Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices

Jose Viladagger Ricardo J RodrıguezDagger

pvtolkiengmailcom rjrodriguezunileoneslaquo All wrongs reversed

daggerComputer Science and daggerResearch Institute ofSystems Engineering Dept Applied Sciences in Cybersecurity

University of Zaragoza Spain University of Leon Spain

May 28 2015

Hack in the Box 2015Amsterdam (Nederland)

About us

Pepe VilaSecurity Consultant at EampYtw cgvwzq

httpvwzqnet

Main research interestsltJavaXSScriptgtandclient-side attacks

NFC security

Android internals

Dr Ricardo J RodrıguezSenior Security Researcher at ULE

tw RicardoJRodriguez

httpwwwricardojrodriguezes

Main research interestsSecuritysafety modelling andanalysis of ICS

Advanced malware analysis

NFC security

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 2 36

About us

Pepe VilaSecurity Consultant at EampYtw cgvwzq

httpvwzqnet

Main research interestsltJavaXSScriptgtandclient-side attacks

NFC security

Android internals

Dr Ricardo J RodrıguezSenior Security Researcher at ULE

tw RicardoJRodriguez

httpwwwricardojrodriguezes

Main research interestsSecuritysafety modelling andanalysis of ICS

Advanced malware analysis

NFC security

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 2 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 3 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 4 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (II)

Wow NFC sounds pretty hipsterTwo main elements

Proximity Coupling Device (PCD also NFC-capable device)Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards (PICC also NFC tags)

Three operation modesPeer to peer direct communication between partiesReadwrite communication with a NFC tagCard-emulation an NFC device behaves as a tag

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 6 36

Introduction to NFC (III)

ISOIEC 14443 standardFour-part international standard forcontactless smartcards

1 Size physical characteristics etc2 RF power and signalling schemes

(Type A amp B)Half-duplex 106 kbps rate

3 Initialization + anticollision protocol4 Data transmission protocol

IsoDep cards compliant with the fourparts

Example contactless payment cards

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 7 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 4 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (II)

Wow NFC sounds pretty hipsterTwo main elements

Proximity Coupling Device (PCD also NFC-capable device)Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards (PICC also NFC tags)

Three operation modesPeer to peer direct communication between partiesReadwrite communication with a NFC tagCard-emulation an NFC device behaves as a tag

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 6 36

Introduction to NFC (III)

ISOIEC 14443 standardFour-part international standard forcontactless smartcards

1 Size physical characteristics etc2 RF power and signalling schemes

(Type A amp B)Half-duplex 106 kbps rate

3 Initialization + anticollision protocol4 Data transmission protocol

IsoDep cards compliant with the fourparts

Example contactless payment cards

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 7 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (II)

Wow NFC sounds pretty hipsterTwo main elements

Proximity Coupling Device (PCD also NFC-capable device)Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards (PICC also NFC tags)

Three operation modesPeer to peer direct communication between partiesReadwrite communication with a NFC tagCard-emulation an NFC device behaves as a tag

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 6 36

Introduction to NFC (III)

ISOIEC 14443 standardFour-part international standard forcontactless smartcards

1 Size physical characteristics etc2 RF power and signalling schemes

(Type A amp B)Half-duplex 106 kbps rate

3 Initialization + anticollision protocol4 Data transmission protocol

IsoDep cards compliant with the fourparts

Example contactless payment cards

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 7 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (I)

What is NFCBidirectional short-range contactless communication technology

Up to 10 cm

Based on RFID standards works in the 1356 MHz spectrum

Data transfer rates vary 106 216 and 424 kbps

Security based on proximity concern physical constraints

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 5 36

Introduction to NFC (II)

Wow NFC sounds pretty hipsterTwo main elements

Proximity Coupling Device (PCD also NFC-capable device)Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards (PICC also NFC tags)

Three operation modesPeer to peer direct communication between partiesReadwrite communication with a NFC tagCard-emulation an NFC device behaves as a tag

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 6 36

Introduction to NFC (III)

ISOIEC 14443 standardFour-part international standard forcontactless smartcards

1 Size physical characteristics etc2 RF power and signalling schemes

(Type A amp B)Half-duplex 106 kbps rate

3 Initialization + anticollision protocol4 Data transmission protocol

IsoDep cards compliant with the fourparts

Example contactless payment cards

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 7 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (II)

Wow NFC sounds pretty hipsterTwo main elements

Proximity Coupling Device (PCD also NFC-capable device)Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards (PICC also NFC tags)

Three operation modesPeer to peer direct communication between partiesReadwrite communication with a NFC tagCard-emulation an NFC device behaves as a tag

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 6 36

Introduction to NFC (III)

ISOIEC 14443 standardFour-part international standard forcontactless smartcards

1 Size physical characteristics etc2 RF power and signalling schemes

(Type A amp B)Half-duplex 106 kbps rate

3 Initialization + anticollision protocol4 Data transmission protocol

IsoDep cards compliant with the fourparts

Example contactless payment cards

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 7 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (III)

ISOIEC 14443 standardFour-part international standard forcontactless smartcards

1 Size physical characteristics etc2 RF power and signalling schemes

(Type A amp B)Half-duplex 106 kbps rate

3 Initialization + anticollision protocol4 Data transmission protocol

IsoDep cards compliant with the fourparts

Example contactless payment cards

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 7 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (IV)

ISOIEC 7816Fifteen-part international standard related to contacted integratedcircuit cards especially smartcards

Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 8 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (V)

[Taken from 1356 MHz RFID Proximity Antennas (httpwwwnxpcomdocumentsapplication_noteAN78010pdf)]

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 9 36

Introduction to NFC (VI)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 10 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right Right

If it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right Right

If it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Introduction to NFC (VII)

Ok So is it secure right RightIf it were so secure you would not be staring at us uml

NFC security threatsEavesdropping

Secure communication as solution

Data modification (ie alteration insertion or destruction)Feasible in theory (but requires quite advanced RF knowledge)

RelaysForwarding of wireless communicationTwo types passive (just forwards) or active (forwards and alters thedata)

We focus on passive relay attacks

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 11 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Introduction to NFC (VIII)

NFC brings ldquocardsrdquo to mobile devicesPayment sector is quite interested in this newway for making payments

500M NFC payment users expected by 2019

Almost 300 smart phones available at themoment with NFC capabilities

Check httpwwwnfcworldcomnfc-phones-list

Most of them runs Android OS

Research HypothesisCan a passive relay attack be performed in contactless paymentcards using an Android NFC-capable device

If so what are the constraints (whether any exists)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 12 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 13 36

Background (I)EMV contactless cards

Europay Mastercard and VISA standard for inter-operation of ICcards Point-of-Sale terminals and automated teller machines

Authenticating credit and debit card transactionsCommands defined in ISOIEC 7816-3 and ISOIEC 7816-4(httpenwikipediaorgwikiEMV)

Application ID (AID) command

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 14 36

Background (I)EMV contactless cards

Europay Mastercard and VISA standard for inter-operation of ICcards Point-of-Sale terminals and automated teller machines

Authenticating credit and debit card transactionsCommands defined in ISOIEC 7816-3 and ISOIEC 7816-4(httpenwikipediaorgwikiEMV)

Application ID (AID) command

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 14 36

Background (II)MasterCard PayPass VISA payWave and AmericanExpress ExpressPay

Are they secure

Amount limit on a single transactionUp to pound20 GBP 20euro US$50 50CHF CAD$100 or AUD$100

cof cof(httpwwwbankinfosecuritycomandroid-attack-exploits-visa-emv-flaw-a-7516op-1)

Sequential contactless payments limited ndash it asks for the PIN

Protected by the same fraud guarantee as standard transactions(hopefully)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 15 36

Background (II)MasterCard PayPass VISA payWave and AmericanExpress ExpressPay

Are they secure

Amount limit on a single transactionUp to pound20 GBP 20euro US$50 50CHF CAD$100 or AUD$100

cof cof(httpwwwbankinfosecuritycomandroid-attack-exploits-visa-emv-flaw-a-7516op-1)

Sequential contactless payments limited ndash it asks for the PIN

Protected by the same fraud guarantee as standard transactions(hopefully)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 15 36

Background (II)MasterCard PayPass VISA payWave and AmericanExpress ExpressPay

Are they secure

Amount limit on a single transactionUp to pound20 GBP 20euro US$50 50CHF CAD$100 or AUD$100

cof cof(httpwwwbankinfosecuritycomandroid-attack-exploits-visa-emv-flaw-a-7516op-1)

Sequential contactless payments limited ndash it asks for the PIN

Protected by the same fraud guarantee as standard transactions(hopefully)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 15 36

Background (II)MasterCard PayPass VISA payWave and AmericanExpress ExpressPay

Are they secure

Amount limit on a single transactionUp to pound20 GBP 20euro US$50 50CHF CAD$100 or AUD$100

cof cof(httpwwwbankinfosecuritycomandroid-attack-exploits-visa-emv-flaw-a-7516op-1)

Sequential contactless payments limited ndash it asks for the PIN

Protected by the same fraud guarantee as standard transactions(hopefully)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 15 36

Background (III)

Relay attacksldquoOn Numbers and Gamesrdquo J H Conway(1976)

Mafia frauds ndash Y Desmedt (SecuriComrsquo88)

P minusrarr V communication link P minusrarr V

Real-time fraud where a fraudulent prover P and verifierV cooperate

Honest prover and verifier contactless card and Point-of-Sale terminalDishonest prover and verifier two NFC-enabled Android devices

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 16 36

Background (III)

Relay attacksldquoOn Numbers and Gamesrdquo J H Conway(1976)

Mafia frauds ndash Y Desmedt (SecuriComrsquo88)

P minusrarr V communication link P minusrarr V

Real-time fraud where a fraudulent prover P and verifierV cooperateHonest prover and verifier contactless card and Point-of-Sale terminalDishonest prover and verifier two NFC-enabled Android devices

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 16 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 17 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (I)Recap on evolution of Android NFC support

Android 42 Jelly Bean (API level 17)

NfcBarcode

IsoPcdB(ISOIEC 14443-4B)

IsoPcdA(ISOIEC 14443-4A)

Android CyanogenMod OS 91

NfcA(ISOIEC 14443-3A)

NfcB(ISOIEC 14443-3B)

NfcV(ISOIEC 15693)

IsoDep(ISOIEC 14443-4)

NfcF(JIS 6319-4)

Ndef

Android 233 Gingerbread (API level 10)

NdefFormatable MifareClassic

MifareUltralight

Android 44 KitKat (API level 19)

thanks to Doug Year

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Card-emulation

Hardware

Card-emulation

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Hardware

Card-emulation NfcAdapterReaderCallback

added

NFC

op

erati

on

mod

es

su

pp

orte

d

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 18 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Background (III)

Relay attacksldquoOn Numbers and Gamesrdquo J H Conway(1976)

Mafia frauds ndash Y Desmedt (SecuriComrsquo88)

P minusrarr V communication link P minusrarr V

Real-time fraud where a fraudulent prover P and verifierV cooperateHonest prover and verifier contactless card and Point-of-Sale terminalDishonest prover and verifier two NFC-enabled Android devices

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 16 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 17 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (I)Recap on evolution of Android NFC support

Android 42 Jelly Bean (API level 17)

NfcBarcode

IsoPcdB(ISOIEC 14443-4B)

IsoPcdA(ISOIEC 14443-4A)

Android CyanogenMod OS 91

NfcA(ISOIEC 14443-3A)

NfcB(ISOIEC 14443-3B)

NfcV(ISOIEC 15693)

IsoDep(ISOIEC 14443-4)

NfcF(JIS 6319-4)

Ndef

Android 233 Gingerbread (API level 10)

NdefFormatable MifareClassic

MifareUltralight

Android 44 KitKat (API level 19)

thanks to Doug Year

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Card-emulation

Hardware

Card-emulation

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Hardware

Card-emulation NfcAdapterReaderCallback

added

NFC

op

erati

on

mod

es

su

pp

orte

d

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 18 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 17 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (I)Recap on evolution of Android NFC support

Android 42 Jelly Bean (API level 17)

NfcBarcode

IsoPcdB(ISOIEC 14443-4B)

IsoPcdA(ISOIEC 14443-4A)

Android CyanogenMod OS 91

NfcA(ISOIEC 14443-3A)

NfcB(ISOIEC 14443-3B)

NfcV(ISOIEC 15693)

IsoDep(ISOIEC 14443-4)

NfcF(JIS 6319-4)

Ndef

Android 233 Gingerbread (API level 10)

NdefFormatable MifareClassic

MifareUltralight

Android 44 KitKat (API level 19)

thanks to Doug Year

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Card-emulation

Hardware

Card-emulation

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Hardware

Card-emulation NfcAdapterReaderCallback

added

NFC

op

erati

on

mod

es

su

pp

orte

d

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 18 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (I)Recap on evolution of Android NFC support

Android 42 Jelly Bean (API level 17)

NfcBarcode

IsoPcdB(ISOIEC 14443-4B)

IsoPcdA(ISOIEC 14443-4A)

Android CyanogenMod OS 91

NfcA(ISOIEC 14443-3A)

NfcB(ISOIEC 14443-3B)

NfcV(ISOIEC 15693)

IsoDep(ISOIEC 14443-4)

NfcF(JIS 6319-4)

Ndef

Android 233 Gingerbread (API level 10)

NdefFormatable MifareClassic

MifareUltralight

Android 44 KitKat (API level 19)

thanks to Doug Year

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Card-emulation

Hardware

Card-emulation

Software

ReaderWriter

Peer-to-peer

Hardware

Card-emulation NfcAdapterReaderCallback

added

NFC

op

erati

on

mod

es

su

pp

orte

d

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 18 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (II)Digging into Android NFC stack

Event-driven framework nice API supportTwo native implementations (depending on built-in NFC chip)

libnfc-nxp

libnfc-nci

NXP dropped in favour of NCIOpen architecture not focused on a single family chipOpen interface between the NFC Controller and the DHStandard proposed by NFC Forum

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 19 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (III)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash ReaderWriter mode

Not allowed to be set directlyrarr Android activity

Android NFC service selects apps according to tag definition ofManifest fileIn low-level libnfc-nci uses reliable mechanism of queues andmessage passing ndash General Kernel Interface (GKI)

Makes communication between layers and modules easier

User App

Tag

NFC developer framework

NfcService

mTagServicetransceive

IPC

TagService

DeviceHostTagEndPoint

ltltrealizegtgt

NativeNfcTag

JNI

doTransceive

System NFC Library

NativeNfcTagcpp

libnfc-nci

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 20 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (IV)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash HCE mode

A service must be implemented to process commands and replies

HostApduService abstract class and processCommandApdu methodAID-based routing service table

This means you need to declare in advance what AID you handle

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 21 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Digging into Android NFC stack ndash Summary

Description Language(s) Dependency OSSNFC developer framework Java C++ API level Yes

(comandroidnfc package)System NFC library CC++ Manufacturer Yes(libnfc-nxp or libnc-nci)

NFC Android kernel driver C Hardware and manufac-turer

Yes

NFC firmware ARM Thumb Hardware and No(systemvendorfirmware directory) manufacturer

Some useful linkshttpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformframeworksbase+mastercorejavaandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+mastersrccomandroidnfc

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformpackagesappsNfc+masternci

httpsandroidgooglesourcecomplatformexternallibnfc-nci+mastersrc

httpnfc-forumorgour-workspecifications-and-application-documentsspecifications

nfc-controller-interface-nci-specifications

httpwwwcardsysdkdownloadNFC_DocsNFC20Controller20Interface20(NCI)20Technical

20Specificationpdf

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845670BCM20793Shtml

httpwwwdatasheet4ucomPDF845671BCM20793SKMLGhtml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 22 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (VI)Some remarkable limitations

Limitation 1Dishonest verifier communicates with a MIFARE Classiclibnfc-nci do not allow sending raw ISOIEC 14443-3 commands

Caused by the CRC computation performed by the NFCC

Overcome whether NFCC is modified

EMV contactless cards are IsoDep fully ISOIEC 14443-compliant

Limitation 2Dishonest prover communicates with a honest verifierDevice in HCE mode

AID must be known in advance

Overcome whether device is rooted

Xposed framework may help to overcome this issue but needs rootpermissions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 23 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (VI)Some remarkable limitations

Limitation 1Dishonest verifier communicates with a MIFARE Classiclibnfc-nci do not allow sending raw ISOIEC 14443-3 commands

Caused by the CRC computation performed by the NFCC

Overcome whether NFCC is modified

EMV contactless cards are IsoDep fully ISOIEC 14443-compliant

Limitation 2Dishonest prover communicates with a honest verifierDevice in HCE mode

AID must be known in advance

Overcome whether device is rooted

Xposed framework may help to overcome this issue but needs rootpermissions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 23 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice umlJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (VI)Some remarkable limitations

Limitation 1Dishonest verifier communicates with a MIFARE Classiclibnfc-nci do not allow sending raw ISOIEC 14443-3 commands

Caused by the CRC computation performed by the NFCC

Overcome whether NFCC is modified

EMV contactless cards are IsoDep fully ISOIEC 14443-compliant

Limitation 2Dishonest prover communicates with a honest verifierDevice in HCE mode

AID must be known in advance

Overcome whether device is rooted

Xposed framework may help to overcome this issue but needs rootpermissions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 23 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice umlJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice umlJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice umlJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice uml

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice umlJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Android and NFC A Tale of Lrve (V)Some remarkable limitations and remarks

Limitation 3Dishonest prover and a dishonest verifier communicate through anon-reliable peer-to-peer relay channelISOIEC 14443-4 defines the Frame Waiting Time asFWT = 256 middot (16fc) middot 2FWI 0 le FWI le 14 where fc = 1356 MHz

FWT isin [500micros 5s]rarr relay is theoretically possible when delay is le 5s

Concluding RemarksAny NFC-enabled device running OTS Android ge 44 can perform anNFC passive relay attack at APDU level when the specific AID of thehonest prover is known and an explicit SELECT is performed

Any communication involving a APDU-compliant NFC tag (ieMIFARE DESFire EV1 Inside MicroPass or Infineon SLE66CL) canalso be relayed

And now letrsquos move to the practice umlJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 24 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 25 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Relay Attack Implementation (I)Experiment configuration

PoS device Ingenico IWL280 with GRPS + NFC support

Android app developed (plusmn2000 LOC)Two OTS Android NFC-capable devices

One constraint only dishonest prover must run an Android ge 44

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 26 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Relay Attack Implementation (II)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 1

Distributed Mafia Fraud

BOT

BOTMASTER

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 27 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Relay Attack Implementation (III)Threat Scenarios ndash Scenario 2

Hiding Fraud Locations

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 28 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Relay Attack Implementation (IV)Resistant Mechanisms

Brief summary of resistant mechanismsDistance-bounding protocols

Upper bounding the physical distance using Round-Trip-Time ofcryptographic challenge-response messages

Timing constraintsNot enforced in current NFC-capable systemsThe own protocol allows timing extension commands

Physical countermeasuresWhitelistingBlacklisting random UID in HCE moderarr unfeasibleRFID blocking coversPhysical buttonswitch activationSecondary authentication methods (eg on-card fingerprint scanners)

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 29 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 30 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Related WorkOn relay attacks

2005-2009 First works built on specific hardware

2010 Nokia mobile phones with NFC capability plus a Java MIDletapp

2012-2013 Relay attacks on Android accessing to Secure ElementsA SE securely stores data associated with creditdebitcardsNeeds a non-OTS Android device

2014 Active relay attacks with custom hardware and customAndroid firmware

Several works studied delay upon relay channel

Relay over long distances are feasiblerarr latency isnrsquot a hardconstraint

Ask us for specific references too many names for a single slideJ Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 31 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Agenda

1 Introduction

2 BackgroundEMV Contactless CardsRelay Attacks and Mafia Frauds

3 Android and NFC A Tale of LrveEvolution of NFC Support in AndroidPractical Implementation Alternatives in Android

4 Relay Attack ImplementationDemo experimentThreat ScenariosResistant Mechanisms

5 Related Work

6 Conclusions

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 32 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (I)

Security of NFC is based on the physical proximity concern

NFC threats eavesdropping data modification relay attacksAndroid NFC-capable devices are rising

Abuse to interact with cards in its proximity

ConclusionsReview of Android NFC stackProof-of-Concept of relay attacks using Android OTS devices

Threat scenarios introduced

Virtual pickpocketing attack may appear before long

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 33 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (II)But then what the hell can I do Should I run away

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 34 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Conclusions (III)

Future WorkDevelopa botnetinfrastructureandearnmoney

Timing constraints of Android HCE mode

Try active relay attacks within EMV contactless cards

AcknowledgmentsSpanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)

University of Leon under contract X43

HITB staff

And thanks to all for hearing us

Visit httpvwzqnetrelaynfc for more info about the project

J Vila R J Rodrıguez Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices HITBrsquo15 AMS 35 36

Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cardswith Android OTS Devices

Jose Viladagger Ricardo J RodrıguezDagger

pvtolkiengmailcom rjrodriguezunileoneslaquo All wrongs reversed

daggerComputer Science and daggerResearch Institute ofSystems Engineering Dept Applied Sciences in Cybersecurity

University of Zaragoza Spain University of Leon Spain

May 28 2015

Hack in the Box 2015Amsterdam (Nederland)

• Introduction
• Background
• • EMV Contactless Cards
  • Relay Attacks and Mafia Frauds
  • • Android and NFC A Tale of Lve
    • • Evolution of NFC Support in Android
      • Practical Implementation Alternatives in Android
      • • Relay Attack Implementation
        • • Demo experiment
          • Threat Scenarios
          • Resistant Mechanisms
          • • Related Work
            • Conclusions