Attempted publication 9th January 2013.

Technical issues incurred by 3rd Party prevented publication.

Version 2 published 12th January 2013. Small changes, mainly to reference numbering.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................................................................................................... 1

The Emperor’s New Clothes .................................................................................................... 11

Physicalists Tend To Be More Intelligent Right? .................................................................. 12

Popularity of Physicalism .................................................................................................. 12

Peer Pressure .................................................................................................................... 18

Plausibility Of Physicalism .................................................................................................... 26

Brain In A Vat Thought Experiment .................................................................................. 27

The Special Context Issue ................................................................................................. 29

The Conscious Influences Issues ....................................................................................... 32

The ‘Sixth Sense’ Issue ...................................................................................................... 33

Summary ........................................................................................................................... 36

A Delusion? .............................................................................................................................. 38

One Alternative To Physicalism ............................................................................................ 39

Dawkins’ argument ........................................................................................................... 39

Spiritual Beings ................................................................................................................. 42

Existence of Satan ............................................................................................................. 53

Free Will ............................................................................................................................... 55

Would We Have Free Will In A Deterministic Universe? ................................................. 58

Some Philosophical Objections to Free Will ..................................................................... 63

Scientific Evidence ............................................................................................................ 69

Evolution .............................................................................................................................. 82

Compatibility of Ultimate Design and Evolution .............................................................. 84

Theological Issues ................................................................................................................. 87

Problem of Evil .................................................................................................................. 87

Accusation That The Account Suggests That God Sins ..................................................... 88

Problem With Being Judged Against ................................................................................ 92

The Room Is Biased Towards Selfishness ......................................................................... 94

Problems with Occasionalism ........................................................................................... 94

Incompatibility with Scripture ........................................................................................ 101

Path Selection ........................................................................................................................ 124

As We Are ........................................................................................................................... 126

Unemployment ............................................................................................................... 128

Obesity ............................................................................................................................ 130

Global Warming .............................................................................................................. 132

As We Could Be .................................................................................................................. 147

Alternative Path .............................................................................................................. 148

Why Lose the money? .................................................................................................... 155

Closing Comments .......................................................................................................... 158

Appendix A – Physics Stuff ..................................................................................................... 160

A Problem With Presentism ............................................................................................... 160

Some notes about time ...................................................................................................... 171

Quantum Effects................................................................................................................. 179

End Notes ............................................................................................................................... 187

1

PREFACE

The title of this book makes a reference to ‘The Hitchhicker’s Guide to the Galaxy’ written by

Douglas Adams. For those of you unfamiliar with it, the following is an abbreviated extract

from an attempt at a transcript of the television series.1

NARRATOR: There are, of course, many problems connected with life of which some

of the most popular are:

Why are people born?

Why do they die?

And why do they spend so much of the intervening time wearing digital watches?

Many of million of years ago, a race of hyper-intelligent, pan-dimensional beings

became so fed up with the constant bickering about the meaning of life, that they

decided to sit down and solve it once and for all, and to this end they built

themselves a stupendous super computer called Deep Thought, that was so

amazingly intelligent that even before its databanks had been connected up it had

started from first principles with “I think therefore I am” and had got as far as

deducing the existence of rice pudding and income tax before anyone managed to

turn it off.

[…]

Only after Deep Thought has been programmed with all the knowledge in the

universe do two men selected of all their race approach it.

MAN 1 (raises his staff)

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice]What is this great task for which I, Deep Thought,

the second greatest computer in the universe of time and space… …have been called

into existence?

MAN1: hehehmm Your task oh computer…

MAN2: No wait a minute did he say second greatest?

MAN1: Errr

2

MAN2: Oh Deep Thought, are you not as we designed you to be, the greatest most

powerful computer of all time?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] I described myself as the second greatest and such

that I am.

MAN2 (to MAN1): Tom (?) can we just clear this up…

MAN2 (to DEEP THOUGHT): Oh deep thought are you not a greater computer than

the The Milliard Gargantu-Brain at Maximegalon, which can count all the atoms in a

star in a millisecond?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] The Milliard Gargantu-Brain, a mere abacus.

Mention it not.

MAN2: And are you not a greater analyst than the Googleplex Star Thinker in 7th

Galaxy of Light and Ingenuity?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] The Googleplex Star Thinker molest me not with

this pocket calculator stuff.

MAN2: But are you not a more fiendish disputant than The Great Hyperlobic

Omnicognate Neutron-Wrangler of Ciseronicus 12?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] The Great Hyperlobic Omnicognate Neutron-

Wrangler could talk all four legs off an Arcturan Mega-Donkey but only I can

persuade it to go for a walk afterwards.

MAN2: What is the problem?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] There is no problem. I speak of none but the

computer that is to come after me

MAN1: I think this is getting needlessly messianic.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] A computer whose merest operational parameters

I am not worthy to calculate… But which it will be my destiny… eventually to design

MAN1: (impatiently) Oh can we get on and ask the question!?

MAN2: Oh all right.

MAN1: O Great Computer, the task we have designed you for… is this: We want

you… to tell us… The Answer.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] ”The Answer”? The answer to what?

MAN2: Life!

3

MAN1: The Universe.

MAN2: Everything!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice]Tricky…

MAN2: But …can you do it?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Yes… I can do it.

MAN1: You mean is an answer? A simple answer?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Yes. Life, the Universe, and Everything… There is

an answer. But I’ll have to think about it.

MAN1: There is an answer…At last!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice]But I’ll have to think about it.

PHILOSOPHER1: We demand admission!

MAN2: Now what?

MAGICTHIGHS: Come on you can’t keep us out!

[While they push past a guard at an entrance to the elevated pathway to the

computer] VROOMFONDEL: We demand you can’t keep us out!

MAN2: Who are you, get out.

MAGICTHIGHS: I am Magicthighs.

VROOMFONDEL: And I demand that I am Vroomfondel.

MAGICTHIGHS: (in a low voice) It’s all right, you don’t need to demand that.

VROOMFONDEL: Alright. I am Vroomfondel, and that is not a demand! That is a solid

fact! What we demand is solid facts!

MAGICTHIGHS: No we don’t! That’s precisely what we don’t demand.

VROOMFONDEL: We don’t demand solid fact! What we demand is a total absence of

solid facts! I demand that I may… or may not be… Vroomfondel.

MAN2: Who are you?

MAGICTHIGHS: We are philosophers.

VROOMFONDEL: Though But we may not be.

MAGICTHIGHS: Yes we are! … We are most definitely here as representatives of the

Amalgamated Union of Philosophers, Sages, Luminaries, and other professional

thinking persons…And we want this machine off, and we want it off now!

VROOMFONDEL: We demand that you get rid of it.

4

MAN2: Well what’s the problem?

MAGICTHIGHS: I’ll tell you what the problem is mate: demarcation. That’s the

problem.

VROOMFONDEL: We demand that demarcation may or may not be the problem.

MAGICTHIGHS: You just let the machines get on with the adding up and we’ll take

care of the eternal verities, thank you very much…By law the quest for ultimate truth

is quite clearly the unalienable prerogative of your working thinkers any machine

actually goes and finds it then we’re straight out of a job aren’t we…I mean what’s

the use of us sitting around half the night arguing about where there may -

VROOMFONDEL: Or may not

MAGICTHIGHS: be a God, if this machine comes along the next morning and gives

you ‘is phone number in the morning?

VROOMFONDEL: We demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Might I make an observation at this point?

MAGICTHIGHS: You keep out of this metal nose.

VROOMFONDEL: We demand that that machine not be allowed to think about this

problem!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] If I might make an observation? [pause] All I

wanted to say is that my circuits are now irrevocably committed to computing the

answer to Life, the Universe, and Everything… But, but the program will take me a

little while to run

MAN2: How long?

DEEPTHOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Seven and a half…

MAN1: What not ‘til next week?

DEEPTHOUGHT: [Booming Voice]…million years

MAN1 : How long!?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] I said I’d have to think about it? And it occurs to

me, that running a program like this is bound to create considerable interest in the

whole area of popular philosophy… yes?

MAGICTHIGHS: Keep Talking.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Everyone’s going to have his theory about what

5

answer I’m eventually going to come up with and who better to capitalise on that

media market

than you yourselves so long as you can keep violently disagreeing with each other

and slagging each other off in the popular press, and so long as you have clever

agents you can keep yourselves on the gravy train for life

MAGICTHIGHS: Bloody ‘ell! Now that’s what I call thinking! Here Vroomfondel, how

come we never think of things like that?

VROOMFONDEL: Dunno. Think our minds must be too highly trained Magicthighs.

[Seven and a half million years later]

[Two men walk along the elevated path towards Deep Thought]

MAN3: The time is nearly upon us

MAN4: Seven and a half million years we’ve waited

MAN3: 75,000 generations since our ancestors set this program in motion, and in all

that time we shall be the first to hear the computer speak

MAN4: It’s an awesome prospect

[MAN3 nods in agreement and mouths “yes”]

MAN3: Deep Thought is about to speak…

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Good evening.

MAN3: er, er, Good evening … oh Deep Thought … do you have … have you

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] An answer for you? Yes, I have.

MAN4: There really is one?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] There really is one.

MAN4: To everything? To the great question of Life… the Universe… and Everything?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Yes.

MAN3: And are you ready to give it to us?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] I am.

MAN3: Now?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Now.

MAN4: Wo-ow.

6

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Though I don’t think you’re going to like it.

MAN3: It doesn’t matter, we must know it!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Now?

MAN4: [in a reverent voice] Yes… now.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Alright.

[Long Pause]

MAN3: Well?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] You’re really not going to like it.

MAN4: Tell us!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] The answer to the Great Question…

BOTH TOGETHER: Yes?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] of Life, the Universe, and Everything…

MAN4: Yes?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Is…

MAN3: Yes?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Is……

BOTH TOGETHER: Yes?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Forty-two. [pause] It was a tough assignment.

BOTH TOGETHER: Forty-two!?

MAN3: Is that all you’ve got to show for seven and a half million years work!?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] I think the problem is that you’ve never actually

known what the question is

MAN3: But it was the Great question, the ultimate question of Life, the Universe,

and Everything.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Yes, but what actually is it?

MAN4 (waves his arms about): Well…just everything! You know! Everything!

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Exactly. You have to know what the question

actually is in order to know what the answer means.

MAN4: Well… Can you please tell us the Question.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] The Ultimate Question?

MAN3: Yes!

7

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Of Life… the Universe… and Everything?

MAN4: Yes.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] Tricky…

MAN3: But can you do it!?

DEEP THOUGHT: [Pause] No. But I’ll tell you who can.

MAN3: Tell us.

MAN4: Tell us.

DEEP THOUGHT: [Booming Voice] I speak of none, but the computer that is to come

after me. A computer, whose merest operational parameters I am not worthy to

calculate, yet I will design it for you. A computer which can calculate the Answer to

the Ultimate Question. A computer of such infinite and subtle complexity that

organic life itself will form part of its operational matrix, and you yourselves shall

take on new forms and go down into the computer to navigate its 10 million year

program. Yes I shall design this computer for you and I shall name it also unto you.

And it shall be called… the Earth.

MAN3: Oh. What a dull name.

While ‘The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy’ is clearly intended to be a comedy, it

nevertheless touches upon some serious points, such as is there a meaning to life and if so

what is it? And are philosophers the ones best equipped to answer it? Stephen Hawking and

Leonard Mlodinow clearly think not, as their comments in their 2010 publication The Grand

Design show:

How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? Where did all this

come from? Did the universe need a creator? Most of us do not spend most of our

time worrying about these questions, but almost all of us worry about them some of

the time.

Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy

has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics.2

They go onto state what they believe the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe and

Everything is…:

8

Why is there something rather than nothing?

Why do we exist?

Why this particular set of laws and not some other?

This is the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe and Everything. We shall attempt

to answer it in this book. Unlike the answer given in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the

Galaxy, ours won’t be simply “42”.3

Unfortunately they fail to provide an answer to the ‘Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe

and Everything’. The reason I state this is because their answer fails to offer an explanation

for why we have the conscious experiences we do if it is as they suggest. If it isn’t clear to

you at this point what the problem would be, hopefully it will be by the end of the first

section of this book. If they never intended the questions to cover these issues then despite

their claim, their answer could hardly be thought to be the Ultimate Question of Life, the

Universe and Everything. Some would say that what we have consciously experienced is all

the evidence we have for any account, and so the account should at least attempt to

address it before claiming it explains everything.

They aren’t alone in avoiding addressing the issue of why we have the conscious

experiences that we do while contemplating the type of questions traditionally

contemplated by philosophers (including whether there may, or may not be, a God). Richard

Dawkins in his 2006 publication ‘The God Delusion’ (which Dawkins dedicates to the

memory of Douglas Adams the author of ‘The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy’4) also avoids

discussing the issue. He does mention that it is natural for us to consider ourselves distinct

from the bodies we experience having, and that the idea of waking up in someone else’s

body is readily understood, and the concept has been used in various literary works5. What

he doesn’t discuss is why we have the conscious experiences that we do, or offer any

evolutionary advantage that consciously experiencing would convey. This is reflected by

there not being any index entry for “consciousness” in the book (‘The God Delusion’).

Though in Dawkins’ case he never claimed to be offering a complete plausible alternative

account to theism. He just provided snippets of an atheist account supposed plausible.

9

In case you aren’t quite clear what I mean by conscious experiencing (having conscious

experiences) the philosopher Thomas Nagel summed up quite neatly in his paper “What is it

like to be a bat”:

…the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that

there is something it is like to be that organism…. fundamentally an organism has

conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is to be that

organism—something it is like for the organism. 6

If you were to wonder what it was like to be like a bat, and think that it would be like

something, then you would be considering a bat to consciously experience. If you thought it

wouldn’t be like anything to be a grain of sand then you would be thinking that a grain of

sand wasn’t consciously experiencing.

Regarding what it is like to be a human, people could discuss what it is like to be given a

drug that affected facial recognition or invoked alzheimer-like symptoms, or people could

discuss what it is like to be moderately drunk etc. So along with the philosopher David

Chalmers, I am considering it to be like something to see a colour, feel a pain, visualise an

object, or think about a proposition7 etc.

The aim of this book is to examine what Dawkins, and Hawking neglected to pay proper

attention to, and consider the plausibility of some answers to the question “why do we have

the conscious experiences that we do” and to examine whether the answer could have any

social implications.

10

11

Part I

THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES

‘If one hasn't felt a kind of vertigo of astonishment, when facing the thought that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon-in every respect, then one hasn't begun to

be a thoughtful materialist. One hasn't got to the starting line.’

- Galen Strawson8

12

Chapter 1

PHYSICALISTS TEND TO BE MORE INTELLIGENT RIGHT?

Dawkins in his publication ‘The God Delusion’ quotes Julian Baggini as writing that:

What most atheists do believe is that there is only one kind of stuff in the universe

and it is physical, out of this stuff comes minds, beauty, emotions, moral values – in

short the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to human life.9

The theory that only physical stuff exists is often referred to as materialism, or physicalism.

While it isn’t necessary for an atheist to hold such a belief, I shall assume that Baggini is

correct in suggesting that most atheists do believe it.

POPULARITY OF PHYSICALISM

In the same publication Dawkins claimed that the majority of eminent scientists both in

Britain and the USA are physicalists (a claim which seems to be supported by the reports he

quotes). In support of this claim he quoted from a survey performed by the psychologist R.

Elisabeth Cornwell (who is an Executive Director of the Richard Dawkins Foundation), and

the psychologist Michael Stirrat10. The survey contained questions about one’s religious

opinions and was reportedly emailed to those Fellows of the Royal Society that have email

addresses. In case you aren’t familiar with who the Fellows of the Royal Society are, they are

eminent scientists from the UK and the Commonwealth who have been elected for life

membership of the Royal Society by their peers based upon their excellence in science.

Dawkins reported that Cornwell and Stirrats’ work was soon to be published, and

commented that:

For the details, and all the rest of their very interesting conclusions, please refer to

their own paper when it is published. 11

Unfortunately I have been unable to find the publication but Dawkins did provide his

readers with some preliminary results. He reported that 23 per cent of the 1074 Fellows of

the Royal Society (FRS) that had an email address responded, which he somewhat

ambiguously suggested was “a good figure for this kind of study”. The ambiguity was due to

13

him not making clear which figure he was referring to. Whether he meant to convey that 23

per cent response rate to be a good for this kind of study, or whether he meant to convey

that his belief was that 247 responses was a good amount for this kind of study, or perhaps

both. He reported that when presented with the statement:

I believe in a personal God, that is one who takes an interest in individuals, hears and

answers prayers, is concerned with sin and transgression, and passes judgement.9

78.8 per cent of the Fellows that responded provided a response of 1 on a 7 point Likert

scale, indicating that they strongly disagreed with the statement, while only 3.3 per cent

provided a response of 7 indicating that they strongly agreed with it10. For those not

familiar with the typical Likert scale wordings, they would tend to be something like:

1. Strongly Disagree

2. Disagree

3. Disagree Somewhat

4. Neutral

5. Agree Somewhat

6. Agree

7. Strongly Agree

Before continuing it is probably worth mentioning that there could be considered to be

issues with the study. For example Charles Whitehead writes regarding the Toward a

Science of Consciousness: Brain; Mind; Reality conference held in Stockholm, 3-7 May 2011:

I find it hard to say whether TSC this year was the most balanced of the most biased

since the first I attended in 1998. That year there were 35 plenary talks, of which 27

were distinctly materialist – that is, they assumed that consciousness ‘arises’ from

‘physical’ processes in the brain. This year there were also 35 plenaries, with 24

devoted to physicalist accounts. I cannot claim absolute precision for these figures,

because it is not always easy to make black-and-white distinctions. Research by

14

Imants Baru š (2008) has shown that many scientists have non-physicalist beliefs but

do not say so for fear of jeopardizing their careers. 12

If it was right that many non-physicalist scientists hide their non-physicalist beliefs because

they worry that if they express them their careers would be affected, then the belief

distribution would be expected to be different within the 77 per cent of the Fellows that

chose not to respond to the survey.

It is also probably worth noting that of the 23 per cent that did respond, 21.2 per cent

weren’t prepared to say that they strongly disagreed with the proposition. This isn’t to

undermine Dawkin’s point that atheism is rife amongst scientists. It is only to clearly

highlight that a substantial number of scientists don’t consider the possibility of a personal

God to be incompatible with scientific discovery. One would also assume that there are

scientists that strongly disagree with the claim that a personal God exists but don’t consider

the existence of God to be incompatible with scientific discovery.

Apart from the Cornwell and Stirrat study Dawkins also mentioned an earlier, 1998, study

done by Edward Larson and Larry Witham in which they polled 517 American scientists

which had been elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Larson and Witham report

that while the response rate for their survey was down on those achieved by the previous

surveys that they were comparing theirs’ to, it was still a little over 50 per cent. Regarding

the Larson and Witham report, Dawkins commented:

…only about 7 per cent believe in a personal God. This overwhelming preponderance

of atheists is almost the exact opposite of the profile of the American population at

large, of whom more than 90 per cent are believers in some sort of supernatural

being. 13

One could be forgiven for thinking that Dawkins was implying that about 93% of these

eminent American scientists were atheists. Though if one were to read the report one

would see that the results were as follows14:

Belief in personal God %

Personal Belief 7

15

Personal Disbelief 72.2

Doubt or agnosticism 20.8

Belief in human immortality %

Personal Belief 7.9

Personal Disbelief 76.7

Doubt or agnosticism 23.3

One might wonder whether Dawkins considers 72.2% to almost exactly match 90% or

whether when reporting the Larson and Witham study he had decided to count those that

expressed doubt or agnosticism as atheists (which arguably they aren’t, given that they

chose to distinguish themselves from disbelievers) in order to make 93%. Dawkins further

commented that:

Like Larson and Witham,…, Cornwell and Stirrat found a small but significant

tendency for biological scientists to be even more atheistic than physical scientists.10

What Larson and Witham actually reported was that:

Disbelief in God and immortality among NAS biological scientists was 65.2% and

69.0%, respectively, and among NAS physical scientists it was 79.0% and 76.3%. Most

of the rest were agnostics on both issues, with few believers. 14

They also reported that:

Biological scientists had the lowest rate of belief (5.5% in God, 7.1% in immortality),

with physicists and astronomers slightly higher (7.5% in God, 7.5% in immortality).14

It seems that rather than reporting that while the NAS biologists were more likely to be

agnostic about the existence of God than NAS physicists and astronomers, Dawkins chose to

count those that expressed doubt or agnosticism as expressing an “atheistic tendency”

(rather than agnostics displaying a “theistic tendency” compared to atheists like himself). A

charitable reading of Dawkins’ report could conclude that he naively didn’t realise that the

way he reported the study could have led readers to assume that there was something

16

about biological scientific evidence that leads to a higher percentage of atheists among

biologists (when actually they were less likely to be atheists).

One might also note that despite a comment Dawkins’s made earlier:

…, there is something utterly special about the hypothesis of ultimate design, and

equally special about the only known alternative: gradual evolution in the broad

sense. They are close to being irreconcilably different. 15

The Larson and Witham indicates that at least 30% of the biological scientists didn’t think

that evolutionary theory was irreconcilable with the hypothesis of grand design. Though one

might respond by saying that I should have read what Dawkins wrote more carefully. He

only wrote that the two hypotheses were “close to being irreconcilably different” (emphasis

added). In other words he never claimed the two hypotheses were irreconcilably different in

fact he is specifically stating that they are reconcilable, and so one could (should?) charitably

consider that Dawkins never meant to give the reader the impression that he was

suggesting in any way that they were irreconcilable.

One might wonder as to the purpose of Dawkins mentioning whether the majority of

scientists believe in a personal God? The reference to the surveys is found in ‘The God

Delusion’ in chapter 3 ‘Arguments for God’s existence’. The chapter is broken up into

sections, one of which has the heading ‘The Argument from Admired Religious Scientists’. It

opens (after a quote from Bertrand Russell) with what is suggested to be an example of an

argument for God’s existence based upon admired religious scientists:

‘Newton was religious. Who are you to set yourself up as superior to Newton,

Galileo, Kepler, etc. etc. etc.? If God was good enough for the likes of them, just who

do you think you are?’ 16

Dawkins, quite rightly in my opinion, points out that this is not a good argument for the

existence of God. If it had been an argument that a belief in God was not incompatible with

either reason or scientific discoveries for example, then it would have seemed a reasonable

appeal to authorities on scientific matters (assuming the etc. etc. etc. included some

eminent contemporary scientists, perhaps Fellows of the Royal Society) that there hadn’t

17

been any scientific discoveries which were incompatible with a belief in God. The studies

Dawkins quotes show that there are a significant number of contemporary eminent

scientists (who one would hope are reasonable) who don’t feel that scientific discoveries

lead to the conclusion that God doesn’t exist. I don’t therefore agree with his comment that:

A reasonable conclusion from existing studies is that religious apologists might be

wise to keep quieter than they habitually do on the subject of admired role models

at least where scientists are concerned.17

The reasonable conclusion would seem to be that while they shouldn’t use the religious

beliefs of scientists to make spurious arguments, they can be used to counter those that

may claim (or insinuate) that modern scientists overwhelmingly (90%+) think that reason

and science is incompatible with a belief in God.

The Richard Dawkins Foundation website (at the time of writing) states:

The mission of the Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science is to support

scientific education, critical thinking and evidence-based understanding of the

natural world in the quest to overcome religious fundamentalism, superstition,

intolerance and suffering.

I assume that many people that believe in God would be happy to promote scientific

education, critical thinking and evidence-based understanding, and would consider that in

discussing the issue of God’s existence, the use of fallacious arguments should be avoided.

In promoting scientific education, critical thinking and evidence-based understanding, one

would expect that one would avoid encouraging people to convert to one’s viewpoint

through denigrating those that hold the opposing viewpoint by suggesting that they are

unreasonable, gullible, risible, less intelligent etc. Likewise one would expect that one would

avoid encouraging people to convert to one’s viewpoint through flattering those who share

your belief by perhaps suggesting that they are more likely to be independent thinkers,

brave, noble, reasonable, more intelligent, less prone to conforming etc. Because while

denigrating those that disagree with your perspective and flattering those that hold it might

work as a technique of encouraging some to adopt your perspective, their adoption of it

would not be the result of a valid critical analysis of the arguments, but because of concerns

18

about how they might be perceived. Such concerns would ironically indicate a lack of

independent critical thinking since such considerations would be irrelevant to a critical

evaluation the arguments supporting the said viewpoint.

PEER PRESSURE

Hans Christian Anderson published a story called the ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’. It

involved two swindlers who heard of the emperor’s fondness for fine clothes and decided to

pretend to be highly skilled weavers in order to carry out a scam. They made outrageous

boasts of their skill as weavers, and these boasts reached the ears of the emperor and the

emperor decided to meet them. During their audience with the emperor the swindlers told

him they could create a fabric so fine that it would appear invisible to those either unfit for

their office, or unpardonably stupid. The emperor was impressed, and thinking that he

would not only gain a new suit, but also a way of being able to distinguish between the

clever and the stupid, he commissioned them to make the new suit. They were given silk,

gold thread, a loom and a bag of gold coins so that they could get started on the suit’s

construction. Word about the special properties of the fine fabric soon spread around court

and the town. As time passed the emperor grew curious as to how the work was

progressing, but was slightly fearful of checking on the progress himself in case he couldn’t

see it. So instead the emperor sent a series of courtiers to investigate the progress for him.

The problem was every time a courtier arrived to check the swindlers progress they would

be presented with the empty loom that they were pretending to be weaving fabric on. The

swindlers would ask them whether they could see the wonderful fabric, and fearful of being

thought stupid, they would claim that they could see the amazing fabric. And so they would

return to the emperor and report how well the fabric was progressing and what fabulous

colours and patterns it had. Given the reports of how well the construction of the suit was

progressing, members of the court advised the emperor that a procession should be

organised to provide him with an opportunity to show off the wonderful suit to the people.

The emperor agreed, and a date for the procession was arranged. When the time of the

procession arrived, the swindlers came to the court to present the emperor with the suit.

They did so in front of all the barons and courtiers, but while neither they nor the emperor

19

could see the suit they all pretended that they could for fear that they might be considered

stupid, or unfit for office if they could not, and so all of them pretended to be impressed by

its splendour. The swindlers then went on to tell the emperor that the fabric was so fine,

that it would feel like he wasn’t wearing anything at all. They asked him to undress, and in

front of all the court proceeded to help ‘dress’ him in the suit. The audience were still fearful

of being thought to be stupid, so each continued with their pretence and passed comment

on how wonderful the emperor looked in his new suit. Once ‘dressed’ it was time for the

procession, so all of the court took their places, and once the chamberlains who were

supposed to carry the train pretended to pick it up, the procession made its way out into the

town. In the town a crowd had gathered as everyone had heard about the properties of the

new suit, and were keen to find out which of them would be able to see it. Of course none

of them could see the non-existent fabric, though like the emperor and the courtiers, they

all hid the fact for fear of looking stupid. The pretence continued until at one point a child

commented that the emperor wasn’t wearing any clothes. Everyone who heard the child

realised that that was exactly as it appeared to them also, and they whispered to each other

what the child had said. The observation was passed by whisper throughout the crowd, until

eventually they all cried out “but he has nothing on at all”. While it seemed to the emperor

that the crowd was right, he decided to continue with his pretence and the chamberlains

followed him, walking with still greater dignity while pretending to carry the train that did

not exist. 18

Though the emperor in the story was particularly silly since even if the weaver’s story had

been true all the “stupid” people would have seen him walking around naked. This might

lead you to think that the idea that because of peer pressure people would pretend to see

something that they don’t is fanciful, and the description of the use of derision or flattery in

order to encourage people to adopt one’s viewpoint as a “technique” might seem a bit

strong. Though if this were the case, you might want to consider the 1955 report ‘Opinions

and Social Pressure’ by the psychologist Solomon Asch. Regarding the importance of being

aware of how people may come to form their opinions Asch writes:

How, and to what extent, do social forces constrain people’s opinions and attitudes?

This question is especially pertinent in our day. The same epoch that has witnessed

20

the unprecedented technical extension of communication has also brought into

existence the deliberate manipulation of opinion and the “engineering of consent.”

There are many good reasons why, as citizens and as scientists, we should be

concerned with studying the ways in which human beings form their opinions and

the role that social conditions play. 19

On factors influencing people to change their opinions he comments:

When the new discipline of social psychology was born at the beginning of this

century, its first experiments were essentially adaptations of the suggestion

demonstration. The technique generally followed a simple plan. The subjects, usually

college students, were asked to give their opinions or preferences concerning

various matters; some time later they were again asked to state their choices, but

now they were also informed of the opinions held by authorities or large groups of

their peers on the same matters. (Often the alleged consensus was fictitious.) Most

of these studies had substantially the same result: confronted with opinions contrary

to their own, many subjects apparently shifted their judgments in the direction of

the views of the majorities or the experts. The late psychologist Edward L. Thorndike

reported that he had succeeded in modifying the aesthetic preferences of adults by

this procedure. Other psychologists reported that people's evaluations of the merit

of a literary passage could be raised or lowered by ascribing the passage to different

authors. Apparently the sheer weight of numbers or authority sufficed to change

opinions, even when no arguments for the opinions themselves were provided.19

Asch goes onto comment:

The investigations were guided by certain underlying assumptions, which today are

common currency and account for much that is thought and said about the

operations of propaganda and public opinion. The assumptions are that people

submit uncritically and painlessly to external manipulation by suggestion or prestige,

and that any given idea or value can be "sold" or "unsold" without reference to its

merits. We should be sceptical, however, of the supposition that the power of social

pressure necessarily implies uncritical submission to it: independence and the

21

capacity to rise above group passion are also open to human beings. Further, one

may question on psychological grounds whether it is possible as a rule to change a

person's judgment of a situation or an object without first changing his knowledge or

assumptions about it. 20

Asch describes a study himself and some colleagues which was pertinent to this question. A

series of tests were performed in which seven to nine college students were assembled in a

classroom, ostensibly to participate in a visual perception experiment. The experimenter

informed them that they would be matching the length of a black line on one white card

with the line of corresponding length on another white card which depicts three black lines

of varying length. An example of the two cards is depicted below20:

22

Going around the room each of the students was asked to state which of the lines on the

second card was the same length as the line on the first card.

Everything was not as it seemed to one of the students however. What he wasn’t informed

of was that the other students were all working in collusion with the experimenter. For the

first few card pairs all the students working in collusion gave the correct answer, then as

further card pairs were shown, they began to start giving the same incorrect answer, only

intermittently giving the same correct answer. The group would be shown 18 card pairs in

all, and 12 out of the 18 times those in collusion would all provide the same wrong answer.

The actual aim of the study wasn’t as the experimenter had said. It wasn’t an experiment in

visual perception. The aim of the study was to see whether the expressed opinion of the

majority (the students in collusion) would affect the expressed opinion of the real subject

(the one that wasn’t aware of the collusion). Figure 1Error! Reference source not found.

below is a picture the article21. In the article the caption underneath says:

EXPERIMENT PROCEEDS as follows. In the top picture the subject (centre) hears rules

of experiment for the first time. In the second picture he makes his first judgment of

a pair of cards, did agreeing with the unanimous judgment of the others. In the third

he leans forward to !ook at another pair of cards. In the fourth he shows the strain of

repeatedly disagreeing with the majority. In the fifth, after 12 pairs of cards have

been shown, he explains that “he has to call them as he sees them.” This subject

disagreed with the majority on all 12 trials.

Seventy five per cent of experimental subjects agree with the majority in varying

degrees.

23

Figure 1

Referring to any of the subjects that took part in the study, Acsh comments:

Upon him we have brought to bear two opposed forces: the evidence of his senses

and the unanimous opinion of a group of his peers. Also, he must declare his

judgments in public, before a majority which has also stated its position publicly.20

24

On the results of the tests on the 123 ‘real’ subjects from institutions of higher learning Asch

makes the comment that:

Two alternatives were open to the subject: he could act independently, repudiating

the majority, or he could go along with the majority, repudiating the evidence of his

senses. Of the 123 put to the test, a considerable percentage yielded to the majority.

Whereas in ordinary circumstances individuals matching the lines will make mistakes

less than 1 per cent of the time, under group pressure the minority subjects swung

to acceptance of the misleading majority's wrong judgments in 36.8 per cent of the

selections.

Of course individuals differed in response. At one extreme, about one quarter of the

subjects were completely independent and never agreed with the erroneous

judgments of the majority. At the other extreme, some individuals went with the

majority nearly all the time. The performances of individuals in this experiment tend

to be highly consistent. Those who strike out on the path of independence do not, as

a rule, succumb to the majority even over an extended series of trials, while those

who choose the path of compliance are unable to free themselves as the ordeal is

prolonged.20

The subjects were all interviewed at the end with regards to their behaviour. Those that did

perform offered different general reasons, and on one of these reasons Asch comments:

More disquieting were the reactions of subjects who construed their difference from

the majority as a sign of some general deficiency in themselves, which at all costs

they must hide. On this basis they desperately tried to merge with the majority, not

realizing the longer-range consequences to themselves. All the yielding subjects

underestimated the frequency with which they conformed.21

The idea that people might deny the evidence of their senses in a desperate bid to try to

hide what they thought might be a deficiency in themselves is the central theme in Hans

Christian Anderson’s story of the Emperor’s New Clothes.

25

If a point was made of claiming that the majority of experts favoured a certain argument,

while suggesting that also accepting would reflect intelligence, whereas rejecting it would

reflect a deficiency, then given the results of studies like those performed by Asch et al one

would expect it to stifle critical enquiry and critical thinking rather than encourage it.

26

Chapter 2

PLAUSIBILITY OF PHYSICALISM

The aim of this chapter is to examine whether physicalism could offer a plausible

explanation for why we have the conscious experiences that we do.

Science made discoveries about the universe while Philosophy didn’t seem to. So some in

philosophy decided to ‘take a more scientific’ approach. And since they believed that we

were simply a changing organisation of particles which followed the same laws of physics as

organisations of particles that weren’t consciously experiencing there would be no way of

testing whether something was consciously experiencing or not. The chemical reactions

would be expected to be the same in every case either way. Therefore from their science

goggles on perspective it couldn’t make any sense to talk about whether something was

consciously experiencing or not unless the term consciously experiencing was changed to

mean something that could be measured scientifically. If it couldn’t be measured

scientifically their science goggles prevented them from understanding what their

philosophical opponents meant by the term consciously experiencing. These philosophers

where presumably guiding what they thought was the proper way reality should be looked

at, presumably also by the scientists that were doing the science. I’ve no idea how much the

scientists really cared what the philosophers thought about what the scientific perspective

should be (they might not have denied that it was like something to be them for example).

What I am not going to cover in this chapter are physicalist accounts which deny that it is

like anything to be us, and would therefore deny that they need to offer any explanation for

why it is like it is to be us.

Robert Kirk explains that:

Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures used to illuminate problems about

consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or

witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious

27

experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies

behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness.22

Those that deny that it is like something to be us, would seem to need to deny that they

could understand what Robert Kirk is suggesting the term zombie is used to refer to in

philosophy. For if they deny that it is like something to be us, how can they understand us to

be different from what zombies (described by Kirk) are imagined to be like? Though these

deniers might define consciousness in such a way that according to their definition the

imaginary zombie creature would be described as being conscious, a problem they face is

explaining how Kirk was suggesting the zombie differed from a human. If they claim that

they don’t understand there to be any difference, a problem they face is people other than

themselves do understand what Kirk is suggesting the difference is.

Anyway, it is like something to be me, and unless you are one of the zombie creatures that

Kirk was referring to then it is like something to be you also. Denying your own conscious

experiences and thus avoiding the issues raised by them doesn’t seem like an option. Even

in the Hans Christian Anderson story they only publically denied their conscious

experiences. They knew themselves what they actually consciously experienced.

BRAIN IN A VAT THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

I am going to use what is often referred to as a ‘brain in a vat’ thought experiment as an aid

to examining whether physicalism offers a plausible explanation of why we have the

conscious experiences that we do. The concept behind the ‘brain in a vat’ has been

described by the philosopher Hilary Putnam:

…: imagine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been

subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person’s brain (your brain) has

been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain

alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-scientific computer which

causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly

normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc.; but really, all the person

(you) is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses travelling from the computer

28

to the nerve endings. The computer is so clever that if the person tries to raise his

hand, the feedback from the computer will cause him to ‘see’ and ‘feel’ the hand

being raised. Moreover, by varying the program, the evil scientist can cause the

victim to ‘experience’ (or hallucinate) any situation or environment the evil scientist

wishes. He can also obliterate the memory of the brain operation, so that the victim

will seem to himself to have always been in this environment. It can even seem to

the victim that he is reading these very words …23

For the purposes of this thought experiment if you don’t believe that “there is only one kind

of stuff in the universe and it is physical, out of this stuff comes minds, beauty, emotions,

moral values – in short the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to human life” then

imagine that you do, and also imagine what you, as such a person, might think is a plausible

account of why you have the conscious experiences that you do.

For those readers that are physicalists, presumably you are already aware of some

physicalist account that you consider to be plausible.

If you are having trouble thinking of a plausible account, don’t worry, you can make

decisions about what such an account might be like as we go through the thought

experiment, and onto the discussion.

For the thought experiment, imagine a consciously experiencing robot that is as close to a

traditional idea of a robot as the account that you are imagining to be plausible will allow.

So for example if you were thinking that the robot brain would only need to function in a

similar way to a human brain, and need not be of any particular chemical composition, then

imagine it to be made up of electronic chips organised in a ‘special way’. If your account

explained why an organic brain would be required (it has to be plausible) in order to

consciously experience, then imagine that the robot has an organic brain. If the account of

consciousness that you are imagining requires that the robot brain have been developed by

some evolutionary type process for some reason, then imagine that it has, etc….

Now imagine two scenarios involving the robot’s brain. In both scenarios imagine that the

brains start out in exactly the same state. In the first scenario imagine the robot brain to be

in the robot as the robot walks around a park commenting on the trees within it, and in the

29

second scenario imagine the robot brain in a vat in a scientist’s lab being given the same

inputs as the brain of the robot in the first scenario. The inputs need not only include

electronic impulses travelling along nerves or some other type of electrical conductor, they

could include changes to the chemical composition of any liquids for example that might

influence how the brain behaved. If you aren’t familiar with brain in a vat type thought

experiments you might want to read this part more than once just to be sure you are clear

on what you are being asked to imagine.

THE SPECIAL CONTEXT ISSUE

Putnam’s outline of the brain in the vat thought experiment (quoted above) seems to

assume that the human brain in the vat would have the same conscious experiences as it

would if it were in a human, as long as the inputs were the same. If you were to agree with

this assumption, then in our thought experiment, you would be likely to think that the robot

brain in scenario 2 would have the same conscious experiences as the robot in scenario 1.

This kind of idea has been made popular in the Matrix series of films. For those of you that

are unaware of the film series, it contains the idea that if machines were capable of

providing the appropriate neural stimulus (brain inputs) then they would be capable of

determining the world which people attached to them would consciously experience. In the

film a machine was inserted into the back of their heads in such a way that it could provide

the appropriate neural stimulus. “So what?” you might think “what’s the problem?”

Unfortunately to highlight the problem I’m going to ask you to imagine a few more

scenarios.

Supposing somewhere else in the universe there exist a species of highly intelligent aliens

that as luck would have it have produced a device that contains a part that is identical to the

robot brain in scenario 2 (the brain in the vat). In this scenario though, which we can refer

to as scenario 3, while the inputs to the brain are the same as in scenarios 1 & 2 we can

imagine that the source of the inputs to the brain are electrical outputs from musical

synthesisers, and that outputs from the brain go to light up fairy lights. At this point you

might start thinking that it is extremely improbable that the inputs from the musical

synthesisers would just happen to be the same as the inputs in scenarios 1 & 2. The

30

likelihood of it happening is irrelevant to us though, since this is just a thought experiment

designed to highlight potential issues with certain accounts. What would these accounts

suggest if such a scenario happened? Whether it actually happens or not isn’t an issue, and

therefore neither is the probability of it happening.

Now we could make up more scenarios in which a device identical to the robot brain in

scenario 2 is in a different context and yet receiving the same inputs. Indeed the amount of

scenarios seems limited only by our imagination.

One might still be wondering what the issue would be with an account which suggests that:

In all possible scenarios, if a mechanism identical to the one that functions as a brain in

scenario 1, receives the same inputs the mechanism in scenario 1, then the conscious

experiences would be the same.

To highlight it further imagine that an alien was to present you with a computer which

contained video images of the mechanism receiving the same inputs in over a billion

different scenarios. There being a video of scenario 1, scenario 2, scenario 3 etc. Now the

account would suggest that in each scenario, no matter what the scenario was, as long as

the inputs were the same the mechanism would either perceive or hallucinate the objects

that exist in scenario 1. The account therefore relies on there being something ‘special’

about scenario 1 when compared with the other billions of scenarios. Now imagine the alien

were to ask you for a plausible explanation of why your account is suggesting there is

anything ‘special’ about scenario 1? The problem is coming up with a plausible explanation

(assuming “I need it to be for my account” isn’t considered to be one). Why would scenario

1 be ‘special’ compared to the others?

Here are some things you might like to consider when thinking of a story to explain what

would be special about scenario 1. Supposing you had in your account suggested that in

order for it to consciously experience the robot brain would have had to of evolved

somehow, you might then choose to go onto say that scenario 1 was the only scenario the

mechanism had evolved to be in. So assuming the account explains why it would matter it

would still leave the following questions; “what if the mechanism had evolved to exist in

31

two of the scenarios?”, and secondly “what if scenario 1 didn’t exist within the universe but

the other scenarios did?”

With regards to the question about what would happen if the mechanism had evolved to

exist in two of the scenarios; a reason could be suggested for why the scenario which was

consciously experienced would depend upon which the mechanism had first evolved in. It

would still leave further questions. Suppose for example you were then asked for a plausible

explanation for how in your story you were suggesting that something that evolved to a

certain point (perhaps over a certain amount of time) determined what a similar mechanism

evolving a year later a thousand light years away would consciously experience. Since if

what it was like to be the mechanism was to have an influence on behaviour then it would

seem like a suggestion of faster than the speed of light causal effect. If the account was

suggesting that which one evolved first would determine what the conscious experiences

were like but not how the mechanism behaved, then such an account would seem to imply

that what the conscious experiences were like had no influence on behaviour. Some

problems with accounts that suggest what the conscious experiences are like have no

influence on behaviour will be discussed later. If the account does suggest that what it is

like to be the mechanism would affect the behaviour. Then as well as requiring a plausible

explanation for this required faster than the speed of light effect, there is the question of

how it affects the behaviour. Supposing it had been the other way around and the other

mechanism in the other scenario had evolved first. In what way would the theory suggest

the behaviour would be different? Would it mean that we couldn’t predict how certain

mechanisms would behave because we wouldn’t know whether they had evolved

elsewhere in the universe? Also would only certain types of molecular groupings have this

ability to be a faster than the speed of light causal effect on other similar types of molecular

groupings (and possibly others?)? If so why would they be ‘special’?

With regards to the second question of what would happen if scenario 1 didn’t exist within

the universe but the other scenarios did, if the answer is still that the conscious experience

would be of the objects that existed in scenario 1 then there is again the question of what

was special about scenario 1 (since in this case it wouldn’t have evolved)? If instead the

answer had been that the conscious experiences would have been different if scenario 1

32

didn’t exist within the universe, then we are back to the question of whether the behaviour

of the mechanism would also be different and the issues associated with the responses

(which as I said we will come to shortly).

Obviously one need not have claimed that what was special with scenario 1 was to do with

evolution, one might have made another claim. An approach which can often be used when

investigating such claims is to question what would happen if one of the other scenarios

also had whatever feature the account claimed was special, and to question what would

happen if none or one of the other scenarios had the special feature and scenario 1 had

never existed.

One response is to claim that given the state of the universe at a particular point in time, the

state of the universe at any other point in time is determined by the laws of physics, and

that being asked to consider scenarios which have not been determined to happen would

be tantamount to being asked to consider that the laws of physics to be different to how

they are. The problem with the response wouldn’t be that it would appear to simply be a

device to avoid answering the questions, it would be that one wouldn’t know whether these

potential scenarios had been determined to happen (maybe we are in a universe where

scenario 1 and/or some or all of the others scenarios of the thought experiment never

actually happened for example), and therefore the questions are simply about what the

theory suggests would be the case if one of these scenarios has actually happened.

This isn’t supposed to be an exhaustive list of the attacks that could aimed at perspectives

that fall into this category. If the scenario was one in which multiple universes existed then

there would be the issue of whether this feature would be found in all universes and if so

why, and if not then what is the behaviour of similar mechanisms in different universes.

THE CONSCIOUS INFLUENCES ISSUES

Assuming you haven’t come up with a plausible story to tell the alien about why in your

account scenario 1 would be “special” (if you think you have, you might want to explain it to

someone else and see if they can see any flaw). Then you might be wondering what the

problem would be with denying that it was special at all. What would be wrong with

33

claiming that the mechanism might have different conscious experiences in each scenario,

and perhaps even no conscious experiences at all in some of them?

If the processing was the same in both scenarios but the conscious experience was different

then the problem would be explaining how the conscious experiences made any difference

to the behaviour, since they had different experiences and the account suggests that they

didn’t react differently.

If what you consciously experience, doesn’t influence your behaviour, how could you justify

the account. You couldn’t claim it to be based upon anything you or anyone else has ever

consciously experienced, i.e. any empirical evidence, without placing yourself in the

contradictory position of claiming that the theory is based on what people have consciously

experienced (which implies that what has been consciously experienced has influenced the

behaviour of making the claim), while at the same time claiming that what people

consciously experience doesn’t influence their behaviour. Yet if you aren’t basing it on what

you or anyone else has ever consciously experienced, what are you basing it on? What

evidence supports it?

THE ‘SIXTH SENSE’ ISSUE

Perhaps your account wouldn’t have suggested that the conscious experiences would be the

same in all scenarios, nor have suggested that the conscious experiences would be different

across the scenarios while the processing remained the same. You might have suggested

that the conscious experiences would have been different and the processing would have

been different.

You’re account might claim that two different external realities couldn’t cause the same

initial reactions to the ‘robot brain’ and perhaps not even initial reactions similar enough for

there would be no discernible difference in behaviour.

34

If you aren’t claiming it, then the problem is how does the mechanism sense the cause of an

initial reaction to a stimulus? There would presumably be scientific implications to such

explanations, as in measuring for the type of effects the theory implies.

There are even scientific implications if you are making the claim that two different external

realities couldn’t cause initial reactions similar enough such that there would be no

discernible difference to the conscious experience of the ‘robot brain’. There are for

example companies that are already in the process of developing bionic eyes. The following

is an extract from a report that was last updated on the 4th March 2009 found on the BBC

News Channel24:

A man who lost his sight 30 years ago says he can now see flashes of light after being

fitted with a bionic eye.

Ron, 73, had the experimental surgery seven months ago at London's Moorfield's

eye hospital.

He says he can now follow white lines on the road, and even sort socks, using the

bionic eye, known as Argus II.

It uses a camera and video processor mounted on sunglasses to send captured

images wirelessly to a tiny receiver on the outside of the eye.

In turn, the receiver passes on the data via a tiny cable to an array of electrodes

which sit on the retina - the layer of specialised cells that normally respond to light

found at the back of the eye.

When these electrodes are stimulated they send messages along the optic nerve to

the brain, which is able to perceive patterns of light and dark spots corresponding to

which electrodes have been stimulated.

The hope is that patients will learn to interpret the visual patterns produced into

meaningful images.

35

Now remember that the account would be suggesting that the conscious experience of the

robot brain in scenario 2 would not be the same as the conscious experience of the robot in

scenario 1. Which raises the question of whether the account suggests that even if the

electrode were to send the same messages to optic nerve, the conscious experience of

would vary depending upon whether the electrodes had been stimulated because light had

been detected from an object that existed in the environment, or whether they had been

stimulated for a different reason? If it does then it could be easily tested and possibly

falsified. An experimenter could have a subject, for example a man wearing one of these

bionic eyes, and be able to stimulate the electrodes to send the same messages along the

optic nerve that would have been sent if the light from some object had been detected. The

experimenter could then test through various tasks whether the subject could always

determine whether the electrodes had been stimulated the experimenter or were being

stimulated because light reflected from some observed object. The subject could be asked

to say whether the conscious experience was any different. If the conscious experience

wasn’t any different and the subject was unable to distinguish between whether the nerve

signal had been sent because light had activated the electrodes or whether they had been

activated by the experimenter, then the account would need to explain why the scientific

tests don’t back up their story. When in the scenarios tested the conscious experience of the

nerve stimulation seems unaffected by the difference in environment, while their claim is

that the conscious experiences should be different. Perhaps they could give some ad hoc

reasons why this happens. Also there would need to be an explanation of the implications

for physics. It’s not like a theory like this would have no physical behavioural implications.

Obviously adjustments to the thought experiment could be made to make it more

appropriate to a specific account, but the general point is that the account is likely to be

scientifically testable. So if physicalists do choose a “sixth sense” type of accounts in order

to offer a plausible story for why we have the conscious experiences that we do, then a

difference in expected scientific results could very well develop between physicalists and

non-physicalists (the physicalists expecting evidence of some “sixth sense” type

phenomena).

36

Physicalists that adopt this perspective will presumably agree with theists that electronic

machines couldn’t be thought of as conscious, or explain the type of influence of what it was

like to be the machine would play on the electronic circuitry. Though without the electronic

machines being able to be conscious there would be a problem with what was ‘special’

about the organic machines, and why would this be expected to make a difference?

SUMMARY

Figure 2 below doesn’t provide you with the details of the arguments, but hopefully it can

be useful for if you think of a physicalist account and were looking for a reminder of the

appropriate issues.

Figure 2

Now one might recall that the Dawkins foundation was aiming to encourage “critical

thinking and evidence-based understanding”. This chapter has hopefully provided you with

some aids in judging the plausibility of physicalist accounts and basing these judgements on

what arguably is the only evidence that we have – our conscious experiences.

So do you ‘see’ a plausible physicalist account?

37

38

Part II

A DELUSION?

‘The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist.’

- line from the film The Usual Suspects.

39

Chapter 4

ONE ALTERNATIVE TO PHYSICALISM

Some might argue that even without a plausible physicalist account for why we have the

conscious experiences that we do, physicalism is still the ‘intelligent’ view to hold, because

there is no plausible alternative which is both compatible with science, and philosophically

defensible. In order to show this isn’t the case, I’ll outline and defend an alternative

account. This isn’t to say that the account I’ll be outlining is the only alternative which is

compatible with science and philosophically defensible. Though one only requires one

example of such an account to illustrate why one can’t reasonably claim that it is intelligent

to have a physicalist perspective purely on the grounds that there is no reasonable

alternative.

There are many variations of the widely held general belief that an alternative viewpoint to

physicalism is one in which God exists, and like many of these, the account I’ll be outlining

will also claim that a loving selfless God exists.

DAWKINS’ ARGUMENT

In his book ‘The God Delusion’ Dawkins puts forward what presumably he regards as his

most convincing argument against the existence of God. The argument has a single premise

which is that God cannot be a single substance. From this he concludes that the God

hypothesis would require an explanation of God’s complexity, otherwise the likelihood of

reality being that God just happened to have the complexity would make the hypothesis

seem improbable. He supplies the reader with a little anecdote:

For better or worse, I attended two days at the Cambridge conference, giving a talk

of my own and taking part in the discussion of several other talks. I challenged the

theologians to answer the point that a God capable of designing a universe, or

anything else, would have to be complex and statistically improbable. The strongest

40

response that I heard was that I was brutally foisting a scientific epistemology upon

an unwilling theology. Theologians had always defined God as simple. Who was I, a

scientist, to dictate to theologians that their God had to be complex? Scientific

arguments, such as those I was accustomed to deploying in my own field, were

inappropriate since theologians had always maintained that God lay outside science.

I did not gain the impression that the theologians who amounted their evasive

defence were being wilfully dishonest. I think they were sincere…. The theologians of

my Cambridge encounter were defining themselves into an epistemological Safe

Zone where rational argument could not reach them because that they had declared

by fiat that it could not. Who was I to say that rational argument was the only

admissible kind of argument? 25

The way Dawkins tells it, you might get the impression that the theologians were running

from reason. It would be surprising if they felt the need to in the face of Dawkins’ argument

however. Before directly addressing why I’d like to introduce a couple of terms which will be

useful in the discussion in making a distinction between two different types of issues that

might come up in a philosophical discussion. The first term is “epistemology” which

concerns what we can know. An epistemological issue is an issue about what we know or

might come to know about the way things are. The second term is “ontology”. An ontology

is an account of what exists, and an ontological issue is an issue about an account of what

exists.

To highlight how these can come into play within an argument, let us consider the following

argument about the philosophical zombies mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 2. Let us

suppose that there are a group of physicalists that suggest that humans can be considered

to be made up of atomic particles, and that the behaviour of humans could theoretically be

explained in terms of the interactions of these atoms. Furthermore they suggest, the laws

governing the interactions of these atoms are the same laws that govern the behaviour of

the atoms that make up things that aren’t consciously experiencing. Now in response to

their claims we can imagine that some people raise the issue of philosophical zombies. They

suggest that if these physicalists were right then they would also be saying that if there was

a creature, a zombie, that didn’t consciously experience but had its atoms arranged in the

41

same way as a human, then it would behave the same as a human. They might claim that

this would show that the physicalists’ suggestion implies that conscious experiences are

epiphenomenal (a property which had no influence on behaviour). They could claim the

suggestion that conscious experiences are epiphenomenal makes the account implausible.

In response the physicalists could accuse the proponents of the zombie thought experiment

of setting up what is known as a straw man argument.

A straw man argument is where instead of reasoning why a given proposal is unreasonable,

one sets up a similar sounding but different proposal (the “straw man”) and attacks that

instead. If the attacks that are made on the “straw man” are ones that cannot be made

against the actual proposal but only against the “straw man” then the argument is

considered to be a “straw man argument”.

The physicalists’ accusation that the zombie argument was a straw man argument can be

based upon them proposing an ontology (account of what exists) in which conscious

experiences and brain states are the same thing, while the proponents of the zombie

argument would be suggesting a different ontology in which the conscious experiences were

distinct from the physical state in order that in the thought experiment they might be

separated to allow for the creation of the zombie. The physicalists could go on to suggest

that the proponents of such a zombie argument would be pointing out an ontological issue

(that the possibility of zombies makes the ontology implausible) with an ontology other than

the one they are actually putting forward. The implausibility of zombies isn’t an issue for the

physicalists’ ontology as it doesn’t allow zombies.

So returning to the argument Dawkins proposed to the theologians. The theologians were

proposing an ontology in which God isn’t thought of as being made up of parts. Whereas

Dawkins proposes an ontology where God is proposed to be a complex of parts, and then

makes an argument against the plausibility of such an ontology. As has been pointed out,

this type of approach is known as a straw man argument, and straw men arguments aren’t

rational arguments against the proposal they are ostensibly aimed at. They just give the

illusion of being so.

42

As for his question “who was I, a scientist, to dictate to theologians that their God had to be

complex?”, he cannot of been suggesting that he had any scientific evidence that we should

think of God as a complex rather than simple ‘substance’, because this would have implied

the existence of God. Surely he wouldn’t expect, or want, even his most adoring followers to

accept it just based on his declaration simply because he was a scientist.

As for his claim that the strongest response that he heard was that he was “brutally foisting

a scientific epistemology upon an unwilling theology”, I’m surprised that he never heard the

response that he was offering a straw man argument which foisted upon the recipients an

argument against a different ontology from the one they were actually suggesting.

As for his claim that the theologians had defined “themselves into an epistemological Safe

Zone where rational argument could not reach them because that they had declared by fiat

that it could not”, again it isn’t clear that they had. I would be surprised if all theologians

declared that rational argument was irrelevant. His argument didn’t reach them because it

wasn’t a rational argument against what they were proposing. I’m not suggesting he was

being wilfully dishonest in using a straw man argument, perhaps he didn’t realise.

That the theologians haven’t any suggestion of how one might perform a scientific

experiment to determine whether, against the intuition of believers over the generations, it

is appropriate to consider God’s nature as being a complex of parts doesn’t in itself

undermine their theory. Any more than the theory that the behaviour of humans could

theoretically be explained in terms of the interactions of atoms governed by the same laws

that govern the behaviour of the atoms that make up things that aren’t consciously

experiencing is undermined by the lack of a way of scientifically determining whether a

robot is consciously experiencing for example.

So I will proceed with the account in which God is a loving, selfless God, which it would be

inappropriate to conceive of as being made up of parts.

SPIRITUAL BEINGS

43

Dawkins quotes from Bertrand Russell regarding the issue of burden of proof concerned

with proposals which cannot be disproved:

Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove

received dogmas rather than dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake.

If I were to suggest that between the Earth and the Mars there is a china teapot

revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my

assertion, provided I were careful enough to add that the teapot is too small to be

revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that,

since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of

human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If,

however the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as

the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of the children at school,

hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle

the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the

Inquisitor in an earlier time.26

Dawkins goes onto comment that:

Russell’s teapot, of course, stands for an infinite number of things whose existence is

conceivable and cannot be disproved.22

With the idea in place that the burden of proof is not on the sceptic to disprove an

assertion, he goes onto suggest that one should evaluate the probability of it being true:

That you cannot prove God’s non-existence is accepted and trivial, if only in the

sense that we can never absolutely prove the non-existence of anything. What

matters is not whether God is disprovable (he isn’t) but whether his existence is

probable. That is another matter. Some undisprovable things are sensibly judged to

be less probable that other undisprovable things. There is no reason to regard God

as immune from the consideration along the spectrum of probabilities. And there is

certainly no reason to suppose that, just because God can be neither proved nor

disproved, his probability of existence is about 50 per cent.27

44

Some might argue that probabilities are only appropriately applied to events that have not

yet happened, and therefore not appropriate to apply to the existence of God. God either

does, or does not exist, therefore the probability, if it was thought to make sense to

consider it a probability, would be either 1 or 0. Though one can sympathise with the

general point Dawkins’ seems to be trying make, which is that we do consider some

hypotheses to be more likely than others. For example imagine you agreed to take place in a

psychological experiment, and were placed in a room adjacent to the experimenter. The

experimenter walks in and informs you that he had a hundred dice in a bucket, and rolled

them only once, and that they all ended up showing the number one. You go into the room

and check, and sure enough the hundred dice are on the floor, all showing the number one.

You are then led back to your original room, while the experimenter remains in his, only to

re-enter your room a minute later informing you that he had done it again, a single roll, but

this time they all ended up being the number two. You go into check, and sure enough they

are all showing the number two, and you are again led back to your room, and the

experimenter goes back to his. Let us assume this continues another five times, with the

result being said to alternate between all the numbers being one, and all the numbers being

two. Now supposing just for the purposes of the thought experiment that you were asked to

judge whether it was more probable that the experimenter really did throw the dice and get

the results that he claimed, or whether it was more probable the dice had been tampered

with and the experimenter’s deception was part of the experiment. I’m presuming that

most would think that it was more probable that the results had been tampered with. What

could they base this on you might ask, if it is believed that one cannot use probabilities after

an event? Well one can look at the two hypotheses:

1) The experimenter fairly threw the dice.

2) The results of the dice were tampered with.

And then evaluate how likely you would expect the result to be if the particular hypothesis

you were considering was true. Some might point out that such methods could still be

wrong. Supposing there was a person that claimed to have won a national lottery, and

actually had, using this method of evaluation one would have come to the wrong result.

That would be true, but you would be as likely to correctly guess that, if you were to pick a

45

randomly selected lottery player who had played the previous week, they wouldn’t have

won it, as you would be to guess that they wouldn’t win in any future week that they

played28.

There are ways in which this type of probability evaluation can be used to evaluate theories.

For example William James in his 1890 publication ‘Principles of Psychology’ had remarked:

There is yet another set of facts which seem explicable on the supposition that

consciousness has causal efficacy. It is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally

associated with beneficial, pains with detrimental, experiences.29

and considered that if the reason wasn’t to be put down to a pre-established harmony, then

in order to put it down to natural selection killing off any who found detrimental

experiences pleasurable like some had suggested, what those experiences were like (e.g.

pleasure or pain) would have needed to have played a causal role in the behaviour of those

organisms. A philosopher named William Robinson responded30 to James’s suggestion that

without some suggestion of a pre-established harmony, evolutionary theory wouldn’t be

able to explain correlation between pleasure and beneficial experiences unless what it was

like to be a human was influencing the way the atoms in at least some part of the human

behaved (this to me seems to be the minimal causal role necessary in order for it to gain or

lose out by process of natural selection). Robinson tried to defend epiphenomenalism (the

suggestion that what it is like to be you plays no direct casual role in your behaviour). I read

his defence as amounting to saying that evolution could have selected the brain states

which correlated with the conscious experiences, and while epiphenomenalism might have

a problem in explaining the correlation between the neural states and the conscious

experiences, other outlooks would have a problem in explaining how conscious experiences

affected behaviour, and therefore epiphenomenalism was no worse off than other

suggestions. Joseph Carabi31 responded to Robinson, suggesting that Robinson’s

interpretation of James’s argument was less than charitable. Carabi pointed out that

Robinson’s response to the issue raised by James assumes the issue was that

epiphenomenalism was unable to offer an explanation for a certain point, whereas Carabi

points out there is another way to evaluate a theory:

46

Fortunately, there is another and very familiar way to think about inference to the

best explanation, though, and that is probabilistically. If we have phenomena that

need to be accounted for and we have theories that can potentially account for

them, in order to choose between them we begin by figuring out how likely each of

the respective theories is to lead us to expect the phenomena we find…. While all

competing general theories may be logically compatible with the phenomena that

need to be explained, some will claim that the observed phenomena are very likely

to occur if they are true, while other theories will claim that the observed

phenomena are not very likely to occur if they are true. (In Bayesian terms, the

phenomena to be explained may have a high conditional probability on some

theories, and a low one on others.) Roughly speaking, the more a respective theory

leads us to expect the phenomena actually observed (the closer the match between

what the theory predicts will probably occur and what in fact does occur), the

more it is supported by the phenomena in question.32

Carabi claims that it is this that James was pointing out when he comments:

There is…[a] set of facts which seem explicable on the supposition that

consciousness has causal efficacy. It is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally

associated with beneficial, pains with detrimental, experiences. Mr. Spencer and

others have suggested that these coincidences are due, not to any pre-established

harmony, but to the mere action of natural selection which would certainly kill off in

the long-run any breed of creatures to whom the fundamentally noxious experience

seemed enjoyable…if pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does not see … why

the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not give thrills of delight, and the most

necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony.33

You might remember that regarding Russell’s teapot Dawkins had commented:

Russell’s teapot, of course, stands for an infinite number of things whose existence is

conceivable and cannot be disproved.22

This would include the theory that a physical universe, as the atheists tend to understand it,

exists. It is conceivable and cannot be disproved. Though as Carabi points out fortunately

47

there are other methods of investigation. In Chapter 2 when we looked at the plausibility of

some of these accounts, there were some for which ‘the Special Context Issue’ arose. The

issue involves the type of probabilistic evaluation talked about by Carabi, and there is no

reason to regard these physicalist teapot theories as immune from the consideration along

the spectrum of probabilities.

Regarding Dawkins’ point that it is not possible to disprove the existence of God, one should

bare in mind there are many variations of the general belief that God exists, and some

aspects of these accounts can be potentially falsified. For example in the account that I am

about to present in this chapter it is claimed that we are spiritual beings that have free will

and are being given the experience of being humans. Not only is this type of claim is quite

common among the accounts that claim that God exists, but it also has the potential to be

falsified, as will be shown in the next chapter. So these accounts shouldn’t be thought of as

teapot type theories, because they themselves can potentially be falsified.

So what do I mean by the ‘spiritual being’? I am using this term interchangeably with the

term mind. Now while a physicalist might be ready to claim that what we consider to be our

mind or consciousness is a brain process, it isn’t so by definition. The physicalist philosopher

Ullin Place famously pointed this out in his famous paper Is Consciousness a Brain Process?34

when he said:

To say that statements about consciousness are statements about brain processes is

manifestly false. This is shown (a) by the fact that you can describe your sensations

and mental imagery without knowing anything about you brain processes or even

knowing that such things exist, (b) by the facts that statements about one’s

consciousness and statements about one’s brain processes are verified in entirely

different ways, and (c) by the fact that there is nothing self contradictory about the

statement “X has a pain but there is nothing going on in his brain”. What I do assert,

however, is that the statement “Consciousness is a process in the brain” in my view

is neither self-contradictory nor self evident; it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis,

in the way that the statement “Lightning is a motion of electric charges” is a

reasonable scientific hypothesis. 35

48

In fact it seems quite natural for us to make a distinction between what we are and what we

experience being. Dawkins in trying to explain the prevalence of belief amongst human

beings that we are spiritual beings reports:

The psychologist Paul Bloom, another advocate of the ‘religion is a by-product’ view,

points out that children have a natural tendency towards a dualistic theory of mind.

Religion, for him, is a by-product of such instinctive dualism. We humans, he

suggests, and especially children, are natural born dualists. 36

Dawkins goes onto comment:

A dualist acknowledges a fundamental distinction between matter and mind. A

monist, by contrast, believes that mind is a manifestation of matter – material in a

brain or perhaps a computer – and cannot exist apart from matter. 36

Strictly speaking Dawkins is incorrect to suggest that a monist believes that mind is a

manifestation of matter, and disguises the fact that there were three obvious alternatives,

not two. While a dualist believes that both mind and matter exist, and that there is a

fundamental distinction between the two of them, there are two further alternatives open

to a monist. They can believe that either only mind exists or, as Dawkins describes, that only

matter exists. Those that believe that only mind exists are often referred to as idealists, and

those that believe that only matter exists are often, as previously mentioned referred to as

physicalists. I don’t want the possibility of only mind existing to be hidden from the reader

by some slight of hand, as it is the viewpoint that I am going to be putting forward, and once

I have done so, one will be able to see that the existence of matter can be added, but it

offers no explanatory value, and would be removed from the account if one were to apply

Occam’s Razor.

Dawkins accepts that F. Anstey’s novel Vice Versa, in which a man and his son find they have

swapped bodies, and P.G.Wodehouse’s Laughing Gas, in which an Earl and a child movie

star undergo anaesthetic at the same time and wake up to find themselves in each others

bodies, only make sense from a perspective where we consider ourselves to be distinct from

the human we experience being37. Dawkins nevertheless admits to having no problem in

enjoying such stories, and comments that:

49

Paul Bloom would say this is because, even though I have learned to become an

intellectual monist, I am a human animal and have evolved as an instinctive dualist37.

For reasons given above one should substitute Dawkins’ use of the word monist for

physicalist. Also while the distinction between ourselves and what we experience being

(which is all the understanding of the stories requires) would be considered to be an

accurate description of reality in dualist accounts, it would also be an accurate description

of reality in some monist ‘idealist’ accounts, including the one that I am putting forward as

an alternative to physicalism. This isn’t the same as the distinction between mind and

matter, because the distinction between mind and matter holds the additional assumption

that ‘matter’ exists. Yet, as previously said, the existence of matter is another one of the

infinite things that Russell’s teapot could stand for. While one might not be able to disprove

its existence we could agree with Russell that hesitation to believe in it should not “become

a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an

enlightened age”.

While some may balk at being a spiritual being, or in other words a mind distinct from any

physical form, it nevertheless seems to be quite a natural way of looking at it. Consider ideas

such as reincarnation or an afterlife or an out of body experience for example, few have any

trouble in understanding what is being suggested. If you are having trouble conceiving of

yourself as being distinct from that which you experience being, then you might want to

consider why people in the past had no trouble in doing so, and yet you do now. If your

answer is that science has progressed, and it has been shown that we aren’t spiritual beings.

Then you must think it strange that Dawkins decided to avoid mentioning this evidence in

his book, and that in the survey done by Dawkins’s colleagues of the beliefs of the eminent

scientists that are Fellows of the Royal Society, at least over 20% (of the 23% that chose to

respond) were ignorant of this perspective dictating evidence that you believe to exist.

Might I suggest that there is no such evidence, and if you are having trouble conceiving of

yourself as being distinct from that which you experience being then it may well be because

you have been indoctrinated into a certain perspective and are not allowing yourself to

critically examine your beliefs by exploring other possibilities.

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The assumption that the physical exists has been questioned numerous times during the

history of philosophy. Rene Descartes in his 1641 publication Meditations on First

Philosophy wrote:

Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted

as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I

had subsequently based upon them. I realised that it was necessary, once in the

course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the

foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable

and likely to last….So today I have expressly cleared my mind of all worries and

arranged for myself a free stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I

will devote myself sincerely and without reservation to the general demolition of my

opinions.38

Aware that during his attempt at this demolition he might unwittingly make assumptions

based upon current opinions, he decides to proceed supposing that;

…some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his

energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours,

shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he

has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or

eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things. I

shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation; and, even if it is not in my

power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, that is, resolutely

guard against assenting to any falsehood, so that the deceiver, however powerful

and cunning that he may be, will be unable to impose upon me in the slightest

degree.39

Having questioned his assumption that the physical existed, he questions whether it can be

questioned whether he exists:

Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something

then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is

deliberately deceiving me. In that case too I undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me;

51

and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am

nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very

thoroughly, I must conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true

whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.40

He then goes onto produce an argument for the existence of God. I won’t go through it

here, as I don’t feel that it is a strong argument especially given his supposition that an evil

demon was going all out to deceive him. I mention it only because his argument for the

existence of the physical is based upon the existence of God.

Now there is in me a passive faculty of sensory perception, that is, a faculty for

receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible objects; but I could not make use of it

unless there was also an active faculty, either in me or something else, which

produced or brought about these ideas. But this faculty cannot be in me, since it

clearly presupposes no intellectual act on my part, and the ideas in question are

produced without my cooperation and often even against my will. So the only

alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me …. This substance is

either a body, that is, a corporeal nature,… or else it is God, or some creature more

noble than a body…. But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not

transmit the ideas to me either directly from himself, or indirectly, via some

creature…. For God has given me no faulty at all for recognizing any such source for

these ideas; on the contrary, he has given me a great propensity to believe that they

are produced by corporeal things. So I do not see how God could be understood to

be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than

corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things exist.41

Clearly an atheist could not make use of such an argument in order to reason that the

physical exists. It is rather unfortunate that Descartes came to the conclusion that he did,

because his ideas were influential and the suggestion that considering corporeal things not

exist involved blasphemy might well have put many off of considering it for too long. One

might point out that strictly speaking Descartes only said that he was unable to see how God

could be understood not to be a deceiver if the source of our conscious experiences were

not physical things. Though if it were to be interpreted in that way, then it was a mistake for

52

him to have reached the conclusion that “corporeal things exist”. I will assume the reading

and that he made a mistake in his reasoning in thinking that what exists was dependent

upon what he was able to see. The reason I do so, is that it would seem an uncharitable

reading to interpret Descartes as thinking that if physical things did exist, it was more likely

that God was a deceiver than it was that Descartes had been unable to see the answer. I

see no problem, if one were to assume that we are spiritual beings having spiritual

experiences, in expecting the source of those spiritual experiences to be spiritual rather

than physical. Nor do I see any problem given the conscious experiences that we have in

reasoning that one couldn’t conclusively tell whether the source was physical or spiritual,

and therefore it wouldn’t have be a deception whichever one it was.

Fortunately not everyone was put off questioning the assumption that the physical existed.

George Berkeley, the Bishop of Colyne, who prior to being made a bishop had famously

argued that we were spiritual beings and that the source of our conscious experiences of

the world is a spiritual source. Berkeley’s account could be interpreted as being similar to

that of Descartes in that in both we can thought of as a thinking thing, a mind, or spiritual

being, which has its own thoughts, but it differs from Descartes’ view in that whereas in

Descartes’ account the source of our conscious experiences of the world are material

objects, in Berkeley’s account the source of our conscious experiences of the world is a

spiritual source. A distinction between Berkeley’s account and the account that I am going

to outline in this section of the book is that whereas in Berkeley’s account our mind is the

source of its thoughts and imagination, in this account though our thoughts and imagination

are guided by us the source of them is a spiritual source other than our own mind. Though

this seems to be based on rules, and one of them seems to be what the brain state of the

human we experience being is. That isn’t to say we don’t have free will. The account claims

we do, and this will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5.

Analogous to the multiple universe theories of the physicalists, in the account I’m outlining

each being could be thought to be a dimension. An answer from the perspective outlined n

the account can be that the being dimensions exist within God. It could for the purposes of

the analogy be thought of as the dimension that holds the multiple dimensions. The spiritual

realm itself in which all spiritual beings exist. Some might question the connection between

53

the entities with such an ontology because with the analogy it would seem while God could

contain all spiritual dimensions and thus connect them, the connection seems to be through

God. So how could Satan be responsible for Hell, since there wouldn’t seem to be a direct

connection in the analogy between Satan and the person that had been judged have

abandoned the loving selfless path. An answer would be that the so called problem begs the

question that God hasn’t the ability to re-arrange the dimensional layout.

EXISTENCE OF SATAN

Not only does the account I am going to outline claim the existence of a loving selfless God,

but it also claims the existence of a hateful and selfish being, that I shall refer to as Satan.

The claim is that the reason we are experiencing this universe or ‘spiritual room’ if you will is

that it is ostensibly designed for the settlement of an issue, the issue being which way is it

better to be, like God, or like Satan. If at this point you were to be thinking that this is

getting silly and how could I possibly claim to know such things: the point of putting forward

the account in this section of the book, isn’t to establish the truth of the account, but to

establish that such an account is compatible with scientific discovery and can offer answers

to philosophical and theological enquires showing the fundamental compatibility between

accounts of where a loving Selfless God exists and scientific discovery and philosophical

enquiries. Because some populist physicalist writers seem to be giving a very different

impression.

If this is established, then one cannot claim that it is intelligent to adopt a physicalist

perspective even if there is no plausible account compatible with science, simply because

there is no alternative (all other accounts being considered to be incompatible with science).

One couldn’t claim that the existence of God and Satan and the conception that we are

spiritual beings with free will is incompatible with scientific discovery. If one were to argue

that an account which made these claims was incompatible with scientific discovery, then

the argument would need to be based on other claims in the account.

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55

Chapter 5

FREE WILL

In The Grand Design, Hawking and Mlodinow make the comment that:

Though we feel that we can choose what we do, our understanding of the molecular

basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics

and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets…. It is

hard to imagine how free will can operate if our behaviour is determined by physical

law, so it seems that we are no more than biological machines and that free will is

just an illusion.42

While there is no scientific evidence that biological processes aren’t governed by the laws of

physics and chemistry, it is incorrect to say that what we know of the molecular basis of

biology shows that they are. The philosopher David Chalmers comments that

…physical theory allows any number of basic forces…, and that an extra force

associated with a mental field would be a reasonable extension of existing physical

theory….43

It is possible he suggests that such a mental field could interact with the physical, and writes

that one could

…suggest that far from ruling out interactionism contemporary physics is positively

encouraging to the possibility.43

The reason Chalmers gives for suggesting that contemporary physics is encouraging to the

idea that the mental could interact with the physical is that in the standard model for

quantum mechanics (the physics involved in modelling the behaviour of tiny particles)

physical entities are considered to be in more than one position until measured, and only

‘collapsing’ into one position on measurement. Not only does the standard model suggest

that there is nothing physical that determines which position the physical entity would

56

collapse into, but also the only type of event that everyone agrees is a measurement is

observation by a conscious observer. Chalmers goes onto say that:

As such, it is natural to suggest that a measurement is precisely a conscious

observation, and that this conscious observation causes a collapse.43

Chalmers is careful to point out that quantum mechanics doesn’t force this interpretation

on us. There are alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics which differ from the

standard model, and which don’t suggest any collapse, and some in which measurement

doesn’t play any special role. Regarding the interpretation that conscious observation

causes a collapse, Chalmers goes onto say:

Of course such an interpretation is controversial. Many physicists reject it precisely

because it is dualistic, giving a fundamental role to consciousness. This rejection is

not surprising but it carries no force when we have independent reason to hold that

consciousness may be fundamental. There is some irony in the fact that philosophers

reject interactionism on largely physical grounds (it is incompatible with physical

theory), while physicists reject an interactionalist interpretation of quantum

mechanics on largely philosophical grounds (it is dualistic).43

It is our lack of knowledge about the molecular workings of the brain that give room for

there to be a dispute about whether there could be a conscious force such as our will having

an influence at the atomic level of our brains. Roger Penrose who was Hawking’s mentor

during his PhD and who subsequently jointly produced a paper with Hawking (offering a

mathematical argument for there being a beginning to the universe)44, has for some time

now been working on a theory which suggests that a force which isn’t computable (its

influence couldn’t even in principle be described by an algorithm) and yet which isn’t

random, is having an influence on the behaviour of the humans we experience being.

Microtubules (cell structures whose main role was thought to be providing structural

support to the cell) have reportedly been found to contain proteins called tublins which can

have their state changed (between alpha and beta states), by a single quantum event.

Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed that these quantum events are influenced by a

force that isn’t computable but isn’t necessarily random, and have developed theoretical

57

models of how this influence can alter the neural activity of our brains45. Their theory isn’t

without its critics, and is considered very speculative, but isn’t being written off on the basis

that what we know about molecular biology of the brain already shows us that it follows the

laws of physics and chemistry as we understand them. The reason that I mention the

account is to show that it is wrong to say that:

…our understanding of the molecular basis of biology shows that biological

processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as

determined as the orbits of the planets…42

As Chalmers has pointed out our understanding of physics doesn’t rule out their being a

mental force.

The account I’m outlining isn’t based on any special activity or lack of it in microtubules. It

does however imply that what we will is reflected in the neural activity of the humans we

experience being, which does raise the question: where is it reflected? This question was

also appropriate for Rene Descartes’s account in which he suggested that the material world

does exist but that we were of a different substance from it. In this dualistic account, where

there were two fundamentally different kinds of substances (the material and the spiritual),

there arises not only an issue of how the spiritual substance influences the behaviour of the

physical substance, but where would the physical substance be under such an influence? In

response to the latter question Descartes ventured a guess that the influence of the spiritual

substance would be found in the pineal gland in the brain, though if he had known about

microtubules and their sensitivity to quantum effects, perhaps he would have given a

different answer. All that would be required for microtubules to be a potential candidate for

where the influence might be occurring, for both Descartes’ account and the one I am

outlining, is that quantum effects in their tublins could have a strong influence on the

overall neural activity. To use an analogy of a puppet; all that is required is that if the strings

were attached to them, they could largely control the puppet. Though it wouldn’t be a

puppet it would be an organism, and it wouldn’t be strings but some quantum effects in the

brain. In response to the question “where would it be reflected”, I wouldn’t go as far as

specifically stating microtubules, but would state that it would be reflected in at least some

spontaneous brain activity.

58

WOULD WE HAVE FREE WILL IN A DETERMINISTIC UNIVERSE?

A deterministic universe is one in which given the state of the universe at any given point in

time, all that happens subsequently had to happen46. So if the universe had of been totally

deterministic then you reading this was an inevitable consequence given the state of the

universe moments after the big bang, and whatever deterministic laws the contents of the

universe followed.

An area of contention within philosophy has been whether we could be considered to have

‘free will’ if the universe was deterministic. A simplified account of the different camps the

philosophers tend to fall into would be the Compatibilists who suggest that the idea of us

having free will is compatible with the universe being deterministic, and the Incompatibilists

who consider the idea of us having free will is incompatible with the universe being

deterministic. The incompatibilists tend to fall into three further sub-groups: the

‘libertarianists’ who suggest that we have free will, and therefore make the claim that the

universe is indeterministic, the ‘hard incompatibilists’ who suggest we haven’t free will, and

the ‘revisionists’ who agree with the hard incompatibilists that we haven’t free will, but

believe we should revise the concepts so as to make them compatible with determinism.

If the revisionists were correct (that our concept of free will is not compatible with a

deterministic universe) and successful (in subsequently changing our concept of free will)

one wonders how we would be expected to refer to what would formerly have been meant

by the term free will. If a vocabulary was produced to allow the expression of certain

concepts, then re-engineering it to make it more difficult to express them seems to be

conducive to the restriction of expression. The idea of changing a language to restrict what

concepts could be expressed was explored in George Orwell’s famous fictional book, 1984,

and was closely linked to the indoctrination of the population.

As mentioned the compatibilists claim that the conception of us having free will is

compatible with the universe being deterministic, and so would deny that any revision of

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the concept is necessary. While the philosophers have tended to analyse their own

intuitions on the matter of what is meant by free will, it could still appear surprising that the

outcomes of analysing their own intuitions should be so varied. Though it becomes less so,

when you realise, as the philosopher Manuel Vargas47 points out, that there are two

different types of account of ‘free will’ that their intuitions can be directed towards. One is a

diagnostic account of free will, intended to reflect what people tend to mean by the term,

the other is a prescriptive account which is not principally concerned with how we do think

and talk about the issue, but how we ought to.

The psychologist Shaun Nichols48 mentions that often the analyst, even when ostensibly

offering a diagnostic account, fails to keep it purely diagnostic, and ends up paraphrasing

the folk intuitions in the form “T is the folk theory, suitably revised to eliminate various

mistakes”49. Which he likens to an anthropologist giving the following research summary:

“The indigenous people have a concept that is identical to our concept of anger, once their

concept is revised to eliminate various errors”49. Galen Strawson seems to highlight the

issue of philosophers conflating the diagnostic and prescriptive accounts when he

comments in an interview that they

“… have made a truly unbelievable hash of all this. They’ve tried to make the phrase

‘free will’ mean all sorts of different things, and each of them has told us what it

really means is what he or she has decided it should mean. But they haven’t made

the slightest impact on what it really means, or on our old, deep convictions that

free will is something we have “50

While it may be reassuring that some feel that the philosophers’ attempts to get us to

change what we mean by free will (whether they explicitly state that they are trying to

change the way we use the word, or whether they try to convince us what we meant by it),

haven’t made an impact, there is still cause to be wary. The Asch experiments showed that

people often show tendencies to conform, and one may also remember Asch’s comment

that:

60

The assumptions are that people submit uncritically and painlessly to external

manipulation by suggestion or prestige, and that any given idea or value can be

“sold” or “unsold” without reference to its merits.

Is it inconceivable that undergraduates could be indoctrinated into accepting a ‘revised’

meaning of free-will? Nichols mentions pilot work done by Gary Bartlett which reported

finding that on being given a set of epistemic thought experiments when enrolling on an

epistemology class, and again when they had completed it, the undergraduate subjects had

shifted their views on key questions closer to those of the lecturer. Nichols suggests that the

finding supports the possibility that the analysis might be vulnerable to sometimes reflecting

indoctrination rather than learning. One might wonder what would have happened if the

lecturer had presented the undergraduates with an account of ‘free will’ which conflated a

diagnostic account with a prescriptive one. Would the undergraduates have tended to shift

their views about what free will means towards the conflated account?

The concern about whether we would have free will or not is often motivated by the issue

of whether we are morally responsible or not. Strawson closely links them when

commenting that the issue of whether we have free will or not is the issue of whether we

could behave in such a way in which it would make sense for God to consider us

blameworthy. One should not be mistaken in thinking that Strawson was suggesting that

God exists. The mention of God seems only intended to highlight what (Strawson considers)

is generally meant by free will using a commonly understood concept. The problem with

moral responsibility and a deterministic universe is how one could hold a person for morally

responsible for what actions they perform if the actions that they were to perform were

determined before they were even born.

Recently psychologists have started to investigate whether people feel that moral

responsibility is compatible with a deterministic universe. Nichols and Joshua Knobe for

example performed an experiment in which they presented subjects with the following

narrative:

Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely

caused by whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the

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universe, so what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened

next, and so on right up until the present. For example one day John decided to have

French Fries for lunch. Like everything else, this decision was completely caused by

what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up

until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to have

French Fries.

Now imagine a universe (Universe B) in which almost everything that happens is

completely caused by whatever happened before it. The one exception is human

decision making. For example, one day Mary decided to have French Fries at lunch.

Since a person’s decision in this universe is not completely caused by what happened

before it, even if everything in the universe was exactly the same up until Mary

made her decision, it did not have to happen that Mary would decide to have French

Fries. She could have decided to have something different.

The key difference, then, is that in Universe A every decision is completely caused by

what happened before the decision – given the past, each decision has to happen

the way that it does. By contrast in Universe B, decisions are not completely caused

by the past, and each human decision does not have to happen the way that it

does.51

The subjects were asked whether they thought Universe A or Universe B was most like ours,

and Nichols and Knobe reported that over 90% of the subjects judged that Universe B (the

indeterministic universe) was most like ours. The subjects were then asked subsequent

questions considered to reflect either a ‘concrete’ or abstract’ condition. In response to the

‘abstract’ condition question;

In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their

actions?52

Only 14% of the subjects’ responses indicated the subject considering that a person in

Universe A could be fully morally responsible. This was considerably lower than the

response rates to the concrete questions about Universe A which had an emotive element

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to them. For example when subjects were presented with the highly emotive scenario

(referred to as the ‘high affect condition’):

As he has done many times in the past Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. Is it possible

that Bill is fully morally responsible for raping the stranger?53

The amount of subjects that thought Bill was fully morally responsible rose to 64% even

when the scenario was still taking place in Universe A. When it was taking place in Universe

B, 95% thought Bill was fully morally responsible. Given the less emotive case:

As he has done many times in the past, Mark arranges to cheat on his taxes. Is it

possible that Mark is fully responsible for cheating on his taxes?47

Only 23% thought that Mark was fully responsible for cheating on his taxes when the

scenario was described as taking place in universe A, whereas 89% thought he was when it

was taking place in universe B.

Nichols and Knobe suggest that people intuitively feel that what they do is not determined,

that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are linked to the idea of peoples’ actions not

being determined. They explain people being more likely to attribute moral responsibility

the more emotive an example is by what they call the Performance Error Model. The

Performance Error Model entails the idea that the more emotive the example is, the more

likely people are to make errors in judgement. While their study isn’t conclusive, and cross

cultural studies for example would be required to verify what people mean by free will, I will

proceed throughout the rest of this chapter using the term ‘free will’ to mean that if people

have ‘free will’ then what they will is neither pre-determined nor random. So when Martin

Fischer comments that

it is incredibly natural – almost inevitable phenomenologically – to think that I could

either go to the movies or to the lecture tonight, that I could either continue working

on this essay or take a coffee break, and so forth54

he would be saying that it is incredibly natural to think that you have free will as I am using

the term.

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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS TO FREE WILL

An argument sometimes referred to as the ‘luck objection’ argument, is that an

undetermined event is simply a matter of chance, the outcome of which isn’t controlled by

anything, including the agent, and that this chance wouldn’t give you any more control over

your actions than if the universe were deterministic55. Why, you might wonder, would

anyone suggest that if an outcome isn’t determined, then it must be luck, given that it

seems to us that it is neither, and that while we may be influenced by past events in the

choices we make, the past events don’t determine those choices, and neither are they

random, but a product of our will.

One prompt towards suggesting the ‘luck objection’ comes from a tendency to look at

causality in terms of one event causing another event. Jaegwon Kim for example comments

that

…in both everyday and most scientific contexts, explanations of individual events are

predominantly causal explanations in the sense that the events cited in the

explanation of an event are its causes and, further, their explanatory efficacy is

thought to stem from their causal status. And when each of a class of events can be

given a similar causal explanation, we may have a causal explanation of a

regularity56.

To help us see the problem, let us think of a person choosing to press either a red or blue

button. Let event A be any of the events that occurred before the person made the choice,

let event B1 be the person choosing to press the red button and let event C1 be them

pressing the red button. The problem is that if you look at causality in terms of events then

to offer a cause one needs to offer an event (that was the cause). If event A could be offered

as the cause of B1, then that event would have determined B1 so where was the free will? If

no event A could be offered as an explanation of B1 then no event prior to B1 could be

offered as an cause for it and so B1 could be said to be random. The suggestion being that

no other explanation for it because causal explanations are in terms of prior events.

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Jonathan Lowe argues that looking at causality in terms of events is the wrong approach. He

concedes that both events and agents can be thought of as causes, but points out that when

we do, we use them in different ways:

It cannot be denied that our ordinary ways of talking about action support, at least

superficially, the idea that agent causation is a distinct species of causation. As well

as making statements of event causation, such as ‘The explosion of the bomb caused

the collapse of the bridge’, we say such things as ‘The bomber caused the collapse of

the bridge’—where, by ‘the bomber’, we might be referring to an individual human

being, or we might be referring to an aeroplane. In short, there is no doubt that the

verb ‘to cause’ may take, as its grammatical subject, a noun-phrase referring to a

persisting object, either human or inanimate, quite as well as a noun-phrase

referring to a particular event. Moreover, since events and persisting objects are

entities belonging to quite distinct ontological categories, it is strongly arguable that

the verb ‘to cause’ must have a different sense when a term referring to a persisting

object figures as its grammatical subject from the sense it has when a term referring

to a particular event plays that role. This is brought out by the fact that, whereas it

would not be incongruous to say, for example, ‘Smith and Jones together caused the

collapse of the bridge’, it would indeed be incongruous to say ‘The explosion of the

bomb and Jones together caused the collapse of the bridge’. The latter sentence

appears to involve a category mistake, rather like the one that famously occurs in

the sentence ‘She came home in a sedan chair and a flood of tears’—the anomaly in

the latter case being that the sense in which a person can be ‘in’ a sedan chair is

quite different from the sense in which a person can be ‘in’ a flood of tears.

The lesson seems to be, then, that event causation and agent causation are distinct

species of causation, because the sense in which an event can be a ‘cause’ is quite

different from the sense in which an agent can be a ‘cause’.57

Lowe goes onto argue that the event causation cases can be re-written in terms of agent

causation, but the opposite isn’t the case. To illustrate this he considers that if the actions of

a causal agent can be written purely in terms of event causation then the following:

65

(I) Agent A caused event e if and only if there was some event, x , such that x

involved A and x caused e.

Must be true.

He then considers the possible agent causation that theists might suggest (though as far as I

could tell it wasn’t linked to theism at all).

Suppose that, on a particular occasion, a human agent, A, caused an event e, such as

motion in A's hand, but that this instance of agent causation is not reducible to one

of event causation. That is to say, suppose that it is not in virtue of some event's

causing e that A may be said to have caused e. Now, this still leaves open the

question of whether or not some prior event or events were causes of e and, if so,

whether or not that prior event or those prior events were causally sufficient for the

occurrence of e. However, it is perfectly conceivable that no prior event or

combination of events was causally sufficient for the occurrence of e, but that A's

agency on this occasion was causally necessary for the occurrence of e. That is to

say, it might be the case that if A had not caused e, then e would not have occurred,

since prior events alone were not causally sufficient for the occurrence of e.

(This is perfectly compatible with the suggestion that certain prior events were,

nonetheless, also causally necessary for the occurrence of e.) In that case, it seems, e

occurred as a consequence of A's agency and yet e was not causally determined by

prior events (nor, we may suppose, did e have the probability of its occurrence fully

determined by prior events). Hence, A was causally responsible for—was genuinely

the author of—e and in causing e acted ‘freely’.

But, it may be asked, isn't it the case that A's causing e was itself caused by some

prior event or events? If so, then wasn't the occurrence of e, after all, causally

determined by prior events (or, at least, wasn't the probability of e's occurrence fully

determined by prior events)? And if not, then wasn't A's causing e something quite

inexplicable—a matter of pure chance? The proper response to these questions, I

suggest, is that if A's causing e was, as is now being supposed, an instance of

irreducible agent causation, then we should not think of it as something which itself

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had a cause of any kind—but that, at the same time, we should not think of it as

something which, in lacking a cause, would therefore have to have been a matter of

pure chance.

It is open to us to say, instead, that A's causing e is subject solely to rational, not to

causal, explanation. That is to say, it is open to us to say that A caused e for a reason,

while denying that anything caused A 's causing e.58

So claims to show that assertion (l) wouldn’t be true for a scenario like the one described

above, since you couldn’t describe the causal agent that is subject to solely rational rather

than causal explanation in terms of event causality. So adopting an event causal model

wouldn’t leave way of allowing for what is after all a plausible scenario, whether or not you

happen to think it is the case.

Lowe also argues that only things in the category of substance can possess causal powers,

and so events aren’t the appropriate candidates for modelling causality:

Strictly speaking, an event cannot do anything and so cannot cause anything. For

causings are a species of doings—that is, in a very broad sense, actions—and doings

are themselves happenings. Thus, talk of an event doing something either involves a

gross category mistake—because, understood literally, it implies that one

happening is done by another—or else, taken less seriously, it may be dismissed as

being no more than a misleading manner of speaking.59

Lowe considers that if a statement such as ‘John’s collision with a train injured him’ was

meant literally, it would involve a category error, since it would be the train that caused

John’s injury, by colliding him, since it was the train that had the right sort of properties to

injure John, such as being hard and having a large mass, and momentum. These aren’t the

properties of the ‘collision’. Lowe suggests that one can analyse event-causal sentences

roughly as ‘some thing A, by acting in a c-type manner caused e’, in order to turn them into

what Lowe calls agent-causal sentences. It should be made clear that by the term ‘agent’

Lowe is referring to any thing of substance. So in the sentence “the brick, by colliding with

the window, caused the window to break”; the brick would be the agent. When considering

free will though, we are generally talking about entities that have conscious experiences.

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The luck objection seems quite strong against an event-causal model of causality, less so

against an agent-causal model of causality. Derk Pereboom60 notes that some such as Alfred

Mele and Ishtiyaque Haji suggest that the luck objection would still cause a problem for an

agent-causal libertarian view, but argues that actually such a view wouldn’t fall to the luck

objection. Pereboom reports that Mele and Haji essentially argue that if event G is agent A

causing decision D at time t, then if all conditions prior to t were the same, G might not have

occurred. Hence they argue that the occurrence of G is a matter of chance, and therefore

the agent doesn’t have control in making the decision. In response Pereboom points out

that while the agent-causal proponent would agree that G need not happen given the

identical events prior to t, they will claim that unlike in event-causal libertarianism in which

given the antecedent events in place, the agent plays no further role in determining

whether the decision occurs, in agent-causal libertarianism given the antecedent events in

place, the explanation of event type G is that it is a logical consequence of the agent causing

the decision.

An argument that bears certain similarities to the luck objection, but approaches from a

different direction is what I will refer to as the ‘ultimate responsibility’ argument. Galen

Strawson uses it to argue that we aren’t ultimately responsible (UR) for our actions. The

argument runs as follows; in order to bring it about that you have mental nature Z such that

it can be said that you are ultimately responsible (UR) for Z

you must already of had mental nature Y, in the light of which you intentionally

brought it about that you now have nature Z. (If you didn’t already have a mental

nature then you didn’t have any intentions or preferences and can’t be UR for the

way you now are, even if you have changed)61.

To be responsible for Z, you would need to be responsible for the mental nature Y (in the

light of which you brought about Z), and to have brought about Y you must have already had

the prior mental nature of X, and so on.

Strawson also provides a forward looking formulation of the problem, by considering that

the way one is initially is as a result of hereditary and early experience which you can’t be

held responsible for. Given this, you cannot at any later stage hope to become UR because

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the way you would try to change would be result of your hereditary and previous

experience. Galen points out that it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random

factors for which one isn’t responsible can contribute to one having any UR for how one is.

This appears to be a different argument from the luck objection which tends to lead us to

consider the issue in terms of physical events whereas Strawson’s argument tends to lead us

to think of the issue in terms of mental characteristics. One might think that in doing so it

offers an attack against agent-causal libertarianism: yes event type G is a logical

consequence of the agent causing the decision, but the decision the agent causes will

depend upon the mental nature of the agent.

The agent-causal libertarian can respond by pointing out that they aren’t suggesting an

ontology where the agent has a mental nature that determines the agents choice. They are

suggesting that the change in the agent’s will is explainable only rationally (e.g. the reason

he went outside was to get some fresh air), not in terms causality. That it is explainable

rationally shows that it isn’t random.

As I have mentioned the account I am outlining makes the claim that our choices are

undetermined, and that we are the ultimate cause of that choice, and therefore ultimately

responsible for our choices. Hopefully I have been able to highlight the problems with the

‘luck objection’ and ‘ultimate responsibility’ type arguments that some thought showed that

we haven’t got free will.

Before moving on I’d like to give a more general account of why any philosophical

arguments which claim to show through reason that we haven’t got ‘free will’ fail.

It is generally accepted that entities can have fundamental powers. For a power to be

fundamental means that it cannot be explained in terms of other powers, in other words, no

reductive account of fundamental powers can be given by definition. The concept of ‘free

will’ being a fundamental power can not be claimed to be incoherent, either in the sense of

the ability being proposed is not understandable, given that many claim to understand what

it being suggested (and feel like they have it), or in the sense that the explanation for the

ability involves a contradiction, because as stated, like all fundamental powers there is no

reductive explanation for it by definition. If one accepts that we as entities can have free will

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as a fundamental power then one accepts libertarianism. If a person were to create an

argument against the libertarian concept of free will and yet construct it on a different

ontology then they would only create a strawman argument against the libertarian

perspective.

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Pereboom writes that “although agent causation has not been ruled out as a coherent

possibility, the claim that we are agent-causes is not credible given our best physical

theories”62. He accepts that the universe might be indeterministic, and that a libertarian

could suggest that the will of the agent is implemented through quantum effects in the

brain, but suggests that if these effects were to occur at frequencies different from what we

would normally expect then we would have expected to have noticed these divergences. He

then goes onto suggest that not having noticed such divergences is sufficient for the

rejection of the account. The problem with Pereboom’s call to reject such accounts anyway,

is that currently there are no means by which such quantum effects in the brain can be

measured. As I understand it currently there are problems with measuring the firings of

individual neurons.

This isn’t to say that there haven’t been any scientific studies of the brain that haven’t been

used by some to suggest that we haven’t got free will. One of the most famous of these is a

series of experiments done by Benjamin Libet with various colleagues.

Libet 63 describes his work as following up on that performed by Hans Helmut Kornhuber

and Lüder Deecke who had found freely voluntary acts to be preceded by a slow electrical

change (referred to as the ‘Readiness Potential’ (RP)) which could be recorded by attaching

electrodes to the scalp. The trials Libet performed were designed to measure brain activity

in relation to a conscious intention to act. Sensors were connected to the subjects’ scalps in

order to detect electrical changes caused by neural activity, and an electromyogram (or

EMG for short, it’s a device to detect the onset of muscle activity) was attached to their arm.

The subjects were then shown a screen depicting a clock face (an oscilloscope) which was

marked from 0 to 60 and on which a spot of light made a revolution of the clock face every

2.56 seconds. Thus each mark represented approximately 43ms (43 thousandths of a

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second) of time. Figure 3 illustrates the idea (it was taken from a paper/article Libet did for

the Journal of Conciousness Studies published in 1999)64:

Figure 3

The note accompanying the diagram says:

…The subject holds his gaze to the centre of the screen. For each performed quick

flexion of the wrist, at any freely chosen time, the subject was asked to note the

position of the clock spot when he/she first became aware of the wish or intention

to act. This associated clock time is reported by the subject later, after the trial is

completed.58

A test for the accuracy of the subjects’ reports of the clock position was established by

giving them a weak electrical stimulus at random times and getting them to report what the

position of the spot on the clock face was when they received the electrical stimulus. It was

found that the margin of error in their reported time was 50ms.

The main experiment involved the subjects being asked to flex their wrist whenever they

felt the urge or wish to do so, and to report the time shown on the oscilloscope clock at the

time of their 'first awareness of a wish to act' (W). Once the EMG (the device attached to

their arm) registered the onset of muscle activity involved in making the wrist flex, the

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preceding 2 seconds of EEG recordings were saved, and later these recordings were then

averaged to calculate the ‘Readiness Potential’ (RP).

If the subject reported having had a sense of planning to act in the next second or so; the

‘Readiness Potential’ (RP) recording was considered to be a type I RP, else it was considered

to be a type II RP65. The experiments found type I RP activity to appear on average 1050ms

before the electromyogram (EMG) recorded muscle activity starting, while the type II RPs

appeared on average 550ms before the said event. The average reported 'first awareness of

a wish to act' (W) was found to be 200ms before the EMG activation, for both type I RPs and

type II RPs. Taking into account the margin of error, adjusted W becomes 150ms before

EMG activation. Figure 4 below illustrates some of the results.

Figure 4

Mele has commented that it is a common judgment (Mele quotes Daniel Dennett as an

example) that the type II RP signal is a “highly reliable predictor”66 of flexing. If the evidence

supported such a judgment, then it would seem to be quite strong evidence against the

claim of free will made in the account that I am outlining, because it would be evidence that

the brain activity, reflected in the detected signal, would have determined that the ‘choice’

to flex the wrist was going to be made, prior to the subjects considering themselves to have

chosen to do so. Had those that made this common judgment correctly interpreted the

evidence, or had they made a mistake?

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Mele argues that their conclusion is due to a mistake in reasoning . I’m not sure why they

didn’t just record all the readings, and then just analyse the two seconds preceding the EMG

activation, so we’d have the missing data Mele writes about:

Daniel Dennett echoes a common judgment when he asserts that the type II RP is “a

highly reliable predictor” of flexing …). Even if this is so, is the brain activity

associated with, say, the first 300 ms of this RP—call it type 300 activity—a highly

reliable predictor of a flexing action or even a muscle burst? In fact, this is not

known. In the experiments that yield Libet’s type II RPs, it is the muscle burst that

triggers a computer to make a record of the preceding brain activity. In the absence

of a muscle burst, there is no record of that activity. So, for all anyone knows, there

were many occasions on which type 300 activity occurred in Libet’s subjects and

there was no associated muscle burst. Recall the subjects who reported

spontaneously vetoing conscious urges to flex. Libet points out that “in the absence

of the muscle’s electrical signal when being activated, there was no trigger to initiate

the computer’s recording of any RP that may have preceded the veto”…). For all

anyone knows, type 300 activity was present before the urges were suppressed.67

Mele goes onto quote from William Banks:

It is possible that robust RPs crop up frequently during the critical interval, but only

when conscious decision is reported is there a response. In this case the unconscious

process would clearly not be a sufficient cause of the action. We do not detect the

ineffective RPs because recording RPs requires back-averaging from the response.

The RPs that do not eventuate in a response would therefore not be discovered.67

Mele67 goes onto point out that recording RPs doesn’t require back averaging from the

response. He reminds the reader that Libet had told of experiments where the subjects

were told to prepare to flex but not flex at time t. Here the back averaging was done from

time t, and discovery of RPI-type signals is evidence that these signals are not enough to

determine the choice of flexing the wrist. Mele states:

If (1) until time v, the averaged veto EEGs and the averaged EEGs for type I RPs are

produced by neural events of the same kind, then (2) the occurrence of events of

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that kind is not sufficient for producing (events that are sufficient for producing) a

flexing. For if 1 is true and 2 were false, the subjects in the veto experiment would

have flexed.

So a signal before every flex does not imply that the signal is a reliable indicator of flexing.

All flexes could be preceded by a signal, but not all signals followed by a flex, in which case a

signal wouldn’t be reliable indicator of flexing. Mele points out that the signals in the Libet

experiments were only recorded for instances when the flex was actually made, and so the

evidence from them leaves the possibility that robust RP signals had appeared but didn’t

result in a flex. Indeed Libet mentions that the subjects did report at times that they had a

conscious wish to act but then “suppressed or vetoed that”68.

Libet has performed an experiment in which subjects were told to prepare to flex at a

certain time (t) but then not to flex. He reported that a large RP was found to precede the

‘veto’ indicating that the subject was preparing to act. Mele notes that these RPs resembled

type I RPs until about 150-250ms before t. Mele points out that if (1) the veto RPs and type I

RPs were produced by the same kind of neural event then (2) the occurrence of these

events are not sufficient for producing a flex. For if (1) were true, and (2) were false then the

subjects would have flexed.

Referring to the first 300ms of type II RP as ‘Type 300’ activity

Figure 5

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Mele considers the following two propositions:

P1) Type 300 activity is sufficient to produce (events that are sufficient for producing) a

muscle burst around 0ms.

P2) P1 would be true if not for the possibility of a consciousness veto.

Mele argues that anyone who believes that one or the other of these propositions has been

shown by the Libet experiment has misunderstood the data. There is no data as to how

often ‘Type 300’ activity might occur without being followed by a type II RP profile from -

250ms onwards (the average remaining time after the initial 300ms of type II RP activity

before EMG activation). As Mele goes onto say:

For all anyone knows, that activity may be a potential cause of proximal intentions

that are more proximal causes of the actions. These proximal intentions may emerge

much later than Libet’s -550ms...They may even emerge on average, around

reported time W in subjects instructed to make W judgments.69

Mele also considers that “one can well imagine subjects wondering occasionally whether,

for example, what they are experiencing is an intention (or urge) to act or merely a thought

when to act or an anticipation of acting soon”70. Though the ‘first awareness of a wish to

act’ (W) was found to be at -200ms (t=0ms being the time of the flex) for both type I & II

RPs. Libet seemed to express surprise at this when he commented: “This value was the

same even when the subjects reported having pre-planned roughly when to act!”71. The

surprise would be understandable given that RPs were only considered to be type I when

the subject reported an “awareness of a general intention or preplanning to act some time

within the next second or so”72. As you could have expected that the pre-planning and will

to flex could have become confused. So while the first awareness of a wish to act could

include some pre-planning like Mele suggests, it could be argued that results indicating that

the subjects that reported a sense of pre-planning also reported the time first awareness of

a wish to act on average around the same time as those that don’t report pre-planning

could be interpreted as indicating that they have successfully managed to distinguish their

sense of preplanning to act from their sense of willing to act. Though in response it could

be said that the RP I signals seem linked to the preplanning to act. Given the ‘veto’

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experiment evidence where an RP signal was visible even when the subjects chose not to

flex, the evidence seems to positively support the notion that RP signals don’t determine

whether the subject flexes or not, the RP signal again seems linked to a planning or urge to

act rather than the act of willing themselves to act. The RP II signals could therefore be

interpreted as reflecting a pre-planning or urge to act so close to the will to act that the

subjects never sensed it enough to report it as an obvious preplanning prior to willing the

flex. The subjects could unintentionally tend to fixate on a point on the screen and

coordinate their flex with the spot reaching it in order to help with the reporting of the time,

since that would be the more difficult of the two tasks (the reporting of the time, and the

flex). When the point on the screen was sufficiently in front of the spot travelling around

the clock face, the subject could be aware of the delay and report an awareness of

preplanning, whereas when the delay was shorter, the subject might be coordinating the

two tasks as quickly as they could, and therefore not have the sensation that there was an

overt delay in which they were preplanning to flex. Though it should be pointed out in the

earlier tests done by Kornhuber and Deecke the subjects simply had to repeat movements

at a self paced rate73 and so there is no possibility that in their tests the subjects were

coordinating the flex with anything, though this doesn’t rule out that the subjects were

intentionally or unintentionally consciously preplanning their movements, i.e. they were

aware that they were just about to move their hand.

So contrary to the judgment of many, the Libet experiments don’t provide evidence that the

conscious decision to flex was determined by any subconscious neural activity . However

based on the common judgment the RP signals were shown to determine whether we

would flex our wrists or move our fingers, the neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran

considered a thought experiment in which it was proposed that you could be hooked up to a

machine which had a screen and that every time you were about to wiggle your finger the

machine would tell you a second in advance. Faced with such a machine Ramachandran

commented:

There are three logical possibilities. (1) You might experience a sudden loss of will,

feeling that the machine is controlling you, that you are a mere puppet and that free

will is just an illusion .... (2) You might think that it does not change your sense of

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free will one iota, preferring to believe that the machine has some spooky

paranormal precognition by which it is able to predict your movements accurately.

(3) You might...deny the evidence of your eyes and maintain that your sensation of

will preceded the machines signal 74

Not sharing the common judgment, Mele offers an alternative possibility. You wait for the

signal and then intentionally not wiggle your finger for another minute or so.

But if this is how you are thinking, then, provided that you are thinking clearly you

will not see the machine as controlling you. And, clear thinker that you are, you will

neither be tempted to believe that the machine has paranormal predictive powers

nor moved to ‘deny the evidence of your eyes.’62

Given the ‘veto’ phenomena discovered during the Libet experiments, the scenario

portrayed by Mele seems supported, and presumably because of this Mele states explicitly

that he isn’t proposing that Ramchandran’s thought experiment be turned into an actual

one.

Though that doesn’t mean that Ramachandran’s thought experiment provides no further

interest for us, especially when Libet reports that in tests where subjects are instructed to

react to a stimulus there is no preceding RP signal. For example if subjects were instructed

to flex their wrists when a certain light comes on, then as long as the light came on in an

unpredictable fashion (so they couldn’t preplan) there would be no preceding RP signal.

While Libet chose to interpret such a flex as not being a ‘freely voluntary act’61, it could be

argued that while an external event (a light coming on for example) would have brought

about the occasion at which the subject chose to flex their wrist, the flex would still be a

freely voluntary act in the sense that they could not have flexed if they so wished (they

could have ignored the instructions). What the experiment did do was cut out any possibility

of the subjects unintentionally preplanning their action while carrying out the

experimenter’s instructions.

Relating the lack of an RP signal when responding to a stimulus to Ramachandran’s thought

experiment; if a screen showed a light on to indicate a lack of RP signal and the light going

off to indicate an RP signal, then intuition and the evidence strongly points to the subjects

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being able to wiggle their fingers when the light comes on. If they could react to sudden

absence of RP signal on the screen in this way, then they can presumably react to a two

second absence of RP signal (that would be the signal they respond to) and so on. This

would require them to be reacting to the absence of signal, and not be preplanning to flex.

After training, one could assume that they could repeat it without looking at the screen (one

could look at a wall and pretend it was the screen for example). If so, then they would be

flexing without preplanning, and have shown the RP was a reflection of preplanning. Results

such as these could be explained by physicalists but arguably wouldn’t really have been

expected by them given the way many seem to have reacted to the Libet experiments.

So unlike Mele, I would propose that if the technology becomes available we should

perform the type of thought experiment suggested by Ramachandran. Subjects could be

given training on such a machine and any progress they make noted. The mention of the

technology becoming available is based on Mele’s remark that although the RP signals

found in the Libet type trials were computed by averaging the results of a number of trials,

scientists are working on developing techniques that would allow the signal to be evident in

a single trial. Which presumably means that up until that point they hadn’t found a reliable

single trial indicator. If they are successful then there seems to be no reason why the type of

thought experiment proposed by Ramachandran couldn’t be carried out.

As I have already mentioned there is a distinction between George Berkeley’s account of us

being spiritual beings and what we are experiencing being a spiritual experience with a

spiritual source to it, and the account that I am outlining. Whereas in Berkeley’s account our

mind is the source of its thoughts and imagination, in the account I am outlining the source

of even our thoughts and our imagination is a spiritual source other than our own mind. So

any evidence that there was neural activity prior to any awareness of a decision to wiggle

our finger would be compatible with concept that the ideas that come to our mind (such as

the idea of wiggling the finger) are based on the neural state of the human that we are

being given the experience of being. What would not be compatible with the account that I

am outlining would be evidence that the brain activity determined our choices. Because in

the account I am outlining the very point of us being given the experience is ostensibly to

settle which way it is better to be, loving and selfless, or hateful and selfish. If there had of

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been evidence that we didn’t have free will, and that neural activity in fact determined what

we had considered to be choices freely made by us, then the account I am outlining would

be incompatible with the evidence.

While Libet concedes that his studies still leave the potential for free will, in the veto of any

action, he points out that the veto itself might be determined by brain activity which is not

near the scalp and which would go undetected by the type of sensors he used. There are

other possible technologies that might prove useful in investigating this however.

In 2007, John-Dylan Haynes et al, of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain

Sciences, performed an experiment in which subjects had the word ‘select’ displayed at the

fixation point on the screen (see Figure 675).

Figure 6

At this point the subject would choose either the task of ‘subtracting’ or ‘adding’, but not

tell the experimenters which task they had chosen. After a variable delay of between

approximately 3 to 11 seconds, the screen then displayed two numbers, one above and one

below the fixation point (see the ‘Task stimuli’ screen in figure 3 above). The subject was

then to perform the task they had chosen on the two numbers. After a further 2 second

delay, they were presented with a screen showing four numbers, one in each visual

quadrant of the screen (see the ‘Response Mapping’ screen in figure 3 above). The subject

then attempted to select the button corresponding to the quadrant that held the result of

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applying the task to the numbers.

While the subjects were performing the task they underwent functional magnetic resonance

imaging (fMRI) and the results of the scanning were analyzed using a computer which

looked for patterns in the brain activity. The results indicate that it found them, because

from the fMRI scans that were taken of the subject’s brain after the subject had chosen to

add or subtract the numbers but before they had been presented with the numbers which

they were to either add or subtract, the computer was able to predict with over 70%

accuracy whether the subject had decided to either add or subtract the numbers.

A physicalist might think that in the Libet experiments, the veto of the flex, even after the

apparent RP, was itself determined by brain activity deeper in the brain, which wasn’t

picked up by the sensors placed on the scalp. They might believe that Dennett and

Ramachandran are essentially correct in thinking that for any freely voluntary act there

exists brain activity over half a second in advance of the action that would be a highly

reliable predictor of it. The beauty of the experiment reported by John-Dylan Haynes et al. is

that it offers a means of detecting the subconscious intention that they believe exists. With

advances in technology being expected to offer improvements to the both the resolution of

the scans and the frequency with which they can be taken, they might consider it to just be

a matter of time before these fabled subconscious intentions could be detected. Here their

theory would be making significantly different scientific predictions from the account I am

outlining. As mentioned the account says that we have free will, and that there are no

subconscious determinants of that will. This isn’t to say that our will cannot be influenced by

what we experience, which is in turn largely based upon the neural state of the human we

are being given the experience of being. It does mean that these influences can be rejected,

and therefore even if there was brain activity might be experienced by the subject as an

inclination to press the button, the subject could always choose to ignore that inclination.

The following experiment could be used to highlight this point.

A subject could have their finger over a button, and be instructed to press the button within

the next two hours, but be free to choose when in those two hours they press it. During this

time they can be undergoing an fMRI scan or a scan by some other appropriate technology.

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The computer could sequentially analyze the scans, checking for patterns, or whatever else

the experimenters consider might help, and after each scan (or perhaps set of scans for a

given time) the computer could indicate whether it is about to make a prediction that the

subject was about to press the button between 0.5 seconds and 1 second after the last

scan(s) it analyzed were taken. This allows the scans to be analyzed over a long period of

time, and removes any practical concerns that with the current technology the computer

would be unable to analyze the scans quickly enough to detect the patterns in real time. So

for example the scan information could be slowly fed to the computer in the order that it

was obtained, and the computer could take three weeks to analyze 0.1 seconds worth of

data. Though I’d be surprised if the computer used by Haynes and his associates took that

long to process the scans it was supplied with.

Now the computer not being able to detect a highly reliable predictor of the button press

wouldn’t prove that the physicalists that thought that such brain activity would be occurring

were wrong, and they could presumably provide excuses for why the computer wasn’t able

to find such activity. What isn’t so clear this point is why they wouldn’t have expected the

computer to have been able to find such activity. Given what Mele had described as the

‘common judgement’ about the Libet experiment, it might be interesting to perform a

survey of the personal opinions of eminent scientists and philosophers, as to whether they

think such brain activity exists, and if so whether they think that the technology used by

Haynes et al. would be able to find it and if not how far they think we are away from

developing such technology. One could maybe expect improvements to the scans for

example, or systems of analyzing them.

The interesting point about the experiment isn’t that it allows the prediction of the account

that I am outlining to be confirmed, it is that the experiment theoretically allows the

account I am outlining to be falsified. Hypothetically if experiments were done and the

computer was able to detect the appropriate activity and reliably predict the subjects’

button presses, then there would be strong evidence that the account I am outlining was

false.

The falsifiability of an account in principle is the main criteria put forward by Karl Popper,

who was arguably one of the greatest philosophers of science in the twentieth century, for

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an account to be considered to be a scientific theory.

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Chapter 6

EVOLUTION

As one might remember it was mentioned that Dawkins suggested that evolution in the

broad sense of gradual changes over time was almost incompatible with the idea of ultimate

design. This chapter will take a look at such a claim examining why it might be made and

how damaging such a claim would be to the plausibility of a hypothesis of ultimate design.

The type of theory commonly referred to as the ‘big bang’ theory was first put forward as a

solution to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. The original solution suggested a universe

that was expanding, and subsequent evidence supports this, though modern solutions

incorporate the evidence that the expansion is accelerating. The models suggest that if one

were to go back in time the universe would be smaller and smaller until it was a single point

which is often referred to as a singularity. Below is an abbreviated account from the NASA

website which gives an idea of what the models suggest:

Our universe began in a tremendous explosion known as the Big Bang about 13.7

billion years ago…. Observations by NASA's Cosmic Background Explorer and

Wilkinson Anisotropy Microwave Probe revealed microwave light from this very

early epoch, about 400,000 years after the Big Bang, providing strong evidence that

our universe did blast into existence….

A period of darkness ensued, until about a few hundred million years later, when the

first objects flooded the universe with light. This first light is believed to have been

captured in data from NASA's Spitzer Space Telescope….

Astronomers do not know if the very first objects were either stars or quasars. The

first stars, called Population III stars (our star is a Population I star), were much

bigger and brighter than any in our nearby universe, with masses about 1,000 times

that of our sun. These stars first grouped together into mini-galaxies. By about a few

billion years after the Big Bang, the mini-galaxies had merged to form mature

galaxies, including spiral galaxies like our own Milky Way. The first quasars ultimately

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became the centres of powerful galaxies that are more common in the distant

universe.

NASA's Hubble Space Telescope has captured stunning pictures of earlier galaxies, as

far back as ten billion light-years away.76

While these models provide an account in which our universe evolved from a ‘big bang’ in

the broad sense of gradual changes over time, the Theory of Evolution first proposed by

Darwin, offers an explanation of the diversity of life on the planet as being the result of

variations between organisms which can be passed on to subsequent generations. If the

variation aids the reproductive chances of the organism then it is more likely to pass the

variation onto its offspring, and the offspring with the variation would be more likely to pass

on the variation to their offspring and so on. Over time variations which aided reproductive

chances would become more wide spread throughout the population. It was suggested that

all cellular organisms had a common ancestry and that the large apparent differences

between them can be explained by a series of beneficial small steps (variations between

organisms and their offspring).

This idea was later supported by the discovery that most of the biological attributes of an

organism are determined by their genes, which can be thought of as discrete hereditary

factors. It was found that in plants and animals for example that these genes were

chemically encoded in strings of DNA referred to as chromosomes. Organism reproduction

involves chemical sequences from these strings of DNA being reproduced and being passed

onto the offspring77. The reproduction of the DNA sequences doesn’t always produce an

exact copy, and the differences between the original DNA sequence and the copy are often

referred to as mutations. The Theory of Evolution combined with genetics provides an

account of how without any ‘ultimate design’ the observed variations between organisms

could have come about from a common ancestry.

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COMPATIBILITY OF ULTIMATE DESIGN AND EVOLUTION

As you might recall the account that I am defending is the one in which it is claimed that the

reason we are experiencing this universe or ‘spiritual room’ is that it is ostensibly designed

for the settlement of an issue; which way is it better to be, like God, or like Satan.

The account doesn’t specify what the ‘rules’ of this universe are, though given the account,

one could expect there to be ‘rules’, as you would in game, or a contest short of war. The

account allows for two types of rules, those that are ‘in the room’ so to speak, which

potentially could be discovered and used by our selves and those that aren’t. The scientific

method has been particularly useful in discovering the rules ‘in the room’.

In the account I am outlining one can see the rules as being designed to both set up an

ostensibly unbiased room and allow certain implications of our choices to be obvious to us.

The rules could be deterministic in the sense that if there were no spiritual beings being

given the experience of being in the room and interacting with it, then the evolution of the

room would be determined. In such a case there would seem little point in both parties

experiencing the determined evolution of the universe in real time, the universe may as well

be set up as it was determined to look at the point intended for the first spiritual beings to

be given the experience of being in it and interacting with it. An analogy might be two

people disputing an issue, and designing a scenario in a chess game which can be played out

to settle it. They could play out all the opening moves in order to arrive at the scenario they

had decided on, but there would seem little point, since they know the scenario, they might

as well set up the board as it would look if those moves had been played. Extending the

analogy, we could then imagine spiritual beings being given the experience of being the

pieces on the chess board and trying to establish how long the game had been going on for.

A theory might reveal the shortest amount of moves required for the pieces to be in the

position they are in, from the starting position of them being lined up on either side of the

board. Given this theory they might consider the game to have been going on for 43 moves

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for example, when actually the game had been set up at move 42 and only one move had

actually been played.

Some might argue that if this were the case, then the universe has been set up to be

deceptive. Though it is difficult to see how this holds any weight when one has reason to

expect it to be the case.

Some might argue that experiments in physics have shown the universe not to be

deterministic and suggest that this somehow would cause problems for the account. In

response I would reply that the universe has not been shown to be indeterministic, there is

for example a deterministic account of quantum mechanics called Bohmian mechanics. As

the physicist John Bell commented in 1987:

In 1952 I saw the impossible done. It was in papers by David Bohm. Bohm showed

explicitly how parameters could indeed be introduced, into nonrelativistic wave

mechanics, with the help of which the indeterministic description could be

transformed into a deterministic one.... But then why had Born not told me of this

‘pilot wave’? If only to point out what was wrong with it? Why did von Neumann not

consider it? More extraordinarily, why did people go on producing ‘impossibility’

proofs, after 1952, and as recently as 1978? When even Pauli, Rosenfeld, and

Heisenberg, could produce no more devastating criticism of Bohm’s version than to

brand it as ‘metaphysical’ and ‘ideological’? Why is the pilot wave picture ignored in

text books? Should it not be taught, not as the only way, but as an antidote to the

prevailing complacency? To show that vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism,

are not forced on us by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice? 78

Even if the rules governing the evolution of the universe were indeterministic, there would

seem to be little problem in considering the deterministic laws being considered earlier

being replaced by indeterministic laws which still allow for the same desired scenario. Even

in this case there would be little point in running through a solution which results in the

same setup of the board so to speak. As with the scenario in which the rules are

deterministic the board might as well be set up in the intended fashion that the rules

allowed for.

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When one then considers the Theory of Evolution given the account, there is no

compatibility problem between the account and the Theory of Evolution. The only

difference is that whereas atheists consider the mutations as random, the account claims

that the mutations, up until the first spiritual beings experiences being in and interacting

with the room, were by design, for a purpose.

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Chapter 7

THEOLOGICAL ISSUES

In this section I will address issues which might be considered to be more theological in

nature.

PROBLEM OF EVIL

One might question why, if God is all powerful, all knowing, and morally perfect, doesn’t it

put an end to evil? Some have suggested that this is more than just a puzzling question.

They claim that the existence of evil shows us through reason that such a God doesn’t exist.

Their argument can be outlined as follows:

1. If God exists, then God is all powerful, all knowing, and morally perfect.

2. If God is all powerful, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.

3. If God is all knowing, then God knows when evil exists.

4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.

5. Evil exists.

6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all

evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil.

7. Therefore, God doesn't exist.79

Dawkin’s states in ‘The God Delusion’ that the:

The authoritative Oxford Companion to Philosophy gives the problem of evil as ‘the

most powerful objection to traditional theism’. But it is an argument only against the

existence of a good God80.

Since the account I am outlining does claim the existence of a good God the problem of evil

is an argument I should address. Since some consider the argument to be valid, i.e. the

argument is structured correctly so as to ensure that if the premises are correct (the lines

numbered 1-6 ) then the conclusion (number 7) will be correct. Therefore they suggest that

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any counter to the argument would involve denying that one of the premises the argument

is based on is true, and the premise that I am denying is true is premise number 6.

The account I am outlining claims that God desires all beings (minds) to freely embrace the

loving selfless path with their ‘hearts’. Premises 1-5 can all be true, and yet premise 6 be

false. For while one could easily imagine that a room could be created where beings like us

were given the experience of being humans, and where any choices to perform evil actions

were simply not carried out, or where no thoughts about performing evil actions were ever

entertained; this would not achieve the desire of these beings freely embracing the loving

selfless path. A being (mind) that has a greater capacity than ours (Satan) that doesn’t rely

on another mind in order to think could if it had rejected the loving selfless path suggest

that beings such as these would be simply slaves to the path. Restricting such a being from

being able to think for itself wouldn’t serve to achieve the state of all beings freely

embracing the loving selfless path either. So while the desire for all beings to freely embrace

the loving selfless path could be considered to be a desire for the elimination of all evil, it

doesn’t follow that the desire can be fulfilled through the exertion of any power. Indeed the

idea of achieving it through the exertion of power could be thought to contain a logical

contradiction, since the beings affected by the power would have embraced the path

because the power was exerted (they never had the option to do otherwise) and therefore

arguably not freely.

So the account I am outlining shows why the ‘problem of evil’ wasn’t really a problem after

all. Premise 6 was wrong because perfectly reasonable scenarios exist in which God knows

evil exists, God has the power to eliminate all evil, and has the desire to eliminate all evil,

but that evil can still exists.

As a side note; conceivably beings like us at the bottom end of the range of dimensions

could in some rooms (in Heaven) be considered to be mouth pieces of God because what

comes to their mind to say is what God gives them to say. Whereas beings at the higher end

of the range of dimensions might tend to think for themselves more.

ACCUSATION THAT THE ACCOUNT SUGGESTS THAT GOD SINS

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An accusation might be made that the account I am outlining is blasphemous, as it suggests

that God sins. The argument behind this accusation would be that the account suggests we

are spiritual beings having a spiritual experience, and that what we experience (including

our thoughts) has a spiritual source. Therefore, in a scenario where one spiritual being in the

room is torturing another, the account is suggesting that the torturer doesn’t cause the pain

to the torture victim, instead the torturer wills the human it is being given the experience of

being to torture the human that the other being experience being, and the spiritual source

to both their experiences, provides the experience to one of carrying out the torture, and

the experience to the other of being tortured. Therefore they would claim, if it is morally

wrong for example for one being to torture another, then the spiritual source (it is

conceivable that Satan is allowed to inflict the pain) by carrying out the torture (through

giving the spiritual experience of the torture to the victim) would be committing a morally

wrong act, and therefore the spiritual source of such experiences could not be a morally

perfect being. Therefore if the account suggests that God would be playing any part in

providing the experience of torture, then it would be suggesting that God was not be a

morally perfect being and therefore blasphemous.

In response one might consider what is meant by morality. One concept of morality that has

been formulated by philosophers is called utilitarianism. The general idea of utilitarianism is

that a moral act is one that results in the greatest overall good. If one were to consider that

God acts so as to achieve the greatest good, such as leading all beings to freely embrace the

loving selfless path, then from a utilitarian perspective God would be considered morally

perfect in acting in a way which leads to the greater good. We might be tempted to

conclude from this that this means that no one could ever think of a more morally perfect

solution to the problem. The problem with drawing such a conclusion would be that in the

same way that the account doesn’t specify whether beings are experiencing being

organisms in different galaxies, it doesn’t specify whether beings are experiencing a set of

different rooms. Though this would seem to invite the response, “why would they?” So

there would seem the possibility (from what the account allows) that it isn’t.

So for example, suppose we consider that God knew that Satan would come up with and

suggest a plan that he thought would work out to his advantage. And let us also suppose

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that Satan wanted to hurt God by making other beings suffer. Let us further suppose that

rather than suggesting a series of rooms in which only one being experienced it at a time,

that a room in which people experienced being in it for fixed periods of time and had

children, so that there would be generations. In such an environment Satan could easily plan

to turn people against each other, and doubt each others word. Plus it could be designed in

such a way that it could never be proven that it wasn’t physicalism. And Satan could inspire

people away from believing either it or God existed. It would have two options (to get

people to worship Satan, or to get them to disbelieve in God and/or Satan) to go for while

trying to lead people to the selfish path. Also it could sow seeds of distrust amongst people

which would even give it a reason to suggest that some rules should be time related. For

example allow certain miracle type interventions up until a certain point. It could then use

the seeming modern day lack of them to fuel arguments against such things ever happening,

and against the existence of God and Satan.

It seems blasphemous to state anything from God’s point of view, but thinking of the room

ourselves we can see that while physicalism may not be disprovable (which was expected),

there are scientific predictions that theism was making as far back as e. The universe also

seems to show us a creation event, and physicalist accounts would seem to need to concede

that there is something outside of the three dimensional space and time of our universe, or

go against the consensus of opinion upon what the results of certain scientific experiments

have shown. Because if they don’t go against the consensus of opinion then it seems that

either by conceding ‘spooky’ action at a distance (I’ve presumed an explanation of how

something could move instantaneously between two points through the three dimensions

of space no matter how far those points are separated would involve them being close in

some dimension), or by postulating multiple universes they would be postulating something

outside of the three dimensional space and time of our universe. You might remember that

there is the question of where would the multiple universes exist. The reason for them to

decide between these two options is covered in more detail in the ‘Physics Stuff’ section of

Appendix A.

There’s also the experience. It feels like we are spiritual beings experiencing being humans,

and that the whole interface between us and what the human does is experiential. If the

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human gets damaged we feel pain, but we can also feel pleasure. Whether we eat

something might depend on its taste, what music we listen to might depend on what it

sounds like. We react to the spiritual experience. We don’t need to concern ourselves with

which neurons get fired, that’s all taken care of, we can will things such as a chair to float,

but it doesn’t, but when we will our body to move, to us the human tends to move in

response to our will, and the experience of willing the movement and how it comes about

without us knowing the neurons that would need to be fired to reflect such a judgement can

be explained. The experience is exactly like you could expect it to be if you were a spiritual

being given a spiritual experience by a spiritual source. Whereas with physicalism I wouldn’t

be expecting a bunch of chemicals to be consciously experiencing at all, no matter what

special shape they got themselves into. I wouldn’t see why it would make a difference. Let

alone expect the experience be set up exactly as you’d expect it to be if you were a spiritual

being experiencing being a human. It wouldn’t help considering that atoms or subatomic

particles might consciously experience either, because then no matter what shape they

ended up arranged in I would still just be expecting the atoms or subatomic particles to be

having whatever individual experience they would have when arranged in a certain shape. I

wouldn’t expect there to be the experience of what one could imagine it to be like if you

were a spiritual being experiencing being a human. I wouldn’t expect the particles conscious

experiences to merge when they joined with each other, because if the nerves to parts of

my body are cut, I wouldn’t get the conscious experience of feeling from the parts of the

body that they served. Even though there are atoms merged together making the body

including the un-serviced bits whole.

Further more we might expect reason to discover things about the room we are in, else why

else be given the ability81. It seems to lead us up a path of discovery. And science does seem

to show that the room we find ourselves experiencing follows rules which can be reasonably

applied to give us previously undreamed of technology to help us and also found that they

can be reasonably applied to create previously undreamed of destruction.

Also it would allow for the people to build a world biased towards the loving selfless path.

It would also I suppose have allowed an infinite amount of beings in an infinite amount of

heavens to view it for themselves and make up their own minds about whether they freely

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choose the loving selfless path (so they are fully aware they are not slaves to that path). A

question from a utilitarian perspective which has a bearing on the ‘problem of evil’ is what is

the moral basis for considering that going down the path of allowing beings to freely

embrace the loving selfless path was better than going down the path of keeping them all in

blissful ignorance? An answer is that it’s better to know you’re free. The ones in blissful

ignorance wouldn’t need to have a concept of freedom, and no question about it would

ever come up. The ones that know they are free have all the bliss of the others but also the

welcome realisation that they are free.

Even though a utilitarian definition of free will was mentioned in the discussion it wasn’t

meant to suggest that the account suggests that there is nothing more to acting morally

than acting in a way that leads to the greater good as utilitarianism suggests. While God’s

will leads to the greater good, we haven’t the foresight to always know what effect our will

will have on the greater good. According to the account I am outlining (unlike in

utilitarianism in which your intention isn’t thought to count towards the moral status of an

act) you make a moral choice when your intention is to make the choice you believe is

pleasing to God, one that you believe is compatible with following the loving selfless path.

PROBLEM WITH BEING JUDGED AGAINST

Another argument which might be raised against the account would be something like this:

Suppose there were one hundred beings born to parents that encouraged them to follow a

hateful selfish path, and one hundred beings born to parents that encouraged them to

follow a loving selfless path, and suppose that about 70% of these children followed the

path their parents encouraged them to. This would mean that about 70 children of the first

group would follow a hateful selfish path, and that about 70 children in the second group

would follow the loving selfless path. So if the account suggests we will be judged on

whether we follow the loving selfless path or not, how does it explain that it is just that

children in the first group would be more likely to be judged against than the children in the

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second group, given that they weren’t responsible for a major influence on their behaviour

(how their parents encouraged them to behave)?

One might recall that in chapter on evolution the account involved the idea of the universe

being deterministic until spiritual beings were given the experience of being in the room and

interacting with it was introduced. As well as involving the idea that the room could be set

up as it would be determined to look at the point the beings were first going to be given the

experience of being in it and interacting with it. Again this is just an example, and not a

claim about how we will be judged, but the concept of the room being deterministic up until

the point that beings were first introduced to it highlights the concept that prior to beings

being introduced to it, there would be deterministic creatures, zombie creatures if you like,

which no person was given the experience of being. How these creatures would act in the

various determined scenarios would be known (because what happens, including how these

creatures behave, is determined). From understanding this one can see that it would be

known how a zombie creature would have act in any given scenario (even later scenarios

which only happened to humans that people were experiencing being). This opens up the

possibility that all could be judged relative to how a zombie equivalent that had the same

neural state would behave.

In response one might question whether such an answer would imply that no matter what

happens in the room the ‘pass rate’ would never improve. An answer is that it wouldn’t

imply that. For example a time might come when the realisation of the implications of it

being like something to be you would play a major influence on your behaviour but not on a

zombie equivalent (which it isn’t like anything to be, since no one is given the experience of

being one). In response to this, one might return to the sentiment of the original question;

how can it be just that a person in one group (the group with the realisation) is less likely to

reject the loving selfless path (and ‘pass’) than a person in the group without the realisation.

An answer is that the judgement of the person without the realisation is just because it is

relative to a zombie equivalent. Even though we would get conscious experiences and the

zombie wouldn’t, to know how the zombie would act must mean that the zombie could talk

about having conscious experiences and follow a reasonable discussion about their

implications, because the ideas can be represented in the neural state, and the way this

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neural state is acted upon would reflect the interaction with these ideas. Whether or not

some things are realised can depend on the choice of how the beings choose to be in their

heart.

THE ROOM IS BIASED TOWARDS SELFISHNESS

The argument against the account here would be that the account suggests that that the

room/universe that we experience is ostensibly unbiased, when in reality the universe is

biased towards selfishness. The basis for this would be the idea would be considered to be

based in the mechanism of evolution. The concept being that mutations which result in

genes which give an advantage to the gene being spread compared to the form of gene that

it mutated from will be more likely to be passed on.

An answer would be that the room/universe we consciously experience isn’t biased towards

selfishness. The theory of evolution tends to suggest that what survives will likely have some

reproductive advantage over what doesn’t. An atheist might suggest that it is best thought

of as progress randomly, whereas a theist might say that evolution up to a certain point was

by design. There is no assumption that a ‘selfish’ strategy will help the survival of the

organism.

Genes themselves aren’t generally thought to have a preference for being passed on (and

thus replicating further) or not. In sexual reproduction they tend to have a 50% chance of

not being passed on from one parent to the offspring.

There is no assumption that a selfish strategy would help humanity. It might destroy itself. A

loving selfless strategy would offer more assurance of humanities survival. Does that mean

that the room is biased towards the loving selfless strategy? The perspective I am outlining

would suggest not. Instead it would suggest the room be best thought of as an ostensibly

unbiased one.

PROBLEMS WITH OCCASIONALISM

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Ninian Smart writes in his book “World Philosophies” that the theologian Abu al-Hasan al-

Ash'ari (?874 - ?935) was the chief “formulator of the orthodox Sunni position”. He further

comments:

As to the question of free will, the Ash’arite position was in theory a middle one,

between free will and fatalism. For the conservative orthodox God has absolute

power over everything, and so they adopted a position of fatalism about human acts.

Now God, according to al-Ash’ari, creates everything, and therefore does indeed

create human actions. But he also creates in human beings the power to make a free

choice between two acts, and between right and wrong. God habitually creates what

a person chooses. So the human being is free only in intending to do one thing rather

than another, and in so intending he acquires the merit or demerit of his choice. This

notion of acquisition was supposed to supply a modicum of freedom in human

deeds. In other words, the human intention is part of the cause of an act, though it is

in turn derived from the power placed there by God. Thus God creates, in the human

being, the ability, choice and will to perform an act, and the human being, endowed

with this derived power, chooses freely one of the alternatives, and wills to do the

act. In accord with this intention, God completes the act. 82

This type of idea is known as Occasionalism, and as has been explained is a concept found in

the example of an alternative to physicalism that I am giving. Just over a century after the

death of the theologian Al-Ash’ari the theologian Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al

was born. About the influences on Al-Ghazali Smart comments:

He was influenced in part by the al-Ash’ari system, skepticla ideas and Sufism. He

also studied the Isma’ilis or esoteric Shi’is, against whom the Caliph commanded him

to write a critique.83

Smart further comments:

Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) had a negative and positive side. On the negative side, his

critique of philosophy seems to have been a vital factory in the virtual demise of live

philosophy in the then eastern parts of the Islamic world. It was to continue with

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vigour in the West: Spain itself became a great intellectual and artistic centre in

which the values of Isalmic, Jewish and Christian civilisations were in interplay.83

Smart goes on…:

On the positive side, al-Ghazali created an important synthesis which helped to bring

together both mystical and orthodox notions, entitled the Revivification of the

Religious Sciences. This together with his The Incoherence of the Philosophers stand

as the two greatest among his voluminous writings. 83

In The Incoherence of the Philosophers Al-Ghazali questions the philosophers assumptions

about reality. He questions their idea that the Universe was eternal, and goes onto say:

If its beginning in time is proved, it is all the same whether it is a round body, or a

simple thing, or an octagonal or hexagonal figure; and whether the heavens and all

that is below them form – as the philosophers say - thirteen layers, or more, or less.

Investigation into these facts is no more relevant to metaphysical inquiries than the

investigation into the number of layers in an onion, or the number of the seeds of a

pomegranate, would be. What we are interested in is that the world is the product

of God’s creative action, whatever the manner of that action may be. 84

Regarding the philosophers’ belief that the objects they experience have any causal effects

on each other Al-Ghazali points out that such a conclusion could not be got through reason

because for example; how could it be reasoned that the following wasn’t true:

(a) among the Principles of Being there should be causes from which flow the

temporal events which are observed to be connected with each other:

(b) unlike bodies in motion, such temporal events should not be liable to destruction

or elimination by us, and

(c) that if they were so liable, only then could we apprehend their separability from

each other, and would consequently understand that their cause lies beyond what

we observe?85

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As mentioned Berkeley (the Bishop of Colyne) had argued that we only know that the mind

exists we don’t know that anything ‘physical’ does. The 18th century philosopher Hume in An

Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding attacks both Descartes’ perspective and

Berkeley’s he is aware of the Occasion. Hume agrees with Berkeley that we cannot know

through reason that the physical exists:

The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly

reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a

connexion is, therefore without any foundation in reasoning. 86

Half a millennia earlier Al-Ghazali had argued that we can’t rationally come to an account of

cause and effect in which the objects, Hume took it further effectively suggesting that we

couldn’t rationally come to the Principle of Being mentioned by Al-Ghazali:

(a) among the Principles of Being there should be causes from which flow the

temporal events which are observed to be connected with each other:85

For what power to cause have we experienced? Hume asks. He considers the claim that we

experience ourselves being a causal agent. He suggests that we have no idea why certain

events seem to follow the command of our wills. Regarding any power of the will he

comments:

Where then is the power, of which we pretend to conscious? Is there not here,

either in a spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or

structure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which being entirely

unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and

incomprehensible?87

He seems to be suggesting that if you aren’t conscious of whether you are a spiritual being,

or a physical thing (the behaviour of which is possibly determined), then, while you can’t

reason that the physical exists you can’t reason that there is such a thing as a mind which is

a causal agent either. All you have are the conscious experiences.

Hume knew that his expansion on what Al-Ghazali had claimed (by claiming that we can’t

reason the Principle of Being) was open to a response from occasionalists who could for

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suggest argue that they experience the causal power within themselves to will, and that if

you didn’t realise that God was the ultimate cause of our experiences then yes the cause

would be unknown to you. So Hume launches an attack directly at occasionalism, and the

problems he tries to raise for it are the topic of this section.

Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God. Not content with

the principle, that nothing exists but by his will, that nothing possesses any power by

his concession: They rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to

render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They

consider not, that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the grandeur

of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It argues surely more

power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than

to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to

contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight, that, of itself, and

of its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the great

Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath all

the wheels of that stupendous machine.

But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory perhaps the

following two reflection would suffice. 88

It is difficult for me to tell whether Hume is writing this tongue in cheek. For as you shall see

his next two arguments cause no problem to occasionalism at all, and one couldn’t be much

less philosophical than the first of them. I therefore wonder whether Hume thought the

argument above was the strongest of the three, and if it didn’t work try ridicule then fall

back on a draw.

Anyway a problem with the suggestion above from Hume is that it is open to a small chain

of replies that starts with: for the spiritual beings to have the power to move their bodies

they might need to know how to operate the physical human that they would experience

being in Hume’s scenario (as Hume himself had suggested they would be expected to). An

answer could be that such a set-up wouldn’t have been suggested by Satan, because it

would be obvious that you were a spiritual being driving the human you experience being.

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And if Satan wanted to have the option of inspiring people to believe in physicalism it

wouldn’t make sense to employ a set up which makes it obvious to those in the room that

they are spiritual beings.

In response a person arguing from Hume’s perspective might question why the experience

couldn’t have been given by “physical stuff” that responds to the persons’ will?

An answer could be that all things are equally easy for God, including maintaining something

for over 2 years when compared to maintaining the same thing for a second.

If the answer that all things are equally easy for God wasn’t accepted, there would be the

question of whether it would be agreed that all things are equally as easy for God for as long

as they are required to be maintained.

If they agree, with perhaps the provision that some creations need no maintenance, then an

answer could be that if God had intended to be monitoring us while we experience the

room, there wouldn’t be a more effortless way of doing it. Because the maintenance would

be equal.

If they don’t agree to either of these then their argument is nothing more than a claim

which makes certain assumptions and involves the assigning of arbitrary values to the effort

involved in things.

The first of Hume’s two more “philosophical confutations of” occasionalism was:

First, it seems to me, that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the

Supreme Being, is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently

apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits, to which it is

confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it,

were ever so logical, there must arise strong suspicion, if not absolute certainty that

it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties when it leads to conclusions

so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience. We are got into a

fairy land, long ere we have reached the common methods of argument, or to think

that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to

fathom such immense abysses. And however we flatter ourselves, that we are

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guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and experience; we

may be assured, that this fancied experience has no authority, when we thus apply it

to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience. But on this we shall have

occasion to touch afterwards.88

To support his view Hume goes on to try to illustrate that reason can lead you into a fairy

land.

No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason

of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of infinite

divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as they are so pompously displayed

by all the geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation.

A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely

less than itself, and so on in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it

is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the

clearest and most natural principles of human reason.89

Though I find no problem with the infinite divisibility of extension, all it seems to involve is

imagining your self being in space and there being a rectangular coloured block and being

able to ask God to cut it to whatever length you like no matter how precise and imagining

God doing it for you. Once cut the precision is finite but while it was only potential it was

infinite.

Though there might be those that agree with Hume, I’m not sure that they would suggest

that the argument qualifies as a philosophical argument against occasionalism any more

than it is a philosophical argument against any reasonable argument. His second

“philosophical confutation” wasn’t one:

Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the arguments, on which this theory is

founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each

other: Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible: But are we not equally

ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates

either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We

have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of

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the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our

ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting any thing, we should be led into

that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest

matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. It is

more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse, than that it may arise

from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases. 90

All he does is conclude ignorance as to whether reality is physical or spiritual and then

question whether it is easier to conceive of motion arising from impulse than arising from

volition presumably thinking that because there was the concept in physics of motion

arising from impulse that it gave the advantage to the physicalists, because the

occasionalists would understand the physics that is expressed in a physicalist manner, and

they could presumably ‘feel’ it when they felt themselves pushed, whereas the physicalists

could deny that it is easy to conceive of motion arising from volition. Though it would

involve them denying that it felt like they had free will. Which would be a different claim

(though they would presumably be combined) to not believing that we had free will,

perhaps because of some philosophical argument for example.

The occasionalists could respond. Is it easier to think of conscious experiences being mental

rather than physical and is that to do with indoctrination? If you remember Dawkins put

forward Bloom’s theory that we are all natural born dualists; prior to indoctrination we tend

to think that we are distinct from the humans we experience being.

INCOMPATIBILITY WITH SCRIPTURE

Another objection to the account could be that it is incompatible with scripture, and that

the explanation it offers for the ‘problem of evil’ for example cannot be used as an

argument for the existence of God as outlined in the scriptures.

A response is that what you see the scriptures outlining can be dependent upon

interpretation. While some may equate their understanding of God with God, God isn’t

defined by our understanding of it.

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In the account I am outlining, while we don’t know the rules regarding the room, including

things such as inspiration, the account suggests that the beings in it could be inspired not

just by God, but also by Satan. The idea of Satan being able to interfere with the inspirations

of the prophets isn’t unique to this understanding. Below are a few of the more popular

translations of the Qur’an’s Surah Al-Haj (the Pilgrimige) verses 52-53 into English:

(Sahih International)

52 And We did not send before you any messenger or prophet except that when he

spoke [or recited], Satan threw into it [some misunderstanding]. But Allah abolishes

that which Satan throws in; then Allah makes precise His verses. And Allah is

Knowing and Wise.

53 [That is] so He may make what Satan throws in a trial for those within whose

hearts is disease and those hard of heart. And indeed, the wrongdoers are in

extreme dissension. (Muhsin Khan (Hilali-Kahn))

52 Never did We send a Messenger or a Prophet before you, but; when he did recite

the revelation or narrated or spoke, Shaitan (Satan) threw (some falsehood) in it. But

Allah abolishes that which Shaitan (Satan) throws in. Then Allah establishes His

Revelations. And Allah is All-Knower, All-Wise:

53 That He (Allah) may make what is thrown in by Shaitan (Satan) a trial for those in

whose hearts is a disease (of hypocrisy and disbelief) and whose hearts are

hardened. And certainly, the Zalimun (polytheists and wrong-doers, etc.) are in an

opposition far-off (from the truth against Allah's Messenger and the believers).

(Pickthall)

52 Never sent We a messenger or a prophet before thee but when He recited (the

message) Satan proposed (opposition) in respect of that which he recited thereof.

But Allah abolisheth that which Satan proposeth. Then Allah establisheth His

revelations. Allah is Knower, Wise;

53 That He may make that which the devil proposeth a temptation for those in

whose hearts is a disease, and those whose hearts are hardened - Lo! the evil-doers

are in open schism -

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(Yusuf Ali)

52 Never did We send a messenger or a prophet before thee, but, when he framed a

desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire: but Allah will cancel anything (vain)

that Satan throws in, and Allah will confirm (and establish) His Signs: for Allah is full

of Knowledge and Wisdom:

53 That He may make the suggestions thrown in by Satan, but a trial for those in

whose hearts is a disease and who are hardened of heart: verily the wrong-doers are

in a schism far (from the Truth):91

Three of the four translations seem to suggest that idea that Satan has been allowed to

tamper with what comes to the prophets this isn’t an insult to the prophets (and clearly not

to God in any of the four translations), and even the Yusuf Ali translation which mentions

vanity, and could be interpreted in meaning that they were vulnerable to Satan because of

their vanity. On a closer reading all it says is that Satan threw a vanity into their desires. It

doesn’t mention whether they had any choice in the matter. If they didn’t then how could

the prophets be considered to be at fault. If they did then the translation could be

interpreted as suggesting they only continued to desire the vanity that was thrown in

because they were actually vain in that respect (and therefore let it remain rather than

seeing it for the vanity it is and removing it). In verse 53 we can see the suggestion that

Satan’s interference will only be a trial for those whose hearts aren’t in the right place.

This would leave the account the scope of no longer thinking of the texts as the unerring

word of God. As previously said the point of this discussion isn’t about whether this

alternative account is true or not, it is about whether it shows that it cannot be said that the

position that we are spiritual beings and that a loving God exists is not incompatible with

reason or scientific discovery. If it does, then any such claims about similar accounts would

need to make the claim on some additional assertion the account makes.

With the alternative account that is being outlined one might also consider, as one might

with any historical documents, that some of the accounts were misreported. The

misreporting could be because of a number of reasons. The most entertaining story tellers

might embellish slightly, or if the story was initially passed on orally then answers to

questions that were raised about story (and possibly the consensus was that they had been

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addressed) might become included in the oral account. Changes (especially if the story was

initially told orally) might have crept in which gave the account more authority, and what

was said may have been expanded up etc.

Some might object and suggest that if scripture is not taken to be the unerring word of God,

then what guidance can it provide us with?

An answer would be through realising that God is a loving, selfless God, and judging the

texts accordingly.

Isaiah 29: 13 (NIV)92 states:

The Lord says:

“These people come near to me with their mouth

and honour me with their lips,

but their hearts are far from me.

Their worship of me

is based on merely human rules they have been taught.

Clearly emphasising the importance of being close to God in your heart.

Jesus can be thought of as showing us God’s heart.

The gospels Matthew, Mark, and Luke, report Jesus teaching, or at least agreeing on what

are the most important commandments God has given us. In the report given in Matthew

22:36-40 (NIV) the Pharisees ask Jesus:

36 “Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?”

37 Jesus replied: “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul

and with all your mind.’38 This is the first and greatest commandment. 39 And the

second is like it: ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’40 All the Law and the Prophets

hang on these two commandments.”

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In Mark 12:28 – 31 (NIV) the report is quite similar to that of Matthew:

28 One of the teachers of the law came and heard them debating. Noticing that Jesus

had given them a good answer, he asked him, “Of all the commandments, which is

the most important?”

29 “The most important one,” answered Jesus, “is this: ‘Hear, O Israel: The Lord our

God, the Lord is one. 30 Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your

soul and with all your mind and with all your strength.’ 31 The second is this: ‘Love

your neighbour as yourself.’ There is no commandment greater than these.”

Whereas in Luke 10:25-28 (NIV) it states:

25 On one occasion an expert in the law stood up to test Jesus. “Teacher,” he asked,

“what must I do to inherit eternal life?”

26 “What is written in the Law?” he replied. “How do you read it?”

27 He answered, “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul

and with all your strength and with all your mind’; and, ‘Love your neighbour as

yourself.’”

28 “You have answered correctly,” Jesus replied. “Do this and you will live.”

In all three reports we can consider that the loving selfless path is being pointed out (in

loving your neighbour as you love yourself) and that this is an indication of the heart of God.

This isn’t to say that all three accounts are identical. In the Mark and Luke accounts we find

the words “with all your strength” which are missing from the Matthew account. In the Luke

account it is an expert of the law that states the importance of these commandments, and

Jesus verifies that what he says is correct, whereas in the Matthew and Mark accounts it is

Jesus that states the importance of these commandments. The differences between these

accounts can be considered to support the idea that we shouldn’t take these accounts to be

unerring. Though again the point being made is only that a account that is compatible with

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us being spiritual beings and the existence of a loving selfless God is compatible with both

reason and scientific discovery.

There are further points of interest in these accounts. Take for example the report given in

John 14:6 (NIV):

6 Jesus answered, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the

Father except through me.

Some might interpret this as one Jesus stating that people must believe in him in order to

get to Heaven, and perhaps, if one were to believe that Jesus had indicated that he was

God, one might go further and suggest that it is stating that unless you believe Jesus was

God, you won’t get to Heaven. There are alternative interpretations however. One is that

Jesus was the embodiment of the loving selfless path, and that only via that path could one

get to Heaven. This interpretation is inline with interpreting the report in Luke 10:25-28

(quoted above) as stating that if you love God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all

your strength and with all your mind and also love your neighbour as yourself, then you can

get to Heaven. This latter interpretation doesn’t require that one believes that Jesus was

God in order to get to Heaven.

One might wonder whether these sentiments are only found in the New Testament, or

whether they are also found in the Old Testament. Well regarding Jesus indicating the most

important commandments, one might remember that while in Matthew and Mark accounts

it is Jesus that points out the most important commandments, in the Luke account it was an

expert in the law. Since the commandments which were stated as being the most important

aren’t part of the Ten Commandments one might wonder where someone knowledgeable

of the Old Testament might have found such commandments. If we look at Deuteronomy

6:5 we find that it says:

5 Love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your

strength.

This sentiment is repeated in Deuteronomy as in 10:12:

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12 And now, Israel, what does the LORD your God ask of you but to fear the LORD your

God, to walk in obedience to him, to love him, to serve the LORD your God with all

your heart and with all your soul,

And again in Deuteronomy 11:13:

13 So if you faithfully obey the commands I am giving you today—to

love the LORD your God and to serve him with all your heart and with all your soul—

We also find the commandment to love thy neighbour as thyself in Leviticus 19:18 (NIV):

“‘Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against anyone among your people,

but love your neighbour as yourself. I am the LORD.

When we look at Leviticus 19:18 slightly more in context we find that it says (Leviticus

19:17-18(NIV)):

17 “‘Do not hate a fellow Israelite in your heart. Rebuke your neighbour frankly so you

will not share in their guilt.

18 “‘Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against anyone among your people, but

love your neighbour as yourself. I am the LORD.

One could easily interpret the Leviticus report as suggesting that loving thy neighbour as

yourself was only an instruction for how Israelites should be towards their Israelite

neighbours, and in the Luke account (where the expert highlights the greatest of the

commandments) we see this issue alluded to:

27 He answered, “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul

and with all your strength and with all your mind’; and, ‘Love your neighbour as

yourself.’”

28 “You have answered correctly,” Jesus replied. “Do this and you will live.”

29 But he wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?”

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30 In reply Jesus said: “A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he

was attacked by robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away,

leaving him half dead. 31 A priest happened to be going down the same road, and

when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side.32 So too, a Levite, when he

came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. 33 But a Samaritan, as

he travelled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on

him. 34 He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he

put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him. 35 The

next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper. ‘Look after him,’

he said, ‘and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may

have.’

36 “Which of these three do you think was a neighbour to the man who fell into the

hands of robbers?”

37 The expert in the law replied, “The one who had mercy on him.”

Jesus told him, “Go and do likewise.”

(Luke 10:27-37 (NIV))

While the Samaritans considered themselves to be Israelites, it is possible that Jesus’ non-

Samaritan Israelite audience would have considered them not to be. For in 2 Kings 17:24 –

28 (NIV) it was reported that while the people of Israel were taken from their homeland into

exile in Assyria;

24 The king of Assyria brought people from Babylon, Kuthah, Avva, Hamath and

Sepharvaim and settled them in the towns of Samaria to replace the Israelites. They

took over Samaria and lived in its towns. 25 When they first lived there, they did not

worship the LORD; so he sent lions among them and they killed some of the

people. 26 It was reported to the king of Assyria: “The people you deported and

resettled in the towns of Samaria do not know what the god of that country

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requires. He has sent lions among them, which are killing them off, because the

people do not know what he requires.”

27 Then the king of Assyria gave this order: “Have one of the priests you took captive

from Samaria go back to live there and teach the people what the god of the land

requires.” 28 So one of the priests who had been exiled from Samaria came to live in

Bethel and taught them how to worship the LORD.

If one were to assume that the non-Samaritan Israelites considered the Samaritans to be

people who had been taught the traditions, but who weren’t actually descendants of Jacob

(Israelites), then their understanding of the good Samaritan parable relies on them knowing

the answer in their heart. This isn’t to say that the idea that Israelites should love their non-

Israelite neighbours wasn’t found in scripture. In Deuteronomy 10:18-19 (NIV) it states:

18 He defends the cause of the fatherless and the widow, and loves the foreigner

residing among you, giving them food and clothing. 19 And you are to love those who

are foreigners, for you yourselves were foreigners in Egypt.

So one can see it was already in the texts that to be close to God in their hearts the Israelite

should love their neighbour even if their neighbour is a foreigner. And if the greatest of the

commandments are to love God with all your heart, strength and soul, and to love your

neighbour as yourself, then aren’t these applicable to everyone? Should everyone not

follow the loving selfless path?

The account allows for the scriptures to not be flawless reports of the word of God, but to

be understood as containing indications from a loving selfless God that we should follow the

loving selfless path. It might be said that the scriptures are incompatible with the idea that

the physical doesn’t exist independent of any mind. The Genesis account for example could

be said to emphasise that God created the universe in 6 days and then on the 7th day did

nothing, in other words the creation existed independently of any action by God. Which

could easily be interpreted as suggesting that once created the creation didn’t require God

to act in order to maintain the creation.

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Not that the account I am outlining requires that all the text need be in agreement with it,

but if one wished one could interpret the 7th day rest as being an indication that the way the

room/universe was modelled was set, or finalised, that the creation phase was over. The

rest was therefore a rest from creation.

The essence of Genesis; that the universe was created, and hadn’t existed for ever, and that

there was a being (represented by the serpent) that was trying to lead those experiencing

being humans away from being obedient to God is in line with the account.

The account doesn’t require the scriptures to have explicitly stated that only the spiritual

realm exists and that we are just being given the spiritual experience of being human, for it

to be compatible with scriptures. The Bishop George Berkeley had argued that only the

spiritual realm exists without, as far as I know, considering the scriptures to have explicitly

stated that it was the case, and without considering his suggestion to be incompatible with

scripture.

However if we look to Isaiah 29:11 - 16 (King James Version) we see the text:

11 And the vision of all is become unto you as the words of a book that is sealed,

which men deliver to one that is learned, saying, Read this, I pray thee: and he saith,

I cannot; for it is sealed:

12 And the book is delivered to him that is not learned, saying, Read this, I pray thee:

and he saith, I am not learned.

13 Wherefore the Lord said, Forasmuch as this people draw near me with their

mouth, and with their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart far from me,

and their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men:

14 Therefore, behold, I will proceed to do a marvellous work among this people, even

a marvellous work and a wonder: for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and

the understanding of their prudent men shall be hid.

15 Woe unto them that seek deep to hide their counsel from the LORD, and their

works are in the dark, and they say, Who seeth us? and who knoweth us?

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16 Surely your turning of things upside down shall be esteemed as the potter's clay:

for shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not? or shall the thing

framed say of him that framed it, He had no understanding?

We might wonder who the ones mentioned in verse 16 that are looking at things in a

perverse way; turning things upside down. They are the ones mentioned in verse 15, but

what should we make of verse 15?

In order to investigate we’ll need to take a look at the Hebrew, and unfortunately all that I

know in terms of the Hebrew is what I have researched, and so if I’ve made any mistakes

then I apologise:

י יוד נו ומ י רא ו מ אמר ם וי ה והיה במחשך מעשיה ר עצ ה לסת ים מיהו ענו׃הוי המעמיק

The Hebrew above93 is usually broken down as something like (Hebrew reads from right to

left rather than left to right like English):

ה ר עצ ה לסת יםהמעמיק מיהו הוי

Counsel to hide from the LORD the ones that go deep Woe! Alas!

י ו מ אמר ם וי והיה במחשך מעשיה

Who and they say their deeds in the darkness And it will be

י יודענו נו ומ רא

knows us Who sees us

Now a translation such as Young’s Literal Translation doesn’t indicate any assumption that

the counsel that the people in question are attempting to hide is their own. Without such an

assumption it makes sense to keep the word order pretty much the same as it is in the

Hebrew.

Young's Literal Translation94

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Woe to those going deep from Jehovah to hide counsel, And whose works have been

in darkness. And they say, 'Who is seeing us? And who is knowing us?'

Since if the counsel was the LORD’s it wouldn’t make sense to have translated it as:

Woe to those going deep to hide (the LORD’s) counsel from Jehovah, And whose

works have been in darkness. And they say, 'Who is seeing us? And who is knowing

us?'

However the majority of the translations do make an assumption about whose counsel it is

and the assumption is that the counsel is the people’s in question. For example:

King James Bible (Cambridge Ed.)

Woe unto them that seek deep to hide their counsel from the LORD, and their works

are in the dark, and they say, Who seeth us? and who knoweth us?

King James 2000 Bible (©2003)

Woe unto them that go the depths to hide their counsel from the LORD, and their

works are in the dark, and they say, Who sees us? and who knows us?

New International Version (©1984)

Woe to those who go to great depths to hide their plans from the LORD, who do

their work in darkness and think, "Who sees us? Who will know?"

With the assumption that the people in question are trying to hide their counsel (or plans)

the change in word order in the above translations doesn’t make too much difference to the

meaning or to the notion that to hide counsel is providing the reason for their actions. Other

translations go a step further in order to make a translation in which they believe the

meaning is better maintained:

English Standard Version (©2001)

Ah, you who hide deep from the LORD your counsel, whose deeds are in the dark,

and who say, “Who sees us? Who knows us?”

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American Standard Version

Woe unto them that hide deep their counsel from Jehovah, and whose works are in

the dark, and that say, Who seeth us? and who knoweth us?

In these versions to hide is no longer functioning as the reason for going deep.

One motive for making the assumption that the counsel is that of the people in question is

to make sense of the text given the context. So one might wonder the sense that was made

of the text with this assumption?

The 17th century theologian John Gill made the following assessment of the text95:

Woe unto them,.... Or, "O ye",

that seek deep to hide their counsel from the Lord; which they consulted against

Christ, to take away his life, to persecute his apostles, and hinder the spread of his

Gospel; which though they consulted in private, and formed deep schemes,

imagining they were not observed by the Lord, yet he that sits in the heaven saw

them, and laughed at their vain imaginations, Psalms 2:1,

and their works are in the dark; in the dark night, as if the darkness could conceal

them from the all seeing eye of God; such works are truly works of darkness, but

cannot be hid, though they flatter themselves they will:

and they say, Who seeth us? and who knoweth us? as no man, they imagined, did, so

not God himself; into such atheism do wicked men sink, when desirous of bringing

their schemes into execution, they have taken great pains to form; and which they

please themselves are so deeply laid, as that they cannot fail of succeeding;…

As you can read, Gill interprets the verse as referring to those that consulted against Jesus

and his apostles. Gill assumes the darkness refers to the darkness of night, and explains

them thinking ”Who seeth us? And who knoweth us?” by the suggestion that they had sunk

into atheism. A problem with this suggestion is that if through their desire to fulfil their

schemes they had sunk into atheism as Gill suggests, then while it would have made sense

to suggest that they hid their plans from those around them, it wouldn’t make sense to

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suggest that they had tried to hide their plans from God, because if they were atheists, they

wouldn’t believe in God, and therefore would make no effort to hide their plans from God.

The 19th century theologian commentator Albert Barnes offers an alternative suggestion:

Woe unto them that seek deep ... - That is, who attempt to conceal their "real"

intentions under a plausible exterior, and correct outward deportment. This is most

strikingly descriptive of the character of a hypocrite who seeks to conceal his plans

and his purposes from the eyes of people and of God. His external conduct is fair; his

observance of the duties of religion exemplary; his attendance on the means of

grace and the worship of God regular; his professions loud and constant, but the

whole design is to "conceal" his real sentiments, and to accomplish some sinister and

wicked purpose by it.

From the Lord - This proves that the design of the hypocrite is not always to attempt

to deceive his fellowmen, but that he also aims to deceive God.95

Barnes isn’t suggesting that the text refers to people that had fallen into atheism. Instead he

suggests that it refers to people who while believing in God, aim to deceive him and

accomplish some wicked purpose while maintaining an external conduct that appears just. I

feel that the problem with this interpretation is that it seems implausible that people who

believed in God could believe that they could hide their plans from God. I suspect the idea

would have seemed implausible to anyone that believed in God at the time of Isaiah, and

ever since. This claim might prove to be controversial, and some might point to verses such

as Job 22:13-14:

King James Bible

13 And thou sayest, How doth God know? can he judge through the dark cloud?

14 Thick clouds are a covering to him, that he seeth not; and he walketh in the circuit of heaven.

Which could be considered to suggest that some people around the time would have

thought that God was in the sky and the clouds could obscure God’s view of them, and

likewise being deep in the earth. However one could note when reading the text in context

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(you’d need to look it up) the text that precedes the quoted text bears no indication that Job

has said anything of the kind. Instead it seems likely that Eliphaz is explaining Job’s

misfortunes by suggesting that Job must have walked the path of wicked men and saying in

his heart what wicked men are suggested to do in Psalms 10:11 (KJV):

King James Bible

11 He hath said in his heart, God hath forgotten: he hideth his face; he will never see

it.

Though Psalms 10 doesn’t seem to be a revelation by God about what wicked men think in

their heart, nor is the author suggesting that he holds such a belief, instead it is written as

though the author is telling God what he thinks wicked men have said in their heart. It

leaves the possibility that he perhaps he thinks it offers an explanation of how they could

behave the way they do rather than it reflecting him having met anyone that held the view

that was expressed. I suspect that anyone believing in God reading the verse would

consider those who believe that God wouldn’t be aware of any of their thoughts or actions

to be obviously mistaken.

The 19th century theologians Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch offer yet another

interpretation suggesting they suggest that:

To hide from Jehovah is equivalent to hiding from the prophet of Jehovah, that they

might not have to listen to reproof from the word of Jehovah.95

Though this interpretation also seems implausible. If the people that were doing the hiding

believed that Isaiah was a prophet of God’s, then it wouldn’t make sense to ask the question

“who sees us, who knows us?” because the answer would be obvious… God. If they didn’t

consider Isaiah to be a prophet of God’s (perhaps because they didn’t believe in God) then

attempting to hide plans from what they thought was a pretend prophet wouldn’t be

equivalent of attempting to hide their plans from God.

That there are arguably problems with these interpretations (from a theist perspective) can

provide weight to considering an alternative assumption – that the counsel in question is

God’s. Though given that the majority of translators clearly assume that this is not the case

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it would seem reasonable of me to offer some further justification for doing so. One might

notice that translations like the following;

King James 2000 Bible (©2003)

Woe unto them that go the depths to hide their counsel from the LORD, and their

works are in the dark, and they say, Who sees us? and who knows us?

New International Version (©1984)

Woe to those who go to great depths to hide their plans from the LORD, who do

their work in darkness and think, "Who sees us? Who will know?"

translate (I think) the first five words as though they had been written (remember Hebrew is

read from right to left, not left to right like English):

ה ה מיהו ר עצ ים לסת הוי המעמיק

from the LORD Counsel to Hide the ones that go deep Woe! Alas!

And had it of been written like this whose counsel it was would be unambiguous, since as

mentioned the following translation wouldn’t make sense:

Woe! Alas! The ones that go deep to hide (the LORD’s) counsel from the LORD.

Similarly whose counsel it was would be unambiguous if the text had been written as

ה ה עצ ר מיהו ים לסת יק ויה המעמ

Counsel from the LORD to Hide the ones that go deep Woe! Alas!

Though the way it was actually written:

ה ר עצ ה לסת יםהמעמיק מיהו הוי

Counsel to hide from the LORD the ones that go deep Woe! Alas!

Seems to me to allow not only for the way it has been interpreted but also:

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Woe! Alas! The ones that go deep from the LORD to hide (the LORD’s) counsel

Though just because the way the text is written in a way that would allow for one to

interpret it as people hiding God’s counsel, it doesn’t mean that we should. One question

we might want to ask is whether it could be thought to make sense that people would try to

hide God’s counsel.

The idea of people hiding or obscuring God’s message isn’t without biblical precedent. For

example if we look Job 38:1-2.

King James 2000 Bible (©2003)

1Then the LORD answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said,

2Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?

New International Version (©1984)

1Then the LORD answered Job out of the storm. He said:

2"Who is this that darkens my counsel with words without knowledge?

We can look also at the text of Job 42:1-3.

King James 2000 Bible (©2003)

1Then Job answered the LORD, and said,

2I know that you can do everything, and that no thought can be withheld from you.

3Who is he that hides counsel without knowledge? therefore have I uttered what I

understood not; things too wonderful for me, which I knew not.

New International Version (©1984)

1Then Job replied to the LORD:

2"I know that you can do all things; no plan of yours can be thwarted.

3[You asked,] 'Who is this that obscures my counsel without knowledge?' Surely I

spoke of things I did not understand, things too wonderful for me to know.

We can see that the scriptures have been interpreted as including text in which God talks

about people hiding or obscuring his counsel/advice/plans without knowledge, and that this

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lends support to an argument suggesting that we could do the same when interpreting

Isaiah 29:15.

Before going further I’d like to say a few things about I’ve read about classical Hebrew. In

classical Hebrew verbs are conjugated under seven heads. They are:

The simple active, e.g. he has ..., which is called Qal.

The simple passive, e.g. he was ..., which is called Niph’al

The intensive active e.g. he has totally..., which is called Pi’el

The intensive passive e.g. he was totally...., which is called Pu’al

The causative active e.g. he has made..., which is called Hiph’il

The causative passive e.g. he was made..., which is called Hoph’al

The reflexive e.g. he has made himself..., which is called Hithpa’el96

And under these heads they are conjugated according to who performed it, i.e. first person,

second person, or third person, the gender of who performed it, the number that

performed it and whether the action has been completed or not (often referred to as the

Perfect and Imperfect, the Perfect being when the action has been completed), and the

mood.

If we look at the word ים יק which as I said, is often translated as “the ones that המעמ

make/go deep”. The root of the word is the verb meaning “to be deep”. According to

Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance is:

A primitive root; to be (causatively make) deep (literally or figuratively):—(be, have,

make, seek) deep (-ly), depth, be profound.97

So it is said to be able to be used literally or figuratively (as in when it is thought to mean

profound). The scriptures have examples of where the concept of depth is applied

figuratively to apostasy (Isaiah 31:6), corruption (Hosea 9:9) and thought (Psalms 92:5), and

the idea that “going deep” in Isaiah 29:15 might be meant figuratively rather than literally

(as in going deep into the ground) is not new. For example the Douay-Rheims Bible assumes

the going deep is being used figuratively for going deep in their hearts.

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Douay-Rheims Bible

Woe to you that are deep of heart, to hide your counsel from the Lord: and their

works are in the dark, and they say: Who seeth us, and who knoweth us?

Though here I will make the assumption that יםהמעמ יק which I believe to be the Hiphil male

plural participle (while a verb it provides a description of those in question) is being used

figuratively with regards to thought.

The verb that makes up the verb phrase with this participle is the verb ר which in Biblical

translations is considered to mean “to hide”. Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance has it as:

A primitive root; to hide (by covering), literally or figuratively:—be absent, keep

close, conceal, hide (self), (keep) secret, X surely.

So again you can see that this also can be used either literally or figuratively.

Around 200CE the Rabbi Judah98 took the decision to write down the Jewish Oral Law, and

the Mishna is the name for the writing in which he set down these laws. These laws were

subsequently read and commented on by generations of rabbi’s and about 200 years later

the rabbis of Palestine wrote down their commentary on the Mishna, and this work became

known as the Palestinian Talmud. More than a century after this, the rabbis of Babylon also

wrote down their commentary on the Mishna, and this became known as the Babylonian

Talmud. Since the Babylonian Talmud was more comprehensive, it has become the one

generally adopted so that if someone talks of studying the Talmud, one would assume that

they meant the Babylonian Talmud. The Talmud itself consists of the Mishna and the

writings on the Mishna; the Gemara. It is in the Gemara that the verb ר took on the

meaning of; to tear down, [to stir up] to loosen to unravel, to dissolve to decompose, to

undo reverse invalidate, to contradict to disprove99. Since the Qal form of ר wasn’t

thought to have been used in the Bible, it is used when one wants to mean to contradict,

while the Hiph’il form is used when meaning to hide. So (at the time of writing) if you went

to Google Translate and pasted it in (you need to watch out for the letter order of the

Hebrew being changed) you would see that it translates as “Secret” and if you hover over

that word and click to see alternative translations you’ll see the translation “contradicted”.

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One might notice that above and below the Hebrew letters mentioned so far are small signs.

These signs are referred to as niqqud100, and they are used to signify vowels or to distinguish

between alternative pronunciations of the letters which are consonants. Several systems of

niqqud were developed in the early middle ages. Prior to this, in the older Hebrew texts

such as those of the Dead Sea Scrolls for example, there is no such system. This older type of

text is often referred to as Ktiv haser101. However while niqqud aren’t generally used in

Modern Hebrew writing neither is Ktiv haser (other than a few cases such as the text of the

Torah read in synagogues). Instead, because of the difficulty in reading Ktiv haser a new

form of writing was developed known at Ktiv male102 and rules involving inserting certain

new letters have been developed for converting text with niqqud into Ktiv male.

In Modern Hebrew (in Ktiv male) the Qal form of ר is written as 103לסתור and means to

contradict while the Hiph’il form להסתיר means to hide. The prefix ל indicates that the

forms are in the infinitive; to contradict, to hide. The form ר which is written with) לסת

niqqud) found in the Leningrad Codex (the oldest complete Bible) in Isaiah 29 verse 15 is

unique. It only occurs once in the Bible and is thought by scholars to be an alternative

spelling of להסתיר (to hide). Though as mentioned earlier the niqqud were only added to

the texts later. One can see from the picture in Figure 7 below of Isaiah 29:15 in the Great

Isaiah Scroll of the Dead Sea Scrolls104 that the writing doesn’t contain niqqud.

Figure 7

Figure 8 below is a close up that shows in these earlier texts the word was actually written

as לסתר (the underlining has been added by myself)

Figure 8

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So in Modern Hebrew לסתור means “to contradict” while להסתיר means “to hide”. One

might also recall that Ktiv male is the standard way of writing Modern Hebrew (especially

without niqqud). With niqqud “to contradict” is ל ר (a different niqqud form from that

found in the Leningrad Codex). The extra letter found in the Ktiv male form was one that

was added according to the rules that were devised for writing Ktiv male (given the niqqud

version). So if the verse hadn’t been found in the Bible and was instead written by some

that uses modern day Hebrew but decided to write what they were saying in Ktiv haser (the

version of Hebrew in the Dead Sea Scrolls for example) then רלסת would specifically mean

"to contradict" rather than “to hide” (it is the form prior to the invention of niqqud, and

therefore prior to any rules of adding additional letters depending on the niqqud).

Interpreting לסתר (as found in the Great Isaiah Scroll of the Dead Sea Scrolls) as “to

contradict” one can give the translation:

Woe! Alas! The ones that make deep (in thought) from the LORD to contradict (the

LORD’s) advice, whose works are done in darkness (ignorance) and who say "who

sees us, who will know us"

This translation would be controversial and relies on the following:

1) The text in the scroll (or book) did not originally have niqqud (the niqqud were added

later)

2) That the meaning of original text contained in the scroll (or book) was to be as though it

was ‘sealed’ from the reader.

3) A way for the text to be as though it was sealed to those that could read it would be for it

not to mean at the time what was actually intended to mean.

4) The verb סתר would later take on new meaning “to contradict”.

5) The verb סתר was uniquely written (in terms of the Bible) in a form לסתר that would later

specifically be the form that meant “to contradict” rather than “to hide”.

6) The text was written in such a way that allowed it to be interpreted as God’s advice.

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7) There are precedents in the scriptures showing that depth can be used figuratively with

thought (e.g. Psalms 92:5).

8) There are precedents in the scriptures showing that the concept of darkness can be used

figuratively for ignorance (e.g. Job 38:2).

So while the translation might be controversial one can argue that scripture provides the

basis for it. With such a translation one could either identify the group referred to in verse

15 as a group which don't believe in God at all, and contain those that argue against God's

advice (that God exists for example). While some of these could belong to the people

mentioned in the previous verse (Isaiah 29:14);

King James Version

14 Therefore, behold, I will proceed to do a marvellous work among this people, even

a marvellous work and a wonder: for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and

the understanding of their prudent men shall be hid.

the text doesn’t limit those referred to in verse 14 to these people, and they certainly aren’t

all of these people, for at least some of these people show reverence to God as verse 13

stated:

King James Version

13 Wherefore the Lord said, Forasmuch as this people draw near me with their

mouth, and with their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart far from me,

and their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men:

So it could be thought to talk of a people some of whom have become atheist and others of

which verbally honour God but who have become far from God in their hearts and who

follow rules created by men.

Understanding those mentioned in verse 15 to be atheists removes what seems to me to be

a plausibility issue with more traditional interpretations which suggest that people who

believe in God should seriously question “Who sees us? Who will know?” It also has

implications for following verse (verse 16):

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King James Version

16 Surely your turning of things upside down shall be esteemed as the potter's clay:

for shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not? or shall the thing

framed say of him that framed it, He had no understanding?

As has been already been mentioned people, especially children, can be thought to tend

towards a dualistic outlook, in which there is the spiritual (mind distinct from the physical)

and the physical. The atheists have 'reasoned' that this dualistic outlook is incorrect and that

the physical is real, and that spiritual is unreal. Verse 16 tells us that they have it the wrong

way around. It indicates that reality is that the spiritual is real and the physical that is unreal,

i.e. we are spiritual beings and that this is a spiritual experience.

While as mentioned the account that I am outlining doesn’t require a direct reference in the

scriptures it could be argued that there is one. As another reminder, the argument in Part II

of this book isn’t that the account given in it is the correct one. It is that one cannot claim

that even though there is no plausible physicalist account that it is still intelligent to be a

physicalist because there is no plausible alternative which is both compatible with science,

and philosophically defensible. So assuming that given what I have been given to

understand about Hebrew and verse 15 in particular, I haven’t made any grammatical

mistakes in the translation, then it would seem that it could be argued that there was a

direct reference. This point could be accepted while disagreeing that it was actually what it

meant. As said rejecting the translation and the suggestion of direct reference of reality

being said to a spiritual reality doesn’t impact the account as a whole. As was mentioned

Bishop Berkeley never considered the idea of reality being a spiritual reality to be in conflict

with scripture. The impact the of considered lack of reference would have on the account

could vary from individual to individual, though unless the verdict is that it renders the

account implausible, it wouldn’t impact on the other points made in Part II.

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Part III

PATH SELECTION

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Chapter 8

AS WE ARE

The aim of Part III of this book is to investigate whether an understanding that a loving

selfless God exists reveals a wisdom that makes the general contemporary wisdom

displayed by our leaders in recent history appear unwise, and in this chapter we will

investigate the wisdom that modern leaders have tended to embrace.

The general wisdom, that most (though not all) leaders seem to embrace is that of

capitalism. By capitalism I mean that the means to produce the goods and services

consumed by the members of society are privately owned by individuals or groups of

individuals. In the capitalist system we can think of these owners of production and service

provision to be competing with each other in a “survival of the fittest” type competition in

the market place and there being the belief that humanity is best guided by this “evolution”

in the market place.

While it isn’t necessarily the case that when one expands another must contract, it is usually

the case that they are all competing for the custom of at least some of those that wish to

consume their services or products (an exception being monopolised niche markets). If a

firm were to lose out to its competitors in this competition then it might need to cease

trading because it is unable to pay its overheads such as rent or wages. By a firm I mean a

decision-making production unit which transforms resources into goods and/or services

which are ultimately bought by consumers, governments and other firms.105

A reasonably well known economic idea is that of Economy of Scale. The idea is that rises in

the amount of product or services a firm provides needn’t be accompanied by an equivalent

rise in the amount of costs that it faces. For example when the amount of production

reaches a certain size it might be cost effective to invest in machinery which can perform

certain labour tasks and result in the cost of production for each unit to be lower. One can

imagine in large farms for example using expensive machinery to aid with harvesting etc.

Such machinery might be underutilised on a smaller holding, and not offer enough of a gain

to have paid back interest payments on what it would cost to have borrowed the money to

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have bought such a machine. Another example of economy of scale would be of large super

markets compared to small grocers. In which the cost to the firm of the goods displayed is

reduced by the better price the supermarket is able to get by its increased buying power,

and the reduction in rent per square foot that it is able to negotiate for its store (compared

with a small grocers) and the reduction in staff costs per item (compared with a small

grocers).

There being competitive benefits to being a larger firm puts a pressure on these competing

firms to seek to expand quicker than their competitors to gain a competitive advantage and

avoid operating at a competitive disadvantage. This motive to expand is one motivation to

make a profit. There are other motivations for profit, such as for the provision of rewards to

the owners of the firm. Hardwick et al. comment that:

Traditional economic theory has assumed that the typical firm has a single objective

– to maximise its profits. No distinction is drawn between the objective of a corner-

store proprietor and that of the largest firm. The modern theories of the firm,

however, do acknowledge that firms may have other objectives, such as sales-

revenue maximisation or the maximisation of managerial utility.

…typically, the owners of a large public company, the shareholders, delegate their

authority to a board of directors who, in turn, place the effective control of the

company in the hands of professional managers. The interests of the shareholders

and the managers may diverge. The shareholders are presumably interested in

obtaining the maximum dividends possible over a reasonable time period, which

implies that the firms should aim to maximise its long-run profits. The managers,

though, who do not necessarily share in the profits, may not have profit

maximisation as their primary objective: instead, they may aim for an increased

market share or greater sales revenue which they feel will bring them more prestige,

greater security, or a higher salary. The managers cannot forget about profits

entirely, however, because they need to a satisfactory level of profits in order to

declare reasonable dividends to keep the shareholders satisfied. 106

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One might wonder what the problem is. One could argue that as long as the society ensures

that companies are engaged in open competition with each other the consumer will end up

getting more or better quality consumable benefits for their money as the companies

compete for their custom through price, innovation, or quality of service for example. One

could also suggest that improvement in the quality of life of consumers’ life in the USA for

example, which has embraced capitalism, has demonstrated how beneficial a capitalist

system is to the people that live in a society which adopts it.

So what are the downsides?

UNEMPLOYMENT

Well the first is that there is no guarantee that the amount of people required to provide

the products and services required by society equals those expected to work in society.

While classical economists such as the French economist Jean Baptiste Say concluded that

as long as the wage rate was flexible and the economy was sufficiently competitive that

there would be full unemployment, this is clearly wrong. Economists have criticised Say’s

theory, though I won’t go into the economic debates but simply try to show the problem by

way of a thought experiment. Let us consider a scenario where one thousand people own

the means to the world’s production, and let us also assume that technology has moved so

far that humans are no longer needed in the production of goods or provision of services.

Let us also assume that for their own desires each owner decides to employ a thousand

servants. Now in this scenario the non-owners which weren’t accepted as servants would

have nothing to offer the owners and would be unemployed. Admittedly this is an extreme

example, and one could imagine different gradations of the thought experiment where the

amount of owners was increased and the amount of people required to produce the goods

required was increased. The point is that clearly even if one were to assume the wage rate

was flexible and the economy was sufficiently competitive full employment wasn’t

guaranteed for those in society who might have expected to contribute labour. By expect to

work I mean that a society may have limits on how old someone should be before they are

generally expected to work (child actors are an example of exceptions to the norm), and

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how old they are generally expected to work before they retire (I suspect dictators might be

examples of exceptions to the norm here, not withstanding involuntary retirements).

“So what?” you might say “In a more realistic scenario the government, in a democracy at

least, would intervene because the people would elect one that would”. There would seem

to be quite a bit of merit to this argument. Governments often do try to intervene to help

their people. They might introduce minimum wages for example, or offer social benefits to

those unemployed to give the poor something that the capitalist owners might want and

therefore compete for. Though there seems to be a balancing point here. The owners

presumably wouldn’t want to pay their employees more than is necessary (as this would

affect their profits), and don’t want to pay perhaps the higher taxes that would be necessary

to provide the unemployed with a more comfortable life. They wouldn’t want to give

something (their profit) which they feel is worth competing for to get back, unless it

somehow made more profit. The latter statement does rely on the assumption that

capitalism is based on the selfish path where firms (which could be looked at as organisms

in the evolving market place) compete for the world’s wealth to come to them.

Now because so many world leaders have considered capitalism as the way forward and

have considered so-called free trade beneficial, firms are able to move their operations from

country to country. Now this can cause problems for the political leaders of a democracy.

Firms or those that have an interest in their interest could contribute to party funds of

political parties, they also contribute money to large portions of the media which in turn

influences the publics’ opinion of them. With what seems to be the current global economy

firms can respond to raises in minimum wages or higher taxation by shifting the

concentrations of their operations to governments more favourable to them. The reasons

might be to avoid higher wages (many firms at the time of writing have invested in countries

India and China), or to avoid paying the higher taxation that might be found in a country

offering social benefits to the less well off. At the time of writing in Britain, the government

(supported by at least some of the media (which isn’t all privately owned)) is ‘naming and

shaming’ some organisations that seem to be constructed in such a way as to avoid paying

tax in this country. Their hope seems to be that the people will respond by withdrawing

their custom from these countries. This in turn will hopefully lead the companies will look at

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how much this public outcry is costing them, and offer to pay the same or slightly less in tax

to stop it. An offer of paying more would presumably be made only to insure against the

possibility of the situation turning even worse for them.

If the firms do set up elsewhere to avoid the higher wages or taxation, then those they

employed would lose their jobs, and the governments want to avoid unemployment rising in

a democracy because it would increase the chance that they will be voted out of office.

So sometimes a country might avoid agreeing with other countries to stand together to

demand a certain minimum wage for their people, in order that their people’s services

might be sold more cheaply to the firms in the market than competing countries. This selling

of their people cheaper could be to compensate firms for disadvantages in setting up in

their country, like a less central location for example compared with setting up in an

alternative country for example. So, since countries can end up competing with each other

to attract firms because of capitalism, a country might consider their option to be ‘sell

cheaper’ vs ‘no buyers’, and consider the ‘sell cheaper’ option to have be better for their

people.

We can see how it easily becomes a situation where the leaders of the countries also take

on a selfish perspective with respect to what they perceive as the interests their country.

Now some might suggest that in a capitalist democracy the people can influence the firms

by withdrawing their custom, and use this power to control the practise of the firms. A

problem with this argument is that because firms are concerned with making a profit they

will tend to use whatever methods enable them to be the most profit regardless of the

impact on society. While people could object by not consuming products or services made

in some objectionable way these products or services might be the cheapest, and the

poorer members of the society might well feel that they don’t have the luxury of being able

to spend more money (in buying more expensive alternatives) as a protest.

OBESITY

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One could be said to be the widespread consumption of cheap but unhealthy food leading

to high rates of obesity. In 2009 Joseph A. Skelton, Stephen R. Cook, Peggy Auinger,

Jonathan D. Klein, Sarah E. Barlow, paper published ‘Prevalence and Trends of Severe

Obesity among US Children and Adolescents’ and reported that it had been found that:

…severely obese children had higher rates of obesity and morbid obesity as adults.

These severely obese children also had higher prevalence of cardiovascular risk

factors and higher levels of adiposity, as measured by serum cholesterol and

triglyceride levels, blood pressure, and skinfolds measurements… Childhood obesity

has also been shown to be significantly associated with increasing inpatient hospital

costs, increasing more than threefold from 1979–1981 to 1997–1999.107

With regards to the children in the USA, Skelton et al. go onto conclude:

There are 2.7 million children with a BMI that puts them at significantly increased

risk of multiple medical and psychological co-morbidities, and it is likely that their

obesity will continue into adulthood. Over 400,000 adolescents might meet criteria

for bariatric surgery. These groups seem likely to increase in number. With

prevalence rates high and climbing, the Expert Committee Recommendations have

endorsed the category of severe obesity as part of the clinical criteria to direct

medical screening and to initiate referral for care. However, specialized clinical and

behavioural services appropriate for severely obese children may be unavailable or

may not be covered by medical insurance. … At the same time, primary care

131paediatricians face many barriers to clinical screening and management including

lack of training, tools, referral resources and re-imbursement. … This mismatch of

need and services is greatest among poor and among children in minority groups,

who have both the highest severe obesity rates and the greatest difficulty accessing

healthcare.108

One might ask why there seems to be such a trend. Skelton et al. had mentioned previously

in their report:

Higher socio-economic positions seem to protect against morbid and severe obesity.

Explanations for this association may include the easy availability and low cost of

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energy dense snacks in poor, inner-city neighbourhoods. … In contrast, fresh fruits

and vegetables are often not available, and adequate amounts are expensive. …

Recent reports confirm the seemingly paradoxical connection of poverty, food

insecurity, and obesity. 109

This isn’t to suggest that those that live in poor neighbourhoods cannot avoid obesity.

Though firms that are prepared to encourage consumers to eat low-cost, possibly

convenience, food even if the food ends up contributing to significant health problems in

the population don’t help. In a similar way to how firms being prepared to encourage

consumers to smoke cigarettes don’t help the health of the population.

Now the government could tax unhealthy food sufficiently to encourage people not to use

such foods as a large proportion of their staple diet, but this wouldn’t affect the price of

fresh fruits and vegetables. Also with firms using the media to encourage consumers to

want these food types to form a large part of their diet, a balanced discussion and steps to

providing equivalently priced healthy food might be required to make this a popular move.

GLOBAL WARMING

Another issue that has its roots in governments competing in a global market and capitalism

is global warming. Figure 9 is of a graph was taken from the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) website (though I looked there before publishing for a reference

and couldn’t find it), and the text was the text found underneath it:

This figure shows how annual average temperatures worldwide have changed since

1901. Surface data come from a combined set of land-based weather stations and

sea surface temperature measurements. Satellite measurements cover the lower

troposphere, which is the lowest level of the Earth's atmosphere. "UAH" and "RSS"

represent two different methods of analysing the original satellite measurements.

This graph uses the 1901 to 2000 average as a baseline for depicting change.

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Choosing a different baseline period would not change the shape of the data over

time.

Figure 9

The graph seems to indicate that the average global temperature has been rising between

1901 and 2011. If so then a question would be “are human beings contributing to this rise?”

Another might be “what would be the consequences be if the rise were to continue?”

The Earth’s temperature is to depend on a balancing act between the amount of energy

entering the earth’s system from the Sun, and the amount of energy leaving it.

The amount of energy reaching the Earth from the Sun is to be influenced by activity in the

Sun itself. If the activity causes an increase in the intensity of the sunlight then one would

expect the Earth’s temperature to rise, if the Sun’s activity causes a decrease in the intensity

of the sunlight then one would expect the Earth’s temperature to drop. The two graphs in

Figure 10 below depicts data from 1978 to 2009110. One shows the average rise in global

temperature over this period the other the fluctuations in the energy reaching the top of

our atmosphere.

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Figure 10

The Sun tends to follow an 11 year cycle with regards to the intensity of sunlight, though the

EPA point out that in the past changes in the Sun’s intensity have influenced the Earth’s

temperature:

For example, the so-called “Little Ice Age” between the 17th and 19th centuries may

have been partially caused by a low solar activity phase from 1645 to 1715, which

coincided with cooler temperatures. The “Little Ice Age” refers to a slight cooling of

North America, Europe, and probably other areas around the globe.110

As the above graph shows however since 1978 when satellites began measuring the amount

of the Sun’s energy the top of the atmosphere receives, the Sun has been following the 11

year cycle with no net increase, while the Earth’s temperature has nevertheless risen during

the same period.

Changes in the Earth’s orbit have had a big impact on the Earth’s climate over thousands of

years. The EPA point out:

In fact, the amount of summer sunshine on the Northern Hemisphere, which is

affected by changes in the planet’s orbit, appears to control the advance and retreat

of ice sheets. These changes appear to be the primary cause of past cycles of ice

ages, in which Earth has experienced long periods of cold temperatures (ice ages), as

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well as shorter interglacial periods (periods between ice ages) of relatively warmer

temperatures.110

They go onto state:

However, solar activity has been relatively constant, aside from the 11-year cycle,

since the mid-20th century and therefore does not explain the recent warming of

Earth. Similarly, changes in the shape of Earth’s orbit as well as the tilt and position

of Earth’s axis affect temperature on relatively long timescales (tens of thousands of

years), and therefore cannot explain the recent warming.110

So if the recent temperature rise cannot be explained by the intensity of sunlight reaching

the planet perhaps one might think that it could be explained by less and less sunlight being

reflected by the earth and more being absorbed. The earth reflects roughly 30% of the Sun’s

energy and absorbs roughly 70% of it. Absorbed sunlight warms the Earth’s system, and

there are factors that affect how much is absorbed. As a rule of thumb light coloured

objects and surfaces such as clouds and snow tend to reflect sunlight, whereas darker

coloured objects and surfaces such as forests and oceans tend to absorb the energy and

heat up. Aerosols (small particles or liquid droplets in the atmosphere) also affect the

amount of the Sun’s energy that is reflected. Their affect can vary depending on their

composition and where they are released. Volcanic particles for example can reach up high

into the atmosphere and reflect sunlight cooling the planet slightly (tenths of a degree

Fahrenheit) for a few years, whereas black carbon emissions that are a part of soot can

increase absorption. The EPA state that:

Overall, human-generated aerosols have a net cooling effect offsetting about one-

third of the total warming effect associated with human greenhouse gas emissions.

Reductions in overall aerosol emissions can therefore lead to more warming.

However, targeted reductions in black carbon emissions can reduce warming.110

So one might ask, what are greenhouse gases? Once the surface of the earth has absorbed

the energy of the Sun and been heated it will start to emit that heat as long wave energy.

Greenhouse gases absorb this energy and then re-emit it in all directions, causing a warming

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of the planet surface and lower atmosphere and inhibiting the escape of the energy from

the system.

One of the main greenhouse gases is carbon dioxide (CO2), though others include methane

(CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), and water vapour. The argument for the correlation between

CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere and temperature has been supported by analysis of

ice core samples from the Antarctic. These ice cores samples give us data about the CO2

concentrations in the atmosphere as well as the temperature at the Antarctic over the

thousands of years that the layers of ice in the core were formed. The graphs in Figure 11

below were again taken from the EPA website110. The top graph shows the estimates for the

CO2 concentrations for the past 800,000 years though they don’t show the data for the last

century, and the graph below shows estimates for the Antarctic Temperature for the same

period.

,

Figure 11

As you can see the CO2 concentration over this time period has been estimated to have

varied from between 180ppm (parts per million) and 300ppm, and there seems to have

been a strong correlation over the past 800,000 years between rises in CO2 concentrations

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in the atmosphere and rises in the temperature. So given scientific understanding of why

greenhouse gases would raise the Earth’s temperature, and the ice core analysis pointing

towards a strong correlation between CO2 and a rise in temperature, if there was found to

be a rise in greenhouse gases it would provide a plausible explanation for the rising

temperature that has been observed over the last century.

As Figure 12110 below (also from the EPA website) shows in the last century the

concentrations in CO2 and other greenhouse gases have increased dramatically. Whereas as

mentioned the CO2 concentration over approximately 800,000 years prior to the 20th

Century had ranged between 180ppm and 300ppm since the beginning of the 20th Century

they have risen to 390ppm, and there have been similar dramatic rises in other greenhouse

gases such as Methane and Nitrous Oxide.

Figure 12

Figure 13 below (again from the EPA website) shows that since 1958 the CO2 in the

atmosphere has risen by 75 ppm, and it seems to be slightly accelerating.

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Figure 13

So what is responsible for this rise in CO2? Could it be volcanic activity for example? The EPA

states that:

Some volcanic eruptions released large quantities of CO2 in the distant past.

However, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that human activities now emit

more than 135 times as much CO2 as volcanoes each year.

Human activities currently release over 30 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere

every year. This build-up in the atmosphere is like a tub filling with water, where

more water flows from the faucet than the drain can take away.110

How global warming will develop is thought to depend on what are termed feedback loops.

A positive feedback loop would increase the temperature rise. For example it is expected

that if the ice caps began melting they’d to reflect less of the Sun’s energy and instead the

exposed soil would absorb it and cause the Earth to heat up more which would causes the

ice caps to melt more and so on. Another example would be of a rise in temperature caused

by the warming of the Earth’s system by greenhouse gases such as CO2 would lead to more

evaporation of water from the oceans which would lead to more water vapour which itself

is a greenhouse gas, and which would also inhibit the escape of energy emitted from the

Earth and warm the oceans and the lower atmosphere and so on.

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The Met Office in its 2010 Evidence The State of the Climate report111 states:

Since the late 1970s the long-term rate of surface warming has been about 0.16 °C

per decade. However, the observed rate of warming has decreased slightly in the last

10 years to 0.05–0.13 °C per decade — depending on whether you use the Met

Office–CRU2 observational dataset, that of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space

Studies (GISS) or NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center (NCDC).

The recent decrease in rate of temperature rise has been independently observed in

both land and sea-surface temperature records. There is also evidence of a slower

accumulation of heat in the ocean down to 700 m depth since 2003.

12-month running mean of global average temperatures from three datasets.

HadCRUT3 (black and grey area) produced by the Met Office–CRU; NCDC (blue)

produced by the National Climate Data Center; and GISS (orange) produced by the

Goddard Institute for Space Studies at NASA. The grey shaded area shows the

approximate 95% confidence range for the HadCRUT3 data. The true global average

is expected to lie outside this range around 5% of the time.

Concentrations of man-made greenhouse gases have continued to increase over the

last decade at a more or less constant rate. So, a slowdown in emissions due to the

recent recession cannot account for the short-term trends.

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We are already familiar with the concept of natural variability, seeing the weather

vary from hour to hour and day to day. Similarly, the climate varies naturally from

year to year and decade to decade. Climate model simulations suggest internal

variability of the climate system could be responsible for all of the recent decrease in

the rate of warming.

…

El Niño occurs every few years across the tropical Pacific Ocean and lasts about 12–

18 months. The water warms and spreads from the West Pacific and Indian Oceans

to the East Pacific. Its counterpart La Niña has the opposite effect — with

temperatures cooler than normal.

El Niño raises the global average temperature and affects weather patterns around

the world, but particularly in the Tropics. For example, it affects the trade winds and

the location of the strongest rainfall in the Pacific region.

Natural variability within the climate system could explain all of the recent

slowdown, but other factors could have contributed.

It is possible that more heat is being transported to the deep ocean, leading to less

warming at the surface. The deep ocean temperature remains a major uncertainty.

We have only been able to monitor the ocean (average depth about 4000 m) to

about 2000 m to any extent since 2002 with the deployment of Argo floats. Prior to

that, data below 700 m are limited.

Two natural factors that have been important in previous decades, however, have

not contributed to the recent slowdown. El Niño/La Niña (ENSO) variability has

contributed a net warming effect over the last decade. There have also been very

few climatically significant volcanic eruptions in the same period (particles emitted

by volcanoes tend to cool the climate).

Other possible factors may have contributed to short-term trends:

• Changes in solar activity

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A natural downturn in the radiation from the Sun occurred during some of the last

decade as part of the well-known 11-year solar cycle, possibly cooling the Earth’s

surface. However, one recent research paper suggests that this could have led to

temporary warming rather than cooling.

• Changes in stratospheric water vapour

In the last decade there has been a small reduction in stratospheric water vapour —

also a greenhouse gas. The reasons for this reduction are not known, but may relate

to natural internal variability controlling the amount of moisture reaching the

stratosphere

• Changes to sea-surface temperature measurement practices

Changes in the way sea-surface temperatures were measured over the last decade

have introduced a small artificial cooling of up to 0.03 °C over the last decade. This is

being corrected in a new version of the Met Office dataset.

• Strong warming in the Arctic is poorly represented

Satellite measurements and other evidence indicate that temperatures in the Arctic

have increased at a faster rate in the last 10 years. This region is poorly represented

in the surface temperature datasets because there are very few observing stations.

The recent shift in the pattern of warming means that understanding the

implications of poor sampling of the Arctic has become more important. This has

contributed to the apparent slowdown in some datasets.

So how is it thought the world would be affected by global warming this century for

example?

So how in the face of this threat how quickly have the world leaders responded?

In their 2010 publication The European Environment State and Outlook 2010 Mitigating

Climate Change the European Environment Agency (EEA) stated that112:

Scientists estimate that, in order to keep the global temperature increase below 2 °C

compared to pre-industrial levels, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must peak

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by 2020 at a level of 44–46 Gt CO2-equivalent and then be reduced by at least 50 %

compared to 1990 levels by 2050. In the past 150 years, there have only been a few

periods when CO2 emissions fell, notably during the global recession in the early

1930s and as a result of the oil shock of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Otherwise,

CO2 emissions have risen relentlessly throughout the period, notably since the 1950s.

Despite significant efficiency improvements, fossil fuel combustion continues to

increase.

[For clarity; a Gt is a giga tonne which is a billion (1,000,000,000) tonnes.]

So how are we doing you might wonder?

Figure 14

Figure 14 above (taken from the aforementioned EEA document113) depicts how the CO2

emissions have been rising relentlessly. Though this graph only depicts the direct CO2

emissions. Gases which are equivalent to CO2 are also being emitted and a breakdown of

CO2 equivalence of global greenhouse gas emissions by gas type is given below in Figure

15Figure 15.

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Figure 15

As one can see by 2005 global emissions had already reached the 44-46 Gt CO2 equivalence

level (a Mt is a million tonnes). 114 below indicates how we have not only already

Figure 16

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exceeded the 2020 target but it also gives a projection of how much we will be over

depending upon which pledges are fulfilled. The dotted base-line indicates the global

increase in CO2 equivalent gases if no pledges were to be kept, and then one can see the

expected difference if the Annex I countries were to keep low pledges for example. I’ll

assume the reader is unfamiliar with what an Annex I party is. According to the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:

Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD

(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries

with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the

Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States.115

Regarding the differing pledges the EEA gives an example of the high and low pledge given

by the EU-27:

In 2007, the EU agreed on an independent binding target to reduce its emissions by

at least 20 % by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. This commitment to a 30 % reduction

if major emitting countries outside Europe make similarly challenging commitments

under a global climate agreement.116

Which seems to suggest that the EU-27 think that they could reduce their further but would

not do so unless other major emitting countries outside Europe were also prepared to

because otherwise the EU-27 feel that they would be disadvantaged economically. For if

this was not the case why would they not reduce their emissions as best as they were able?

I think it has been said that economics is war without weapons, and David Cameron (the

British Prime Minister at the time of writing) reportedly echoed this sentiment when

speaking at the 2012 annual CBI (Confederation of British Industry) conference. The

following extracts are from a report by the Telegraph:

“When this country was at war in the 40s, Whitehall underwent a revolution,” he

said.

“Normal rules were circumvented. Convention was thrown out. As one historian put

it, everything was thrown at the overriding purpose of beating Hitler.

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“Well, this country is in the economic equivalent of war today - and we need the

same spirit. We need to forget about crossing every ‘t’ and dotting every ‘i’ and we

need to throw everything we’ve got at winning in this global race.”117

So with leaders considering themselves to be in an global economic race which they view as

the economic equivalent of war it is easy to see how they could be put off performing as

well as they could when it comes to managing the risk of potential threats such as

temperature rises. This might seem surprising when even if one were to accept that many

leaders have generally embraced the selfish path of capitalism as being best for the people

they govern, their behaviour could (if humankind were contributing significant quantities of

greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and these were contributing to global warming) lead

to an avoidable threat being realised and causing suffering to those same people. Though if

the economic situation got too war-like then casualties might be considered.

As the same CBI conference Cameron also reportedly said:

in this global race you are either quick or you're dead.

Though he didn’t make clear when he thought the race would end. Was it supposed to

continue until all were dead but one? If so did he realistically think that Britain had a

possibility of winning, or were the people being lead down a path to an almost inevitable

“death” if not for them then for the union’s future generations?

Maybe some rich influential people don’t look at the race in terms of countries and instead

look at it in terms of the corporations that globally compete within the world. They might

take a selfish perspective in terms of their own family and think that as long as they are

allowed to invest in these corporations and could live on these investments then how the

individual countries do in these races is irrelevant, and that their wealth will protect them if

any of the once avoidable threats do happen.

While I’m not suggesting that Warren Buffet (sometimes referred to as the greatest investor

of all time) holds the above view, regarding the idea of the rich considering themselves as a

distinct group from the rest, he did reportedly say:

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There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and

we're winning.118

Though in the context in which he said this, he himself was questioning how it could be fair

that someone like himself was required to pay so little tax relative to his income.

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Chapter 9

AS WE COULD BE

While as said most world leaders seem convinced that capitalism is the way forward for the

people they represent, there are alternatives.

For example the alternative to physicalism that I outlined chapter 4 depicts us as spiritual

beings being given a spiritual experience. And if you were to hold this belief then you would

realise that a loving selfless God exists, and that you are not the person you experience

being. You’d realise that you could have been given the experience of being any human.

You’d probably also realise that if the human you experience being has any talents that are

very much in demand but in short supply, then it wouldn’t be right to use the principles of

supply and demand found in capitalist market places in order to gain a bigger share for

yourself in return for the same amount of labour as everyone else. Imagine you were a

parent with several children and you left them in room to selflessly and lovingly share out

dessert and you returned to find that those that were capable of taking more than their fair

share had taken it. Whether you would be surprised or not isn’t the question, it is whether

you as a parent would consider that they had behaved fairly. Consider another story, if God

placed a group of beings the experience of being seven humanoids in a garden which had

one type of fruit on the ground and a different type of fruit floating high in the air, and yet

another type of fruit that grew at the bottom of a great lake. Now supposing God informed

these people that they were being tested and that they each needed to eat one of these

fruits each day otherwise they would experience suffering. Let us suppose that God had said

he would return in a few years to let them know how they got on in the test. Now each of

the humanoids could pick nine fruits a day from the ground each, but one of them had

wings, and two of the others had fins. The one with wings was capable of getting the fruits

of the air, and the two with the fins were capable of getting the fruits of the sea.

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Now let’s suppose that there were two suggestions put forward and the one with the wings

had to decide which suggestion to go with.

Suggestion A) That the one with the wings spends its collection day collecting fruits from the

air, the two with the fins spend their collection days collecting fruit from the water, and the

other four collect the fruits from the ground, and everyone shares the proceeds at the end

of the day.

Suggestion B) That at the end of every day each individually needs to negotiate an exchange

rate for the fruits which could allow the one with the wings to negotiate a favourable

exchange rate with air fruit compared to other fruit.

The question is which suggestion would you expect the one with the wings to get the

highest score for selecting?

ALTERNATIVE PATH

So this does provide an obvious alternative path to global capitalism. One where everyone

puts in the same amount of work and gets an equal share of the goods and services.

I’ll outline an example of one.

One could imagine a world setup like a series of all inclusive holiday resorts run by the only

company in the world, the Global Service. The Global Service being the organisation which

every able adult under normal circumstances contributes the same amount of years service

to. I say under normal circumstances because the people could for example vote that as a

punishment for breaking certain laws the offender has to do extra Gobal Service time.

The Global Service would be the organisational structure that those working for it adhere to

in order to ensure that those in the ‘holiday resorts’ are well looked after. This is not to

suggest that all ‘holiday resorts’ would appear the same. The main infrastructure (such as

transport means, and utility connections etc.) provided and maintained by the Global

Service might be the same, but they could organise themselves into different ‘locales’.

These locales could vote on the ‘look’ of their locale including how it is laid out etc., and

vote on what laws those that were staying in the resort wanted to be governed by. These

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laws wouldn’t govern Global Service employees working in that locale. The Global Service

employees would be under the laws the people had voted that those working for the Global

Service should be under. Though, for example, a law for the Global Service could be

something like: It shall be against the law to bring a substance into a locale which is

prohibited by that locale’s law. And so have a connection to the locale laws. Though the

Global Service laws could be voted for by the people globally. As a safeguard a global

constitution could also be voted on, which would limit the impact of any unforeseen

implications of any Locale or Global Service Law that might get passed. Once the

constitution was voted upon I’d imagine changes to it to be rare, and well publicised.

You might wonder whether the capitalist system is so inefficient that people’s standard of

lives could really be improved. For unless the capitalist system was inefficient how could

people produce more goods and services given the same resources?

If you were to view some production units efficiency in terms of work hours put in to output

then the capitalist system might not seem that inefficient. It probably wouldn’t have made

sense to have taken into account the unemployed. If you were looking at it on a global scale

though it would make sense to look at how many people the system caused to be

unemployed. It would also make sense to look if there were any people employed doing

tasks that weren’t required.

For example in this global alternative that I am outlining there are no countries only ‘locales’

and so there are no armed forces required, nor are there any people required to

manufacture for them. There would be no need for money, since goods would be free. Since

all that were able contributed to providing them. So there would be no requirement for any

jobs in banking, insurance, pensions, investments etc. Nor would there be the need for

anyone to work on shop tills. Nor would there be any tax related jobs, nor politicians, nor

political parties, nor anything to do with public relations. There would be massive cuts in

accountancy, and advertising. Also pretty much all manufacturing would be done on large

scales which would provide labour savings when compared to the market under capitalism

where there are many small to medium sized manufacturers. Likewise in farming, there is

only one farming operation, the Global Service which has all the latest equipment. While

how it farms would be subject to the people’s vote. Also there would be no inefficiencies in

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any industry caused by union job protection. Unions aren’t required. The people vote for

the way the Global Service would be.

All these efficiency savings raise the amount of work hours that could potentially be spent

on extra production when compared with the global capitalist system.

Now the massive rise in standard of living for the majority will call for extra production. The

amount of work hours that would initially be put into building work alone would be huge.

Those these building requirements would be expected to drop off after an initial period of

demand.

Yet there can be further savings over capitalism.

This society wouldn’t be a society which required people to consume in order to keep on

working. Therefore many items might be made to a higher quality to give them a longer

lifespan, rather than opting to produce a slightly cheaper (in terms of production costs) item

which has a significantly shorter life span and therefore encourages extra consumption and

extra profit as a capitalist company might. Also people wouldn’t be encouraged to take what

they don’t really want or need. Goods wouldn’t be status items any more.

Some means of transportation could be publically owned. For example technology allows us

to implement public transportation very differently from how it is today. While this may

seem fanciful I see no technical problems with roads being underground with ‘taxi’ vehicles

controlled by ‘transport computers’ which taxi people around. These taxis could be

summoned at taxi points, and their interiors could include the entertainment stations into

which passengers could dock their personal entertainment preference devices to help the

journey be more pleasurable. The transport computers, taxis and tunnels could be made

with an eye to mitigating the affects of potential threats such as earthquakes and flooding.

These tunnels could also have main arteries that could be used for the transport of goods.

Utility cabling could also be carried in these tunnels and maintenance of the cabling be

carried out within them. With roads underground, they would be less susceptible to

fluctuations in weather conditions, and road accidents would virtually disappear, and it

would save materials as the individual vehicles would generally be used a lot more and

parked a lot less and so less of them would need to be built. Also depending on the decision

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of the locale, the former roads and pavements could be turned into parkland, and the air

would be cleaner as there wouldn’t be the car fumes. The taxis and transport vehicles could

be electrically powered. It seems fanciful, but I’m not sure it requires a level of technology

higher than what we have.

Other examples of shared ownership in the resorts could include the provision of workshops

where people could pursue hobbies in which they build things for themselves. People could

be trained how to use the workshops while they are at school, and it will mean that less

tools would need to be manufactured (no need to manufacture a load for the majority of

them to be left lying around unused most of the time), and yet the ones the people share

could be high quality, and the equipment in the workshops being some of the latest.

The resorts would also provide restaurants for people to eat out at. By doing this there

would be less food wastage, including food wastage that comes about through rejection of

some food produce because of what it looks like, not being the right shape for example.

There would also be no wastage on supermarket shelves where food goes past its sell buy.

Neither would there be the wastage that occurs when individuals do buy the produce from

the supermarket but don’t get around to using it, and end up throwing it away. Restaurants

could even cut down on wastage by advertising within the Global Service locally if they feel

they have an excess of any ingredient, and they could devise food options to encourage the

use of any excess. The following is an extract from the executive summary of a 2011

document produced by the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)

titled Global Food Losses and Food Waste and it should give you an idea of the potential

savings:

The results of the study suggest that roughly one-third of food produced for human

consumption is lost or wasted globally, which amounts to about 1.3 billion tons per

year. This inevitably also means that huge amounts of the resources used in food

production are used in vain, and that the greenhouse gas emissions caused by

production of food that gets lost or wasted are also emissions in vain.

Food is lost or wasted throughout the supply chain, from initial agricultural

production down to final household consumption. In medium- and high-income

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countries food is to a significant extent wasted at the consumption stage, meaning

that it is discarded even if it is still suitable for human consumption.

Significant losses also occur early in the food supply chains in the industrialized

regions. In low-income countries food is lost mostly during the early and middle

stages of the food supply chain; much less food is wasted at the consumer level.

Overall, on a per-capita basis, much more food is wasted in the industrialized world

than in developing countries. We estimate that the per capita food waste by

consumers in Europe and North-America is 95-115 kg/year, while this figure in Sub-

Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia is only 6-11 kg/year.119

The summary also goes onto say:

The causes of food losses and waste in low-income countries are mainly connected

to financial, managerial and technical limitations in harvesting techniques, storage

and cooling facilities in difficult climatic conditions, infrastructure, packaging and

marketing systems.119

As previously mentioned in this alternative scenario the Global Service would be doing the

farming and would have the latest equipment (and techniques).

The restaurants would allow less energy to be wasted on cooking, and it would make it

easier for a lot of families to eat well balanced diets. Furthermore there would be less effort

in man hours actually spent cooking. It doesn’t generally take twenty times as long to cook a

meal for twenty as it does to cook the same meal for one. Bulk food wastage collection is

also simplified. It also seems that we have the technology to be able to provide waiter

robots which could carry food and drinks to tables (which would act to lower human work

hour requirements) if the restaurant wasn’t a buffet. Many product services (such as clothes

shops) provided by the Global Service could be designed as self service. So with shops for

example, the Global Service would only have to concentrate on keeping the outlets clean,

safe and stocked. What they stock could depend upon what the people have requested.

People could be trained in school how to use these shops, such as learning how to fold

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clothes the way they are folded in the shops so that people would find it easy to put the

clothes back on the shelves as they found them for example.

Health care provision requirements would be expected to go up given the low standard of

health care provision some areas of the world seem to have, but with no motive to

encourage people to have unhealthy habits and the organisation of healthy activities for

them to participate in would contribute to a general health improvement. The relief of the

stress of uncertainty about the provision for loved ones would also contribute to a general

health improvement. But there are probably lots of people that were in financial services

that could have been trained to be doctors. Perhaps different systems of health care

provision could be looked at, for example one where general doctors refer patients to more

specialist doctors that work in teams in which at least one was a general doctor before

specialising.

With the Global Service providing scientific and technological research there would be

economy of scale savings here when compared with capitalism in that whereas under

capitalism companies could research in secret, and this could involve companies performing

research that they wouldn’t have done had they been aware of breakthroughs elsewhere.

This saving of time might not be reflected in a lowering of work hours but instead in

advancement of scientific understanding and in technological breakthroughs. If main areas

of research were how to build machines which could cut down on the amount of work hours

to run Global Service, one would expect in line with technological advances the total

amount of work hours Global Service required would decline.

If demands on the Global Service declined over time as people began to take material things

for granted, or if a decline in demand for building infrastructure occurred then further

reductions in the total amount of work hours Global Service required would be expected to

occur.

In line with the reductions to the amount of work hours Global Service requires there could

be reductions in the amount of time people had to contribute to the Global service. These

reductions could be reflected not in a decrease in the amount of hours a day that everyone

had to do but in a decrease in the term of service that people were expected to contribute.

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If robots could provide all the goods and services Global Service was requested to do then

no one would have to work.

What the Global Service and the various locales would actually be like would depend on

what choices the people made.

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Chapter 9

WHY LOSE THE MONEY?

Some people might question why we couldn’t still have money. They might agree that we

could organise ourselves differently, they might agree that we should all get an equal share

for providing an equal term of work. However, they might say that money would be a useful

way of managing of demand for particular items. If resources of a particular material were in

short supply, and the demand for it was too great, then it could be priced quite high.

Therefore money could be used to both manage demand for goods, and protect against

extremely selfish levels of consumption.

They might even quote I Timothy 6 which says in verse 10:

For the love of money is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they

have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows.

It is the love of money that is the problem they might say, not money itself.

The first part of my response might appeal more to those that believe in following the

teachings of Jesus. Verses 9-13 then report the prayer that Jesus taught to his disciples:

9 After this manner therefore pray ye: Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be

thy name.

10 Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.

11 Give us this day our daily bread.

12 And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.

13 And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For thine is the kingdom,

and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen.

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There is some debate about whether “For thine is the kingdom, and the power and the

glory, for ever. Amen” should appear in the text but for the purposes of this discussion it

isn’t important. It doesn’t appear in Luke 11:2-4 where it says:

2 And he said unto them, When ye pray, say, Our Father which art in heaven,

Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in

earth.

3 Give us day by day our daily bread.

4 And forgive us our sins; for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us. And

lead us not into temptation; but deliver us from evil.

(King James Version)

But the Luke version is slightly different to the Matthew version in other ways too. The

prayer as it is often taught in English doesn’t mention forgiving debts. Given that there is

reference to the forgiving of debts every seven years in Deuteronomy 15 it seems possible

that Jesus could have referring at least in part to this practise, and that it might apply to

monetary debt though this isn’t the part I’m going to focus on. Instead I’ll just focus on the

part:

“And lead us not into temptation…”

To help me illustrate the point, I’d like you to imagine that a parallel universe was created

doing the opposite of what we do in this one with regards to whether we decide to build a

global system in which money plays no part. So there should be two universes one in which

the people of earth decided to build such a system, and the other in which they didn’t. Now

supposing a suggestion was put forward in the universe in which money had been abolished

that money should be re-introduced. Now Exodus 20:17 is:

17 Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's

wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing

that is thy neighbour's.

(King James Version)

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And Deuteronomy 5:21 is:

21 Neither shalt thou desire thy neighbour's wife, neither shalt thou covet thy

neighbour's house, his field, or his manservant, or his maidservant, his ox, or his ass,

or any thing that is thy neighbour's.

(King James Version)

Now in light of the commandment one might question whether the re-introduction of

money could lead some people into the temptation of coveting what they couldn’t afford? If

so (and I assume historically people have been tempted to covert what they can’t afford)

then to re-introduce money would be lead the people into temptation. Now would those

that follow Jesus and pray not to be lead into temptation vote for the re-introduction of

money? Presumably not assuming they were sincere in their prayers, and by knowing that

the re-introduction of money wouldn’t be right they know that the abolishment of it is.

While lusts could temp people into evil, the root of all evil associated with money could be

thought to be the systems that use it.

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(The Last Chapter (unless you count Appendix A))

Chapter 10

CLOSING COMMENTS

Some might say that it’ll never happen. The leaders would never let us look at what the

world might look like if we were all well organised and followed the loving selfless path.

What the generations could not only have for themselves, but for their children and future

generations. We could ask them though “If all the other leaders agreed to have a look at

what the world might be like if we were all organised and followed the loving selfless path,

would you?” If they answer “no” then they aren’t out for the best for you, or your children,

or future generations, for if they were, then why not look, just in case it was better. If they

decided not to look but later on it was looked at and found to be pleasing to the people

what type of punishment to themselves would they think fitting?

Some might think it has been slightly strange that I have repeatedly written Satan with a

capital letter, as it is often written as satan. The only reason is that I assume the small ‘s’ to

be an attempt at an insult, and not only does the insult seem slight but it also seems to have

the implication that Satan still has an impact on you, otherwise you would have written it as

Satan because proper nouns start with a capital letter. A bigger insult to Satan, whether you

were trying to express one or not, would be to choose to build the type of world that you

thought would be pleasing to God.

Some might say that different religions have different understandings of what would be

pleasing to God, and that this would prevent any “Global Service” idea. But I don’t see why

this should be the case. Presumably they all believe that God is a loving selfless God, and

would therefore presumably believe that a step down the loving selfless path would be a

step in the right direction, even if it wasn’t what they envisaged as the end result. The

“Global Service” idea allows locales to make their own laws and so people can live as they

wish to live. Differences in religious opinion can be discussed, and differences in the locales

themselves could be seen. Perhaps problems in one which were absent in another might

give guidance as to which way is right. Though so might the quality of life. Since I can’t see

any reason why we should expect them to be incompatible. Given that you could have

experienced being born into any understanding how could you tell which one of the other

understanding was correct other than by feeling in your heart that they give you a better

understanding of God, or through reason? So with the world at peace it would be a good

opportunity for the various understandings to explain their understanding of God, and enter

constructive discussion. Presumably all believers believe that their belief is the most

reasonable, or more obviously expresses the Heart of God, and that if they had been born

into a different belief they would still have been able to either have seen that the one they

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have is the most reasonable or have realised in their heart that it more obviously expresses

the Heart of God. So why would they choose not to explain and discuss it while everyone is

at peace and humanity is distinctly aiming to follow the loving selfless path?

I don’t wish to give the impression that because of the order of the material covered in this

book that I believe that whether we take a look at what the world could look like if we were

to try building one that would be pleasing to God rests on the resolution of any

philosophical issues. Would it be that there weren’t enough humanists amongst the atheists

to care that for the good of humanity we should take a look anyway?

If there are any inaccuracies of I have unwittingly misrepresented an account then I

apologise. Though I think if I have, it shouldn’t distract from the bigger question raised, i.e.

should we build a world that we believe is pleasing to a loving selfless God. The question of

whether you’d need to be a theist to see the beauty in such a world is a side issue.

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APPENDIX A – PHYSICS STUFF

The material covered reflects my understand of physics that I have found interesting with

regards to the issue of whether we should view ourselves as spiritual beings or a changing

group of atoms.

A PROBLEM WITH PRESENTISM

Regarding time Putman once commented120:

I think that if we attempted to set out the “man on the street’s” view of the nature

of time, we would find that the main principle underlying his convictions on this

subject might be stated somewhat as follows:

(1) All (and only) things that exist now are real.

Future things (which do not exist) are not real (on this view); although they will come

to be. Similarly, past things (which have ceased to exist) are not real, although they

were real in the past.

This “man on the street’s” view of time is often referred to in philosophy as ‘presentism’,

and it isn’t the only view of time. A reason to abandon the intuitive view of time is that it

has been said to be incompatible with Einstein’s Theory of Relativity.

In Newtonian Physics if event e1 happened at time t1 and event e2 happened at time t2 one

can consider the time interval between the events (t2 – t1) to be well defined independently

of any observer’s frame of reference. A frame of reference is “a standard relative to which

motion and rest can be measured”121. This isn’t the case in Special Relativity. According to

Special Relativity the time interval between the events would be dependent upon the

observer’s frame of reference.

I will use a thought experiment122 to illustrate the difference between the time interval

predictions made by Newtonian Physics and Special Relativity, though for simplicity I will

only consider the spacetime dimensions x (one of space) and t (time).

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Now if Mr A and Mr B started to race with Mr A going 1 meter every second and Mr B going

2 metres every second then from the perspective from someone on the starting line (where

x is the distance from the starting line) the graph might look like this:

Figure 17

Where after 1 second A had moved a distance of 1 whereas B had moved a distance of 2,

and at two seconds A had moved a distance of 2 whereas B had moved a distance of 4.

Though another perspective would be to look at it from the perspective of Mr A. From A’s

perspective (where x is the distance is the distance from A) the following graph might seem

appropriate:

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Figure 18

Where from A’s perspective B was moving away from him at 1 distance per second in the

negative x direction.

From B’s perspective the graph would look like this:

Figure 19

To B it would seem as though A were getting further away from him at a rate of -1 distance

per second (going 1 distance per second in the negative direction on the x axis).

In Newtonian mechanics the translation between different frames of reference with respect

to x and t can be done using the following formulae:

t’ = t

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t’ is the time of the event in the perspective you would be trying to work out.

t is the time of the event from the perspective you are translating from.

x’ = x – vt

x’ is what the x value will be translated to in the perspective you would be trying to work

out.

x is the x value from the perspective you’d be translating from.

v is the velocity of the perspective you would be translating to from the perspective you are

translating from.

So if we were to take the example of Mr A and B and translate from B’s perspective to A’s

perspective for the events at 2 seconds, we could work out where B would be from A’s

perspective at t =2 (we are translating the event at the 2 second mark from B’s perspective).

t’ = t = 2

x = 0 (B is always at 0 from its perspective)

v = -1 (from B’s perspective the perspective we are translating to is moving away from it at a

velocity of -1 distance per second)

which means:

x’ = x – vt

x’ = 0 – (-1 x 2)

x’ = 0 - - 2

x’ = 0 + 2

x’ = 2

So at t=2 from A’s perspective B is at x = 2, and we can see this from Figure 20.

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We can also work out A’s position from A’s perspective given what we know about B’s

perspective.

t = 2 (we are translating the event at the 2 second mark from B’s perspective)

t’ = t = 2

x = -2 (A is at x = -2 from B’s perspective at t = 2)

v = -1 (from B’s perspective the perspective we are translating to is moving away from it at a

velocity of -1 distance per second)

Which means:

x’ = x – vt

x' = -2 – (-1 * 2)

x' = -2 - - 2

x' = -2 + 2

x' = 0

So we know that from A’s perspective that at t = 2, A was at x = 0 also in Figure 20.

To hopefully help illustrate the difference between Newtonian physics and Relativity I’ll

outline another thought experiment.

We can imagine two spaceships which are both moving relative to each other with respect

to the x axis (like A and B only in this example they will be viewed as moving in opposite

directions).

On board Spaceship 1 (S1) are the boys; John, and Bob. From the boys perspective S1 is

1000km long, with John at the front, and Bob at the back being 1000km from John in the

positive x direction.

On board Spaceship 2 (S2) are the girls; Sara, Alice, Judy, and Kate. From the girls

perspective, S2 is 1250km long, with Sara at the front, and Alice being 800km behind Sara in

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the positive x direction, and Judy being 1000km behind Sara (200km behind Alice) in the

positive x direction, and Kate being 1250km behind Sara (250km behind Judy) in the positive

x direction.

Let us imagine that the boys consider their spaceship to be at rest, while S2 is traveling in the

positive x direction at 0.6c (0.6 times the speed of light). Let us also imagine that the boys

have their watches synchronised with each other and that the girls have their watches

synchronised with each other. Let x and t be variables describing John’s frame of reference,

and x’ and t’ be variables describing Sara’s frame of reference. As Sara passes John (event

e1) both agree that x = x’ =0 and t = t’ = 0.

Let event e2 be that at t = 0, x = 1000 from the boys perspective.

According to Newtonian mechanics, the e2 happened from the girls perspective at:

x’ = x – vt = 1000 – (0.6c * 0) = 1000

t’ = t = 0

So according to Newtonian Mechanics e1 and e2 both happened at the same time from both

the girls’ perspective (as it is from the boys’). Sara was passing John, while Judy was passing

Bob. This is illustrated below in Figure 20.

Figure 20

Under Special Relativity the result is significantly different. Special Relativity uses the

Lorentz Transformations in order to translate between different frames of reference. The

formulae are given below:

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√

And the formula for length contraction is:

Where L is the actual length of the object in its rest frame.

For the purposes of the calculations I will approximate c (the speed of light) to be 300,000

kilometres per second (m/s).

So using Special Relativity rather than Newtonian physics we can work out what the boys

perspective of the girls would be from the girls perspective of themselves.

v = 0.6c

√

√

√

√

√

And the length the boys’ ship will appear to the girls will be

So at the time Sara was opposite John, Alice who is 800km in the positive x direction from

Sara was opposite Bob who is at the end of their 800km long craft (from the girls

perspective).

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But what was the event that happened at x=800 t=0 (Alice passing Bob) like from Bob’s

perspective

x = 800

v = -0.6c

Because from the girls perspective they are still and Sara is at x = 0, while the boys are

moving in the negative x direction.

t = 0

We can use this to work out x’ and t’ (x and t from the boys perspective)

= ( )

(

) (

) (

)

(

)

The event which from Alice’s perspective happened at t=0 x=800 (passing Bob) from the

boys’ perspective happened 0.0016s after John was opposite Sara and at x=1000 (which

from the boys’ perspective is where Bob is standing.

Now from the boys’ perspective the craft the girls were on wouldn’t appear to be 1250km

long because of the length contraction. Gamma ( will be the same from both the boys and

the girls perspective. So:

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From the boys’ perspective the girls’ ship was only 1000km long, which meant that from the

boys’ perspective Bob was 1000km in the positive x direction from John, and Kate was

1000km in the positive x direction from Sara.

Where with Newtonian physics Bob and Alice would have been expected to have agreed

about which event was simultaneous to Sara being opposite John. According to relativity

they will disagree what event was simultaneous with John being opposite Sara. Alice will

think the event of her passing Bob was simultaneous with it. While Bob will think him

passing Kate was. So which one was right you might ask? If you did some proponents of

relativity could say that the very question reflects a Newtonian understanding of the world.

It could be argued from the perspective of a relativist that both Alice and Bob are equally

correct even though they give different answers, and that is because simultaneity depends

upon perspective. There is no need to think of there being some absolute perspective and it

could be dropped from the theory on appeal to Occam’s Razor. Time can be thought of as

another dimension of space, and if you could go faster than the speed of light then you

could go back in time. From this perspective it would seem all past events would need to

still exist because potentially (if you had the means) they could be gone to and why would

they not exist just because you didn’t have the means. They might or might not say that all

future states exist too, and if so then what I don’t understand is; if every part of all the

physical past present and future exists at its relevant some spacetime coordinate then what

is it that is moving between the coordinates? After all I’m sure we all have the experience

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being able to move through space (as we might if we went and made a cup of tea) and we

all seem to experience moving along with the present.

Though either version (whether they say the future physical exists eternally or not) opens

up a whole new playground for physicalist stories. Because prior to this if, in a physicalist

theory, all that is said to exist is the present then what happened prior to present can have

no effect on the future over and above any effect from the present. To show this we can use

a thought experiment where we have two identical ‘presents’ but which have different

pasts. If the story were to claim that whether a mechanism had evolved or not would make

a difference to future behaviour, then it would be incompatible with this type of physicalist

theory. Because if given the two identical states one were to say that their futures would be

affected differently because of their difference pasts, then one would be saying that in the

present there are causes (the causes of the past) other than what physically exists (all that

physically exists is the present). Since this would mean that the physical isn’t the only thing

that exists, any theory which suggests this cannot be a physicalist theory.

There wouldn’t be any problem with the new playground though because the past (and

possibly the future) exist, and so the events from the past could have and effect on the

future over and above that which the present would have because the past is part of what

physically exists and so there is no suggestion being raised that it isn’t only what physically

exists that has causal powers. So the accounts could involve justifications from the past why

conscious experiences should be the way they are. It could be claimed that it was important

that the mechanism evolved for example. Though many had chosen to play in the physicalist

playground there does seem to be some limitations to any accounts that are put forward

without fully explaining the theory. The reason is that while they might argue that theists

don’t explain things in much more depth, I suspect that would be a misunderstanding of

most theist positions. When things are argued to be fundamental that isn’t a lack of

explanation that is the explanation. The idea of things being fundamental are found in

physics (fundamental properties or particles). It isn’t a concept peculiar to theism, and the

theists need ask for no special treatment in the way they use it. The physicalist on the other

hand would seem to simply be saying there might be a plausible account in this general

direction but I don’t know of one, and can’t think of one myself.

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Some then go onto argue that if relativity is interpreted as there being no absolute

simultaneity then there is no absolute view for God to take. The idea of an absolute view

could be said to be nonsense by some proponents of relativity. Though the theists could

claim that God having a perspective of the model on which the presentations to the beings

experiencing being in the universe are being based, is not incompatible with relativity, and if

it were it would mean that the idea of there being a single physical model of reality would

be incompatible with relativity. Mark Hinchliff (Hinchliff, 2000) a professor of philosophy at

Reed College offers a theory that he claims is compatible with the empirical consequences

of Special Relativity:

…going back to the period in physics preceding Einstein's 1905 paper. If we assume

that we are in a Newtonian spacetime with absolute space and a relation of absolute

simultaneity and we assume that light travels at the same speed c in all directions in

absolute space, then the speed of light in an inertial frame in absolute motion will

not be c. But in such an inertial frame the speed is measured to be c. How can this

be? An old answer is that clocks and rods in absolute motion undergo the familiar

Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction. The speed of light will then be measured to be the

same in all inertial frames, even though it is not.

This "neo-Lorentzian" theory will, I believe, accommodate the same experimental

results as the special theory, and it comes with a relation of absolute simultaneity. It

is thus a way for us to fit the special theory or a theory with the same experimental

consequences into a presentist setting.123

It seems as though there would also be a difference between how some might view

simultaneity. Some may follow Albert Einstein’s view of simultaneity. In “Relativity The

Special And The General Theory” Einstein states:

Supposing that as a result of ingenious considerations an able meteorologist were to

discover that lightning must always strike the places A and B simultaneously, then

we should be faced with the task of testing whether or not this theoretical result is in

accordance with reality. We encounter the same difficulty with all physical

statements in which the conception “simultaneous” plays a part. The concept does

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not exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of discovering whether or not it

is fulfilled in an actual case. We thus require a definition of simultaneity such that

this definition supplies us with the method by means of which, in the present case,

he can decide by experiment whether or not both lightning strokes occurred

simultaneously. As long as this requirement is not satisfied, I allow myself to be

deceived as a physicist (and of course the same applies if I am not a physicist), when

I imagine that I am able to attach a meaning to the statement of simultaneity. (I

would ask the reader not to proceed farther until he is convinced on this point). 124

The ‘presentist’ theist might respond that it is precisely the point that we couldn’t measure

simultaneity, but that doesn’t prevent us from attaching a meaning to the statement of

simultaneity, the events would be at the same point in Absolute Time. We can understand

the concept and can thus attach a meaning to the statement. This could be distinguished

from the measured simultaneity Einstein talks of. If any frame of reference could arbitrarily

be declared to allow measurement of “Absolute Time” and it wouldn’t make any difference

to the physics except perhaps the addition of a few new notations, then it would seem to

show that the concept of absolute time is compatible with relativity.

SOME NOTES ABOUT TIME

Sydney Shoemaker opens his 1969 paper “Time without change” with the following

comment:

It is a widely held view that the passage of time necessarily involves change in such a way

that there cannot be an interval of time in which no changes whatever occur.

Aristotle spoke of time as "a kind of affection of motion," and said that, although

time cannot be simply equated with motion or with change, "neither does time exist

without change." Hume claimed that "'tis impossible to conceive ... a time when

there was no succession or change in any real existence." And McTaggart presented

as something "universally admitted" the contention that "there could be no time if

nothing changed" (from which, he claimed, it follows that everything is always

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changing, at least in its relational qualities). Similar claims can be found in the works

of contemporary writers.125

Shoemaker goes onto say:

…the obvious and often mentioned fact that it is by observing certain sorts of

changes, e.g., the movements of clock hands, pendulums, and the sun and stars, that

we measure time. Even if what we are measuring is the length of time during which

a given object remained unchanged, it seems necessary that something, namely

whatever we are using as our clock, should have changed during that interval. 126

And so seems to accept that if there was a period of no physical changes in the universe,

then the amount of time there was no change for could not be measured (because there

would be no change to the measuring device). But is it true as philosophers such as Hume

have said that it is impossible to conceive of time without physical changes to the universe?

Shoemaker puts forward a thought experiment which shows that it isn’t. He imagines a

universe where all physical matter is found within 3 regions which he labels as A, B and C.

He imagines that though the regions are spatially separated the inhabitants of each region

can observe the happenings in each others regions from their own, and can also travel to

each others regions. He then imagines that:

Periodically there is observed to occur in this world a phenomenon which I shall call

a "local freeze." During a local freeze all processes occurring in one of the three

regions come to a complete halt; there is no motion, no growth, no decay, and so on.

At least this is how it appears to observers in the other regions. During a local freeze

it is impossible for people from other regions to pass into the region where the

freeze exists, but when inhabitants of other regions enter it immediately following

the end of a freeze they find that every-thing is as it would have been if the period of

the freeze had not occurred. Eggs laid just prior to the beginning of a freeze lasting a

year are found to be perfectly fresh; a glass of beer drawn just prior to the beginning

of the freeze still has its head of foam, and so forth. And this remains so even when

they make the finest measurements, and the most sophisticated tests, available to

them; even radioactive decay, if such exists in this world, is found to be completely

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arrested during the period of a local freeze. Those people who were in the region

during the freeze will initially be completely unaware that the period of the freeze

has elapsed, unless at the beginning of the freeze they happened to be observing

one of the other regions. A man who was stopped in the middle of a sentence by the

onset of the freeze will resume the sentence at the end of it, and neither he nor his

hearers will be aware that there has been any interruption. However, things will

seem out of the ordinary to any inhabitant of a frozen region who at the beginning of

the freeze was looking into one of the other regions. To such a person it will appear

as if all sorts of major changes have occurred instantaneously in the other region:

people and objects will appear to have moved in a discontinuous manner or to have

vanished into thin air or to have materialized out of thin air; saplings will appear to

have grown instantaneously into mature trees; and so on. Although people might

initially refuse to believe that events that seem to them to have only just occurred in

fact occurred a year before and that they have been unconscious for a full year, it

would seem that they would eventually come to believe this after hearing the

reports of observers from other regions and, more important, after they themselves

have observed local freezes in other regions.127

Shoemaker considers that the inhabitants could use clocks to measure the regularity of the

freezes in each region and that it could turn out that region A freezes once every three years

for an a year and that, region B freezes once every four years for a year, and that region C

freezes once every five years for a year. So regions A and B would freeze for a year every

twelve years, and regions A and C would freeze for a year every fifteenth year, and regions B

and C would freeze for a year every twentieth year. Now given that these simultaneous

freezes are observed by the inhabitants of the universe, how should they regard the

universal freeze across regions A, B and C, that would be expected every sixty years? Should

they think that every sixty years none of the regions freeze because time should only be

thought to exist while there is change, or is it more natural to assume that every sixty years

there is no change for a year in the universe (i.e. time goes on even without any physical

change in the universe) and that if you found out the reason why there were freezes you

would explain the sixty year event also, you wouldn’t need to be looking for an explanation

for why the freezes didn’t happen in the sixtieth year.

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For Shoemakers full argument I suggest you read the paper, the only reason for mentioning

it here is that it helps show that one can have a clear conception of time continuing without

any change to the physical.

Hawking and Mlodinow in ‘The Grand Design’ point out some of the features of the laws of

the universe that might make some question whether the laws of the universe have been

constructed by design. They point out that:

Most of the fundamental constants in our theories appear to be fine-tuned in the

sense that if they were altered by only modest amounts, the universe would be

qualitatively different, and in many cases unsuitable for the development of life. 128

And they give some examples.

They consider how carbon life forms could have come to be formed. They consider that

there must have been carbon formed, and consider the first step to be when in older stars

two protons (hydrogen nuclei) collide and fuse with each other to form helium, and if two

helium atoms collide they don’t just bounce off, for an instant they make a beryllium atom

with four protons. Once the star starts to run out of hydrogen;

…the star’s core collapses until its central temperature rises to about 100 million

degrees Kelvin. Under those conditions, nuclei encounter each other so often that

some beryllium nuclei collide with a helium nucleus before they have had a chance

to decay. Beryllium can then fuse with helium to form an isotope of carbon that is

stable. 129

They note that that this process of carbon creation which is known as the triple alpha

process because the three helium atoms which it requires are of a type which are also called

alpha particles. The problem is that “the usual physics predicts that the rate of carbon

production via the triple alpha process ought to be quite small”. Explaining the evidently

higher production rate Fred Hoyle in 1952 predicted that situation called resonance must be

happening, a situation which “greatly increases the rate of nuclear reaction”. And to enable

the resonance to be happening he;

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…predicted that the sum of the energies of a beryllium nucleus and a helium nucleus

must be almost exactly the energy of a certain quantum state of the isotope of

carbon formed…. At the time, no such energy level was known, but based on Hoyle’s

suggestion, William Fowler at Caltech sought and found it, providing important

support for Hoyle’s views on how complex nuclei were created.

Hoyle wrote, “I do not believe that any scientist who examined the evidence would

fail to draw the inference that the laws of nuclear physics have been deliberately

designed with regard to the consequences they produce inside the stars.”130

They go onto say that using computer models they can now see that as little a change as

0.5% in the strong nuclear force, or 4% in the electric force “would destroy either nearly all

the carbon or all the oxygen in every star, and hence the possibility of life as we know it.”131

Regarding the other nuclear force, the weak force, they state that if it;

…were much weaker, in the early universe all the hydrogen in the cosmos would

have turned into helium, and hence there would be no normal starts; if it were much

stronger, exploding supernovas would not eject their outer envelopes, and hence

would fail to seed interstellar space with the heavy elements planets require to

foster life.131

They go on132:

If protons were 0.2 percent heavier, they would decay into neutrons destabilising

atoms. If the sum of the masses of the types of quark that make up a proton were

changed by as little as 10 percent, there would be far fewer of the stable atomic

nuclei of which we are made; in fact, the summed quark masses seem roughly

optimized for the existence of the largest number of stable nuclei.

If one assumes that a few hundred million years in a stable orbit are necessary for

planetary life to evolve, the number of space dimensions is also fixed by our

existence. That is because, according to the laws of gravity, it is only in three

dimensions that stable elliptical orbits are possible…Also, in more than three

dimensions the gravitational force between two bodies would decrease more rapidly

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than it does in three dimensions. In three dimensions the gravitational force drops to

¼ of its value if one doubles the distance. In four dimensions it would drop to 1/8, in

five dimensions it would drop to 1/16, and so on. As a result, in more than three

dimensions the sun would not be able to exist in a stable state with its internal

pressure balancing the pull of gravity. I would either fall apart or collapse to form a

black hole…

The emergence of the complex of structures capable of supporting intelligent

observers seems very fragile…. Were it not for a series of startling coincidences in

the precise details of physical law, it seems, humans and similar life-forms would

never have come into being.

Finally they come to what they consider to be the most impressive fine tuning coincidence,

the Cosmological Constant.

…, in 1915, when he formulated the theory, Einstein believed that the universe was

static, that is, neither expanding nor contracting. Since all matter attracts other

matter, he introduced into his theory a new antigravity force to combat the

tendency of the universe to collapse onto itself. This force, unlike other forces, did

not come from any particular source but was built into the very fabric of space-time.

The cosmological constant describes the strength of that force.

When it was discovered that the universe was not static, Einstein eliminated the

cosmological constant from his theory and called it the greatest blunder of his life.133

Though as Hawking and Mlodinow point out:

…in 1998 observations of very distant supernovas revealed that the universe is

expanding at an accelerating rate, an effect that is not possible without some kind of

repulsive force acting throughout space. The cosmological constant was resurrected.

Since we now know that its value is not zero, the question remains, why does it have

the value it does. Physicists have created arguments explaining how it might arise

due to quantum mechanical effects, but the value they calculate is about 120 orders

of magnitude (a 1 followed by 120 zeroes) stronger than the actual value, obtained

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through the supernova observations. That means that either the reasoning

employed in the calculation was wrong or else some other effect exists that

miraculously cancels all but an unimaginably tiny fraction of the number calculated.

The one thing that is certain is that if the value of the cosmological constant were

much larger than it is, our universe would have blown itself apart before galaxies

could form and – once again – life as we know it would be impossible.

Though Hawking doesn’t seem to believe in miracles, and with Leonard Mlodinow put

forward an alternative proposal in the book The Grand Design. Though before discussing it

I’d like to discuss an earlier proposal by Hawking. In A Brief History of Time; Hawking had

stated134:

In the classical theory of gravity, which is based on real space-time, there are only

two possible ways the universe can behave: either it has existed for an infinite time,

or else it had a beginning at a singularity at some finite time in the past. In the

quantum theory of gravity, on the other hand, a third possibility arises. Because one

is using Euclidean space times, in which the time direction is on the same footing as

directions in space, it is possible for space-time to be finite in extent and yet have no

singularities that formed a boundary or an edge. Space-time would be like the

surface of the earth, only with two more dimensions. The surface of the earth is

finite in extent but it doesn’t have a boundary or edge: if you sail off into the sunset,

you don’t fall off the edge or run into a singularity.

His theory was, as I understand it, that the universe wouldn’t be able to escape its own

gravitation pull, and so the expansion of the universe would slow down and eventually

contract coming to a Big Crunch.

The universe would expand to a very large size and eventually it would collapse again

into what looks like a singularity in real time.135

Though the theory has something called “imaginary time”, and with imaginary time there is

no singularity at the Big Bang nor at the Big Crunch. Though as Hawking points out:

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When one goes back to the real time in which we live, however, there will still

appear to be singularities. The poor astronaut who falls into a black hole will still

come to a sticky end; only if he lived in imaginary time would he encounter no

singularities. 136

Now as you might recall observations were made in which the universe was shown to be

expanding exponentially. So this theory was dropped, since it needed a universe which

would collapse back on itself. The new idea that Hawking Mlodinow are suggests is that

universes can appear out of nothing if the total energy of the universe equalled 0, and any

universe whose total energy equalled 0 could and would exist:

On the scale of the entire universe, the positive energy of the matter can be

balanced by the negative gravitational energy, and so there is no restriction on the

creation of whole universes. Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and

will create itself from nothing in the manner described in Chapter 6. Spontaneous

creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe

exists. 137

In chapter 6 we read that the universe shouldn’t be thought of as having a start because:

“we must accept that our usual ideas of space and time do not apply to the very

early universe”138

I assume this is because of the idea of imaginary space brought up in his earlier theory.

Though presumably still at one point of space and time there would be a first cause or first

causes. By first causes I mean causes which nothing physical was a cause of. Again, if I have

misunderstood then I apologise.

So their answer to the startling coincidences in the laws of physics was “spontaneous

creation” of all the universes whose total energy equalled 0, which as I understand it would

include all material universes were the positive matter was balanced out by the negative

gravity (so any universe that obeyed our laws of physics) and so while the coincidences may

seem startling, they were bound to happen.

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The general problem with their theory seems to me to be that it relies on a rule. That as

long as the total energy of universe is equal to 0 the said universe will exist. Where does the

rule come from? Why not the rule that “as long as the amount of red cubes equals the

amount of blue cubes then the ‘cube universe’ will exist”. What part of reality are they

suggesting was biased towards the “as long as the total energy of universe is equal to 0 the

said universe will exist” outcome/rule over any other arbitrary outcome (rule)?

Asking for one simple rule to at least be able to give a plausible physical model for

physicalism (consciousness issues aside) might not seem like a big ask, but if they are asking

it from nothing, it is! Also the explanation seems to assume that the expansion of space

itself requires no energy. If so this would presumably need an explanation.

QUANTUM EFFECTS

In the early twentieth century a statistical model of the atom (quantum mechanics) was

developed. In other words a model which gave percentage chances for certain results of

measurement of subatomic attributes. Which lead to a dispute about whether the seeming

randomness implied in the percentage reflected reality at the atomic level, or whether it

was due to an incomplete conception of the events taking place. In 1932 John Von

Neumann’s claimed to have shown that it was mathematically impossible to introduce

variables (subatomic properties which could be modelled mathematically) which could have

been hidden from measurement but still playing a part in causing the seemingly random

behaviour, in order to produce a deterministic reformulation of the model compatible with

the predictions of the statistical formulation. The claim became widely accepted by both

physicists and philosophers of science139, and seemed to undermine a deterministic

understanding of the universe.

In 1935 Albert Einstein along with two of his postdoctoral research associates Boris Podolsky

and Nathan Rosen (EPR), published a paper in which they suggested that a theory of the

physical could only be considered complete, if every element of physical reality had a

counterpart in the theory140 .

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The paper assumed that all causes of an effect were local, i.e. were within a distance equal

to or less than the distance the speed of light would have travelled in the time interval

between the cause and the effect. So it assumes that you couldn’t have a cause in one

galaxy which affected a galaxy a thousand light years away in less than a thousand years

from when the event (the cause) happened. Because it was thought that nothing, not even

the propagation of the effects the cause has on the universe could exceed the speed of

light. Any effect on the universe was going to take at least a thousand years to get there.

The paper’s thought experiment was considered to show statistical quantum mechanics as

an incomplete theory because it lacked counterparts for both simultaneous position and

momentum that the thought experiment is used to illustrate must exist if nothing can travel

faster than the speed of light, and therefore not every element of physical reality (position

and momentum) has a counterpart in the theory, and therefore the theory is incomplete.

In 1985, David Mermin who was director of the Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics

at Cornell University at the time wrote:

Einstein’s talent for saying memorable things did him a disservice when he declared

“God does not play dice.” For it has been held ever since the basis for his opposition

to quantum mechanics was the claim that a fundamental understanding of the world

can only be statistical.

But the EPR paper, his most powerful attack on the quantum theory, focuses on

quite a different aspect: the doctrine that physical properties have in general no

objective reality independent of the act of observation.

As Pascual Jordan put it:

“Observations not only disturb what has to be measured, they produce

it….We compel [the electron] to assume a definite position…. We ourselves

produce the results of measurements.”

Jordan’s statement is something of a truism for contemporary physicists. Underlying

it, we have all been taught, is the disruption of what is being measured by the act of

measurement, made unavoidable by the existence of the quantum of action, which

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generally makes it impossible even in principle to construct probes that can yield the

information classical intuition expects to be there.

Einstein didn’t like this. He wanted things out there to have properties, whether or

not they were measured :

“We often discussed his notions on objective reality. I recall that during one

walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me and asked whether I really

believed that the moon exists only when I look at it.”141

Regarding the Born-Einstein letters that have been published, Mermin writes:

Einstein tries over and over again, without success, to make himself clear. In March

1948, for example, he writes:

“That which really exists in B should …not depend on what kind of

measurement is carried out in part of space A; it should also be

independent of whether or not any measurement at all is carried out in

space A. If one adheres to this program, one can hardly consider the

quantum-theoretical description as a complete representation of the

physically real. If one tries to do so in spite of this, one has to assume that

the physically real in B suffers a sudden change as a result of a

measurement in A.

My instinct for physics bristles at this.”

Or, in March 1947:

“I cannot seriously believe in [the quantum theory] because it cannot be

reconciled with the idea that physics should represent a reality in time and

space, free from spooky actions at a distance.”142

Quantum mechanics allows for two particles to be ‘entangled’ in what they call a “singlet

spin state”. When in such a state, no matter what axis you measure the spin of one of the

particles on, when you measure the spin of the other along the same axis it will be the

opposite of the other. And the thought experiment involves two such entangled particles.

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The following is a thought experiment based upon one given by David Mermin143 and is

essentially one put forward by David Bohm in 1951 which itself was a version of the EPR

thought experiment.

Imagine a something that will emit two particles along a line in opposite directions. The

source of the particle emission is at x = 0 and there is a particle detector at x = -1000 and

another one at x = 1000. The source emits two particles, one travels in the negative x

direction and the other in the positive x direction. Each detector has three sets of magnets.

Each set is orientated perpendicular to the particle’s flight path, and is separated from each

other in orientation by 120o. So the detector is capable of measuring along three separate

orientations. A switch on the detector is used to determine which magnet orientation will

be used to measure the spin of the particle. If when measured in the orientation of the

selected magnet set, the particle is deflected towards its north pole, the particle is deemed

to have ‘up spin’ and the detector will display a green light, if it is deflected toward the

magnet’s south pole, it is deemed to have ‘down spin’ and the detector will display a red

light. If one assumes that that Special Relativity is correct, and that nothing can propagate

faster than the speed of light (including causal influences) then all causes (direct or

transitive) of an effect must be local i.e. within a distance equal to or less than the distance

the speed of light would have travelled in the time interval between the cause and the

effect. This assumption effectively establishes an ‘event horizon’ for an entity. The idea

being that any event outside of an entity’s event horizon cannot causally affect the entity.

Quantum mechanics had predicted that the singlet spin state relationship (the spin of one

particle when measured will be the opposite of the measured spin of the other if measured

along the same axis) would still hold even if the particles were outside of each others event

horizons when the measurements took place.

The thought experiment is intended to highlight that if all causes are local as assumed then

the spin of one particle cannot be ‘fixed’ by an event outside of its event horizon (such as

the measurement of the spin of the other if that measurement was done out of the other’s

event horizon). Therefore it is assumed both particles must have already had an inherent

spin independent of whether any measurements took place or not outside of their event

183

horizon. This conclusion went against the general interpretation of quantum mechanics,

which was neither particle had an inherent spin until one or the other was measured.

In the experiment set up, Einstein assumed that for the measurement of one particle to

have of affected the measurement of the other while still outside of its event horizon there

would had to of been what Einstein referred to as spooky action at a distance. The issue is

that quantum mechanics suggests that the particle would instantaneously alter the possible

values of measurement from the entangled particle, no matter what distance separates

them. Though the point that it is instantaneous would at any distance involve going the

speed of light, it just seems clearer when you imagine large distances. As a side the idea of

things being instantaneous seems to me to be an example of simultaneity. So if a theory

contained the concept of such instantaneous action then it seems to me at least to

inherently have the idea of absolute simultaneity whether we could measure when the

instantaneous action happened or not. The simultaneity being between the measurement

of one particle and the change in the state of the other, as one would be the instantaneous

cause of the other. The simultaneity would seem to be a part of any such theory, assuming it

aimed to be a plausible model of ‘physical reality’.

In 1952 Bohm did what John Von Neumann had claimed was impossible, and put forward a

deterministic formulation of quantum mechanics (one in which there was no statistical

randomness), in which non-local effects were posited i.e. an effect’s causes could exist

outside of its event horizon (which expands at the speed of light).

In 1964 John Bell published a paper which was purported to show that no local hidden

variables (such as inherent spins) could be introduced which to allow a deterministic

description and still give results compatible with those given by quantum mechanics.

The idea behind Bell’s theory will be illustrated in this second thought experiment, which is

also based upon the one given by Mermin. Let us consider the same experimental setup

that was used in the previous thought experiment, where we separate the single spin state

particles and separated and emit them from the source towards the detectors. For any

suggestion that the spin values where determined by local hidden variables of the quantum

systems (the particles) before being measured, we can conceive of each particle’s local

184

hidden variables as somehow serving as instructions for how the particle will react upon

measurement. The way the particle is must serve to determine behaviour for all three

orientations of measurement. We aren’t concerning ourselves with how the particle

determines how it will behave in a certain way when measured, we are just going to create

labels for the way it determines up and down spins for the 3 axis that are being measured.

For convenience let’s construct a naming convention for the instructions in the form N-ABC,

where N is a number indicating which particle is being referred to, and A is an indicator of

the particle spin when measured under the detectors' first setting; ‘U’ will symbolise ‘up

spin’, while ‘D’ will symbolise ‘down spin’. B and C will indicate the particle spins for the

second and third detector settings respectively using the same symbolism (‘U’ and ‘D’) as A.

So for example ‘1-UUD’ symbolises the deterministic causes (the details of which are a

mystery to us) for the first particle which would cause it to register as an ‘up spin’ when

measured by the detectors’ first and second orientations but a ‘down spin’ when measured

by the detectors’ third orientation. Since the particles are in a singlet spin state (a state in

which, for any given axis, the spin of one particle when measured will be the opposite of the

measured spin of the other), given the causes for ‘1-UUD’ for the first particle the causes for

the second particle must cause ‘2-DDU’. Otherwise you could measure both on the same

axis and the results wouldn’t necessarily be opposite. And the point is that quantum

mechanics predicts that they will always be opposite if they are measured on the same axis.

If particles with these causes were fired at the detectors, we would expect the lights on the

detectors to be the same if for example the detector for the first particle was set to its

second orientation and detector for the second particle was set to its third orientation. We

can symbolise those settings of the detectors as 2:3 (first detector set to its second

orientation, and the second detector set to its third orientation). We can see that the lights

on the detectors would be the same with the causes for ‘1-UUD’ ‘2-DDU’ if the detector

settings were 1:3 2:3, 3:1, 3:2, and different if they were 1:1, 1:2, 2:1, 2:2, 3:3. So if the

orientations of the detectors were independently randomly set, the lights on them would be

different 5/9 times. One can see that this probability is maintained for the causes for 1-UUD,

1-UDD, 1-UDU, 1-DDU, 1-DUU, 1-DUD (and the complementary set of causes for the second

particle). When the causes are 1-UUU or 1-DDD the lights on the randomly set detectors will

be different all the time. If the orientations of the detectors were independently randomly

185

set and hidden local variables were set to ensure that a singlet spin state is maintained on

measurement; the frequency the light colours of the detectors being the same would be

expected to be less than the frequency with which they differed. The inequality in expected

frequencies with local hidden variables is the key point of Bell’s Inequality Theorem.

Quantum mechanics predicts not only that the light colours will be different if the same

orientation is measured by both detectors, but also that if the orientation of the detectors

was independently randomly set, there would be no inequality between the frequency of

the detectors light colours being different, and the frequency of them being the same.

In 1992 Alain Aspect et al. performed a version of this experiment using entangled photons

emitted from a caesium atom that had been suitably bombarded by lasers and

measurements of the polarisation of the photons was taken. The results supported the

predictions of quantum mechanics. There was no inequality between the frequency of the

spins being the same and the spins being different. Many have taken it as evidence that

non-local causes or “spooky action at a distance” is a reality. Mermin144:

The EPR experiment is as close to magic as any physical phenomenon I know of, and

magic should be enjoyed. Whether there is physics to be learned by pondering it is

less clear. The most elegant answer I have found to this last question comes from

one of the great philosophers of our time, whose view of the matter I have taken the

liberty of quoting in the form of the poetry it surely is:

We have always had a great deal of difficulty

understanding the world view

that quantum mechanics represents.

At least I do,

because I’m an old enough man

that I havent’ got to the point

that this stuff is obvious to me.

Okay, I still get nervous with it….

186

You know how it always is,

every new idea,

it takes a generation or two

until it becomes obvious

that there’s no real problem.

I cannot define the real problem,

therefore I suspect there’s no real problem,

but I’m not sure

there’s no real problem.

Nobody in the 50 years since Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen has ever put it better than

that.

Though this may be considered premature as proponents of certain deterministic theories

might argue that their theories don’t require “spooky action at a distance” because they

don’t fall to Bell’s Inequality Theorem. They might argue that although the universe is

deterministic it would be wrong to think that this means the particle would hold instructions

or causes for whether it would be diverted up or down when measured around a certain

orientation as Bell’s Inequality Theorem assumes a deterministic theory must. Instead they

might suggest that when the first particle is measured two universes are created; one in

which it was measured to go up and another in which is was measured to go down. And

when the second particle is measured another two universes are created; one in which it

was measured to go up and another in which is was measured to go down. The first particle

‘up’ measurement universe then marries up with the second ‘down’ measurement universe,

and the first particle ‘down’ measurement universe marries up with the second particle ‘up’

measurement universe. So there would be no randomness (the universes were determined

to have split) and it gives the expected result of the second particle having the opposite spin

from the first particle, no matter what orientation either was measured on. This solution

seems to bring in to raise the issue of where these two new universes are existing. It doesn’t

187

sound as though they are sharing the same space dimensions as before the split. So is the

underlying reality best reflected by considering that a new copy of the space dimensions, as

we experience them, comes into existence, and if so which is the new one, or would it be

wrong to think of there being one newer than the other, and that it would best reflect

reality if we thought of two new copies of spacetime coming in to existence and the original

somehow ceasing to exist? The physicalist alternative accepting that there exists something

outside of our universe, is accepting “spooky action at a distance”. It is interesting to note

the moral message that seems to accompany the multiple universes theory, which is that

any action you are capable of carrying out (must have been allowable by quantum effects)

would have to be carried out in one of them. There is no personal moral judgement involved

in whether this universe was the one you (a bunch of chemical compounds) did it in.

Coincidence?

END NOTES

1. For purposes of transcribing the television show I used as a template a transcript of the

radio show found on http://www.clivebanks.co.uk/ under “The Hitch-Hiker's Guide to the

Galaxy (Fit the Fourth)” by Douglas Adams and then ran through a video of the episode 4

television series which I found on YouTube, and wrote down what it seemed like to me.

2. The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, imprint of Transworld

2. The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, imprint of Transworld

Publishers Bantam edition published 2011, page 13.

3. The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, imprint of Transworld

Publishers Bantam edition published 2011, page 19.

4. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page prior to the contents page.

5. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, pages 179-180.

6. What is it Like to Be a Bat? By Thomas Nagel in Philosophy of Mind, classical and

contemporary readings, edited and contributed to by David Chalmers, page 219.

188

7. Consciousness and Its Place in Nature by David Chalmers,

Philosophy of Mind, classical and contemporary readings, edited and contributed to by

David Chalmers,

8. Realistic Materialist Monism by Galen Strawson found in Towards a Science of

Consciousness III (1998) edited by S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers, (Cambridge, MA:

MIT, 1999), page 23.

9. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 13.

10. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 101.

11. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 102.

12. A conference report Science and Spirit in Stockholm written by Charles Whitehead in the

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 18, No. 7-8, 2011, pp222-41. The reference given

for the Imants Baru š work is Beliefs about consciousness and reality: Clearing the confusion

concerning consciousness in The Origin of Consciousness in the Social World, edited by

Charles Whitehead, 2008. Exeter: Imprint Academic.

13. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 100.

14. Leading Scientists Still Reject God, Nature, vol. 394, 23 July 1998 page 313.

15 . The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 61.

16. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 97.

17. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 103.

18. Story based upon the one found at http://hca.gilead.org.il/emperor.html at the time of

writing, which is suggest to be a translation of the original.

19. Opinions and Social Pressure by Solomon Asch. The copy I used was one found on

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace/w1001/readings/asch.pdf at the time of

189

writing. It seems to be an offprint especially for academic institutions because it contains a

study guide. The text quoted appears in the page numbered 2.

The article seems to have first appeared in Scientific American, 1955, Vol. 193, pages 31-35.

Since the article in the down load starts is from pages 2-6, I assume the reference page in

the actual article would be 31.

20. Opinions and Social Pressure by Solomon Asch. The copy I used was one found on

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace/w1001/readings/asch.pdf at the time of

writing. It seems to be an offprint especially for academic institutions because it contains a

study guide. The text quoted appears in the page numbered 3.

The article seems to have first appeared in Scientific American, 1955, Vol. 193, pages 31-35.

Since the article in the down load starts at page 2 and goes on until page 6, I assume the

reference page in the actual article would be 32.

21. Opinions and Social Pressure by Solomon Asch. The copy I used was one found on

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace/w1001/readings/asch.pdf at the time of

writing. It seems to be an offprint especially for academic institutions because it contains a

study guide. The text quoted appears in the page numbered 4.

The article seems to have first appeared in Scientific American, 1955, Vol. 193, pages 31-35.

Since the article in the down load starts at page 2 and goes on until page 6, I assume the

reference page in the actual article would be 33.

22. Zombies by Kirk, Robert, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/zombies/

23. Reason, truth and history by Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,

1981, page 5.

190

24. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/8101049.stm. There were at the time

of more stories on the BBC website regarding bionic eyes come up when searching “bionic

eye”.

25. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 153.

26. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 52.

27. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 54.

28. This assumes the odds for winning each week are the same.

29. Principles of Psychology by William James, vol.1 page 143.

30. Evolution and Epiphenomenalism, William Robinson, Journal of Consciousness Studies,

14, No. 11, 2007, pp. 32-35.

31. Pleasure’s Role In Evolution A Response To Robinson, Joseph Corabi, Journal of

Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 7, 2008, pages 78–86

32. Pleasure’s Role In Evolution A Response To Robinson, Joseph Corabi, Journal of

Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 7, 2008, page 84.

33 . Pleasure’s Role In Evolution A Response To Robinson, Joseph Corabi, Journal of

Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 7, 2008, page 81.

34. Philosophy of Mind, classical and contemporary readings, edited and contributed to by

David Chalmers, 1A.C8 Consciousness a Brain Process? by U.T.Place pages 55-60. Original

reference given as: British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50, 1956.

35. Philosophy of Mind, classical and contemporary readings, edited and contributed to by

David Chalmers, 1A.C8 Consciousness a Brain Process? by U.T.Place page 56.

36. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 179.

37. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 180.

191

38. Meditations of First Philosophy, Rene Descartes, ed. John Cottingham, 13th edition 2007,

Cambridge University Press, page 12.

39. Meditations of First Philosophy, Rene Descartes, ed. John Cottingham, 13th edition 2007,

Cambridge University Press, page 15.

40. Meditations of First Philosophy, Rene Descartes, ed. John Cottingham, 13th edition 2007,

Cambridge University Press, page 16.

41. Meditations of First Philosophy, Rene Descartes, ed. John Cottingham, 13th edition 2007,

Cambridge University Press, page 15.

42. The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, imprint of Transworld

Publishers Bantam edition published 2011, page 45.

43. Philosophy of Mind, classical and contemporary readings, edited and contributed to by

David Chalmers, 2A.27 Consciousness and Its Place in Nature by David Chalmers, page 262

44. A Brief History of Time, by Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 49

45. At the time of writing this information could be found on:

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/orchOR.html

46. I don’t claimed to have created this definition, I assume I have just picked it up

somewhere but am not sure where. Sorry for not giving proper credit if it has been used

before.

47. Revisionism, Manuel Vargas in Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert

Kane, Derek Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, 2007, Blackwell Publishing, page 129.

48. Folk Intuitions on Free Will, Nichols, S. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:1-2, 2006,

pages 57-86.

49. Folk Intuitions on Free Will, Nichols, S. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:1-2, 2006, page

63.

192

50. You cannot make yourself the way you are. Strawson, G. In Tamler Sommers, A Very Bad

Wizard. Believer Books (Strawson, 2009, p.12)

51. Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Nichols,

S. & Knobe, J. (2007). Nous 41:4, pages 663-685.

52. Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Nichols,

S. & Knobe, J. (2007). Nous 41:4, page 670.

53. Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Nichols,

S. & Knobe, J. (2007). Nous 41:4, page 675.

54. Compatibilism, Martin Fischer in Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert

Kane, Derek Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, 2007, Blackwell Publishing, page 46.

55. Pereboom attributes the concern of this question as being raised by Randolph Clarke in

his 1997 paper, “On the Possibility of Rational Free Action”, published in Philosophical

Studies 88, pp. 37-57

Hard Incompatibilism, Derek Pereboom in Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer,

Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, 2007, Blackwell Publishing, page 107.

56. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, by Jaegwon Kim, in Philosophy of

Mind, classical and contemporary readings edited and contributed to by David Chalmers,

page 153.

57. Personal Agency, The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J Lowe page 122.

Durham University

Print publication date: 2008, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921714-4, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

58. Personal Agency, The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J Lowe page 129.

193

Durham University

Print publication date: 2008, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921714-4, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

59. I think this was from Personal Agency, The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by Lowe, E.

J page 4. I had noted (Lowe, 2008, p.4) and I think this is the book it refers to though I

looked at it online through an academic institution. I can no longer use that service, and

have had problems checking. Further details from about what I believe to be the relevant

publication:

Print publication date: 2008, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921714-4, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

60. Hard Incompatibilism, Derek Pereboom in Four Views on Free Will by John Martin

Fischer, Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, 2007, Blackwell Publishing,

page 110.

61. The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism by Strawson, G. (2000). Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, Vol. LX, No.1, page 150.

62. Hard Incompatibilism, Derek Pereboom in Four Views on Free Will by John Martin

Fischer, Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, 2007, Blackwell Publishing,

page 85.

63. Do we have Free Will? By Benjamin Libet, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8–9,

1999, pages 47-57.

64. Do we have Free Will? By Benjamin Libet, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8–9,

1999, page 55.

65.Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-

Potential) the Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act by Benjamin Libet, Curtis A.

Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl. Brain (1983), 106, page 623.

194

66. Testing Free Will, by Mele, A. R. (2010). Neuroethics , 3, page 164.

67. Testing Free Will, by Mele, A. R. (2010). Neuroethics , 3, page 165.

68. Do we have Free Will? By Benjamin Libet, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8–9,

1999, page 52.

69. Testing Free Will, by Mele, A. R. (2010). Neuroethics , 3, page 167.

70. Testing Free Will, by Mele, A. R. (2010). Neuroethics , 3, page 168.

71. Do we have Free Will? By Benjamin Libet, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8–9,

1999, page 51.

72. Do we have Free Will? By Benjamin Libet, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8–9,

1999, page 48.

73. What is the Bereitschaftspotential?, by Hiroshi Shibasaki, Mark Hallet, Clinical

Neurophysiology 117 (2006) page 2341.

74. Testing Free Will, by Mele, A. R. (2010). Neuroethics , 3, page 166.

75. Taken from Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, by John-Dylan

Haynes,Katsuyuki Sakai, Geraint Rees, Sam Gilbert, Chris Frith, and Richard E. Passingham.

Current Biology 17, 323–328, February 20, 2007

The study was mentioned on the BBC website. Link at the time of writing:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/6346069.stm

76. http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/spitzer/multimedia/timeline-2006121889912.html

77. In sexual reproduction each parent will contribute partial sequences of their DNA which

will combine to produce the DNA of the offspring. In asexual reproduction the DNA can be

an exact copy of the parents.

78. Page 160 in Bell, J. S. (1987). Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics.

Cambridge University Press.

195

79. Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring

2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/evil/>.

80. The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, 1st Edition, page 108.

81. I’m not sure where but I seem to remember reading an Immanuel Kant book where he

suggested that reason must have been given us for a purpose otherwise if for just some

evolutionary survival type behaviour we could have just responded to any stimulus with a

behaviour which didn’t require any conscious experience, I can’t remember exactly how it

was worded, but seem to remember thinking Kant was assuming consciousness for thoughts

such as reasoning, or at least that was the point I was seeing that could be made from what

Kant said.

82. World Philosophies by Ninian Smart, edited by Oliver Leaman, 2nd Edition, 2008, page

194.

83. World Philosophies by Ninian Smart, edited by Oliver Leaman, 2nd Edition, 2008, page

203.

84. Tahafut al-Falasifah [Incoherence of the Philosophers] by al-Ghazālī. Pakistan

Philosophical Congress Publication No.3, 1963, translation by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, page 8.

85. Tahafut al-Falasifah [Incoherence of the Philosophers] by al-Ghazālī. Pakistan

Philosophical Congress Publication No.3, 1963, translation by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, page

187.

86. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume published by Hackett

Publishing Company, second edition, 1997, page 105.

87. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume published by Hackett

Publishing Company, second edition, 1997, page 45.

88. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume published by Hackett

Publishing Company, second edition, 1997, page 47.

196

89. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume published by Hackett

Publishing Company, second edition, 1997, page 107.

90 . An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume published by Hackett

Publishing Company, second edition, 1997, page 48.

91. quran.com

92. NIV is the default bible for www.biblegateway.com though others are supported.

93. http://biblos.com/isaiah/29-15.htm at the time of writing it is the first of the parallel

texts.

94. http://bible.cc/isaiah/29-15.htm at the time of writing, Young’s Literal Translation is the

last of the Bible translations.

95. http://biblecommenter.com/isaiah/29-15.htm (at the time of writing)

96. I think this is based on a table in Hebrew Grammar by Jacob Weingreen, second edition,

page 100, but it may have come from another source.

97. http://biblesuite.com/hebrew/6009.htm

98. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemara

99. Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic

Literature compiled by Marcus Jastrow, 1903. It is found on

http://www.tyndalearchive.com/tabs/jastrow/ To look up ר then look up the first letter

on the left hand side, then scroll to the bottom and you’ll see the word there if it hasn’t

changed since I used it.

100. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niqqud (at the time of writing)

101. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ktiv_haser (at the time of writing)

102. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ktiv_male (at the time of writing)

197

103. If you go to http://www.morfix.co.il which is an online modern Hebrew dictionary, and

type לסתור in then if it hasn’t changed you see the translation:

to contradict; to refute ; (chemistry) to neutralize, to counteract ; (literary, talmudic)

to muss, to make untidy (hair)

104. I am pretty sure these images where taken from http://dss.collections.imj.org.il/isaiah,

though when I last went to use it, it said click on the scroll to examine it but it didn’t seem to

work.

105. An Introduction to Modern Economics by Prof Philip Hardwick, Mr Bahadur

Khan (Author), Mr John Langmead. Page 17. Unfortunately I don’t know which edition.

106. An Introduction to Modern Economics by Prof Philip Hardwick, Mr Bahadur

Khan (Author), Mr John Langmead. Unfortunately I don’t know which edition or which page.

107 . Prevalence and Trends of Severe Obesity among US Children and Adolescents, Joseph

A. Skelton, Stephen R. Cook, Peggy Auinger, Jonathan D. Klein, Sarah E. Barlow, In 2009,

page 2.

108. Prevalence and Trends of Severe Obesity among US Children and Adolescents, Joseph A.

Skelton, Stephen R. Cook, Peggy Auinger, Jonathan D. Klein, Sarah E. Barlow, In 2009, page

6.

109. Prevalence and Trends of Severe Obesity among US Children and Adolescents, Joseph A.

Skelton, Stephen R. Cook, Peggy Auinger, Jonathan D. Klein, Sarah E. Barlow, In 2009, page

5.

110. http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (at the time of writing).

111. http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/media/pdf/m/6/evidence.pdf (at the time of writing).

Page 8.

112. The European Environment State and Outlook 2010 Mitigating Climate Change by the

European Environment Agency (EEA) was found at

http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/europe/mitigating-climate-change. Page 4.

198

113. The European Environment State and Outlook 2010 Mitigating Climate Change by the

European Environment Agency (EEA) was found at

http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/europe/mitigating-climate-change. Page 8.

114. The European Environment State and Outlook 2010 Mitigating Climate Change by the

European Environment Agency (EEA) was found at

http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/europe/mitigating-climate-change. Page 8.

115. http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php.

116. The European Environment State and Outlook 2010 Mitigating Climate Change by the

European Environment Agency (EEA) was found at

http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/europe/mitigating-climate-change. Page 4.

117. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9688715/Britain-is-in-an-economic-

war-says-Cameron.html

118. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney/26every.html

119. http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/mb060e/mb060e00.pdf

120. Time and Physical Geometry by Hilary Putnam The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 8

(Apr. 27, 1967), pages 240.

121. I have the reference note (DeSalle, 2009, Introduction) unfortunately I’m not sure of

the precise reference.

122. based on a thought experiment provided by The Foundational Questions Institute

(FQXi) in www.fqxi.org/data/forum-attachments/SR_Example_Phy200.pdf

123. A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting by Mark Hinchliff. Philosophy of

Science, Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy

of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Sep., 2000), page 585.

124. Relativity The Special And The General Theory, by Albert Einstein, BN Publishing, page

16. It is under the section On The Idea of Time in physics.

199

125. Time Without Change, by Sydney Shoemaker, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 12

(Jun. 19, 1969), page 363.

126. Time Without Change, by Sydney Shoemaker, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 12

(Jun. 19, 1969), page 366.

127. Time Without Change, by Sydney Shoemaker, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 12

(Jun. 19, 1969), page 369.

128. A Brief History of Time, by Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 203.

129. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 200.

130. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 202.

131. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 203.

132. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 204.

133. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 206.

134. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 135.

135. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 138.

136. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 139.

137. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 227.

138. A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking, 1992 reprint, page 172.

139. Bohmian Mechanics by Sheldon Goldstein, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/qm-bohm/

Goldstein writes (in section 2):

200

Physicists and philosophers of science almost universally accepted von Neumann's

claim. For example, Max Born, who formulated the statistical interpretation of the

wave function, assured us that …

No concealed parameters can be introduced with the help of which the

indeterministic description could be transformed into a deterministic one.

Hence if a future theory should be deterministic, it cannot be a modification

of the present one but must be essentially different.

140. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument in Quantum Theory, Fine, Arthur. The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/qt-epr/>.

141. I took this from what claimed to be a faithful transcript of the article Is the moon there

when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory in Physics Today, April 1985, pages 38-

47. The quote comes from the first page of the transcript, and so I assume it appears on

page 38. The transcript has more pages than the article.

142. I took this from what claimed to be a faithful transcript of the article Is the moon there

when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory in Physics Today, April 1985, pages 38-

47. The quote comes from the second page of the transcript but the transcript has more

pages than the article.

143. I took this from what claimed to be a faithful transcript of the article Is the moon there

when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory in Physics Today, April 1985, pages 38-

47. The quote comes from the second page of the transcript but the transcript has more

pages than the article. Though in the transcript it is under the heading A gedanken

demonstration.

144. I took this from what claimed to be a faithful transcript of the article Is the moon there

when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory in Physics Today, April 1985, pages 38-

47. The quote comes from the thirteenth page of the transcript just above the references.

The quote at the end was from Richard Feynman the reference is given as R.P.Feynman, Int.

J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982).