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ISACA New York Metropolitan December 2011 Audi=ng Firewalls Michael Hamelin Chief Security Architect, Tufin

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ISACA  New  York  Metropolitan  December  2011  

Audi=ng  Firewalls    Michael  Hamelin  Chief  Security  Architect,  Tufin  

whoami    

2  

tufin.com/blog    

/hackerjoe    

•  Michael  Hamelin  [email protected]  

•  Chief  Security  Architect,  Tufin  Technologies  

•  16  Years  in  Security,  Hacking,  Networking  

/in/Hamelin    

/TufinTech    

3  

Survey Says …

One in 10 IT professionals cheat on firewall audits

Audi=ng  Firewalls    

•  We  have  all  done  it  the  hard  way  …  

4  

Why  are  Audits  so  difficult  we  need  to  cheat?  

 •  Firewall  Audits  tradiGonally  have  been  very  difficult  to  

complete    •  Firewall  Audits  are  oKen  poorly  defined  

•  Auditors  tradiGonally  are  not  technical  individuals  

•  We  are  pressured  to  pass  audits  over  building  security  

•  We  do  what  ever  we  need  to  get  rid  of  the  auditor  

5  

Engineering  vs  Audi=ng  

•  We  build  firewall  policies  for  access  •  Rules  •  Users  •  Servers  •  Services  

•  Auditors  try  and  protect  businesses  •  Assets  •  Risks  •  People  •  Processes  

 •  Access  rules  and  assets  don't  usually  match  up  

6  

Auditors  Don’t  Trust  Technology  

•  Truth  is  …  Auditors  don’t  all  want  to  learn  technology…  

•  Auditors  want  to  compare  implementa=on  to  standards  or  to  policy  

•  Technology  minu=a  can  waste  everyone’s  =me  

•  Tools  should  understand  technology  

•  Tools  should  allow  ques=ons  about  policy  

•  Tools  should  allow  ques=ons  about  business  risk  

7  

Audi=ng  by  hand  

•  How  long  to  Audit  a  firewall?  •  How  long  to  Audit  a  Cisco  router  config?  

 Just  READING  over  a  large  configuraGon    •  65,000  lines  is  1083  pages  •  1083  pages  is  about  3249  mins  •  3249  mins  is  roughly  54  hours.  •  …  basically  8  days  of  work  

 How  many  mistakes  will  you  miss  in  54  hours?  

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Lifecycle  of  a  firewall  RuleBase  

•  We  must  make  sure  Audit  is  part  of  the  rule  lifecycle  

•  We  also  need  to  think  about  Risk  Assessment  and  Compliance  as  part  of  the  Design  /  Approval  stages  

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Lets  look  at  how  firewall  audits  mature  

•  Level  1  •  AudiGng  like  an  engineer,  rule  by  rule  •  Following  fixed  audit  standards  

•  Level  2  •  Looking  at  risks  based  on  basic  direcGons  

•  (Inbound  vs  Outbound)  •  Level  3  

•  Looking  at  the  device  configuraGons  •  Looking  at  people  and  processes  

•  Level  4  •  Zone  based  risk  assessment  

•  Level  5  •  Compliance  (asset)  based  assessments  

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Firewall Maintenance

We can start with the basic firewall maintenance

Engineers  Look  at  Firewall  Audits  like  Engineers  

•  Level  1  -­‐  We  look  for  for  rules  with  flaws  

•  Rules  with  ‘ANY’  •  Rules  with  3  ‘ANY’  fields  •  Rules  with  2  ‘ANY’  fields  •  Rules  with  1  ‘ANY’  field  

•  Rules  with  no  comments  •  Rules  with  too  many  hosts/objects/services  •  Rules  with  services  we  don’t  like,  risky  protocols  

•  Rules  that  are  shadowed  •  Rules  that  are  unused  

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Bad  things  we  have  learned  to  do  

•  Auditors  look  for  ANY  in  a  rule  base.  

•  We  have  learned  to  place  in  negated  objects  

•  We  have  learned  to  place  in  ‘IP  Protocol’  instead  of  ANY  

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Lets  look  harder  at  that  ‘ANY’  check  

•  Firewalls  can  Hide  ANY  

   

•  What  about  almost  ANY  

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Automate  Level  1  

•  Everything  in  the  Level  1  Audi=ng  can  be  automated  today  with  tools  on  the  market  •  Good  (My  minimum  recommendaGon)  

• Run  the  tests  at  least  once  a  quarter  •  Beher    

• Run  the  test  once  a  month  •  Best  

• Run  the  test  on  every  change  event  in  real  Gme  with  triggers  …  

•  Check  Point  gives  us  a  safety  net  “Save  Policy”  •   …  we  should  use  it  to  trigger  our  new  analysis  a_er  a  

Save  and  before  an  Install  

15  

Lets  look  at  how  firewall  audits  mature  

•  Level  1  •  AudiGng  like  an  engineer,  rule  by  rule  •  Following  fixed  audit  standards  

•  Level  2  •  Looking  at  risks  based  on  basic  direcGons  

•  (Inbound  vs  Outbound)  •  Level  3  

•  Looking  at  the  device  configuraGons  •  Looking  at  people  and  processes  

•  Level  4  •  Zone  based  risk  assessment  

•  Level  5  •  Compliance  (asset)  based  assessments  

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Level  2  

•  Looking  at  rules  with  more  intelligence  •  Are  there  any  rules  that  violate  our  corporate  security  policy?  

•  Are  there  any  rules  that  allow  risky  services  inbound  from  the  Internet?  …while  you  may  have  a  different  list  of  what  is  considered  “risky”  for  your  company,  most  start  with  protocols  that  pass  login  creden?als  in  the  clear  like  telnet,  @p,  pop,  imap,  hAp,  netbios,  etc…  

•  Are  there  any  rules  that  allow  risky  services  outbound  to  the  Internet?  

•  Are  there  any  rules  that  allow  direct  traffic  from  the  Internet  to  the  internal  network  (not  the  DMZ)?  

17  

Automate  Level  2  

•  Everything  in  the  Level  2  Audi=ng  can  be  automated  today  with  tools  on  the  market  

18  

Lets  look  at  how  firewall  audits  mature  

•  Level  1  •  AudiGng  like  an  engineer,  rule  by  rule  •  Following  fixed  audit  standards  

•  Level  2  •  Looking  at  risks  based  on  basic  direcGons  

•  (Inbound  vs  Outbound)  •  Level  3  

•  Looking  at  the  device  configuraGons  •  Looking  at  people  and  processes  

•  Level  4  •  Zone  based  risk  assessment  

•  Level  5  •  Compliance  (asset)  based  assessments  

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Level  3  

•  Looking  at  people  and  processes  •  Who  made  the  changes  •  Why  did  they  make  them  •  Were  they  authorized  to  make  them  

•  Looking  at  the  device  configura=ons  •  Physical  configuraGons  •  OS  configuraGons  •  Default  firewall  configuraGons  

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People  and  Processes  

•  Is  the  requester  documented,  and  is  s/he  authorized  to  make  firewall  change  requests?  

•  Is  the  business  reason  for  the  change  documented?  •  Are  there  proper  reviewer  and  approval  signatures  

(electronic  or  physical)?  •  Were  the  approvals  recorded  before  the  change  was  

implemented?  •  Are  the  approvers  all  authorized  to  approve  firewall  

changes  (you  will  need  to  ask  for  a  list  of  authorized  individuals)?  

•  Are  the  changes  well  documented  in  the  change  =cket?  •  Is  there  documenta=on  of  risk  analysis  for  each  change?  •  Is  there  documenta=on  of  the  change  window  and/or  install  

date  for  each  change?  •  Is  there  an  expira=on  date  for  the  change?  

21  

Device  Audit  vs  Policy  Audit  

Devices  Audits  

•  Checking  services  •  Checking  user  accounts  

•  Checking  soKware  versions  

•  Checking  SSH  banners  •  Checking  NTP  servers  •  Checking  …  

any  configuraGon  

Policy  Audits  

• Dangerous  protocols  

• Unused  policies  •  Risky  flows  • Unauthorized  connecGons  

•  Checking  …  • Traffic  vs  Policy  

22  

Automate  Level  3  

•  Much  of  Level  3  Audi=ng  can  be  automated  today  with  tools  on  the  market  

•  Mastering  Level  3  involves  pudng  in  pace  a  solid  workflow    

23  

Lets  look  at  how  firewall  audits  mature  

•  Level  1  •  AudiGng  like  an  engineer,  rule  by  rule  •  Following  fixed  audit  standards  

•  Level  2  •  Looking  at  risks  based  on  basic  direcGons  

•  (Inbound  vs  Outbound)  •  Level  3  

•  Looking  at  the  device  configuraGons  •  Looking  at  people  and  processes  

•  Level  4  •  Zone  based  risk  assessment  

•  Level  5  •  Compliance  (asset)  based  assessments  

24  

Level  4  

•  Zone  based  risk  assessment  •  Security  tesGng  based  on  your  zones  • …maybe  it’s  3  zones  • …maybe  its  more  like  100  zones  

•  Traffic  paeerns  are  defined  by  zones  •  Zones  typically  are  defined  by  separate  trust  levels  

25  

Policies  that  allow  risky  services  

•  NIST  and  others  standards  have  tried  to  define  risks  by  protocol  

   •  Truth  is  protocols  alone  are  not  a  good  indica=on  of  

the  Risk  

•  Risk  should  include  Data,  network  loca=on  and  direc=on  of  traffic  

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Internet

AT&T

Chase

SeaLand

B2B Router

DMZ Router

AT&T Hosted

Sealand Hosted

Chase Hosted

Internal Servers

172.30.8.16255.255.255.240

172.30.8.32255.255.255.240

172.30.8.48255.255.255.240

10.42.0.0255.255.252.0

10.40.42.8255.255.255.248

10.40.42.16255.255.255.248

10.42.40.16255.255.255.252

29  

Lets  look  at  some  examples  

 •  Connec=ons  allowed  from  DMZ  back  to  Internal  

Networks  

•  Groups  with  ‘extra’  networks  

•  Mistyped  netmask  compromising  confiden=ality  

•  Mul=ple  firewalls  passing  the  same  risky  flows    

30  

Lets  look  at  how  firewall  audits  mature  

•  Level  1  •  AudiGng  like  an  engineer,  rule  by  rule  •  Following  fixed  audit  standards  

•  Level  2  •  Looking  at  risks  based  on  basic  direcGons  

•  (Inbound  vs  Outbound)  •  Level  3  

•  Looking  at  the  device  configuraGons  •  Looking  at  people  and  processes  

•  Level  4  •  Zone  based  risk  assessment  

•  Level  5  •  Compliance  (asset)  based  assessments  

31  

Level  5  

Audi=ng  by  Policy  Zones  

•  Take  the  zones  concept  up  to  the  business  level  

•  It  is  about  protec=ng  assets  and  data  

•  ConfidenGal  Systems  with  Internet  Accesses  

•  SPI  databases  with  access  from  Internet  or  DMZ  

•  CriGcal  Systems  with  risky  protocol  access  

32  

33  

Internet

AT&T

Chase

SeaLand

B2B Router

DMZ Router

AT&T Hosted

Sealand Hosted

Chase Hosted

Internal Servers

172.30.8.16255.255.255.240

172.30.8.32255.255.255.240

172.30.8.48255.255.255.240

10.42.0.0255.255.252.0

10.40.42.8255.255.255.248

10.40.42.16255.255.255.248

10.42.40.16255.255.255.252

Thank  You    www.tufin.com      

Michael  Hamelin    [email protected]