Assessment of Mineral Regimes in the East African Community

Assessment of Mineral Regimes in the East African Community:

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RIYADH

SANAA

Lac Volta

CAPE TOWN

Lobaye

Sénégal

Niger

Sirba

Benoué

Niger

Niger

dougou

Logone

Chari

Oubangui

Oub

angu

i

Congo

Cong

o

Congo

Lual

aba

Ogoué

Ivind

o

Ngoun

Kasai

Kasai

Lukenie

Kwango

Cassai

Sankuru

Mbomu

Uele

Aruwimi

Cubango

Cuito

Cunene

Cune

ne

Cuando

Lungue Bungo

Cuanza

Cuango

Zambezi

Zambezi

Kabo

mpo

Kafue

Luan

gwa

Chambe

shi

Luap

ula

Lufira

Ruwuma

Rufiji

Ruhaha

Grea

t

Igombe

Tana

Jubba

Shabaelle

Shebele

Genale

Blue Nile

Whi

te N

ile

Awash

Athi

Galana

Mou

louy

a

Nile

Nile

Gambie

Komoe

Nzi

Bandama

Sassandra

Whi

te V

olta

Black Volta

Ouem

e

Mono

Moa

Rokel

St Paul

Sank

aran

i

Bafing

Bakoye Baoulé

Bani

Orange

Orange

Limpopo

Vaal

Sak

Tugela

Luge

nda

Lurio

Save

Sebou

Tshuapa

Luyua

Kotto

Bamingui

Ouham

Kadei

Sanaga

Vina

Chari

Koma

Gongo

laKaduna

Rima

Sokoto

Niger

Tinkisso

Mbini

Boumba

Chi

nko

Lomani

Ruki

B A S S I N D U S A H A R A S E P T E N T R I O N A L

M U R Z U K B A S I N

N U B

I A

N

B A

S I

N

B A S S I N D E T I N D O U F

B A S S I N D E T A O U D E N I

B A

S S

I N

S E

N E

G A

L O

M

A U

R I

T A

N I

E N

B A S S I N D E S I U L L E M E D E N

B A S S I N D U T C H A D

U M M R U W A B A B A S I N

B A

S S

I N

D

U

C O

N G

O

L O W E R K A L A H A R I B A S I N

K A R O

O

B A S I N

U P P

E R

K A L

A H

A R

I

B A S

I N

C U V E L A I - E T O S H A

B A S I N

Lake Victoria

L a k e T a n g a n y k a

L a k e M a l a w

i

H a

u t

O g

o u

é

Plateaux mandingues

Massif de Liptako

T i b e s t i

A h a g g a r

G r a n d E

r g O

c c i d e n t a

l

P l a t e a u du T i n r h e r t

T a d e m a ï t

G h a z a l

G r a n d E

r g d

e B i l

m a

Goulmi de Maradi

P l a t e

a u d e l

a

A d a ma o u a

H a u t e K o t t o

H a m a d a d u D

r a a

T a n e z r o u f t

A d r

a r

O u

a d

d a

ï

K u

r d

u f

a n

Bamingui Bangoran

Chari Baguirmi

Guerra

Mas

sif d

e Te

rmit

E r g

d u T é n é r é

T a h o u a

T a m e s n a

S a r i r a

l Q a t t

u s a h

Al H a m m a d a h al H a m r a

Tidikelt

Sebkha Mekerrhane

Erg d ' A d m e r

F e z z a n

I d e h a n a w b a r i

Jabal Nafusah

S a r i r T i b e s t i

I d e h a n R e b i a n a

E r d i

E n n e d i

Jaba

l Bin

Ghu

naym

ah

Al Jabal al Gharb

Damergou

G h u r d A b u M

u h a r r i k

G r a n d E

r g O

r i e n t a

l

Tass

ili ou

a n

Ahagg

ar

Hamada El Haricha

E r g

C h

e c

h

E l H a n k

Plaine des Koramas

I r h a z e r

Vallé

e de

l'Az

aoua

k

Vallé

e de

l'Aza

gare

t

Vallé

e du

Tile

msi

Bougoumi - Sikasso

K a s a ï

C h

a ï

n e

d e

s

M

i n

t u

m b

a

Tumbide Range

M o x

i c o

C u a n d o

Okavango Delta

N a m

i b D e s e r t

Grès du Tegama

D i o u r b e l

C a s a m a n c e

F e r l o

Sulla mountains

Cape m

ount

Grand Gedeh

Bong A s h a n t i

Cala

bar O

goja

A t a k o r a

B é n o

u é

Nana - Mambéré

H a u t e

M o n t s de

C r i s t a l

B e n g u e l a

H u a m b o

C u b a n g o

Kilimandjaro

.

M a la n g e

M a s s i f R e g u i b a t e

B a h r e l

A t l a s

S a h a r i e n

A n t i A t l

a s

M o y e n A t l

a s

Qattarah

depress

ion

Ghadirar Razzah

Bassin del'Azaouad nord

T é n é r éd u

T a f a s s a s s e t

P l at ea u d eMa n g u e ni

P l at ea u d u D j a d o

C u v e t t e d

e

B a h r El G

h a z a l

Bassin de l'Azaouad sud

Infracambrienplissé de Gourma

Delta in

térieur d

u

Niger

F o u t a D j a l l o n

Damagaram Mounio

Lac Tchad

Mount Kinyeti(3187 m)

B a s s eK o t t o

O m b e l l a -M p o k o

M a s s i f

d u M a n

Grand Bassa

P l a t e a u xB a t é k é

O g o u éL o l o

C u a n z aS u l

C u a n z aN o r t e

Stamprietartesian

basin

TUNISALGER

RABAT

TRIPOLI

EL-QAHIRA (CAIRO)

AL KHURTUM ASMARA

LUSAKA

ANTANANARIVO

WINDHOEK

MAPUTOPRETORIA

COTONOU

GABORONE

OUAGADOUGOU

YAMOUSSOUKRO

ACCRA

BISSAU

MONROVIA

NOUAKCHOTT

ABUJA

HARARE

MBABANE

MASERU

S I R T

Graben de Gao

Détroit Soudanais

Fossé de Tefidet

K a

o u

a r

Tim M

erso

i

Dallo

l M

aour

i

Dal

lol B

osso

Fossé de Nara

E r g K e n a c h i c h

Grès d

e Ba

ndiag

ara

Grès de Koutiala

Plain

e du

Gon

do

Plaine de Nioro

Bassin d

e Segou

Dors

ale

de l'A

zaou

ad

Etosha pa n

K a l a h a r i D e s e r t

Gobabis - Ghanzi structure

A l I s t i w a i y a h

C a p r i v i S t r i p

O g a d e n

D a m a r i d e s

T r a r z a

S a l o u m

B A S I N

C Y R E N A I C A

R E D S E A

I N D I A N

O C E A N

A T

L A

N T

I C

O C

E A

N

A n

t o n

g i

l

V o

h i b

o r

y

I t r e m o

I k a l a m a v o n y

Bemarivo

Mas

ora

Androyen Anoysien

M E D I T E R R A N E A N S E A

I f o r a s

H o

g g

a r

T a s s i l i n' A j j e r

C a p e f o l d b e l t

Mouho

un

Nakambé

Nazinon

H a u t A t l a

s

JERUSALEM

AMMAN

S an g h a

O u b a n g u i e n

H a u t M b o m

o u

W o l e u N t e m

L i k i B e m b i en

O v a m b o l a n d

O t a v i

D a m a r a

W a t e r b e r g

D r a

k e

n s

b e

r g

e

S w a r t b e r g e

U k i n g a

mtns

Livingstone

U s a g a r a

Dodoma belt

Emi Koussi(3415 m)

Hadabat alJilf al Kabir

Djabal al Uwaynat

DAKAR

NIAMEYBANJUL

BAMAKONDJAMENA

DJIBOUTI

CONAKRY

ADIS ABEBA

FREETOWN

LOME

BANGUI

YAOUNDEMALABO

MUGDISHO

LIBREVILLEKAMPALA

NAIROBIKIGALI

BUJUMBURA

BRAZZAVILLE

KINSHASA

DAR ES SALAAM

LUANDA

LILONGWE

A ï r

B i r S a f s a f

B a y u d ad e s e r t

N u b a (Mts)

D a r f

o u r

1

5

1

5

5

5

23

1

5

5

1

5

1

5

1

6

10

84

1

25

35

8

18

1

7

53

5

49

1

5

742

1

49

74

21

4

1

70

1

1

7

12

5

93

1

86

58

12

10

2

44

12

84

25

5

58

12

36

5

9

10

44

64

5

1

58

84

1

5

1

39

9

49

1

7

49

54

49

10

42

8

93

74

25

64

68

34

63

5

6

1

77

5

34

49

18

31

93

86

58

86

12

10

39

45

8

91

14

49

8

39

57

58

25

1

86

6

5

7

1

94

2

10

59

5

70

4

62

93

9

1

25

65

1

84

1

12

60

39

7

84

9

10

44

49

4

70

24

14

32

35

25

5

12

1

5

5

63

5

1

12

8

5

62

70

5

45

53

50

1

94

9

5

72

1

7

84

1

54

17

94

63

12

53

43

86

5

23

26

1

91

8

5

5

45

5

72

93

49

5

62

24

49

1

25

69

37

34

70

1

23

5

44

90

47

1

1

44

2

7

12

4

83

1

21

1

1

80

17

31

28

58

58

12

76

58

26

18

12

67

73

1

84

44

56

58

65

5

60

1

1

44

5

58

64

6

25

5

51

39

10

78

1

7

45

25

5

49

9

1

56

44

58

54

12

5

1

8

53

51

1

85

1

1

1

27

63

39

86

70

10

5

37

10

81

70

93

64

69

58

97

98

1

61

44

39

7

63

1

68

25

70

95

44

74

35

10

74

18

49

1

72

58

5

35

9

18

69

60

1

86

35

9

25

73

18

5

64

39

1

39

1

14

8

5

1

10

70

58

72

4

56

44

86

72

7

64

47

13

4

93

1

5

44

65

72

1

65

10

58

26

1

67

1

9

5

34

70

5

5

5

9

35

58

43

58

62

58

72

73

74

54

42

18

1

37

84

49

87

32

9

5

54

10

1

10

56

31

1

58

19

49

5

77

1

12

9

5

69

6

5

70

51

14

1

1

1

1

14

55

1

94

1

58

5

25

93

5

60

1

83

5

18

5

58

86

63

69

6

65

54

5

1

42

54

70

1

74

18

9

72

44

64

49

44

5

43

23

25

27

90

10

1

34

1

10

5

10

12

1

18

42

84

9

72

93

86

5

27

5

5

78

92

5

1

53

54

1

39

7

1

23

1

51

39

42

44

39

63

5

74

44

44

87

1

84

1

10

58

5

49

25

45

4

41

47

54

74

54

49

5

85

5

49

1

44

1711

18

97

1

51

547

17

31

12

1

53

44

5

57

93

63

28

45

4

30

93

10

39

10

9

5

27

1

1

72

1

86

74

5

85

17

9

5

1

44

58

58

27

9

1

58

12

58

44

58

10

65

31

84

5

90

10

10

63

68

64

1

9

12

5

63

57

5

5

1

1

64

9

25

42

1

28

44

70

64

70

84

54

10

70

35

44

5

73

93

86

58

20

68

5

9

10

60

90

1

44

54

70

63

7

36

67

70

1

1

12

63

64

58

57

49

39

18

58

74

1

10

78

1

78

23

4

5

5

1

9

45

1

5

12

5

17

26

86

70

60

53

9

72

72

12

49

10

64

74

12

74

48

7

35

35

1

84

1

72

10

78

54

47

23

69

26

23

47

12

65

68

58

47

84

49

10

1

7

4526

12

58

9

25

5

1

5

7

44

56

74

64

49

75

28

1

4

86

49

12

1

9

37

1

1

50

63

20

1

6

5

4

12

57

86

37

70

85

28

1

74

18

54

5

58

12

56

44

1

84

9

72

18

58

72

12

1

47

5

70

23

55

56

1

10

84

64

85

5

1

1

86

49

21

5

70

75

72

7

63

74

65

93

1

32

10

1

9

45

42

93

70

76

85

54

1

1

44

86 1

76

86

63

1

1

44

39

74

1

12

1

2

1

39

28

93

10

58

1

70

11

75

8

12

44

47

10

5

10

5

44

5

49

10

35

23

84

6

2

1

1

5

10

10

8

10

18

93

47

54

44

12

85

64

92

1

10

58

44

72

17

30

38

62

1

5

35

78

83

35

24

5

72

84

1

9

44

5

58

49

60

70

54

5

84

51

1

1

5

35

11

6

42

55

53

35

1

74

1

45

5

58

2

10

44

84

83

63

9

44

6

5

1

98

70

18

44

23

58

63

57

62

5

1

85

25

44

25

84

44

72

12

48

5

86

1

5

54

1

1

49

60

7

1

5

7

2

13

70

9

1

5

79

1

5

70

1

10

47

49

18

54

93

61

7

1

94

1

47

65

78

49

70

65

72

54

25

10

72

44

27

1

20

5

84

44

1

44

39

9

70

5

44

10

94

25

63

1

1

49

25

58

5

1

9

49

5

1

26

63

84

72

85

70

55

56

63

54

5

20

5

1

5

1

4

1

63

39

1

76

45

45

31

60

49

58

55

4

1

1

60

78

23

12

49

85

5

25

74

2

12

2

17

75

18

74

5

76

1

64

1

74

10

7

1

2

10

61

17

10

17

44

47

72

5

84

70

1

58

84

83

58

81

1

58

5

10

5

6

84

1

49

15

44

1

1

5

75

54

44

39

49

74

63

49

86

84

1

57

70

70

49

78

1

12

1

54

55

47

12

10

1

44

11

42

1

44

63

47

72

59

74

72

74

56

76

47

14

5

54

72

1

14

10

90

10

24

52

12

49

44

10

63

17

23

1

20

1

45

5

78

49

58

1

18

72

2

74

17

34

5

1

5

58

55

5

18

25

12

5

49

10

49

31

5

9

63

51

10

95

32

58

85

58

39

25

44

74

11

47

1

49

10

45

63

1

44

17

39

64

44

2

9

70

84

54

49

35

5

74

68

2

84

1

1

49

1

5

74

7

5

12

5

20

58

9

9

5

12

25

5

70

10

74

74

5

7

1

70

7

2

44

18

76

69

49

58

17

64

74

58

8472

49

84

56

12

63

57

12

95

12

49

9

37

10

76

35

70

56

18

2

49

1

49

5

44

93

9

37

27

54

76

74

44

86

84

76

21

12

18

54

39

9

44

12

61

1

10

12

7

92

29

27

5

90

10

64

85

2

12

76

1

1

70

58

4

5

7

51

25

79

63

83

35

36

64

9

1

64

45

9

58

54

5

64

44

44

5

1

49

1

78

49

21

84

9

1

44

81

20

49

1

74

9

1

64

1

5

63

2

33

44

85

2

74

58

57

61

10

76

7

58

72

51

1

61

7

74

31

1

35

69

75

47

9

9

93

5

44

10

5

42

44

10

5

72

44

12

11

54

74

70

2

47

1

44

74

33

36

5

17

70

58

44

68

10

12

2

70

86

70

9

78

47

38

70

4

2

44

74

57

7

45

93

1

57

58

46

69

54

44

64

73 Ma

30 Ma

38 Ma

50 Ma

79 Ma

113 Ma

50°E

50°E

45°E

45°E

40°E

40°E

35°E

35°E

30°E

30°E

25°E

25°E

20°E

20°E

15°E

15°E

10°E

10°E

5°E

5°E

0°

0°

5°O

5°O

10°O

10°O

15°O

15°O

20°O

20°O

25°O

25°O

35°N

35°N

30°N

30°N

25°N

25°N

20°N

20°N

15°N

15°N

10°N

10°N

5°N

5°N

0° 0°

5°S

5°S

10°S

10°S

15°S

15°S

20°S

20°S

25°S

25°S

30°S

30°S

35°S

35°S

40°S

40°S

^

#

X

1 2

6

5

7

3 4

8 9

10 11

12 13

14

27 28 29

15

16 17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

30

32 3332 - Ds - sedimentary33 - Dp - plutonic

31 31 - DCs - sedimentary

34 34 - SDs - sedimentary

35 35 - OCs - sedimentary

1 - Qs - sedimentary2 - Qv - volcanic

3 - Np - plutonic4 - Nv - volcanic

6 - Ev - volcanic

5 - ENs - sedimentary

7 - PNs - sedimentary

8 - CZs - sedimentary9 - CZv - volcanic

10 - K2s - sedimentary11 - K2v - volcanic

12 - K1s - sedimentary13 - K1v - volcanic

56 - NPvs - volcano-sedimentary57 - NPp - plutonic58 - NPm - metamorphic

59 60 61 62

59 - MPNPs - sedimentary60 - MPNPms - metasedimentary61 - MPNPm - metamorphic

Main occcurence ofdiamondiferous kimberlite

Jurassic

Cenozoic

Cretaceous Oceanic plateau (with mean age) andsecond order elevation (white contour)

SDRs (Seaward deeping reflectorsequences) related to the opening ofthe South Atlantic ocean during EarlyCretaceous (passive margin volcanism)

x Ma

OCEANIC CRUST (Atlantic and Indian Oceans) and OCEANIC DOMAIN

1 - Geological contact2 - Fault3 - Inferred fault4 - Thrust fault

14 - Ks - sedimentary

15 - JKp - plutonic

16 - Js - sedimentary17 - Jv - volcanic

18 - TJs - sedimentary19 - TJsK - sedimentary (Karoo)

20 - TJ1d - subvolcanic (CAMP)

21 - Ts - sedimentary

22 - MZd - dolerite, carbonatite, syenite

23 - PJsK - sedimentary (Karoo)

24 - PTs - sedimentary

25 - CKsGN - continental sedimentary (Nubian Sandstone)

26 - CJs - sedimentary

27 - CPs - sedimentary28 - CPsK - sedimentary (Karoo)29 - CPp - plutonic

30 - Cs - sedimentary

36 36 - ODs - sedimentary

37 37 - OSs - sedimentary

38 38 - €Ds - sedimentary

39 40 39 - €Os - sedimentary40 - €Ovs - volcano-sedimentary

41 41 - €s - sedimentary

42

43

42 - NP3Os - sedimentary

43 - NP3€s - sedimentary

44 44 - NP€p - plutonic

45 46 47 48

45 - NP3s - sedimentary46 - NP3pa - plutonic alcalin and alcali-calcic47 - NP3pca - plutonic calco-alcalin (Hoggar)48 - NP3m - metamorphic

49 49 - NP2-3vs - volcano-sedimentary

50 51 5250 - NP2s - sedimentary51 - NP2vs - volcano-sedimentary52 - NP2p - plutonic

53

54

69

53 - NP1-3s - sedimentary

54 - NP1-2vs - volcano-sedimentary

56 57 58

62 - MPNPpm - plutonic and metamorphic

CEN

OZO

ICM

ESO

ZOIC

PALE

OZO

ICPR

OTE

RO

ZOIC

63 64 63 - MPs - sedimentary64 - MPpm - plutonic and metamorphic

65 6665 - PP3-4vs - volcano-sedimentary66 - PP3-4pm - plutonic and metamorphic

68

70 71 72 73 74 75

76 77 76 - PPpm - plutonic and metamorphic77 - PPvp - volcanic and plutonic

78 78 - NAPP2svs - sedimentary and volcano-sedimentary

79 80 81

82 83 84

79 - NAPPm - metamorphic80 - NAPPpm - plutonic and metamorphic81 - NAPPp - plutonic82 - NAvsm - volcano-sedimentary and metamorphic83 - NAvsp - volcano-sedimentary and plutonic84 - NApm - plutonic and metamorphic

85

86

85 - MANAvs - volcano-sedimentary

86 - MAm - metamorphic

88 89 90 91 92

93 93 - PAMApm - plutonic and metamorphic

94 95 94 - PAvsm - volcano-sedimentary and metamorphic95 - PApm - plutonic and metamorphic

96

97 98 9997 - P€vs - volcano-sedimentary98 - P€mp - metamorphic and plutonic99 - P€v - volcanic

96 - P€PZd - diorite and dolerite

AR

CH

EAN

PRO

TER

OZO

IC

Lake

CONTINENTAL AREAS

LEGEND

Carbonatite

5 - Inferred thrust fault6 - Normal fault7 - Inferred normal fault

1

2

4

6

3

5

7

M25

M21

M16

M10N

M4

M0 34 31 25 21 18 13 6 5

0.01

9.7

20.1

33.1

40.1

47.9

55.9

67.7

83.5

120.4

126.7

131.9

139.6

147.7

154.3

MA

GN

ETIC

ANO

MA

LYAG

E (M

a)

Historically active volcano

1

2

45

3

1 - COB - Continental Ocean Boundary

2 - Spreading ridge axis

3 - Isochron line4 - Transform fault5 - Inferred transform fault

1 - Red Sea. West Mediterranean2 - East Mediterranean

1 2

Astroblem

Quaternary2.6 - 0 Ma

UpperCretaceous

100.5 - 66 Ma

Neogene23 - 2.6 Ma

Paleogene toNeogene

66 - 2.6 Ma

Paleogene66 - 23 Ma

Tertiary66 - 2.6 Ma

Cenozoic66 - 0 Ma

LowerCretaceous

145 - 100.5 Ma

Mesozoic252 - 66 Ma

Permian toJurassic

299 - 145 Ma

Permian toTriassic

299 - 201 Ma

Carboniferous toCretaceous

Cretaceous145 - 66 Ma

Jurassic toCretaceous201 - 66 Ma

Jurassic201 - 145 Ma

Triassic toJurassic

252 - 145 Ma

Triassic toLower Jurassic

252 - 174 Ma

Triassic252 - 201 Ma

359 - 66 Ma

69 - PP2mNP3 - with Ediacaran metamorphism (Hoggar)

87 87 - MAmPP3 - with Orosirian metamorphism (Hoggar)

70 - PP2svs - sedimentary and volcano-sedimentary71 - PP2vsm - volcano-sedimentary and metamorphic72 - PP2m - metamorphic73 - PP2p - plutonic74 - PP2pm - plutonic and metamorphic75 - PP2v - volcanic

88 - MAvs - volcano-sedimentary89 - MAvsm - volcano-sedimentary and metamorphic90 - MAp - plutonic91 - MApm - plutonic and metamorphic92 - MAm - metamorphic

Carboniferous toJurassic

359 - 145 Ma

Carboniferous toPermian

359 - 252 Ma

Carboniferous359 - 299 Ma

Devonian toCarboniferous419 - 299 Ma

Devonian419 - 359 Ma

Silurian toDevonian

443 - 359 Ma

Ordovician toCarboniferous485 - 299 Ma

Ordovician toDevonian

485 - 359 Ma

Ordovician toSilurian

485 - 419 Ma

Cambrian toDevonian

541 - 359 Ma

Cambrian toOrdovician

541 - 443 Ma

Cambrian541 - 485 Ma

Ediacaran toOrdovician

635 - 443 Ma

Ediacaran toCambrian

635 - 485 Ma

Neoproterozoic toCambrian

1.000 - 485 Ma

Ediacaran635 - 541 Ma

Cryogenian toEdiacaran

850 - 541 Ma

Cryogenian850 - 635 Ma

Tonian toEdiacaran

1.000 - 541 Ma

Tonian toCryogenian

1.000 - 635 Ma

55Tonian1.000 - 850 Ma

55 - NP1s - sedimentary

Neoproterozoic1.000 - 541 Ma

Mesoproterozoic toNeoproterozoic1.6 - 0.541 Ga

Mesoproterozoic1.6 - 1.0 Ga

Orosirian toStatherian

2.05 - 1.6 Ga

Orosirian2.05 - 1.8 Ga

Rhyacian2.3 - 2.05 Ga

Rhyacian2.3 - 2.05 Ga

Paleoproterozoic2.5 - 1.6 Ga

Neoarchean toRhyacian

2.8 - 2.05 Ga

Neoarchean toPaleoproterozoic

2.8 - 1.6 Ga

Neoarchean2.8 - 2.5 Ga

Mesoarchean toNeoarchean3.2 - 2.5 Ga

Mesoarchean(to Neoarchean ?)

3.2 - 2.5? Ga

Mesoarchean3.2 - 2.8 Ga

Mesoarchean3.2 - 2.8 Ga

Paleoarchean toMesoarchean

3.6 - 2.8 Ga

Paleoarchean3.6 - 3.2 Ga

Precambrian4.6 - 0.541 Ga

Precambrian toPaleozoic

4.6 - 0.252 Ga

67Orosirian2.05 - 1.8 Ga

67 - PP3mNP3 - with Ediacaran metamorphism (Hoggar)

68 - PP3p - plutonic

500 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 km

SCALE 1:10,000,000

SPECIAL EDITION FOR THE 35TH INTERNATIONAL GEOLOGICAL CONGRESSPubliée à l’occasion du 35e Congrès Géologique International

27 August - 4 September 2016 Cape Town, South Africa

Printing sponsored by theAfrican Mineral Development Center

This map was prepared at the French Geological Survey (BRGM) by Denis Thiéblemont, with the technical (GIS) support of Frédéric Chêne, using the following documents: - the Geology and major deposits of Africa map at 1:10M scale, by J. P. Milesi et al. (2004),- the CGMW Geological Map of Africa at 1:5M scale (1st edition, 1985-1990), - the most recent national geological maps of the following countries: Algeria, Angola, Burkina-Fasso, Central Africa, Chad, Congo (Dem. Rep), Congo (Rep.), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea (Central and Eastern regions),

Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Tanzania, and regional upgrades of other areas using academic papers.Regional syntheses arranged according to the general legend were provided as follows:

Tuareg shield: Jean-Paul Liégeois (Royal Museum for Central Africa - RMCA, Tervuren, Belgium) and Aziouz Ouabadi (Faculté des Sciences de la Terre, Université des Sciences et de la Technologie HouariBoumediene - USTHB, Algiers, Algeria).South Lybia, Northern Niger and Nothern Chad areas: xxx Algiers (Algeria)East African rift: Bernard Le Gall, René Maury (University of Brest, France) and Mohamed Jalludin (Centre d’Étude et de Recherche de Djibouti - CERD, Republic of Djibouti) Ivory Coast: Max Vidal (University of Orléans, France) and Cyril Ouattara Gbélé (ESMG, Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast)Cameroon: Rigobert Tchaméni (University of N'gaoundéré, Cameroon)Congo: Max Fernandez-Alonso (Royal Museum for Central Africa - RMCA, Tervuren, Belgium)

André Michard, Pierre Nehlig, Philippe Rossi , ....... are acknowledged for their thorough review of parts of the map. The offshore area was carried out thanks to TOTAL data and was adapted from the Tectonic map of Africa at 1:10 M scale (CGMW, 2010).The location of the main carbonatitic intrusions was taken from A. Wooley (2001): Alkaline rocks and carbonatites of the World. Part 3: Africa London, Geol. Soc.; data on the location of historically active volcanoes were selected from the Global Volcanism Program run by the Smithsonian Institution (Washington, D.C., USA) from the Website: www.volcano.si.edu/world/summary.cfm?sumpage=num; the location of the diamondiferous kimberlites was taken from the CGMW Metallogenic Map of Africa at 1:5M scale (2002), and the location of astroblems from the 3rd edition of the CGMW Geological Map of the World, Physiography sheet (2010).

The outer boundary of the continental margin (dark blue line) is still largely imprecise or conjectural and has no legal force in the framework of the United Nations Convention of the law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

CGMW thanks: BRGM for its involvement in the preparation of the map, the collaborators from other institutions referred to hereabove for their different contributions, UNESCO and the Geological Society of Africa (GSAf) for their aegis of the project, the TOTAL company for providing the synthesis of offshore data and the African Mineral Development Center (ADMC) for funding the printing of this special 35 IGC edition.Mercator projection - Datum WGS 84; Central meridian: 20°E; Parallel Standard: 0°; False East : False North: 5.000 kmCitation of the map: Thiéblemont D.(edit.) et al. Geological Map of Africa at 1:10M scale, CGMW-BRGM 2016Downloading of the pdf file of the map is available at the CGMW (www.ccgm.org) and BRGM (www.brgm.fr) web sites.ISBN : 9782917310328 doi:10.14682/2016GEOAFR

Copyright © CGMW - BRGM Printed in the Republic of South Africa by Art 2 Print

Cette carte a été préparée au Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM, France) par Denis Thiéblemont, avec la collaboration technique (SIG) de Frédéric Chêne, à partir des documents suivants : - la Carte géologique et des principaux gites minéraux d’Afrique à 1:10M, par J. P. Milesi et al. (2004),- la Carte géologique de l’Afrique à 1:5M (CCGM, 1ère édition, 1985-1990)- les cartes géologiques nationales des pays suivants : Algérie, Angola, Burkina-Fasso, Centre Afrique, Congo (Rep. Dém.), Congo (Rép.), Djibouti, Éthiopie, Gabon, Guinée (régions centrale et orientale), Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritanie,

Tanzanie, Tchad, et d’actualisations régionales à partir de publications académiques.Des synthèses régionales ont été fournies par des collaborateurs pour les secteurs suivants :

Bouclier touareg : Jean-Paul Liégeois (Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale - MRAC, Tervuren, Belgique) et Aziouz Ouabadi (Faculté des Sciences de la Terre, Université des Sciences et de la Technologie Houari Boumediene - USTHB,Alger, Algérie) Région sud Libye, nord Niger et nord Tchad : xxxx, Alger (Algérie)Rift est-africain : Bernard Le Gall, René Maury (Université de Brest, France) et Mohamed Jalludin (Centre d’Étude et de Recherche de Djibouti - CERD, République de Djibouti) Côte d’Ivoire : Max Vidal (Université d’Orléans, France) et Cyril Ouattara Gbélé (ESMG, Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire)Cameroun : Rigobert Tchaméni (Université de N'gaoundéré, Cameroun)Congo : Max Fernandez-Alonso (Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale - MRAC, Tervueren, Belgique)

André Michard, Pierre Nehlig, Philippe Rossi , ....... sont remerciés pour leur relecture de parties de cette carte. La partie maritime a été réalisée grace aux données fournies par TOTAL et adaptées à partir de la Carte Tectonique à 1:10M de l’Afrique (CCGM, 2010)..La position des principales intrusions de carbonatites a été tirée de l’ouvrage de A. Wooley (2001) : Alkaline rocks and carbonatites of the World. Part 3: Africa London, Geol. Soc., les positions de volcans actifs a été sélectionnée à partir du fichier du Global Volcanism Program actualisé par la Smithsonian Institution (Washington, D.C., USA) dans le site Web : www.volcano.si.edu/world/summary.cfm?sumpage=num, la position des kimberlites diamantifères a été tirée de la Carte métallogénique de l’Afrique de la CCGM (2002), et la position des astroblèmes de la feuille 1 Physiographie de la Carte géologique du Monde à 1:25M de la CCGM (2010). La limite externe de la marge continentale (ligne bleu foncé) est encore imprécise ou largement conjecturale et ne saurait avoir aucune valeur juridique dans le cadre de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (UNCLOS).La CCGM remercie : le BRGM pour la préparation de la carte ainsi que les collaborateurs des autres organismes cités ci-dessus pour leurs différentes contributions, l’UNESCO et la Société Géologique de l’Afrique (SGAf) pour leur patro-nage de ce projet, la compagnie TOTAL qui a fourni la synthèse du domaine maritime et le Centre Africain de Développement Minier (ADMC) qui a permis l’impression de cette carte à l’occasion du 35e CongrèsGéologique International au Cap (Afrique du Sud).

Projection Mercator - Datum WGS 84. Méridien central : 20°E, Standard parallèle : 0°, Faux Est : Faux Nord : 5 000 kmCette carte doit être citée comme suit : Thiéblemont D. (édit.) et al. Carte géologique de l’Afrique à l’échelle du 1/10M, CCGM-BRGM 2016Un fichier pdf de la carte est disponible pour téléchargement sur les sites Web : www.ccgm.fr et www.brgm.fr.ISBN : 9782917310328 doi:10.14682/2016GEOAFRCopyright © CGMW - BRGM L’impression a été réalisée en République d’Afrique du Sud par Art 2 Print

CARTE GÉOLOGIQUE DE L’AFRIQUEà 1 : 10 millionième

GEOLOGICAL MAP OF AFRICA1:10 million scale

Printed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the ECA Printing and Publishing Unit. ISO 14001:2004 certified.Printed on Chlorine Free Paper

Aligning Frameworks with the African Mining Vision

African Union

Assessment of Mineral Regimes in the East African Community:

Aligning Frameworks with the African Mining Vision

To order copies of Assessment of Mineral Regimes in the East African Community: Aligning Frameworks with the African Mining Vision, please contact:

Publications SectionEconomic Commission for AfricaP.O. Box 3001Addis Ababa, EthiopiaTel: +251 11 544-9900Fax: +251 11 551-4416E-mail: [email protected]: www.uneca.org

© 2017 Economic Commission for Africa Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

All rights reservedFirst printing January 2017

ISBN: 978-99944-68-82-9

Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted.Acknowledgement is requested, together with a copy of the publication.

The designations employed in this report and the material presented in it do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa or the African Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Designed and printed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the ECA Printing and Publishing Unit. ISO 14001:2004 certified. Printed on chlorine free paper

Cover photos: Shutterstock.com

iii

Assessment of Mineral Regimes in the East African Community: Aligning Frameworks with the African Mining Vision

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................v

I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................1

II. Governing the mining sector in Africa and the Africa Mining Vision ..................3

III. Governing the mining sector in East Africa ............................................................ 13A. Burundi..................................................................................................................... 15B. Kenya ........................................................................................................................ 18C. Rwanda .................................................................................................................... 34D. United Republic of Tanzania ................................................................................ 44E. Uganda ..................................................................................................................... 56F. TheEastAfricanCommunity’sapproachtoharmonizationofmining

policies and legal frameworks ............................................................................. 66

IV. ConclusionsandRecommendations ........................................................................ 69

References .............................................................................................................................. 74

v


Acknowledgements

ThisstudywaspreparedundertheleadershipofDr.FatimaDenton,Director,SpecialInitiativesDivision,EconomicCommissionforAfrica(ECA).

The ECA core team comprised Rose Mwebaza, Kojo Busia, Charles Akong, John SloanandOliverMaponga.ProfessorMigaiAkechundertookthecountrystudiesanddraftedthereport.

Thestudywasstrengthenedbyfeedbackandadditionsmadeduringameetingofover30expertsinKigali,Rwanda,on4-6May2016.UsefulcommentsandsuggestionswerealsoreceivedfromotherstaffoftheAfricanMineralsDevelopmentCentre.

The studywould not have been possiblewithout the contribution and supportprovided by Abenet Hailemariam, Fikre Asmamaw and Yeshimebet Tesfaye.

1


I. Introduction

Several initiatives have sought to formulate policy and regulatory frameworksthatwouldenableAfricancountriestoharnessthedevelopmentpotentialoftheirmineral resources.These initiatives have included theJohannesburgDeclarationand Plan of Implementation of theWorld Summit on SustainableDevelopment;the Yaoundé Vision on Artisanal and Small-scale Mining; the African MiningPartnership’s Sustainable Development Charter and Mining Policy Framework;the SouthernAfrican Development Community Framework and ImplementationPlan forHarmonizationofMiningPolicies, Standards, Legislative andRegulatoryFrameworksinSouthernAfrica;theWestAfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnionCommonMiningPolicyandCommunityMiningCode;theEconomicCommissionfor Africa and African Development Bank summary report of the 2007 Big Table on ManagingAfrica’sNaturalResourcesforGrowthandPovertyReduction;andtheworkoftheInternationalStudyGrouptoReviewAfrica’sMineralRegimes.

These initiativesculminated intheAfricanUnion’sadoptionoftheAfricaMiningVision in 2009, the purpose of which is to create a “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainablegrowth and socio-economic development”. The Vision is intended to integrate the mineral sector into the broader economy of each country. The African Minerals Development Centre was established in 2013 to support the coordination andimplementationoftheAfricaMiningVision.

The core mission of the African Minerals Development Centre is to work with StatesmembersoftheAfricanUnionandtheirnationalandregionalorganizations,including theAfricanUnionCommission and regional economic communities, toenablemineral resources toplay a greater transformative role in the continent’sdevelopment through increased economic and social linkages and, in this manner, tohelpaddressitsintractablepovertyandlimiteddevelopment.Aprincipalfunctionof the African Minerals Development Centre is to support African countries in enhancing their capacities foreffectivemineralpolicyand regulatorydesignandimplementationthroughalignmentwiththeAfricaMiningVision.Tothatend,theAfricanMineralsDevelopmentCentrecommissionedthisstudy,withtheobjectiveofreviewingthepolicyandregulatoryframeworksofthefiveEastAfricancountries(Burundi,Kenya,Rwanda,UgandaandtheUnitedRepublicofTanzania)foralignmentwith theAfricaMiningVision. Inparticular, thestudyseeks toassess theextentto which these countries’ policy and regulatory frameworks have accommodated and enabled the implementation of the development objectives of the AfricaMining Vision, including the extent to which these frameworks have enabled the utilizationofmineral resources tounderpinbroad-based sustainablegrowthandsocioeconomic development. The study also evaluated the extent to which these policy and regulatory frameworks have facilitated the attainment of theVision’sprincipal goals, which include: fostering a transparent and accountable mineral sectorpromotinggoodgovernanceinthemineralsector;improvingknowledgeandoptimizingthebenefitsofmineralresourceendowments;developinglinkagesandusingthemtosupporteconomicdiversification;harnessingthepotentialofsmall-

2


scalemining; fosteringenvironmentally sustainable, safe and socially responsibleminingpractices;andbuildinghumanandinstitutionalcapacities.

In terms of methodology, the study is based on in-depth review of literature and interviewswith key informants, including officials of governmentministries,regulatory agencies, experts and stakeholders. These interviews were conducted during country missions in July and August 2015.

Thestudy’smainfindingisthatalthoughtheminingpoliciesandlawsoftheEastAfrican countries address many of the goals of the Africa Mining Vision, they have notsoughtspecificallytoaligntheirminingregimeswiththeVision.Countriesarebeginning, or planning, to incorporate more of the tenets of the Africa Mining Vision into their mineral sector frameworks. There are a number of key elements that should be incorporated and which are vital to ensuring that the mineral sector is welllinkedwiththenationaleconomyandinclusiveoflocalcommunitiesandsmall-scaleminers. Improvements topolicy frameworks areparticularlyneededwherepolicygapshaveallowedthecontinuationofpoorpracticesorpreventedlinkagedevelopment inthepast;specifically,morenarrowlydefinedtargetsandabetterdefinitionofthegovernment-firm-communityrelationshipinmineraldevelopmentare needed.

Thestudynotesthatanumberofactionableelementsneedtobefullyincorporatedinto country mining visions, including transparency and accountability in mineral sectorgovernance;streamlinedminingadministrationandlicensing;anapex-levelvisionforlinkagesandvalueadditionwithaccompanyingspecific,concretemeasures;involvementoflocalcommunitiesinnaturalresourcemanagement;aclearapproachwithmandatorystepsforfirmsinlocalhiringandprocurement;provisionofmineralandgeographicaldataandmapping;environmentalprotections;theempowermentofwomen inmineral sectorpolicies; andembracingamulti-facetedapproach tosupporting artisanal and small-scale miners that goes beyond formalization andenables those miners’ participation in the wider economy. A regional approachwithin the East African Community (EAC) could help to identify best practicesregardingthosepolicyaspectsandtobuildavisionforcross-bordercooperationinaccordancewiththecharacteristicsofeachcountryandthepotentialfortheregionto harmonize mineral sector strategies through a regional value-chain approach to mineral linkages.

Chapter II of this report outlines the conceptual framework of the study and then examines how Africa’s mining sector has been governed in the past and how it ought to be governed in future if it is to contribute to development. Chapter III examines howtheEastAfricancountriesgoverntheirmineralsectorsandtheregionaleffortstowardsharmonizationofgovernanceregimes.ChapterIVsetsouttheconclusionsandrecommendationsofthestudy.

3


II. Governing the mining sector in Africa and the Africa Mining Vision

ItisestimatedthatAfricacontains30percentoftheworld’smineralreservesbut,despite the continent’s abundantmineralwealth,1 African countries have largely exhibited low levels of development and poor standards of living.2 For the most part,Africahasnotbeenunable tounlock itsmineralwealth for thebenefitsofitscitizensandthewayinwhichthecontinent’smineralwealthandthepervasivepoverty of its people exist concurrently therefore remains a paradox.3 Instead, exploitativemultinationalcorporationsandAfricanelitesseemtohavebeenthemain,ifnotsole,beneficiariesofthiswealth.Forvariousreasons,includinglackofexpertiseandcorruption,Africancountrieshavetendedtonegotiateunfavourableminingdevelopmentagreements,with theresult that thecontinenthas receivedinadequatereturnsforitsminerals.Africaalsolackssystematicgeologicalmappingof its mineral resource base.4 Yet another troubling feature of African mining is that it has largely been seen as a supplier of strategic minerals to industrialized countries, and policies have thus focused on minerals that play that role. This approach has also seen the mining sector being developed as an “externally-oriented enclave only narrowlylinkedwiththerestofthedomesticeconomythroughthetaxespaidtothe state by the mining companies and their small pool of mainly lower level African workers”.5

MostofAfrica’smineralshavethereforebeenexportedinrawform,orafteronlybasicprocessing,andwithoutsignificantvalue-addition.6 The export of raw minerals yields fewer skilled and secure jobs, generates less revenue and is more vulnerable tofluctuationsinglobalcommodityprices.Inaddition,althoughartisanalandsmall-scalemining(ASM)activitiesarewidespreadinAfricaandemployalargenumberofpeople, the policy and regulatory frameworks that could facilitate the development orsustainablegrowthofASMoperationshavelargelybeenabsent.Indeed,theseframeworks have tended to favour large-scale mining, typically operated by foreign ormultinational firms. Further, the exploitationofAfrica’smineral resourceshasoftenbeenaccompaniedbytheviolationofhumanrightsandthedestructionoftheenvironment, local economies and social fabrics.7 In many cases, those who either occupy or own the land on which minerals are to be found have also complained of inadequate recognition of their rights, including the lack or inadequacy ofcompensationwhenever they are asked to giveway for the commencement ofminingactivities.

1 Hany Besada and Philip Martin, Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a “Fourth” Generation? Research report (Ontario, North-South Institute, 2013), p. 3.2 Eli G. Burton, “Reverse the Curse: Creating a Framework to Mitigate the Resource Curse and Promote Human Rights in Mineral Extraction Industries in Africa”, Emory International Law Review, vol. 28, No. 1 (2014), p. 425.3 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes (Addis Ababa, UNECA, 2011), p. 9.4 African Union, Africa Mining Vision (2009), p. 2.5 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development, p. 14.6 African Union, Africa Mining Vision, p. 2.7 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development, pp. 46, 49, 59, 70.

4


Following independence, many African countries sought to address the shortcomings of the regimes that colonial governments established around mining, such as the “obliterationofAfricanenterprise,evenwherethegeologicalconditionsfavouredsmall-scaleproducersandwhereAfricantraditionandexperiencewereconsiderable,asintheGoldCoastandSouthernRhodesiangoldindustries”.8 Newly independent Governmentstookanumberofpolicyapproachesinthisregard,includingvestingminerals inthestate,establishingstateminingenterprisesandtakingsubstantialshares inexistingminingcompanies,buttheseapproachesdidnotbearfruit, forvarious reasons. For example, most state mining companies functioned poorlyand failed to invest in research and development to keep mining and processing operationscompetitive.Lowmineralpricesalsodiscouragedinvestments,leadingtoacollapseinexplorations.

A need therefore arose to address the shortcomings of these post-independence policy approaches, not least because most African countries were also severely indebted by the early 1980s. Countries therefore turned to the World Bankand International Monetary Fund for assistance, and these institutions becameincreasinglyinvolvedindesigningeconomicreformsacrossthecontinent,throughwhat came to be known as structural adjustment programmes.9 The programmes emergedoutofadiagnosisbytheseinternationaldevelopmentpolicyinstitutionsthat the policies that African states had been pursuing were responsible for their pooreconomicperformance.TheWorldBankobserved,forexample,that“themainfactorsbehindthestagnationanddeclinewerepoor[macroeconomicandsectoral]policiesemanatingfromadevelopmentparadigmthatgavetheStateaprominentrole in production and in regulating economic activity”.10 Public enterprises,whichconstitutedaprincipalmeansthroughwhichAfricanstatesparticipated indevelopment, were also performing poorly.

Duringthisperiod,therewasalsoanattackonbiggovernmentintheWest,whichled to the ascendance of the ideology of neoliberalism.11 According to this ideology, the “main restrictionon the tendency for freecapitalisteconomies togrow is…marketfailureresultingfromperversegovernmentalintervention”.12 In the view of neoliberals, Governments in developing countries had gone too far in interfering with the free play of markets. The structural adjustment programmes were therefore inspired by neoliberalism and the perceived failures of the state-led development paradigm that African countries had pursued in the 1960s and 1970s. To enhance development, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund now requiredAfrican countries to increase the role of the market in their economies, a process thatmandated,inparticular,thereductioninthesizeofthepublicsector,includingthroughprivatizingpublic enterprises and removinggovernment regulations andcontrols.

8 Ibid, p. 13.9 Ibid, p. 15.10 World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead – Summary. (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1994), p. 20.11 Neoliberalism refers to “a broad structure of political beliefs founded on right wing, yet not conservative, ideas about political democracy, individual freedom and the creative potential of unfettered entrepreneurship”. Richard Peet, “Review essay: Neoliberalism or Democratic Development?” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), p. 329.12 Ibid.

5


As part of the structural adjustment process, many African countries have therefore reformed their mining regimes13 over the past two decades or so and there has been a“consciousattempttoredefinetheroleofthestateinordertoensureitswithdrawalfromproductiveactivities”.14 Many state-owned enterprises in the mineral sector, forexample,havenowbeenprivatized.ThisapproachisexemplifiedbytheWorldBank’s Strategy for African Mining, which sought to address the underperformance of the mining sector.15 According to theWorld Bank, most of the state-ownedenterprisesinthemineralsectorlackedthemanagementandtechnicalcapabilitiesand the necessary risk capital to invest, and could not therefore sustain the developmentofAfrica’spotential.TheWorldBankconsideredthatthesolutiontothisproblemlayin“attractingnewhigh-riskcapitalfromforeignminingcompanies”16 and hence advised African countries to facilitate private investment. In order to attractprivateforeigninvestment,itfurtheradvisedAfricancountriestoestablishsuitablemining regimes, includingstable legalandfiscal frameworks,contractualstability, regulatory frameworks with minimal ministerial discretion, renewableand transferable mineral rights with long-term security of tenure, easy conversion betweenexplorationandexploitationlicences,minimumworkcommitments,profitrepatriation,attractivereturnsonequitygiventhehigherriskpremiumsallegedlyrequired for projects in African countries, guarantee of majority ownership, and the managementofpoliticalrisks.

The resulting mining regimes have therefore been characterized by “decreasedregulation, liberalizedsocialand labourpolicies,andmoreprivatesector-friendlyownershipandtaxationschemes”.17AsdecreedbytheWorldBank,miningpolicieshave emphasized the “role of the private sector as owner and operator and of government as regulator and promoter”.18 Further, African Governments have limitedthe“pursuitofsocialorpoliticalgoals,suchasexpandedsocial,educationaland employment programs, through operational involvement in the resourcesector”.19 The ensuing mining codes have therefore eliminated local sourcing and employment requirements.

However, theseWorld Bank inspired mining regimes are now being called intoquestion. First, critics maintain that these regimes have been “premised on asectoral approach that privileged the perspectives of potential investors ratherthananapproach thatmighthavesought toarticulate theseviewswithbroaderconcerns regarding the contributionof themining sector to national or regionalmacroeconomic strategies”.20 For example, few of the inputs into capital-intensive mining activitieshavebeen sourced locally.TheWorldBank approachhasbeendeemed to ignore the need to build intersectoral linkages and encourage the local transformationofmineralresources,whichwouldallowthesectortocontributetobroaderdevelopmentobjectives.

13 A regime is defined as the governance arrangements, including policies and regulatory frameworks. See: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, Little, Brown & Co, 1977).14 Bonnie Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process of African Mining Regimes”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. 30, No. 1-2, 2011, p. 200.15 World Bank, Strategy for African mining (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1993).16 Ibid, p. 10.17 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 3.18 World Bank, Strategy for African mining, p. 53.19 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 8.20 Bonnie Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process”, p. 201.

6


Second,thesereformshaveledtoareductionofstatesovereignty,therebyseriouslycompromisingthestate’scapacitytoimplementdevelopmentalgoals,particularlygiventhattheyrequirethestatetowithdrawfromregulatingkeymacroeconomicinstruments.Thereformshave,forexample,ledtoareductioninthelevelsofadvaloremroyalties requiredby thestate,anda reduction incorporate incometaxrates,aswellascustomsdutiesonimportedcapitalgoods.Africanstatesthereforehave less autonomy,while transnational mining companies have assumedmorepower. In other words, the state’s power to harness mineral resources is “decidedly constrained”whenittriesto“influencewhereandhowinternationalproductiontakesplace”.21Thisreductioninstatesovereignty isoftenexacerbatedbyunfavourablebilateral investment treaties,whichprotect the interestsof foreign investorsbutrestrict the policy space available to countries to pursue aggressive socioeconomic development and pro-poor growth. 22What has resulted is a structureof powerthatmakesitdifficultforAfricancountriestointroduceregulatoryframeworksthatpromotedevelopmentalandenvironmentalobjectivesandprotecthumanrights.

Third,criticsmaintain that the resultingmining regimeshavenot recognized theneedforcertainformsofregulation,particularlywithregardtotheprotectionoftheenvironment.23TheWorldBankapproachfavouredself-regulation inthisrespectand,asaresult,therehasonlybeena“nominalrecognition”24 of the need for social andenvironmentalregulations.Forthemostpart,suchregulationshaveremainednon-binding.Theneed topay greater attention to environmental protectionhasnowbeenheightenedbytherapidgrowthofnewinvestors–particularlyBrazil,theRussianFederation,India,andChina–intheAfricanmineralsector.

Fourth, a number of the states in which these regimes have been established have weakinstitutionalandpoliticalcapacities.Asaresult,statefunctionssuchasservicedelivery, rule-settingand implementationhavebeendelegated toprivateactors.Many policy aspects of a small-state mining approach ignore the importance of state involvement in nurturing mining sectors in many developed countries, which are linked to the broader economy, and of the historical need to build the necessary institutional structures before taking a gradually more laissez-faire approach tomining.Sincethestatehasretreatedfrommediatingsocioeconomicrelations,thetransnationalminingcompaniesoperatinginthesecountrieshaveincreasinglybeensubjected to social claims.25 Further, these companies “face the risk of potentialconflictand,consequently,theneedtoensurethesecurityoftheirownactivities”. 26 Thus, some of these companies have turned to private security forces to ensure the securityoftheiroperations.Becausesocioeconomicrelationsarepoorlymediated,thesecompaniesalsofacelegitimacychallenges.

Finally, the World Bank inspired reforms have neglected ASM, despite thissector’s undisputed potential to alleviate poverty and safeguard livelihoods. Inparticular,theforeigninvestmentmodelhasbeenblamedforunderminingefforts

21 John M. Stopford, Susan Strange and John S. Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 14.22 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 22.23 Bonnie Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process”, p. 205.24 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 9.25 David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Social Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 60.26 Bonnie Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process”, p. 209.

7


to formalizeASM. It isacknowledged that theASMsector is “plaguedbya longlist of social and environmental problems”,27includingenvironmentaldegradation,increased levels of child labour, adverse impact on human health, links to civil wars, connectionswithmoney-laundering, and supporting terrorist activities.Many oftheseproblemscanbeattributedtothefact thattheASMsector isunregulatedand operates outside the legal sphere. The need has therefore arisen to formalize theASMsector, includingthroughregisteringandorganizingunregulatedmining,bringingASMintotheformaleconomyoratleastopeningnewspaceforASMtoexistinaquasi-formalizedstateinordertoextendbasicservicesandprotectionswhile recognizing the operators’ right to mine. These measures would make mining activitiesmore sustainable andwould channel benefits tominers at the bottomof theproduction chain. In theprocess, impoverished,mineral-rich communitieswouldbecomemoreprosperous.Formalizationwouldentail,amongotherthings,adequatezoningof landsuited forASMactivitiesand theprovisionof technicalsupport to small mining communities. However, the prioritization of large-scalemining toencourage international investmentshas led tovastquantitiesof landbeingapportionedtomultinationalmineralexplorationandexploitationcompaniesandhasoftenprevented theobjectiveofbringing small scale-operators into thelegaldomainfrombeingrealized.Policieshavethustreatedlarge-scaleminingandsmall-scaleminingunequally.Oneeffectofthishasbeentoexacerbate“tensionsbetweenthelarge-scaleandsmall-scalesectors,resultinginconflictoverlandandother key livelihood resources”.28

Inordertodealwiththesechallenges,variousprivate,voluntaryandtransnationalinitiatives,with theirorigins indebatesovercorporate social responsibility,haveemerged.29 Examples include the Voluntary Principles on Security and HumanRights,whichprovideguidelines fordealingwithstateorprivatesecurity forces;the International Council on Mining and Metals, which aims to improve socialand ecological standards and contribute to the resolution of conflicts betweenresourceextractionandthepreservationofnature;theKimberleyProcess,whichisacertificationprocessestablishedinthecontextoftheissueof“blooddiamonds”resultingfromthecivilwarsinLiberia,SierraLeoneandAngolatopreventtradeinconflictdiamondswiththehelpofacomplexcertificationsystem;theExtractiveIndustries Transparency Initiative, which aims to increase the transparency ofpublicrevenuesemanatingfromtheresourcesector;andthePublishWhatYouPaycampaign, which also seeks to increase transparency in the resource sector.30

Formultinationalminingcompanies,implementingtheseinitiativesisimportant,asitsecuresthema“sociallicensetooperate”inaffectedcommunities.31 However, the initiativesremainlimitedineffectivenessforvariousreasons,suchastheirvoluntarynature and the absence of regulatory enforcement. A common concern is that even wheremultinationalcompanieshaveadoptedtheseinitiatives, localcommunities

27 Roy Maconachie and Gavin Hilson, “Safeguarding Livelihoods or Exacerbating Poverty? Artisanal Mining and Formalization in West Africa”, Natural Resources Forum, vol. 35, 2011, p. 293.28 Ibid, p. 301.29 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 15.30 Schnell, M. and M. Grosmann, “International Approaches to Improve Resource Governance in Africa”, In Geological Resources and Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Holistic Approaches to Transparency and Sustainable Development in the Extractive Sector. Jürgen Runge and James Shikwati, eds. (New York, CRC Press, 2011), pp. 46-47.31 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 16.

8


continuetobearthesocialandenvironmentalcostsofminingactivities.Weakstatecapacityhasalsomeantthatrevenueofficialsdonothavethecapacityto“accuratelymonitor theoutput and capital expenditures ofmultinationalmining companies,allowingfirmstomanipulatetheirtaxobligationsandminimizetheroyaltiespaidtolocalgovernmentsandmining-affectedcommunities”.32

ThenetresultisthattheWorldBankinspiredminingregimeshavenotproducedsignificantlocalbenefits,leadingtocallsfortheirrevision.Althoughtheliberalizedregulatoryframeworkshavemaximizedbenefitsforthemultinationalcompanies,theyhavefailedtoprovidebroadlysharedbenefitstoaffectedcommunities.Further,Governments andmultinational companies alikehave failed to reinvest resourcerevenues into health, education, and employment-creation services. A numberof countries have therefore taken the decision to “review their mining contracts tobetterrespondtothenewdemandsforthesocial regulationofprivatesectordevelopment that have accompanied the rapid process of liberalization and theopening up of mineral-rich African economies to investment”. 33 These processes of revisionareleadingtotheadoptionoftheAfricaMiningVisionapproach,inwhichtheminingsectorisviewedasacatalystforbuildingintersectorallinkages.Someof therevisedregimesnowcontainprovisions for “greaternationalparticipation,facilitation of mining activities, increase of fiscal revenue and local communitydevelopment”.34 They also require transparency in the contractual arrangements betweenhost governments, local communitiesandmining companies.For theserevisionstomakeadifference, it isnecessarytoensurethatcitizenswillbeableto access to information about the mining arrangements and that independentjudiciaries will be able to enforce them.

AnumberofotherAfricancountrieshavealsosoughttoformalizetheirASMsectors.Notably, in this regard, Mali has adopted an approach that could be emulated by other countries.Mali’sbreakthroughcamefromworkingwithtraditionalcommunitiestoformalizetheirartisanalworkingsandthecountryhasnowlegalizedproceduresforsecuring licences thatprovide traditional societiesengaged insmall-scaleminingwithsecurityoftenure.Ithasalsoorganizedsmall-scaleminersintocooperativesandassociations.Mali’sexperiencedemonstrateshoweffortstoformalizetheASMsectormustbebasedonaclearunderstandingofthedynamicsofaffected localcommunities.35

At the regional level, African states have now sought to harmonize their policies and regulatory frameworks,36 including in the areas of monitoring mechanisms, administrative systems and single points of contact for licensing and regulatoryapprovals.OneexampleoftheseharmonizationeffortsistheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStatesdraftDirectiveontheHarmonizationofGuidingPrinciplesand Policies in theMining Sector,which seeks to create a commonmining andextractivecodeofconductinWesternAfrica,focusedonaparticipatoryapproach,sustainable development, poverty reduction, environmental protection, good

32 Ibid, p. 13.33 Campbell, B. “Revisiting the Reform Process”, p. 212.34 Steven De Backer, Mining Investment and Financing in Africa: Recent Trends and Key Challenges. (Webber Went-zel, 2012), p. 10.35 Maconachie and Hilson, “Safeguarding Livelihoods or Exacerbating Poverty?”, pp. 301-302.36 Besada and Martin, Mining Codes in Africa, p. 21.

9


governance and defence of human rights. However, harmonization initiativescontinue to be hampered by various obstacles, including disparate policy andregulatory frameworks, inadequate geological knowledge of mineral resource endowments, inadequate physical infrastructure required for mineral resources development, processing and value added manufacturing, and a lack of capacity andpoliticalwillforimplementation.37

All in all, African mining continues to face national and regional governancechallengesthatmuststillbeovercomeifAfrica’smineralresourcesaretocontributemeaningfully to sustainable development. Yet another development is the recent declineindemandformineralcommoditiesinChina,IndiaandBrazil.Thehopeisthatthistimeround,Africancountrieswillmakemoreoptimaluseofthelullinglobalcommoditypricestodevelopmorefavourablemarketconditionsthrougheffectiveandefficientpolicyandregulatoryframeworksforthemineralssector.However,andabove all, there is an urgent need to strengthen linkages between mineral resource extractionandAfrica’sindustrialdevelopment,iftheseresourcesaretocontributeto broad, long-term development goals. Unfortunately, the required linkages remain poorlydeveloped,whichreflects“theindustry’smainorientation–extractingandshipping minerals to overseas markets”.38

TheAfricaMiningVision provides a timely andmuch-needed policy frameworkforaddressingthesechallenges;inparticular,itseekstoaddresstheshortcomingsof the neo-liberal approach. According to the Africa Mining Vision, this approach was“narrowmindedandmoregearedtowardsattractingforeign investmentandpromotingexportsandlesstowardsfosteringlocaldevelopment”.39 Further, it faults this approach for being “sectoral-centred”, favouring foreign direct investment over local capital development and failing to integrate poverty reduction intominingpoliciesbecauseoftheweaklinkagesbetweenlocal,nationalandregionaleconomies.

Theapproachhasalsobeencharacterizedbyasymmetricalpowerrelations,withtheresultthatdecision-makingprocesseshavetendedtofavourbipolarinitiatives(governmentandprivatesector)whileexcludinglocalcommunitiesandcivilsocietyat large. As a result, the local costs associated with mining, such as environmental impacts,andsocialandculturaldisruptions,havenotbeenadequatelycompensatedfor. The Vision decries the magnitude of special incentives offered to miningcompanies, which reduce the share of rent that African Governments depend on receiving in order to fund their social and development programmes.

In order to address these challenges, the Africa Mining Vision seeks to integrate Africa’s mineral sector into the continent’s social and economic developmentprocess through six related goals:

37 H. Mtegha and others, “Regional Organisations’ Approach to Mining and Exploitation in Sub-Saharan Africa”, In Geological Resources and Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Holistic Approaches to Transparency and Sustain-able Development in the Extractive Sector. Jürgen Runge and James Shikwati, eds. (New York, CRC Press, 2011), p. 158.38 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development, p.151.39 Africa Mining Vision, p. 11.

10


1. Fostering a transparent and accountable mineral sector, in which resource rentsareoptimizedandutilized topromotebroadeconomicandsocialdevelopment;

2. Promotinggoodgovernanceofthemineralsector,inwhichcountriesandcitizensparticipateinmineralassets,andinwhichthereisequityinthedistributionofbenefits;

3. Improving theknowledge,andoptimizing thebenefits,offinitemineralresourceendowmentsatalllevelsofminingandforallminerals;

4. Harnessing the potential of small-scale mining to both improve rurallivelihoodsandtointegratetheruraleconomyintonationaldevelopment;

5. Fostering sustainable development principles based on environmental and socially responsible mining, which is safe, inclusive and appreciated bycommunitiesandallstakeholders;

6. Buildinghumanandinstitutionalcapacitiestowardsaknowledgeeconomythatsupportsinnovation,researchanddevelopment.

At the governance level, the Africa Mining Vision therefore calls for a review of mining policy and regulatory frameworks, which need to appropriately and directly addresstheissuesofprimaryimportanceifthesesixgoalsaretoberealized.Sincethe review of the liberalized mining regimes is a recent and ongoing exercise, the nature of the evolving mining policies and regulatory frameworks is not well understood.ThisstudyseekstofillthatgapwithrespecttoEastAfrica,specificallyinevaluatingtheextenttowhichEastAfricancountriesarealigningtheirpolicyandregulatory frameworks with the Africa Mining Vision, by determining the extent to which these frameworks are enhancing the good governance of the mineral sector and,iftheyarenot,whatgapsstillexistbetweenthenationalpolicyenvironmentsand the approach advocated by the Africa Mining Vision.

TheActionPlanforImplementingtheAfricaMiningVisionprovidesnineparametersforevaluatingtheframeworksinplaceacrossEastAfricancountries:

1. Mining revenues and mineral rents management: does the mining sector effectively garner and deploy resource rents? For example,what fiscalprovisions govern the collection ofmineral rents and, further, towhatextentarefinancialinflowsfromminingchannelledintolong-termphysicaland social capital?Another important question iswhether themineralregime has mechanisms for establishing a fair market value of resources, suchastransparentandcompetitiveconcessioning.

2. Geological andmineral information systems: have countries developeda comprehensive knowledge of their mineral endowment, which would enablethemtomakeinformeddecisionsonmineralsectordevelopment?Geological and mineral data should not only be available, but also

11


accessible, as this would lower the risk to investments in explorationand mine development. It would also greatly assist countries in their negotiationswithminingcompanies.

3. Building human and institutional capacities: is the mining sectorknowledge-driven and does it provide an engine for an internationallycompetitive industrial economy? This entails upgrading skill levels, intermsofvariety,depthandquantities,andthedevelopmentofnewskills,forexampleintheareaofplanningandoversight.Stakeholderinstitutions,such as parliaments, local communities and civil society, also need toupgradeskillstobeeffectiveintheirroleofprovidingchecksandbalancestogovernmentfunctions.

4. Artisanal and small-scale mining: has the potential of artisanal andsmall-scale mining been harnessed, with a view to advancing integrated and sustainable rural development? This entails, among other things,regularizing and mainstreamingASM into broad-stream socioeconomicactivities; developing a regulatory regime that promotes a viable andsustainableASMsector;upgradingknowledge,skillsandtechnologiesintheASMsector;anddevelopingandstrengtheningASMassociations.

5. Mineral sector governance: has the country created a sustainable and well-governed mining sector that is inclusive and appreciated by all stakeholders,includingsurroundingcommunities?Thisentailsestablishingstrong, transparentandparticipatorygovernanceprocessesandrespectforhumanrightsinminingoperations.

6. Research and development: is the mining sector knowledge-driven?Capacity must be enhanced to generate new knowledge in mining-related products, processes, technologies, and services. It requires countries to develop their capacity forknowledgegenerationand innovation,whichcanbemeasuredintermsoftheavailabilityofscientistsandengineers,thequalityofscientificresearchinstitutions,university-industryresearchcollaboration,private-sectorspendingonresearchanddevelopment,andgovernment procurement of advanced technology products.

7. Environmental and social issues: is the mining sector environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by all stakeholders and surrounding communities? This requires strengthening the capacity ofstateinstitutionsforenvironmentalregulation,buildinglocalcommunitycapacity to negotiate favourable impact and benefits agreements,and building effective mechanisms for grievance, dispute and conflictresolution.

8. Linkages and diversification: does the mining sector catalyse andcontribute to broad-based growth and development through linkages?This requires leveraging mineral extraction and processing operationsintobroadereconomicdevelopmentoutcomes,identifyingmineralsthatoffer possibilities for national and regional industrial development and

12


integration,investingininfrastructurenetworks,andprovidingincentivesfor investorstostructureprojects inwaysthatdeepentheir integrationintothebroadernationalandregionaleconomy.

9. Mobilizing mining and infrastructure investment: has the level of investmentflowsintominingandinfrastructureprojectsbeenincreasedto support broad socioeconomic development? This entails developingeffectiveinvestmentpromotionandprotectionstrategies,enhancingtheparticipation of the local private sector in infrastructure projects, andestablishing natural resource development corridors.40

These nine parameters must be articulated in the mining policies, laws andregulations – all important instruments for these countries – if the goals of theAfrica Mining Vision are to be realized. Chapter III of this report therefore examines the extent to which these parameters have been, or are being, considered in the policies and regulatory frameworks of the East African countries.

40 African Union Commission, African Development Bank and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Action Plan for Implementing the Africa Mining Vision – Building a sustainable future for Africa’s extractive industry: From vision to action (2011).

13


III. Governing the mining sector in East Africa

AlthoughtheminingpoliciesandlawsofthefiveEastAfricancountriescoveredbythe study address many of the goals and concerns of the Africa Mining Vision, the countrieshavenot thus farsought tospecificallyaligntheirminingregimeswiththat Vision and, for the most part, references to the Africa Mining Vision in these regimesaretangentialatbest.However,Rwandaistheexceptiontothis,insofarasit is currently developing a country mining vision.

Thelawsofthesecountriesconfervaryingmineralrights(seetable1).Allfivecountrieshavesoughttoenhancetransparencyandaccountability in theadministrationoftheirmining regimes, although, aswe shall see, somearemoredemocratic thanothers. Kenya, for example, is in the process of dispersing the powers of its mining commissioner,whowill now be required to consult the nationalMineral RightsBoardbeforeexercisingmanyofhisorherpowers.Similarly,theUnitedRepublicofTanzania has similarly created a Mining Advisory Board.

These countries have also sought to improve knowledge of their mineral resources andareatvariousstagesofmapping these resources.Some,suchas theUnitedRepublic of Tanzania, have renegotiated mineral development agreements inresponse to public complaints that mining companies were taking the lion’s share of thebenefitsarisingfromtheexploitationofmineralresources.ButallfivecontinuetoexperiencevariouschallengeswithrespecttoharnessingthepotentialofASM,fostering sustainable development principles, managing licences and mineral development agreements, enhancing linkages between the mining industry and therestoftheireconomies,andresolvingconflictsbetweenminingcompaniesandcommunitiesthatliveinoraroundminingareas.

Another notable feature of the mining regimes of these countries is that, for the most part, their policies and regulatory frameworks remain gender neutral, although Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania have included some provisions on gender equality and equity in their policies. This gender neutrality persists despite thefactthatwomenplayasignificantroleintheminingsector.Forexample,ASMhasahugefemaleworkforce,estimatedatbetween40and50percentacrossthecontinent.41 It is therefore apparent why the Africa Mining Vision calls upon countries to work towards gender equality and the empowerment of women.42Inparticular,iturgescountriestoempowerwomenthroughtheintegratinggenderequityintominingpoliciesandlawsandformulatinggenderchartersfortheirminingsectors.

41 African Mineral Development Centre, African Women in Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (2015), p. 2.42 Africa Mining Vision, p. 32.

14


Tab

le 1

: Min

eral

rig

hts

in E

ast

Afr

ican

co

untr

ies

Coun

try

Reco

nnai

ssan

ce

licen

ceProspecting/

exploration

licen

ce

Retention

licen

ceLa

rge-

scal

e mininglicence/

leas

e

Smal

l-sca

le

min

ing

licen

ceRe

conn

aiss

ance

pe

rmit

Prospecting

perm

itM

inin

g pe

rmit

Artisanalmining

licen

ce

Buru

ndi

Researchpermit;

durationnot

indi

cate

d

1 ye

ar +

rene

wal

of

1 y

ear

Exploitation

licen

ce: 2

5 ye

ars

+ un

limite

d re

new

als

of 1

0 ye

ars

Artisanallogging

perm

it: 2

yea

rs

+ un

limite

d re

new

als

of 2

ye

ars

Keny

a2years(non-

renewable)

3 ye

ars

+ 2

rene

wal

s of

3

year

s

2 ye

ars

+ 1

rene

wal

of 2

ye

ars

25 y

ears

+ 1

re

new

al o

f 15

year

s

Durationnot

indi

cate

d5

year

s +

1 re

new

al o

f 5

year

s

5 ye

ars

+ 1

rene

wal

of 5

ye

ars

Uga

nda

Prospecting

licen

ce: 1

yea

r (anymineral);

not c

lear

if

rene

wab

le.

Exploration

licen

ce: 3

yea

rs

+ 2

rene

wal

s of

2

year

s

3 ye

ars

+ 1

rene

wal

of 2

ye

ars

21 y

ears

+ 1

re

new

al o

f 15

year

s

Location

licen

ce: 2

yea

rs

+ un

limite

d re

new

als

of 2

ye

ars

Rwan

da4

year

s +

1 re

new

al o

f 4

year

s

25 y

ears

+

unlim

ited

rene

wal

s of

15

year

s

15 y

ears

+

unlim

ited

rene

wal

s of

10

year

s

5 ye

ars

+ un

limite

d re

new

als

of 5

ye

ars

Uni

ted

Repu

blic

of

Tanz

ania

4 ye

ars

+ 1s

t re

new

al o

f 3

year

s +

2nd

rene

wal

of 2

ye

ars

5 ye

ars

+ 1

rene

wal

of 5

ye

ars

Speciallicence:

perio

d re

ques

ted

by a

pplic

ant

Min

ing

licen

ce:

10 y

ears

+

1 re

new

al

of10years;

prim

ary

min

ing

licen

ce: 7

yea

rs

+undefined

rene

wal

15


ThisstudywillproceedbyexaminingthemineralframeworksinplaceinthefiveEACStatesmembers.Itgivesasnapshotofthepolicyenvironmentandlegalframeworks,with an analysis of the extent to which the inclusive and dynamic elements of the AfricaMiningVisionareembedded.Thiswillfeedintothepolicyrecommendationsin Chapter IV on the elements that should be adopted by the countries to ensure that theirmineral sectors better linked andprovide greater benefits that canbesharedacrosslocalcommunitiesandtheeconomyatlarge.

A. Burundi

Burundi produces cobalt, copper, nickel, niobium (columbium), tin, tantalum,tungsten, gold, and limestone. Mining accounts for less than 1 per cent of the country’sgrossdomesticproduct(GDP);43 nevertheless, the Government considers thedevelopmentofthemineralsectortobeofhighimportance,givenitspotentialto enhance job creation, economic diversification, and tax revenues.44 Burundi has, for example, the second largest coltan reserve in the region and about 6 per cent of world nickel reserves, but these resources are currently being extracted by artisanalmethodsandtheindustryfaceschallenges,suchasinadequateelectricityand transport infrastructure. 45 Burundi enacted a new Mining Code in 2013 and is nowintheprocessofformulatingaminingpolicy.46 However, the country has not carried out any geological surveys owing to the costs involved.

43 Thomas, R. Yager, Thomas R, “The Mineral Industry of Burundi”, in 2012 Minerals Yearbook, United States Geological Survey, ed. (Washington, D.C., Government Publishing Office, 2014)44 iTSCi, Governance Assessment Burundi (2013).45 African Development Bank, Burundi: Country Strategy Paper 2012-2016 (2011).46 Republic of Burundi, Promotion of Extractive and Mineral Processing Industries in the EAC: Burundi Status (2012).

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TheMiningCodeestablishesthefollowingcategoriesofmineralrights:explorationlicence,researchpermit,exploitationlicence,artisanalloggingpermit,anddealer’slicence.47TheMinister,asthelicensingauthority,processesapplicationsfortheselicences on a first come, first served basis. Power is largely centralized in theMinister, although he or she is required to consult a regulatory board or council of ministersbeforemakingcertaindecisions.Theexplorationlicencedoesnotconferan exclusive right to prospect, and is not transferable. It is granted for a period of one year and may be renewed once for a similar term. The licence holder must commencesurveyoperationswithinthreemonthsofthedateofthelicencebeinggranted.

A research permit confers on the holder an exclusive right to explore and search for the substances for which the permit is issued. It also permits the holder to take samplesofthosesubstancesforthepurposesofconductinganystudyornecessarytesting, although the samples must be delivered to the Ministry. The holderof a researchpermit is required to commenceoperationswithin thetime frameprescribed by the licence.

An exploitation licence confers on the holder the exclusive right to prospect,research and exploit the mineral substances for which the licence is issued. It is granted for a period of 25 years or the life of the mine, and may be renewed for additional10-yearperiods.Everyexploitation licencemustbeaccompaniedbyamining agreement, which must be renewed whenever the licence is renewed. The Mining Code stipulates the provisions of the mining agreement, which include:free carried interest for the state of at least 10 per cent; themining company’sguarantees;theminingcompany’scommitmentstothecreationofinfrastructure,socioeconomiccontributions,employmentofcitizens,procurementoflocalgoodsandservices;andenvironmentalprotectioningeneralandrestorationofexploitedsitesinparticular.ManyoftheseprovisionsarekeyelementsoftheAfricaMiningVision. Further, an applicant seeking an exploitation licence must provide anapproved feasibility study, an approved socioeconomic impact study, an approved environmental impact assessment (EIA) study, a capital works programme andpreparationdepositforitsoperation,andanoperatingplan.

An artisanal permit can be obtained only by a formal mining cooperative. Thismineral right is granted for two years, and may be renewed for an unlimited number of further two-year periods. Finally, the dealer’s licence confers on the holder the righttodealinartisanalmineralsubstances.ItshouldalsobenotedthattheMiningCode stipulates that all mineral research and exploitation activities can only beundertakenafterthepriorconsentofpersonslikelytobeaffectedbysuchactivitieshas been obtained. Further, such persons are entitled to compensation for anyinterferencewiththeirlandownershiporoccupationrights.

Inpractice,thereareproblemswitheffortstoformalizeartisanalmining.Accordingto many stakeholders, formalizing the artisanal mining sector requires “morethan justorganizingminers intocooperatives”.48 Among the issues are that many

47 Republic of Burundi. Mining Code of Burundi 2013.48 K. Matthysen, Review of the Burundian Artisanal Gold Mining Sector (Antwerp, International Peace Information Service, 2015), p. 13.

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artisanalminersarenotfamiliarwiththenotionofacooperative,are“suspiciousaboutpotentialbenefits,andbelieveitwillmainlyservethewealthierstakeholdersto increasetheirprofits”.49There isafear,therefore,thateffortstoformalizethesectorwillbesubjecttoelitecapture.Theprocessofregistrationisalsocomplicatedandmaydiscouragemanyartisanalminersfromseekingpermits.Artisanalminersarefirstrequiredtofileademandwiththelocaladministratorwho,inconsultationwiththerelevantcommunalcouncil,grantsacertificateconfirmingtheavailabilityofthelandtobemined.TheymustthenregistertheircooperativeandapplytotheMinistryofMiningtoauthorizetheiractivities.Oncethisisdone,theMinistryofMining and the Ministry of Environment send a mission to the site to observe the situationonthegroundandregisterthefuturepermit’sgeographicalcoordinates.Apermitisthenissuedtothecooperativeonceithaspaidallthetaxesdue.

Table 2: Extent of alignment of the policy and regulatory frameworks of Burundi with the Africa Mining Vision

Parameter Achievements DrawbacksMining revenues and mineral rents management

• Licenceapplicationsprocessedonfirstcome,firstservedbasis

• Mining agreement required for all exploitationlicences

• Free carried interest for the state• Royaltiespaidforallminerals• Royaltiesnegotiatedwithinmining

agreements

• Inadequate capacity to audit mineralproductionandexports

• Mineral concession system notsufficientlycompetitiveortransparent

• Not clear how mineral revenues are managed and used

Geological and mineralinformationsystems

– • No geological surveys• Inadequateinformationtostimulateinvestments

Building human andinstitutionalcapacities

• Licenseesrequiredtoemploycitizens

• No clear policies on building humanandinstitutionalcapacities

Artisanalandsmall-scale mining

• Regularizationthroughpermitsystem

• Minersorganizedintocooperatives

• No programmes on developing knowledge, skills and technologies

• No programmes on extension services,includingfinancing,marketing,health,safetyandenvironment

Mineral sector governance

• Lesserdiscretionarypowersforregulatoryauthorities

• Minister required to consult regulatory board/council of ministers in decision-making

• No clear policies on public participationindecision-making,monitoringandevaluationofmineral projects

• No clear policies on transparency andaccesstoinformation

• Noclearpoliciesonprotectionofhuman rights

Research and development

– • No clear policy on research and development

Environment and social issues

• Licenseesrequiredtoprotectenvironment and restore exploited sites

• Compensationforinterferencewithland/occupationrights

• Enacted environment code

• No clear policies on strengthening statecapacityforeffectiveenvironmental management/regulation

• No clear strategy for dealing with adverseimpactsofASM

49 Ibid, p. 14.

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Parameter Achievements DrawbacksLinkagesanddiversification

• Licenseesrequiredtoprocurelocalgoods and services.

• Governmentmakingeffortstopromotevalueaddition

• No clear strategies for enhancing mineral-basedindustrializationanddiversificationofeconomy

Mobilizing mining and infrastructure investments

• Licenseesrequiredtobuildinfrastructure

–

B. Kenya

ThemostsignificantmineralsofKenyahavehistoricallybeen industrialminerals,suchasfluorspar,sodaash,kaolin,rareearthsandcement;in2012,Kenyaproduced5 per cent and 2 per cent of theworld’s production of soda ash and fluorspar,respectively.50 The country also produces metals such as gold, iron ore, niobium (columbium),titaniumandzirconium.Otherminerals found inKenyaarekyanite,manganese, silica sands, gemstones, gypsum and limestone.51 Nevertheless, mining

50 Thomas R. Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Kenya”, in 2012 Minerals Yearbook. United States Geological Survey, ed. (Washington, D.C., Government Publishing Office, 2014)51 Republic of Kenya, Promotion of Extractive and Mineral Processing Industries in the EAC: Kenya Status.

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andquarryingonlyaccountsforabout0.7percentoftheGDPofKenya.Accordingtothe Ministry of Mining, the country’s mineral resources are “vastly underexploited”, althoughtheminingsectorcontinuestogrowandthecountryisseekingtopositionitself as a regional mining sector hub for East Africa.52

A number of global mining companies now have operations in Kenya, althoughthereisasignificantpresenceofartisanalandsmall-scaleminerswho,forexample,account formostof thegoldproduction.TheGovernment isnowtakingvarioussteps tomake thecountryamoreattractivedestination formining investments,including by intensifying efforts to acquire mineral and geological data througha countrywide aeromagnetic survey, the contract for which has been awardedto a Chinese geological institute. The Ministry of Mining has automated itsmineral licensing system by establishing an online mining cadastre portal, which isexpectedto increaseefficiencyandtransparency inthegrantofmineral rightsandthemanagementofconcessions.Inaddition,thecountryisinvestingheavilyininfrastructureprojects,withaviewtoreducingthecostsofminingoperationsovertime.Ithasalsoembarkedonreducingthecostofenergyandproducingadditionalpower,whichithopeswillstimulateeconomicgrowthinitsindustries,includingthemining sector.53

1. Governing the Kenya mining sectorForalongtime,Kenyadidnothaveapolicyframeworkformineraldevelopment,and the Mining Act54,firstenactedin1940andlaterrevisedin2012,constitutedthe main instrument for the governance of the mining sector. This Act established the Minister responsible for mining and the Commissioner of Mines and Geology as theprincipalinstitutionsresponsibleforadministeringtheminingregime.TheActestablishedlegalrightsandspecificationsforlicensing,butrepresentedanadhocapproach to the mineral sector rather than a coherent policy framework. Under this law, any person who wished to prospect or mine on any land was required to obtain eitheranexplorationorextraction licence.Therewere four typesofexplorationlicences:prospectingright, exclusiveprospectingright, special licence, and mining location.Aprospectingrightwasnottransferable,andlastedoneyear,althoughitcouldberenewedforanotheryear.Theholderofaprospectingrightwasentitledtoprospectforminerals,subjecttoanytermsandconditionstheCommissionermight,“in his absolute discretion”, have deemed fit.55 The prospecting right thereforeenabledtheholdertoidentifyapotentialareaoverwhichtoapplyforanexplorationlicence.

Theexclusiveprospectinglicencecouldonlybegrantedtotheholderofaprospectingrightorapersonwhoseagentwastheholderofaprospectingright.Apersonseekinganexclusiveprospectinglicencewasrequiredtosubmitanapplication,togetherwithaprogrammeofwork,andtosatisfytheCommissionerthatheorshehadsufficientcapitaltoensureproperprospecting.Theexclusiveprospectinglicencealsolastedoneyearandcouldberenewedforfurtherone-yeartermsuptoamaximumoffiveyears.Thelicencecouldonlybetransferredtoadifferentholderwiththeconsent

52 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Mining, Kenya Mining Investment Handbook 2015 (Nairobi, Government of Ken-ya, 2015), p. 19.53 Ibid, pp. 28-32.54 Republic of Kenya, Mining Act 1940.55 Ibid, Section 14(a)(i)(b).

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of the Commissioner. In exchange for the grant of this licence, the holder could be required to furnish afinancial guaranteeandwas required toobserve all thetermsandconditionsofthelicence,includingkeepingsuchrecordsofprospectingoperations,asdeterminedbytheCommissioner.Further,anymineralsobtainedinthecourseofprospectingwerethepropertyof theGovernment,andcouldonlybe removed from the land or disposed of with the Commissioner’s consent. The speciallicencegrantedtheholdertherighttoprospectundertermsandconditionsdetermined by the Commissioner, including the area of land in which mining was to occur,themineralstobeprospected,taxessuchasroyaltiesandfees,labour,andthe form and period of the licence.

Finally, amining locationwasmadeupof “claims”; a claimwas allowedover anarealessthan200mby250m,andalocationcouldhaveamaximumof10claims.Theholderwasallowedamaximumofeightlocationsinanygivenadministrativedistrict. A person aggrieved by any decision of the Commissioner refusing to grant anyoftheselicenceswasabletoappealtotheMinisterwhosedecisionwas“finaland…notsubjecttoappealorreviewinanycourt”.56

Asfarasextractionwasconcerned,theCommissionercouldgrantthemineralrightholder a mining lease or special mining lease in respect of that land, upon such terms andconditionsas theCommissionerdetermined, includingademonstration thatthemineralrightholderhadsufficientworkingcapitaltosustainminingoperations.Thisleasecouldbegrantedforatermofnotlessthanfiveandnotmorethan21years, and be renewed for such term as the Commissioner considered appropriate. Further,whereprospectingorminingoperationsdisturbedtherightsoftheowneror occupier of any land, or caused nuisance or damage to the land, the holder of the mineral right was liable, and on demand duly made, to pay the owner or occupier fair andreasonablecompensationforthedisturbance,nuisanceordamage.Anowneroroccupieroflandwhowasdissatisfiedwiththecompensationofferedcouldreferthemattertocourtwithinonemonthofmakingthedemandforcompensation.

The Mining Act also regulated dealing in minerals, which was deemed to include the buying,selling,bartering,depositingorreceivingasapledgeorsecurity,exporting,cuttingorpolishinganymineralcoveredbytheAct.Anypersonwishingtodealinminerals was required to register as a dealer and obtain a mineral dealer’s licence eachyear. Itwas a criminal offence to possess or deal inmineralswithout thatlicence. Mineral dealers were also required to “maintain a proper register of the kind, quantity andquality ofminerals theyhavedealt in, bought, sold, bartered,exported,cutorpolished,[and]themannerbywhichitwasobtainedordisposedof”.57

Therewerevariouschallengesintheadministrationofthisregime.First,theabsenceof a policy framework meant that emerging issues in the sector were addressed on anadhocbasis,whichoftenledtouncoordinatedresponsestotheissues.58 Having been enacted in 1940, the Mining Act was in more recent years deemed outdated, as it did not address modern industry needs or trends and did not conform to

56 Ibid, Section 93.57 Ibid, Section 12(4).58 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Mining, Strategic Plan 2013-2017 (2013), p. 25.

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internationalbestpractices.Thelawexcludedfromitsjurisdictionseveralmineralsthat were mined or quarried on a commercial basis and, further, it did not cater for differencesinthetypeandscaleofmineraloperationsandstandardizedtermsandconditionsofmineralrights.59

There was also corruption in the licensing arrangements, due to an absenceof transparency. It was in response to that corruption that the Governmentestablishedataskforcein2013toreviewexistingagreementsandlicencesrelatingtoprospecting,explorationandmining.60 The task force found that some licences had been issued even where the licensing prerequisites – such as the consent of the relevant county council or the land owners – had not been met, licensees hadnotdemonstratedadequatefinancialcapacitytocarryoutminingoperations,and licences had been issued in respect of large areas of land even though the programmes of work and expenditure proposals did not justify the awards. Inother cases, some mining licences had been issued where the applicants did not havevalidprospectinglicences,whileothershadbeenissuedtoentitiesthatwerenotincorporatedatthetimeoftheapplication.Inlightofallthis,theMinistryofMining began working towards computerizing its licensing system to reduce human interaction, as away of reducing corruption.61 It was also deemed necessary to circumscribe the Commissioner’s licensing powers, which were prone to abuse.

Anotherissuewasthattheinstitutionalframeworkdidnotfacilitatethemaximizationofthebenefitsthataccruedfrommining,whichthereforemeantthattherewaslowinvestmentandlowvalueaddition.Artisanalandsmall-scaleminers,forexample,mined most of the minerals but sold their products in raw form without value addition.62 Inaddition, theGovernmenthadnotdevotedsignificant resources tothe sector, which was consequently underfunded. The Government now plans to address this challengeby establishingvalue addition centres.Another constrainttothemaximizationofbenefitshasbeenthelackofdeliberateeffortstopromotepreferentialsourcingoflocalgoodsandservicesbyminingcompanies.Further,thecountryhasnotbeenabletotaxminingcompanieseffectivelyduetotheabsenceofawell-structuredandclearfiscalregimeforthesector.63

Conflictsarosebetweenminingcompaniesandthecommunitieslivingintheareaswheremineralsweretobefound,becausetheexpectationsofthesecommunitiesregarding,forexample,employment,incomegenerationandgeneraldevelopment,hadnotbeenmet.Unfortunately,theMiningActdidnotprovideforconsultationwithstakeholdersintheprocessofconsideringapplicationsformineralrightsand,as such, it did not give local communities a role in themanagement ofmineralresources.Anumberofcommunitiesalsoraisedconcernsconcerningdisplacement/resettlement,landcompensationandsharingofbenefitsaccruingfromminerals.64 A caseinpointwasatitaniumminingprojectalongthecoast,wheretheGovernmentforcibly displaced individuals who refused to accept compensation that they

59 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy (2014), p. 2.60 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Mining, Ministerial Task Force, Report on Review of Prospecting, Exploration and Mining Licenses and Agreements (2014).61 Ministry of Mining, Strategic Plan 2013-2017, p. 29.62 Ibid, pp. 29-31.63 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 4.64 Ministry of Mining, Strategic Plan 2013-2017, pp. 26, 32.

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considered inadequate.65 The Government did not consult the community on the questionofcompensationandmerelyimposedthedecisionsonit.

In general, the Government did not consider the non-economic value of land in calculating the amounts of compensation, which left local communitiesdisenchanted.66 Another common problem was that community land was rarely demarcatedortitled,leadingtotheexploitationandoppressionoflocalcommunitiesintheprocessofresettlementandcompensation.67 This happened, for example, in TaitaTavetaCounty,wheremostofthelandonwhichminingoccuredwasnottitled.Further, there was no framework for resolving disputes between mineral rights and surface rights,whichwereprotectedequallyby theConstitution; thishamperedexplorationandmineraldevelopmentanddiscouragedinvestments.68

The extraction of minerals also caused extensive environmental degradation insomecases,andminingcompaniesdidnotgivedueconsiderationtoenvironmentalprotection concerns. For example, those undertaking major mining projects didnotalwaysconductEIAsand,whentheydid,theEIAswereofteninadequate.69 In thecaseofthetitaniummininginKwaleforexample,theEIAdidnotadequatelyaddress “the impact of the toxic substances, including radioactive emissionsreleased fromtheminingoperationson thecoastalecosystem,nor theneed forcontinuous rehabilitationof theminingarea”.70 Health and safety concerns were also ignored, with the result that mine workers were vulnerable to various hazards.71 Inparticular,mine inspectorsdidnotusually inspector regulate theactivitiesofsmall-scaleminers.Inaddition,theGovernmentwasnotabletoregulateartisanaland small-scale mining, which is mostly extra-legal.72

Crucially,theMinistrydidnothavetherequisitehumanandfinancialcapacitytoenforce the regime.73 As a result, the Mining Act was “rarely enforced” and most mineral dealers operated informally and did not pay for licences and taxes. Further, even though the Act prohibited government officers from acquiring or holdingmineral rights, a good number of them engaged in mining.74 Inadequate geological dataandinformationalsohamperedthedevelopmentoftheminingsector.75 As a result, the country’s mineral resources remained underexplored and underexploited.

65 Kayumba Angelani Ange, Challenges and Prospects of Equitable Benefit Sharing in Mining Sector: A Case Study of Titanium Mining in Kwale County, Kenya, Master’s thesis, Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy, University of Nairobi (2014), p. 33.66 Collins Odote and Smith Otieno, “Getting it Right: Towards Socially Sustainable Exploitation of the Extractive Industry in Kenya”, East African Law Journal, vol. 1, 2015, p. 234.67 Mwandawiro Mghanga, The Wealth in the Underground that is Elusive to Local Communities – Mining in Taita Taveta County: Prospects & Problems (Nariobi, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2012), paragraph 2.4.68 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 2.69 Mghanga, Mining in Taita Taveta County, para. 6.70 T.C. Davies and O. Osano, “Sustainable mineral development: Case study from Kenya”, Geological Society London Special Publications, vol. 250, No. 1, 2005, p. 93.71 Charles M. Mwalimu, “Kenya’s Legal Framework on Mining: Its Adequacy in Safeguarding the Social, Eco-nomic and Environmental Welfare of the Local Community in Mui Basin”. Available from http://www.academia.edu/3841695/KENYA_S_LEGAL_Framework_on_mining_it_s_adequacy_in_safeguarding_the_social_economic_and_environmental_welfare_of_the_local_community_in_mui_basinnd72 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 4.73 Ministry of Mining, Strategic Plan 2013-2017, pp. 26, 31.74 Mghanga, Mining in Taita Taveta County, para. 2.1.75 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 2.

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Some of these challenges could have been addressed had the Governmentnegotiated effectivemineral development agreements, but this did not happen.ThespecialminingleaseissuedtoTiominResourcesInc.wasillustrative;theleaserequiredthelesseetocarryoutminingoperations“inaworkmanlikemannerandin accordance with good mining practice”, without stipulating any benchmarks.Similarly,itrequiredthelesseetocarryoutminingoperationsinsuchamannerasto protect the environment against unnecessary damage and “with due regard to safetyprinciplesandrequirementscontainedinthelaws,rulesandregulations”inforceinthecountry.Italsoprovidedthatthelesseeshould“endeavourtosatisfythe local markets without overriding supply contracts already entered into”. Under theagreementrelatingtothatmininglease,Tiominwasalsograntedanumberoftaxexemptionsandfiscalincentives,includingthereductionofcorporateincometaxongainsorprofitsby50percentfromthedateofcommercialproductionforaperiodof10years.Withrespecttoemployment,theagreementrequiredTiomintogiveprioritytoKenyanswithappropriatequalificationstothemaximumextentpracticable and consistentwith efficient operations and to ensure that Kenyansweretrainedtotakeupthemajorityofkeypositions.Ontheuseoflocalmaterialsandlocalservices,itrequiredTiomintousereasonableeffortstopurchasegoodsand materials available in Kenya, provided that those goods and materials are of internationallycomparablequality,availableattherequiredtimeandintherequiredquantities,andofferedatcompetitivepricesonadeliverablebasisinKenya.

2. Establishing a new governance frameworkThe Government has recently formulated a new policy framework – the Minerals andMiningPolicyof2014–toaddressthoseearlierchallengesandanewmininglawwasenacted inMay2016.Thepolicyaims tochange theorientationof theeconomic policies of Kenya, which have favoured agriculture and tourism as the main drivers of economic growth and development, by giving the mining sector better attention.The hope is that, as a result, themining sectorwill be able tocontribute10percenttoGDPby2030,asenvisagedinthecountry’sVision2030.This economic policy blueprint recognizes the mining sector as one of the key drivers for economic growth that will help to transform Kenya into a middle-income economyby2030.Thepolicyreviewwasfurthernecessitatedbythepromulgationofanewconstitution.TheConstitutionofKenyaof2010vestsmineralresourcesinthenationalgovernmentintrustforthepeople.76 It also requires parliamentary ratificationofanytransactionthatinvolvesthegrantofarightorconcessionfortheexploitationofnaturalresources,includingminerals.77

Inordertoaddresstheabovechallenges,theMineralsandMiningPolicyseeks,inparticular,to:

1. Providealegalframeworkthatconformstocurrentindustryneeds,trendsandinternationalbestpractices;

2. Provide a strategy for clear, simple, predictable, transparent andaccountablelicensingprocedures,includingaccesstoland;

76 Republic of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 62.77 Ibid., Article 71.

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3. Enhancetheacquisition,processinganddisseminationofgeologicalandmineraldata;

4. Provideastrategyforvalue-additionofminerals;

5. Provide a framework for harmonizing mining and environmentallegislations;

6. Provideaframeworkformainstreamingactivitiesofartisanalandsmall-scaleminers;

7. Provide a framework for local participation in minerals and mininginvestmentventures;

8. Provideaframeworkforawell-structuredminingfiscalregime;

9. Provideaframeworkfortheequitablesharingofmineralbenefits.

Withrespecttominingrevenuesandrentmanagement,theGovernmentisseekingtomaximizethefiscalbenefitsgeneratedbytheexploitationofmineralresourcesby striking “a balance between generating short-term revenue, and attractinglonger-term investment in the mining sector”.78 It has proposed harmonizing the fiscalregime,planningforallfiscalobligationsandenhancingtheabilityofminingauthorities to administer the regime efficiently and effectively. To that end, theGovernmentplanstointroducemeasuressuchasrequiringtheCabinetSecretarytopublicizemineralroyaltiesandrentsperiodically,settingoutintherelevanttaxlawscorporate income tax and capital gains tax on the transfer or assignment of mineral rights,identifyinganddevelopingstrategicminerals,andensuringequaltreatmentofminingbusinessesregardingimportdutiesandsalestaxorvalueaddedtax.

On geological and mineral information systems, the policy observes that therate at which information is being generated cannot copewith demand, whichnecessitatesaconcertedefforttofast-tracktheacquisition,processing,storageanddisseminationofthedata.TheGovernmenthasthereforeproposedconductinganationwideairbornegeophysicalsurvey,acquiringspacebornedataandconductinggroundsurveysofidentifiedanomalies,inordertoprovideinformationtopotentialinvestors.79 Further,thenewMiningActrequirestheCabinetSecretarytoensurethatadatabaseofgeoscienceandinformationiskeptandmaintained,andmadeavailable to the public on request.80

ThepolicyseekstoprovideaframeworkformainstreamingandformalizingASMoperations.TheGovernment also aims to remove the barriers that hinderASM,especially access to finance, insecure mineral rights and inadequate technicalcapacities.Further, itseekstogiveartisanalandsmall-scaleminers incentivestooperate legally.Thepolicyoutlinesvariousmeasures toharness thepotentialof

78 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 9.79 Ibid., p. 8.80 Republic of Kenya. Mining Act 2016, Section 29.

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ASM, including throughappropriate licensing,which shouldenable artisanal andsmall-scale miners to obtain fair market prices for minerals, providing market information, training, facilitatingaccess tocredit,offeringsuitablemineral rights,and facilitating access to land.The policy also seeks to encourage artisanal andsmall-scaleminerstouseappropriate,affordableandsafetechnologybyfacilitatingthe collation and dissemination of information about appropriate technologiesand providing extension services and technology demonstrations. It also setsout theneed to advise and support artisanal and small-scaleminers on formingrepresentative associations and to assist them in tax compliance. To mitigatethe negative impacts ofASM, theGovernment has also proposed disseminatinginformation to raiseawarenessonhealth, safetyandenvironmental risks amongartisanalandsmall-scaleminers.81

Regarding the governance of the mineral sector, the Government has proposed establishinga“simple,stable,predictable,transparent,efficientandunifiedregulatoryframework”.82 It has also proposed establishing a standardized and transparent licensingsystem,inordertoconductmineraloperationsonalevelplayingfieldandbaseinvestmentdecisionsonfactorsthatcanbepredictedandplannedfor.Onemeasurethatwouldfacilitatetherealizationofthisgoalisenhancingthecapacityofminingauthoritiestoadministerthesystemefficientlyandtransparently.Asecondproposal is to automate and rationalize the licensing system so as to promotetransparency.

TheGovernmentconsideredthenewmininglawtobecriticaltorealizingthegoalsofthepolicy,particularlygoodgovernanceand,subsequently,theKenyanParliamentdulyenactedthatnewMiningAct2016.Thisnewlawseekstofacilitatedemocraticgovernance of the mining sector by dispersing the powers formerly exercised by the Commissioner,whicharenowexercisedbytheCabinetSecretary,MineralRightsBoard,DirectorofMinesandDirectorofGeologicalSurvey.TheCabinetSecretaryisresponsibleforthegeneraladministrationoftheminingregime.ThemembershipoftheBoardisdrawnfromboththepublicandprivatesectorsandanefforthasbeenmadetoensurethatitnotonlyhastechnicalexpertisebutalsobringstogetherall governmental agencies concerned with mining, including county governments, theNationalLandCommissionandNationalTreasury.TheBoardcouldthereforefacilitate much-needed inter-agency coordination. Its role is to advise and giverecommendationstotheCabinetSecretaryontheadministrationof licences,theadministrationofmineralrightsagreements,thedesignationoflandforASM,thedeclarationofmineralsasstrategicminerals,andthesettingofroyaltiesandotherfees.TheCabinetSecretaryis,inturn,requiredtoconsulttheBoardbeforemakingadministrativedecisions.

TheDirectorofMinesisresponsiblefortheday-to-dayoperationoftheDirectorateofMines,whose functions includemanaging and developingmineral resources,supervisingmining activities, ensuring compliancewith licensing conditions andadvising theCabinet Secretary and the Board during the negotiation ofmineralagreements. The Director of Geological Surveys is responsible for the day-to-dayoperationof theDirectorateofGeologicalSurveys,whose functions include

81 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, pp. 10-11.82 Ibid., p. 7.

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undertaking geological surveys and determining the country’s mineral potential,developing a national repository of geo-science information and providing thatinformationtoprospectiveinvestors,providinggeoscienceexpertiseinevaluationsofprospectingandminingapplications,andsupportingtheDirectorofMinesintheadministrationandsupervisionofprospectingandminingapplications.

Thehopeisthatthisdispersalofpowerandtherequirementofconsultationwillenhanceaccountabilityintheadministrationoftheminingregime,therebyreducingorpreventingthecorruptionthathasbeenpreviouslywitnessed in licensing.Forexample,although it is the responsibilityof theCabinetSecretary togrant,denyorrevokemineralrights,heorshecanonlydosoontherecommendationoftheBoard.Further,theMiningAct2016requirestheCabinetSecretarytonotifytheBoardofitsdecisiontoapproveorrejectalicensingapplicationbeforenotifyingtheapplicant. Although this requirement could enhance transparency and accountability in the licensing decision-making process, it is not clear what the Board is supposed todoweretheCabinetSecretarynottoheeditsadvice.

The Act introduces a new nomenclature of mineral rights, which may be granted in respectoflarge-scaleorsmall-scaleoperations.Ingeneral,aprospectingorminingoperation is classified as small scalewhere the proposed prospecting area doesnot exceed 25 contiguous blocks orwhere the proposedmining area does notexceedtwocontiguousblocks.Themineral rightsthatcanbegranted inrespectoflarge-scaleoperationsare:reconnaissancelicences,whichmaybegrantedforanon-renewabletermoftwoyears;prospectinglicences,whichmaybegrantedforatermnotexceedingthreeyearsandrenewedatmosttwotimesaftertheinitialgrant;retentionlicences,whichmaybegrantedforatermnotexceedingtwoyearsand renewed for a furtherperiodnot exceeding twoyears; andmining licences,which may be granted for a term not exceeding 25 years or the forecast life of the mine, whichever is shorter, and renewed for a term not exceeding 15 years or the remaining life of the mine, whichever is shorter.

Conversely, the mineral rights that can be granted in respect of small-scale operationsarereconnaissancepermits;prospectingpermits,whichmaybegrantedforatermnotexceedingfiveyearsandrenewedforonefurtherterm;andminingpermitswhichmaybegranted fora termnotexceedingfiveyearsand renewedforatermnotexceedingfiveyearsortheremaininglifeofthemine,whicheverisshorter.TheCabinetSecretarymaydesignateothermineralrights,butonlyontherecommendationoftheBoard.

AnapplicantseekingareconnaissanceorprospectinglicenceisrequiredtoprovidetotheCabinetSecretaryinformationontheareainrespectofwhichthelicencee is sought, the mineral or minerals in respect of which the licence is sought, the proposedprogrammeofoperations,detailsofthetechnicalexpertiseandfinancialresources, a plan for the procurement of local goods and services, and a plan for the employmentandtrainingofcitizens.

A retention licence may be granted where the holder of a prospecting licencehas identified amineral deposit that is of potential commercial significance, butthe deposit cannot be developed immediately due to temporary adverse market

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conditions, economic factors, technical constraints, or other factors beyond thereasonable control of the licence holder. In order to demonstrate the existence of anysuchconditions,theapplicantisrequiredtoprovidetheCabinetSecretarywithafullindependentstudyandassessmentoftherelevantadversemarketconditions,economic factors, technical constraints or other factors that may make it impossible todevelopthemineraldepositimmediately.TheCabinetSecretarymayonlygrantaretentionlicencewhere,ontherecommendationoftheBoard,theapplicationisdeemedtobe reasonable regarding thestudyandassessment; theapplicanthasadequatefinancialresources,technicalcompetenceandminingindustryexperience;the applicant has obtained an environmental and social impact assessment licenceandanenvironmentalmanagementplan;andtheapplicanthasacceptableproposals for the procurement of local goods and services and the employment andtrainingofcitizens.Anapplicantseekingamining licence isalso required tosupplytheinformationrequiredforaprospectinglicence.Inaddition,theapplicantis required to provide proof of submission and approval of an environmental and social impact assessment report and environmental management plan, and a plan givingparticularsoftheapplicant’sproposalswithrespectto“sociallyresponsibleinvestments for the community”.83

The Act also seeks to ensure the effective negotiation and administration ofmineraldevelopmentagreements.ItempowerstheCabinetSecretary,workinginconsultationwiththeNationalTreasury,toenterintosuchagreementswithholdersofmining licenceswhere the proposed investment exceedsUS$ 500million. Inparticular,theagreementshouldprovideforvalueaddition–thatis,theprocessingof minerals – and should be prepared in a standard format. To ensure transparency and accountability in the making of mineral agreements, the Act provides that both HousesofParliament (theNationalAssemblyandSenate)must ratifyallmineralagreements. In addition, all agreements must be made available to the public.Further,theActrequirestheCabinetSecretarytomakeregulationswhichprovideforaccountableandtransparentmechanismsofreportingminingandmineral-relatedactivities,includingrevenuepaidtotheGovernmentbymineralrightsholdersandproductionvolumesundereachlicenceorpermit.

The holder of a reconnaissance permit enjoys non-exclusive rights to conduct reconnaissanceforthemineralormineralsonlyintheareaspecifiedinthepermit.Theyarerequiredtocomplywiththetermsandconditionsofthepermitandtotakeallnecessarymeasurestoprotecttheenvironment.Further,wheretheprospectingconcerns community land, the applicant for a reconnaissance permit is required toobtaintheconsentofthecommunity if theoperationswill involveexcavationanddrilling.Thesameobligationsapplytotheholderofaprospectingpermitandtheholderofaminingpermit,althoughthe latter isalsorequiredtoprotectandrestoretheenvironmentwithintheminingareaandsubmittotheCabinetSecretaryquarterlyreportsonminedevelopmentandmineralproduction.

ItshouldbenotedthattheActhasbeenharmonizedwithexistingenvironmentallegislation, as dictated by theMinerals andMining Policy.84 Thus, mineral rights holders are also required to comply with the requirements of the Environmental

83 Republic of Kenya. Mining Act 2016, Section 119.84 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 8.

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ManagementandCo-ordinationAct1999.Mininglicencesarenotgrantedunlesstheapplicant has also obtained an environmental impact assessment licence. Applicants forprospectinglicences,retentionlicencesandmininglicencesarealsorequiredtoprovide environmental protection bonds sufficient to cover the costs associatedwiththeimplementationoftheenvironmentalandrehabilitationobligationsoftherights holder.

TheActalsoestablishedasystemfortheregulationofartisanalmining,which itdefinesas“traditionalandcustomaryminingoperationsusingtraditionalorcustomaryways and means”.85ItempoweredtheCabinetSecretarytoestablishcountyofficesof the Ministry, and to designate a representative of the Director of Mines tobe the head of the county office.The idea is to decentralize the administrationoftheminingregime,sothat it isaccessibletoartisanalminers.Accordingly, thecountyofficer isresponsibleforgranting,renewingandrevokingartisanalminingpermits, supervising and monitoring the operations and activities of artisanalminers, facilitating the formationofartisanalassociationgroupsorcooperatives,andpromotingthefairtradeofartisanalminers.Inaddition,theActestablishedanArtisanalMiningCommitteeforeverycountytoplayarolesimilartotheMineralRightsBoardbyadvisingthecountyofficerinthegranting,renewalorrevocationofartisanalminingpermits.Artisanalminerscanapplyforartisanalpermits,whichhave a term of three years and may be renewed for one more similar term. Further, theholderofanartisanalpermitmayapplytoconvert it toasmall-scalepermit.Theartisanalpermitandsmall-scalepermitaresubjecttolessstringentregulatoryrequirementsthanthelicences;theholderofanartisanalpermitisrequiredtomineandproducemineralsinaneffectiveandefficientmethod,toobservegoodminingpractices,healthandsafetyrulesandtopaydueregardtotheprotectionoftheenvironment.

Inordertodiscouragetheacquisitionofmineralrightsforpurposesofspeculation,the Act stipulates timelines within which operations in respect of any rightsgrantedmustcommence.Thus,theholderofareconnaissancelicence(whichisnottransferable)mustcommenceoperationswithinthreemonthsofthegrantofthelicence,whiletheholderofamining licence isrequiredtocommenceoperationswithin six months of the grant of the licence.

TheActseekstoenhanceefficiency intheprocessingofapplicationsformineralrights:applicationsforprospectingorreconnaissancelicencesmustbedeterminedwithin90daysandapplicationsformininglicencesmustbedeterminedwithin120days.AnapplicantwhoisaggrievedbythedecisionoftheCabinetSecretarymayappeal to the High Court within 30 days.

TheActintroducescompetitivetenderingasthemechanismforawardingmineralrightsinrespectoflarge-scaleoperations.Inothercases,mineralrightsareawardedonafirstcome,firstservedbasis.

In an effort to facilitate credible public participation in the licensing decision-making process, theAct requires theCabinet Secretary to notify landowners or

85 Republic of Kenya. Mining Act 2016, Section 4.

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lawful occupiers of land, the community and the relevant county government that heorshehasreceivedanapplicationfora licence.Thepurposeof thisnotice isto give these persons and entities an opportunity to object to the grant of thelicence. It is then the responsibility of the Board to hear and determine any such objections.Inaddition,beforetheBoardcanrecommendtotheCabinetSecretarythegrantofamineralright,theapplicantforalicencemustprovidenotificationofapprovalfromtheNationalLandCommission, ifthemineralright is inrespectofpublicland;therelevantstateagency,ifthemineralrightisinrespectoflandheld,used or occupied by such a state agency; the relevant Cabinet Secretary, if themineralrightisinrespectofaplaceofburial,religioussignificance,publicbuildingorotherpublicpurpose;theGovernoroftherelevantcounty,ifthemineralrightisinrespectoflandsituatedwithinatown,municipalityortradingcentre;theCabinetSecretaryresponsibleforwildlife,ifthemineralrightisinrespectoflandsituatedwithinamarinepark,anationalparkora local sanctuary; theCabinetSecretaryresponsible for the environment, if the mineral right is in respect of land situated withinaprotectednaturalenvironment;theDirectoroftheKenyaForestService,ifthemineralrightisinrespectoflandsituatedwithinaforestarea;andanyotherpersonwhointheopinionoftheCabinetSecretarywouldbeaffectedbythegrantofthemineralright,suchasownersofprivatelandorthecommunityinoccupationof the land. The Act therefore seeks to ensure that the grant of mineral rights does not undermine prior land rights and thus mineral rights cannot be granted with respect to private land without the express consent of the owner, although the Act goesontostipulatethatsuchconsent“shallnotbeunreasonablywithheld”.TheAct therefore envisages that the applicant for a mineral right and the landowner, whether private or community, shall enter into an agreement concerning the payment of adequate compensation.Where the community land in question isunregistered,theNationalLandCommissionisrequiredtosafeguardtheinterestsofthecommunity.ItisenvisagedbytheActthattheCabinetSecretarywillmakeregulationsforthegrantingofprospectingandminingrightsovercommunityland.

All mineral rights are granted subject to conditions such as protection of theenvironment, community development, and safety of prospecting and miningoperationsandofthepersonsundertakingsuchoperations.Further,mineralrightsholders are required to submit sitemitigation and rehabilitationormine-closureplans,andprovideanenvironmentalprotectionbondsufficienttocoverthecostsassociated with the implementation of their environmental and rehabilitationobligations.With respect to community development, the Act requires mineralrights holders to implement community development agreements. The Act requires theCabinetSecretarytoenforcetheseconditionsas if theywerecontained inacontractbetweentheCabinetSecretaryandtheholderofthemineralright,meaningthattheseconditionswillbeimpliedtermsofanygrantofmineralrights.

TheMinistry has developed CommunityDevelopmentAgreement Regulations,86 which envisage that community development agreements will be reached through fair negotiations betweenmineral rights holders and affected communities,willaddress broad development objectives as opposed to being focused narrowlyon financial compensation, and will be formalized so that they become legaldocumentsbindingtobothparties.Theaimistoensurethatminingoperationsare

86 Republic of Kenya. Community Development Agreement Regulations 2016.

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consistentwiththecontinuingeconomic,socialandculturalviabilityoftheaffectedcommunities and to ensure accountability and transparency in mining-relatedcommunity development.87EveryaffectedcommunitywillberepresentedinthesenegotiationsbyaCommunityDevelopmentAgreementCommittee(comprisingthecommunity’srepresentativeintheCountyAssembly,onewomen’srepresentative,tworecognizedcommunityleadersorelders,twoyouthrepresentatives,thelocalcommunity Chief, two representatives of marginalized groups, and the area’sMemberorMembersofParliament).Theagreementsmustbeinaccordwithandcomplementcountyandnationaldevelopmentplans,mustincludemechanismsformonitoring the impact of the agreements on the community, and will be subject torevieweveryfiveyears.TheseagreementsrequiretheapprovaloftheCabinetSecretarybeforetheycancomeintoforce.88

TheMiningActalsostipulatesproceduresforthepaymentofcompensationwheremineral rights disturb or deprive the owners or lawful occupiers or users of the land orpartoftheland.Insuchcases,thepersonseekingcompensationisrequiredtomakeademandorclaimforcompensationtotheholderofthemineralright,whoshouldthenpay“prompt,adequateandfaircompensation”.89 Accordingly, the Act requiresthemineralrightsholdertodepositacompensationguaranteebondwiththeMinistryandencouragespartiestoresolvedisputesoncompensationamicablythroughnegotiations.Wherethepartiesareunabletoagree,eitherpartymayreferthedisputetotheCabinetSecretaryfordetermination,andmayappealtotheHighCourtwheretheyaredissatisfiedwiththatdetermination.Theholderofamineralright cannot commencemining operations unless the questionof compensationhasbeenresolved.Further,theCabinetSecretaryisresponsibleforensuringthatcommunitieswhoprefer tobe compensatedbywayof resettlement are settled,at the cost of the mineral right holder, on suitable alternate land, that due regard is given to their economic well-being, and social and cultural values, and that the resettlementisundertakeninaccordancewithrelevantphysicalplanninglaw.

Onemployment and training, theAct seeks toensureeffective transferof skillsby requiring mineral rights holders to submit to the Cabinet Secretary detailedprogrammes for the recruitmentand trainingof citizensofKenyaasaconditionforthegrantofthemineralrights.ItalsorequirestheCabinetSecretarytomakeregulationsforthereplacementofexpatriates,thenumberofyearssuchexpatriatesshallserve,andcollaborationandlinkagewithuniversitiesandresearchinstitutionstotraincitizens.TheholdersofmineralrightsarealsorequiredtogivepreferenceinemploymenttomembersofthecommunityandcitizensofKenyaandarefurtherrequired to give preference in the conduct of their operations, to themaximumextent possible, to materials and products made in Kenya, services offered bymembersofthecommunityandcitizens,andcompaniesorbusinessesownedbycitizens.

TheAct also provides a framework for local participation in mining investmentventures. First, it provides that the state shall acquire a free carried interest of 10 percentinthesharecapitaloflarge-scaleminingoperationsandminingoperations

87 Ibid., p. 9.88 Ibid., p. 22.89 Republic of Kenya. Mining Act 2016, Section 153(1).

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relatingtostrategicminerals,90inrespectofwhichthestateshallnotpayfinancialcontribution. Second, it requires the holder of a mining licencewhose plannedcapitalexpenditureexceedstheamountprescribedbytheCabinetSecretarytolistatleast20percentofitsequityonalocalstockexchangewithinthreeyearsaftercommencingproduction.However,thesethresholdsarenegotiable.Theholderofamininglicencemaynegotiatehowmuchoftheequityshouldbelistedonthestockexchangeandtheperiodwithinwhichthelistingshouldoccur,forexample,wheremarketconditionswouldnotallowforthesuccessfulcompletionoftheofferingonthe stock exchange.

Regardingtheequitablesharingofmineralbenefits,theActrequiresmineralrightsholderstopayroyaltiesatratesprescribedbytheCabinetSecretary.Thoseroyaltiesarethendistributed,withthenationalGovernmentreceiving70percent,thecountygovernmentreceiving20percent,andthecommunitywheretheminingoperationsoccur receiving 10 per cent.

Thepolicysaysverylittleonthequestionsofcapacitydevelopmentandlinkagesanddiversification.Theonlyreferencestocapacitydevelopmentarefoundintheconditionsthatlicenceapplicantsmustmeet,suchasgivingpreferencetocitizensofKenya regarding employment. Nevertheless, it does contain statements on mobilizing mining and infrastructure investment. According to the policy, the Government will establish a responsive regulatory framework, with a view to fostering mining investmentopportunities forgreater socioeconomicdevelopment.Themeasuresaimed at realizing this strategic objective include requiringmining companies tomeetobligationsoncreatingbusinessandemploymentopportunities,trainingandskillstransfer.Aswehavealreadyseen,thesemeasuresformpartoftheconditionsforgrantingmineral rights.Further, theGovernment intends tohold freecarriedinterestsinmajorminingoperationsandinthedevelopmentofstrategicmineralsandtoestablishmechanismsthatenablethelistingoflarge-scaleminingcompaniesin local stock exchanges. 91

90 Strategic minerals are minerals declared as such by the Cabinet Secretary with the approval of the Cabinet and by notice in the Kenya Gazette.91 Ministry of Mining, Minerals and Mining Policy, p. 10.

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Table 3: Extent of alignment of the policy and regulatory frameworks of Kenya with the Africa Mining Vision


• Planstomaximizefiscalbenefits.• Planstoharmonizefiscalregime.• Planstoenhanceadministration

of mining regime – e.g., publicizing royalties,developingstrategicminerals, and ensuring equal treatment of businesses regarding tax.

• Statetoholdfreecarriedinterestinlarge mining companies.

• Licenseessubjectto“useorlose”requirement.

• Licencesawardedthroughcompetitivetenderingoronfirstcome,firstservedbasis.

• RoyaltiespaidatratesdeterminedbyCabinetSecretary.

• Royaltiestobesharedbetweennationalgovernment,countygovernmentsandlocalcommunities.

• Noclarityonimprovingnationalcapacity to audit mineral productionandexports.

• No clarity on building capacity innegotiatingfiscalissues,andmonitoring compliance with tax laws.

• No clear framework for reducing tax leakages.

Geological and mineral informationsystems

• Planstocarryoutgeophysicalsurveyandtoshareinformationwithinvestors.

• LawrequiresCabinetSecretarytokeep, maintain and facilitate access to database of geoscience and information.

• No clear policy on enhancing capacityofnationalgeologicalinstitutions.


• Applicants for licences required to give preference to employment of citizensandtoprovidetrainingforcitizens.

• No clear policy on assessing human resources and skills needs.

• No clear policy on building human andinstitutionalcapacities.

• No clear policy on enhancing coordinationandpolicycoherencewithin and across public sectors.


• PlansforframeworktomainstreamandformalizeASM.

• PlanstosupportASMbyprovidingaccesstofinance,securerights,technical capacity, market information,training(onhealth,safety,andenvironmentalrisks),andsafe technology.

• Noclearpoliciesandregulationson how to build a viable and sustainableASMsector.

• Nodeterminationanddesignationof geologically suitable areas for ASM.

• No clear policy on developing and strengtheningASMassociations.


• Dispersalofregulatory/administrativepowers.

• Proceduralfairnessinlicensing.• Publicparticipationinlicensing

decision-making.• Plantoestablishstable,transparent

and accountable regulatory framework, including licensing system.

• Plantoenhanceadministrativecapacity,automateandrationalizelicensing system.

• Use of community development agreements as a tool of governance.

• No clear policy on mainstreaming health and human rights issues into impact assessment procedures and policy planning frameworks.

• No clear guidelines for companies to comply with human rights standards.

• Nosector-specificguidelinesforpublicparticipation.

• Legislaturenoteffectivelyresourced to provide oversight overmineralsectorinstitutionsandmining companies.

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Parameter Achievements DrawbacksResearch and development

• LawrequiresCabinetSecretarytomakeregulationsforcollaborationand linkages between industry and institutionsofhigherlearning.

• Inadequate funding for minerals research.

• No policy or legal instruments to encourage research and development.

Environment and social issues

• Lawsubjectslicenseestorequirements of environmental protection,communitydevelopment,safetyofoperations.

• Lawrequireslicenseestoimplementcommunity development agreements.

• Lawrequiresagreementforadequatecompensationoflandowners/occupiers of land.

• Need to strengthen state capacity foreffectiveenvironmentalmanagement/regulation.

• Need to develop a sustainable environmental, social and health and safety strategy.

• Needtodevelopcapacitiesofcommunitiestonegotiateimpactandbenefitsagreements.

• Need guidelines for grievance, disputeandconflictresolution.

Linkagesanddiversification

• Lawrequireslicenseestogivepreference to Kenyan goods and services.

• No clear policy or strategy on value addition.

• Nomulti-sectoralapproachestomineral development.


• Lawrequireslicenseestolistsomeequity in a local stock exchange.

• Lawenactedonpublic-privatepartnerships.

• Planstofosterinvestmentopportunities.

• Noeffectiveinvestmentpromotionandprotectionstrategy.

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C. Rwanda

Source: World Bank 2014.

Mining inRwandaconcentratesonbasemetalssuchastin(cassiterite), tantalum(coltan)andtungsten(wolframite),andisprimarilysmallscaleinsizeandmethod.92 Rwanda also produces small amounts of gold, peat and limestone. The majority of operationsconsistofsmall-scaledomesticentrepreneursandminingcooperatives.However,thereis littleprocessingofminerals inthecountry,apartfromcement,brickandtilemanufacture.93Nevertheless,Rwandaplaysasignificantrole intheworld’sproductionofmineralssuchastantalum,tin,andtungstenand,in2012,forexample, it produced about 12 per cent of the global output of tantalum.94

92 World Bank, “Unearthing the Subsoil: Mining and Its Contribution to National Development”, Rwanda Econom-ic Update, No. 6. (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2014), p. xi.93 Ian Wilson, Environmental, Social and Economic Dimensions to Consider in the Development of the Mining Industry in Rwanda (Rwanda, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2014), p. 24.94 Thomas R. Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Rwanda”, in 2012 Minerals Yearbook, (Washington, D.C., United States Geological Survey, 2014), p. 35.1

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Mining products are the biggest single export products of Rwanda.95 In 2012, minerals represented 23 per cent of the country’s exports and contributed 1.3 per centofGDP.96Unfortunately,thecountry’sprimaryminingexports–tungsten,tinand tantalumore (the so-called3Tminerals) – have gainednotoriety as conflictminerals,asRwandanmilitiagroupshavebeenaccusedofminingintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandusingtheproceedstosupportrebelactivityintheKivuregion.Todealwiththisproblem,theGovernment,workingwiththeInternationalTinResearchInstitute,establishedin2010acertificationschemefordomesticallyproduced 3T minerals to meet end users’ requirements under the American Dodd-Frank Act.97 This law requires American companies and their suppliers to declare whetherthe3TGminerals(3Tandgold)ortheirderivativesusedintheirproductsoriginatefromtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongooranyadjoiningcountry;ifso,they must provide a report on the due diligence undertaken in the value chain and publiclydisclosewhetherornottheproductsareconflict-free.98

1. The policy frameworkFollowing independence, the Rwandan Government grouped together all mining companiesandfoundedtheSociétédesMinesduRwanda(SOMIRWA),inwhichit held 49 per cent of the shares.This corporation filed for bankruptcy in 1985and,thereafter,theGovernmentfoundedanewpubliclyownedcompany,theRégied’ExploitationetdeDéveloppementdesMines(REDEMI),tocontinueminingandexploration.TheGovernmentsoughtatthesametimetoreinvigoratetheartisanalminingsectorbyorganizingminingcooperativesintotheCoopérativedePromotionde l’IndustrieMinièreArtisanale auRwanda (COPIMAR).99After the genocideof1994,theGovernmentstartedtoprivatizethepubliclyownedminesandCOPIMARwasrenamedtheFédérationdesCoopérativesMinièresauRwanda(FECOMIRWA).

Rwandaintroducedarevisedminingpolicyin2009withaviewtoacceleratingthetransformationoftheminingindustryfromapubliclyruntoaprivateindustry.100 The policy has sought to address the major constraints facing the mining industry throughaframeworkoffivestrategicpillars,namely:

1. Strengtheningthelegal,regulatoryandinstitutionalenvironment;

2. Developingtargetedinvestment,fiscalandmacroeconomicpolicies;

3. Improvingminingsectorknowledge,skillsanduseofbestpractices;

4. Raisingproductivityandestablishingnewmines;

5. Diversifyingintonewproductsandincreasingvalueaddition.

95 Jasper Van Teeffelen, The EU Raw Materials Policy and Mining in Rwanda: Policy Coherence for Development in Practice (Amsterdam, Evert Vermeer Foundation, 2012), p. 27.96 Wilson, Environmental, Social and Economic Dimensions, p. 9.97 Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Rwanda”, p. 35.1.98 Van Teeffelen, The EU Raw Materials Policy and Mining in Rwanda, p. 28.99 Ibid., p. 25.100 Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Natural Resources, A Revised Rwandan Mining Policy: Transforming Rwan-da’s Mining Industry, 2009, p. 2.

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Key programmes under these pillars have included streamlining the regulatory framework, establishing a fiscal strategy, consolidating existing information onmineral deposit potential, promoting the Extractive Industries TransparencyInitiative and corporate social responsibility, establishing a financingmechanismfor artisans, reforming licensing for mineral traders, developing value-additioninvestmentopportunities,andproviding improvedelectricitysupply forsmelters.The policy notes that, “Rwanda’s minerals face extraordinary price swings leading to large export earnings fluctuations”.101 In terms of streamlining the regulatory framework,thepolicyrevisedthepermitapplicationprocesssothatapplicationswouldinfuturebeaddressedtodistrictsandthenforwardedtoacentralcommitteetasked with analysing and issuing the permits.

On mining revenues and rents management, the policy established a clear andsimple tax regimewith little discretion,with the objective ofmaking it easy forinvestors to calculate their tax liability. It has also limited the exemptions formining companies.The new tax structure has therefore avoided the granting ofadditionalspecialexemptionstominingcompanies,soasto limitdistortionsanddiscrimination in the economy. Mining companies also face zero-rated importdutiesoncapitalequipmentandrawmaterials,inaccordancewiththeEACcustomunionrules.TheGovernmenthassetoutdetailedandcodifiedaccountingrulesandproceduresforthehassector,sothatminingfirmsandtherevenueauthorityshareacommonunderstandingoftheadministrationofcorporatetaxandthecalculationofroyalties,theaimofwhichwastoreducethefrequency,lengthandcostoftaxdisputes and negotiations. In addition, the policy has introduced an ad valoremroyalty system, which incurs lower administration and compliance costs than aprofit-basedroyaltysystemandisadministrativelyfeasiblefortheRwandaRevenueAuthority and reduces the bureaucratic burden on business.Advalorem royaltyrates are considered able to provide stable revenues for the Government in the face ofpricevolatility. Further, thepolicyhas exempted import duties and corporatetaxesonexploratoryactivitiesinordertoencourageinvestmentforthepurposesof increasing knowledge of mineral reserves. The policy also contains measures to introduceastandardrateforcorporatetax,andforthecentraladministrationoftaxes,withtheexceptionoflandrents.Further,italsoprovidesfortheinclusionofrenegotiationclauses inmineraldevelopmentagreements,whichwouldfacilitatethe renegotiationof royalty rates to accommodatefiscal policy changes.On theissueofrentsmanagement,thepolicystatesthataproportionofthenationaltaxescollected should be returned to the community in which the mining company is based,asaneffectivemeansofbuildinglocalsupportfortheminingindustryanddemonstratinglocalimpact.

Ongeologicalandmineralinformationsystems,thepolicynotesthattherearenoreliableestimatesofexistingandpotentialdepositsthatcanattractinvestors.Themininglawrequirespermitapplicantstomakeaninitialestimateofthevalueofthereservesthattheyplantomine,andtomakeaninitialmappingofthedeposit.Whilethis approach should help to build geological knowledge, the policy notes that it could exclude some small-scale miners from applying for new permits, because of the high costs of developing the estimates andmapping deposits.The policytherefore underscores the need for the Government to take charge of mapping

101 Ibid., p. 11.

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exercises,inordertoprovidebetterinformationandencourageprivateinvestors. Tothatend,theGovernmenttookmeasurestoconsolidateexistingknowledgeofpotential deposits, to invest significantly in geological surveying and to stronglyenforceprospectionpermits.

On building human and institutional capacities, the policy recognizes thedevelopment of local skills as a key means of ensuring that the mining industry has a positiveimpactonruralcommunitiesandthecountryasawhole.Itnotes,however,that there had previously been only limited investment in local technical mining skills, resulting in limited locally available expertise in geology,mineengineeringand metallurgy. The Government therefore carried out a needs assessment and, beingawareoftheskillsneededbytheminingindustry,hasmadeeffortstotrainminingscientists,andenhancelocalbusinessandmarketingskills.Further,itnotestheneedtotrainofficialsoftherevenueauthority, includingcustomsofficials, intheeconomicsandpeculiaritiesoftheminingsector. Forexample,customsofficialsneed to be able to differentiate between minerals and to rapidly assess that aspecificpieceofequipmentisnecessaryfortheminingsector.Thepolicyalsostatesthatminingfirmsshouldbeassistedtobringininternationalexpertiseforaperiodof two to three years through a system of free work permits, subject to strict skills transfer requirements. The policy also proposed developing degree programmes in localuniversities,technicaltrainingprogrammesintechnicalschools,andtrainingand exchange programmes with regional geology and mineral institutions. Thepolicyalsounderscorestheneedtoincreasetheemploymentofwomen;thetargetis that women should account for 20-30 per cent of jobs in the mining sector.

TheGovernmenthassoughttoformalizeoperationswithrespecttoartisanalandsmall-scale mining, recognizing that they face higher compliance costs than large-scale mining companies, and to develop a tax regime for small and medium-sized enterprises,whichwouldalsobenefitsmall-scaleminingoperators.Theaimoftheseformalizationmeasuresistofacilitatetheacquisitionofprivatepropertyrightsandorganizational representation, thereby enabling small-scale operators to accessbettermarketopportunitiesfordevelopment,includingcapitalfinancing.Throughthepolicy,theGovernmenthas,inaddition,soughttocreateaminingdevelopmentfund, partly supported by royalty revenues, in order to support small-scale mining with technical assistance and business development. The policy outlines the need fora technical andfinancial support scheme forartisanalandsmall-scaleminerstoenable themaccessfinance,and improveproductivityandprofitability. Italsoproposes supporting them through technical assistance, including by providingextension services, and business development support, including business planning, accounting and management skills. Another notable measure outlined in thepolicy is the development of a local jewellery sector as a means of increasing the participationofwomeninminingactivities.

In order to address concerns over the protectionof the environment and socialfabrics, the policy underscored the need for careful monitoring of the existingenvironmentalregulationsandtheestablishmentofapublic-privatefundtosupportcommunitydevelopment.Itwasconsiderednecessarytointroduceincentivesformining companies to engage in community development, such as making the costs

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of community development a deductible expense. The policy also calls for theintegrationofcommunitydevelopmentinitiativesintodistrictdevelopmentplans.

On linkages and diversification, the policy considers diversifying exports intoothersectorsandaddingvaluetomineralsorfacilitatingdownstreamintegrationofminerals into other industries to be themost effective strategies for dealingwith price fluctuations.The policy notes, however, that these strategies can behampered by insufficient local production and the cost and reliability of energy. The policy advocates the creation of opportunities in the production of localconstructionmaterials, thedevelopmentofbusinessopportunities for gemstonecuttingandpolishingenterprises,thedevelopmentofamineralprocessingcentre,the development of a mining services sector, and improving the supply of electricity for processors.

Although the policy does not address the issue of research and development, it contains statements on mobilizing mining and infrastructure investment. To increasetheflowofcapitaltotheminingindustry,theGovernmentshouldprovidepartnership funding for the small-scale mining subsector, which could take the form of amultilateral fundwith low interest rates, or public-private partnershipagreements. It was also proposed that the Government should create a project-financingunit,whichwoulddeveloplarge-scaleprojectsthatcouldbefinancedincollaborationwithinternationalfinancialinstitutionsandlargeprivatesectorfirms,and to create a mining development fund, whose role would be to make strategic public investments in the mining sector and receive a share of royalty revenues.

TheMiningPolicy iscurrentlyunderreview,astheGovernmentseekstoalign itwith the Africa Mining Vision and develop a country mining vision. The Government planstomechanizetheminingindustryinordertoenhancevalueadditionandhasalreadysetupasmelterinKigalitoprocesscalcaritesoastoproduceandexporttinandotherfinishedproducts.102

2. The legislative frameworkTheprimary lawthatgovernsminingactivities is theLawonMiningandQuarryOperations of 2014, which is administered by the Rwanda Geology andMinesAuthority. The law defines minerals as “substances which can be processed toincrease their economic value and which include metallic and non-metallic substances withtheexceptionofhydrocarbonsandwater”.103 Itgovernsactivitiesrelatingtothe exploration, mining, purchase, sale, stocking, processing, transportation andmarketingofmineralandquarryproductsandradioactiveminerals.Therearefourclassifications of mining licence: exploration licence, which may be granted fora period not exceeding four years and renewed once for a period not exceeding fouryears,afterrelinquishmentof50percentoftheunexploredarea;small-scalemining licence, which may be granted for a period not exceeding 15 years of the estimated life of the ore body proposed to bemined,whichever is shorter, andmayberenewedforfurtherperiodsofnomorethan10years;large-scalemininglicence,whichmaygrantedforaperiodnotexceeding25yearsortheestimated

102 Interview with Minister of State for Mining, Kigali, Rwanda, 22 July 2015.103 Republic of Rwanda. Law on Mining and Quarry Operations 2014, Section 2(3).

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life of the mineral ore body proposed to be mined, whichever is shorter, and may be renewedforfurtherperiodsofnomorethan15years;andartisanalmininglicence,whichmaybegrantedforaperiodnotexceedingfiveyearsandrenewedforfurtherperiodsofnomorethanfiveyears.Theselicencesaregrantedonafirstcome,firstservedbasis,althoughtheymaybeobtainedthroughacompetitivebiddingprocessused for public procurement, where the Minister decides to use this method. The lawrequirestheMinistertonotifytheapplicantofthedecisiontograntordenyaminerallicenceand,iftheapplicationisrejected,toexplaintotheapplicantthereasonsforthatrejection.Similarly,thelawrequirestheMinistertonotifypersonsseeking the renewal of their licences within sixty days of the decision on the renewal application,andtoexplainthereasoniftheapplicationisdenied.

Theexplorationlicenceconfersontheholderthefullrighttocarryoutexplorationoperationsintheexplorationlicencearea, whichshouldconsistofcontiguousblocksnot exceeding 400 hectares. Further, the holder of that licence may sell mineral ore specimens and samples obtained from exploration operations without theMinister’spriorauthorization,butisrequiredtopaytaxesassociatedwiththesaleof such mineral ores. The holder also has the exclusive right to apply for a mining licence over any portion of the exploration licence areawhere an economicallymineablemineraldepositisdiscovered.Theholderofanexplorationlicencemustmeetfourkeyconditions,whicharetocommenceoperationswithin90daysofthedateofissueofthelicence;carryoutexplorationoperationsinaccordancewithaprogrammeapprovedbytheMinister;employandtrainemployeesinaccordancewithtermsandconditionsagreeduponissueofthelicence;andkeepexplorationrecordsindicatingmineraloresdiscovered.

A small-scale mining licence confers on the holder the full right to carry out exploration andmining operations in the licensed area,which should consist ofcontiguousblocksnotexceeding100hectares.Inexchangeforthisright,theholderof a small-scale licencemust observe the following conditions: complywith anydirectivesthattheMinistermaygiveconcerningsafetyorgoodminingpractices;notifytherelevantlocalgovernmentandauthorizedofficeroftheintentiontobeginorceaseexplorationormining;carryoutrehabilitationandreclamationofminedoutareas;andkeepaccuraterecordsofmineralsminedfromtheminingarea.

A large-scale mining licence confers on the holder the full right to carry out mining operationsinthelicensedareaconsistingofcontiguousblocksnotexceeding400hectares;thoseoperationsmayincludethetreating,smelting,refining,ordisposingof the mineral products discovered. In exchange for the grant of this right, the holderof this licence is required to fulfil twocriticalobligations:conductminingoperations in accordance with a programme approved by the Minister and anenvironmentalmanagementplanapprovedbyrelevantauthorities;andcommenceminingoperationswithin180daysofthelicencebeingissued.

Anartisanalmining licenceconfersontheholdertheexclusiverighttocarryoutexplorationandminingoperations in the licensedarea, consistingof contiguousblocks not exceeding 49 hectares, and to sell the mineral ores obtained in that area. In exchange for the grant of this right, the holder is required to fulfil fourconditions: comply with any directives that the Minister may give concerning

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safetyorgoodminingpractices;carryoutrehabilitationandreclamationofminedoutareas;keepaccuraterecordsofmineraloresminedfromthelicencearea;andsubmit an environmental management plan to be approved by the Minister before commencingmining operations. In practice,mines inspectors havemade effortstoorganizeartisanalminersintocooperativesorsmallcompaniessothattheycanapply for these licences.104FECOMIRWAandtheRwandaMiningAssociationarerespectivelyresponsibleforthesecooperativesandsmallcompanies.105

Wheretheholderofanyoftheselicencesdiscoversradioactiveminerals,heorsheisrequiredtonotifytheMinisterwithinsevendaysofthediscovery,andmayonlydealwithsuchminerals inaccordancewiththetermsandconditionsofapermitgranted by the Minister. The law also requires holders of mineral licences to pay fair andreasonablecompensationtotheownersorlawfuloccupiersofthelandsubjecttosuchlicences.Suchownersorlawfuloccupiersoflandmustmakearequestforcompensation,whichshouldthenbenegotiatedbytheparties.

The law also requires mineral rights holders to safeguard workers’ health and safety and to complywith environmental laws and regulations.Regarding the latter, allminerallicencesmustincludeconditionsrelatingtotherehabilitationoftheminedoutareas.Inaddition,minerallicenceapplicantsmustprovidefinancialguaranteesfortheprotectionoftheenvironment.TheholderofamininglicenceisalsorequiredtogiveprioritytocompetitiveRwandancontractorsforservicesandtomaterialsand goods produced in Rwanda. Further, a mineral licence may require the holder toexplorethefeasibilityofcarryingoutinsideRwandatheprocessingandrefiningofmineralproductsorotheroperationsthatwouldaddvaluetoortransformthemineral products derived from the applicable mining areas.

The law permits the Minister to enter into mining agreements with mining licence holders in order to “perfect” their rights and obligations; unfortunately, theseagreements have tended to be confidential documents.106 However, a model mining agreement is publicly available and gives an indication of the contentsof these agreements. The model requires, for example, the licensee to provide a social action plan,which should be developed from a social impact assessment,anotherresponsibilityofthe licensee.Second,themodelagreementrequiresthelicensee to comply with all applicable laws with respect to the treatment of labour andall issuesrelatedtohygiene,healthandsafetyduringminingoperations,andtopracticemodernhealthandsafetyprocedures,inaccordancewithinternationalbestindustrypractices.ThelicenseeisalsorequiredtogiveprioritytogoodsandservicesproducedbyRwandancitizenswhenpurchasinggoodsandservicesrelatedtotheminingoperations.ThelicenseeshouldalsoendeavourtoemployRwandancitizensinatleast33percentofallmanagementpositionswithinthreeyearsandtoincreasethatlevelto50percentwithinfiveyears.Inthepast,theGovernmenthadgivenlicenceswithoutexploitationagreementsbut,since2014,ithasbeenissuinglicencesonlyafterapplicantshavesignedtheseagreements.107 Further, companies

104 Wilson, Environmental, Social and Economic Dimensions, p. 67.105 Interview with Officer, Department of Mines and Geology, Kigali, Rwanda, 21 July 2015.106 Wilson (Environmental, Social and Economic Dimensions, p. 36) suggests that this policy should be revised so that only the related Work and Investment Programme is confidential, as that might be regarded as commercially sensitive.107 Interview with Officer, Department of Mines and Geology, 21 July 2015

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thathadbeengrantedlicencespriortotheintroductionofthisrequirementarenowbeingrequiredtoobtainexploitationagreementsasapreconditionfortherenewalof their licences. These measures mean that the licensing regime does now provide a mechanism for addressing environmental and social issues.

Rwanda faces various challenges in administering this regime. First, although the Government has adopted a Mining and Quarrying Code of Practice, itsimplementationispoor,particularlyregardingartisanalminers.Forexample,manycooperativescannotaffordtobuythewaterpumpsthatwouldenablethemtocleanminerals at the mining sites. As a result, they clean the minerals in nearby rivers, therebypolluting theenvironment. Further, theGeology andMinesDepartmentlacks the human resources it requires to inspect mines regularly.108

Nevertheless, Rwanda has endeavoured to implement the Africa Mining Vision strategies, including improvingknowledgeof itsmineralendowment, legitimizingASMactivities,conductingresearchandimprovingmineralsectorgovernance.Onemajor remaining gap is that it has not yet managed to establish linkages between mineralresourceextractionandindustrialdevelopment.109 A new smelter has recently beenopenedinRwandainanefforttoenhancevalueaddition,butthesmelterdoesnothaveenoughpowersupply.Asituationsuchasthisdemonstratestheneedforregionalcooperation,thusenablingtheEACcountriestoshareresources.110

108 Van Teeffelen, The EU Raw Materials Policy and Mining in Rwanda, pp. 37-38.109 Wilson, Environmental, Social and Economic Dimensions, pp. 38-39.110 Interview with mining expert, Kigali, Rwanda, 22 July 2015.

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Table 4: Extent of alignment of the policy and regulatory frameworks of Rwanda with the Africa Mining Vision


• Mineral development agreements requiredforallexploitationactivities.

• Renegotiationclauserequiredfor all mineral development agreements.

• Plansto:establishsimpletaxregime;limittaxexemptionsforminingcompanies;codifyaccountingrulesandprocedures;introduce ad valorem royalty system;exempttaxesonexploratoryactivities;sharebenefitswithcommunities.

• Planstoadministermosttaxescentrally.

• Insufficientcapacitytoauditmineralproductionandexports.


• Planstoinvestingeologicalsurveying.

• Noreliableestimateofdeposits.


• Government has carried out a needs assessment.

• LicenseesrequiredtoemployRwandancitizens.

• Proposaltotrainpersonnel,includingrevenueofficers.

• Planstoenforcestrictskillstransfer requirements imposed on mining companies.

• Planstodevelopdegreeandtechnical training programs.

• Planstodeveloptrainingandexchange programmes with regionalinstitutions.

• Planstoincreaseemploymentofwomen.

• Limitedinvestmentinbuildinglocaltechnical skills.


• Regulationsonmodelmines.• Plansto:formalizeASM;developasuitabletaxregimeforASM;createaminingdevelopmentfund;createatechnicalandfinancialsupportscheme;providebusinessdevelopment support.

• Planstoincreasewomen’sparticipation.

• Insufficientregulatorycapacity.


• Use of licensing regime as a governance tool.

• Mineral development agreements areconfidential,thuslittleornopublicparticipationinlicensingdecision-making.


• Nostatedpoliciesorregulations.

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Parameter Achievements DrawbacksEnvironment and social issues

• Lawsubjectslicenseestorequirements of environmental protection,safetyofoperations,labour and health.

• Licenseerequiredtoprepareasocialactionplan.

• Plansto:enhanceenforcementofenvironmentalregulations;establish a public-private fund for community development.

• Planstogiveminingcompaniesincentivestoengageincommunitydevelopment.

• Planstointegratecommunitydevelopmentinitiativesintolocaldevelopment plans.

• PoorimplementationofMiningandQuarryingCode.

• Insufficientenforcementcapacity.


• Government has opened a smelter.• Licenseesrequiredtogive

preference to local goods and services.

• Plansto:diversifyexportsintoothersectors;createopportunitiesforproductionoflocalconstructionmaterials;developbusinessopportunitiesforgemstonecuttingandpolishing;developmineralprocessingcentre;developminingservicessector;and improve electricity supply.

• Insufficientlocalproduction.• High energy costs.• Unreliable energy supply.


• Plansto:providepartnershipfundingforsmall-scalemining;developaproject-financingunit;and create a mining development fund.

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D. United Republic of Tanzania

Gold is the main mineral of the United Republic of Tanzania, and the country accounts for about 2 per cent of the world’s gold mine output. It also produces cobalt, nickel, copper,ironore,titanium,vanadium,niobium,silver,uranium,tantalum,diamond,limestone, gypsum, phosphate, gemstones (particularly tanzanite), graphite, andrareearths.Theminingsectorcontributesabout3.5percentof theGDPof theUnited Republic of Tanzania.111

The country began liberalizing its mineral sector in the late 1980s, following disappointments with state control. The Government undertook a mineral sector-restructuringprogramme,withaviewtoencouragingandpromotingprivatesector-led development.112Withinthat,italsosoughttoencouragesmall-scaleandartisanalmining.113In1997,anationalminingpolicywaspassedandtheTanzaniaInvestmentActwasenacted,aimedatattracting foreignprivate-sector investment.Thiswasfollowed by a Mining Act in 1998.114TheWorldBankinfluencedthesereformsandnot only played a central role in developing the blueprint for the mining sector, but financedlarge-scaleminingactivities.115TheWorldBankalsoinitiatedafive-year

111 Thomas R. Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Tanzania”, in 2012 Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C., United States Geological Survey, 2014), p. 41.1.112 Wilbert Kapinga and Aisha Ally Sinda, “Tanzania”, in Minerals and Mining: A Practical Global Guide, Pedersen, Per Vestergaard, ed. (London, Global Law & Business, 2012), pp. 243-244.113 Siri Lange, “Gold and Governance: Legal Injustices and Lost Opportunities in Tanzania”, African Affairs, vol. 110, No. 439, 2011, p. 238.114 Kapinga and Sinda, “Tanzania”, p. 245.115 Society for International Development, The Extractive Resource Industry in Tanzania: Status and Challenges of the

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Mineral SectorTechnicalAssistance project.The reforms included incentives forforeigninvestmentssuchaslowroyaltyrates,rightofminingcompaniestooffsetalltheir capital expenditure against tax in the year in which it is spent, and low taxes on imports of mining equipment.116 These reforms led to the growth of investments in mineral development, as a result of which the mining sector has become the leading sector in terms of exports. Today, a number of international mining companiesoperate large-scale mines in the United Republic of Tanzania.117 However, many citizens believe that the sector has benefited foreignmining companies to theirdetriment. That belief has been fuelled, for example, by the knowledge that, in the period 1998-2002, “mining companies kept more than 90 percent of the total revenue of exports”,118 by a failure to share mining contracts and development agreementswiththepublic,andbyunmitigatedenvironmentalhazards inminingareas.

Withrespecttoenvironmentalhazards,ithasbeenclaimedthatalthoughlicenseesusually conduct EIAs prior to large-scale projects, there is no monitoring and evaluationofperformanceaftertheprojectscommence.119 The Government was also faulted for failing to incorporate into such agreements socioenvironmental terms that could directly address the needs of the local communities in whichminingactivitiesoccurandprotecttheenvironment.120 Again, the mining companies’ community development spending has been low in comparison to the value of the mineralsexported,andhasfailedtogeneratesignificantlocaleconomicimpacts.121

Further, analysis of these contracts and development agreements found that they were faulty in various respects. For example, they did not require the licensees to trainlocalstaffortransfertechnology,andmerelyencouragedthemtoundertakecorporate social responsibilityactivities; theydidnothave requirementsonhowmining revenues would be shared between the investor, central government, local governmentsandlocalcommunities; 122andtheycontainedstabilizationclausesthatprotected “investor rights at the expense of human rights, environmental rights, and labour and health standards”.123Further,thestabilizationclausesprecludedareviewof fiscal termswhere therewere changes in economic circumstances, includingmineralprices.Inanycase,themajorityoftheexistingagreementswereconcludedbefore the Government had formulated its strategy for mineral sector development, and consequently did not take into account the country’s long-term development objectives.Allinall,theperceptionisthattheseagreementshavebeen“extremelyfavourable” to foreign mining companies and that they should be subjected to publicscrutiny,includingparliamentaryoversight,inordertosafeguardthepublicinterest.124Inaddition,large-scaleminingoperationshavegenerallybeendetached

Mining Sector (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2009), p. 30; Madoshi H. Makene and others, “Calling for Justice in the Goldfields of Tanzania”, Resources, vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp 8-9. 116 Mark Curtis and Tundu Lissu, A Golden Opportunity? How Tanzania is Failing to Benefit from Gold Mining, (Dar es Salaam, Christian Council of Tanzania, 2008), p. 8.117 Kapinga and Sinda, “Tanzania”, p. 245.118 Lange, “Gold and Governance”, p. 239.119 Ibid., p. 240.120 Policy Forum, The Demystification of Mining Contracts in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, Policy Forum, 2012), p. 8.121 Curtis and Lissu, A Golden Opportunity?, p. 10.122 Josephat Kweka, “The Role of TNCs in the Extractive Industry of the United Republic of Tanzania”, Transnation-al Corporations, vol. 18, 2009, pp. 105, 114.123 Society for International Development, The Extractive Resource Industry in Tanzania, p. 40.124 Petro S. Magai and Alejandro Marques-Velazquez, Tanzania’s Mining Sector and Its Implications for the Country’s Development, Working Paper (Berlin, Berlin Working Papers on Money, Finance, Trade and Development, 2011), p.

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fromlocalsupplychains,withtheresultthattheyarepoorlylinkedtothedomesticeconomy.125 It has therefore been suggested that avenues should be created for domesticinvestorstoenterintopartnershipswithforeignersintheownershipandmanagement of the mining companies.

Public disaffectionwith foreignmining companiesprompted theGovernment toreview mining contracts, with a view to explaining the small revenues from mining activities.This review led to the renegotiationof some agreements, in order to,among other things, provide more revenue to the Government and enhance compensationforpeoplewhoareevacuatedtomakewayforminingactivities.Thereviewalso ledtothepromulgationofanewminingpolicyand lawin2009and2010,respectively.126

The policy and regulatory environment also favoured large-scale mining to the detrimentofsmall-scalemining.TheGovernmentprioritizedthedevelopmentoflarge and medium-scale mining as an economic strategy, leading to many large tracts of land being allocated to large companies.127 Although the Government set aside variouslocationsforsmall-scalemining,itdidnoteffectivelyprotecttherightsofsmall-scaleminersoncelucrativedepositswerediscovered.Insuchsituations,thesmall-scaleminersfacedmanyproblems,includingunlawfulevictions.128Artisanalminers have also protested against the grant of mining rights to foreign mining companies in areas they claim to have discovered and for which they have obtained mining licences in the past.129ItshouldbenotedthatASMactivitieshaveaccountedfor various social, environmental and economic problems, including child labour, tax evasion,diggingandabandoningofpits,clearingforests,andpollution.

The owners or occupiers of land containing minerals were, in many cases, not paid adequatecompensation,leadingtoconflicts.Often,citizenswerenotawareofthecriteriaforcompensation,whichwereinanyeventnotparticularlyclear.Insomecases,thepersonsaffectedwerenoteveninvolvedintheprocessfordeterminingcompensation.Many peoplewere also displacedwithout being compensated orformally relocated.130 A key challenge is that the majority of those living in rural areas have no titles to the lands they occupy and merely rely on a customaryrightofoccupancy,whichdoesnotconfer secure tenure inpractice. In termsofcompensation, the holders of this right have been paid only for the investmentor work that they have put into the land, but not for the land itself. Furthermore, displacedpeoplefindit“extremelydifficultandexpensive”tousethelegalsystemtoclaimthecompensationduetothem,withtheresultthatsuchcompensationisoftenlacking,insignificant,orsubjecttoembezzlementbytheauthoritiesentrustedto distribute it.131

19.125 Kweka, “The Role of TNCs in the Extractive Industry”, p. 119.126 Kapinga and Sinda, “Tanzania”, p. 245.127 United Nations Environment Programme, Analysis for stakeholders on formalization in the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector based on experiences in Latin America, Africa, and Asia: Tanzania Case Study (Geneva, UNEP, 2011), p. 128 Society for International Development, The Extractive Resource Industry in Tanzania, p. 50.129 Siri Lange, Land Tenure and Mining in Tanzania (Bergen, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2008), p. 1.130 Society for International Development, The Extractive Resource Industry in Tanzania, p. 51.131 Lange, “Gold and Governance”, pp. 244, 251.

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1. The mining policy of 2009The 2009 mineral policy of the United Republic of Tanzania seeks to transform the mineral sector, so that it can contribute significantly to the acceleration ofsocioeconomicdevelopment.Itsaimistoincreasethemineralsector’scontributiontoGDPandpovertyalleviationbyintegratingtheminingindustrywiththerestoftheeconomy.Thismissionistoberealizedthroughanumberofobjectives,including:

1. Improving the economic environment to attract and sustain privateinvestment;

2. Promoting economic integrationbetween themineral sector andothersectorsoftheeconomy;

3. Strengtheningthelegalandregulatoryframeworkandenhancingcapacityformonitoringandenforcement;

4. Participating strategically in viable mining projects and establishing anenablingenvironmentforcitizenstoparticipateinownershipofmines;

5. Supportingandpromotingthedevelopmentofsmall-scalemining;

6. Facilitating, supporting and promoting increased participation ofTanzaniansingemstonemining;

7. Establishingtransparentandadequatelandcompensation,relocationandresettlementschemesinminingoperations;

8. Strengtheninglocalcommunityparticipationinminingprojects;

9. Promotingandfacilitatingvalueadditionactivities;

10. Developingalocalbasefortechnicalcapacity;

11. Strengthening the institutional capacity of the Geological Survey ofTanzania;

12. Promoting safety, maintaining hygiene conditions and protecting theenvironmentinminingareas;

13. Encouragingandpromotingtheparticipationofwomeninminingactivitiesandstrengtheningtheenforcementoflawsandregulationsagainstchildlabourinminingactivities. 132

Thepolicy alsohas as anobjective theharmonizationof themineral policy andmininglegislationwithotherpoliciesandlegislationrelatedtotheadministrationof

132 United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 2009, p. 9.

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themineralsector,presumablyincludingthosegoverningtaxation.Sincethepolicy’sintroduction,theGovernmenthasestablishedamineralsauditinstitutionand,withrespecttominingrevenuesandrentsmanagement,hasrenegotiatedanumberofunfavourableminingagreementsThepolicydescribesgovernmentparticipationinmineralprojectsasanalternativefiscalinstrumentforcapturingashareofthefiscalbenefitsgeneratedfromminingandalsoforgivingforeigninvestorsanassuranceagainstpolitical risk. Inpractice,however, theGovernmentdoesnothavea freecarrying interest in any existing mining project. The policy has also sought toestablishanenablingenvironment forcitizens toparticipate in theownershipofmedium-andlarge-scalemines, includingbyfacilitatingtheregisteringofforeignmining companies on the local stock exchange.

Concerning geological and mineral information systems, the policy underscoresimprovedgeologicinfrastructureasaprerequisiteforpromotinginvestmentinthemineralsectorandtheeffectivemonitoringandmanagementofgeo-hazards.Thepolicy therefore calls for the strengtheningof theGeological SurveyofTanzaniain collecting, processing, interpreting, archiving and disseminating quality geo-scientificinformation,mapsanddata.Otherpolicyobjectivesincludestrengtheningthe capacity of the Geological Survey to provide reliable laboratory and geo-technicalservicesandtomonitorgeo-hazardsandtheenvironment;andenhancingcollaborationbetweentheGeologicalSurveyandtheprivatesectortopromotethecountry’smineralpotential.

Regardinghumanandinstitutionalcapacity,thepolicyrequirestheGovernmenttoboostitscapacityforadministration,monitoringandenforcementand,tothatend,providedforthecreationofamineralsauditagency.

Ontheissueofartisanalandsmall-scalemining,thepolicynotesthattheGovernmenthasmadeeffortssince1997toformalizeartisanalminersintosmall-scaleminersand provide extension services, but that these efforts have not enhanced thecontributionofsmall-scaleminingtotheeconomy.Toaddressthischallenge,thepolicy outlines how the Government should develop and implement programmes to transform and upgrade small-scale mining into organized and modernized mining; facilitateaccessof small-scaleminers tomarkets,geological information,and technical andfinancial services; andworkwith small-scaleminers toensureenvironmental protection. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals subsequentlyestablishedaSmall-ScaleMiningDevelopmentDivisionundertheCommissionerofMinerals,whichactsasanationalcentreforsmall-scaleminingmanagement,andisresponsibleforcoordinatingoutreachprograms,amongotherthings.133

The policy also indicates that, although the law prohibits the engagement of children inminingactivities,small-scaleminingcontinuestobepronetotheuseofchild labour,causingvarioussocialproblems. Inparticular,childrenworking inminesareexposedtoharshconditions,whichaffecttheirwell-being,andtheyalsomisseducationopportunities.Toaddressthischallenge,theGovernmentseekstocollaborate with stakeholders to strengthen the monitoring and enforcement of lawsandregulationsontheuseofchildlabourinminingactivities.

133 UNEP, Tanzania Case Study, p. 16.

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Regarding mineral sector governance, the policy considers the previous legal framework to have been adequate in terms of ensuring transparency, predictability, minimumdiscretionandsecurityoftenure,andproposedonlythatthecapacityformonitoring and enforcement should be strengthened. Accordingly, the country has subsequently used the licensing regime to enforce the requirements of the Mining Act 2010.

Onresearchanddevelopment,thepolicyunderscoredthatthedevelopmentandappropriateutilizationof researchfindings and skilledhuman resources arevitalfor the sustainable development of the mineral sector. The Government had previously taken measures to introduce and expand training in relevant fieldsin the mining industry, but those measures had been deemed inadequate. The researchdevelopmentoutputsof theGeological SurveyofTanzania, universitiesandother training institutions, forexample,hadnotbeenadequatelyutilized.Toaddress these challenges, the Government set out its aims in the mining policy of continuing its collaborationwith the private sector to promote, support andstrengthen training institutions to offer training in technical skills related to theminingindustry;continuingitscollaborationwithminingcompaniestosupportthetrainingofcitizensintechnicalskillsrelatedtotheminingindustry;requiringminingcompaniestoemploylocalexpertsanddevelopsuccessionplansforcitizenstotakeoverexpatriatepositions;andworkingwithotherStatesmembersoftheEACandSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunitytoassessskilldeficienciesintheminingindustryandtodevelopandmaintainanactivedatabaseonrequiredskills.

On environmental and social matters, the policy has acknowledged that large-scaleminingcould lead to the relocationofcommunitiesanddisruptionof theirlivelihoods. To tackle that issue, the policy sets out that, where relocation isinevitable,theGovernmentisresponsibleforvaluingthelandandpropertiesoftheaffectedcommunities,whiletheinvestorwouldberesponsibleforthepaymentofcompensation,relocationandresettlement.Thereisarecognizedneedtoensuretransparentcompensationprocedures,propervaluationoflandandotherproperties,adequatecompensationrates,andpromptpaymentofcompensation.Investorsarealsorequiredtoprepareandimplementsoundrelocationandresettlementschemes.In terms of community development, although mining companies are required to implement credible corporate social responsibility policies, the policy states simply that the Government should “encourage” them to involve local communities insettingprioritiesforcommunitydevelopmentprojectsandsocioeconomicmattersduring the lifespan of their mining projects.

Thepolicyacknowledgestheneedtostrengthenmonitoringandregulationoftheindustryinordertoreduceoreliminateitsadverseeffectsonhealthandsafety,theenvironment, and social issues. The Government has therefore sought to strengthen its enforcement capacity and required mining companies to set aside funds for environmentalrehabilitationandmineclosure.Thepolicyalsooutlinestheneedforlawsandregulationsonsafety,occupationalhealthandenvironmentalissuestobeharmonized.

Thepolicyalsoemphasisesthattheparticipationofwomeninminingactivitiesisanimportantsocioeconomicdevelopmentactivity.TheGovernmenthasconducted

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awarenesscampaignsandfacilitatedtheformationofminingassociationsforwomen,but the policy acknowledges that women face economic and sociocultural barriers that restrict their effective involvement in mining activities and, consequently,onlyreceiveminimalbenefitsfromtheirendeavours.Toaddressthesechallenges,theGovernmenthascontinuedtopromotetheparticipationofwomeninminingactivitiesandtoensurethatallprogrammesrelatedtominingwerebasedongenderequality and equity.

Onthesubjectoflinkagesanddiversification,thepolicystatesthatthegovernmentneeded to promote investment in the fabrication andmanufacturing sectors tostimulatemineralsbeneficiationandalsotopromoteinvestmentinlapidary,stonecarving and jewellery making. It also states that the Government should collaborate withtheprivatesector,regionalandinternationalorganizationstostrategicallyinvestinsmeltingandrefiningindustries.Inthisrespect,itisnoteworthythatthepolicystates that the Government should work towards harmonizing its mineral policy with that of its neighbours and cooperate with them in enhancing the development of the mineral sector. The policy has also sought to enhance the development of the gemstoneminingindustry,byfacilitating,supportingandpromotingtheincreasedparticipationofcitizensingemstonemining.Alsoamongitsaimsisthepromotionand development of the United Republic of Tanzania as Africa’s gemstone centre, ensuringtheparticipationofcitizens inowninggemstonesmines,promotingtheparticipation of local investors in gemstonemining, and improving collaborationwith the private sector to develop gemstone mining. The Government also seeks to promoteandfacilitatevalueadditionactivities,suchasgemstonecutting,polishingand jewellery, metal smelting and refinery and, to that end, it has proposed toinvest in providing the required technical skills, access to capital and adequate infrastructureandfacilities.

The Government is also working to enhance the linkages between the mining sector and the rest of the economy, which it acknowledges are currently weak. Localcontentaccountsfor56percentoftotalprocurement,accordingtoarecentassessmentoftheprocurementofgoodsandservicesinthemajorminesoperatingin the country.134 The Government is therefore taking various steps to boost local content in mining, including:

1. Developingregulationsonlocalcontentinmining;

2. Developing and implementing coordinated programs to increaseintegrationofthemineralsectorwithothersectorsoftheeconomy;

3. Developingessential infrastructure inareaswherethere ispotential forestablishingnewmines;

4. Encouraging local business entities to timely supply quality goods andservices;

134 Interview with Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 12 August 2015.

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5. Monitoringtheperformanceofminingcompaniesonlocalcontent;

6. EstablishingaNationalCommitteetostimulatelocalcontentinmining.

Thepolicystatesthat,inordertopromotetheintegrationofthemineralsectorwithother sectors, theGovernment shoulddevelopessential infrastructure inminingareas, require mining companies to procure local goods and services, and support citizenstosupplyqualitygoodsandservicestotheminingindustry.

2. The Mining Act of 2010TheMiningActof2010establishedtwoinstitutionstoadministertheminingregime,namely the Commissioner for Minerals and the Mining Advisory Board. 135 The Commissionerisresponsiblefortheday-to-dayadministrationoftheregime,andissupportedbyvariousofficers,whiletheBoardadvisestheMinisterforMiningonvariousmattersrelatingtotheadministrationoftheAct.ThePresidentisresponsibleforappointingthechairoftheBoard,butitsothermembersareappointedbytheMinister.TheActalsoestablishedtheGeologicalSurveyofTanzaniaasthenationalagencyresponsibleforadvisingtheMinisterongeologicalmattersandundertakingthe geological mapping of the country.

TheAct established the followingmineral rights: prospecting licence, gemstoneprospectinglicence,retentionlicence,specialmininglicence,mininglicence,primarymininglicence,processinglicence,smeltinglicenceandrefininglicence.

A prospecting licence confers on the holder the exclusive right to conductprospectingoperations in theprospectingarea forminerals towhich the licenceapplies.AnapplicantseekingaprospectinglicencemustprovidetheCommissionerwiththefollowinginformation:themineralormineralstobeprospected,theareaoflandoverwhichthelicenceissought,astatementofthefinancialandtechnicalresources available to the applicant, and a statement on the procurement plan of goods and services available in the United Republic of Tanzania. Upon receiving the application, theCommissioner is required to seek theadviceof theBoard.Afterreceiving the Board’s report, the Commissioner is then required to consider the competingbidsandtoselectthebidwhichismostlikelytopromotethe“expeditiousandbeneficialdevelopment”ofthemineralresourcesofthearea,takingintoaccounttheapplicant’sprogrammeofprospectingoperations,expenditurecommitments,financialandtechnicalresources,andpreviousexperienceinconductingprospectingandminingoperations.

Whenanapplicationhasbeenrejected,theActrequirestheCommissioner,asthelicensing authority, to inform the applicant of the reasons for the decision within fourweeks of the application being registered. The prospecting licencemay begrantedforatermnotexceedingfouryearsandmayberenewedforaninitialperiodnot exceeding three years and a subsequent period not exceeding two years. The holderofaprospecting licencemustcommenceoperationswithinthreemonths,or such further period as allowed by the licensing authority. Further, the holder ofaprospectinglicencemustadheretotheprospectingprogrammeappendedto

135 United Republic of Tanzania. Mining Act 2010.

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thelicenceandmustgivenoticetothelicensingauthorityofthediscoveryofanymineraldepositofpotentialcommercialvalue.

Where the holder of a prospecting licence (other than a prospecting licence forbuilding materials or gemstones) has identified a mineral deposit of potentialcommercial value but cannot develop it immediately due to technical constraints, adversemarket conditions or other temporary economic factors, he or shemayapplytotheMinisterforaretentionlicence.TheapplicationmustbeaccompaniedbyanyinformationthattheMinistermayreasonablyrequire,includingstudiesandassessments by appropriate independent experts, indicating the potential valueofthemineraldeposits,constraints,thelikelyimpactofminingoperationsontheenvironmentand themannerofeliminatingorminimizinganyadverseeffects.Aretentionlicencemaybegrantedforaperiodnotexceedingfiveyears,andmayberenewedonceforafurtherperiodoffiveyears.Itentitlestheholdertoapplyforaspecial mining licence.

TheholderofaprospectinglicenceorretentionlicencemayapplytotheMinisterforaspecialmininglicenceormininglicence.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwois that a mining licence may only be granted for a period not exceeding 10 years, and mayberenewedforafurthertermnotexceeding10years.Everyapplicationforaspecialmininglicencemustincludeinformationontheproposedplanforrelocation,resettlementandcompensationofpeoplewithintheminingarea;anenvironmentalcertificate; details of expected infrastructure requirements; a procurement planfor the purchaseof goods and services available inTanzania; and a plan for theemploymentandtrainingofcitizensandsuccessionplanforexpatriateemployees.Thespecialmining licence isgrantedsubject tovariousconditions, including theprovisionofanenvironmentalmanagementplan.Inpractice,affectedcommunitiesplaynoformalroleinmonitoringimplementationoftheenvironmentalmanagementplan.136Thespecialmininglicencemaybegrantedfortheestimatedlifeoftheorebody indicated in the feasibility study report, or such period as the applicant may request, whichever is shorter.

TheActseekstoenhancevalueadditionbyrequiringmineralrightsholderstosetaside certain amountsofminerals forprocessing, smeltingor refiningwithin thecountry.Further,theholderofaprospectingormining licence isrequiredtopayfair and reasonable compensation to the lawful occupier of any land containinganymineralssubjecttothe licence,whereoperations interferewiththerightsofthe occupier. Disputes on the amount of compensationmay be referred to theCommissioner for resolutionand furtherappealsaredirected to theHighCourt.Where it isnecessary to relocateanyoccupierof land, themineral rightsholdermustsubmitaplanforcompensation,relocationandresettlementofthelandowneror occupier.

Theprimarymininglicencetargetssmall-scaleminers.Applicationsforthislicencehavebeendecentralizedinanefforttomakethelicensingsystemmoreaccessibleto poorer artisanal and small-scalemining groups,137 and are made to the Zonal

136 Interview with Officer, Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 10 August 2015.137 UNEP, Tanzania Case Study, p. 11.

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MinesOfficer.Thislicenceconfersontheholdertherighttoprospectforandmineminerals within the prescribed area. It is granted for a period of seven years and may berenewed.PrimarymininglicenceholdersdonothavetocompleteEIAs,giventhat they may lack the ability to do so.138Nevertheless,thelicenceisstillsubjecttoconditions, includingadherencetoregulationsonsafetyandprotectionoftheenvironment.Theseregulationshavebeencodifiedintheformofasimplesetofregulations,whichstipulatesthespecificmeasuresthatmustbeundertaken.139 The ZonalMinesOfficeralsoprocessesthedealer’slicenceandbroker’slicence.Itshouldbenoted that theAct seeks toprevent conflictsbetween small-scale and large-scaleminersbyassigningtheMinisterthepower–tobeexercisedinconsultationwith the Board – to designate areas specifically for small-scale prospecting andminingoperations.Forexample,whereaprospectinglicenceexpires,orpartofithas been relinquished, the Minister may declare the area an exclusive area for small-scale mining.140 In making this decision, the Minister must consider factors such as geological data and the ability of small-scale operators to extract the mineral deposits inquestion.UndertheAct,gemstonemining is reservedforcitizens,aspartofanefforttoempowerlocalartisanalgemstoneminers.141

However,theAct’sattemptstoformalizeartisanalmininghavebeencriticizedforfailingtorecognizerealitiesontheground.Forexample,itfailstoappreciatethatinformalleasingandtransferringofminingtitlesarecommonpractice.Therealityis that most holders of primary mining licences “are not engaged in actual mining activities,butinsteadleaseoutthemineralaccesstopitholderswhoorganizetheminingactivities”.142 Again, although the sub-leasing of pits contradicts the mining legislation,formalcontractualobligationsbetweenprimarymininglicenceholders,pitownersandworkersareexceptionallyrare.Asaresult,theneedhasarisentoensurethatthelicensingsystemisbetterlinkedtotheserealities.143Anadditionalchallenge is that the Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency lacks the capacity to monitor the activities of artisanal miners, the majority of whom remain unregistered.Furthermore, since there is a large number of these miners, the agency can undertake strategic audits only occasionally.144Artisanalminersarealsodifficult toregulatebecause they tend to be migratory.145

The Act requires “authorized miners” to pay royalty on the gross value146 of the mineralsproducedundertheirlicencesatspecifiedrates,dependingonthenatureofthemineralinquestion.ItalsoauthorizestheMinistertoenterintoadevelopmentagreementwherethecapitalexpenditureofestablishingminingoperationswithinthespecialminingareasubjectoftheagreement isaboveUS$100million.Suchan agreement is made according to a standard model prescribed in regulations

138 Ibid., p. 13.139 United Republic of Tanzania, Mining Regulations (Environmental Management and Protection) 1999.140 Interview with Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 12 Au-gust 2015.141 UNEP, Tanzania Case Study, p. 11.142 J. B. Jønsson and N. Fold, “Handling Uncertainty: Policy and organizational practices in Tanzania’s small-scale gold mining sector”, Natural Resources Forum, vol. 33, No. 3, 2009, p. 214.143 UNEP, Tanzania Case Study, p. 12.144 Interview with Officer, Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 10 August 2015.145 Interview with Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, 12 Au-gust 2015.146 The Mining Act defines gross value as “the market value of minerals at the point of refining or sale or, in the case of consumption within Tanzania, at the point of delivery within Tanzania.”.

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made under the Act. The Minister must refer proposals to enter into development agreements to the Board for its advice. Further, all such agreements are subject to aperformancereviewbythepartieseveryfiveyears.

Table 5: Extent of alignment of the policy and regulatory frameworks of Tanzania with the Africa Mining Vision


• Mineral development agreements requiredforcertainexploitationactivities.

• Renegotiatedunfavourablemineraldevelopment agreements.

• Governmentparticipationinmineral projects.

• Planstoharmonizeminingpolicies,includingtaxation.

• Planstoestablishmineralauditsagency.

• Insufficientcapacitytoauditmineralproductionandexports.


• PlanstoenhancecapacityoftheGeologicalSurveyofTanzania.

• PlansforcollaborationbetweentheGeologicalSurveyandtheprivate sector.

• Noreliableestimateofdeposits.


• Licenseesrequiredtoemploycitizensanddevelopsuccessionplans.

• Noclearinformationonneeds.• Limitedinvestmentinbuildinglocal

technical skills.Artisanalandsmall-scale mining

• EffortsmadetoformalizeASM,and provide extension services.

• PlanstoorganizeandmodernizeASM.

• PlanstoassistASMwithaccesstomarkets,geologicalinformation,andtechnicalandfinancialservices.

• Planstostrengthencapacitytomonitor and enforce laws and regulations.

• PlanstoestablishnationalcentreforASMmanagementandcoordination.

• PlanstoworkwithASMoperatorsfor ensure environmental protection.

• Insufficientregulatorycapacity.• Unrealisticformalizationefforts.• Widespreaduseofchildlabour.



• Dispersal of licensing powers.• Transparent, predictable and

secure tenure.• Planstoenhancecapacityfor

regulatory monitoring and enforcement.



• Planstocontinuecollaboratingwith private sector.

• Noparticularattentiontoresearchand development.

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• Facilitatedformationofwomen’sminingassociations.

• Planstorequireinvestorstopaycompensationtransparentlyandpromptly, and implement sound resettlement/relocationschemes.

• Planstoharmonizelawsandregulationsonsafety,healthandenvironmental issues.

• Insufficientmonitoringandenforcement capacity.

• Dislocationofcommunitiesanddisruptionoflivelihoods.

• Permissiverequirementsoncommunity development.

• Insufficientparticipationofcommunitiesindesignandimplementationofcommunitydevelopment projects.

• Economic and cultural barriers to women’sparticipation.


• Licenseesrequiredtogivepreference to local goods and services.

• Planstodevelopregulationsonlocal content, and programmes on integrationofsectors.

• Planstoestablishnationalcommitteetostimulatelocalcontent in mining.

• Insufficientlocalproduction.• High energy costs.• Inadequate energy supply.


• Plansto:createenablingenvironmentforcitizenparticipationinownershipofmines;facilitateforeigncompaniestoregisterinlocalstockexchange;promoteinvestmentinfabrication,manufacturingandlapidary;developessentialinfrastructure;and partner with private sector to investinsmeltingandrefining

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E. Uganda

Ugandaaccountsfor4percentoftheworld’sproductionofpumiceandpumicite.The country also produces cobalt, gold, iron ore, kaolin, stone aggregates, lead, limestone,niobium(columbium),salt,steel,tantalum,tin,tungstenandvermiculite.Miningaccountsforabout0.3percentoftheGDPofUganda.147 The mining regime comprises theMining Policy of 2000 andMining Act of 2003, which are bothcurrently under review.

TheMiningPolicyof2000constitutedtheresponsetoaminingregimethatwasdeemed unsuitable. That regime had, for example, favoured the exploitation ofmineralsforexportandpaidscantattentiontobuildinglocalutilizationcapacity.148 The policy has therefore sought to establish an “internationally competitiveinvestment environment for the mineral sector in order to develop and maintain astrong,dynamicandprofitablemining industryforthebenefitofthepeopleofUganda”.149 It has also sought to encourage local entrepreneurs to develop small-scaleminesasastrategyforofferingemploymentandalleviatingpovertyamongtheruralpopulation.Throughthesestrategies,theGovernmenthopedthatthemineralsector would serve as an “engine of growth” towards industrial development, increased revenue and foreign exchange earnings, and socioeconomic development. Thepolicyoutlinestwomeasuresasbeingkeytorealizingthesestrategies:first,carrying out geological surveys of the entire country and, second, encouragingartisanal and small-scaleminers to form associations and other organizations inordertoimprovetheircapacitytoproduceandmarketmineralcommodities.

1. The legislative frameworkTheMiningActof2003establishedtheCommissionerforGeologicalSurveyandMinesDepartment,whoisappointedbythePresident,asthemainadministrative

147 Thomas R. Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Uganda”, in 2013 Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C., United States Geological Survey, 2015), p. 45.1.148 Republic of Uganda, Mineral Policy of Uganda, 2000, p. 12.149 Ibid., p. 5.

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body.150 Italsoestablishedthefollowingcategoriesofmineralrights:prospectinglicence,explorationlicence,retentionlicence,mininglease,andlocationlicence.Italso prohibits dealing in minerals without a mineral dealer’s licence. However, the holder of a mineral right may sell any minerals without obtaining a mineral dealer’s licence.

A prospecting licence confers on the holder a non-exclusive right to carry onprospectingoperationsforanymineralforaperiodofoneyear.TheActdoesnotstipulatetheconditionsthatshouldbefulfilledbyanapplicantforaprospectinglicenceandsimplystatesthatanapplicationmustbemadetotheCommissionerinthe prescribed form, upon payment of the prescribed fee, and may contain any other matterthattheapplicantwishestheCommissionertoconsider.Nevertheless,theholderofaprospectinglicenceisrequiredtosubmittotheCommissionergeologicalandfinancial reportsandotherprescribed informationonaquarterlybasisoratotherprescribedintervals.Further,theholderofthis licencehasanobligationtoreport any mineral discovery to the Commissioner and to repair any damage caused tothesurfaceofthe landonorbeforeexpirationoftheprospectingoperations.AnymineralsobtainedinthecourseoftheprospectingoperationsarethepropertyoftheGovernment;theholderofthelicencecannotdisposeofthemwithoutthewrittenconsentof theCommissioner, save for “suchreasonablequantityasmaybeprescribedforthepurposeofsampling,assay,analysisorotherexamination”.151

Where the holder of a prospecting licence desires to retain or dispose of suchminerals, heor she is required to apply to theCommissioner, stating thenatureandquantityoftheminerals.TheCommissionerwillonlyauthorizetheapplicanttoretainanysuchmineralordisposeofitifheorsheissatisfied,respectively,thatitisreasonablynecessarytoenabletheapplicanttotestthemineralbearingqualitiesofthelandonwhichtheapplicantisprospecting,orthattheapplicanthaspaidtheprescribedroyalties.

Anexplorationlicencemaybegrantedforaperiodnotexceedingthreeyears, but can only cover an area not exceeding 500 km2, although a person may hold more than one such licence. The licence may be renewed for two further periods, each not exceeding two years. This licence confers on the holder the exclusive right to carryoutexplorationoperationsintheareaoflandandforthemineraltowhichthelicencerelate.Anapplicationforanexplorationlicencemustbeaccompaniedbyaplanoftheareaoverwhichthelicenceissought,identifythemineralsinrespectofwhichthelicenceissought,andprovideinformationonthefinancialstatusandthe technical and industrial competence and experience of the applicant. It must alsoprovideaproposedprogrammeandestimatedcostofexplorationoperationsandtheparticularsoftheapplicant’sproposalswithregardtotheemploymentandtraining of citizens. However, the applicant is not required to consult membersof any local community likely tobe affectedby theexplorationactivities.152 The Commissionermustapprovetheprogrammeofexplorationandbesatisfiedthattheapplicanthasadequatefinancialresources,technicalcompetenceandexperience

150 Republic of Uganda, Mining Act 2003, Section 13.151 Ibid., Section 25(1).152 Human Rights Watch, How Can We Survive Here? The Impact of Mining on Human Rights in Karamoja, Uganda, (Human Rights Watch, United States of America, 2014), p. 47.

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tocarryouteffectiveexplorationoperations.Further,theholderofanexplorationlicencemustcommenceoperationswithinfourmonthsofthelicencebeingissuedandmustnotifytheCommissionerofthediscoveryofanymineralsnotcoveredbythe licence.

TheholderofanexplorationlicencemayapplytotheCommissionerforaretentionlicencewherethemineraldepositthatheorshehasidentifiedcannotbedevelopedimmediately because of “adverse market conditions, economic factors or otherfactors beyond their reasonable control, which are of a temporary nature”.153 A retention licencewill only be grantedwhere the Commissioner is satisfied thatthese conditions have been met. A retention licence confers on the holder anexclusive right to apply for a mining lease over the area in respect of which the retention licencehasbeengranted.The licencemaybegranted foraperiodnotexceeding three years and renewed for a period not exceeding two years. However, theCommissionermaycancelthislicenceintheeventhatheorsheissatisfiedthatcommercial mineral development of the area subject to the licence has become possible.

Theholderofanexplorationlicence,aretentionlicenceoralocationlicencemayapplyforamininglease.Inadditiontofulfillingthepreconditionsforthegrantingofanexplorationlicence,apersonseekingaminingleasemustsatisfytheCommissionerthattheprogrammeofproposedminingoperationstakesproperaccountoftheEIA;the proposals on the procurement of goods and services obtainable in Uganda are satisfactory;andtheapplicanthassecuredthesurfacerightsofthelandthatformsthesubjectoftheapplication.Regardingthelatter,theapplicantmustdemonstratethat he or she has reached an agreement with the landowner of the area intended tobemined.HoldersofexplorationlicencesandminingleasesarealsorequiredtocarryoutEIAsoftheirproposedoperationsandmayonlycommenceoperationsaftersecuringacertificateofapprovaloftheiroperationsfromtheNationalEnvironmentManagement Authority. Further, these mineral rights holders must carry out annual environmentalaudits,keeprecordsindicatinghowtheiroperationsconformtotheEIA,andsubmitanenvironmentalrestorationplanfortheexplorationorminingareathatmaybedamagedoradverselyaffectedbytheexplorationorminingoperations.

Inpractice,thereareallegationsthatEIAreportsarenotsharedwithorexplainedtoaffectedlocalcommunities,whoareconsequentlyleftwithoutbenchmarksagainstwhich they can hold mining companies to account.154Inaddition,theActdoesnotrequire applicants for mineral rights to carry out social or human rights impacts assessments.155 The Commissioner may require mineral rights holders to execute environmental performance bonds to ensure that they fulfil their environmentalobligations,butthesebondsarenotmandatoryforallmineralrightsholders.

TheAct requires the Commissioner to determine applications formining leaseswithin 60 days of receiving them. A mining lease may be granted for a period not exceeding21years,ortheestimated lifeoftheorebodyproposedtobemined,

153 Republic of Uganda, Mining Act 2003, Section 35(1).154 Avocats Sans Frontières, Human Rights Implications of Extractive Industry Activities in Uganda: A Study of the Mineral Sector in Karamoja and the Oil Refinery in Bunyoro (Avocats Sans Frontières, Kampala, 2014), p .42.155 Human Rights Watch, How Can We Survive Here?, p. 49.

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whichever is shorter, and may be renewed for a period not exceeding 15 years. It confers on the holder the exclusive right to conduct exploration and miningoperationsintheminingarea.Theholderofthislicencemustcommenceproductiononorbeforethedatespecifiedintheprogrammeofdevelopment.

TheActpermitstheMinistertoenterintoamineralagreementregardinganymatterrelatingtotheoperationsoractivitiesunderanexplorationlicenceormininglease.ThisagreementmayregulatematterssuchastheminimumexpenditureinrespectofexplorationorminingoperationsandtheprocessingoftheextractedmineralsinUganda.

The licensing process has experienced various challenges, including the irregular issuance of licences.156 In 2012, for example, the Government suspended the issuance ofnewmininglicencesfollowingrevelationsthatanumberofmineralrightshadbeengranted irregularly and had ended up in the hands of speculators who lacked the financialortechnicalabilitytoundertakeprospectingorminingoperations.ItwasallegedthattheprocessofvettingapplicationsintheCommissioner’sofficewasnotrigorousandwasopentocorruptionandfavouritism.TheGovernmentthereforeestablishedacommitteeconsistingoftechnocratsfromdifferentministriestovetapplicationsforlicencesunderacompetitivebiddingprocess.Anotherchallengeisthat although the Government carried out a geological survey that covered about 80 per cent of Uganda, the survey did not cover the key mining region of Karamoja, duetoinstability inthatregionatthetimeofthesurvey.TheMinistryofEnergyandMineralDevelopmentnonethelesswentaheadandissuedprospectinglicencesand mining leases covering approximately 25 per cent of the total land area in Karamoja.157

Thelocationlicencetargetssmall-scaleoperations,andisdescribedasalicenceforprospectingandminingoperationsby“methodswhichdonotinvolvesubstantialexpenditure and the use of specialized technology”.158 There is, therefore, no distinctionbetweenartisanalandsmall-scalemining.Applicationsforthelocationlicence are also made to the Commissioner and the licence may be granted for a period not exceeding two years and renewed for further periods not exceeding twoyearsatatime.Holdersofthislicencearesubjecttolessstringentregulationsthan large-scaleminers; they are, for example, exempted from the requirementsofEIAsandaudits.Despitetheseprovisions, theASMsectorofUgandaremains“largely disorganized and informal” and only about 5 per cent of miners are formally licensed.159PartoftheproblemisthatmanyASMminershavelittleornoknowledgeoftheMiningAct,whilethosewhoseeklicencesencountersignificantcostsandbureaucraticbarrierstoobtainingthem,inadditiontotheannualfeesandreportingrequirements. The licensing procedures and requirements are “quite complex” for local people in regions such as Karamoja.160TheamountoflandavailableforASMactivityhasalsoreduced,asanincreasingquantityoflandisdevotedtolarge-scale

156 Halima Abdallah, Uganda suspends new mining licences issuance. The East African, 3 November 2012.157 ASF, Human Rights Implications of Extractive Industry Activities in Uganda, pp. 14-15.158 The Mining Act defines substantial expenditure as “expenditure in excess of five hundred currency points necessary to bring the mine into production or such other amount as may be prescribed”.159 Alec Crawford, Kristi Disney and Melissa Harris, Uganda: Assessment of Implementation Readiness (International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, 2005), p. 26.160 J. Houdet and others, Cost Benefit Analysis of the Mining Sector in Karamoja, Uganda (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Kampala, 2014), p. 28.

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prospectingandminingoperations.Indeed,mostoftheareaswhereartisanalminersareactivearealreadycoveredbyexplorationlicences.161 The Government also has limitedcapacitytomonitortheASMsectorandenforceregulations.Limitedstatecapacity has also meant that the Government is unable to mediate disputes between ASMandlarge-scaleminingoperations,whichcanarise,forexample,whereASMminersworkonornearlarge-scaleminingoperationswithouttheconsentofthemineral rights holders.

Withrespecttothecompensationfordisturbanceoflandrights,theActrequiresthe holder of a mineral right to pay the owner or lawful occupier of any land subject to the mineral right “fair and reasonable compensation”. However, the affectedownerorlawfuloccupieroflandmustdemandthiscompensationwithinoneyearof the date when the act that is the basis for the claim occurred. Alternatively,theowneror lawfuloccupierof landisentitledtoashareoftheroyaltiespayable inrespectoftheextractedminerals.Theseroyaltiesarepayableon“thegrossvalueof the minerals based on the prevailing market price of the minerals at such rates as shall be prescribed”.162 It should be noted that the Act exempts samples of minerals required for the purposes of assay, analysis or other examination, in quantitiesdeterminedbytheCommissioner,fromthepaymentofroyalties.

Local communities have complained that they receive little or no compensationand that they are not consulted on themining operations or the compensationmethodology.163Where there are attempts at consultation, these are often “notin good faith” and are manipulated by local leaders or local elites, who convene communitiestorubberstampprocesseswiththepromiseofsinkingboreholesorbuildingschoolsandhospitals,forexample.Theyalsodonotreceivecompensationwhen the land is communally owned, since they cannot prove ownership. In any case, a lack of transparency means that royalty payments often do not reachtheir intended targets.164Furthermore,compensationagreementsarepreparedinEnglish,whichmanypeopleinaffectedcommunitiesinregionssuchasKaramojado not understand. There have also been inordinate delays in the payment of compensation.Affectedcommunitieshavealsosufferedforcefulevictionsinsomecases.165 The Government now plans to formulate a model community development agreementtoalleviateconflictsovercompetinglanduses.166

AnypersonaggrievedbytheCommissioner’sdecisiononthedenialorcancellationof a licence may appeal to the Minister. The Minister may, within 60 days of receiving the appeal, set aside or vary the decision about which the complaint was received and must provide the reasons for his or her decision. A person aggrieved by the Minister’s decision may apply to the High Court for judicial review.

161 United Nations Environment Programme, Analysis for stakeholders on formalization in the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector based on experiences in Latin America, Africa, and Asia: Uganda Case Study (UNEP, Geneva, 2011), p. 13.162 Republic of Uganda, Mining Act 2003, Section 98.163 M.A. Rugadya and others, Tenure in Mystery: Status of Land under Wildlife, Forestry and Mining Concessions in Karamoja Region, Uganda (TROCAIRE Uganda and Oxfam GB, 2010), p. 20.164 Crawford, Disney and Harris, Uganda: Assessment of Implementation Readiness, p. 19.165 ASF, Human Rights Implications of Extractive Industry Activities in Uganda, pp. 23, 29, 37.166 Interview with Officer, Department of Geological Survey and Mines, Entebbe, Uganda, 4 August 2015.

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2. Towards a new policy frameworkTheGovernmentofUgandanowproposesseekingtheresolutionofthechallengesexperienced in administrating the former mining regime by establishing a newpolicyframework. IthassofarformulatedadraftMineralsandMiningPolicyforUganda 2015, for which the Africa Mining Vision has been a useful guide, and is also reviewing the mining law.167Thedraftpolicyseekstoaddressthefollowingkeyissues:

1. Inadequatelegalandregulatoryframeworksandinstitutionalcapacity;

2. Inefficientregulationandadministrationofmineralrights;

3. Lackofaharmonizedpositiononcompetingmineralandsurfacerights;

4. Lackofvalueadditioninthemineraldevelopmentvaluechain;

5. Informalandunregulatedartisanalandsmall-scaleminingsector;

6. Limitedcommunityandnationalparticipationinmineraldevelopment;

7. Inadequate regulatory framework on health, safety and environment matters;

8. Lackofregionalandinternationalcooperation.168

Onthequestionofminingrevenuesandrentsmanagement,thedraftpolicyrequiresthe Government to establish mechanisms for verifying the values of the minerals extractedbylicensedpersons.Thismeasureiscriticaltoensuringthatthecountryobtainssufficientrevenuesfromtheextractionofmineralresources.Further,thedraftpolicyproposesthattheGovernmentshouldimprovethecollection,efficiencyandtransparencyofreportingofminingrevenues, includingpromotinginitiativessuchastheNaturalResourceCharter,ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiativeandPublishWhatYouPaycampaign.Ontheprocessingofmineralrights,itstatesthatthoserightswillbegrantedonacompetitivebasis,andthatapplicantswillbeguaranteed procedural fairness. Further, mineral rights holders will be subjected tothe“use itor lose it”principlesoastominimizespeculation,whichremainsamajor problem.169 The draft policy also proposes the alignment of the IncomeTaxActwithrelevantsector legislationsoastoenhanceconsistency,particularlywith respect todefiningexplorationanddevelopmentexpenditure,andapplyingthe transfer of interest rules to mineral rights. It proposes several measures for achieving the objective of harmonizing the fiscal regimewith themining policyandlegalframework:applyingfiscalframeworkstotheminingsector;makingthefiscal regime internationallycompetitive;creatingcommensurateandprogressivefiscal and administrative sanctions for non-compliance; improving the collection,efficiencyandtransparencyofreportingofminingrevenues;creatingamechanism

167 Interview with Officer, Department of Geological Survey and Mines, Entebbe, Uganda, 4 August 2015.168 Republic of Uganda, Green Paper on the Minerals and Mining Policy for Uganda 2015, pp. 12-13.169 Interview with Officer, Department of Geological Survey and Mines, Entebbe, Uganda, 4 August 2015.

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for promoting inter-agency information and data sharing; dealing with mineralsmuggling; enforcing tax payments; and addressing issues of treaty shopping,transfer pricing and non-compliance by mining companies. A related measure is to establish a well-regulated and well-managed mineral royalty scheme that seeks to upliftthesocioeconomicwelfareofmineralrichcommunities.TheCommissioner,forexample,willberequiredtoperiodicallyaudittheroyaltyreturnssubmittedbyminingcompaniesandtonotifytheUgandaRevenueAuthorityofanyinconsistenciesin the returns.

Concerninggeologicalandmineralinformationsystems,thedraftpolicystatesthatthe Governmentwill provide the physical, social and institutional infrastructurerequiredtomaketheminingindustrycompetitive.Onesignificantmeasuretowardsachieving this objective is to conduct geological, geochemical and geophysicalsurveysoftheentirecountryatvariousscales.Asecondmeasureistoensuretheeffectivecollection,analysis,archivinganddisseminationofinformationabouttheminerals sector.

Regardinghumanandinstitutionalcapacity-building,theGovernmenthasestablishedanagency–theDirectorateofGeologicalSurveyandMines–tomanagetheminingsector. It now aims to ensure the adequate financing and strengthening of theDirectorate’sinstitutionalcapacity,sothatitcaneffectivelyadministerandmonitorthe sector. The Government also plans to support skills development through formal and industrial training, including by establishing training institutions, requiringlicenseestotrainUgandannationalsanddevelopscholarshipandapprenticeshipschemesforcitizens,andcollaboratingwithstakeholders.

With respect to ASM, the Government has tried to formalize artisanal minersintosmall-scaleminersandprovideextensionservices.However,thedraftpolicyconsiders these measures to have been inadequate. It therefore seeks to augment them by requiring the Government to create clear legal frameworks and regulatory mechanisms to facilitate theorganizationofASM, access toproperty rights andensuing obligations forASM.The specificmeasures include licensing, regulatingand monitoring ASM activities; developing suitable formalization strategies;promotingbestpractices intheASMsector;educatingASMworkersonminimalstandardsofhealth;andfacilitatingandencouragingASMparticipationinsupplychain initiatives.TheGovernmentalsoproposesestablishingminimumstandardsonhealth,safetyandenvironment,andtrainingartisanalminersonthesestandardsand also on appropriate technology. Thedraftpolicy also acknowledges the roleofwomenandchildreninartisanalandsmall-scalemining.Itnotesthattherearebarriersthatpreventwomenfromeffectivelyparticipatinginmineraldevelopmentand also that mining deprives children of education opportunities and exposesthem to health and safety risks. To address these challenges, the policy proposes the followingspecificmeasures:strengtheningtheroleandparticipationofwomeninnegotiationsforlossoflandinrelationtominingactivities;ensuringthatallminingprogrammes,includingeducationandtrainingopportunities,arebasedongenderequalityandequity;andcollaboratingwithstakeholderstostrengthenmonitoringandenforcementoflawandregulationsontheuseofchildlabourinminingactivities.

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On mineral sector governance, the draft policy acknowledges that the miningindustry has been plagued by land conflicts and lack of clear mechanisms forcompensation,resettlementanddisputeresolution.Toresolvetheseproblems, itrequires the Government to take the following measures:

1. Prescribecriteriaforassessingcompensation;

2. Mandate mining companies to provide plans for compensation orresettlementforeachproject,whichshouldbeinformedbycomprehensivefeasibility studies carriedoutwith fullparticipationandconsultationofprojectedaffectedpersons;

3. Establish clear procedures and standards for stakeholder consultationsandmechanismsfornegotiation,mediationandarbitration,withaviewtoprotectingtherightsoflandowners;

4. Ensurethatland-owningcommunitiesbenefitfromminingrevenues;

5. Ensurethatinformationissharedwiththepublicandthatapplicantsformineralrightsseekfreepriorinformedconsentofcommunitiesandlocalgovernmentsconcerningtheprospectingandminingofmineralresources.

It also requires the Government to establish a model community development agreement, with a view to encouraging mining companies to acquire social licences to operate. Further, the Government will now require mining companies to enter into community development agreementswith host communities as a conditionprecedent to any award of a mining lease.

Onenvironmentandsocialissues,thedraftpolicynotesthatexplorationandminingactivities always negatively impact safety, health and the environment, whichnecessitates measures to ensure that these impacts are avoided, minimized and mitigated inaccordancewithenvironmental, safety,healthandmining laws.TheGovernmentthereforeproposestakingthefollowingspecificmeasures:

1. Promoteandenforcebestpracticesforhealth,safety,andenvironmentalmanagementinminingareas;

2. Provide a legal and regulatory framework for health, safety andenvironmentalmanagement inexplorationandmining,post-miningandmineclosureoperations;

3. Require mining companies to undertake EIAs and social impact assessments,andengageaffectedcommunitiesintheseactivities;

4. Establishanenvironmentalprotectionfundtorehabilitateorphanedminesandaddressotherrelatedenvironmentalissues;

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5. Strengthen institutional capacity and stakeholder collaboration inmonitoring,inspectionandenforcementofrelevantlawsandregulations;

6. Promote the development and application of environmentally friendlytechnologiesandmethodsinminingactivities;

7. Developguidelinesforaddressinggrievances,disputesandconflicts.

Withrespecttolinkagesanddiversification,theGovernmentrecognizesthatvalueadditioncangenerateenormouseconomicvalue, that themining industry couldbecomeahubforcreatingbackwardlinkageswithindustriesthatmanufactureandsupplymineinputs,andthatitcouldcreateforwardlinkagestobeneficiatingandprocessing industries using the rawmaterial commoditiesmined in the country.Tofacilitatetheselinkages,thedraftpolicyproposesthattheGovernmentshouldallocateresourcesforresearchanddevelopmentofthemineralvalueadditionandbeneficiationmechanismsandopportunities.TheGovernmentmustalsoestablishasuitablelegalframeworkandstrategiestodrivetheindustrialization,valueadditionandbeneficiationobjectives.ThedraftpolicyrequirestheGovernmenttoinstitutecertain specificmeasures, namely to strengthen andmaintain amodernmineralanalysis andbeneficiation laboratoryunder theDirectorateofGeological Surveyand Mines; establish benchmarks for beneficiation and value addition; developappropriate incentives to encourage the establishment of processing and otherbeneficiationindustries;andestablishasuitableframeworkandstructuresfortheregulationofmineralprocessingandexportation.

Regarding the mobilization of mining and infrastructure investment, the draftpolicy acknowledges that the minerals sector has not been adequately promoted and marketed. A number of measures are therefore set out in the policy to remedy this problem: establish a mineral promotion and investment unit; develop localmineralmarkets,incollaborationwithstakeholders;acquireinformationonforeignmineral markets; eliminate barriers to mineral exports; and implement regionalandinternationalinitiativesonpreventingtheillegalexploitationofminerals.Thedraftpolicyalsorecognizesthatdevelopingthemineralsectorandpromotingvalueadditionwillrequireinvestmentsininfrastructure,includingsmeltersandprocessingplants.Responsibilityforthis isplacedontheprivatesector,whoseparticipationthe policy proposes to secure through tools such as public-private partnerships.

Onthequestionofregionaland internationalcooperation,thedraftpolicynotesthat the successful exploitation of mineral resources, tracking of transnationalminingactivities,beneficiationandvalueadditionwillrequireasynergeticapproachthatembracesboth international and regionalprinciples.To thatend, it requirestheGovernment to collaboratewith international and regional bodies, integratekeyregionalandinternationalprinciplesandguidelinesatthedomesticlevel,andcooperatebothinthedevelopmentofhumanresourcesandintheharmonizationoflegislationandtechnicalstandards.

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Table 6: Extent of alignment of the policy and regulatory frameworks of Uganda with the Africa Mining Vision


• Competitivebiddingforlicences.• Plansto:establishmechanismsforverifyingvalueofminerals;improverevenuecollectionefficiencyandtransparencyinreportingrevenues.

• Planstoensurethatcommunitiesbenefitfromminingrevenues.

• Plansto:subjectlicenseesto“useitorloseit”requirement;harmonizefiscalregimewithminingpolicyandlegalframework;establishmineralroyalty scheme.

• Irregular issuance of licences.• Mineral samples exempted from paymentofroyalties.

Geological and mineral informationsystems

• Carried out geological survey, and planstoensureitcoversentireterritory.

• Planstoensureeffectivecollection,analysis,archivinganddisseminationofmineralinformation.

• Geological survey does not cover key mining area of Karamoja.


• Established Directorate of geologicalSurveyandMinestomanage sector.

• Plansto:enhancetheDirectorate’sinstitutionalcapacity;establishtraininginstitutions;requirelicenseestotrainnationals.

• Noclearinformationonneeds.• Limitedinvestmentinbuildinglocal

technical skills.


• EffortstoformalizeASMoperatorsthrough licensing and provision of extension services.

• Plansto:strengthenregulatorycapacity;establishminimumhealth,safetyandenvironmentstandards;strengthenwomen’sparticipation.

• ASMislargelydisorganizedandinformal.

• ASMoperatorsareignorantofpolicy and legal regime.

• Complex licensing procedures and requirements.

• InadequatelandforASMactivities.• Limitedstatecapacitytomonitorandenforcelawsandregulations.

• Barrierstowomen’sparticipation.Mineral sector governance


• Plansforclearandeffectivestakeholderparticipationmechanisms.


• Landconflicts.• Communitiesnotconsultedonminingoperationsorcompensation.


• No stated policies. • Noparticularattentiontoresearchand development.

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• Licenseesrequiredtopayfairandreasonablecompensation.

• Plansto:developmodelcommunitydevelopmentagreement;requirelicensees to provide plans for compensationorresettlement;establishenvironmentprotectionfund;enforcehealth,safetyandenvironmentrequirements;andstrengthen regulatory capacity.

• Unclear mechanism for compensation,resettlementanddisputeresolution.

• Complicated procedure for claiming compensation.

• Littleornocompensationforcommunities.

• Nocompensationforcommunallyowned land.


• Plansto:allocateresources;establish a suitable legal framework;anddevelopappropriateincentives.

• Insufficientlocalproduction.• High energy costs.• Inadequate energy supply.


• Plansto:establishmineralpromotionandinvestmentunit;developlocalmineralmarkets;invest in smelters and processing plants;andsecureprivatesectorparticipationthroughpublic-privatepartnerships.

F. The East African Community’s approach to harmonization of mining policies and legal frameworks

ThepartnerStatesoftheEACrecognizethepotentialofnaturalresourcestoboostpoverty reduction and intraregional trade and development and have thereforedecided to cooperate in the management of their natural resources. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community provides the framework for this cooperation.By this treaty, theEACpartner States have agreed to takeconcertedmeasurestofostercooperationinthejointandefficientmanagementandsustainableutilizationofnaturalresources.170Withrespecttomanagingthemineralresourcessector,thesecountrieshaveagreedtopromotejointexploration,efficientexploitationandthesustainableutilizationofsharedmineralresources;pursuethecreationofanenablingenvironmentforinvestmentintheminingsector;promotetheestablishmentofdatabases,informationexchangenetworksandthesharingofexperiencesinmanaginganddevelopingthemineralsector;andharmonizeminingregulationstoensureenvironmentallyfriendlyandsoundminingpractices.171 The five states further recognize that development activities, including mining, mayhave adverse impacts on the environment. They have therefore agreed to develop a common environmental management policy and common environmental control regulations,incentivesandstandards.

The partner States have since initiated a number of processes and activities toimplement these treaty provisions.172Forexample,theyhavepreparedaProtocolon Environment and Natural Resources and have adopted Environmental Impact AssessmentGuidelinesforSharedEcosystems.Article18ofthisprotocolrequiresthepartnerStatesto:

170 Treaty Establishing the East African Community, Article 111(1)(a).171 Ibid., Article 114(2)(c).172 East African Community Secretariat, Brief on Minerals and Mining in the EAC, 2015.

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1. Developandharmonizetheirpolicies,lawsfortheexploitationofmineralresources;

2. Develop common measures for ensuring that mineral resources are exploitedinanenvironmentallysoundmanner;

3. Developstrategiesandprogrammesfortherestorationandrehabilitationofminesandquarries;

4. Cooperateonresearchandexchangeofdataandinformationrelatedtomineralresources;

5. Develop strategies on sustainable production, value addition andmarketingofmineralsandtheirproducts;

6. Establisheffectivemeasurestoregulatemineralresourcestrading;

7. Take appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollutionresultingfromtheexplorationandexploitationofmineralresources.

ThepartnerStateshavealsodevelopedanIndustrializationPolicy,withaviewtopromoting regional industries that use the region’s natural resources to providelinkagesamongindustriesthroughdiversification,specializationandcomplementarypolicies.173

More significantly, the partner States have, since 2011, been working towardsharmonizingtheirmineralpoliciesandlaws,andhavearticulatedthisdesireintheircurrent development strategy.174TheEAC’sTerrestrialEcosystemsWorkingGroup,with itsCommitteeonEnvironment andNaturalResources, is spearheading thisharmonizationprocess,whichcoversareas includingaccess toandownershipofland;accesstoandownershipofminerals;mineralroyalties;proceduresforEIAsandmonitoringofenvironmentalplans;benefitsforcommunitiesduringandaftermining;reviewandrationalizationofartisanalandsmall-scalemining;valueadditiontominerals; the role of communities, local authorities, central governments andminingcompanies;marketingofminerals;andemploymentandhumanresourcesdevelopment.175

Currently, the EAC Secretariat is mapping the mining policies and laws of thepartnerStates,inordertofacilitatetheirharmonization.176Adraftofthismappingexercise isduebetoconsideredbytheSectoralCommitteeonEnvironmentandNatural Resources and adopted by the Council of Ministers in late 2016. A challenge the EAC faces in this regard is that Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have revised their mining policies and/or laws since the commencement of this mapping exercise.

173 Ibid., p. 3.174 East African Community, Development Strategy 2011/2012 – 2015/2016.175 East African Community Secretariat, Brief on Minerals and Mining in the EAC, 2015, pp. 3-4.176 Interview with Officer, Environment and Natural Resources division, East African Community secretariat, Arusha Tanzania, 13 August 2015.

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ThepartnerStatesareconcerned thatmineralexploitationhasbeen focusedonproduction forexportwithoutadditionalprocessing toaddvalue, in the formofintermediategoodsorfinal products.A teamhasbeenestablished toundertakea feasibility study on the means of adding value to the exploitation of mineraldeposits.177Aspartoftheharmonizationprocess,thepartnerStateshaveidentifiediron ore, coal, nickel/copper/cobalt and limestone as being strategic to the development of the EAC region.178Thedevelopmentofthe“vast”mineralpotentialintheregionshouldbeprioritized,indeedfast-tracked,soastobringaboutrapidgrowth in the region. Ironore, forexample,hasbeen identified ineverypartnerStateandiscriticaltoexpandingtheexistingsteelprocessingandmanufacturingsoastoenhanceindustrialandconstructionusage.179Further,coalhaspotentialforenergygenerationandironandsteeldevelopmentintheregion.EconomicgrowthinthepartnerStatesisconstrainedbyalargeelectricitydeficit,180 which coal could helptoeliminate.Limestoneisalsocriticalintheconstructionindustry,asabuildingblock incementandaggregateproduction,and inagriculture.ThepartnerStatesalsohaveconsiderablepotentialfordevelopmentandvalueadditionregardingthe3T minerals.

However, minerals are not being exploited optimally due to a lack of regionalcoordination,whichcould,amongotherthings,enhancesynergiesandinformation-sharing.181ThepartnerStateshavethereforesoughttocreatemechanismsforbettercoordinationofmineralvalueaddition,andtheEACSecretariathasproposedtheestablishmentofaregionalstakeholdertechnicalcommitteeonthedevelopmentof mineral resources and mineral value addition. Furthermore, the SecretariatcommissionedastudytoreviewtheminingregimesofthepartnerStates,withtheobjectofidentifyinggapsandpotentialareasforreforms,soastocreateanenablingenvironment for mineral value addition. This study recommended, in particular,that the EAC should develop regionalmineral value addition strategies for coal,ironore,andnickel-copper-cobalt,whichwouldformthebasisofjointpromotion,policy coordination, and appropriate fiscal arrangements. 182 The Secretariat iscurrentlyformulatinganEACmineralvalueadditionstrategyasafollow-uptotherecommendationsofthisstudy.183

177 East African Community Secretariat, Brief on Minerals and Mining in the EAC, 2015, pp. 3-4.178 East African Community Secretariat, Report of the Expert Group Consultative Meeting: Review of the Common-wealth Secretariat Consultants Final Reports on the EAC Mineral Resources Potential and the Legal and Regulatory Frame-works for Mineral Extractive Industries and Mineral Value Addition in EAC Region (Bujumbura, Burundi, 2013).179 Ibid., p. 6.180 P. Precht and others, Analysis of Mineral Resources Availability and Potential for Mineral Value-addition in the East African Community, in Economic and Legal Section Special Advisory Services Division Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013, p. 54.181 East African Community Secretariat, Report of the Expert Group Consultative Meeting, p. 6.182 Precht, Analysis of Mineral Resources Availability and Potential, P. 83.183 Email communication with Officer, Department of Industrial Development, East African Community secretari-at, 13 August 2015.

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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

It is clear that East African countries can learn from each other’s experiences as they seek to improve the governance of their mining sectors. In light of the historical mineral policy and legal frameworks in EAC countries, and recent movements towards establishing new frameworks based on many similar tenets of the, several areas of attentionhaveemergedthatwouldhelptobringaboutanapproachtogovernancethatenablestheinclusiveanddiversifieddevelopmentofthesector,withpositiveknock-oneffectsacrossthebroadereconomyandsociety.Policymakerswoulddowell to note the policy gaps in past mineral sector frameworks, and how the pillars oftheAfricaMiningVisioncouldhelptofillthesegapsinthenewframeworksthatare currently under development.

TheproposedlegalframeworkofKenyaoffersusefullessonsintermsofenhancingtransparencyandaccountability inmineral sectorgovernance.Theconcentrationof powers in theMinister of Commissioner, regarding for example, the grantingorrevokingoflicences,oftenledtocorruptionandthehoardingofmineralrights.Dispersing those powers makes sense, particularly if the licensing authority isrequired to consult a body of experts in exercising them, as it ensures that mineral development agreements can be effectively negotiated and implemented.Thereis also a need to establish thresholds determining when a Government can enter into such agreements, so that only companies that are able to demonstrate that their proposals will contribute to national development are granted favourableinvestmentterms.InthecaseofRwanda,transparencymustcontinuetoapplytothe 3T mineral value chains, to ensure trust in the original source of these minerals.

Revenue management is one area of governance in which a move towards greater transparency is sorely needed. In each EAC country, bodies established to audit andaddresstaxpracticesandleakagesneedtobeproperlyfinancedandbestowedwith a strong mandate. The Rwanda “clear and simple” tax regime should be fully implemented,withreducedbureaucraticburdensonfirmsandamorestreamlinedstructurewhile also limitingmining company exemptions.While countries haveincludedamulti-stakeholderapproachtopolicymakinginthepast,theinvolvementof civil societyorganizations, private sector representatives andothersneeds tocontinue beyond consultation and should be a tenet of policy decision-makingandimplementation;miningcontractnegotiationanddecision-making;monitoringandevaluation;andothervitalsteps.IneveryEACcountry,therealsoneedstobegreaterdecision-makinginputsfromotherrelevantministriestoenablebetterandmore coordinated industrial, mineral and trade linkages. Government involvement in minerals should not be viewed as a two-dimensional drive to collect more mineral revenues, but rather as nurturing the sectoral linkages that will go on to unlock futurediversifiedrevenuestreams.

The licensing process should be streamlined, so that each country has only one institutionwithoverallresponsibilityforlicensing.IntheUnitedRepublicofTanzania,for example, we have seen that the Minister and the Commissioner are both licensingauthorities.Suchanarrangementdoesnotbodewellfortransparencyand

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accountabilityandshouldberectifiedbyestablishingasingle licensingauthority.Thereshouldalsobecleartimelinesformaking licensingdecisions,and licensingauthorities should be required to give reasons for their decisions. Governmentsneedtoensurethatlicenceapplicationsystemsarenotsimplystructuresinnameonlyandthattheycanfunctionasintendedwithoutbeingcircumvented.

Countriesshouldalsoseektodecentralizetheadministrationoftheirminingregimes,as has happened in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania. Decentralized administrationwould,inparticular,enhanceeffortstoformalizeASMoperationsbymovinggovernmentadministrativeservicesclosertoresource-challengedartisanalminers.

There needs to be a stronger mandate for general strategies for developing linkages andvalueadditionand formore specificmeasures tobothaddvalue tomineralactivities and harmonize mineral policy with strategies for industrialization andtrade. This first requires more coherent strategies for linkage and value chaindevelopment. In thecaseofKenya, the stipulation in the2016Act thatmineraldevelopment agreements should provide for value addition needs to be furtherelaboratedtoincludehowtoachievethediversificationandcapacitydevelopmentneededforthisvalueadditionandwhatparticularroleshouldbeplayedby localand foreignfirms.Parallel investment inother infrastructure, particularly energy,willhelptolinkminingandotherinterventionsandtoensuregreatercoordination,including at the decision-making level. The Rwanda mineral policy review should encourage more in-country processing of minerals, including cement, brick and tile,inordertofacilitatedownstreamvaluechains,particularlywiththenecessaryenergyinputsandsupportforanewsmelter,andatthesametimeidentifylocalopportunities for upstream materials procurement. In the United Republic ofTanzania, enhanced gemstone production should be actively pursued alongsideindustrialmineraldevelopment,whichshouldbefacilitatedthrougheffectivepolicyharmonizationunderastrongcross-sectoral,ministerialmandate.Thenewmineralpolicy framework of Uganda should ensure that resources are allocated for value addition and linkage development as intended, and thatmineral policy is betterlinkedwith industrial and tradepolicy.Amineralpromotionand investmentunitshould be established as planned, with a clear strategy for developing local mineral markets and following up on sidestream infrastructure and energy investments.

At a regional level, while the EAC countries have already been working to harmonizemineralpolicies,theseeffortsnowneedtotakeonanewdimensionasthe countries review and revise their individualmineral frameworks.The settingof EAC-wide standards and best practiceswould provide consistent approachesin line with the Africa Mining Vision. Moreover, a regional approach to linking mineralframeworksandindustrializationeffortswouldyieldgreatersuccessthanisolatednationallinkagestrategies.Forexample,identifyingandmappingstrategicminerals, the possible linkages with priority manufacturing sectors, and investments required to achieve those linkages,would benefit from information-sharing andjoint interventions.Transportationcorridorsandsharedenergynetworksare justsomeofthemanyareaswherecooperationcanboostthereturnsonsidestreaminvestments. A regional approach to building value chains is needed so that more effectiveactioncanbetakenregardingthemineralsthathavebeenidentifiedas

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havingvast potential for the region. Indeed, a consolidated regionalvalue chainapproach to mineral policy harmonization and linkage development would begroundbreaking,wherebyopportunities forspecializationcouldbeestablishedatthe country level so as to carve out a niche for mineral-based development within the regionalvision.Suchmeasureswillrequireconsiderablepoliticalwillandintegratedaction.InternationalinstitutionssuchastheAfricanMineralsDevelopmentCentreshould seek to draw on their experiences in order to support the EAC in developing thisnewapproach,inparticularwiththemappingexerciseofexistingandplannedmineral policies in this study.

Localcommunitiesneedtoplayarealandactiveroleinthemanagementofnaturalresources, and thus need to be included in and respected by mineral policy frameworks. Mineralrightsholdersshouldberequiredtonegotiateandimplementcommunitydevelopment agreements and it must be the responsibility of the Government to establish the bare minimum standards for such agreements. These agreements are notintendedtoplaceburdensonlargefirmsbutrathertoactasatoolfordialogueandcooperationbetweenthemandlocalcommunities.Governmentinterventionsshouldthusbothprovideincentivesforbetterfirm-communityrelationsandensurethatdisputesettlementsystemsfunctionasintendedtoallowforfairandequitabledecision-making.TheproposedminingregimeofKenyaoffersausefulframeworkfor the structureand implementationof theseagreements,which shouldensurethatminingcompaniesobtainmuch-neededsociallicencestooperate.Inaddition,affectedcommunitiesshouldparticipate in the implementationofenvironmentalmanagementplans,giventhelimitedenforcementcapacitiesoftheseGovernments.The outcomes of environmental and local impact assessments need to be fully shared withthelocallyaffectedcommunities.TheUnitedRepublicofTanzania’splansforcompensation,relocationandresettlementshouldincludemandatoryelementsthataregeneroustothoseaffectedbyminingactivities.Realizingtheseobjectiveswouldbe assisted by the development of a model community development agreement, whichshoulddrawonthecountries’bestpracticesinordertoformanEAC-widestandard for community engagement.

Effortstowardsbuildingthecapacitiesofdomesticworkersandfirmsneedtobebackedupbyseriouscommitments toboth thesegroups, throughthesettingoftangible requirements for foreign firms and partners in local-content and local-hiring policies. The Kenya 2016 Act, for example, states that holders of mineral rights should, to the greatest extent possible, “give preference” to local hiring and procurement, but the success of this approach requires both an overall strategy with aclearvisionforthecountry’sfuturelaboursupplyanddomesticfirmcapabilityatthehigherendofthepolicyframeworkandasetofspecifictargetsandinstrumentsto help achieve this vision at the lower end. Training must be geared towards new linkagesbetweenthemineralsectorandthewidereconomy,ratherthanonstaticskillsforminingactivities,andshouldthusaddressbothlower-skillneedsaswellas the training of technicians and engineers. As with other sectors, the skills gap between labour supply and demand needs to be properly measured through needs assessments, with a strategy to help close this gap through investment in the right typesoftrainingprogrammes.Foreignandlargefirmsmusttakeanactiveroleintraining workers in the skills required, rather than hiring workers trained through effortsbytheGovernmentortheworkersthemselves.

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The five countries must do much more to realize gender equality and theempowerment ofwomen in themining sector and to increase opportunities forand encourage women’s involvement in mining. To that end, each country should formulate a gender charter for its mining sector, which should also address the employment of women at the higher end of mineral value chains.

Increasing the collection and processing of mineral and geological data andmapping should be a goal of future mineral policy. In the short term this should include greater sharing of methods and technology in partnership with external dataproviders,asisanoptioninKenya.Thisshouldevolvetoaneventualtargetof producing that information nationally. More detailed plans are needed forresearch and development in data-gathering and in the mineral sector in general, including greater funding provisions. The United Republic of Tanzania should seek tostrengthenitsgeologicalsurveycapacitieswhilemandatingsupportfromforeignand private sector partnerships. Uganda should ensure that future surveys cover all regions of the country.

Environmentalprotectionmustbeanimplementableandmeasureableelementofmining frameworkssoas toprevent the levelofenvironmentaldegradationthatwasallowedowingtoloopholesoranabsenceofreferencestosuchprotectionintheframeworksofpreviousminingpoliciesandlegislation.Ensuringtheinclusionofprotectionincurrentframeworkswouldbetothebenefitoflocalcommunities,thegreaterenvironmentandwell-beingofallcitizens,andwouldhelptoaddressthelong-termharmcausedbyover-extraction.Aswiththecommunityagreements,bestpracticesshouldbedrawnuponinordertoformulateacommonEACenvironmentalmanagement policy.

Finally,althoughEACcountrypoliciesallclaimtosupportthegrowthofASM,theirGovernmentshavetendedtoprioritizethedevelopmentoflarge-andmedium-scalemining as an economic strategy and have consequently allocated large tracts of land tolargecompanies.ASMpolicieshavetoooftenbeengearedtowardsformalizationastheendgoal;theyshouldinsteadembraceamulti-facetedapproachtosupportASMinitscurrentformandshouldbetterlinksmallandinformalminerswiththenationaleconomy.TherequirementbyRwandathatanexplorationlicencecanonlybe renewed upon relinquishment of 50 per cent of the unexplored areas is a useful mechanismformakingavailablemuch-neededlandforASMactivities.InthecaseoftheUnitedRepublicofTanzania,whenaprospectinglicenceexpiresorpartofitis relinquished, the Minister may declare the area exclusive for small-scale mining, if itissuitableforsuchactivity.Thecountry’sactionsinthissectormustalsoaddresschildlabourandhumanwell-being,whicharekeyissuesforASM.Asnotedinthecase of Uganda, despite their limited capacity, artisanal and small-scale minersmuststilltakeintoaccounttheimpactoftheiractivitiesontheenvironmentandcommunity.Thesecountriescontinuetostruggleintheireffortstoregulateartisanalminers.Anyregulationmustbeprecededbyanunderstandingofthenatureoftheiractivities,whichtendtovaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother.Burundiwoulddowelltoensurethatformalizationwouldindeedbeofbenefittoartisanalandsmall-scaleminers,tocountersuspicionsamongsomethatitmayonlybenefitelites.BurundiandRwandashouldbothsimplifytheirregistrationprocessesandprovidefinancialandgeneralsupporttosmallfirmsinpursuingformalization.Theimplementation

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ofASMprovisionstodatehasbeenpoorandmustbeplacedasahigherpriorityinmineralframeworks.Ugandashouldensurethatitprovidesassistancetoartisanaland small-scaleminers as a strategy for poverty reduction, as is intendedby itsminingpolicy,includinginobtaininglicencesandmeetingreportingrequirementsandsupportingtheorganizingandformalizationofASM.Inthisareainparticular,thefiveEACcountries should seek todrawon thepositiveexperienceofothercountries, such as Mali.

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Yager,ThomasR.(2014).TheMineralIndustryofBurundi.In2012 Minerals Yearbook. UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey.Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPublishingOffice.

Yager,ThomasR.(2014).TheMineralIndustryofKenya.In2012 Minerals Yearbook. UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey.Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPublishingOffice.

Yager,ThomasR.(2014).TheMineralIndustryofRwanda.In2012 Minerals Yearbook. UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey.Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPublishingOffice.

Yager,ThomasR.(2014).TheMineralIndustryofTanzania.In2012 Minerals Yearbook. UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey.Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPublishingOffice.

Yager,ThomasR.(2015).TheMineralIndustryofUganda.In2013 Minerals Yearbook. UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey.Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPublishingOffice.

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AfricanUnion(2009).AfricaMiningVision.

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African Union Commission, African Development Bank and United NationsEconomicCommissionforAfrica (2011).ActionPlanfor ImplementingtheAfricaMiningVision–BuildingasustainablefutureforAfrica’sextractiveindustry:Fromvisiontoaction.

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RepublicofKenya(2013).MinistryofMining.StrategicPlan2013-2017.

RepublicofKenya(2014).MinistryofMining,MineralsandMiningPolicy.

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United Republic of Tanzania. Mining Act 2010.

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InterviewsInterviews were conducted with the following people:

MinisterofStateforMining,Kigali,22July2015.

Officer,DepartmentofMinesandGeology,Kigali,21July2015.

Mining expert, Kigali, 22 July 2015.

Officer,MinistryofEnergyandMinerals,DaresSalaam,UnitedRepublicofTanzania,12 August 2015.

Officer,TanzaniaMineralsAuditAgency,DaresSalaam,UnitedRepublicofTanzania,10 August 2015.

Officer,DepartmentofGeologicalSurveyandMines,Entebbe,Uganda,4August2015.

Officer, Environment and Natural Resources division, East African Communitysecretariat, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 13 August 2015.

Officer,DepartmentofIndustrialDevelopment,EastAfricanCommunitysecretariat,13August2015(viaemail).