Assignment 3 Major Essay

STRA 524 Intelligence-Led Enforcement

Julie AMBURY, Student ID# 300065471 17B Wood Street

GREYTOWN 5712 Phone 04 238 3696

Mobile 027 3244 808 Email [email protected]

Course Coordinator: Associate Professor Jim Veitch School of Government Victoria University of Wellington, NZ

Assignment 3 – Major Essay (due 5pm Friday 17 October 2008, extension arranged to 5pm Friday 24 October 2008)

WORD COUNT - 4,118

10 Measures of Effective Criminal Intelligence

Julie AMBURY, Student ID#300065471 STRA 524, Assignment 3 – Major Essay

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How do we know when criminal intelligence in law enforcement has been effective? This

essay sets out to establish ten measures for effective criminal intelligence. These

measures will be explored within the context of the New Zealand Police (NZP) and

consideration will be given as to whether the measures are unique to the NZP or whether

they may be transferable to other law enforcement organisations in New Zealand and

internationally. A NZP example of the use of outcomes, goals, outputs and measures will

be provided to establish some understanding of what they are and to provide a framework

for consideration of intelligence outcomes, outputs and measures. To do this, some

definitions and models of intelligence will be explored to establish what intelligence

outcomes might be. Following that measures are established within a framework of the

interpret and influence components of an intelligence model and intelligence as a

structure, a process and a product.

The NZP strategic goals and outcomes are community reassurance resulting in confident,

safe and secure communities, policing with confidence resulting in less actual crime and

road trauma, and fewer victims, and organisational development resulting in a world class

Police service. These goals and outcomes are linked to the NZ Justice Sector goal for a

safe and just society, resulting in safer communities and the enjoyment of civil and

democratic rights. Each NZP strategic goal is supported by activity areas (outputs), which

contribute to the achievement of the goals and outcomes. Measures are put in place to

assess progress against each outcome. Put simply, an outcome is what we hope to

achieve, an output is how we intend to do it and a measure is how we demonstrate

success.1

For example, the goal of policing with confidence resulting in the outcome of less actual

crime and road trauma, and fewer victims, is supported by four key output areas. These

are evidenced based proactive policing, timely and effective response to calls for service,

thorough investigations and effective resolutions. Outputs for evidenced based proactive

policing (one of the key output areas) include execution of court summonses, warrants and

orders, and strategic road policing. A range of measures will be used to assess the

progress of the outcome (less actual crime and road trauma, and fewer victims) including

monitoring crime and vehicle crash rates reported in six-monthly Police statistics,

1 New Zealand Police. (2008). Statement of Intent 2008/09 – 2010/11 New Zealand Police.

Wellington:New Zealand Police.


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monitoring crash, death and hospitalisation rates as reported in the Ministry of Transport

annual survey and monitoring the level of victimisation as reported in the Ministry of

Justice New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey.2

Intelligence has been defined in many ways within the context of law enforcement over

recent years and varies across organisations, both in New Zealand and internationally. In

2000, the Australian Customs Service defined intelligence as “a value-added product,

derived from the collection and processing of all relevant information relating to client

needs, which is immediately or potentially significant to client decision-making.”3 In 2003,

Ratcliffe stated that “a broader view of intelligence could incorporate the view that

intelligence is a structure, a process and a product.”4 Ratcliffe’s 2007 definition of criminal

intelligence was that it “… is the creation of an intelligence product that supports decision

making in the areas of law enforcement, crime reduction and crime prevention.”5 In 2008,

Ratcliffe goes on to cite de Lint et al. differentiating between knowledge products (that

generate understanding) and intelligence products (that generate action).6

In 2008, the New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance (MOG) defines

intelligence as “the product of an analytic process that evaluates information collected from

diverse sources, integrates the relevant information into a cohesive package, and

produces a conclusion about a criminal occurrence by using a scientific approach (i.e.

analysis).” It goes on to say that intelligence is “a planned product intended to provide

significant direction to Police decision makers about crime and criminals, road trauma and

community safety concerns (often referred to as ‘fear of crime’).” The MOG glossary

adopts Ratcliffe’s broader view of intelligence as a structure (the people that make up an

intelligence unit), a process (the application of the intelligence cycle) and a product (the

end product of the intelligence process) and goes on to define intelligence in short, as

processed information that can be acted upon.7

2 New Zealand Police. (2008). Statement of Intent 2008/09 – 2010/11 New Zealand Police.

Wellington:New Zealand Police. 3 Australian Customs Services (2000). Cited by Ratcliffe, J.H. (2003). Intelligence-led policing. Trends and

Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 248, 6. 4 Ratcliffe, J.H. (2003). Intelligence-led policing. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 248, 6. 5 Ratcliffe, J.H. (2007). Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information Management for

Law Enforcement Leaders. Washington:Police Foundation. (p. 8). 6 de Lint et al. (2007). Cited by Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton, Devon:Willan

Publishing. 7 New Zealand Police. (2008). New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance. PNHQ,

Wellington:National Intelligence Office.


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Ratcliffe’s 3-i model8 was first introduced to New Zealand in 2003 following a review of

NZP intelligence undertaken at that time. It was adopted by the NZP and modified to

reflect a reciprocal relationship between the intelligence practitioner and the decision

maker and renamed the New Zealand Crime Reduction Model.9 This was the very

beginning of intelligence-led policing for the NZP and supported the primary operating

strategy of the Police at that time, known then as Crime and Crash Reduction. The 3-i

model demonstrates the role intelligence has within a law enforcement environment. That

is, to interpret the criminal environment in order to influence the decision maker, who can

then impact upon the criminal environment. Interpret, influence and impact are the three

law enforcement activities that make up the 3-i’s of the Model.

Just as there are many definitions for intelligence in organisations across New Zealand

and internationally, there are also many different versions of intelligence cycles. While the

3-i model demonstrates the role of intelligence, the intelligence cycle demonstrates the

process for intelligence. The NZP Intelligence Cycle10 has been through a recent change

following consultation with a working group of intelligence leaders and practitioners. It is

set out in the NZP Intelligence MOG and constitutes eight parts: direction, collection,

evaluation, collation, analysis, responses, dissemination and review. What is important to

note, is that the intelligence cycle is not a precise, sequential model where the intelligence

practitioner efficiently moves from one stage to the next. In reality, the practitioner can

skip, ignore, revisit or merge each part of the cycle depending on time, the requirements of

the end-user, accepted practice or local knowledge. The intelligence cycle depicts in a

most elementary way, how specialist staff members add value to information.11

Having explored some definitions of intelligence and models for the role of intelligence and

the intelligence process, consideration must be given to what the outcomes and goals

might be for intelligence within law enforcement. The 3-i model would suggest that the

outcome of intelligence is to have an impact on the criminal environment, thereby making

our communities safer. While this may be true, what this implies is that if no impact is

8 Refer Appendix ‘A’. 9 Refer Appendix ‘B’. 10 Refer Appendix ‘C’. 11 New Zealand Police. (2008). New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance. PNHQ,



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made on the criminal environment, that intelligence has indeed failed. On this basis, if an

analyst provides intelligence that was never used by the decision maker was it ever really

intelligence? Yes, it was still intelligence. It just could be that the decision maker either

did not understand what he or she should do with the intelligence product or they did not

know how to use that product to implement the best responses to impact on the criminal

environment. As Mark Evans, the NZP National Manager, Intelligence rightly states, “No

intelligence product, no matter how good it is, to my knowledge has ever arrested an

offender.”

Can then, the NZP example of outcomes, goals, outputs and measures be used as a

model to establish ten measures for effective criminal intelligence? Based on the

definitions and models for intelligence that have been explored it is safe to say that the

outcome for intelligence is clear. Effective intelligence must empower and enable the

decision maker to have an impact on the criminal environment. This in turn, links into the

NZP goal of policing with confidence resulting in the outcome of less actual crime and road

trauma, and fewer victims.12 What is displayed here is that the intelligence outcome links

into NZP goals and outcomes, just as the NZP goals and outcomes linked into Justice

Sector goals and outcomes. The intelligence outcome of empowered and enabled

decision makers must be achieved by effective interpretation of the criminal environment

and the capability to influence the decision maker. These two things then, interpretation

and influence, must be identified as the key output areas for intelligence. From here,

outputs supporting these key activity areas must be decided, along with a way to

demonstrate the success of them (measures).

To date no measures for effective criminal intelligence have been established despite the

NZP Intelligence Cycle (and others) having always accommodated the need for review as

part of the intelligence process. Performance measures such as the volume of reported

crime, the number of offences cleared, the number of arrests made etc. paint part of the

picture around the success of the decision maker’s impact on the criminal environment,

but as previously mentioned do not necessarily demonstrate whether intelligence has been

successful. These types of measures are known as quantitative, or hard measures. Any

measures relying implicitly on quantitative data in a dynamic environment such as law

12 Refer Appendix ‘D’.


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enforcement do not provide a complete picture of effectiveness. For example, how can it

be proven that a reduction in burglaries is due completely to the implementation of the

decision maker’s responses? It is probable that other immeasurable factors may have

contributed to the reduction, such as increased personal security measures or a

decreased level of reporting to police, which means there may not have actually been a

reduction.

To balance quantitative data, qualitative, or soft data must be taken into consideration.

The scientific application of quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrates clearly the

difference between the two, and can be applied as a concept within law enforcement.

Quantitative analysis is the “measurement of the quantities of particular constituents

present in a substance” and qualitative analysis is the “identification of the constituents

present in the substance.”13 Without identifying other factors that may be contributing to

an increase or a decrease in a particular crime type, as previously mentioned, there is the

danger of only measuring the quantity of a particular crime type which provides little

information to the decision maker about effectiveness of implemented responses. In turn,

there is likely to be even less information that can be used by the decision maker to inform

future responses.

To this end, any measures for effective intelligence must incorporate both quantitative

(hard) and qualitative (soft) measures. In establishing the ten measures for effective

criminal intelligence this approach has been taken. What have also been taken into

account are the two key output areas, interpretation and influence, which have been

considered within Ratcliffe’s definition of intelligence as a structure, a process and a

product.14 This framework for measures is underpinned by the NZP Intelligence MOG

principles of intelligence,15 Evans’ intelligence axioms16 and Ratcliffe’s ten yardsticks for

intelligence-led policing17 some of which have been used and adapted as measures.

13 Dictionary. (2002). The Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English Second Edition. Auckland,

New Zealand:Oxford University Press, p. 925. 14 Refer Appendix ‘E’. 15 New Zealand Police. (2008). New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance. PNHQ,

Wellington:National Intelligence Office. 16 Refer Appendix ‘F’. 17 Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton, Devon:Willan Publishing, pp. 235-237.


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The initial intention was to collate and articulate the measures in one of three ways: by

structure, process and product, by output (interpret and influence) or by the type of

measure (hard or soft). When a matrix was completed to establish what the intelligence

measures might be it demonstrated that there are numerous factors that crossover. For

example, one of the measures inside the people-interpret cell also applied inside the

people-influence cell. To this end, the following paragraphs will begin to set out the

measures in no particular order but will follow the general guide of intelligence as a

structure (people), process and product. It must be acknowledged that measures of

success for the development and implementation of the National Intelligence Project have

been set out in the NZP National Business Plan.18 These are specific to the National

Intelligence Project where the proposed measures in this essay relate directly to the

success of intelligence in law enforcement.

The first measure for effective criminal intelligence is whether a centralised control for

intelligence within the organisation exists. Without centralised control there is likely to be

duplication of effort and gaps in collection of information, no mutual support between

regions, districts and areas, lack of information security and no technical control of people

(structure), processes or products.19 No successful business exists without a centralised

control and a strategy. There is no reason why the business of law enforcement should be

any different. Prior to the implementation of the NZP National Intelligence Project

pockets of effective intelligence existed despite the lack of centralised control. However,

the development of the NZP National Intelligence Centre will see the improvement of

intelligence, nationwide. It will create an intelligence culture within the organisation by

sharing best practice, standardising products and processes, and recognising excellence.

The prevalence of an intelligence culture within an organisational culture, particularly one

as staid as the NZP, is a significant indicator of the effectiveness of intelligence. If an

intelligence culture were to exist within the NZP that was as robust as the Criminal

Investigation Branch culture, this would be a very clear indicator of its effectiveness.

A nationally and internationally recognised career pathway for intelligence practitioners will

be in place, evidenced by a structure incorporating intelligence roles that can be applied to 18 New Zealand Police. (2008). Police National Business Plan 2008/2009. PNHQ, Wellington:National

Business Planning Group. 19 New Zealand Police. (2008) New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance. PNHQ,



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specialist units across the organisation and which provide clear job descriptions and

equality in rates of pay. Recognition of this may be evidenced by the adoption of this

pathway into other law enforcement organisations across New Zealand and internationally.

The number of intelligence roles at all levels of the organisation must be set and monitored

along with the quality of job descriptions and remuneration. An increase in the number of

intelligence job descriptions and ambiguity around the role of the intelligence practitioner

will be indicators that an improvement is required. Further evidence that this measure is

being achieved may take the form of the amount of interest exhibited by individuals both

internally and externally seeking a career in criminal intelligence.

A nationally and internationally recognised standard of professional development will also

be in place. This links into the previous measure and will be evidenced quantitatively by

the number of general and specialist intelligence courses delivered by the NZP Training

Service Centre, the numbers attending the courses and the results achieved.

Recognition may also take the form of acceptance of the training programme as part of the

National Qualifications Framework and the attendance of intelligence practitioners across

law enforcement in New Zealand and internationally. The qualifications and experience of

those developing and delivering training is likely to be reflected in the quality of it.

Therefore a balance of academic and practical experience is likely to require ongoing

monitoring. The level and relevance of education provided by universities must also be

taken into consideration as an indicator of the academic and practical balance required.

Whether the training provided actually meets the needs of the intelligence requirement

within the organisation must also be closely monitored and must be aligned with the

intelligence career pathway. Analysts who demonstrate the necessary skills, knowledge

and training to interpret the criminal environment and influence the decision maker will

provide a measure of effective intelligence.

A committed and challenging command structure is critical to effective intelligence and will

be evidenced by a national, regional, district or area structure that reflects this commitment

and that exists to action intelligence products. Ways that this can be measured include

the physical location of the intelligence unit in relation to the decision maker, who the

intelligence unit manager reports to and how far removed this is (or not) from the decision

maker. Consideration must also be given to whether the intelligence unit is an integral

part of the decision making process (e.g. whether they are consulted in the Tasking and


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Coordination Meetings (TCMs)) and whether informal surveys of intelligence practitioners

would reflect they have a committed and challenging primary decision maker or

management team. How well committed management is to intelligence may also be

measured by their investment in information technology, data collection, management and

leadership, while the investment in their own education as well as that of the intelligence

practitioner may be indicative of their capability to challenge intelligence. If the decision

maker does not know what their intelligence unit is for, what they are capable of providing

and how he or she should use the intelligence that is provided, it is detrimental to

themselves and the organisation. Sir David Phillips rightly states that

“… unless commanders value and understand ‘intelligence’, recognising its

strengths and weakness, and feel confident enough to use it, they are unlikely to set

clear requirements. This observation is made because almost every review of

intelligence failure, from Pearl Harbour to modern day Iraq, illustrates that the

technical failures of intelligence collection and analysis are generally less to blame

than the faulty perceptions of those tasking the decisions.”20

Each part of the intelligence process benefits from the use of the appropriate analytical

tools. If there is evidence that these have been effectively applied then there is likely to be

a much better intelligence product that has the capability to influence the decision maker.

Ratcliffe states that “decisions made in the interpret phase dominate the rest of the (3-i)

model” and that “analysis and accurate interpretation of the criminal environment are

essential to intelligence led policing and crime control.”21 The intelligence practitioner’s

use of analytical tools and models such as the intelligence cycle, the SARA problem

solving model,22 the crime triangle23 and numerous others is something that can be

concretely measured. The use of these tools and models should be reflected in sound

analysis and demonstrate the analyst’s capability to interpret the criminal environment and

influence the decision maker. A checklist confirming the use of these tools, or at the very

least, the inclusion of them as appendices or availability of them as supporting data may

20 Phillips, D. (2008). Police Intelligence Systems as a Strategic Response. In Dr C Harfield et al. (Ed.),

The Handbook of Intelligent Policing: Consilience, Crime Control and Community Safety. (pp. 28-29).

21 Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton, Devon:Willan Publishing, p. 115. 22 Clarke, R.V. & Eck, J. (2003). Become a Problem-Solving Crime Analyst. University College, London:Jill

Dando Institute of Crime Science. 23 Ibid.


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be a clear way to establish how sound the analysis is and how well it supports or discounts

what is anecdotally accepted.

Effective management of data, while it is connected to the previous measure, justifies

being a measure on its own. Successful integration of technology with working practices,

rather than the amount of money spent on technology alone, may be the best measure of

effective management of data, and therefore intelligence. Ratcliffe cites the Birchard

Inquiry Report,24 which was conducted following the murder of two British 10-year-old girls

in August 2002, as an intelligence failure due to the organisational reliance on informal

methods of communication. This failure occurred as a result of lack of effective audits to

check that systems were operating properly, inadequate training of police officers, lack of

guidance on record creation, review and deletion, little evidence of sufficient strategic

review of information management systems and no real awareness among senior

managers of the scale and nature of data management problems.25 The successful

integration of technology with workplace practices may be measured by the presence of

audits that check systems are operating properly, the quantity and quality of training

provided to police officers for the collection and evaluation of information and for data entry

staff who manage the information. If these checks and balances are in place there is an

increased likelihood of data quality, which in turn will increase the likelihood of relevant,

accurate and timely intelligence.

The intelligence product must be capable of informing a decision. This might be measured

quantitatively by the existence and frequency of TCMs, the numbers of people who attend

them and whether they are the right people. That is, whether the people who attend have

the capability to be tasked by the decision maker to implement responses. There are

national guidelines that exist for TCMs covering requirements for frequency and guidelines

about how the meeting should be run and who should attend. How integral the intelligence

product is in informing the TCM and how well decisions reflect intelligence

recommendations within that product could also be indicative of how effective the

intelligence is. However, if the decision maker does not fully understand the impact

24 Bichard, M. (2004). Cited by Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Analytical frameworks: DIKI continuum. In

Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton, Devon:Willan Publishing, p. 97. 25 Ibid.


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component of the 3-i model then no matter how effective the intelligence is, there is the

possibility that inappropriate responses may be tasked.

Whether the right intelligence product has been used is another measure of effective

criminal intelligence. While this links to the previous measure, there a specific ways this

measure might be considered. The existence of standardised products and terminology

means management can focus on taking action, instead of conducting analysis in a

meeting format where it is not appropriate to do so. How well the product allows the

decision maker to do this is a test of whether the product is the correct one and whether

the product contains the quality of information it needs to. The frequency of correctly

chosen intelligence products may also be an indicator of how effective intelligence is

provided the quality remains intact. That is, there is no use in producing an intelligence

product to meet requirements of frequency if the information in it is useless to the decision

maker. Guidance and monitoring of the appropriate use of intelligence products by

intelligence unit managers in consultation with the decision makers is critical to the

ongoing effectiveness of intelligence.

Ratcliffe states that decision makers and intelligence practitioners must “demonstrate

leadership, ownership and understanding of the tenets of intelligence-led policing for it to

succeed.”26 Leadership is pivotal in ensuring that processes are adhered to and

supported27 but this is not necessarily just the responsibility of decision makers. Equal

responsibility must sit with intelligence unit managers and intelligence practitioners for all

three elements: leadership, ownership and understanding. While senior decision makers

are in the right positions to champion for intelligence, leadership is not just their

responsibility. Whether the organisation has subject matter experts and provides

leadership in intelligence to other organisations, nationally and internationally, may also be

a very good indicator of the effectiveness of it. The quality of leadership with an

organisation can be assessed using the likes of a 360-degree feedback tool and others. A

correlation between effective leadership and effective intelligence may be an indicator that

leadership is indeed a contributing factor, and therefore a measure, of effective

intelligence.

26 Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton, Devon:Willan Publishing, p. 237. 27 New Zealand Police. (2008). New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance. PNHQ,



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Ownership has been covered in part by the committed and challenging command structure

measure but a clear indicator of ownership, and the contribution it has to effective

intelligence, is that the absence of one (or more) significant intelligence or decision making

staff members, must not see the entire process stall or falter.28 If this does happen, then

clearly lack of ownership, by either the intelligence practitioner and / or the decision maker

is an issue and impacts directly on the effectiveness of intelligence. The understanding

each party has of their role in the intelligence process is critical to the effective outcome of

it. The most measure of understanding will be most evident in TCMs.29

The level of creativity, integrity and credibility that intelligence practitioners have is critical

to the effectiveness of intelligence. How these attributes can be measured is the

challenge. Evidence of creativity, particularly within a structure that demands

standardised products, may be difficult to see. However, intelligence unit managers and

decision makers must be able to see the analyst’s capability to think outside the square

reflected in the quality of the intelligence product. Creativity may be more evident in the

intelligence process (before it becomes a product) and therefore an assessment of the

level of creativity may be subjected to the opinion of the assessor or the analyst’s peers.

Integrity and credibility are also vital attributes. The measurement of these is also difficult,

but again, this will be reflected in the product. What is key to all of these is the presence of

a robust relationship between the practitioner and the decision maker. Understanding

each other, and understanding each other’s business is vital to effective intelligence. The

analyst’s capability to network with internal and external partners to interpret the criminal

environment and the analyst’s capability to influence the decision maker will depend

largely on their capability to build relationships and networks.

This essay intended to establish ten measures for effective criminal intelligence which

have been explored within the context of the New Zealand Police (NZP). A test of their

strength may be in how transferable they are to other law enforcement organisations and

businesses in New Zealand, and internationally. A NZP example of the use of outcomes,

goals, outputs and measures provided a clear basis of understanding for consideration of

28 New Zealand Police. (2008). New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance. PNHQ,

Wellington:National Intelligence Office. 29 Ibid.


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intelligence outcomes, outputs and measures. Definitions and models of intelligence were

explored to establish what intelligence outcomes might be, and what the subsequent

outputs and measures might be. The actual implementation (rather than lip service) of

intelligence led policing stands a far greater chance in terms of contribution to effective

intelligence, than other policing styles. What must be noted is that this is the very first

attempt at compiling a set of measures for intelligence. To this end it must be used as a

start point for further discussion and research so that a national, or even international, set

of measures may be recognised.


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REFERENCE LIST

Clarke, R.V. & Eck, J. (2003). Become a Problem-Solving Crime Analyst. University

College, London:Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science.

Dictionary. (2002). The Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English Second

Edition. Auckland, New Zealand:Oxford University Press.

New Zealand Police. (2008). New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of Guidance.

PNHQ, Wellington:National Intelligence Office.

New Zealand Police. (2008). Police National Business Plan 2008/2009. PNHQ,

Wellington:National Business Planning Group.

New Zealand Police. (2004). New Zealand Police Statement of Intent 2004/2005. PNHQ,

Wellington:New Zealand Police.

New Zealand Police. (2008). Statement of Intent 2008/09 – 2010/11 New Zealand

Police. Wellington:New Zealand Police.

Phillips, D. (2008). Police Intelligence Systems as a Strategic Response. In Dr C Harfield

et al. (Ed.), The Handbook of Intelligent Policing: Consilience, Crime Control and

Community Safety. (pp. 28-35).

Ratcliffe, J.H. (2007). Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information

Management for Law Enforcement Leaders. Washington:Police Foundation.

Ratcliffe, J.H. (2003). Intelligence-led policing. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal

Justice, 248, 6.

Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton, Devon:Willan Publishing.


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APPENDICES

Appendix ‘A’ – Ratcliffe’s 3-i Model30

Appendix ‘B’ – New Zealand Crime Reduction Model31 (Note the modified ‘influence’ arrow reflecting a reciprocal relationship between intelligence and the decision

maker.)

30 Ratcliffe, J. H. (2003). Intelligence-led policing. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 248.

Retrieved from www.jratcliffe.net on 23/09/08. 31 New Zealand Police. (2004). New Zealand Police Statement of Intent 2004/2005. PNHQ,

Wellington:New Zealand Police. (p. 13).


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Appendix ‘C’ – NZP Intelligence Cycle32

Appendix ‘D’ – Intelligence Outcome and Outputs

32 New Zealand Police. (2008). The intelligence cycle. In New Zealand Police Intelligence Manual of

Guidance. PNHQ, Wellington:National Intelligence Office.


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Appendix ‘E’ – Intelligence Measures Framework

Appendix ‘F’ – Evans’ 10 Intelligence Axioms33

1. Be prepared to do battle for access to the right information.

2. Trust and confidence take years to develop and can be lost in an instant.

3. Results of the analytical process are of no value unless they are disseminated

effectively to those with the power to make decisions.

4. Customers are sceptical and cynical.

5. Be bold, but not foolhardy.

6. Be a creative intelligence analyst.

7. You cannot build a reputation on the basis of what you are going to achieve.

8. Tell the truth.

9. Being an analyst is not a popularity contest.

10. Good analysis will usually make people feel uncomfortable, at least for a while.

33 Evans, R.M. (2007). Mark’s 10 Intelligence Axioms. Power point presentation delivered to students of the

New Zealand Strategic Intelligence Course, December 2007.

Intelligence Measures

Decision makers who are capable of impacting on the criminal environment

Interpret Influence

People

Process

Product

Hard

Soft

NZP Principles of Intelligence / Evans’ Intelligence Axioms / Ratcliffe’s 10 Yardsticks


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Appendix ‘G’ – 10 Measures of Effective Criminal Intelligence

Documents

Assignment 3 Major Essay