EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-5156. Marzo 11, 1954.]

CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante y apelante, contra ISAIAS

FERNANDO, Director de Obras Públicas, demandado y apelado.

D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.

El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Díaz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A.

Torres en representacion del apelado.

SYLLABUS

PRACTICA FORENSE; ACCION CONTRA UN FUNCIONARIO PUBLICO

POR DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS. — La acción contra el demandado como Director de

Obras Públicas encargado y responsable de la construcción de los sistemas de

irrigación en Filipinas, por alegadas extralimitaciones en el desempeño de sus

funciones oficiales, es una dirigida personalmente contra él. "Ordinarily the officer or

employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any

other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his

tortious act." (49 Am. Jur. 28.) En ese caso, no procede el sobreseimiento de la

demanda por el fundamento de que la acción es una dirigida contra la República de

Filipinas.

D E C I S I O N

DIOKNO, M p:

Carmen Festejo, dueña de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9

hectáreas y media de superfice, demandó a "Isaías Fernando Director, Bureau of

Public Works, que como tal Director de Obras Públicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y

proyectos de irrigación y es el funcionario responsable de la construcción de los

sistemas de irrigación en el país," alegando que — .

"The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without

authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without

obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the

plaintiff, and against her express objection, unlawfully took possession of

portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation

canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about

the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to

the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff." — R. on A., p. 3.

causando a ella variados daños y perjuicios. Pidió, en su consecuencia, sentencia

condenando el demandado:

". . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of

land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179

square meters and to return the land to its former condition

under the expenses of the defendant." . . .

"In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and

appropriated can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to

pay to the plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the portions totalling an

area of 24,179 square meters;" — R. on A., p. 5.

y además a pagar P9,756.19 de daños y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las

costas R. on A., pp. 5-6.

El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, presentó moción de

sobreseimiento de la demanda por el fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene

jurisdicción para dictar sentencia válida contra él, toda vez que judicialmente la

reclamación es contra la República de Filipinas, y esta no ha presentado su

consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior estimó la moción y sobreseyó la

demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.

En apelación, la demandante sostiene que fué un error considerar la demanda

como una contra la República y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.

La moción contra "Isaías Fernando, Director de Obras Públicas, encargado y

responsable de la construcción de los sistemas de irrigación en Filipinas" es una

dirigida personalmente contra él, por actos que asumió ejecutar en su concepto oficial.

La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga

cometer en el desempeño de sus funciones oficiales.

Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn. 584, 24 NW

49, 90 ALR 1472. Allí el Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la

carretera ocupó o se apropió de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal

Supremo del Estado declaró que es personalmente responsable al dueño de los daños

causados. Declaró además que la ratificación de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era

equivalente a una orden a los mismos. He aquí lo dijo el Tribunal.

"We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding

that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the

scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way

upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and

usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties

imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's

land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the

limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before

construction began. . . .

"'Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be

inferred from acquiescence where there is power to restrain.' It is unnecessary to

consider other cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury could find or

infer that, in so far as there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's

land as a dumping place for the rock to be removed from the additional

appropriated right of way, defendant planned, approved, and ratified what was

done by his subordinates." — Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A. L. R., 1472, 1476,

1477.

La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos

parecidos se resume como sigue:

"Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally

liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for

whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act." — 49 Am. Jur. 289. . .

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power

conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a

public agent." — 43 Am. Jur. 86.

"It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-

judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction

and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to

personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by

law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under

color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are

wholly without authority." — 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.

El articulo 32 del Código Civil dice, a su vez:

"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,

who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes

or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be

liable to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx.

"(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of

law;

xxx xxx xxx.

"In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the

defendant's acts or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party

has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for

damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of

any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a

preponderance of evidence.

"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may

also be adjudicated."

Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda,

No. L-1648, Agosto 17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre

1950.

Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuación de la tramitación de la

demanda conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto

a las costas. Así se ordena.

Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo y Labrador, MM., estan conformes.

Separate Opinions

CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than

that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as

an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias

Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the

complaint, it is alleged:

"4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works is in

charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the

construction of irrigation system in the Philippines:

5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works,

without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,

without obtaining first a right of way and without the consent and knowledge of

the plaintiff, and against her express objection, unlawfully took possession of

portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation

canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about

the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to

the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff." (Italics supplied.)

The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were

performed by said defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly

shows that the designation of his office was included in the title of the case to indicate

that he was being sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the

fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a judgment.

"Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession

of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate

area of 24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former condition under

the expense of the defendant". (Paragraph a, of the complaint).

We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system

referred to in the complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to

the same pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the

Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds, which

pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner

in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works,

the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government. Consequently, in

praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the irrigation canal

involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff herein, and that said land be

restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its

possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the

Government to be removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez * (47 Off. Gaz.,

665), the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in interest as defendant" in the

case at bar. In other words, the same partakes of the nature of a suit against the state

and may not be maintained without its consent.

Hence I am constrained to dissent.

Bengzon, J., concurs.

||| (Festejo v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-26803. October 14, 1975.]

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION COMPANY,

CURTISS CANDY COMPANY, CUDAHY PACKING CO.,

CLUETT, PEABODY & CO., INC., CANNON MILLS COMPANY,

FORMICA CORPORATION, GENERAL MOTORS

CORPORATION, INTERNATIONAL LATEX CORPORATION,

KAYSER-ROTH CORPORATION, M & R DIETETIC

LABORATORIES, INC., OLIN MATHIESON, PARFUM CIRO,

INC., PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, PROCTER &

GAMBLE PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

PARFUMS PORVIL DENTRIFICES DU DOCTEUR PIERRE

REUNIS SOCIETE ANONYME, R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO

COMPANY, SWIFT AND COMPANY, STERLING PRODUCTS

INTERNATIONAL, THE CLOROX COMPANY, WARNER

LAMBERT PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY and ZENITH

RADIO CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF

PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P.

VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ,

respondents.

Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ANTONIO, J p:

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners

challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the

Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of

Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes"

proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits

of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by

him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a

mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining

the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-

mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the

Patent Office.

Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference

and cancellation proceedings in said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896,

282, 247, 354, 246, 332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267, 111, 400, 324, 114, 159,

346, and 404.

Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the Director of Patents is

vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of

Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:

"168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. — The Director of

Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the

event that the Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of

Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases,

instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over

the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision shall be

subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of

notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said

sections are applicable and appropriate and the appeal fee shall be P25.00."

The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by

the Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and

Commerce. 1

Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce, amended the aforequoted Rule 168 to read as follows:.

"168. Original jurisdictional inter partes proceedings. — The Director of

Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. [In the

event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this

Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of

the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences taxes over the

original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be

subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of

notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said

sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.]

Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title

shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking

official of the office designated by the Director but all judgments determining

the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director

and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.).

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the

hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez,

Teofilo Velasco, Rustice Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.

Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear

their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under

the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said

objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for

mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of

petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of

Patents under the general law 2 and Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 3* to sustain the

contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is

"empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers

or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of

the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the

Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to

the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the

same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department

Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,

for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority

undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark

Law (Republic Act No. 166).

It has been held that power conferred upon an administrative agency to which

the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may

be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may

be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express

provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4 There is no provision

either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so

far as the designation of hearing examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such

authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive

interpretation of the Act.

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents

suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act

No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative

flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the

administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to

determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, 5 decide

applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, 6 cancellations of patents under

Republic Act No. 165, 7 inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, 8 claims of

interference, 9 cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law 10 and other matters in

connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in

view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and

every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his

other duties. 11 For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the

discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would

not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction

of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at

top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time

and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious

consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a far wider range of

delegations to subordinate officers. This subdelegation of power has been justified by

"sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to

concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and

practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the

smaller and far less important matters of detail." 12

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the

administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power

to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will

be made. 13

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment

and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical

administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the

facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. 14 It is sufficient that the

judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.

Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the

actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in

the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and

submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in

the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are

fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer

concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is,

however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of

making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must

consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on

the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on

the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.

Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not

jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced

by the proceedings.

Moreover, as then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this

Court, has correctly pointed out, the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing

officers of the Philippine Patent Office from 1963 to 1968 18 not only confirms the

departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the act of

the Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the

administration of the law. 19

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against

petitioners.

Castro (Actg. C.J.), Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., is on leave.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.

||| (American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-26803, October 14, 1975)