Authentication: the problem that will not go away Prof. Ravi Sandhu Chief Scientist [email protected] 703 283 3484 Protecting Online Identity

Authentication: the problem that will not go away

Prof. Ravi Sandhu

Chief Scientist

[email protected]

703 283 3484

Protecting Online Identity™

© Copyright Ravi Sandhu 2008

Page 2

The State of Cyber Security

We are in the midst of big change Nobody knows where we are headed Conventional wisdom on where we are

headed is likely wrong


Page 3

Security Schools of Thought

OLD THINK:

We had it figured out. If the industry had only listened to us our computers and networks today would be secure.

REALITY:

Today’s and tomorrow’s cyber systems and their security needs are fundamentally different from the timesharing era of the early 1970’s.


Page 4

Change Drivers

Stand-alone mainframes and mini-computers

Internet

Enterprise securityMutually suspicious

security with splitresponsibility

Vandals Criminals

Few and standard services

Many and newinnovative services


Page 5

Authentication is fundamental to security is hard

Authentication can enable single sign on (or reduced sign on) digital signatures

Authentication Characterized


Page 6

Something you knowPasswords, Personal facts

Something you haveSmart card, One-Time-Password generator, PC …

Something you areFingerprint, Iris, DNA, Voiceprint, …

Multifactor = 2 or more of theseLeap to 2-factor from 1-factor provides biggest gain2 factors typically from different categories above

Authentication Sliced


Page 7

Shared secrets versus public-private keysShared secrets do not scale, especially across

administrative domainsShared secrets do not facilitate single sign-onThe holy grail of public key infrastructure continues

to offer the best hope for scalability and single sign-on

Mostly true BUT don’t forgetKerberos, symmetric key single sign-on within an

enterpriseATM network

Authentication Sliced Differently: Take 1


Page 8

One-way authentication versus mutual authentication

One-way authentication is the normIt is particularly susceptible to phishingOne-time passwords are susceptible to MITM

attacks due to lack of mutual authentication

Authentication Sliced Differently: Take 2


Page 9

Two-factor (or multi-factor) Mutual authentication

Strong Authentication


Page 10

Existing Authentication Methods & Threats

Strong User Authentication

Weak User Authentication

Transaction Authentication


Page 11

Why Are These Security Measures Vulnerable?

Authentication technologies are vulnerable to MITM Phishing 2.0 attacks when:

They rely on weak, easily spoofable information

They rely on ‘shared secrets’

They use only one-way SSL security

Vulnerable Authentication Technologies :IP Geo, Device Fingerprint, OTP Tokens, Scratch Cards, Grid Cards, Cookies, Text, and Pictures


Page 12

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Are Happening

A man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): attacker is able to read, insert and modify transactions between two parties without either party knowing that the link between them has been compromised.

CitiBank Attack:July 10th, 2006Defeated OTP Tokens35 MITM Sites in Russia

Amazon Attack:January 3rd, 2007Defeated Username/Password

Bank of America:April 10th, 2007Defeats Sitekey Cookie/Picture (Movie)

ABN AMRO:April 20th, 2007Defeats OTP Token


Page 13

The Citibank Attack Decrypted

Phishing email

Links to fake CitiBusiness login page, hosted in Russia by Tufel-Club.ru and routed through botnet.

Inputs and steals users’ credentials (including Token code) in real time at the actual CitiBusiness.com site

Attacker changes transaction or executes a new transaction


Page 14

IP Spoofing Story

IP Spoofing predicted in Bell Labs report ≈ 1985 1st Generation firewalls deployed ≈ 1992 IP Spoofing attacks proliferate in the wild ≈ 1993 VPNs emerge ≈ late 1990’s Vulnerability shifts to accessing end-point Network Admission Control ≈ 2000’s


Page 15

Evolution of Phishing

Phishing 1.0Attack: Capture reusable passwordsDefense: user education, cookies, pictures

Phishing 2.0Attack: MITM in the 1-way SSL channel, breaks OTPsDefense: 2-way SSL

Phishing 3.0Attack: Browser-based MITB client in front of 2-way SSLDefense: Transaction authentication outside browser

Phishing 4.0Attack: PC-based MIPC client in front of 2-way SSLDefense: Transaction authentication outside PC, PC hardening


Page 16

Sandhu’s Laws of Attackers

1. Attackers existYou will be attacked

2. Attackers have sharply escalating incentiveMoney, terrorism, warfare, espionage, sabotage, …

3. Attackers are lazy (follow path of least resistance)Attacks will escalate BUT no faster than necessary

4. Attackers are innovative (and stealthy)Eventually all feasible attacks will manifest

5. Attackers are copycatsKnown attacks will proliferate widely

6. Attackers have asymmetrical advantageNeed one point of failure


Page 17

Sandhu’s Laws of Defenders

1. Defenses are necessary

2. Defenses have escalating scope

3. Defenses raise barriers for attackers

4. Defenses will require new barriers over time

5. Defenses with better barriers have value

6. Defenses will be breached


Page 18

Sandhu’s Laws of Users

1. Users exist and are necessary

2. Users have escalating exposure

3. Users are lazy and expect convenience

4. Users are innovative and will bypass inconvenient security

5. Users are the weakest link

6. Users expect to be protected


Page 19

Operational Principles

A.Prepare for tomorrow’s attacks, not just yesterday’sGood defenders strive to stay ahead of the curve, bad

defenders forever lag

B.Take care of tomorrow’s attacks before next year’s attacks

Researchers will and should pursue defense against attacks that will manifest far in the future BUT these solutions will deploy only as attacks catch up

C.Use future-proof barriersDefenders need a roadmap and need to make

adjustments

D.It’s all about trade-offsSecurity, Convenience, Cost

Documents

Authentication: the problem that will not go away Prof. Ravi Sandhu Chief Scientist [email protected] 703 283 3484 Protecting Online Identity