One  AP  Policy  

College  Enrollment  Rate  

  35  

0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  

51.5  52  

52.5  53  

53.5  54  

54.5  55  

55.5  56  

56.5  57  

1991   1993   1995   1997   1999   2001   2003  Cohort  Year  

Figure  3:  Relationship  Between  Number  of  States  with  AP  Policies  and  the  National  Six-­‐

Year  Graduation  Rate    

Graduation  Rate  (Percent)  

Number  of  States  with  AP  Policies  

-­‐15  

-­‐10  

-­‐5  

0  

5  

10  

15  

20  

25  

0   2   4   6   8   10   12   14   16  

Change  in  the  College  Enrollment  Rate  

Years  with  an  AP  Policy  

Figure  4:  Change  in  Six-­‐Year  Graduation  Rate  vs.  Years  with  AP  Policies  (1996-­‐2008)  

  36  

-­‐8  

-­‐6  

-­‐4  

-­‐2  

0  

2  

4  

6  

8  

10  

12  

14  

0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13  

Figure  5:  Change  in  Six-­‐Year  Graduation  Rate  vs.  Years  with  AP  Policies  (1991-­‐2003)  

  37  

Table 1: Effect of Any AP Policy on AP and College Outcomes (1994-2009)

Falsification Test (1994-2009)

Specification (Row 1): Year Fixed Effects Only Specification (Row 2): Year Fixed Effects and State Fixed Effects Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

     

 Specification:  

(1)  AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(2)  AP  Exams  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

(3)  AP  Exams  Passed  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

 

(4)  Percentage  of  High  School  Graduates  Enrolling  in  College  

Immediately  After  HS  

Graduation  

(5)  Three-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Associate’s  Degree  Seeking  

Students  

(6)  Six-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  Bachelor’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

(1)  Any  AP  Policy   16.054  [8.240]  

29.882*  [13.751]  

0.830**  [0.286]  

0.827  [1.852]  

-­‐1.574  [1.692]  

0.528  [1.302]  

 (2)  Any  AP  Policy   8.092*  

[3.862]  15.781*  [7.223]  

3.683  [2.230]  

2.487**  [0.880]  

0.130  [0.858]  

0.026  [0.321]  

 Observations   716   716   385   337   538   444  

     

 Specification:  

(1)  AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(2)  AP  Exams  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

(3)  AP  Exams  Passed  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

 

(4)  Percentage  of  High  School  Graduates  Enrolling  in  College  

Immediately  After  HS  

Graduation  

(5)  Three-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Associate’s  Degree  Seeking  

Students  

(6)  Six-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  Bachelor’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

(1)  Two  Years  Before  Any  AP  

Policy  

-­‐4.330  [4.235]  

-­‐8.818  [7.338]  

-­‐4.033  [7.717]  

-­‐0.348  [1.468]  

-­‐1.506  [1.625]  

-­‐1.053  [0.776]  

 

(2)  Two  Years  Before  Any  AP  

Policy  

-­‐3.032  [2.438]  

-­‐5.660  [4.592]  

-­‐4.845  [4.886]  

0.571  [0.974]  

-­‐0.847  [15.682]  

-­‐0.128  [0.497]  

Observations   716   716   385   337   538   444  

  38  

Table 2: Effect of Any AP Policy on AP and College Outcomes Over Time (1994-2009) (Specification 2: Year Fixed Effects and State Fixed Effects)

  (1)  AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(2)  AP  Exams  Per  

1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(3)  Percentage  of  High  School  

Graduates  Enrolling  in  College  

Immediately  After  HS  

Graduation    

(4)  Three-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Associate’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

(5)  Six-­‐Year  College  Graduation  Rate  of  Bachelor’s  

Degree  Seeking  Students  

Four  Years  Before  Any  AP  Policy  

-­‐1.634  [14.160]  

-­‐1.469  [7.813]  

2.367  [1.655]  

-­‐6.902  [4.665]  

0.889  [1.020]  

Three  Years  Before  

Any  AP  Policy  1.984  

[16.129]  -­‐0.200  [8.792]  

-­‐1.518  [1.894]  

-­‐8.854  [4.663]  

-­‐0.244  1.134]  

Two  Years  Before  Any  AP  Policy  

5.012  [18.592]  

1.32  [10.214]  

2.282  [1.925]  

-­‐8.065  [4.841]  

-­‐0.026  [1.213]  

One  Year  Before  Any  AP  Policy  

8.197  [21.440]  

2.766  11.777]  

-­‐0.956  [2.236]  

-­‐8.037  [5.304]  

-­‐0.021  [1.286]  

First  Year  with  An  AP  Policy  

13.87  [22.952]  

6.019  [12.442]  

2.777  [2.354]  

-­‐6.972  [5.755]  

-­‐0.283  [1.266]  

Second  Year  with  An  AP  Policy  

10.966  [26.368]  

4.301  [14.341]  

2.472  [2.473]  

-­‐7.862  [5.146]  

-­‐0.550  [1.245]  

Third  Year  with  An  AP  Policy  

21.883  [27.078]  

9.395  [14.791]  

0.988  [2.907]  

-­‐7.421  [5.379]  

-­‐0.207  [1.265]  

Four+  Years  with  An  AP  Policy  

45.931  [30.697]  

21.919  [16.471]  

3.749  [2.777]  

-­‐6.322  [5.540]  

0.438  [1.331]  

Observations   716   716   337   538   444   Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

  39  

-­‐10  

0  

10  

20  

30  

40  

50  

-­‐2  

-­‐1  

0  

1  

2  

3  

4  

5  Four  Years  Before  any  AP  Policy  

Three  Years  Before  any  AP  Policy  

Two  Years  Before  any  AP  Policy  

One  Year  Before  any  AP  Policy  

First  Year  with  an  AP  Policy  

Second  Year  with  an  AP  Policy  

Third  Year  with  an  AP  Policy  

Four+  Years  with  an  AP  Policy  

Increase  in  AP  Students  relative  to      

5  Years  Before  Any  AP  Policy  

Increase  in  College  Enrollment  Rate    

Relative  to    5  Years  Before  Any  AP  Policy  

Graph  of  Table  2:  Effect  of  Any  AP  Policy  on  Number  of  AP  Students  and  College  Enrollment  

for  Seniors  

Percentage  of  High  School  Graduates  Enrolling  Immediately  in  College  

Number  of  AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

  40  

Table 4: Effects of Specific Policies (1994-2009) (Specification 2: Year Fixed Effects and State Fixed Effects)   (1)  

AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(2)  AP  Exams  

Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(3)  AP  Exams  Passed  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

 

(4)  Percentage  of  High  School  

Graduates  Enrolling  in  College  

Immediately  After  HS  

Graduation  

(5)  Three-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Associate’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

(6)  Six-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Bachelor’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

Equipment/  Instructional  Grants  

-­‐26.330  [14.482]  

-­‐14.796  [8.186]  

-­‐2.831  [5.044]  

1.259  [2.609]  

0.109  [2.172]  

0.439  [0.592]  

Financial  Incentives  

36.604*  [15.644]  

22.121**  [7.608]  

18.882**  [4.946]  

3.081  [2.073]  

4.804*  [2.359]  

0.046  [0.530]  

Funds  for  Teacher  Training  

22.197  [13.854]  

12.319  [6.931]  

5.31  4.296]  

2.824*  [1.342]  

-­‐0.102  [1.319]  

1.788**  [0.572]  

State  Test  Fee  Reductions  

-­‐8.206  [17.638]  

-­‐4.706  [9.656]  

-­‐3.009  [4.015]  

-­‐2.845*  [1.266]  

-­‐0.343  [1.865]  

-­‐0.705  [0.510]  

Guaranteed  Minimum  AP  Credit  

-­‐1.738  [15.699]  

0.561  [8.351]  

-­‐6.911  [5.329]  

-­‐2.995  [1.554]  

0.407  [1.718]  

2.628**  [0.707]  

Accountability  Incentives  

39.593  [22.212]  

21.138  [11.141]  

6.292  [6.454]  

0.787  [0.993]  

1.438  [1.670]  

0.693  [0.698]  

Mandating  AP  Offerings  

47.444  [38.053]  

29.1  [23.342]  

9.412  [11.417]  

2.436  [1.610]  

2.228  [3.417]  

-­‐0.144  [0.545]  

K12  and  Higher  Ed  Collaboration  

11.115  [14.740]  

7.101  [7.612]  

-­‐3.17  [6.267]  

0.862  [1.584]  

-­‐0.562  [1.598]  

0.367  [0.859]  

National  Test  Fee  Reductions  

-­‐7.245  [4.901]  

-­‐4.401  [2.914]  

-­‐0.397  [1.605]  

-­‐0.109  [0.700]  

-­‐0.543  [0.478]  

0.113  [0.286]  

National  AP  Incentive  Grants  

26.830*  [12.176]  

13.064*  [5.710]  

5.039  [5.367]  

-­‐1.223  [0.892]  

-­‐0.317  [1.590]  

-­‐0.142  [0.758]  

Observations   716   716   385   337   538   444   Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

  41  

Table 5: Effects Over Time of the Effective AP Policies (1994-2009) AP Outcomes Effective Policies: Financial Exam Performance Incentives and National AP Incentive Grants   (1)  

AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(2)  AP  Exams  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

(3)  AP  Exams  Passed  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

 

(4)  Percentage  of  High  School  

Graduates  Enrolling  in  College  

Immediately  After  HS  

Graduation  

(5)  Three-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Associate’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

(6)  Six-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Bachelor’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

First  Year  of  Effective  Policy  

3.163  [5.994]  

8.054  [11.383]  

5.875  [4.660]  

1.472  [1.498]  

0.974  [1.311]  

0.839  [0.513]  

Second  Year  of  Effective  Policy  

2.257  [6.898]  

6.808  [13.238]  

-­‐0.385  [5.964]  

-­‐2.445*  [1.113]  

-­‐0.811  [1.675]  

1.128  [0.728]  

Third  Year  of  Effective  Policy  

-­‐4.013  [8.813]  

-­‐5.054  [16.339]  

5.937  [6.398]  

1.888  [1.195]  

0.084  [1.890]  

0.720  [0.945]  

Four+  Years  of  Effective  Policy  

24.839*  [12.103]  

48.482  [24.674]  

19.178*  [8.370]  

0.176  [1.634]  

3.089  [2.157]  

2.068  [1.282]  

Observations   716   716   385   337   538   444   Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets *significant  at  5%;  **  significant  at  1%

  42  

Table 6: Effects Over Time of the Effective AP Policies (1994-2009) College Outcomes Effective Policies: Funds for Teacher Training and Guaranteeing Minimum AP Credit   (1)  

AP  Students  Per  1,000  HS  Juniors  and  Seniors  

(2)  AP  Exams  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

(3)  AP  Exams  Passed  Per  1,000  HS  

Juniors  and  Seniors  

 

(4)  Percentage  of  High  School  

Graduates  Enrolling  in  College  

Immediately  After  HS  

Graduation  

(5)  Three-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Associate’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

(6)  Six-­‐Year  College  

Graduation  Rate  of  

Bachelor’s  Degree  Seeking  Students  

First  Year  of  Effective  Policy  

0.349  [6.069]  

1.397  [11.376]  

1.964  [3.674]  

2.127  [2.098]  

0.309  [1.335]  

1.455**  [0.486]  

Second  Year  of  Effective  Policy  

-­‐0.698  [7.119]  

-­‐1.658  [13.825]  

4.749  [4.583]  

1.172  [1.654]  

0.034  [1.541]  

1.883**  [0.878]  

Third  Year  of  Effective  Policy  

6.666  [7.820]  

10.328  [14.882]  

7.011  [5.753]  

2.158  [1.315]  

0.886  [2.252]  

2.768**  [0.594]  

Four+  Years  of  Effective  Policy  

13.221  [8.137]  

21.727  [16.181]  

6.140  [7.509]  

1.909  [1.696]  

0.131  [2.386]  

3.136**  [0.896]  

Observations   716   716   385   337   538   444   Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets *significant  at  5%;  **  significant  at  1%

  43  

Appendix  A:  State  Policies  and  Timing    

Table  A1:  Year  of  First  AP  Policy  by  State  State   Year  of  First  AP  Policy  South  Carolina   1987  Missouri   1987  Utah   1988  West  Virginia   1989  California     1990  Indiana     1990  Iowa   1991  Wisconsin   1993  Arkansas     1995  Montana   1995  New  Jersey   1995  Massachusetts   1996  Michigan     1996  Texas   1996  Georgia     1997  Oklahoma   1997  Colorado     1998  Ohio   1998  Louisiana   1998  Virginia   1998  Kentucky   1998  South  Dakota   1998  Washington   1998  Delaware   1998  Oregon   1998  Alabama   1998  Mississippi   1998  New  Mexico   1998  Tennessee   1998  Hawaii   1998  New  York   1998  Pennslyvania   1998  Rhode  Island   1998  Florida     1999  Minnesota   1999  Connecticut   1999  

  44  

Maryland     1999  Illinois   1999  Maine   1999  North  Carolina   1999  Nevada     2000  New  Hampshire   2000  Vermont   2000  Alaska   2000  Kansas   2000  Nebraska   2000  Wyoming   2000  North  Dakota   2001  Arizona   2003  Idaho   2003  

 Table  A2:  Variation  in  Timing  of  State  Advanced  Placement  Policies  

Policy   State  and  Year9  Equipment  or  Instructional  Grants  to  

Schools  or  Districts  Missouri  (1986)  Indiana  (1990)  

West  Virginia  (1991)10  Arkansas  (1995)  Oklahoma  (1997)  

South  Carolina  (1999)  Utah  (1999)  

Minnesota  (2000)  Massachusetts  (2000)  Alabama  (2006)  Wisconsin  (2006)  New  Mexico  (2007)  

Mandating  Course  Offerings   South  Carolina  (1984)11  West  Virginia  (1991)  Indiana  (1994)12  Ohio  (1998)13  

Arkansas  (2005)14  Mississippi  (2006-­‐2009)15  

Tennessee  (2008)  Accountability  Incentives  

1. Must  report  number  or  percentage  of  

Missouri  (1986):  1,  2  Wisconsin  (1993):  1  New  Jersey  (1995):  1  

                                                                                                                         9  Year  in  parentheses  is  the  year  the  policy  takes  effect;  unless  otherwise  noted,  the  policy  continues  to  the  present.  10  Schools  in  Wyoming  receive  extra  funding  for  each  pupil  enrolled  in  an  Advanced  Placement  course.    11  Each  district  must  provide  at  least  one  AP  course  if  there  is  an  adequate  number  of  talented  students.    12  Each  district  must  offer  at  least  2  AP  courses.    13  Each  educational  center  in  Ohio  must  develop  a  plan  to  guarantee  AP  offerings.    14  All  districts  in  the  state  must  offer  AP  courses.    15  All  schools  must  offer  at  least  one  AP  course  in  each  subject  area.    

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students  enrolled  in  AP  2. Must  report  number  of  courses  offered  3. Must  report  the  number  or  percentage  of  

students  who  take  AP  exams  4. Must  report  AP  exam  performance  5. Accreditation  and  school  grades  depend  on  

1-­‐4  

Michigan  (1996):  1,  2,  3,  4  Oklahoma  (1997):  1,  5  Colorado  (1998):  1,  5  Louisiana  (1999):  1  Utah  (2001):  3,  4  

Kentucky  (2001):  1,  2,  3,  4,  5  Texas  (2001):  1,  4,  5  California  (2002):  2  Virginia  (2003:  1,  3  Maryland  (2004):  1  

Arkansas  (2006):  1,  3,  4  Ohio  (2006):  1  

West  Virginia  (2007):  4,  5  Subsidizing  AP  Test  Fees  

(State  Test  Fee  Reductions  or  Reductions  funded  by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Education  

Test  Fee  Reduction  Grants)  

South  Carolina  (1984)  Indiana  (1990)  Missouri  (1994)  Arkansas  (1995)  

Massachusetts  (1996)  Texas  (1996)  Georgia  (1997)  

Connecticut  (1997)  Oklahoma  (1997)  Alabama  (1998)  California  (1998)  Colorado  (1998)  Delaware  (1998)  Florida  (1998)  Hawaii  (1998)  Iowa  (1998)  

Kentucky  (1998)  Louisiana  (1998)  Michigan  (1998)  Mississippi  (1998)  New  Mexico  (1998)  New  York  (1998)  Ohio  (1998)  Oregon  (1998)  

Pennsylvania  (1998)  Rhode  Island  (1998)  South  Dakota  (1998)  Tennessee  (1998)  Utah  (1998)  

Virginia  (1998)  Washington  (1998)  West  Virginia  (1998)  North  Carolina  (1999)  

Illinois  (1999)  Maryland  (1999)  Minnesota  (1999)  Montana  (1999)  Wisconsin  (1999)  Nebraska  (2000)  Nevada  (2000)  

New  Jersey  (2000)  Vermont  (2000)  

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Alaska  (2000)  New  Hampshire  (2001)  North  Dakota  (2001)  

Maine  (2002)  Kansas  (2003)  Arizona  (2003)  Idaho  (2003)  

Wyoming  (2008)  Mandating  or  Providing  Funds  for  Teacher  Training  and  Professional  

Development  

West  Virginia  (1989)  Indiana  (1990)  Iowa  (1991)  

Arkansas  (1995)  Missouri  (1996)  Texas  (1996)  

Oklahoma  (1997)  Minnesota  (1999)  California  (2000)  Kentucky  (2002)  

South  Dakota  (2002)  Montana  (2003)  

Washington  (2003)  Utah  (2003)  

Connecticut  (2004)  Florida  (2004)  Nevada  (2004)  

South  Carolina  (2004)  Arizona  (2005)  Delaware  (2005)  Illinois  (2005)  Maine  (2005)  Virginia  (2005)  Alabama  (2006)  Georgia  (2006)  

Massachusetts  (2006)  Wisconsin  (2006)  New  Mexico  (2007)  

Mississippi  (2007-­‐2009)  Oregon  (2009)  

Guaranteeing  College  Credit  at  Public  In-­‐State  Institutions  for  Passing  AP  

Exam  scores  

Indiana  (1990)  Arkansas  (2000)  Kentucky  (2003)  Utah  (2004)  Florida  (2004)  Oregon  (2005)  

West  Virginia  (2005)  North  Dakota  (2007)  

Ohio  (2008)    

Collaboration  between  K-­‐12  and  Higher  Education  Systems  for  AP  

Utah  (1988)  California  (1990)  

West  Virginia  (1990)  Montana  (1995)  Arkansas  (1997)  Florida  (2000)  Kentucky  (2002)  

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Indiana  (2005)  Minnesota  (2007)  

Financial  Incentives  Based  on  AP  Exam  Performance  

Arkansas  (1995)16  Texas  (1996)  

Oklahoma  (1997)  Florida  (1998)17  Colorado  (1999)18  

 

                                                                                                                         16  Schools  receive  $50  for  each  student  who  earns  a  3  or  higher  on  the  AP  exam.    17  Districts  receive  additional  funding  for  each  student  who  earns  a  3  or  higher  on  the  AP  exam.    18  The  best  performing  schools  in  the  state  (based  on  the  percentage  of  students  passing  exams  and  percentage  of  students  who  successfully  complete  an  AP)  receive  financial  awards.