AusTRALIA, like Britain, owes her freedom from invasion in the present war to the fact that she is an island. Her position vis-a-vis Japan is analagous to that of Britain's vis-a-vis Germany and Occupied Europe, with the Timor Sea and Torres Strait taking the place of the English Channel and the Straits of Dover. ·

The accompanying maps illustrate the com­parison. In spite of Germany's domination of the European coastline from the North Cape to the Pyrenees, the narrow strip of water separating Britain from the Continent proved again, as in the past, the barrier across which an invading army could not pass. In spite of Japan's naval, military and air strength within the area of the Archipelagos, in spite of that strength extending southward almost to the northern coast of the continent, Australia re­mained free from invasion because the aggres­sor was denied the necessary sea-borne trans­port of his armies, his tanks, his artillery and supplies, across the narrow strip of water dividing Australia from the northern island screen.

Geography has favoured both Britain and Australia. But that favour is dependent on control of the seas, and maintenance of their sea-borne communications. "Rule Britannia, Britannia, rule the Waves", is an exhortation neither of them must ever forget if they 'vould hold their birthright. For they live, as islands, by virtue of the sea.

Let us look at Australia's position vis-a-vis Japan. So long as she remembers that exhorta­tion, it is sound. So long as control of the three main oceans washing her shores-the Indian Ocean, the Southern Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean-remains in friendly hands; and so long as, in addition, Australia can maintain control of Port Moresby, and sufficient air ~trength to protect her Timor Sea coast, she 1s secure.

Fortunately for Australia, she had remem­bered that exhortation in her naval policy, and the control of the three main oceans in which she is set-and consequently her lines

of communication with the rest of the free world, those lines along which in one direc­tion flows the ever-increasing help coming to her shores, and in the other direction flow the primary products she produces and by which she lives-remains in Allied hands.

It so remains by virtue of the proper ex­ercise of sea power, that power by which the influence of a British Fleet thousands of miles distant from Australia in the Indian Ocean, and of a United States Fleet far beyond her shores in the Pacific, ensures her integrity. For in visualizing an invasion of either the east or west coasts of Australia, or of an attempt to sever Australia's main lines of com­munication, Japan had to bear in mind that her flanks would be, exposed once she ven­tured from the security of the Archipelagos into the open oceans. And she could not make a major naval move outside the Archipelagos until any threats to her flanks had been re­moved.

With Port Moresby in Australian hands, and with air power in Papua commanding the western Coral Sea with the threat of land­based bomber and torpedo-bomber attack, a Japanese fleet would be in a parlous position cutting down into the Coral Sea and leaving an intact United States Fleet in its only line of retreat. There would be no sea room to the westward, with the Barrier Reef stretching ·to the southward and the reefs and narrows of Torres Strait blocking the passage.

Somewhat similar-although qualified-cir­cumstances obtain to the west of the conti­nent. Here again, the Japanese flank, extend­ing beyond the limits of the Malayan Archi­pelago, would be jeopardized by British con­trol of the Indian Ocean. But in the west Japan would not, in any case, be in a position to use the naval strength she could utilize in the east. Her main fleet bases outside of Japan are those in the Mandated Islands, north-east of Australia. And it was there, or in the eastern area, that she had to keep her main naval strength in order to contain the Pacific naval forces of her enemies/ For it is in the

AUSTRALIA AN ISLAND

east that lies Japan's naval Achilles' heel. The Pacific War is in the first place a naval-air war. The naval threat to Japan lies mainly in the east and south-east, and it was against that threat that she had to concentrate her major naval strength.

The task of the Royal Australian Navy was, therefore, to use her larger fleet units in col­laboration with the British and United States Fleets in such a way as would best serve the interests of sea power in its wider aspects, while at the same time ensuring the integrity of immediate Australian waters by, in co­operation with the Royal Australian Air Force, patrolling and protecting the long Aus­tralian coastline, maintaining the coastal and approach shipping routes, and safeguarding the all-important sea supply lines to New Guinea, the Torres Strait islands, · and Darwin. That is to say, to exercise the un­changing function of sea power to keep con- · trol of the sea, to make freely available its use to our own ships carrying our own soldiers, our own war materials and supplies, our own

life-giving imports and exports, and to deny such use to the ships of the eriemy.

This latter was a task which, in narrow waters open to enemy air attack, was one to be shared by the Navy and the Air Force. Past experience had shown that the Navy alone suffered too great a disadvantage when operating without air . support in narrow waters under enemy air dominance. The job could be done by ships alone when air support was lacking if the need exceeded all other considerations, all considerations of losses of ships and men. It was done at Greece and at Crete, and the convoys which enabled Malta to hold out were fought through in similar circumstances. As a result, the Middle East was saved, air power was built up, and North Africa was won and Italy defeated, with the Mediterranean reopened as an Empire life line. The importance of sea power, without which none of these things could have been done, was again made apparent. But Britain's lack of Mediterranean air power in those days of 1940 and 1941 made the odds heavy and the cost high. Let us see how it worked out here.

H.M

In the Archipelagos through which japanese drove in their southward advance from December 1941 to May 1942 the odds were alL in their favour. As had the Axis Powers in the Mediterranean during I 940-I941, they had overwhelming air power, operating both from carriers and from land bases on the islands. In addition; they had absolute naval superiority, so that their con­trol of ,the sea within the Archipelagos was complete, and they could move their invasion armies as and when they were needed with little artd largely ineffective opposit_ion.

Their advance was rapid. The part the Royal Australian Navy took in assisting our American and Dutch Allies in the vain at­tempt to stem that advance has been told in H.M.A.S. It cost Australia the cruiser H.M.A.S. Perth and the sloop Yarra. Yet the advance, although rapid, was not speedy enough. Singapore and the Philippines were lost to -Britain and the United States, but theirs was not a dead loss. The Allied gain in the time it took the japanese finally to re­move these possible threats to their flanks was little enough. But, as it turned out, it sufficed.

Among the early Australian moves were the garrisoning and reinforcement of Allied. islands which acted as a protective screen to the north of the continent. An Australian garrison. had previously been established at Rabaul, ·and a few days after Japan's entry

/ into the war the R.A.N. was actively co­operating with our Dutch Allies in the trans­port of A.I.F. troops to Dutch Timor and to Ambon, the movements being carried out in Australian and Dutch transports, with naval escorts of H.M.A. ships. Shortly before this, Australia had experienced her first air alarm. This was at 2200 local time at Darwin, on the I I th December, I 94 I, when the Port War Signal Station reported having heard aircraft. A message had been received earlier from Ambon reporting eight aircraft flying south, an.d these aircraft could have arrived over Darwin at the time of the report. No raid developed, and "All clear" was sounded at 2330.

The first large-scale reinforcement on the eastern side of the island screen took place in January 1942. A number of troop transports, including one of world's largest passenger

l\fk.

liners, took troops and· equipment from Aus­tralia to Port Moresby under the ocean escoq of the Royal Australian Navy. _

Thus did Port Moresby blossom. as:·;;~.: ~ .. g'e­scale base in the present war, althoug.\\· !~~ a naval establishment it had been in the pict~re since the opening of hostilities with Germany in September 1939. Earlier in that year, Port Moresby had been the headquarters of the New Guinea Naval Survey party which had been operating. under Lieutenant-Commander R. B. A. Hunt, R.A.N ., and this officer was appointed Naval Officer-in-Charge, Port Nloresby, when it became apparent that war ' with Germany was imminent. The first duty of N.O.l.C. Port Moresby was to establish Port War Signal Station, Examination Service, and Naval Control Service, using personnel of the New Guinea Survey party.

With the outbreak of war, however, addi­tional personnel was sent to the establishment from the mainland, and in this connection Base Staff Port Nloresby claims that:

"The original two officers and eighteen ratings, all R.A.N .R. personnel, drawn from Adelaide, i\1elbourne, Sydney and Brisbane depots, were the first R.A.N .R. personnel to leave the shores of Australia proper after the outbreak of war. In fact it seems prob­able that they were the first representatives of any of the defence services to leave Aus­trali(l after cmnmencement . of hostilities. Further the Base Staff at Port .1\lloresby was the first Australian Naval Staff established away from the Australian Coast."

At about this period the "N" Class de­stroyers had represent~tion in the eastern war theatre. During January 1942, H.l\tLA.Ss Napier, N iza1n and Nest or were off the coast of Java, when they formed part of a British force which brought out aircraft reinforce­ments for the hard-pressed land forces l\1alaya and the Netherlands East Jndies. Theirs was only a fleeting visit, however, and urgent duties elsewhere called them to the westward and later to the Mediterranean, where the three ships were in company-with

The portrait reproduced opposite is that of Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C., hoisted his flag as 'Rear-Admiral Cotnm<mdiin; Australian Squadron on the 13th June,

AUSTRALIA AN ISLAND

the addition of their sister N onnan-when Nest or was sunk as a result of damage suffered in an air attack on the I 6th June, I 942. But that is another story.

1\11eanwhile the Japanese south·ward drive continued rapidly. In the west, the enemy landed at Balikpapan in Borneo on the 2 3rd January, the same day he took Rabaul the east, overwhelming the small Australian garrison by sheer weight of numbers. advance was him \vithin bombing

stone -~",.,..r.;o.,...,.,..,..,-r

on the Australian more severe. This was at

19th February, and resulted considerable damage and some shipping

losses, and a long casualty list with many killed, including Royal Australian Navy and United States Navy personnel, Royal Austra­lian Air Force personnel, merchant seamen and civilians.

This Darwin attack was the culmination of a series of attacks carried out by Japanese air­craft on shipping in the Arafura and Timor seas, the heaviest of these being on the I 6th February, when a convoy bound from Dar­win to Dutch Timor, escorted by the United States cruiser Houston and the destroyer Peary, and the two R.A.N. sloops W arrego and Swan, was heavily bombed by thirty-five Japanese heavy bombers and nine four-engined flying boats. The majority of the attacks were made on the U.S.S. Houston, and observers speak of the magnificent fight she put up. Despite the strength of the enemy attack, no hits were scored on the ships, and the convoy returned to Darwin undamaged.

H.M.A. ships-of which a number were in Darwin during the raid of the I 9th February -were fortunate in that they suffered no material losses apart from a lugger, which was sunk, though practically all the ships were heavily machine-gunned-some suffering casu-

21

alties-as well as being bombed. Of the other ships sunk was the United States destroyer Peary, which went down fighting her guns to the last in a manner which is spoken of with the highest admiration. One or two H.M.A. ships suffered slight damage, but not sufficient to put them out of action. R.A.N. casualties during this were five killed and thirty-six wounded.

areas now the smaller Australian

standard, ships OU'....,<eU.AA.A;;;,.

names of Australian towns, wherever were employed, was similar. They ·were to shoulder heavy tasks the months to come, and carry them out with distinction success, as were many other smaller sisters who carried on the Australian naval ~~...~.au.~.~~...lvJu in tasks which by their nature denied them any current public recognition.

During February the Japanese grip dosed and tightened on Australia's northern island screen. On the eighteenth of the month enemy occupied Finschhafen, to the north of Huon Gulf, New Guinea. The day following the raid on Darwin, he took l{oepang and Dilli, in Timor. Thus began the Navy's asso­ciation with the Timor "guerrillas", which was to continue until the evacuation of that force in early 1943, after it had harried and pestered, and harmed the Japanese not a little over a period of nearly twelve months.

Port Moresby experienced its second raid on the night of the 4th/ 5th February, again at about 0330, and on the 24th February had its first daylight raid. This was the comnlence­ment of a period during which both Darwin to the west and Port Moresby to the east were to become familiar with Japanese aircraft. Danvin' s introduction· was harsher than Port i\1oresby's, but familiarity, though it did not

.M.A.S. Mk. II

breed contempt, did breed nicknames. As one report from the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Darwin, stated inter alia:

"Enemy aircraft reconnaissance in the Timor Sea by four-engined flying boats has been fairly extensive. The flying boat which regularly appeared in the western approaches to Darwin was known to the A.M.S. vessels on which 'visiting cards' were dropped, as 'Recco Joe'. The Jap has locally been nicknamed 'Merv'."

Koepang and Dilli were occupied on the 2oth February. On the 2nd March Japanese aircraft bombed Wyndham and Broome. On the 8th March the enemy occupied Lae and Salamaua, in the Huon Gulf, New Guinea. The pincers were· creeping closer to the north of Australia itself. There still remained, how­ever, the Timor Sea and the Torres Strait to cross before an invader could set foot on the land. Bombing itself was not sufficient. Nor, for that matter, was the bombing all on one side. In the west a number of raids were carried out during February by aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force on objectives in Timor and T animbar Islands, and during March Allied air power began to grow in New Guinea, and to return the compliment to the enemy by carrying out heavy raids on his positions at Lae and Salamaua.

Meanwhile, the Malayan Archipelago had fallen entirely into Japanese hands with the enemy's conquest of Java, which was com­pleted early in March. He was now in posses­sion of dominating sea power and air power within the chain of islands forming the north­eastern boundary of the Indian Ocean, and this power extended right across the north of Australia, reaching down to the nearest islands screening the continent, and continuing to the eastward to include the northern Solomons, the Japanese having occupied Buka Island and established themselves on Bougainville and F aisi during March.

Away over to the west, toward the Bay of Bengal, Japanese penetration was also pro­ceeding. The British forces were having to withdraw in Burma, and on the 23rd March the enemy occupied the Andaman Islands, opening his way for naval and air attacks in the Bay of Bengal. These were not long in

22

coming. India had its first taste of air attack with the enemy's bombing of Co canada and Vizagapatam on the north-east coast on the 6th April. The aircraft came from a Japanese naval force, including carriers, which carried out a raid into the Bay of Bengal. Three days later T rincomalee and Colombo, in . Ceylon, were bombed, an operation which cost the enemy heavily in aircraft. The Japanese naval force in the Bay of Bengal during these attacks was reported as consisting of at least three battleships,. five carriers, heavy and light cruisers and destroy~r flotillas. No surface action developed, all enemy action being con­fined to air attacks, in which we lost the air­craft carrier H.M.S. Hermes, the cruisers H.M.S. Dorsetshire and Cornwall, and the Australian destroyer H.M.A.S. Vampire.

In spite of the Japanese strength, however, this excursion did not develop beyond the dimensions of a raid, and the enemy force withdrew from the area within a few days. The British retained control of the Indian Ocean, a fact which was made dear by the safe arrival in Australia during March of units of the A.I.F., which were brought back from the Middle East. The convoy in which they came had a quite uneventful passage, with no sight nor sign of the enemy.

At this stage it might be as well to take a wider survey of the general world operations.

In the west, the Battle of the Atlantic was still in full swing, with the Allies holding their own against the U -boats. Britain had long before this taken on an additional mari­time liability in the shape of the Arctic con­voys she was fighting through to Russia. It was about the time of the Japanese raid into the Bay of Bengal that the British Navy and Merchant Service were fighting one of those all out battles against German surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft, which became a feature of the Murmansk convoy operations. This particular occasion was that on which a large convoy, whose escorts included .an air­craft carrier and the cruiser H.M.S. Trinidad, survived three combined attacks, during which at least one German destroyer was sunk, and three U -boats severely damaged, if not sunk.

In Russia itself the opposing armies were poised for the coming German offensive. The Russians still held Sebastopol-the fortress was

AUSTRALIA AN ISLAND

to fall at the beginning of July, after an eight months' siege-but the Germans were to take the Crimea and drive 'veil to the eastward be­fore the northern summer was over.

Further south in Libya, the Axis forces were also gaining the~ upper hand. Christmas I 94 I had seen the British drive to the ·west reach Benghazi, but the following weeks had seen the tide of war change and sweep east­wards again. We lost Tobruk in June, and in the same month the advancing Germans and Italians crossed the Egyptian frontier, caus­ing the British to retire from Mersa Matruh. Shortly afterwards the British line was estab­lished from El Alamein to the Qattara De­pression, and only seventy mile~ westward of Alexandria. ·

Another British maritime commitment. Three hundred British merchant ships were continuously employed on the long passage from Britain round the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt and the Middle East, to keep the armies supplied and enable them to hold the El Alamein line, and prepare for the subse­quent westward drive which was to come.

In India the situation was far from bright. The Cripps Mission, which had sought to find a solution of the differences splitting the country, had failed in its endeavours. Mahatma Gandhi's draft motion for the All India Con­gress Committee demanded British withdrawal from India, stating inter alia: "If India were freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. Congress is of opinion that if the British withdrew, India would be able to defend herself in the event of the J ap­anese or any other aggressor attacking India." Akyab, the last port held by the British in Burma, was lost, and early in May the J ap-

. anese were on the Indian border and within bombing range of Indian cities with land­based aircraft, Chittagong, chief city of the Bengal Presidency, being bombed on the 8th May.

To the Axis Powers, to Germany and Italy in the west, and to Japan in the east, it must have appeared that their respective eastward and westward drives promised well, and that their claim that control of the Indian Ocean had passed from the British Navy had some foundation in near-future fact. The prospects

of a link between West and East Axis must have appeared bright.

British sea power was such, however, that further commitments could be undertaken , to place a spoke in the Axis wheel. On the 6th May a British naval force escorting troop transports arrived at the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar (hitherto under Vichy French administration) off the south-east African coast, and occupied the port and naval base of Diego Suarez, thus forestalling any Jap~ anese moves in that direction, giving Britain additional naval bases, and strengthening the security of the Indian Ocean route to the Middle East and India.

Sea power, then, was keeping the situation under control in the main oceans, and main­taining the various lines of communication. By its means Russia w~s being supported with an increasing :flow of vital war supplies, the Middle East armies were being built up for the decisive westward push, and India was being reinforced to an extent which denied Japanese aspirations regarding that country, and stopped the enemy's westward drive. Now sea power was about to be manifested in the Pacific with results peculiarly important to Australia.

Short as had been the period of the Jap­anese advance to the limits of the Western Pacific Archipelagos, it had not been short enough. The time involved had permitted ex­pression to be given to the amazing recupera­tive powers of the United States. By the time the Japanese were established on the Akyab­N orthern Solomons line, our American allies had largely repaired the damage done to their naval power at Pearl Harbour, and had been enabled so to reinforce and dispose their naval forces in the south-western Pacific as to be ready for eventualities.

Indeed, they did not await eventualities, but by a well-planned use of that additional range given to naval power by carrier-borne aircraft, carried out an operation which must have caused the enemy concern as to the safety of his own home waters. On the I 8th April, Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe were bombed by aircraft from the U.S. carrier Hornet, which flew off sixteen bombers eight hundred miles from the main Japanese

H.M.A.S. Mk. II

islands. 1~he attack, which took the enemy completely by surprise, was successful.

But the Japanese were fully seized with the importance to them of Port Moresby, and early I 942, they made an attempt to launch an attack on the base by sea. The Battle of Coral Sea was the result.

This battle took place in a series of engage-ments over a wide area during period the

May to 8th and was ~attle" history,

oppos1ng "' ............ a,._,..,

of each

U.S.N., surprised and smashed a Japanese vasion force which was of a force in-tended the operation.

Japanese vessels, naval transport, were sunk or damaged. United States losses were three aircraft. On the -7th Rear-Admiral Fletcher's aircraft struck ma1n body of the Japanese force in Louisiade Archipelago off Misima Island. In this attack the new Japanese aircraft carrier Ry koku and a heavy cruiser v1ere sunk, and more than twenty-five enemy aircraft were shot down. The following day the same task force suc­ceeded in seriously damaging a second Jap­anese carrier, the Shokaku, with bomb and tor­pedo hits. During this engagement the enemy counter-attacked with aircraft on U .S.S. Lex­ington, which suffered torpedo and bomb hits and subsequently sank.

Meanwhile, in the western Coral Sea, a task force under the command of the Rear­Admiral Commanding the Australian Squad­ron, Rear-Admiral J. G. Crace, C.B., and in­cluding the Australian cruisers H.M.A.Ss Aus­tralia (Flag) and Hobart, was screening Port Moresby. This force withstood without loss or damage, and without air support, a heavy enemy attack by high-level and torpedo bombers on the 7th May, shooting down three of the enemy aircraft.

The final result of the Coral Sea battle vva~ that this Japanese attempt on Port Moresby was frustrated, the enemy suffering a defeat in which he lost one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two strayers and several transports and vessels, and sustaining severe damage to more than twenty ships, including an aircraft ... ~ ................ .

the dan1aged ships, a cruiser and probably sank. The United States Navy the carrier Lexington, destroyer Si1ns, the tender Neosho.

ISt June, were carried out on pmnts so apart as harbours of Diego Suarez in l\1adagascar, Sydney, South neither case was the attack successful. Little damage was suffered by the Allies, and the Japanese midget submarines in both places, at least being destroyed by harbour defence vessels at Sydney.

The Sydney Harbour raid was the precur­sor of a submarine campaign against shipping off the east coast of Australia, a number of vessels being torpedoed and sunk during June and July, not without loss to the Japanese sub­marines themselves. Such enemy activity oc­curred intermittently subsequent to May, 1942, and is described in greater detail in a later chapter of this book.

The Japanese northern thrust, which oc­curred in early June, was a two-pronged attack, one directed at Attu and Kiska islands in the Aleutians, and the other at lVlidway Island. Each of these objectives lies at the vvestern extremity of a chain of islands leading to an important base, in the case of Attu and Kiska that of Dutch Harbour on Unalaska Island; in the case of Midway that of Pearl Harbour, on Oahu. Success would have achieved a double object, first to remove potential threats to Japan itself, second to establish footholds-

AUSTRALIA AN ISLAND

attack on key American positions.

immediate Aleutian objectives were secured by Japan, both Attu and Kiska being occupied without opposition. In the Midway operation, however, the Japanese suffered their second defeat, and one even heavier than that of the Coral Sea.

At about 0900 on the 3rd June, United States naval reconnaissance aircraft reported a strong enemy force about seven hundred miles off l\11idway Island, proceeding eastward. This force was attacked by aircraft from Midway Island, and hits were scored on one cruiser and one transport. This attack was followed up by a moonlight attack by Catalinas during the night, two torpedo hits being scored on large ships, one of which is believed to have sunk.

Early the next morning, United States medium and heavy bombers, dive bombers and torpedo aircraft attacked the enemy force, causing considerable damage. The enemy countered with a bombing attack on Midway Island, but could not disable it as an airfield, and failed to catch any United States aircraft grounded. 1\ieanwhile, United States naval forces were brought into position, and carrier-

\vere launched and throughout day carried out a number of attacks

which, by nightfall, had completely defeated the Japanese.

The situation at sundown on the 4th· June was that the United States forces had gained mastery of the air in the 1\!Iidway region, and had sunk or so severely damaged that they sank later four Japanese aircraft carriers, dam­aged two battleships-one severely-sunk a destroyer, and damaged several other ships. At dawn next day the United States forces returned to the attack on the enemy, who was now retiring to the westward, and scored fur­ther bomb hits on enemy cruisers. The chase continued throughout the day and following night, and on the next day, the 6th June, be­tween 0930 and Iooo, carrier-borne United States aircraft scored direct hits on the heavv cruisers Mogami and Mikuma, and sank one of the screening destroyers.

The United States had suffered its heaviest naval loss of the battle on the 4th June, when the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Yorktown was dis­abled by enemy aircraft, and subsequently sank. Now, on the 6th June, the last day of the battle, it sustained its second, and lesser loss, when the destroyer H a1nman was tor-

. fvl.A.S. 1\ik. II

pedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine. Apart from the~e two ship losses, the United States forces lost a considerable number of aircraft.

The Japanese, however, suffered out of all proportion. Their expedition was a complete failure, and cost them four aircraft carriers, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu sunk; three battleships damaged by bomb and torpedo hits; one cruiser, Mikuma, sunk; four heavy cruisers damaged; one light cruiser damaged; three destroyers sunk and several damaged; and a number of transports damaged and/or sunk. In addition, the Japanese lost nearly two hundred aircraft, and suffered a heavy casualty list in killed or drowned.

The 6th June ended the Battle of Midway. The enemy was in full retreat to the west­ward, and repeated' attempts by the United States forces to re-establish contact were fruitless. 1\llidway was another occasion on which a major sea battle was fought without opposing surface forces being engaged one with another. This time all the damage to surface forces was done by aircraft and submarines.

Severe as the Coral Sea and Midway de­feats were to Japan, she still continued to press forward. Indeed, she could not do other­wise. While the Allies retained footholds in the islands to the north and east of Australia, not only was Australia sheltered but Japanese domination of the Archipelagos was menaced with the potential threat of growing Allied naval and air power, and Japan had to en­deavour to deny the Allies advanced bases from which to exercise that power. She there­fore continued her southward penetration of

the Solomon Islands and determined-since the attempt to take Moresby by sea had been frustrated-to land on the northern coast of Papua, where she had air power which gave her a large measure of sea control-and attack Moresby from the landward side.

Early in July, therefore, she extended her control in the Solomons to the occupation of the island of Guadalcanal, and commenced building an airstrip at Lunga. Three weeks later her troops landed in strength at Buna and Gona, and the enemy began his overland march to Port Moresby. Two days after the landing he was at Awala, twenty-six miles west-south-west of Buna; on the 28th July he occupied Kokoda.

Meanwhile, in the west, he was occupying areas already within his sphere of influence and under his control. During July his forces landed on Tanimbar, Aru, Kei and Bunda islands in the Arafura Sea, and at the end of the month his aircraft carried out a raid on Port Hedland, Western Australia. Concur­rently with these moves, he was further ex­tending his penetration in the Solomons, and made landings on Malaita Island.

But the example of the celestial sun pursu­ing his southern declination, was not long to be followed by those who had taken "Old Jamaica" as their symbol. For the people of the south the sun was now rising, and soon they would be able to say, "Lo, the winter is past." The nadir was not quite yet, but the turning point lay close ahead when, from de­fence and retreat, our policy was to follow that Jine of attack and advance for which the victories of the Coral Sea and Midway had paved the road.

liO

WITH THE DARWIN BOOIVI DEFENCE

The harbour boom defence is by no means an innovation. 11: has been a naval necessity for centuries, and there has been a number of instances of ships of the Royal Navy "breaking the boom" of enemy ports in the past. Modern submarine activ­ity makes an added need for boom defences, and the installa­tions and personnel are an im­portant part of any navy toaday. Boom defence work calls for real "sailorizing" ability and plenty of hard work. Seaman­ship is tested in such jobs as handling the buoys with the horns of the boomaworking ves­sels, towing net sections where and when they are required, and clambering about the tackle and gear making certain that all is correct. But there are moments of relaxation for some in the store boat taking out sup­plies to the boom vessels.

The boom-working vessels are Australian-built and bear typically Australian names, such as Kangaroo:~ Koala and Kookaburra:~ by which they are as identifiable as by their unusual shape, with the "horns" or cranes projecting over their bows. Boom de­fence work entails much handling of wires and gear in wet surroundings, and is one case in which the tem­peratul·e of Darwin's sea water is appreciated.

111