Assessment of USAID Support for Kenya’s 2017 Elections

DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DRG-LER) ACTIVITY

FINAL REPORT [REVISED]

TASKING 073 ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR

KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS

Contract No. GS-10F-0033M/AID-OAA-M-13-00013

July 2018

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by NORC at the University of Chicago. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

DRG-LER – GS-10F-0033M/AID-0AA-M-13-00013

FINAL REPORT – ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS | i


TASKING N073 ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR


FINAL REPORT July 2018

Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M/AID-0AA-M-13-00013

Submitted to: Morgan Holmes

Submitted by: NORC at the University of Chicago Attention: Renee Hendley, Program Manager Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: 301-634-9489; E-mail: [email protected]

DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

mailto:[email protected]


FINAL REPORT – ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS | ii

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................... IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 1

Background ............................................................................................................................. 1

Scope and Methodology ......................................................................................................... 1

Key Findings ........................................................................................................................... 1

Recommendations for Future USAID Programming ............................................................... 3

PURPOSE .................................................................................................................................... 5

ASSESSMENT TEAM .................................................................................................................. 5

METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................... 5

LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 6

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................... 7

USAID Strategy Planning and Execution ................................................................................ 7

Support to Key Sectors ........................................................................................................... 8

Coordination and Communications ......................................................................................... 9

CONTEXT ..................................................................................................................................... 9

USAID’S STRATEGY 2017 ........................................................................................................ 11

FROM STRATEGY TO ACTIVITY: IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS ....................................... 14

UNDP Basket Fund ............................................................................................................... 14

Kenya Electoral Assistance Program .................................................................................... 15

Rapid Response Mechanisms .............................................................................................. 16

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 1: ENHANCED PROFESSIONALISM, INDEPENDENCE, AND EFFICIENCY OF IEBC AND THE JUDICIARY .................................................................. 17

Support to Election Management and Administration ........................................................... 17

Support to Election Dispute Resolution (EDR) ...................................................................... 19

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 2: ENHANCED ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ...................................................................................................................... 21

Support to Election Observation ........................................................................................... 21

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 3: STRENGTHENED CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND WOMEN AND YOUTH LEADERSHIP ............................................................................... 25

Support to Women and Youth Political Participation ............................................................. 25

Support to Voter Education ................................................................................................... 27

Support to Media ................................................................................................................... 29


FINAL REPORT – ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS | iii

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 4: VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CONFLICT MITIGATION. . 30

Support to Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Early Response (EWER) ....................... 30

COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION ............................................................................... 33

Official International Community ........................................................................................... 33

Within the U.S. Mission ......................................................................................................... 34

With Implementing Partners .................................................................................................. 35

With USAID/Washington ....................................................................................................... 35

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE USAID PROGRAMMING .............................................. 35

General Recommendations .................................................................................................. 36

Program Recommendations ................................................................................................. 37

ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................... 39

ANNEX 1 - INTERVIEW TOPICS/QUESTIONS ......................................................................... 40

ANNEX 2 - EVALUATION INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS........................................................... 43

ANNEX 3 - FINAL CONCEPT PAPER ....................................................................................... 46

ANNEX 4 - FINAL INCEPTION REPORT ................................................................................... 57

ANNEX 5 - TASKING SCOPE OF WORK SENT BY USAID..................................................... 78


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ACRONYMS CEO Chief Executive Officer

CEPPS Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening

CMM USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation

CMP Conflict Mitigation Panel

CSO Civil Society Organization

DCHA USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

DGE Donor Group on Elections

DRG Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

DRL Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

EDR Election Dispute Resolution

ELOG Election Observation Group

EWER Early Warning Early Response

FIDA Federation of Women Lawyers

HRSM Human Rights Support Mechanism

ICT Information and communication technology

IDLO International Development Law Organization

IEBC International Electoral and Boundaries Commission

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

JCE Joint Committee on Elections

JWCEP Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations

KEAP Kenya Electoral Assistance Program

KEWOPA Kenya Women Parliamentary Association

KII Key Informant Interview

KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights

LER Learning, Evaluation, and Research

LTO Long-Term Observer

MCK Media Council of Kenya

NCIC National Cohesion and Integration Commission

NDI National Democratic Institute

NORC NORC at the University of Chicago

NSC National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

ORPP Office of Registration of Political Parties


FINAL REPORT – ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS | v

PEARL Peaceful Empowerment in Arid Lands

PPDT Political Parties Dispute Tribunal

PVT Parallel Vote Tabulation

SBU Sensitive but Unclassified

SCORE Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism

SEPK Strengthening Electoral Processes in Kenya

SOW Statement of Work

STO Short-Term Observer

SUPKEM Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USAID/KEA USAID/Kenya and East Africa

USG U.S. Government


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background

On August 8, 2017, just over 15 million Kenyans went to the polls to choose the country’s next County and National Assembly Members, Senators, Governors, and President.

While the Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) declared incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta the victor with 54% of votes cast, controversy soon emerged over the transmission of results, which formed the basis for the opposition’s challenge in the Supreme Court. Fueled by the opposition’s claims that results were falsified, protests took place across the country, many of which turned violent and resulted in numerous casualties.

On September 1, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the presidential election. In accordance with this decision and Article 138 of the Constitution, the IEBC set a date of October 17 for a repeat or “fresh” presidential election, later postponed to October 26. Leading opposition candidate Raila Odinga eventually withdrew from this election, leaving no real challenge to Kenyatta in the repeat poll. Having failed in their further appeals to the Supreme Court, the opposition refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the election and continued demonstrations and protests in defiance, as the country grew increasingly polarized along political and ethnic lines, and the mood tense.

Events turned quickly, however, on March 9, 2018, with a surprise meeting between Kenyatta and Odinga and the start of a comprehensive reform process, which if implemented would mean greater inclusivity in Kenya’s governance and political processes.

Scope and Methodology

Fallout from the 2017 elections, combined with this new national dialogue, will result in changes to laws and regulations related to elections, as well as to Kenya’s main electoral institutions. As the United States Agency for International Development Kenya and East Africa (USAID/KEA) contemplates future support to elections and political processes in Kenya, it sought to review and identify key lessons learned from USAID’s assistance for the 2017 elections.

An assessment team composed of experts from NORC at the University of Chicago and USAID’s Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) Center conducted a series of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with representatives of USAID and State Department, implementing organizations, Kenya’s election and civil society institutions, and other experts. Findings gathered through KIIs were also informed by a comprehensive document review.

Key Findings

USAID/KEA contributed significantly to a joint strategy of the U.S. government (USG) that reflected a shared understanding of Kenya’s pre-electoral environment and identified key threats to a peaceful and credible election. A new strategy was quickly developed to coordinate responses to the “fresh” October presidential election. USAID programs and priorities corresponded to these strategies.

All USAID electoral assistance operated within the realities and constraints of Kenya’s politics. USAID/KEA showed flexibility in addressing a complex and unpredictable electoral process in Kenya, making important decisions to adapt programming, as well as by mobilizing additional funding and staff, and using rapid response mechanisms.



Issues with project procurement and start-up, followed by political events in the country, delayed many election-assistance activities. As a result, several interventions were not as effective as they might have been. At the same time, investment in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) basket fund enabled USAID to act earlier in the electoral cycle and influence the direction of elections assistance.

Consolidating elections programming in a reduced number of award mechanisms provided some advantages; however, it also increased operational risks. Investing most of USAID’s support in a single program led to some management and relationship issues between the implementing consortium’s prime grantee and subgrantees. The capacity of the IEBC and other institutions to work with USAID’s implementing partners was limited as Election Day drew near. While USAID provided some longer-term assistance through its judicial program and the UNDP basket fund, and awarded a significant elections assistance project in 2016, focusing more support earlier in the electoral cycle would have enabled greater capacity-building. USAID/KEA’s support to the electoral disputes process benefitted from an electoral-cycle approach; programming built on achievements of the 2013 assistance program. Activities in support of the 2017 elections helped ensure that judicial and electoral institutions were ready to handle the volume of disputes before them during the different campaign and election periods. However, new approaches to case management could not always be implemented properly due to insufficient time and planning.

International and domestic observers’ statements and findings penetrated local, national and international media. However, there is still a relatively low level of understanding about the work of observers, and observer statements at times were victims of political posturing and disinformation over findings and methodologies. Technical assistance provided by USAID/KEA partners to the domestic observer network was critical in ensuring proper methodologies for high quality observation and reporting.

Support to political party processes during the 2017 electoral cycle focused mainly on the inclusion of women, youth, and persons with disabilities as viable candidates in the primary and nomination periods. Through USAID support, local Kenyan CSOs used their comparative advantages and networks to improve programming reach, at the same time building their own capacities and methodologies. The immediate impact of this work in 2017 was limited, however, with few participants of USAID/KEA programs vying for or attaining office. The late start of new activities supporting these potential candidates is likely to have contributed to the limited impact.

USAID-supported voter education efforts relied on evidence-based research and informed both strategies and materials, which were widely perceived as an improvement over previous elections. More information may have been helpful in explaining more nuanced issues such as vote tabulation and various technologies employed in elections.

In contrast to 2013, media was not a priority of USG assistance for the August elections; support to journalists and media outlets was part of other activities, rather than a separate effort to improve the sector. However, the role of disinformation and fake news in Kenya did lead to USAID/KEA designing a new stand-alone activity in support of media around the October election.

USAID/KEA’s assistance empowered local mechanisms in conflict-prone counties that identified and quickly diffused potential incidents in the electoral period. Conflict-prevention support was also based on mapping of potential “hotspots” and constant



liaising with national partners. However, coupling this work with election programming under one mechanism created some problems in implementation.

Both local actors and the international community in Kenya have recognized and welcomed USAID/KEA and U.S. Embassy Nairobi’s leadership in donor coordination, policy-setting, and diplomatic messaging. Coordination and information-sharing within the USG could have been greater in the initial stages of program development.

Recommendations for Future USAID Programming The following recommendations are intended to inform the design of election-support strategies and activities for the next electoral cycle. Additional suggestions related to program design, as well as specific priority areas for elections programming, are contained in the body of the report.

To the extent possible election programing should start earlier to enable greater capacity-building and allow for political and project management issues that might impact timelines. An ideal approach to USAID/KEA’s election assistance would provide limited, yet sustained, support to reform of key election institutions and partners, with additional assistance provided closer to Election Day to address only priority needs. USAID should also look to incorporate election activities in programs supporting media, civil society, and other sectors that are relevant to elections and political processes.

The ongoing national dialogue can increase the trust and buy-in for future political and electoral reforms, and create a foundation for a credible and peaceful power transition in 2022. USAID should support the national conversations to promote public participation and input. Such support should include international assistance but be locally driven and not color the process as one led by foreign actors. This reform process will also present several important opportunities to support the revision of the electoral legal framework.

Strengthening the independence of media, civil society, and judicial institutions will be integral to the credibility of future elections. USAID/KEA’s technical assistance to electoral administration should be balanced with an appropriate level of support for the judiciary, human rights, media, and civil society. Election-assistance programs in Kenya should be designed to allow flexibility and adjustments as needed, depending on the cooperation and political will exhibited by key partners.

The successful coordination of election and political support in Kenya across the USG should be continued. USAID/KEA could review its coordination practices with assistance partners to minimize current burdens placed on some organizations, perhaps by adding resources needed for reporting and similar functions.

Regular data collection and analysis can help USAID/KEA develop appropriate strategies and identify different sectors to be supported in any new election-assistance portfolio. Where these do not exist, USAID might consider funding such studies.

Parliament may amend several electoral laws prior to elections scheduled in 2022, and outcomes of the national dialogue may usher in further changes to the legal framework. USAID/KEA should provide technical assistance and support advocacy for reforms based on Kenya’s international commitments and best practices in elections.

If strengthening elections remains a priority for the USG, USAID/KEA should maintain close cooperation with the IEBC. Such an approach could be organized in phases, with initial programming to strengthen the IEBC’s independence and transparency, as well as



build technical skills within key departments. USAID could then provide additional funding in a later period to address any remaining gaps in the administration of elections.

USAID/KEA’s long relationship with the judiciary has been successful over two election cycles and should be continued. Working with the Political Parties Dispute Tribunal (PPDT) is one approach to redress problematic party dynamics in Kenya. Institutional reform of the PPDT and broader dispute resolution processes may also benefit from technical support, depending on the outcome of reforms to the sector.

USAID/KEA should place greater emphasis on political parties as they are a crucial component of elections in Kenya and affect many other areas of USAID technical assistance. New opportunities to work with political parties need to be carefully analyzed and taken into consideration in future program design. USAID could also assist in the eventual implementation of the Election Campaign Finance Act.

Support for citizen observation should continue in the period between elections, focusing on capacity-building. The Election Observation Group (ELOG) requires assistance to improve its management, relationships with media and political parties, and technical capacities. USAID/KEA could also support ELOG in developing new methodologies, such as monitoring campaign finance requirements, or observing results transmission.

International observation will remain important to supporting democratic elections in Kenya, and USAID/KEA assistance should include a focus on observing the long-term pre-electoral environment and the period of post-election dispute resolution. USAID and observer missions should carefully plan strategies for presenting key findings and educating stakeholders on the role and capacities of observers.

As increasing the representation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in elective offices is a long-term goal, these efforts should be continued so as not to lose capacities or momentum. Increasing female representation in elected positions in Kenya should address specific barriers to women’s participation and the operating environment, including work with parties and parliamentary caucuses for both youth and women.

USAID/KEA should continue to support evidence-based research in the design of future civic and voter education strategies and public information campaigns, and build capacities of the IEBC, political parties, and CSOs to utilize such tools.

The growing restrictions on media suggest that USAID/KEA should contemplate broader media support before the 2022 election. Recent activities to improve the quality of journalism and combat fake news and hate speech could be expanded.

USAID/KEA should continue to assess and address the underlying conflict dynamics that affect Kenya, but separate conflict programs from election-support activities unless the former are explicitly related to capacities of electoral institutions. Should State/CSO again implement a conflict prevention program, USAID/KEA should take advantage of potential opportunities arising from close coordination with this activity.



PURPOSE As part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Learning, Evaluation, and Research (DRG-LER) Activity, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) asked NORC at the University of Chicago to assess USAID’s support to the 2017 Kenya general elections, in order to identify key lessons learned in USAID’s provision of technical assistance that may be relevant for future USAID Kenya programming.

Guided by the USAID Statement of Work (SOW) and the Concept Note and Inception Report prepared by NORC, an assessment team reviewed four interconnected lines of inquiry concerning (1) the relationship of the assistance to strategic U.S. government (USG) priorities; (2) the mix, intensity, and effectiveness of activities supported by USAID; (3) the management and mitigation of risks affecting program implementation; and (4) the coordination of efforts among implementing organizations, USAID and broader USG, and the international community. The project’s scope did not include in-depth analysis of activities to evaluate specific impact and outcomes or the implementation of any particular project. The USAID SOW, Concept Note, and Inception Report can be found in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 to this report.

At the time of the fieldwork, most activities related to election administration, voter and civic education, inclusion, and conflict prevention supported in 2017 were drawing to a close, and USAID/Kenya and East Africa (KEA) was considering the design of follow-on election and political process assistance activities. The assessment team has provided a number of recommendations for future programming to assist USAID/KEA in this process. However, the SOW did not include the design of a specific project or activities.

The primary audiences for this assessment are USAID/KEA and USAID/Washington. While the report provides detailed context and description of the activities supported by USAID, it assumes some familiarity with Kenyan elections and USAID’s election-assistance programming.

ASSESSMENT TEAM The assessment team consisted of USAID staff and independent experts with backgrounds in elections, rule of law, media, human rights, legal and constitutional affairs, and political party programming. The team was comprised of independent experts Gavin Weise and Dr. Collins Odote, and Dr. Assia Ivantcheva of USAID’s DRG Center, with Gavin Weise serving as the Team Leader. The assessment team received substantial logistical support from the NORC home office and USAID/KEA.

METHODOLOGY The assessment team collected data primarily through a literature review and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs).1 With some limitations, the team was able to arrive at key findings and conclusions through triangulation of observations from document sources and interview

1 Originally the team planned several Focus Group discussions; however, only two such discussions took place due to logistical constraints. These discussions resembled a group interview.



subjects. The assessment team discussed details of projects with USAID representatives, implementers, and beneficiaries to confirm or refute details, observations, and conclusions about the assistance provided. To limit interviewer bias, the entire assessment team attended almost all interviews, with members taking their own notes, which were then compared and amalgamated.

Prior to fieldwork, the team conducted a comprehensive review of documents related to USAID election assistance in Kenya, as well as Kenyan politics and elections, with an emphasis on the 2017 process. These materials included publicly available project documents, success stories, domestic and international observer statements, other donor reports, public opinion polls, media stories, and scholarly articles. USAID/KEA provided the assessment team with additional strategy documents, project descriptions, and progress reports that it felt would contribute to the team’s understanding of election assistance and other relevant issues in Kenya. During fieldwork, the assessment team also acquired additional program documents from USAID and partners, as well as publications and other materials created with USAID assistance.

KIIs and group discussions took place with a number of interlocutors, including:

USAID and U.S. Embassy personnel;

Partners implementing USAID projects with election-assistance components;

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Kenya active in elections and voter and civic education;

Other international and local organizations with a background in democracy programming in Kenya;

Government institutions charged with election duties and participating in USAID assistance activities, including the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the judiciary, Political Parties Dispute Tribunal (PPDT), Office of Registration of Political Parties (ORPP), and others.

Interviews took place from April 4 to April 19, 2018, in Nairobi, and before and after fieldwork in March and April in Washington, DC. The assessment team interviewed key individuals outside of Nairobi and Washington, DC over Skype. The team had planned a series of interviews and focus groups in western Kenya; however, this trip was canceled after consultations with USAID/KEA due to time constraints. A final list of interviews is attached as Annex 4.

The assessment team used semi-structured, open-ended interview guides for the KIIs. The interviews generally drew upon one or two guiding issues and then focused in on detailed questions and topics relevant to the subject being interviewed. A list of the guiding questions can be found in Annex 5. At the beginning of each interview the assessment team explained the purpose of the assignment and their goals for the interview. The team encouraged participants to be forthcoming with positive and negative observations, and gave assurances that no comments would be attributed to a specific individual or organization.

LIMITATIONS Ongoing turmoil at the IEBC seriously impacted the assessment team’s ability to meet with this principal beneficiary of USAID assistance. The team had requested meetings with both the policy-level Commissioners and the technical staff of the Secretariat. Shortly prior to the first



scheduled meeting at the IEBC, however, the Chairman of the Commission suspended the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in what became a contentious and highly public affair. Meetings with the IEBC were rescheduled for the final week of fieldwork. Just hours prior to these meetings, three of the six current Commissioners resigned, in large part in protest over the ongoing saga between the Chairman and CEO.2 Although the assessment team did eventually meet with two of the remaining Commissioners, including the Chair and the acting CEO, no additional meetings with the IEBC took place during fieldwork.

While the time in country was largely sufficient to undertake fieldwork, scheduling conflicts and interlocutors’ availability limited the number of interviews. The assessment team was unable to meet with key interlocutors from the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC) and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), as well as implementers of non-USAID programs related to elections or conflict prevention. While the team interviewed representatives of several CSOs in Kenya, meetings were limited to those implementing key components of USAID assistance.

The assessment team worked from documents provided by USAID/Washington and USAID/KEA prior to and during fieldwork, including implementing partner awards, progress reports and other related documents. Implementing partners furnished additional documents and information, although not all documents requested were provided. The team nevertheless felt the literature review enabled them to reliably assess details of USAID’s strategy, projects, and activities in support of Kenya’s 2017 elections.

Several implementers of USAID assistance had multiple sources of funding for their activities, and they could not always distinguish which activities had USAID support. This was especially true for Kenyan institutions receiving assistance from various donors.

Occasionally there were sharp contrasts in views amongst KII subjects, making it difficult to reach key findings and conclusions. In such cases, the assessment team would seek out additional information or conduct follow-up interviews to gain additional insight. When it proved impossible to arrive at a definitive position or conclusion, the matter was generally excluded from the report. When it was necessary to include the issue, the team attempted to present the topics neutrally and without assessment.

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS USAID Strategy Planning and Execution

USAID/KEA contributed significantly to what would become a USG joint strategy of support for the 2017 Kenya elections. The joint strategy reflected a shared understanding of the pre-electoral environment and identified key threats to a peaceful and credible election. USAID programming reflected the strategy’s priorities, and any departures were justified by new developments. A new strategy was quickly developed to coordinate responses to the “fresh” October presidential election.

While USAID/KEA strategic thinking was well defined in the 2015-18 USAID draft strategy paper and reflected in the subsequent USG joint strategy, it was not clear how decisions were made on what activities ultimately to support. In hindsight, what proved

2 An additional Commission member had resigned soon after the August poll and had yet to be replaced.



important areas for support — for example, media and broader work on political parties — were only marginally addressed as USAID/KEA prioritized other issues.

After the 2013 elections, USAID support for elections and political processes in Kenya decreased. USAID/KEA designed a new program in 2015; however, issues with project procurement and start-up significantly delayed the commencement of new assistance activities. As a result, several interventions were not as effective as they might have been. At the same time, the investment in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) basket fund enabled USAID to engage in certain activities earlier in the electoral cycle and influence decisions on multilateral elections assistance.

Consolidating elections programming within a few award mechanisms offered USAID/KEA some advantages; however, it also increased operating risks, and activities were sometimes jeopardized. Issues that arose due to political attacks against the prime implementer of USAID/KEA’s main program affected implementation of subgrantee activities. Investing most of USAID’s support in a single program also led to management and relationship issues between implementers.

Support to Key Sectors

According to numerous interlocutors and expert assessments, the IEBC was better prepared for the 2017 elections than in 2013. The decision to continue focusing USAID support on the IEBC was a key factor behind some of the successes. USAID/KEA’s assistance positively affected election preparations in several priority areas, such as operations and logistics, planning, the application of technologies and voter education. USAID’s support to voter registration also addressed a critical need and contributed to the IEBC’s ability to register many new voters, especially youth.

USAID/KEA’s support to the resolution of electoral disputes benefitted from following an election-cycle approach — there was a logical continuation of programming during and after the 2013 elections, which progressed into support for judicial institutions. However, some achievements, like the development of new case management systems, could not be fully realized due to insufficient time and planning.

The capacity of the IEBC and other institutions to work with USAID implementing partners was limited in the period close to Election Day. Focusing more assistance earlier in the electoral cycle would have enabled greater capacity-building in Kenya’s electoral administration, as opposed to the focus on crisis management in the months and weeks prior to the election. USAID programing was also adversely impacted by political and operational issues affecting implementers and beneficiaries.

International and domestic election observers’ statements and findings, including the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), penetrated local, national, and international media and contributed to the public’s understanding of election processes in Kenya. These recommendations can provide a roadmap for post-election legal and technical reforms. This being said, there is still a relatively low level of understanding in Kenya about the work of observer groups, which at times fell victim to political posturing and disinformation over findings and methodologies.

Support to political party processes in the 2017 elections focused on the inclusion of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in the primary and nomination periods, including building a list of 5,000 potential candidates. While there may be long-term



benefits from investing in such a list, the effect in 2017 was not immediately evident. Few participants in USAID/KEA programs vied for or attained office. There was incremental improvement in the number of women elected to key positions, such as governors, yet it is impossible to establish direct correlations between this outcome and USAID’s assistance.

USAID/KEA programs in voter education across multiple components relied heavily on evidence-based research and involved a variety of media. This innovative approach informed voter education strategies and materials. USAID/KEA should focus future programs on the transfer of these methodologies and practices to local institutions charged with civic and voter education, such as the IEBC and CSOs. Information campaigns did not sufficiently address more complicated issues like the vote counting and transmission process and the technology employed in elections.

Media were identified as a priority in USAID/KEA’s early strategic thinking, and a media component was contained in several election programs. However, unlike in 2013, there was no major media support initiative. The prevalence of fake news and social media fueling disinformation and hate speech led USAID/KEA to change its strategy for the October 2017 elections. Using rapid response mechanisms, USAID/KEA provided support to media to address such challenges. It was not possible to assess the activities, given that they started very close to the Election Day and continue after the election.

USAID/KEA’s assistance empowered local mechanisms in conflict-prone counties, which identified and diffused potential violence in the electoral period. While there is a need for election security and early warning capacities within the police, IEBC, and other key institutions, coupling much of the conflict prevention programming to USAID’s elections work under the same mechanism did not appear to add much value. The USG’s broader conflict prevention approach in Kenya should include efforts to mitigate election-period conflict within communities.

Coordination and Communications

There was a high level of coordination within the USG and wider international community in Kenya. Both international and local stakeholders in Kenya have recognized USAID/KEA and U.S. Embassy Nairobi for their leadership role in policy setting, diplomatic messaging and technical assistance. This frequent coordination and information sharing should also extend to the initial stages of program development, which did not always occur in the design of USAID/KEA election activities.

Coordination between State/CSO and USAID/KEA was highly effective in the USG’s election observation efforts. The U.S. mission was led by the State/CSO team in Nairobi, who worked closely with USAID personnel and experts to prepare and provide training and report Election Day observations.

CONTEXT On August 8, 2017, more than 15 million Kenyans, or 79% of registered voters, went to the polls to choose the country’s County and National Assembly Members, Senators, Governors, and President. This was the second election under the 2010 Constitution, which introduced changes



in the legal and institutional arrangements for elections, including the creation of the IEBC, and fixed the election date for the second Tuesday in August every five years.

The first such election, held in 2013, saw Uhuru Kenyatta prevail over then Prime Minister Raila Odinga in the first round by the narrowest of margins.3 While Odinga disputed this outcome, Kenya’s electoral and judicial institutions effectively dealt with legal challenges to the results and post-election conflict was minimal — nothing like the devastating violence the country experienced in 2007. However, allegations of electoral mismanagement and fraud lingered, which affected public trust and had implications for the preparations for the 2017 elections.

The opposition continued its strong objection to the IEBC’s handling of the 2013 election and called for the removal of the IEBC’s Commissioners. In early July 2016, following mediation efforts by the international community and religious leaders, the country’s two main political forces agreed on a parliamentary resolution to establish a committee to investigate the allegations against the IEBC, and make recommendations for legal and administrative reforms to ensure credible elections in 2017.

As a result of this process, the IEBC Commissioners resigned, and were replaced by a new team headed by Wafula Chebukati only seven months before Election Day. In addition, parliament introduced amendments to the electoral legal framework on voter registration and audit of the register, party nominations, use of technology, and dispute resolution. A new stand-alone Election Offences Act also came into force in October 2016. The change in Commissioners, the introduction of a revised legal framework so close to the Election Day, and the opposition’s continued attempts to discredit the IEBC, presented considerable challenges for the election administration in the run-up to the August 2017 poll.4

On Election Day, polling took place without major incident and preliminary reports by domestic and international observers judged the polls credible. The IEBC declared Kenyatta the victor in the first round with just over 54% of the vote. His nearest opponent, Odinga, received just under 45% of votes cast. However, controversy soon emerged over the transmission of results, and would form the basis for legal challenges in the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, protests against the results, fueled by the opposition’s claims that the results system was hacked and the outcome falsified, led to violence across several parts of the country, especially the informal settlements of Nairobi and in Nyanza and western parts of Kenya. Nearly 40 people were killed and many more seriously injured, most thought to be the victims of police brutality and targeted attacks.5

On September 1, the Supreme Court by a majority decision of 4 to 2 annulled the results of the presidential election. The Court based its decision on “irregularities and illegalities,” including non-compliance with Constitutional principles and standards for the conduct of a presidential election. The Court did not rule on whether the results reflected the will of the people, but it did explicitly note that neither the IEBC nor the Kenyatta administration committed deliberate fraud.

3 Kenya has a two-round presidential election system whereby a single candidate must win over 50% of the votes cast to avoid a runoff between the candidates receiving the most votes. Kenyatta won 50.7% in the first round. 4 The IEBC found itself embroiled in numerous court cases on almost every major activity in preparation for the election, including the audit of the voter register, procurement of ballot papers, procurement and adoption of technology, timelines for party primaries and the resignation of public servants contesting elections. 5 According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. Some media sources put the figure higher.



In accordance with the Court’s decision and Article 138 of the Constitution, the IEBC subsequently set a date of October 17 for a repeat or “fresh” presidential election. However, legal and procedural ambiguities regarding the repeat polling, combined with internal divisions amongst the Commission members and a number of threats against the IEBC and judiciary, would greatly affect preparations. The election date was postponed to October 26.

The repeat poll was initially expected to be a runoff between Kenyatta and Odinga.6 Odinga, however, withdrew from the race due to claims that the IEBC had been compromised and would not undertake the necessary reforms per a specific list of opposition demands, which eventually resulted in a boycott of the October 26 elections in several parts of the country.

Preparations for the October poll were fraught with challenges and controversy, including public statements by Chairman Chebukati on the IEBC’s lack of credibility, the sudden departure of Commissioner Roselyn Akombe, and the Supreme Court’s failure to hear the opposition’s appeal on the eve of the election. In the end, the IEBC decided not to hold voting in 26 of Kenya’s 290 constituencies due to threat of further violence.

President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared winner of the presidential election and sworn in on November 28, 2017 for a second and final term as President. The opposition, having failed in the appeals to the Supreme Court, refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the election and continued a series of protests, boycotts, and calls for succession. These actions culminated in a mock swearing-in of Odinga as the “People’s President” on January 30, 2018. The government temporarily shut down media outlets, including leading television news programs that broadcast the event. The country grew increasingly politically and ethnically polarized, and the mood tense, as the opposition’s resistance continued into March 2018.

Events turned quickly, however, on March 9, 2018, with a surprise meeting between Kenyatta and Odinga, referred to as the “Handshake.” The statement released during the event prioritized nine areas of reform, including inclusivity in governance and political processes. Kenyatta and Odinga later appointed a 14-member team to implement the unity deal and lead a national dialogue.

Fallout from the 2017 election process, including reforms brought about by the national dialogue, will likely result in changes to the electoral legal framework and the country’s electoral institutions, including the IEBC. Meanwhile, the Chairman’s suspension of the IEBC’s CEO this April in order to conduct an audit of recent procurements, followed by the resignation of three Commissioners in protest, has thrown the institution into considerable disarray and uncertainty.

USAID’S STRATEGY 2017 A joint election strategy, which informed programming of USAID and other U.S. agencies, guided election assistance in the run-up to the 2017 general elections in Kenya. The approach of the U.S. mission in Kenya could serve as an example to many missions that, despite working in highly contested and potentially destabilizing political environments, do not have a USG joint election strategy that harmonizes diplomatic interventions and development assistance.

6 However, following a Supreme Court ruling to reinstate an additional candidate from the August 8 election, the IEBC decided to include all eight original candidates in the repeat poll.



USAID/KEA took the lead in formulating the strategic direction of election assistance priorities through an initial draft strategy paper.7 The 2015-2018 draft strategy paper identified several challenges to holding credible and peaceful elections, such as the IEBC’s lack of credibility, and threats to CSOs and media. It also identified potential flashpoints for violence, including ethno-political tensions, sharp political polarization, land disputes, lack of democratization of political parties, marginalization of women, regional imbalances, and insufficient reforms in the security sector. Sadly, each of these issues would factor into the conflict and electoral violence that would occur in 2017. The draft strategy paper focused technical assistance on restoring public confidence in Kenya’s electoral process and institutions (especially the IEBC), building social cohesion and ethnic harmony ahead of the election, providing long-term support to oversight mechanisms, and mobilizing women and youth to register as voters and candidates. By and large, these strategic objectives coincide with the objectives and activities contained in the USG joint strategy.

The USG joint election strategy was an effort to address a key lesson from the 2013 elections: to pursue a balanced approach in seeking to promote peaceful, but also credible, elections. This goal of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections was to be the focus of both diplomatic and programmatic interventions, and included four main strategic sub-objectives:

Enhanced professionalism, independence, and efficiency of the IEBC and judiciary;

Enhanced accountability and transparency of the electoral process;

Strengthened citizen engagement and women and youth leadership; and

Violence prevention and conflict mitigation.

This report organizes the findings and conclusions from USAID assistance around these four sub-objectives.

Sub-objectives were further reflected in specific activities that largely mirrored those proposed in the 2015-18 strategy paper. The strategy also underlined the importance of active collaboration and coordination with USAID/Washington, U.S. Embassy colleagues, and interagency actors, as well as with Kenyan stakeholders and other development partners.

After the Kenyan Supreme Court annulled the August presidential election, USAID formulated a revised program strategy for the support of the October election. This strategy, “USAID/Kenya and East Africa Strategy to Support the Fresh Presidential Election,” was aligned with other interagency strategy and planning documents and was consistent with earlier strategic priorities and goals, while taking into consideration the new electoral-political context and the heightened risk of conflict and violence. Like the USG joint strategy for the August election, it aimed to ensure that the October poll was credible and peaceful, and if conflict ensued, to help secure peace and order, rebuild social cohesion, restore the political legitimacy of key institutions, and respond to humanitarian needs.

USAID’s technical assistance under this new strategy would continue its focus on support to the IEBC. However, this assistance was to be conditioned on the institution’s transparency and openness to working with USAID partners, and the attitudes of the two leading political candidates towards the institution. The new strategy sought to prevent and mitigate new conflicts and address existing trauma from post-election violence in August, as well as balance short-term electoral needs with the long-term priorities of strengthening key political processes

7 Draft USG Strategic Focus on Electoral Assistance to Kenya: 2015-2018.



and institutions, including the judiciary, political parties, and civil society. The strategy again emphasized working with other donors to establish a common vision and support of the October election, and included new activities such as support for conflict-sensitive journalism and combating fake news, with a focus on community and popular media in areas with an elevated risk for violence. It also expanded USAID support for human-rights observation.

Odinga’s sudden withdrawal from the repeat presidential poll would necessitate several changes to the assistance activities under the October program strategy, and triggered discussions within USAID as to whether a boycotted election could fit into the strategic goal of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. USAID/KEA carefully considered the implications for programs, and the complicated and delicate questions of legitimacy and risk of violence given this fluid environment; in some cases, it modified activities accordingly.8

Findings

USAID/KEA’s 2015-2018 draft strategy paper shows thoughtful approaches and early leadership within the USG. Similarly, the USAID/KEA program strategy for the October poll, as well as decisions to revise activities following Odinga’s withdrawal from the election, displayed leadership and carefully guided assistance efforts within a delicate, highly contentious environment.

USAID/KEA showed flexibility in addressing the complex and unpredictable electoral process in Kenya by making some important decisions. For example, support to results management and reporting was intentionally limited due to increased political sensitivity and risks. After the post-election violence in August, USAID/KEA put greater emphasis on monitoring human rights violations.

While a strategy must prioritize certain areas at the expense of others, the assessment team could not discern how strategic priorities and decisions were made — for example, why the mission decided initially to provide minimal media sector support, or why engagement with political parties was limited to working with women, youth, and persons with disabilities. While USAID/KEA relied on several assessments of 2013 electoral support to inform programming, in comparison to the 2013 elections, USAID made less use of analytical reports and public opinion survey data to inform strategies and activities during implementation.

Conclusions

USAID was instrumental in contributing to and updating an interagency strategic vision that included both diplomatic and technical assistance interventions in support of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections in Kenya. As a result, the USG joint strategy and October program and diplomatic strategies reflected a shared understanding of the pre-electoral environment and identified key threats to a peaceful and credible election. USAID should assume a similar role in support of a joint strategic approach that would provide a coherent vision for assisting the election process in 2022.

The USAID draft strategy paper stated, “multiple USAID elections evaluations have stressed that elections need to be viewed as a process, not a point in time, and

8 For example, when training party agents ran the risk of appearing to support just one party, USAID/KEA decided to postpone political party work until after the election. The planned support to ELOG’s PVT shifted to an observation mission, which still drew statistically viable conclusions about the process. USAID also decided to provide a strategic communications consultant to assist the embattled IEBC with addressing transparency and public relations issues.



investments in elections are needed early when the election administration and country can better absorb the assistance.” Strategy development for the 2017 elections did not entirely reflect this advice, in that elections assistance became a USAID priority considerably late in the electoral cycle. Even though some electoral assistance was continued following 2013, the first draft strategic paper only came into being in 2015.

The election strategies identified many political issues and challenges; however, much of the assistance was technical in nature, such as support and advice to the IEBC and judiciary with operations and technology issues. Such efforts revealed that technical assistance by itself cannot resolve certain deep societal divisions and structural issues, and hence limitations should be recognized and acknowledged from the start. Strategies and activities might have reflected a more even balance between support to the IEBC, judiciary, and other institutions, and support to civil society, political parties, human rights, and media.

Both the August and October electoral strategies identified substantial funding and human resource needs in advance of these elections, which likely contributed to obtaining these resources. USAID/KEA successfully mobilized additional funds and short-term staff using a variety of rapid-response mechanisms, and in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy and USAID/Washington. However, some resources and staff were deployed only very close to Election Day.

FROM STRATEGY TO ACTIVITY: IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS USAID/KEA considered a variety of mechanisms to support several key activities in support of the 2017 elections. The choice of mechanisms had important implications for programming and impact that merit further discussion. Many of the assessment team’s observations regarding these mechanisms should be taken into consideration when designing future electoral assistance programs in Kenya. They can also be of value to other missions.

UNDP Basket Fund

One such mechanism was the UNDP basket fund for the Strengthening Electoral Processes in Kenya (SEPK) project, implemented by UNDP in partnership with UN Women, OHCHR, and UNODC under the “Delivering as One” principle. This fund follows a similar arrangement set up to support the 2013 elections.9 While UNDP envisioned that the project would start in January 2015, it was not until September 2015 that USAID became the fund’s initial donor, with an investment of USD 3.8 million, to be later increased to USD 4.35 million.

Using the UNDP basket fund provided certain advantages to USAID/KEA. USAID was able to make a relatively small investment in elections yet support a number of activities, including human-rights monitoring, technical assistance to the IEBC, and training and assistance to conflict mitigation and security-sector actors. It also provided USAID/KEA a “seat at the table” of the SEPK Donors Group and Project Steering Committee. The return on this investment was considerable: USAID/KEA enjoyed influence on the basket fund’s direction and priorities.

9 USAID/KEA’s contributions to this basket fund totaled just over USD 6 million from March 2010 to December 2013.



Participating in the basket fund also provided USAID an opportunity to engage with the IEBC and other key stakeholders early in the election cycle. USAID/KEA issued a solicitation for a new elections program around the same time; however, due to procurement issues this program would not begin until the following spring, in the form of the Kenya Electoral Assistance Program (KEAP). In supporting SEPK and KEAP, USAID was able to have more than one entry point with key interlocutors and processes. This approach was validated during the period when KEAP’s prime implementer, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), faced problems that briefly interrupted programming.

One of the largest drawbacks of the basket fund mechanism is lack of control of the activities. UNDP determines the priorities and designs the project. While donors, including USAID, conditioned some funds in the current basket, USAID/KEA had considerably less influence in program design and implementation than it would through a standalone USAID election-assistance program.10

For donors with a high degree of management and financial controls, a basket fund potentially incurs additional risk, especially if the fund follows national as opposed to direct implementation, as it did with the 2013 project. Concerns about the management of funds in 2013 caused some donors to hesitate to participate in the new basket fund.11 These concerns were abated by the switch to a direct implementation modality for the current basket fund; however, it is possible that future funds could revert to national implementation.

Finally, the implementation of activities in the basket fund is largely limited to the UN agencies. While this may seem an obvious point, USAID/KEA has at times desired technical capacities in elections assistance, political party programing, election observation, and other areas of election work that it feels may be better provided by other organizations and technical specialists. If financial resources are scarce, this consideration may temper USAID’s willingness to invest in a “seat at the table” in future election cycles.

Kenya Electoral Assistance Program

The other major new mechanism for elections assistance was the Cooperative Agreement issued to IFES for KEAP. In 2013, USAID managed ten separate mechanisms related to elections assistance — KEAP effectively reduced this number to four for the 2017 elections.12 A “one-stop shop” for the bulk of elections programming had several potential advantages, mainly having to do with efficiencies in USAID/KEA’s program management, procurement and other contractual actions, and reporting obligations. However, it seemed these benefits did not always materialize, or were outweighed by other issues that at least in part could be attributed to the single-award mechanism and structure of the consortium.

As a standard practice, election assistance has separate providers for election observation and election administration. This was noted by donors as a concern in Kenya following the 2007

10 Even with conditioned funding, program reporting is based on the entire basket fund, which prevented clear attribution of activities and impact to the individual donor contributions. 11 Two donors requested money be returned from the basket fund due to concerns about the IEBC’s use and management of those funds. 12 These awards were to International Development Law Organization (IDLO), IFES (for KEAP), UNDP (basket fund), and the Carter Center.



elections.13 The assessment team found no evidence that the work in either area was compromised by grouping it together through IFES under KEAP. However, the structure of the program did create the possibility for some conflict of interest. Implementers of the community-based conflict mitigation work expressed a similar concern.

Placing conflict, elections administration, inclusion, election observation, and other programming under the single award within the structure of KEAP created issues between the prime implementer and subgrantees. Programming was not always easily split by component, and IFES and subgrantees shared responsibilities in areas such as voter education and conflict prevention. While the work was complementary, tasks were not always clearly divided.14

The prime implementer is ultimately responsible for successful execution of all program components. IFES believed that some subgrantees were underperforming, and it had the responsibility to address and remedy such situations. At the same time, some of the same subgrantees felt they had greater competencies in certain disciplines and were accustomed to implementing USAID programs without an intermediary. Such dynamics raised tensions among the consortium members and detracted from implementation. However, it appeared that any issues were successfully resolved, at times with the direct involvement of USAID. If such a mechanism is used in the future, USAID/KEA should carefully develop clear programmatic distinctions, areas of responsibility and reporting lines.

Supporting many activities through a single mechanism had the unintended consequence of “linking” or increasing risks to implementation across different activities. When IFES’s activities drew the attention of the government, IFES was forced to cease programming for a brief spell. Subgrantees cited a need to dissociate from IFES at this time, and at least one major subgrantee declined to accept work under the project. When resuming the program, IFES proceeded with obvious caution. These developments, all within several months of the election, delayed important procurements and affected each project component.

USAID may have placed too many requirements in the award that undermined the flexibility needed to operate in Kenya’s fluid electoral environment. Although a cooperative agreement gave the mission and implementers greater flexibility than under a contract, the KEAP award conditions initially allowed spending only in certain components, and within these subcomponents (for example, support to ORPP and IEBC in party regulation and campaign finance), and not others (for example, election law reform).15 KEAP’s prime grantee and subgrantees were restricted in this manner to focus the assistance on key beneficiaries and critical needs. However, in implementing elections work within dynamic political environments such as Kenya, USAID should consider whether these restrictions were necessary, and give greater latitude to implementing partners. For the same reason, the use of grants and cooperative agreements rather than contracts should be continued for elections and political process assistance.

Rapid Response Mechanisms

USAID/KEA utilized two additional “Rapid Response” mechanisms to source funds in the period before the unscheduled October election. These Rapid Response mechanisms are essentially 13 Evaluation of USAID Electoral Assistance to Kenya, January 2008- August 2013, June 2014. 14 One example was in the conflict prevention programming, where there was overlap at regional and local levels. 15 These restrictions were removed by KEAP Award Modification #2 on September 27, 2016.



obligated funds within existing USAID Leader Awards that are not tied to any country budget — missions can apply for the funds for unseen election events, contingencies or crises.16 These funds enabled USAID/KEA to respond with programming in line with the new strategy for the October election.

Through the Global Elections and Political Transitions Leader Award, USD 1.88 million in Rapid Response funds were accessed to engage in party agent training, conduct additional election observation and Election Dispute Resolution (EDR) activities, and facilitate dialogue across parties and institutions during the heated campaign and election results periods.17 Through the Human Rights Support Mechanism (HRSM) Leader Award, a similar fund was accessed to initiate programs with Freedom House and Internews to address the deteriorating human rights environment and election-related media issues, including fake news and hate speech.

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 1: ENHANCED PROFESSIONALISM, INDEPENDENCE, AND EFFICIENCY OF IEBC AND THE JUDICIARY Support to Election Management and Administration

For the March 2013 elections, USAID provided substantial election administration support through UNDP and IFES, including capacity-building for the newly-created IEBC in election planning and management, and assistance with voter registration, results transmission, civic and voter education, political party oversight and EDR. Closer to Election Day, this capacity-building approach evolved into more urgent technical assistance with various electoral operations. USAID/KEA’s support to the IEBC concluded with post-election review activities and project closeout.18

In September 2015, USAID/KEA began supporting election administration in the run-up to 2017 elections through its investment in the new UNDP basket fund. Through UNDP’s SEPK project, USAID provided assistance to the IEBC’s central, regional, and local election personnel, and security officials involved in election operations and policing. In May of 2016, USAID awarded KEAP, which contained a substantial component of election administration support to be implemented by IFES.19 The primary beneficiary was the IEBC, although technical assistance was also provided to the ORPP, PPDT, and police.

USAID supported a range of activities through both programs. International and local advisors worked closely with the IEBC on logistics, strategic communications, legislative development, dispute resolution, and information and communication technology (ICT). USAID’s partners

16 The KEAP program also had USD 250,000 in funding reserved for rapid-response interventions. 17 As described earlier, due to Odinga’s withdrawal, many activities had to be postponed or reprogrammed in the post-election period. 18 Election administration support through UNDP ended prior to the project’s close in December 2014. CEPPS/IFES closed in June of 2014. 19 The total budget for the component was set at USD 6 million; however, this amount also included the funding allocated to EDR and voter education activities.



developed several systems to aid election administration, including an election-operations tracking system, a document management system for archiving election forms, tools for risk management and storage and disposal of election materials, and assistance with operational plans, such as the National Talley Center Operational Plan.

Before the August poll and again before the October repeat election, USAID implementers supported training for the newly appointed IEBC Commissioners, as well as training programs for additional election officials.20 USAID/KEA also supported capacity-building for electoral security personnel, including the development of manuals and other guides and the training of up to 180,000 officers from the Kenyan police and other security agencies.

USAID assistance was instrumental in voter registration, providing technical personnel and registration kits, educational campaigns, and training guides and seminars for voter registration clerks and ICT staff. USAID’s support also included strategic communications, work with the IEBC in voter outreach, and legal assistance with drafting registration requirements and resolving electoral disputes.

Findings

USAID/KEA’s assistance to the IEBC improved election preparations in several priority areas, such as operations and logistics, planning, the application of technologies, voter education, and voter registration. The decision to support the IEBC and the technical assistance provided by USAID and implementing partners was key to several of the IEBC’s achievements in the 2017 election.

Supporting voter registration addressed a critical need and contributed to the IEBC’s ability to register many new voters, especially youth. USAID/KEA partners assisted the IEBC in creating a variety of educational and awareness materials for voter registration, including the IEBC’s voter registration week campaign. Partners quickly mobilized resources to distribute additional voter registration materials and personnel; this successfully addressed shortcomings in the voter registration process.

Despite invoking the electoral-cycle approach in key strategies and project documents, much of USAID/KEA’s support to election administration came late. Some activities from USAID’s 2013 election program carried over into 2014; however, these projects were more “lessons learned” and not necessarily designed with the next election in mind. The gap in programs was partially due to funding constraints and procurement and startup delays — factors which, to an extent, were beyond USAID/KEA’s control.

The changes in both IEBC Commissioners and KEAP Key Personnel impacted the timing and flow of USAID/KEA’s assistance. Election assistance was in catch-up mode; implementing partners had to work hurriedly with the IEBC, USAID, and each other to see where their assistance could be most useful within a compressed time period, rather than following a longer-term, structured plan.

Despite USAID/KEA’s efforts to strengthen the IEBC’s strategic communications and outreach capacities, such capacities remained insufficient. The IEBC did not always communicate its preparedness or progress as Election Day approached, resulting in less

20 These were generally training-of-trainers programs, or programs tailored for specific IEBC officials at the regional level.



confidence in the institution as election events transpired, including those related to disputes on results.

Having more than one implementer providing technical assistance to electionadministration had advantages: UNDP contributed to election planning in ways notpossible through KEAP due to the delayed start of this program. However, there wassome degree of overlap in areas of assistance, with both implementers reporting onsuccesses in election planning and monitoring timelines, reviewing logistics andoperational issues, developing political party registration guidelines and materials,training, etc. While the assistance provided did not appear to be redundant orduplicative, interlocutors noted that greater coordination would have been welcome.

Lingering concerns about the IEBC’s fiscal management, reductions in overallassistance budgets, competing priorities, and the fact that elections in 2013 were largelysuccessful and peaceful were all factors that contributed to donors’ deemphasis ofelection administration needs for 2017. USAID focused on Kenya’s devolution andprioritized resources around this process and did not support institutional reform andcapacity development within the electoral management until late 2015. Nevertheless,USAID/KEA was instrumental in refocusing donor efforts on electoral administrationsupport at this time.

USAID assistance operated within the realities and constraints of Kenya’s politics. AllIEBC Commissioners were removed in early October 2016, and a new commission wasappointed just 170 days prior to elections. This compounded problems of the late startand confusion with implementer mandates and required rebuilding key relationshipswithin a brief period. Complicating matters further, accusations against IFES concerningits role in the country’s electoral processes slowed activities in late December 2016 andled to the loss of key technical and management personnel. IFES and USAID’sapproaches to election management support were necessarily more measured, if notconservative, after such events.

The USAID-supported document management system offered a logical and easysolution to problems with results transmission identified in the August poll. However,USAID/KEA and implementers determined that the IEBC had sufficient resources toresolve the issue without USG assistance. Involvement with election results transmissionat that late stage would have implied some ownership of this process and would haveincurred considerable risks. Staying with a measured, cautious approach to assistingwith results transmission appeared to be the correct course of action.

The IEBC and other election institutions remain cooperative and open to USAID support.This is important as USAID’s objective of helping ensure Kenya has peaceful andcredible elections would be challenged absent direct engagement with the IEBC.However, cooperation in 2017 was tempered towards the end of the electoral cycle, asthe capacity to engage was lower due to the many demands of the election. Electionofficials are also generally more risk averse closer to Election Day.

Support to Election Dispute Resolution (EDR)

USAID/KEA’s support to EDR in Kenya was built around the experiences from the 2013 election cycle. During this period, USAID/KEA’s partner International Development Law Organization

Conclusions



(IDLO) worked with several judicial institutions, including the ad-hoc Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations (JWCEP) under the program Supporting the Implementation of the New Constitution of Kenya.

For the 2017 election cycle, USAID assistance continued through IDLO within the current judicial support program that has operated from February 2013. IDLO has supported the now permanent Judiciary Committee on Elections (JCE) through capacity-building for judges, magistrates, and staff; the development and revisions of election petition rules; inputs into election law reform; the development of a Bench Book on EDR; FAQs and other civic education materials; and support for research and administration of election cases.

Assistance also extended to other institutions empowered with EDR functions by the 2010 Constitution, including the IEBC and PPDT.21 USAID/KEA supported these institutions through both IDLO and IFES (KEAP) to develop rules of procedure and model rules on internal dispute resolution for political parties, and furnishing research staff, computers, websites, and case management systems. IFES also trained the IEBC Legal Department and other staff on EDR issues, and assisted in drafting guidelines for FAQs, an EDR operations strategy, and violations to the Code of Conduct.

Findings

The longer-term, continuous support from USAID to institutions involved in EDR, in particular the JCE, has helped make these investments successful and more sustainable. Activities had buy-in from the leadership of the judiciary at all levels and were prioritized across the institution.

Although USAID previously focused on post-election petitions, its support for the 2017 elections recognized that dispute resolution is important at all stages of the electoral cycle and targeted both the pre-election and post-election phases. This recognition helped ensure that the judiciary, PPDT, and IEBC were ready to handle the volume of disputes before them during the different campaign and election periods.

IDLO and USAID/KEA successfully managed risks to their programs brought on by accusations from certain political factions. The IDLO leadership, supported by USAID and U.S. Embassy, engaged high-level officials when necessary to maintain support for the program and activities. Project partners, including Kenya Law Reform Commission and the JCE, made public statements supporting the work of IDLO in Kenya, while IDLO itself adopted an effective policy of non-response to the media.

Some EDR interventions appear to have been ineffective — for example, two separate case management systems developed by IFES and IDLO were underutilized by the PPDT and JCE. The problems did not appear to be technical, nor the efforts duplicative, but were related to time constraints and lack of planning. Beneficiaries did not have the time to integrate these systems within the wider judiciary, nor the resources to operate them given existing procedures for filing election petitions. PPDT, however, is using the case management system for post-election disputes.

21 PPDT also assumed key responsibilities in EDR related to party primaries through the 2016 amendments to the Political Parties Act.



Conclusions

Support to EDR followed an election-cycle approach and did not stop after the 2013 elections, continuing through events and publications by JWCEP and others.22 Such an approach helped the judiciary to consolidate previous gains and undergo reforms that would be critical to EDR in 2017, such as the transformation from the ad-hoc JWCEP to the permanent JCE. These measures also helped judicial institutions to cope with the large volume of petitions in 2017.

Case management is a critical component of EDR: the volume and nature of disputes generally follow key electoral deadlines and processes, such as candidate registration or declaring results. Often, multiple jurisdictions between judicial and administration institutions deal with electoral dispute matters. Attempts to create case management systems in Kenya must consider the staff required to operate them, as well as hardware and network needs. Such systems will also need to address potential chokepoints caused by existing rules of procedure and practices. In addition, election case management systems should be integrated into the larger judicial case management plans. All these considerations require a comprehensive and long-term approach to case management, which was not always followed by USAID/KEA implementers in 2017.

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 2: ENHANCED ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY Support to Election Observation

USAID has made consistent investments in international and domestic election observation in Kenya. During the 2013 elections, USAID/KEA provided USD 1.5 million towards the Carter Center’s observation of the long-term, Election Day and post-election environments. Through the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), USAID supported an NDI pre-election delegation to assess electoral preparations, identify gaps and offer recommendations. The Election Observation Group (ELOG) was created in 2010 after the Kriegler report recommended a permanent and professional domestic observation platform.23 USAID provided funding for ELOG’s observation activities and technical assistance through NDI for the 2013 elections and was the largest donor of civic observation.

Beginning in February 2017, USAID invested USD 1.43 million in an international observation effort, again through the Carter Center.24 The Carter Center maintained a core team of experts based in Nairobi and six long-term observer teams throughout Kenya, and implemented a short-term mission consisting of 100 observers in 157 of Kenya’s 290 constituencies for the August

22 See for example: Balancing the Scales of Electoral Justice: Resolving Disputes from the 2013 Elections and the Emerging Jurisprudence (IDLO and JTI, 2016). 23 Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections Held in Kenya on 27 December 2007. 24 This was eventually expanded to USD 2.32 million to support monitoring of the electoral environment following the Supreme Court’s nullification of the August presidential election and repeat polling in October.



election. USAID also supported a delegation of NDI experts during an April 2017 pre-election assessment mission and a short-term international observation mission in August.

Under KEAP, USAID/KEA again provided the largest contribution to ELOG’s monitoring efforts, USD 1.58 million.25 Through its member organizations, ELOG focused on pre-election monitoring, Election Day observation, and monitoring of results tabulation and dispute resolution. Two hundred ninety Long-Term Observers (LTOs) were deployed throughout the country beginning in March 2017, focusing on electoral preparations and campaign activities, as well as several thematic areas including media, campaign finance, voter education, campaign-related violence and hate speech. On Election Day, ELOG fielded 8,300 Short-Term Observers (STOs), including those who participated in PVTs for the presidential election and gubernatorial races in Busia, Meru, and Nairobi.26 ELOG also fielded observers at the tally centers.

Security constraints, the absence of a competitive election following Odinga’s withdrawal and uncertainty over whether the election would go ahead until shortly before the poll, resulted in a less comprehensive assessment of voting processes in the October “fresh” election. ELOG reduced its coverage to include only 215 of 264 constituencies where polling took place. The Carter Center redeployed LTOs, but did not field STOs, and consequently did not assess voting on Election Day. NDI did not field an observation team in the second round of polling.

The Carter Center, NDI, and ELOG issued several important statements of their key findings throughout the August election, including on ELOG’s PVT results, as well as statements on the Supreme Court decision nullifying the presidential election and on the October repeat poll. Post-election, ELOG has been monitoring court petitions and is planning several activities to amalgamate recommendations for electoral reform.

Findings

Observation missions supported by USAID/KEA provided an independent account of the electoral environment, and interlocutors widely complimented the missions’ reports and statements. The role of international observation in Kenya came under significant scrutiny following the August poll, however, when positive statements about the election were mistakenly construed as support for the winning candidate, and then questioned in light of the Supreme Court ruling. Public credibility of international observation was unfairly undermined by this backlash.

ELOG received less financial support to observe the elections than in 2013 and limited its monitoring of different issues surrounding the campaign and election periods. Funding for ELOG’s election monitoring work was not awarded until January 2017, which affected several monitoring activities and overall capacities.27 For example, ELOG was unable to monitor the pre-electoral period from the start or the IEBC’s mass voter-registration activities.

Technical assistance provided by USAID/KEA through NDI to ELOG was critical in ensuring that ELOG adopted and executed proper methodologies. NDI provided onsite

25 The UK provided ELOG the equivalent of USD 1.32 million, which, along with other smaller contributions, brought the total budget for the 2017 election monitoring activities to around USD 3 million. 26 A PVT uses a representative sample of polling stations in the country to provide an estimation of results parallel to official results, within an accepted margin of error. 27 Funding was to begin in October 2016 through a subgrant issued by NDI but was delayed until January 2017 to address several administrative and financial arrangements within the consortium prior to award.



assistance with data collection and analysis, reporting, setting up the PVT simulation exercise, and trouble-shooting.

International and domestic monitoring groups closely coordinated their activities at both the national and local levels, improving the overall quality of observation. In addition to information sharing, international observation missions can give greater voice to domestic observer findings and have better access to key interlocutors to report important findings. ELOG in particular cited the role of international observer groups in bringing issues to the attention of the IEBC.

The PVT results compiled by ELOG reflected the official IEBC tally within the accepted margin of error. However, the PVT findings had limited impact as an independent account of results for media, parties, and the public during the charged post-election period when the opposition rejected the official results. Findings of the various missions were politicized and sometimes taken out of context. However, they were successful in contributing to the international community’s diplomatic engagement and policy decisions.

ELOG members made several attempts to reach out to and include the media and political parties in their events; however, these efforts were generally unsuccessful. Adding a spokesperson later in the 2017 campaign helped ELOG improve its public profile, although this change came too late to fully address this issue. Nevertheless, ELOG’s observations and findings enjoyed greater media attention than in 2013.

Domestic observation can be a risky and even dangerous undertaking. ELOG employed several risk-management measures to facilitate its work and keep operations afloat. Members developed security and safety plans for their operations and staff, and trained observers on these measures. ELOG also planned responses for a number of potential developments and scenarios within the campaign, including draft statement language for different election outcomes.

ELOG’s methodology was challenged when it came to assessing the transmission of results, a process which is often abstruse and not always well understood by observer groups, media and the general public. Lack of information and understanding of the technical details behind results transmission made it difficult to implement measures to observe this process comprehensively.

Conclusions

USAID-supported observation missions offered a host of electoral reform recommendations to the IEBC, political parties, and other stakeholders, which can serve as a roadmap for legal and technical reforms. USAID/KEA should work with domestic and international observers to consolidate and advocate these reforms.

The independence of observer missions is critical to their ability to provide an unbiased account of the quality and nature of election processes. According to interlocutors within the different observer groups, USAID/KEA and U.S. Embassy Nairobi respected this independence.

Regrettably, interpretations of observer comments ultimately undermined perceptions of the U.S.’s neutrality. Anticipating and preventing such scenarios in future will be difficult. To avoid possible confusion over U.S. policy on key issues, consideration should be given to using foreign dignitaries or technical experts, instead of high-ranking U.S.



political figures, to lead observer missions. This choice, however, is not completely within USAID’s control, and ultimately will depend on the specific dynamics in Kenya in future electoral cycles.

The total cost of election observation was roughly USD 4 million (between ELOG, Carter Center, and NDI). Availability of funds in future election cycles may require USAID to prioritize resources within this area of assistance. Given that domestic observation is important for the development of Kenya’s civil society, enjoys a greater reach and depth of coverage, and has fewer logistical demands, USAID/KEA should support these efforts even if at the expense of international observation missions. In such a scenario, USAID/KEA could still maintain its support for international observation through limited or long-term observer missions, reducing the Election Day component, or potentially through contributions to the observation activities of other international missions.

ELOG greatly benefited from NDI’s technical assistance. However, such assistance would be more valuable earlier in the electoral cycle and would enable ELOG members to acquire and hone skills and methodologies well before an election. Domestic observation optics are important — and sensitive. By 2022, Kenyan CSOs should develop the capacity to lead all aspects of Kenya’s domestic observation, with international partners addressing only specific, technical areas as needed. Several interlocutors felt that ELOG could have been more strategic in its communications during the 2017 elections. This includes the PVT outcome, which represented a critical piece of information that could help inform the public and parties about the accuracy of election results. USAID/KEA election-support programs should place greater emphasis on messaging results of any non-partisan, parallel tabulation, and building awareness of ELOG’s independence and political neutrality.

The timing of ELOG and Carter Center’s funding affected the scope and depth of their observation missions. Work must start earlier in an election cycle to effectively monitor important election organization processes, many of which affect voting rights and the quality of election administration. Similarly, important party developments, such as pre-campaign rhetoric, primaries, and credentialing of candidates began or occurred before USAID/KEA’s support could enable a robust monitoring effort. Such processes are often just as important as the Election Day and should be part of an observation effort.

USAID has successfully kept the Carter Center on the ground post-election to share findings and recommendations with different stakeholder groups and conduct legal analysis of election-related court rulings. USAID/KEA should consider also focusing post-election observation on potential electoral and political reforms, including within the IEBC, while avoiding funding post-election activities of observer groups that may overlap with programs of other USAID partners.

ELOG currently spans 10 organizations with different capacities and comparative advantages in monitoring and observation, enabling it to cover all regions of the country and to monitor different thematic issues in elections.28 However, it was not immediately clear who was the lead organization in terms of mission management and technical fields. USAID and other donors should review ELOG’s current organizational and

28 ELOG’s current members include: Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Centre for Governance and Development, Constitution and Reform Education Consortium, Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace, Institute for Education in Democracy, Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), National Council of Churches of Kenya, United Disabled Persons of Kenya, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SupKeM), and Youth Agenda.



financial management arrangements to strengthen the consortium well in advance of the 2022 elections. Such assistance could also potentially help avoid the kind of delays that affected their operations in 2017.

Recent Kenya elections seem most vulnerable at the point where observers have limited access and information — for example, in the transmission of results from polling stations and tally centers. Several new approaches to observing elections in light of these technologies might be incorporated in the methodologies of ELOG and other groups to improve the quality and comprehensiveness of election observation.29

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 3: STRENGTHENED CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND WOMEN AND YOUTH LEADERSHIP Support to Women and Youth Political Participation

USAID’s review of its support for Kenya’s 2013 elections concluded that despite many donor investments in political party support, political parties largely minimized the role of women in the electoral process.30 While Kenya has a progressive constitutional dispensation and saw an increase in the numbers of women in elective and appointed positions following the 2013 elections, several factors continued to contribute to an absence of women from political office, including traditional stereotypes concerning women in positions of power and authority, a lack of high-profile candidates, and insufficient financial resources to contest primaries and elections.31

For the 2017 elections, USAID/KEA decided to shift approaches away from activities that focused primarily on advocacy at the national level and decreasing women’s political marginalization, to identifying, training, and supporting women candidates for office. USAID/KEA’s activities were implemented by NDI through KEAP and also by UN Women under SEPK. NDI issued several subgrants to local organizations in September 2016 designed to assist women, youth and persons with disabilities to vie for office.32

Central to this approach was the training and mentorship of 5,000 women to prepare them to contest elective office in 2017. Directly and through its partner organizations, NDI sponsored activities to sensitize political party, religious, and community leaders and elders on women as candidates, and train and mentor women on leadership skills, campaign planning, and messaging. NDI’s partners also sought to improve women’s coverage in media by compiling candidate portfolios, training candidates on interviewing and press appearances, and working with journalists and media outlets to feature women candidates and platforms. NDI worked with the IEBC to educate youth and persons with disabilities on the election process, including how

29 See for example: Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies, Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), 2013. 30 USAID’s Support for Kenya’s 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review, February 2014. 31 See: FIDA Kenya, Kenya Gains and Challenges: A Gender of Audit of Kenya’s 2013 Election Process. 32 These CSOs included: Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA), Kenya Women’s Holding (Tuvuke), and Women’s Empowerment Link.



to run for office. Through partner KEWOPA, USAID facilitated mentorship and connections among existing parliamentarians and political aspirants.

USAID implementing partners also worked with the National Election Boards of political parties to support women in the areas of EDR and nomination guidelines developed with OPPR. Through KEAP, USAID/KEA contributed to the development of a Gender and Inclusion policy at the IEBC, as well as the requirements for nomination of candidates to office. UN Women also supported CSOs and the National Gender Equality Commission to advocate for and monitor adherence to the constitutional provision on gender balance in political representation.33 NDI and UNDP also assisted with the training of female candidates’ agents.

Findings

USAID/KEA’s programs identified several innovative interventions to address root causes of exclusion of women from political office — for example, seeking support from religious leaders and community elders for women and youth aspirants, or a fund for women who desire to run for office to save and borrow resources.

Linking women who seek political offices with those who have experience in campaigning and governing offered inspiration and mentorship, empowering several women who did run for, and sometimes win, office. As women’s political inclusion is an issue not easily addressed through technical assistance, this strategy should be repeated when designing future political and electoral support programs.

New activities supporting women’s efforts to run for office took place too late to influence the 2017 elections. Partners’ discussions with community elders and political party officials, building women’s public profiles, and training on campaign skills also had insufficient time to have serious impact on the party primaries.

The involvement of ORPP in programming was laudable due to the important role that it plays in the regulation and development of political parties in Kenya. However, local CSO partners’ expectations that ORPP would “rein in” political parties and compel them to nominate more women to meet the two-thirds gender requirement were misplaced, as ORPP’s powers do not extend this far.

Conclusions

USAID/KEA’s support for women, youth and persons with disabilities to be viable candidates built on previous efforts and ventured into new areas. Local Kenyan CSOs used their comparative advantages and networks to improve programming reach, at the same time building their own capacities and methodologies. As increasing the representation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in elective offices is a long-term goal, these efforts should be continued so as not to lose capacities or momentum before 2022.

It proved difficult to change the operating environment for women within the 2017 party primaries. USAID/KEA partners expressed frustration with the inability to hold parties accountable for their own pledges to support women candidates. Advancing women and youth in political life in Kenya requires sustained efforts that extend beyond the

33 According to Article 81 of the Constitution, a single gender can occupy no more than 2/3 of elected positions. However, this provision has yet to be fully enacted in the legislation.



campaign period. USAID/KEA should carefully review the impact of the 2017 election programs in support of women and youth candidates, balancing any short-term election support with longer-term approaches to greater inclusion in political life.

Important contributions were made through USAID assistance programs to institutions like the IEBC and National Election Boards of political parties and helped women and youth to contest elective office. However, such efforts did not go far enough or sufficiently consider the full influence of parties in this process. Future efforts to promote these groups’ participation as candidates in elections should more directly focus on the parties themselves.

The targeting of 5,000 women, although powerful in its symbolism, proved practically difficult and yielded few immediate results in terms of helping women candidates to contest and win office: in the 2017 elections, there were only 1259 women who contested seats (and 179 who were elected). Most women who participated in USAID/KEA programs to support women candidates chose not to run, citing lack of capital, family pressures, intimidation and other familiar reasons.34 However, such lists of potential candidates may prove more beneficial over the longer term as a useful database of women leaders in public and political life. In addition, the participants may simply require more time to mature into viable candidates, and more experience campaigning, than the current program afforded.

Support to Voter Education

External evaluations of the 2013 elections in Kenya were critical of voter education efforts by authorities and these programs’ lack of strategic focus.35 In 2013, USAID/KEA worked primarily through partner Uraia Trust, together with the IEBC, to develop a national civic education curriculum, “The Citizen Handbook,” to educate Kenyans on the electoral process and system. USAID/KEA continued to focus on civic education work through Uraia Trust until early 2016.

For the 2017 elections, USAID/KEA first supported official voter education through SEPK, including the development of the IEBC voter education strategy. SEPK supported the IEBC’s media campaign, and the development of a voter education curriculum and manual, which was also shared with CSOs.

Voter education also featured prominently in KEAP. IFES carried out substantial research on voter education needs, including on potential target demographic groups and messaging methodologies, by using existing statistics and conducting a series of focus groups. The findings became the basis for the IEBC’s educational campaign, YVOTE. Utilizing door-to-door education, traditional TV and radio media placements, and social media, the campaign sought to increase youth participation and confidence in elections and promote a peaceful 2017 election process. Further, under KEAP, Uraia Trust focused on civic and voter education for youth and marginalized groups, reaching out to these potential voters through a network of civic educators and a variety of educational materials.

Both KEAP and SEPK supported education efforts around voter registration, including IEBC’s voter registration week, through radio and TV announcements, roadshows and other methods. Through KEAP’s innovation grant program, USAID/KEA supported several CSOs implementing 34 NDI and FIDA, A Gender Analysis of the 2017 Kenya General Elections, February 2018. 35 See, for example: USAID 2013 Final Evaluation Report, and Supporting Kenya’s Election Processes: Lessons from Past Evaluations, Report Prepared for the Joint Donor Group on Elections, December 2014.



projects to increase voter registration and participation. IFES also provided technical assistance on messaging and outreach to its subgrant partners under KEAP.

KEAP’s voter education activities also used targeted messaging to encourage peace, bring reconciliation, and interrupt potential violence. USAID/KEA’s partners led peace and reconciliation campaigns such as Taifa Letu 2017 and #BetterThanThis, and called on Kenya’s youth to be active promoters of peace. IFES also designed a digital public awareness campaign for NCIC, “Zero Tolerance for Hate Speech,” to encourage a commitment to peaceful elections through the signing of a public pledge.

Findings

USAID/KEA partners’ use of evidence-based research was effective for prioritizing resources and designing voter education materials. The results of this research were shared with key beneficiaries, including the IEBC and CSOs, and used in media campaigns for voter registration and motivation of key groups, as well as to promote peaceful elections. USAID’s assistance facilitated important electoral processes like voter registration, an area where the Kenyan government and the IEBC had possibly placed insufficient attention.

Evidence-based research increased the quality of USAID assistance and programming across implementers. IFES shared its findings with KEAP partners to raise the overall quality of voter education efforts, and to share methodological approaches that might be useful in future work in this area.

Post-election studies conducted by KEAP show the wide reach of the digital voter education campaigns in particular. The IEBC’s YVOTE campaign had 104,815,233 unique impressions through Google, YouTube, AdWords banners and third party web sites, and a total of 16,667,755 people reached through social and digital media.36

Conclusions

USAID/KEA’s approach to voter education informed by research appeared to address one of the concerns of 2013, namely that money directed at such efforts lacked strategic focus. USAID should focus current technical assistance on consolidating successful voter education methodologies employed in 2017 at the IEBC and Kenyan CSOs active in voter and civic education.

Kenyans still require additional information about certain parts of the election process. USAID/KEA’s support in messaging concentrated mainly on voter motivation (including registration), the voting process, and conflict prevention. Future efforts might also include more complex issues like results transmission, trust in electoral institutions and processes, the role of observers, and acceptance of the results.

Voter awareness activities through digital media should build upon the efforts and lessons learned in 2017. For example, placements on Google, YouTube, and Facebook generally performed the best; however, Facebook ads presented a challenge for conflict prevention and rapid response due to text limits and vetting requirements. Also, these

36 Presentation: Social Media and the Kenyan Elections, Kenya Electoral Assistance Program.



ads often required active promotion to be successful. Unbranded ads had somewhat limited success in that the ads lacked a credible, known messenger.37

Voter education programs could be timed better with the specific periods of the electoral cycle that they seek to address. For example, to have greater impact, information campaigns on registration should occur before the IEBC’s voter registration week. The investment in evidence-based research to identify priority needs and demographic groups took place only after USAID/KEA had supported the development of the IEBC’s strategy for voter education, which may have limited the impact of this research.

Support to Media

During the 2013 elections, USAID/KEA provided significant support to media, most notably through Internews as a component of the CEPPS program. USAID/KEA acknowledged the grave issues faced by the media in the 2015-2018 election strategy paper and suggested robust media sector support. However, a focus on media did not materialize in the USG joint strategy prior to the August elections, and there was no dedicated media program for elections.

USAID/KEA did however provide some support to media and journalists within components of other election programs and activities. This included assistance through SEPK to draft Elections Coverage Guidelines together with Media Council of Kenya (MCK), and the training of print journalists and TV and radio stations on these guidelines. Through KEAP’s Innovation Grants, the Aga Khan Foundation organized a five-month program to train journalists on fair and accurate reporting of elections and political events. These trainings focused on priority regions and vernacular media outlets, covering issues such as hate speech, social media, fact-checking of citizen reports, and verification of candidates’ statements.

Through KEAP, the NDI/Tuvuke program also trained journalists on providing gender-balanced reporting when covering elections, and Act! worked with MCK, Association of Media Women in Kenya, and Kenya Union of Journalists to deliver conflict-sensitive reporting for journalists and radio stations.38 Observation groups funded by USAID monitored media, and various media outlets were used in educating the electorate.

Engagement with media did become an integral part of the strategy for the October election. Through HRSM, USAID launched a new nine-month media activity to improve election reporting, combat hate speech and misinformation, and support open dialogue on election processes.39 The project also includes post-election work through MCK and Kenya’s Editors’ Guild on detecting and countering fake news and improving journalists’ safety. MCK is also implementing media-literacy activities so that citizens can better detect disinformation and play a more active role in countering fake news and hate speech.

Findings

USAID/KEA’s election programming did not address weaknesses related to media freedoms and credibility. Rather, USAID partnered with several media institutions to

37 Ibid. 38 Conflict-sensitive reporting and countering hate speech were also included in other USG programs from State/CSO and the Embassy Public Affairs Section. 39 This project built on a previous State/DRL program that provided mentorship to community and vernacular media houses in Nairobi, Nakuru, and Kisumu, and supported roundtables with IEBC and media.



address discrete issues in elections, such as journalists’ ability to report on elections and political events and provide gender-balanced coverage.

While journalists may have attempted balanced, quality reporting on elections and political issues, this fact may have been partially moot as there was little discussion of real issues by parties. Appeals to ethnicity infiltrated media’s coverage of elections and dominated certain media outlets — vernacular radio stations, for example. Media ownership in Kenya remains non-transparent; major media sources are owned and controlled by political elites, a significant challenge to editorial independence.

The phenomenon of fake news was significant in Kenya’s 2017 elections. The problem was compounded by mainstream media that did not refute and frequently repeated false information. USAID/KEA programming adjusted to this new reality; however, it was likely too late to seriously address such a widespread issue.

Conclusions

Media assistance was one of the success stories of 2013. In hindsight, USAID/KEA’s withdrawal from the media sector may have been premature given the global trends of disinformation and the prominence of hate speech in Kenya that deepens ethnic and political divides. Recent events indicate media freedom in Kenya continues to be under threat — notably the shutdown of broadcasters who covered opposition post-election activities.

In response to events on the ground and changing dynamics after the August poll, USAID/KEA successfully mobilized new resources to address media issues, working with an organization already established in Kenya. In this sense, USAID/KEA did the best it could by rapidly responding with programs to address emerging problems. However, the activities had a post-election focus with no real effect on the pre-election period or Election Day. Some programs began only after the October election was over.

STRATEGY SUB-OBJECTIVE 4: VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CONFLICT MITIGATION. Support to Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Early Response (EWER)

Following the violence of the 2007 national elections, the international community invested heavily in strengthening the peace and conflict prevention infrastructure in Kenya. In the run-up to the 2013 elections, USAID and other donors supported key institutions, such as the NCIC and NSC, particularly through a UNDP project to support the Uwiano Platform for Peace. USAID/KEA also supported peace-messaging initiatives through its implementing partners. Fortunately, despite a fiercely contested election, wide-scale violence did not occur.

Use of conflict prevention mechanisms in Kenya decreased in the aftermath of the 2013 election. Interlocutors cited an overreliance on the benefits of forthcoming devolution and turnover in key agencies as major reasons for this change. However, USAID/KEA continued to support multiple projects that included a focus on conflict prevention during this period, including its program supporting devolution (AHADI), as well components of the Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism (SCORE), NiWajibu Wetu, Peace III and



Peaceful Empowerment in Arid Lands (PEARL) programs. Nevertheless, the peace infrastructure in Kenya, at least at the national level, had diminished ahead of the 2017 elections.

Against this backdrop, USAID/KEA decided to support conflict prevention and early warning early response (EWER) activities in its main elections assistance projects, SEPK and KEAP. Through SEPK, USAID invested in EWER systems, reengaged the coordinating mechanisms for peace and security, and trained election security personnel. SEPK also included monitoring of human rights violations through the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), including the violence after the August poll. USAID/KEA provided additional support to KNCHR for human-rights monitoring around the October election through Freedom House.

With a budget of USD 6 million, conflict mitigation was one of KEAP’s main components. IFES and a local CSO Act! carried out activities after the original implementer was removed from the KEAP consortium in the autumn of 2016.40 Mercy Corps, which conducted a similar program for State/CSO, had planned to take over this component but decided not to at the last minute because of the Kenyan government’s intense scrutiny of IFES during this period. Instead, Act! would expand its original local conflict prevention and EWER activities under KEAP from 4 to 10 counties, with IFES implementing conflict programming at the national level.41

Act! began its work in the initial four counties around November 2016. It developed a methodology that combined “hotspot” mapping; Conflict Mitigation Panels (CMPs) within local communities to bring together various actors including CSOs, religious leaders, and government and security services personnel; and rapid-response deployments to address potential conflicts. Act! also widely publicized the NSC early warning system (Code 108), and trained users on collecting data and updating the system. Act! expanded the reach of these programs in April and May 2017 through the additional funding for the counties east of Nairobi.42

KEAP implemented an extensive peace-messaging campaign, which consisted of select media and social media placements, peace caravans (road shows), radio programs, and other events. Act! also held county conversations on peaceful elections and youth forums, and trained journalists and radio stations on conflict-sensitive reporting. IFES supported additional CMPs, as well as rapid-response interventions, in fifteen counties east of Nairobi.

At the national level, USAID/KEA provided support to the IEBC, NCIC and CSOs through both KEAP and SEPK programs. Implementing partners assisted in the creation of the IEBC’s system to identify risks and potential conflicts, communication campaigns with the NCIC to combat hate speech and promote peace, coordination of multiple EWER systems with the national Uwiano system, and improvements to the national CSO Coordination Platform and regional coordination groups.

Findings

USAID/KEA’s interventions in conflict prevention were successful on the local level where deployed. USAID partners established mechanisms that could identify and quickly

40 The original member of the consortium was the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). 41 These counties included Lamu, Garissa, Tana River, Mombasa, Nairobi, Kilifi, Kwale, Marsebit, Isiolo, and Meru. 42 The total award was increased from around USD 400,000 to USD 2.17 million.



respond to diffuse potential conflicts. CMPs were able to work with both the security structures and potential conflict actors to mitigate potential violence.

The rapid rollout of programs in counties and sections of Nairobi was most successful where implementers already had an established presence. Act! was able to use existing relationships with CSOs and community leaders to establish CMPs quickly, which in turn were able to adopt project methodologies and intervene in potential conflicts almost immediately. Identifying and hiring project staff within local partners from previous projects facilitated oversight and management.

CSOs, government, implementers, and donors (including the USG) working in both conflict prevention and EWER used mapping to identify and prioritize potential “hotspots.” These mapping exercises were well coordinated, for example by dividing geographic regions amongst implementers and sharing data and findings. However, pinpointing election-related violence still proved challenging; violence also occurred in locations not identified by many conflict assessments, for example in some parts of Nairobi.

The need to change the KEAP conflict prevention implementer contributed to the delay of programming in some areas to as late as spring 2017. Programming was challenged and limited under such a timeframe. However, this development was largely outside the control of USAID/KEA.

Several USAID/KEA activities, including the reestablishment of the CSO platform, partially addressed the deterioration of the national conflict prevention infrastructure since 2013. However, interlocutors doubted the ability of Kenya’s institutions to address a serious conflict resulting from the 2017 election.

The state-civil society relationship in Kenya negatively impacted the credibility of the national conflict prevention EWER mechanisms. Relatively few CSOs were actively involved at the national level compared to 2013. Some interlocutors felt the emphasis within the national institutions shifted more to security and order as opposed to conflict mitigation.

There were several different interventions in conflict prevention EWER across the USG.43 Despite frequent coordination meetings, some partners did not seem aware of what other actors were planning or implementing, even within the same project — for example, the national and local activities of KEAP partners. Time constraints understandably challenged coordination.

Conclusions

Conflict in Kenya has underlying causes that are not election-related but deeply rooted within and between communities, such as age-old boundary disputes, the emergence of youth gangs, and resource competition. Violence related to elections in Kenya should therefore be viewed in the context of these root causes, rather than the election itself. Linking much of the election-period conflict prevention programming to ongoing projects

43 In addition to the USAID activities under KEAP and the projects listed above, State/CSO was funding the USD 2.1 million Kenya Election Violence Prevention (KEVP) program implemented by Mercy Corps in five counties in western Kenya. This initiative employed different methodologies but has components similar to the conflict prevention work under KEAP.



that deal with conflict and its root causes, rather than making it an activity implemented within the framework of elections assistance, may prove a more effective approach.

USAID/KEA partners’ long-term presence in locations where conflict prevention activities were focused facilitated implementation and mitigated risks. Inception meetings were held immediately with local leaders within parties, state security, and religious groups to garner support and buy-in to the program. In the absence of these relationships it is unlikely USAID/KEA’s assistance would have been as successful, given that electoral campaigns were underway by the time the program was fully operational.

Connecting conflict prevention activities to election programming within the same mechanism created challenges. There were doubts whether an elections-focused organization has capacity in conflict prevention, and whether local organizations could implement large-scale programming related to elections and conflict. Without evaluating the different organizations’ capacities, it is conceivable that this merger of activities and implementers might compromise programming.

Having two separate USG projects and approaches for conflict prevention around elections appeared to have been inevitable given the sources and timing of the activities. However, keeping programs fully separate may have resulted in some lost opportunities for leveraging resources, shared learning, and risk mitigation. If these programs can be more closely aligned during the planning stages, they may have greater impact. At a minimum, the lessons learned from the two approaches from 2017 should be reviewed in any future conflict prevention and EWER program design.

Beginning conflict prevention and EWER activities so close to the Election Day impacted programming. Planning, training, and project management were all stressed. Establishing strong mitigation structures where no capacities existed was not feasible, nor was transforming the project from a limited, “hotspot” approach to a wider program. Locally-based work in some areas took place only a few months prior to the August election, and was unable to address conflicts taking place during important election processes, such as party primaries and candidate nominations.

COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION Coordination and communication regarding the USG assistance for the 2017 elections were integral to the USG joint strategy, which promoted active interagency collaboration and close cooperation with key international partners in Kenya. It also called for coordination in working with the IEBC, civil society, and development partners, specifically within the Donor Group on Elections (DGE) and through the UNDP basket fund. The strategy’s plan to have “constant dialogue at all levels” was realized, with USAID/KEA staff actively participating in various coordination meetings.

Official International Community

USAID/KEA and U.S. Embassy Nairobi are widely recognized as leaders in both diplomacy and donor coordination efforts around elections. Providing a third of all funding, the USG was the leading driver behind electoral assistance, which enabled influence beyond USAID’s and State’s programs and activities. Interlocutors praised the U.S. Ambassador for his numerous



interventions, as well as the role U.S. officials played within the high ambassadorial group that crafted joint approaches, positions, and statements.

The principal mechanism of coordination was the DGE, consisting of technical and political officers of international missions. Within the DGE, six thematic areas provided means for donors and implementers to share updates and exchange information on specific areas of election support. The DGE has a rotating chair; unlike in 2013, the U.S. did not chair the group during the peak period of support for the 2017 elections. However, USAID and the U.S. Embassy were often looked to for their leadership, such as during the joint State/CSO-USAID coordination of various diplomatic observation activities. Through its investment in the UNDP basket fund, USAID/KEA wielded influence in decision-making within the project’s Donors Group and Joint Steering Committee.

Within the U.S. Mission

With the 2007 post-election violence and conflict as background, USAID/KEA held internal coordination meetings at several levels to discuss and plan for different scenarios beginning in the spring of 2017. As elections drew nearer, USAID/KEA held cross-sectoral meetings every week with the participation of various offices, such as the Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Food For Peace (FFP), Health, and the Program Office to coordinate electoral and humanitarian assistance and a number of contingency plans in the advent of widespread conflict and humanitarian disasters.44 Such contingency and humanitarian assistance planning was also aligned with the Kenyan government’s own emergency plans and those of international agencies such as the Red Cross and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). USAID’s mapping of “hotspots” based on existing NCIC and IEBC maps also increased the USG’s ability to respond to programmatic and potential humanitarian assistance needs. The Democracy, Governance and Conflict (DGC) team at USAID/KEA had regular election meetings closer to Election Day, and DGC staff prepared a weekly update of election developments and activities for multiple recipients within the USG. Coordination was also extended to regional levels, with local partners across USAID/KEA’s programs participating in planning meetings and WhatsApp alert groups.

The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi established an election working group, with USAID/KEA a key contributor. As the election date approached, the U.S. Embassy and USAID/KEA met daily. USAID/KEA also provided information and resources to the Ambassador on all electoral administration and assistance requests.

State/CSO-USAID coordination was highly effective in the USG’s election observation efforts, and potentially could be a model for interagency election observation. The U.S. mission was led by the State/CSO team in Nairobi who worked closely with USAID personnel — including additional temporary staff with significant experience in elections — in the preparation and delivery of training, and in reporting. State/CSO and USAID/KEA coordinated their programs in conflict prevention, dividing areas of focus geographically to prevent redundancies in efforts and extend the reach of the conflict prevention work.45

44 For example, FFP was able to call upon an additional USD 7.25 million in cash and in-kind resources to be used in the event of a crisis affecting access to food. 45 In Nairobi, this proved more difficult both between the USG programs and between the different implementers of USAID’s program.



Coordination could have been better at the program design stage. A number of interlocutors within State and USAID expressed frustration over the limited communication on what USAID/KEA was planning within its election-support program.

With Implementing Partners

There were frequent and regular coordination meetings among USAID/KEA and implementing partners. Interlocutors’ opinions varied greatly on the usefulness and utility of these meetings — in general, and perhaps not surprisingly, those partners with less access and fewer sources of information generally found them more helpful.

Somewhat paradoxically, a few local partner organizations felt there was insufficient information on USAID’s overall strategy and support for elections in Kenya. There were also instances of local implementers being unaware of USAID having provided the assistance it did, particularly when it was channeled through other organizations or the UNDP basket fund.

Communication between USAID and partners close to Election Day was intense and somewhat strained due to the need for frequent and detailed reporting, and the number of requests for information from different contacts within the USG and other implementing partners.46 While such intense reporting is usually inevitable, according to interlocutors it sometimes detracted from the implementation of activities. Implementers occasionally received the same inquiry from several USG staff in Washington; such requests could have been streamlined.

With USAID/Washington

Within USAID/Washington, there was an active group of working-level contacts across bureaus, in particular the Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the Africa Regional Bureau. Kenya was on the USAID/DCHA watchlist, monitored by representatives of various offices, which facilitated rapid information sharing and responses as well as high-level attention as Election Day approached. USAID participated in an interagency coordination group that included colleagues from State/CSO and Democracy Human Rights and Labor (DRL), with USAID/KEA participating via teleconference in the group’s weekly meetings. Unlike in 2013, higher-level interagency Kenya meetings took place only shortly prior to Election Day. USAID/KEA’s reporting to Washington on Election Day was internally assessed as positive and provided insight into situations transpiring across Kenya.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE USAID PROGRAMMING The following are recommendations for USAID/KEA to consider when designing strategies and activities for the next electoral cycle, which culminates with the 2022 general elections. In many cases, these recommendations correlate directly to the key findings and conclusions highlighted in this report.

46 A typical example of this dynamic was local election and human-rights monitoring groups who had frequent requests to brief visitors, provide updates from Election Day, and verify information from different localities.



General Recommendations

Kenya has simultaneous local, parliamentary, and presidential elections and consequently prolonged periods between major election dates. Budgetary constraints mean USAID will have to decrease support to some sectors between elections. A logical approach to election assistance would be to provide limited yet sustained assistance to reform of the critical elections infrastructure, such as the IEBC, political parties, and judiciary, followed by targeted capacity-building for these institutions. To the extent possible, USAID/KEA could also make elections a component of new programs supporting civil society, media, and other sectors that have a clear relationship to elections and political processes.

Several USAID/KEA programs in support of Kenya’s elections operated on a short timeline too close to the Election Day. Donor assistance provided within the final few months and weeks of an election is often unable to address key areas and can be difficult for beneficiaries to absorb. While many USAID/KEA election-assistance programs were planned far enough ahead of Election Day, numerous factors, some outside of USAID’s control, delayed certain activities. The fluidity of Kenya’s operating and political environments requires programs to start earlier to account for unplanned project management and political issues that impact timelines.

Regular data collection and analysis can help USAID/KEA develop appropriate strategies and identify different sectors to be supported in any new election-assistance portfolio. In cases where such data or studies do not already exist, USAID might consider funding activities to obtain this information.

Parliament may amend several electoral laws prior to elections scheduled in 2022, including the Elections Act, Political Parties Act, Campaign Finance Act and possibly even the Constitution. Implementation of reforms as part of the “Handshake” meeting and national dialogue will likely also bring changes to the electoral legal framework. USAID/KEA should provide technical assistance and support to CSOs to advocate for reforms based on Kenya’s international commitments and best practices in elections.

The national dialogue can create a foundation for a credible and peaceful power transition in 2022. USAID/KEA should support this process, for example, through county-level focus groups and public outreach events to promote public participation. Any support to national dialogue by donors, however, should be carefully designed as locally driven and not taint the process as one led by international actors. Support should also be developed in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy Nairobi Front Office and Political Section and with the diplomatic community.

Strengthening the independence of media, civil society, and judicial institutions will be integral to future elections in Kenya being credible. USAID/KEA’s technical assistance to electoral administration should be balanced with appropriate support for the judiciary, human rights, media, and civil society. USAID/KEA election-assistance programs in Kenya should be flexible, allowing USAID and partners to adjust activities depending on cooperation and political will exhibited by beneficiaries.

Election and political support in Kenya is closely coordinated across the USG. While current practices should be continued, USAID/KEA could review its interactions with local and international assistance partners to minimize burdens placed on some organizations during elections. USAID/KEA should support the coordination and



communication needs of partners — especially local organizations — and include resources for these needs when designing programs.

Program Recommendations

If strengthening the election process remains a priority for the USG, USAID/KEA should continuously engage with the IEBC. Such an approach should be organized in phases and conditioned on political will and commitments to reform. Assistance should begin almost immediately and focus on strengthening the IEBC’s independence and transparency, as well as developing technical skills within key departments. In the current period, USAID/KEA could engage the IEBC in its restructuring and development of a new Strategic Plan to make these processes transparent and participatory. USAID could then provide additional funding in support of the IEBC to address any critical gaps in the organization and administration of elections in 2022.

USAD/KEA’s long relationship with the judiciary has been successful over two election cycles and should be continued. USAID should also support efforts to strengthen the PPDT’s ability to resolve party disputes. Reform of the PPDT and broader dispute resolution processes may benefit from technical support depending on the outcome of reforms to the sector, for example, if ad-hoc regional “benches” are implemented, or if Kenya adopts an electoral court model for EDR.

Citizen observation should be supported within future election programs, both through ELOG and potentially other groups. Depending on the political climate in the country, USAID should give priority to the needs of citizen observation over international missions if budgetary resources are scarce. ELOG requires further assistance to improve its capacity to implement technical processes like PVTs, and also its management, media and public profiles, and relationships with political parties.

Prior to the next national election, USAID/KEA should consider supporting ELOG or other domestic CSOs in developing and testing new methodologies, for example, monitoring compliance with any new political and campaign finance legislation. CSOs could also benefit from observing several key events should they take place, including the census, delimitation of boundaries and national referenda.

Depending on conditions, USAID/KEA should engage in some form of international observation in 2022, and this support should extend to the pre- and post-election periods. Supporting a single or joint international mission is likely more manageable in terms of both funding and messaging. If there is concern about observer statements during periods of high political tension, USAID/KEA might request to review findings and statements prior to publication or be consulted on the scheduling of politically sensitive meetings. However, such measures must be careful so as not to undermine the independence of observer missions.

USAID/KEA should place greater emphasis on political parties as they impact many areas of electoral assistance in Kenya. Potential programming could focus on strengthening parties’ internal governance structures and processes, and party primaries, an area where women candidates in particular suffered in 2017. USAID/KEA should also support the development of key institutions involved in party regulation, including the ORPP, IEBC and Political Parties Liaison Committee. USAID could also assist in the eventual implementation of the Election Campaign Finance Act.



Increasing representation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in elected positions in Kenya requires a long-term approach that extends beyond any single election cycle. The methodologies developed through USAID programming may have more chance to show impact if continued through to the 2022 campaign. At the same time, equal support should be given to the operating environment for women candidates, including work with political parties and parliamentary caucuses for youth and women.

The use of evidence-based research in voter-education campaigns marked an improvement over 2013. USAID should continue to support evidence-based research in the design of future civic and voter education strategies and public information campaigns, and work with international partners on building the capacities of the IEBC, political parties, and CSOs active in civic and voter education to fully utilize such tools.

USAID/KEA’s focus on media diminished from 2013. However, current limits on independent media, the quality of journalism, and the increasingly restricted atmosphere for media in Kenya suggest that USAID/KEA should revisit this approach before the 2022 election. Media in Kenya could be strengthened through support to editorial standards, transparency in ownership, conflict- and gender-sensitive reporting, and media literacy. USAID should also look at strengthening existing media-support institutions and measures that could protect media professionals.

Fake news is likely to continue to be a destabilizing force in Kenyan elections, used to influence voter intentions or even spur conflict. While USAID’s partners made some notable efforts to combat fake news, more comprehensive support should be provided to help Kenyan institutions confront this problem — for example, by helping independent media produce and disseminate diverse and accurate information.

USAID/KEA should separate broader conflict programs from the election-assistance activities unless they are explicitly related to electoral institutions — such as support to police in Election Day duties and the IEBC’s use of early warning systems. Support for community conflict-related election programming might be better placed within existing projects dealing with local issues. Election programming in Kenya should also include a platform for institutional coordination on electoral security. Should State/CSO again implement a conflict prevention program, USAID/KEA should closely coordinate with these activities and look for opportunities to leverage resources and programming.


ANNEXES | 39

ANNEXES


ANNEX 1 - INTERVIEW TOPICS/QUESTIONS | 40

ANNEX 1 - INTERVIEW TOPICS/QUESTIONS A. Relationship of the Assistance to Strategic U.S. Government Priorities

(1) Did current U.S. strategies (including USAID CDCS, joint Kenyan Election Strategy) and priorities for Kenya envision support to electoral processes or actors?

(a) Was programming based on reference to host government strategies (Kenya 2030, MPT II etc.)?

(2) What were the principal drivers behind decisions to provide assistance in certain sectors?

(a) Were there major shifts or turning points in the approach taken by USG in elections assistance? If so, why?

(3) Was there a logical progression in the choice of programming, sectors supported, implementation instruments and mechanisms over the period leading up to the 2017 elections?

(a) Can programming be viewed in phases?

(4) Have perceptions of U.S. assistance affected choices about which type of assistance to supply? If so, how?

(5) Has the support provided by USAID to electoral stakeholders improved the USG’s ability to realize other strategic priorities in Kenya now and in the future? Why or why not?

(6) Are there other donors/implementers who are better positioned (politically or technically) than USAID to provide certain kinds of assistance?

(7) Will USAID’s new CDCS likely have more or less focus on elections or political processes?

(a) If the intention is minimize or reduce involvement in election support, is there a strategy for withdrawal from the sector?

(b) If the intention is to increase electoral support, what are the areas of strategic importance?

B. Mix, Intensity, and Effectiveness of Program Activities

(1) Did USG election-support activities seek to address the major needs of elections in Kenya?

(a) Was there a clear priority for programs in terms of emphasis and dollar amount?

(b) Which sectors and which stakeholder groups would you prioritize going into the 2017 elections?

(2) Were certain interventions and assistance possibly less needed, or even counterproductive?

(a) How, in concrete examples, did U.S. assistance advance the capacities of electoral stakeholders prior to 2017?



(3) Which areas of election support were most beneficial to recipients and the process as a whole?

(4) Do you believe that U.S. assistance can positively impact many of the problems in Kenya’s elections?

(5) Were project timelines appropriate for the envisioned assistance? If not, please give an example of how programming might have been affected.

(6) Which of your several main activities do you believe had the most impact?

(7) Besides your own work, which other interventions by donors/implementers do you view as highly successful?

(8) How important will it be for USAID/USG to maintain support to elections at the present point in the electoral cycle?

(a) Is there an area of support (or target beneficiary) that you feel might be phased out in future programming?

(b) If elections were held in 2019, in what sectors and which institutions would you think needed the most support?

(c) Are there new opportunities that have emerged after the 2017 election where USAID assistance could be beneficial?

(9) How were more traditionally disadvantaged groups, including women, persons with disabilities, certain ethnic groups, etc., impacted by U.S. election programs?

(a) Was there an appropriate emphasis on marginalized groups? Or was more needed?

(10) Were the results achieved commensurate with the cost (financial or otherwise) of the activities?

C. Managing Risk

(1) During program design, did USAID effectively identify the risks to activities?

(2) Was USAID immediately aware of program risks during the project life cycle? Was the coordination with implementing partners and beneficiaries in Kenya sufficient to quickly identify and deal with emerging risks?

(a) Were appropriate contingency plans identified in USAID/implementers’ activities to sufficiently address risks that may have arisen?

(3) How did unfolding electoral/political dynamics in Kenya affect the achievement of election program results? To what extent was this different from what USAID anticipated?

(4) How did USAID adjust its program activities and approaches to implementation when faced with changing risk?

(5) Did USAID deal with risks emanating from Kenyan government concerns during program design or implementation?

(6) Did any risks emerge from unexpected sources?

(7) Did the choice/number of implementing mechanisms play any role in reducing or increasing risk?



(8) What additional measures could USAID or implementers have taken to identify and/or mitigate risks to election programming in Kenya?

(9) What risk mitigation strategies and measures used or learned during Kenya’s 2017 election cycle programming are suited for future programming?

D. Coordination

(1) Was there effective coordination of activities both within USAID and the broader USG?

(a) Were the coordination measures insufficient, appropriate, or excessive?

(b) Which coordination measures worked really well in 2017? Which did not?

(c) Did coordination efforts have a downside? Was any department/office particularly burdened?

(2) How did USAID effectively engage and coordinate with other donor organizations (outside the USG)?

(3) Was the coordination between USAID and implementers sufficient? Why or why not?

(a) To what extent did this coordination improve USAID election program performance?

(4) Did activities and events on the ground receive sufficient attention from senior USAID, State, White House officials?

(5) Were USAID’s activities, objectives, and support of Kenya’s electoral process effectively communicated to beneficiaries?

(6) Were beneficiaries and other external stakeholders sufficiently informed of and consulted on the design and implementation of USAID programming?

(7) Did the choice of USAID implementation mechanisms facilitate optimal coordination? Why or why not?

(8) How should future coordination practices be changed?


ANNEX 2 - EVALUATION INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS | 43

ANNEX 2 - EVALUATION INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

Category Organization /

Agency Interviewee USG United States Agency

for International Development/ Kenya East Africa (USAID/KEA)

Tina Dooley-Jones Stephen Brager Faye Haselkorm Zephania Aura Razia Kimani Fred Wafulo Denise O’Toole Sheila Karani Marti Mertens

U.S. Embassy Kenya Ambassador Robert Godec Matthew Van Etten Heather Fabrikant Randi Michel

USAID Washington Cael Savage Mark Goldenbaum Karen Freeman Ashley Quarcoo Tara Twing Mark Phelan

U.S. Department of State

Patrick Quirk Kofi Gwira

USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)

David Hamilton Luis Sobalvarro

UN and Diplomatic Community United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP)

Sheila Ngatia Joram Rukambe Wambua Kituku James Wagalla

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Academia Nanjala Wandibba

UN Women Zebib Kavuma Lucy Mathenge Jane Serwanga Robert Simiyu Sebastian Gatimu

Embassy of Germany Dr. Alexander Puk




Agency Interviewee International Partners International Law and

Development Organization (IDLO)

Romualdo Mavedzenge Anne Nderi Benard Moseti

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

Rushdi Nackerdien Kristina Wilfore Genet Menelik Deryck Fritz Leah Kimathi George Gathuka Carla Chianese

National Democratic Institute (NDI)

Dickson Omondi Roseline Idele Ursula Bahati

The Carter Center David Carroll Sarah Johnson Rachel Fowler

International Republican Institute (IRI)

John G. Tomaszewski Jesse Adelman

Internews Brice Rimbaud Sammy Muraya

Local Kenyan Partners Kenya Women’s

Holding Ltd. Makena Mworia Margaret Mbugua

FIDA-Kenya Angela Ngoizi Women’s

Empowerment Link Virginia Nduta

Election Observation Group (ELOG)

Regina Opondo Mulle Musau

Uraia Trust Grace Maingi Nancy Wamwea Abubakar Said

Act! Anne Nyabera Henry Kuria Felisia Odada

Kenyan Institutions/Agencies Media Council of

Kenya (MCK) Victor Bwire

Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)

Kagwiria Mbogori Ann Okutoyi George Morara

Judiciary Committee on Elections (JCE)

Justice Msagha Mbogholi Lilian Arika




Agency Interviewee Kenya Law Reform

Commission Joash Dache Peter Musyimi Joan Obunga

Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA)

Hon Mishi Juma Mboko Hon. Alice Wahome

Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC)

Chairman Wafula Chebukati Dr. Abdi Yakub Guliye Marjan Hussein Marjan

Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP)

Lucy Ndung’u

Political Parties Liaison Committee (PPLC)

Jane Njiru Julius Wambua Taabu Daniels

Political Party Disputes Tribunal (PPDT)

Roselynn Aganyo Chairman Kyalo Mbobu Milly Lwanga Joyce Mutiso

Other/Experts Elisabeth Dallas . Prof Karuti Kanyinga


ANNEX 3 - FINAL CONCEPT PAPER | 46

ANNEX 3 - FINAL CONCEPT PAPER



CONCEPT NOTE

TASKING 073

ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS

Contract No. GS-10F-0033M/AID-OAA-M-13-00013

March 2018

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by NORC at the University of Chicago. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.



TASKING N073

ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR


March 2018 Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M/AID-0AA-M-13-00013 Submitted to: Morgan Holmes Submitted by: NORC at the University of Chicago Attention: Renee Hendley, Program Manager Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: 301- 634-9489; E-mail: [email protected] DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.




CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................... 44

OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS ................................................................................................. 45

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................... 46

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 47

ASSESSMENT TEAM ................................................................................................................ 49

TIMELINE AND DELIVERABLES ............................................................................................... 49

PROPOSED STAFFING ............................................................................................................. 50

ANNEX: RESUMES .................................................................................................................... 51



ACRONYMS

CVE Counter(ing) Violent Extremism

DCHA (Bureau for) Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance


DRGA Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment

FGD Focus Group Discussion


KII Key Informant Interview



USG U.S. Government



OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS As part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Learning, Evaluation, and Research (DRG-LER) Activity, USAID has requested NORC at the University of Chicago to design and budget for an Assessment of USAID’s Support to the 2017 Kenya General Election and Repeat Presidential Election. The Assessment Objective is to inform future decisions about USAID/Kenya and East Africa (USAID/KEA) DRG programming for elections. The assessment document key lessons learned in USAID’s assistance for the 2017 elections, and make recommendations relevant for future USAID election programming. However, the Assessment Team will not provide program or project designs under this task.

Per the USAID Statement of Work, the assessment will involve four inter-connected sets of questions around four areas of inquiry:

Relationship of the Assistance to Strategic U.S. Government Priorities

To what extent did USAID’s elections assistance support USG strategic priorities and objectives related to free, fair, credible and peaceful elections in Kenya?

What could have been improved or done differently?

Mix, Intensity, and Effectiveness of Programmatic Activities

Was the mix and intensity of different type of activities (i.e. support to IEBC, Electoral Dispute Resolution, political party work, electoral conflict mitigation, women’s political participation, cross-sectoral coordination, etc.) effective and appropriate?

Are there activities that needed more or less attention?

Was electoral security addressed sufficiently?

Managing Risk

What were the risks and how were they managed?

How did Kenya’s political and conflict environment affect the achievement of election program results?

Was assessment of conflict dynamics assessed and addresses properly?

Was there anything within USAID or implementing partners’ manageable interest that could have been done to manage programmatic risks related to host government concerns, electoral conflict and violence or political dynamics more effectively?

Coordination

To what extent did internal and external coordination help or hinder USAID election program performance? Internal includes internal USAID coordination, inter-agency coordination, coordination between field and Washington. External coordination includes coordination among donors, Kenyan stakeholders and implementing partners.



While the assessment will address each of the four question sets above, the specific focus of the assessment and the attention to each area will be determined in close coordination with USAID during the design, drafting and revision stages.

BACKGROUND Kenya has a turbulent and intermittently violent electoral history since the resumption of a competitive multi-party landscape in 1992. Elections in Kenya are generally contested along ethnic lines, characterized by fierce campaigning and challenged electoral authorities and outcomes, at times leading to violence. Most notable were the atrocities following the December 2007 election in which over 1,000 Kenyans died and half a million were displaced. The following national elections, held in March 2013, again saw a bitter campaign, challenges in electoral administration, and limited incidents of violence. Despite a razor-thin margin of victory in the first round of the presidential contest for Uhuru Kenyatta over then Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Kenya’s electoral and judicial institutions effectively dealt with legal challenges to the results. While Odinga vowed to continue to question the administration of the election, the Supreme Court’s ruling was generally accepted, and peace prevailed.

Prior to the August 2017 elections increasing unrest took place in the country as the opposition challenged the fairness of the electoral playing field and the need to reform the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), whose members eventually stepped down and were replaced in early 2017. The August presidential poll was increasingly viewed as a flashpoint for a repeat of election-related violence, fashioned again around ethnic divisions, and where Kenyan society and key institutions would again be strained and tested. In response, the US Government initiated several activities to support election administration and civil society in the run up to the national elections.

The official results of the presidential contest gave Kenyatta a first-round victory with 54 percent of the vote. His closest rival was again Odinga, who refused to concede, insisting on his electoral victory. While Odinga sought legal remedy in the Supreme Court, protests and riots and the ensuing response by government forces left dozens dead. In September, the Supreme Court overturned the re-election of Kenyatta, citing widespread irregularities in the tallying, tabulation and transmission of results, and ordered a revote. Held on October 26, this election was boycotted by Odinga due to continued convictions of electoral manipulation and malpractice, and the IEBC’s failure to implement the opposition’s full demands for electoral reform. Only about 39 percent of the electorate participated in a contest easily won by Kenyatta.

The post-election period is still marked by uncertainty, with a lack of engagement by Kenyatta of his political rival, and the call for new elections by the opposition, who on January 30 declared Odinga the “people’s president”. Against this backdrop, USAID/KEA and USAID/Washington’s DRG Center seeks to assess and document key lessons learned in USAID’s assistance to Kenya’s 2017 election cycle, which will include recommendations for future USAID election programming.



ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY NORC’s research approach will use qualitative research methodologies for this assessment. Qualitative approaches can address aspects of research questions that are not well suited to quantitative analysis. Qualitative approaches are also ideal for investigating complex processes, and in many cases can reveal unanticipated project effects. Interview guides are flexible and can be modified throughout the actual interview (whereas survey instruments must be developed and finalized well in advance), with probing for nuanced responses. Qualitative methods, moreover, can support quantitative methods by exploring the attitudinal sources of quantitative findings, and providing context (or counterexamples) for surprising quantitative results.

NORC’s proposed qualitative approach will be based on literature and document review and in-depth key informant interviews (KIIs) to provide concrete examples that illustrate in greater detail the impact and results of activities.

Document Review

The assessment will begin with a document review of materials related to USAID election assistance and other relevant reports concerning the 2017 election process. While not exhaustive, this will include USAID strategy documents, implementer progress reports, success stories, domestic and international observer reports, available reports of other donors, public opinion polls and major media stories and scholarly articles. Information from these sources will inform the KII protocol, interview questionnaires, and focus group discussion/roundtable guide(s).

Key Informant Interviews

In-depth KIIs will be conducted among USAID Kenya election assistance participants and provide the core source of data collection. Interviews will address the four sets of research questions gauging the effectiveness, appropriateness, and impact of USAID’s electoral support. The Assessment Team will implement KIIs among as many beneficiaries as is practical. The resulting narratives or stories will permit interviewees to speak to experiences relevant to the research questions, and from their perspective.

Interviews are anticipated with staff and leadership across the USAID Mission, U.S. Embassy, international and local implementing partners, and other donors involved in election support, as well as multiple stakeholders from the Kenyan government, civil society, including senior officials of the IEBC, Office of Registrar of Political Parties, and representatives from Political Parties Dispute Tribunal, the judiciary, and others. If deemed useful, the team may travel to western Kenya for additional interviews.

The NORC team will also conduct interviews with cognizant USAID personnel and implementing partner staff in Washington, DC prior to and after fieldwork, through each of the research phases. While interviews will primarily be face-to-face, if required NORC will utilize telephone/Skype interviews. A final list of interview subjects will be agreed with USAID prior to deployment.

NORC will develop semi-structured, open-ended interview guides that will be tailored for each category of KIIs. The methodology used in conducting the KIIs is outlined in Table 1, below.



Table 1: General Methodology for Conducting KIIs

KII guides for various classes of stakeholders will be prepared in advance of fieldwork, outlining the key questions and probes to address during the interview; the guides may be further adapted before each individual interview.

The interviewer will take written notes during the interview, and within a day of the interview he/she will transcribe the interview notes.

Respondents will be offered anonymity and the option of speaking “off the record,” and where such protection is requested, data will be coded and stored so that the respondent’s identity cannot be matched to the interview content, except by the interviewer.

The interview will start with more structured questions and pre-determined topics and will end with more open-ended questions that may reveal unanticipated topics and themes.

Analysis of the KIIs will include a summary of common themes that emerge in response to each topic in addition to “outliers” – highlighting the range of responses and experiences.

The Assessment Team, either jointly or independently, will conduct the majority of interviews during the 18 days of fieldwork in Kenya. If necessary, the team will follow up with beneficiaries in telephone or Skype interviews. After each day, the team will debrief with the Team Leader and review notes, with notes being typed up each day.

Focus Groups / Roundtables

Focus group discussions (FGDs) or roundtables will also be conducted during Kenya fieldwork. Focus groups offer an opportunity to discover rich information on complex questions, and the environmental, organizational and individual-level factors that contribute to participant views. The focus group structure allows for feedback among participants, which typically generate responses that may not have emerged during face-to-face interviews or through surveys. While the results may not be generalizable to the broader population, they can provide invaluable points of departure for the assessment. They can also provide source material for vignettes with which to illustrate more general conclusions. By using FGDs, the Assessment Team can also create a more inclusive study during the field work, potentially bringing in representatives from wider stakeholder groups who may offer interesting, diverging perspectives.

NORC will identify a suitable venue where participants and the Assessment Team can easily attend to maximize schedules. Per the SOW, focus groups might be best utilized to explore issues relating to the mix, intensity and effectiveness of programmatic activities. Potential participants for FGDs might include representatives of civic organizations active in elections, or beneficiaries of USAID-supported activities, such as election workers, observers, or other groups. The exact format and number of FGDs will be elaborated and verified with USAID prior to deployment. However, due to the technical nature of the study and high-level of the participants, NORC envisions a minimal number of pre-scheduled FGDs and potentially another 1-2 to be determined upon undertaking fieldwork. NORC will rely on the advice and assistance of USAID/Kenya to identify participants and assist with outreach for participation.

NORC will establish an internet accessible shared drive facility for all relevant documents, for all team members, and USAID, with a filing structure that enables efficient collaboration.



ASSESSMENT TEAM Per the USAID Statement of Work, NORC will provide two senior-level consultants -- one International and one Kenyan -- for the Assessment Team, each with proven track records and experience in Elections, Democracy, Governance and Human Rights program assessments, solid analytical and writing skills, and expertise in elections and political transitions in conflict-prone environments. These consultants will be joined by an elections and conflict expert from USAID/Washington, who will participate as a full member of the team and will contribute to research, analysis and drafting of the report.

The International Consultant will serve as the Team Leader for the assessment and will have primary responsibility for work planning, data collection, drafting of field work instruments, preparation of the assessment report and other deliverables, and day-to-day technical interaction with USAID. NORC will provide overall project oversight and management, ensuring that timelines are maintained and providing quality assurance for all deliverables.

TIMELINE AND DELIVERABLES Team members are expected to prepare and carry out the assessment as outlined in the Concept Note and the requirements of the Statement of Work. Proposed schedules have been designed around availability of Assessment Team members, including USAID members, local and international holiday periods, and a desire to maximize flow and logic of data collection and research.

Draft Assessment Team Inception Report/Implementation Plan, anticipated o/a March 10, 2018.

Desk research will begin immediately upon USAID approval of Concept Paper.

U.S.-based meetings will take prior to deployment for fieldwork, anticipated o/a March 18- March 30, 2018.

Kenya fieldwork will begin as soon as possible following U.S.-based meetings for a approximately 3 weeks, anticipated o/a April 3, 2018.

Out-brief for USAID/KEA will take place prior to team departure from Kenya, consisting of an oral presentation and outline of preliminary findings and recommendations.

Draft Report will be submitted 10 work days after completion of fieldwork, anticipated o/a May 2, 2018. Embassy and USAID/KEA and DRG will submit comments and questions on the draft to NORC within two weeks after receipt, anticipated on or prior to May 16, 2018.

Final Report with revisions will be completed within two weeks after NORC receives comments. At the discretion and approval of the Mission, a copy of the final report may be submitted to the Development Experience Clearinghouse (www.dec.org).

http://www.dec.org/



PROPOSED STAFFING NORC has selected a highly qualified team to conduct the assessment. The team includes: Team Leader and subject matter expert Gavin Weise, who will lead the assessment and manage the development, implementation and analysis of research methods and activities. He will assist in the document review and development of interview and FGD protocols and supervise the conduct of the KIIs and FGDs. The Team Leader will also be responsible for drafting the Final Report. Dr. Collins Odote will fill the Kenyan consultant role; he will be assist the Team Leader and advise on the local context, identification of key informants and stakeholders to be consulted during the assessment, and provide expert analysis and input with regard to local institutions and their place in the Kenyan political and electoral structure. The team will also include Assia Ivantcheva (USAID/W), who will serve as a member of the assessment team and whose role will be more fully determined through discussions with the Team Leader. Zeph Aura (USAID/KEA), will serve as the main point of contact for the USAID Mission. Although NORC will have primary responsibility for organizing the schedule and setting interview appointments, we expect that in some instances protocol or existing relationships may make it more effective for the Mission to set the appointments; the Team Leader will coordinate with the Mission on this point as the list of interviewees is developed. NORC understands that USAID may change the composition of their participants based upon expertise and availability.

Gavin Thompson Weise is an expert on democracy and elections programming. He has more than 15 years of experience providing technical advisory services and management support on USAID, UNDP and other donor/implementer democratic governance programs. He is currently the managing partner of The iVote Group, LLC, a consulting firm specializing in democratic development and project management. His project experience includes needs/sectoral assessments, program design, budgeting, implementation, performance monitoring and evaluations. Mr. Weise is also an experienced election official trainer both in the US and internationally, has designed and delivered voter education programs, created e-Learning training courses for polling officials, and designed assessment tools for election management bodies to measure performance, training, accessibility, and other election administration issues. He has served in an advisory capacity to election commissions in addition to working with several other national government agencies and judicial institutions on election and governance issues. Mr. Weise has also worked with NGOs on access to justice, election observation, and governance and political finance monitoring.

Dr. Collins Odote is a faculty member of the University of Nairobi and teaches as a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP) and School of Law. Prior to joining the University, he had worked with and for a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) developing particular competencies in legal research, governance, project cycle management, process consulting, evaluations, election related work, environment and natural resource management work, capacity strengthening and training. For the past several years he served as a Program Manager of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, where he was responsible for conceptualizing and managing programs in partnership with local Kenyan organizations in a diverse range of areas of governance and democratization. He also worked on regional integration issues including with the East African legislative Assembly. Dr. Odote recently completed an evaluation of the DFID Kenyan Election Management and Security Project and designed Kenya’s first Strategy for Integrated and Long-Term Civic Education for the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs and undertook civic education on elections, land and devolution. He also consulted for many institutions in the run-up to the 2013 elections.



ANNEX: RESUMES

GAVIN THOMPSON WEISE

KEY QUALIFICATIONS

Over fifteen years’ experience implementing democratic governance and civil society assistance projects and missions in Europe, Former Soviet Union, Balkans and North Africa.

Sound project cycle management skills, including program design, business development and fundraising, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.

Technical background including needs and legal framework analysis, CSO support, civic education, election administration, trainings and online learning programs, impact and process evaluations.

Experienced in complex international operations and working with diverse stakeholders.

SELECTED EXPERIENCE

Managing Member/Principal, The iVote Group, Limited Liability Company, Washington, DC (2016-Present)

Responsible for financial, operational and reporting duties of limited liability corporation.

Provide technical advisory, business development and management services for CSOs, international organizations and other clients. Recent clients include Counterpart International, UNDP, International Republican Institute, US Vote Foundation and others, projects include:

Online legal aid services global mapping platform and mobile phone app to connect citizens and CSOs with legal aid, part of USAID civil society innovation project.

Content management and research for API and website on different voting options and rules for voter registration, voter ID, and early voting and absentee balloting for 50 US states plus territories. Clients of API data include: Facebook GoVoteBot, Rock the Vote, Overseas Vote Foundation and others, reaching tens of millions of voters during 2016 electoral cycle.

Web-based tool to be used in ongoing anti-corruption and transparency programming for local governments and civil society, digitally facilitating the process of collecting information on vulnerabilities to corruption within target municipalities.

Online training portal for election staff, including animated technical courses and feedback surveys.

Youth Election Worker program to educate students on elections and civic participation and train and certify participating high school students as local polling officials.

New business development, including capture research, concept papers, and RFP/A responses.



Election Expert, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR, Norway Parliamentary Election (2017)

Member of expert team conducting study of Norway’s reformed system of election administration within the Ministry of Local Government and Elections Directorate, new electronic election management system, and campaign and political finance regulations.

Drafted election administration and technology sections of ODIHR’s Final Report and delivered outbrief for the Ministry, including recommendations for future reform in accordance with Norway’s commitment to international standards.

Election Analyst, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR, Mongolia Presidential Election (2017)

Member of Core Team assigned to election administration, voter registration, candidate registration, disability access, civil society and election day. Liaison to GEC, State Registration Agency and CSOs. Responsible for drafting interim and final reports and briefing materials for observers.

International Evaluation Consultant, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (2016/2017)

Conducted final process and impact evaluation of UNDP project to introduce use of biometric identification technology for registration and voting in Kyrgyzstan during the 2015 election cycle.

Completed evaluation inception methodology, document review, field research, final outbrief presentation and evaluation report.

Carried out key informant interviews with representatives of the Central Election Commission, State Registration Service, donor and implementer community, civil society, and UN/UNDP staff.

International Expert, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Tirana, Albania (2016)

Designed democracy, civil society support and elections assistance program for joint UN agencies in Albania (UN Women and UNDP), including formal concept papers for USAID and other donors.

International Senior Consultant, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Bucharest, Romania (2015/2016)

Advised Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania on the development of strategies, approaches and core competencies for providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to priority beneficiary regions/countries.

Compiled needs assessment through field interviews with government officials in Romania, Egypt and Ukraine to identify priority needs and proposed future activities.

Drafted official government strategy and operational plan for ODA/electoral assistance.



Chief Technical Advisor, Elections, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Tirana, Albania (2015)

Provided technical assistance and advisory support to the Central Election Commission of Albania, including departments of IT, Training, Voter/Civic Education and Spokesperson.

Conducted public opinion research to determine voter education needs after Albania’s Territorial Administrative Reform and prior to elections to the new local municipalities.

Implemented BRIDGE trainings in Election Dispute Resolution and Gender.

Developed database systems for the CEC’s registration of political subjects, regulation of campaign finance and expenditures, local voting center operations and results transmission.

Designed animated training and educational videos for local polling officials, observers and voters.

Deputy Director for Europe and Asia, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Washington, DC (2008-2015)

Managed portfolio of elections and civic participation assistance programs in Albania, Kosovo, Ukraine, Serbia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Supervised program staff and provided guidance in project management and technical issues such as civic and voter education, training, results management, legal analysis and other areas.

Served as project manager/ interim Director for programs in Albania, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.

Lead or participated in needs assessments, pre-election delegations, election law analyses, project reviews and evaluations and other analytical activities.

Designed programs and drafted concept papers and proposals for USAID (EPP IQC and CEPPS), State Department/DRL, Government of Canada, DFID and other donors.

Consultant, Pact, inc. Kyiv, Ukraine (2008)

Lead proposal writer for USAID Ukraine’s civil society support project (UNITER), which ran from 2008-16.

Regional Director, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, Eurasia Foundation, Kyiv Regional Office, Ukraine (2006-2008)

Supervised offices in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Lithuania conducting local, regional and international development programs, with funding from foreign governments, private corporations, foundations, and intergovernmental organizations.

Served as Board Chair for New Eurasia Establishment, a local NGO in Minsk, Belarus.

Programs and activities included: legal aid centers; community development; public private partnerships; civic/voter education; election observation; anticorruption watchdogs; advocacy for



European integration; support to European Humanities University; business education and training.

Represented the Foundation with donors, project partners and national and local officials.

Developed proposals for US and European development agencies and private foundations.

Acting (interim) Director, Ukraine / Director of Programs and Deputy Director, Ukraine,

American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, Kyiv, Ukraine (2003-2006)

Supervised a 27-member staff on multiple rule of law projects: training program for defense attorneys; support to national network of over 40 CSOs and student law clinics providing pro bono legal assistance; development of a national concept on law enforcement reform; judicial pre-trial release pilot program; political party and judicial election law trainings; Civic and voter education.

Managed international offices including project/entity registration, setting salary scales, personnel recruitment, staff evaluations, cost-allocations between donors, and other management duties.

Issued RFPs, reviewed grant applications from CSOs, assisted in development of project ideas, drafted subgrant agreements, tracked grantee programmatic and financial reporting.

Developed concept papers, proposals and program budgets.

Program Officer, Ukraine and Moldova, American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, Washington DC (2002-2005)

Responsible for programmatic, financial, and administrative oversight of USAID technical legal assistance projects in Ukraine and Moldova.

Monitored grants to network of CSOs in Moldova and Ukraine providing advocacy and legal aid services.

EDUCATION

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh (2000 - 2002)

Master of Public and International Affairs, Certificate in International Corporate Environment, Certificate in West European Studies, Certificate from Slavic Languages Institute (Russian)

College of Arts and Science, New York University (1993 - 1996)

BA German, minors in Political Science, European Studies; Summa Cum Laude



COLLINS ODOTE

KEY QUALIFICATIONS

Dr. Collins Odote is a faculty member of the University of Nairobi and teaches as a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP) and School of Law. Prior to joining the University, he had worked with and for a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) developing particular competencies in legal research, governance, project cycle management, process consulting, evaluations, election related work, environment and natural resource management work, capacity strengthening and training. For the past several years he served as a Program Manager of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, where he was responsible for conceptualizing and managing programs in partnership with local Kenyan organizations in a diverse range of areas of governance and democratization. He also worked on regional integration issues including with the East African legislative Assembly. Dr. Odote recently completed an evaluation of the DFID Kenyan Election Management and Security Project and designed Kenya’s first Strategy for Integrated and Long-Term Civic Education for the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs and undertook civic education on elections, land and devolution. He also consulted for many institutions in the run-up to the 2013 elections.

SELECTED EXPERIENCE

Consultant, Review of DFID Kenya’s Election Management and Security Program (2013).

Consultant, Expert team advising the Judiciary Working Committee on election preparedness for 2013 Elections (2012).

Lecturer/Senior Lecturer, Environmental Law, Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy, University of Nairobi (2011-Present).

Long-term Consultant, National Democratic Institute (2010)

Responsible for designing and piloting a country-wide Leadership and Campaign Academy for young men and women interested in running for elective office in the 2012 elections. Also responsible for developing a Manual for Political Parties in the new constitution and facilitating workshops for diverse groups. Retained to advise political parties, the Registrar of Political Parties and the Electoral Commission on the New Constitution and the Political Parties Act and on election preparedness and inter-parties engagements for the 2013 elections. Program leadership of the political parties program responsible for amongst others, liaison program between political parties, IEBC and Registrar of Political Parties, advise on electoral and political party legislation and reforms, multi-party engagement, single-party capacity building and institutional strengthening, training of candidates and Party Agents training.

Lead Report Writer, The People’s Verdict: Report of the 2010 Observation Report for the

2010 Referendum, Elections Observation Group (2010).

Expert Consultant and Advisor, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (2010). Retained by the Ministry to advise it on the constitutional review process and on draft by



Committee of Experts, focusing on electoral systems and representation of the people.

Program Manager, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Kenya (2002-2009).

Responsible for the design, implementation and evaluation of key programs at the foundation including political party strengthening, parliamentary program, governance, participation and influence by key stakeholders in international trade negotiations, regional integration. Also responsible for developing and maintaining partnerships between the foundation and key partners including government agencies, Kenya National Assembly, the East African Legislative Assembly, key political p[arties, civil society and trade union movement. principal program focal point for the foundation’s trade program within the East African region including Sudan and Ethiopia. Part of senior management team assisting the Resident Director to run the Kenyan office

Director, Project & Allied Consultants Ltd, Kenya (2007-2010)

A consultancy firm conducting diverse consultancy work on elections, governance, project cycle, management, research and institutional development for a variety of organizations in public and civil society sectors.

Consultant, Institute for Education in Democracy, Audit of the Voter’s Register (2002).

Part of the team that carried out data analysis, report preparation and editing of the inaugural report by IED on the veracity of the Voters register prepared by the Electoral Commission of Kenya. This was based on a quantitative survey of both registered and unregistered voters upon the completion of the registration of voters for the 2002 General Election.

Advocate, Lumumba and Mumma Advocate (2000-2002)

Lawyer in a Nairobi law firm undertaking litigation and conveyancing for a variety of clients. Responsibilities included taking instructions, preparing pleadings and Documents, appearing in court on behalf of clients and maintaining links with clients.

EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy in Law, University of Nairobi (2010).

Master of Laws (LLM), University of Nairobi (2004)

Diploma in Law, Kenya School of Law (1999)

Bachelor of Laws, University of Nairobi (1998)


ANNEX 4 - FINAL INCEPTION REPORT | 57

ANNEX 4 - FINAL INCEPTION REPORT



INCEPTION REPORT

TASKING 073


Contract No. GS-10F-0033M/AID-OAA-M-13-00013 March 2018 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by NORC at the University of Chicago. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.




INCEPTION REPORT

TASKING N073


March 2018

Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M/AID-0AA-M-13-00013

Submitted to: Morgan Holmes

Submitted by: NORC at the University of Chicago Attention: Renee Hendley, Program Manager Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: 301- 634-9489; E-mail: [email protected]

DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.




CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................... 61

OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS ................................................................................................. 62

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 62

TIMELINE ................................................................................................................................... 66

DELIVERABLES ......................................................................................................................... 66

ANNEX 1: PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW LIST ............................................................................. 68

ANNEX 2: PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW TOPICS/QUESTIONS ................................................. 72

ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW NOTES CAPTURE TOOL .................................................................... 75



ACRONYMS

CSO Civil society organization

DCHA (USAID Bureau for) Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance


DRGA Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment

DRL (Department of State Bureau of) Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

ELOG Election Observation Group

FGD Focus group discussion

FIDA Federation of Women Lawyers

IDLO International Development Law Organization


IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems)

IP Implementing partner

IRCK Inter-Religious Council of Kenya

IRI International Republican Institute

KHRC Kenya Human Rights Commission

KII Key informant interview


NDI National Democratic Institute

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives

SOW Statement of Work

SUPKEM Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims)

UNDP United Nations Development Programme


USAID/KEA USAID/Kenya and East Africa

USG U.S. Government



OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS As part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Learning, Evaluation, and Research (DRG-LER) Activity, USAID has requested NORC at the University of Chicago undertake an assessment of USAID’s Support to the 2017 Kenya General Election and Repeat Presidential Election. The purpose of the assessment is to document key lessons learned in USAID’s assistance for those two elections, making recommendations relevant for future USAID programming around elections.

The Assessment Objective is to inform future decisions about USAID/Kenya and East Africa (KEA) DRG programming for elections. The assessment team will not provide project designs under this task, however.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY This study will combine elements of program evaluation, sectoral assessments and project design. The Assessment Team will rely on qualitative methods, including Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), to capture data necessary to complete the study, including out-briefs, presentations and reports.

Provisional Lines of Inquiry

Based on the USAID SOW and the Concept Note prepared by the Team Leader (see Annex 4), the assessment team will need to address four inter-connected lines of inquiry:

(1) Relationship of the assistance to Strategic U.S. Government Priorities

To what extent did USAID’s elections assistance support USG strategic priorities and objectives related to free, fair, credible and peaceful elections in Kenya?

What could have been improved or done differently?

(2) Mix, Intensity, and Effectiveness of Activities

Was the mix and intensity of different type of activities (i.e. support to IEBC, Electoral Dispute Resolution, political party work, electoral conflict mitigation, women’s political participation, cross-sectoral coordination, etc.) effective and appropriate?

Are there activities that needed more or less attention?

Was electoral security addressed sufficiently?

(3) Managing Risk

What were the risks and how were they managed? How did Kenya’s political and conflict environment affect the achievement of election program results?

Was assessment of conflict dynamics assessed and addressed properly?



Was there anything within USAID or implementing partners’ manageable interest that could have been done to manage programmatic risks related to host government concerns, electoral conflict and violence or political dynamics more effectively?

(4) Coordination

To what extent did internal and external coordination help or hinder USAID election program performance? (Internal includes internal USAID coordination, inter-agency coordination, and coordination between the Kenya Mission and Washington. External coordination includes coordination among donor partners, Kenyan stakeholders and implementing partners.

Qualitative Data Collection

NORC’s approach will use qualitative research methodologies for the assessment. Qualitative approaches can address aspects of research questions that are not well suited to quantitative analysis. The assessment team will collect data primarily through a review of relevant literature and relevant USG and Implementing Partner (IP) documents, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

A comprehensive document review will include materials related to USAID election assistance and other relevant reports concerning Kenyan political and electoral background and context, with an emphasis on the 2017 election process. While not exhaustive, this will include USAID strategy documents, IP progress reports, success stories, domestic and international observer reports, available reports of other donors, public opinion polls and major media stories and scholarly articles. Information from these sources will inform the KII protocol, interview questionnaires, and FGD/roundtable guide(s).

The Assessment Team will compile an initial document library at the outset of the study, adding to it as necessary over the course of the interviews and fieldwork. USAID will provide the team with reports and documents it feels will contribute to the team’s understanding of election assistance and other DRG issues in Kenya and USAID/USG priorities.

The team will conduct interviews primarily in Nairobi. It may be advisable to travel to at least one region where repeat elections did not take place. However, this decision will be made by the Assessment Team in consultation with USAID at a later date. Interviewees and locations will be determined with input from USAID. The team will also conduct interviews with USG officials and IPs in Washington, DC, and potentially in other locations via Skype/telephone if needed. A preliminary list of possible interviews in Kenya, Washington, DC and elsewhere is attached as Annex 1.

Prior to beginning interviewing, the team will consult with USAID/KEA to determine the best way to describe the purpose of the meeting and the assessment. The team will use semi-structured, open-ended interview guides for the KIIs that can be modified as additional information is acquired in the field. The guide will be based on the preliminary interview questions listed in Annex 2; however, each guide will be individually tailored prior to the interview based on the participant.

Given the sensitivity of this research and practical considerations interviews will not be recorded with audio equipment; team members will therefore take detailed notes. These will be shared promptly and regularly among all team members. Respondents will be offered anonymity and



the option of speaking “off the record,” and where such protection is requested, data will be coded and stored so that the respondent’s identity cannot be matched to the interview content, except by the interviewer.

When conducting interviews team members will follow the following guidance:

Interviews will not seek to cover all the assessment scope; rather they will use a select few preliminary interview questions (see Annex 2), depending on the interview subject, to shape the interview.

The Assessment Team will then go into another set (generally between 3 and 6 questions) of fairly specific topics/questions to be covered – these may be taken directly from the preliminary list in Annex 2, or be further refined by the Assessment Team in the interview guide.

Typically, the duration of interviews will be kept to no more than one hour and 15 minutes.

The Assessment Team will explain the purpose of the interview and that nothing said is for attribution.

It will be explained what the Assessment Team are interested in discussing, but will begin with open-ended questions.

Gender will be factored into questions wherever appropriate.

Interviewers will attempt to discern the quality/veracity of the information provided by the informant (for example, is it only rumor or hearsay?

Interviewers will try to be aware of partisan or other ties.

Where relevant efforts will be made to seek specificity and tangible examples (for example, “What would be an example of the point you just made?”

The Assessment Team will try to triangulate information and opinions.

Towards the end of the interview, the interviewee will be asked if there are other topics s/he wants to discuss or if s/he has any questions.

Team members will complete a write up of the interviews on a daily basis, and upload interview notes to the shared drive that has been established by NORC every two to three days, using a common capture tool (see Annex 3 for a provisional format).

FGDs or roundtables will also be conducted during the Kenya fieldwork. Focus groups offer an opportunity to discover rich information on complex questions, and the environmental, organizational and individual-level factors that contribute to participant views. The focus group structure allows for feedback among participants, which typically generates responses that may not have emerged during face-to-face interviews or through surveys. The Assessment Team will attempt to organize a number of small group meetings involving 4 to 6 key informants from similar stakeholder groups and/or political orientations. These might include the following:

Political scientists and political economists at one or more leading universities,

Participants in USAID programs (election officials, observers, youth, women leaders, etc.)



Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) active in similar issues (observation, electoral law reform, etc.)

Members of political parties

Due to time constraints and in order to involve more USG personnel, group interviews may also take place at USAID/State in Washington, DC and Kenya.

Given the difficulty of moving quickly around Nairobi, and a desire to have discussions take place in a “neutral” environment, NORC will identify a suitable venue where participants and the Assessment Team can easily attend to maximize schedules.

The exact format and number of FGDs will be elaborated and verified with USAID prior to deployment. However, due to the technical nature of the study and high-level of the participants, NORC envisions a minimal number of pre-scheduled FGDs and potentially another 1-2 to be determined upon undertaking fieldwork. NORC will rely on the advice and assistance of USAID/KEA to identify participants and assist with outreach for participation.

Limitations

The assessment combines elements of a retrospective evaluation of USAID-supplied programming, and prospective look at opportunities and challenges for programming going forward. While the approach has many benefits, there will be significant limitations to the degree the Assessment Team can review impact and outcome of any particular activities, while at the same time identify opportunities and make recommendations for elections support within the broader DRG context. As such, the analysis will be made at a more generalized-level, rather than going in-depth into each project and activities. The Assessment Team may however choose to investigate one or more aspect of programming more deeply than others, depending on findings from the initial document review and KIIs.

Political sensitivities surrounding elections in general in Kenya, and USAID support of the process, will likely have a profound impact on the work of the Assessment Team. It is possible that key interlocutors may not be willing to meet with the Assessment Team during field work. The team will be guided by USAID/USG guidance regarding political sensitivities and on how to describe the purpose of the assessment to participants.

Sharp political polarization and opinions about the outcome of the 2017 elections will potentially also have impact on certain individuals/groups willingness to participate, and their responses to questions. While biases are important to note in drawing conclusions and making recommendations going forward, the Assessment Team will also need to pay attention to the source of any bias or beliefs and interpret them accordingly.

Logistically, the size and density (ie, traffic) of Nairobi may reduce the number of KIIs and FGDs that can take place during the field work. Besides high-level officials and USG staff interviews, the venue selection for interviews will be carefully considered to minimize the burden on participants and maximize the Assessment Team’s time. It is recommended that the international members of the Assessment Team stay at the same hotel to maximize time available for daily pre- and post- discussions, and to create more efficient operations in general. FGD venues will be selected with the same considerations in mind.



TIMELINE The Team Lead, Country Expert, and USAID expert(s) will conduct fieldwork over the course of three weeks, with support from a Nairobi-based logistician/assistant. The team will begin fieldwork o/a April 3, and conclude on April 20. Prior to departure, the team will discuss its findings with USAID staff and then formally present those findings at an outbrief.

NORC will submit a draft assessment report, incorporating feedback provided by USAID during the outbrief, within two weeks of the team’s departure. Within two weeks of receiving the draft report, USAID will provide NORC with a consolidated and reconciled set of written comments on the report, including identifying any sensitive information to redact from the final report. Once the team receives all written comments, it will finalize and submit the final report to USAID within two weeks.

The Aassessment Team will include an executive summary and if helpful, a one-page visual dashboard of key findings to be completed and submitted, along with the final report, by the deadline below.

Key dates:

March 5: Contract start-up

March 5-11: Inbrief, Inception Report Preparation, Introductory U.S. Interviews

March 12-18: Submission and Approval of Inception Report; Initial Desk Review

March 19-25: Continued Desk Review and U.S. Interviews

March 19-31: Continued Desk Review and U.S. Interviews

April ½: Team Departs for Kenya

April 3-20: Fieldwork

April 20: Outbrief for USAID/KEA

May 8: First draft of report submitted

May 22: USAID comments on report due

June 5: Final report due

DELIVERABLES

Draft Assessment Team Inception Report/Implementation Plan, containing study methodology, preliminary interview questions, suggested KII participants, interview capture tool, deliverables and timeline.

Interview List representing a wide range of in-country informants, including USG and international community members; government officials; and representatives of election administration, political parties, media, civil society, and academics, among others.



Outbrief of Findings for Mission and Embassy staff, in country, at conclusion of fieldwork.

Draft Assessment Report for review and comment by USAID.

Final Assessment Report (with executive summary) addressing USAID comments.

At the discretion and approval of the Mission, a copy of the final report may be submitted to the Development Experience Clearinghouse (www.dec.org)

http://www.dec.org/



Annex 1: Preliminary Interview List

This list has been prepared in the initial days of the study, and will be significantly edited over the course of the desk review, and in close coordination with USAID/KEA and DRG. Generally, institutions and organizations are named – where possible, a suggestion of a specific individual has also been included. The Assessment Team understands this list will change significantly and will rely on USAID for input on the institutions and individuals suitable for participation in interviews and focus groups. A finalized list, with schedule, will be agreed upon prior to departure for fieldwork.

Institutions/parties • President’s Office/Executive

– TBD

• Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission – Wafula Chebukati

• IEBC secretariat staff – Ezra Chioloba (CEO) – James B. (ICT) – Rasi Masudi (VoterEd) – Anne Nderitu (Training)

• Legislature (Senate and National Assembly) – TBD

• Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs – Hon William Cheptumo

• Kenya Women Parliamentary Association – TBD

• Office of the Registrar of Political Parties – Lucy Ndung’u

• Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions – Dorcus Oduor

• Political Party Dispute Tribunal – Kyalo Mbobu – Milly Lwanga

• National Cohesion and Integration Commission – Hon Francis Ole Kaparo

• National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management – TBD

• Judiciary Committee on Elections – Msagha Mbogholi

• Kenya Law Reforms Commission – Joash Dache



• National Gender and Equality Commission – TBD

• Kenya National Commission on Human Rights – Kagwiria Mbogori

• State Law Office – Maryanne Njau

• Supreme Court – David Maraga (CJ/P)

• Jubilee – TBD

• NASA (National Super Alliance) – TBD

• Political Party Liaison Committee – Jane Njiru

• Others (TBD)

Non-state/Civil

• ACT! – TBD

• ELOG (Election Observation Group) – TBD

• SUPKEM (Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims) – Ambassador Yusuff Nzibo

• Media Council of Kenya – Victor Bwire

• Media outlets/journalists: – TBD

• IRCK (Inter-Religious Council of Kenya): – Francis Kuria

• National Council of Churches of Kenya – Reverend Canon Karanja

• FIDA (Federation of Women Lawyers) – Teresa Omondi – Barbara Kawira

• KHRC (Kenya Human Rights Commission) – George Kegoro

• Other non-state actors (religious leaders, customary or tribal leaders, identity groups, academicians) – Karuti Kanyinga – Mshai Mwangola



International and global actors/implementers • UNDP

– Wambua Kituku – Jane Serwanga

• UN WOMEN – Robert Simiyu

• Embassy of United Kingdom – Jerusha Ouma

• Embassy of Canada – TBD

• Embassy of Norway – TBD

• Mercy Corps – TBD

• Safer World – TBD

• Internews – TBD

• NDI (National Democratic Institute) – Pat Merloe (DC) – Michelle Brown (DC) – Dickson Omondi

• IRI (International Republican Institute) – John Tomaszweski (DC)

• IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) – Rushdi Nackerdien (DC) – Michael Yard (via Skype) – Kristina Wilfore (via Skype) – Deryck Fritz

• IDLO (International Development Law Organization) – Anne Nderi

• The Carter Center – Don Bisson (via Skype)

USG interlocutors • USAID DRG

– Tara Thwing – Cael Savage

• USAID/OTI – David Hamilton (DC)



• USAID DCHA – Karen Freeman – Monica Azimi

• USAID/KEA – Stephen Brager – Faye Haselkorn – Zephania Aura

• State CSO – Patrick Quirk

• State DRL – TBD

• Others (TBD)



Annex 2: Preliminary Interview Topics/Questions

Preliminary interview questions have been organized around the four major lines of inquiry set out by USAID SOW. The general topics/questions listed below may be raised directly in interviews or focus groups, but more likely will form the basis for more specific questions tailored for different stakeholders, to be elaborated in the KII protocol and FGD discussion guides. The focus of interviews and the nature of the questions asked will also depend on the person or people being interviewed and the information needs of the Assessment Team. Depending on the interview participant, lines of inquiry will need to be pursued carefully – and in some cases only indirectly. All questions will be rewritten in interview protocols and discussion guides as needed for appropriate tone and grammatical person.

E. Relationship of the assistance to Strategic U.S. Government Priorities

(8) How did current U.S. strategies (including USAID CDCS, joint Kenyan Election Strategy) and priorities for Kenya facilitate support to electoral processes or actors?

(9) What were the principle drivers behind decisions to provide assistance in certain sectors?

(10) Were there major shifts or turning points in the approach taken by USG in elections assistance, and if so why?

(11) Can one construe a logical progression in the choice of programming, sectors supported, implementation instruments and mechanisms over the period leading up to the 2017 elections?

(12) Have perceptions of U.S. assistance affected choices about which type of assistance to supply, and if so how?

(13) Has the support provided by USAID to electoral stakeholders improved the ability of the USG to realize other strategic priorities in Kenya (now and in future?) Why or why not?

(14) Was programming aligned with host government strategies (Kenya 2030, MPT II etc.)?

(15) Are there other donors/implementers who are better positioned (politically or technically) to provide certain kinds of assistance than USAID?

(16) Will USAID’s new CDCS likely have more or less focus on elections or political processes?

F. Mix, Intensity and Effectiveness of Programmatic Activities

(11) Did USG election support activities address the major needs of elections in Kenya?

(12) How would you prioritize the needs going into the 2017 elections – which sectors? – which stakeholder groups?

(13) How, in concrete examples, did the U.S. assistance provided advance the capacities of electoral stakeholders prior to 2017?

(14) Which areas of election support were most beneficial to recipients and the process as a whole?



(15) Were certain interventions and assistance possibly less needed, or even counterproductive?

(16) Is there an area of support (or target beneficiary) that you feel might be phased out in future programming?

(17) Do you believe that U.S. assistance can positively impact many of the problems in Kenya’s elections?

(18) How important will it be for USAID/USG to maintain support to elections at the present point in the electoral cycle?

(19) If elections were held in 2019, in what sectors and which institutions, would you think the most support was needed?

(20) Are there new opportunities post-election 2017 that have emerged where USAID assistance could be beneficial?

(21) Were more traditionally disadvantaged groups, including women, persons with disabilities, certain ethnic groups, etc. particularly impacted by U.S. election programs?

(22) Were the results achieved commensurate with the cost (financial or otherwise) of the activities designed to bring them about?

G. Managing Risk

(10) Did USAID effectively identify the risks to activities during program design?

(11) Was USAID immediately conscious of program risks during the project life cycle – was the coordination with implementing partners and beneficiaries in Kenya sufficient to quickly identify and deal with emerging risks?

(12) How did USAID adjust its program activities and approaches to implementation when faced with changing risk?

(13) How did unfolding electoral/political dynamics in Kenya affect the achievement of election program results – to what extant was this different from what USAID anticipated?

(14) Were appropriate contingency plans identified in USAID/implementers activities to sufficiently address risks that may arise?

(15) Were risks emanating from Kenyan government concerns during program design or implementation dealt with?

(16) Did any risks emanate from unexpected sources?

(17) Did the choice/number of implementing mechanisms play any role in mitigating or exacerbating risk?

(18) What additional measures could USAID or implementers have taken to identify and/or mitigate risks to election programming in Kenya?

(19) What risk mitigation strategies and measures used or learned during Kenya’s 2017 election cycle programming are suited for future programming?

H. Coordination

(9) Was there effective coordination of activities both within USAID and the broader USG?



(10) Were the coordination measures insufficient, appropriate or excessive?

(11) What forms of coordination worked really well in 2017 – which less so?

(12) How did USAID effectively engage and coordinate with other donor organizations (outside the USG)?

(13) Was the coordination between USAID and implementers sufficient – why or why not?

(14) To what extent did this coordination improve USAID election program performance?

(15) Did coordination efforts have tradeoffs – was any department/office particularly burdened?

(16) Which measures of coordination / mechanisms were particularly useful – and which not?

(17) Were USAIDs activities, objectives and supporting Kenya’s electoral process effectively communicated to beneficiaries?

(18) Were beneficiaries and other external stakeholders sufficiently informed of and consulted on the design and implementation of USAID programming?

(19) Did activities and events on the ground always receive sufficient attention from senior USAID, State, White House officials?

(20) Did the choice of USAID implementation mechanisms facilitate optimal coordination – why or why not?

(21) What changes could be introduced to coordination practices in future?



Annex 3: Interview Notes Capture Tool

DESCRIPTIVE DATA Interviewer name(s): Date, start time, end time: Location of interview: Respondent name (first name, family name): Respondent contact information: Organizational affiliation, position within affiliation: Sex: INTRODUCTION [Insert script developed with USAID/KEA] Do you understand participation is voluntary? (Yes/No) Do you have any questions? (Yes/No)

If Yes, have these been satisfactorily answered Do you agree to participate in this interview? (Yes/No) INTERVIEW QUESTIONS [Tailored list to be inserted prior to interview] INTERVIEW NOTES [Insert notes here] HEADLINE(S) [Major take-aways from the interview]



AREAS OF ASSESSMENT ADDRESSED (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) Priority research questions

Relationship of the assistance to Strategic U.S. Government Priorities Mix, Intensity and Effectiveness of Programming Managing Risk Coordination

Key Element of Election Assistance

Administration Training/Capacity Building Materials support/procurements Voter Registration

Political Party Support New(Women/Youth) Candidates Capacity building

Observation Electoral Dispute Resolution Conflict Mitigation

Early warning/detection Peace Messaging Capacity Building (CSO, Police, other)

Media Support Civic/Voter Education Youth Engagement

Other Key/ Cross-cutting Issues

Persons with Disabilities Gender Corruption Youth/first time voters [add as needed]

Key Actors and Institutions

President’s Office/Executive Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

Commissioner(s) Voter Education and Partnerships Voter Registration and Electoral Operations Information and Communications technology Finance and Procurement Audit Risk and Compliance Human Resources and Administration Legal and Public Affairs Research and Development Registrar of Political Parties



Legislature (Senate and National Assembly) Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs Kenya Women Parliamentary Association Office of the Registrar of Political Parties Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Political Party Dispute Tribunal National Cohesion and Integration Commission Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations Ministry of Education Kenya Law Reforms Commission National Gender and Equality Commission Kenya National Commission on Human Rights National Cohesion and Integration Commission State Law Office Courts

Superior Subordinate

Local (decentralized) government Political Parties/Coalitions

Jubilee NASA Other

Civil Society Media Private sector Academia Other non-state actors (religious leaders, customary or tribal leaders, identity groups) International and global actors

Embassy Donor Agency UNDP UN WOMEN UN (Other) Other [specify]

USG interlocutors

USAID DRG USAID DCHA USAID/KEA USAID/OTI USAID [specify] State [specify] State CSO State DRL Other [specify]


ANNEX 5 - TASKING SCOPE OF WORK SENT BY USAID | 78

ANNEX 5 - TASKING SCOPE OF WORK SENT BY USAID

ASSESSMENT OF USAID SUPPORT FOR KENYA’S 2017 ELECTIONS STATEMENT OF WORK

DRAFT 1/25/2018 Overview, Purpose and Objectives USAID/Kenya and East Africa (USAID/KEA) and the USAID/Washington’s DRG Center are seeking the services of a team to carry out an assessment of USAID’s election programming for Kenya’s 2017 election cycle. The purpose of the assessment is to assess and document key lessons learned in USAID’s assistance to Kenya’s 2017 General Elections and Repeat Presidential Election. The assessment should also make recommendations relevant for future USAID programming around elections. Key questions to address in the assessment include:

• Relationship to Strategic USG Priorities: To what extent did USAID’s elections assistance support USG strategic priorities and objectives related to free, fair, credible and peaceful elections in Kenya? What could have been improved or done differently?

• Mix, Intensity and Effectiveness of Programmatic Activities: Was the mix and intensity of different type of activities (i.e. support to IEBC, Electoral Dispute Resolution, political party work, electoral conflict mitigation, women’s political participation, cross-sectoral coordination, etc.) effective and appropriate? Are there activities that needed more or less attention? Was electoral security addressed sufficiently? What were the risks and how were they managed?

• Managing Risk: How did Kenya’s political and conflict environment affect the achievement of election program results? Was assessment of conflict dynamics assessed and addresses properly? Was there anything within USAID or implementing partners’ manageable interest that could have been done to manage programmatic risks related to host government concerns, electoral conflict and violence or political dynamics more effectively?

• Coordination: To what extent did internal and external coordination help or hinder USAID election program performance? Internal includes internal USAID coordination, inter-agency coordination, coordination between field and Washington. External coordination includes coordination among donors, Kenyan stakeholders and implementing partners.



Evaluation Team and Tasks USAID seeks two senior-level consultants --one International and one Kenyan -- with proven track records and experience in Elections, Democracy, Governance and Human Rights program assessments, solid analytical and writing skills, and expertise in the area of elections and political transitions in conflict-prone environments. It is desirable that the international consultant has experience working in Kenya, including familiarity with Kenyan electoral institutions. These external consultants will be joined by one or two elections and conflict experts from USAID/Washington who will participate as full technical members of the team and will contribute to analysis and drafting of the report. The consultants will:

● Conduct a desk review of strategic, programmatic and other reports about USAID Election Assistance and other relevant donor or observer reports about the 2017 electoral process.

● Conduct key informant interviews in Nairobi, Kenya. The team is expected to meet with selected Embassy officials, USAID staff from different offices across the Mission and other donors involved in the election support, international and Kenyan-based implementing partners; and senior officials of the Independent Elections and Boundary Commission, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and representatives from Political Parties Dispute Tribunal, the judiciary, and others.

● The team will hold focus groups or round table discussions with key actors, such as implementing partners and donors.

The International Consultant will also:

● Serve as the team lead for the assessment ensuring timely deliverables and quality control.

● Serve as the lead technical expert with responsibility over data collection and management.

● Hold meetings and interviews with USG staff at USAID, State and Implementing partners’ headquarters.

● Serve as the lead drafter of the report. S/he will be responsible for delivering the first draft, based on inputs from the other team members, and consequent revisions per the time frame and deliverables described below.

Deliverables and Timeline

1) In brief (can be a phone call) with USAID to discuss the scope of work and expectations. To be completed within 3 days of Award.

2) Assessment Team Inception Report/Implementation Plan -- To be submitted within 3 days of the USAID inbrief.

3) Desk research and US Based Meetings: 6 days are allocated to this and should begin immediately upon USAID approval of inception report/implementation plan.

4) Kenya field work. Should begin as soon as possible following US Based meetings for a period of 18 days.



5) Outbrief for USAID/KEA: Due before the team departs Kenya. Should include an oral presentation and outline of preliminary findings and recommendations.

6) Report: Drafting the report should start in country and the first draft will be finished in 10 days after completion of field work. Embassy and USAID/KEA and DRG would have 2 weeks to provide comments to the draft. Revisions will be finalized by the external consultants within two weeks after that timeline.

Level of Effort and Other Inputs It is anticipated that the assessment team will be responsible for the following inputs: International Consultant -- 35 days (includes 7 days preparation, 18 days in country field work and 10 days for report writing/editing) Local Kenyan Consultant -- 28 days (includes 5 days preparation, 18 days in country field work and 5 days for report writing/editing). Travel, transportation and meeting costs as necessary for carrying out the assessment. It is expected that the team will be responsible for scheduling their own meetings. USAID/KEA will provide assistance as needed and feasible.



Annex 1: Overview of USAID Elections Programs USAID programming in support of Kenya’s 2017 election cycle was carried out through various implementing partners and mechanisms as described below: USAID KENYA ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (KEAP) PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: MAY 2016 – FEBRUARY 2018 FUNDING: $18.68 MILLION USAID KEAP supports Kenyan efforts to strengthen the credibility of electoral processes and encourage peaceful, inclusive political participation during the 2017 General Elections. Implemented by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), KEAP addresses the most pressing vulnerabilities of the electoral system in Kenya during the full electoral process. KEAP has four programmatic objectives:

1. Strengthen key electoral institutions to implement legislative reforms, expand voter registration and voter education, and effectively administer the 2017 elections;

2. Enhance the participation of women and youth and traditionally marginalized groups as voters, competitive candidates for elected office and effective advocates for positive change;

3. Ensure transparency and accountability of political processes through domestic and international observation; and

4. Mitigate electoral conflict and violence through dialogue, consensus-building and strengthening conflict early-warning /early-response mechanisms.

Specifically, KEAP provides direct technical assistance and support to the International Boundaries and Electoral Commission (IEBC) to strengthen its internal governance systems and process, develop and draft election regulations, promote voter education and registration, and enhance the application of technology for election management.

KEAP is supplemented by activities designed to support of the new Presidential election, and implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes (IFES, the National Democracy Institute and the International Republican Institute) and local partners. The activities include a variety of interventions, such as domestic observation, conflict prevention and mitigation, post-election reconciliation and bipartisan dialogue. This assistance is funded through the rapid response and small grants mechanisms of USAID’s Global Elections and Political Transitions award. September 2017 – August 2018 Funding: $1.9 Million STRENGTHENING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN KENYA (SEPK) PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: SEPTEMBER 2015 – DECEMBER 2018 FUNDING: $4.35 MILLION USAID is contributing to the UNDP-managed multi-donor fund to support the preparations for the 2017 elections, including the October 2017 fresh presidential election. The goal of the project is to promote consolidated, strengthened and sustainable electoral institutions, systems and processes in Kenya. Project activities and results focus on four main areas: i) strengthen the institutional and legal framework for the electoral processes; ii) expand the participation of voters, parties and candidates in the electoral process with emphasis on women, youth and persons with disabilities; iii) support the administration of more efficient, transparent and peaceful elections; and iv) improve electoral justice and increase compliance with the electoral framework.



SUPPORTING THE KENYA CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: FEBRUARY 2013 – DECEMBER 2018 FUNDING: $900,000 USAID has funded the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) to provide technical assistance and support to the Judiciary Committee on Election (JCE) to reinforce jurisprudence on election petitions, enhance institutional capacity and boost case management by judicial officers. This support has contributed to the efficient and effective dispensation of the more than 188 election petition cases arising from the 2013 election, and the development of the Judiciary’s Strategic Plan for the 2017 election. Continued support for the 2017 election cycle will concentrate on fortifying the capacity of the judiciary to resolve electoral disputes transparently. INTERNATIONAL ELECTIONS OBSERVATION MISSION TO KENYA'S AUGUST 8, 2017 ELECTION PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: APRIL 2017 - FEBRUARY 2018 FUNDING: $2.31 MILLION USAID is supporting the Carter Center to deploy a long-term comprehensive observation mission to assess the electoral and political processes surrounding Kenya’s 2017 elections. Technical experts and long-term observers will undertake an assessment of the political/electoral dynamics, legal framework and administrative aspects of the elections vis-à-vis international standards, use of elections technology and Kenya’s national legal framework for elections. A high-level leadership delegation and additional complement of short-term observers joined the mission during the immediate August 8 election period to assess voting, counting and transmission of results. A comprehensive report will be issued upon the completion of the mission summarizing key findings and recommendations for improvements to Kenya’s future electoral processes. MONITORING THREATS TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIC SPACE AROUND KENYA’S REPEAT ELECTIONS PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: OCTOBER 2017 - MARCH 2018 FUNDING: $162,721 USAID is supporting a rapid response program with Freedom House (FH) to help the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) to monitor, document, and report on human rights abuses and violations, engage with government institutions to ensure accountability, and contribute to the protection of civic space in Kenya in the period before, during, and after the October 2017 repeat presidential election. In addition to direct support to KNCHR to compile and analyze data on human rights violations and engage with stakeholders, FH will also provide mentorship and technical assistance to help KNCHR develop a monitoring, documentation and reporting plan based on international best practices.

RESPONDING TO FAKE NEWS AND RUMORS IN COMMUNITY AND VERNACULAR MEDIA IN KENYA PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: OCTOBER 2017 - JUNE 2018 FUNDING: $500,000 USAID is supporting Internews to increase Kenyan citizens’ access to accurate and conflict-sensitive information about the October 2017 repeat presidential election, and the post-election period through social, community and mainstream media. The project will work towards this goal by improving election reporting, combating fake news, hate speech and misinformation, and supporting open dialogue about election processes. Increasing access to crucial and conflict-sensitive information will empower Kenyan citizens, helping them make peaceful, informed decisions in a difficult and potentially violent political environment.



Annex 2: Illustrative Final Report Outline Intro, Background and Context

• Purpose and rationale

• Brief context of electoral process Executive Summary

• Main findings and conclusions and program recommendations related to relationship to USG priorities, effectiveness of programmatic activities and management of risk.

• Key Recommendations Methodology

• Include the methods used, persons/institutions interviewed and background documents reviewed.

Detailed Findings and Conclusions

• What went well, what could be improved and other lessons learned. Detailed Recommendations

• Based on findings, what changes are recommended to improve the effectiveness of future election programming? What are the key program areas where USAID/KEA should focus on?