Autocracy and Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia - Kim Andersen

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Autocracy and democracy in post-Soviet Russia

and Ukraine

Kim Andersen

January 8, 2012

Contents

1 Introduction 3

2 Theoretical introduction 4

2.1 Democracy and autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2 Consolidation of democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3 Checks and balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3 Introducing the explanans 8

3.1 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3.2 Party system and party of power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3.3 Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4 Methodological approach 13

4.1 Most similar systems design and process tracing . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2 Operationalisation and causal links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4.2.1 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4.2.2 Party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4.2.3 Party of power (PoP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154.2.4 Author of the constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4.3 Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine 17

6 Case study 23

6.1 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

6.2 Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

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7 Considering an alternative explanation 27

8 Discussion and conclusion 28

8.1 Diffusion versus the rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

8.2 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 32

B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 33

C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 34

D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 35

E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007 36

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1 Introduction

Both Russia and Ukraine became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991, and

as “young” countries, their democratic history have been turbulent. Execu-

tive and legaslative arm-wrestling over power-sharing has been the norm rather

than the exception. Despite these scuffles, Ukraine managed to embark on a

consolidation course, whereas Russia slided into autocracy as depicted in figure

1. Thus, the research question sounds, Why did Russia slide into autocracy,

whereas Ukraine remained somewhat stable in the same period .

Figure 1: Democratic development in Russia and Ukraine according to Freedom

House

Notes: Scores are an addition of political rights and civil liberties, and as such, most

only be seen as a rough estimate.

Source: Freedom-House (2011)

The understanding of the research question entails three pivotal components of

democracy. First of all, a clear definition of democracy is needed. Secondly,

yet equally important, the utilisation of Linz and Stepan as well as Schedler’s

theoretical conceptualisation of consolidation is needed. Thirdly, to consolidate

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democracy, a functional political system is needed, and this depends on the

checks and balances especially between the presidency and parliament. Hence,this paper deals with the question of democratic consolidation and encroach-

ment through a battery of structural and actor explanans derived from these

theoretical understandings. Thus, it is the structure-actor dichotomy that acts

as the central structure of the paper.

The demise and collapse of democracy has often been related to a presence

of natural resources such as oil and minerals (Ross, 2001: 356f). Yet these mod-

ernisation theorists, who forward these theoretical understandings, have only

developed a conceptual understanding of the effects of natural resources on the

state apparatus and its relationship with its population. They have not delved

upon how natural resources enters the system. Often it has been assumed that

states autocratise and then use the resources to bolster the regime. This paper

attempts to develop an understanding of how natural resources enter the polit-

ical system. The argument is developed in section 3.1. For now it must suffice

to say that the interplay between natural resources , party system , constitution ,

and party of power determine the effectiveness of the checks and balances. This

is answered by utilising a “Most Similar Systems Design” bolstered by “Process

tracing”.

Finally, the scope conditions of this paper needs to be stated. First of all, the

focus is new democracies. Functioning democracies such as Norway, have accessto natural resources, yet because of the consolidated nature of these democracies,

they do not get impeded. Thus, the countries of interest are those that can be

considered newly constituted democracies embarking on a consolidation course.

Finally, these countries must have realised their natural resources and priva-

tised these former state assets. Hence, this paper is limited to post-communist

countries and in particular the former Soviet Union.

The next section deals with the theoretical introduction, whereas the third

section elaborates on the explanans. The fourth and the fifth section depict the

theoretical model and the methodological approach, whereas section six and

seven compares and elaborates on the comparison through process tracing. The

eighth section delves briefly upon the question of diffusion as an alternative

explanation. The last section discuss and concludes.

2 Theoretical introduction

This section sets out to develop an understanding of democracy and autocracy.

Hereafter it continues with the question of consolidation and finally addresses

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checks and balances as are needed for the functioning of democracy.

2.1 Democracy and autocracy

Democracy is a contested concept. Definitions are as numerous as there are

regimes claiming the name of democracy. The right definition of democracy

depends on the cases. The Ogden-Richards triangle shows the relationship be-

tween the intension of the definition and the number of cases or extensions.

Thus, using a definition with many intensions such as liberal democracy, the

number of cases is reduced to western democracies. This paper deals with cases

that are far from being liberal democracies, yet have significant democratic as

well as autocratic traits. Thus, to capture these countries, two definitions suit-able of these cases are needed.

The first definition that needs to be elucidated is that of democracy under-

stood as minimalist democracy. According to Schumpeter, who subscribes to a

minimalist definition, democracy is an arena where deliberation takes place, yet

he denounces this as a possibility. Hence, he leaves the electorate with the task

of electing the deliberating leadership (Moller and Skaaning, forthcomming).

This position is echoed by Moller and Skaaning, who argue that minimalist

democracy includes competitive elections (Moller and Skaaning, 2010: 271). It

is important to stress the competitive element of elections. Such elections stress

the importance of a balanced polity, because an imbalanced polity would be

able to make encroachments on the meaningfulness of competitive elections (cf.

section 2.3).

The second definition is that of autocracy . Linz and Stepan (1996: 38f) define

autocracy as a political system with limited pluralism, and thus mobilisation is

not prevalent. There is no guiding ideology, and hence the system is arbitrary1.

The government is leaded by a small group, which is exercising power within

illdefined formal limits but with predictable norms. It is also important to

note that there are no checks and balances. The polity is biased in favour of

the leadership. The understanding of the leadership is further developed byCheibub et al. (2010: 87), who define three types of autocracy by stressing

three types of leadership. The leadership-type that is relevant in this paper is

the one where there are no hereditary succession nor usage of titles as well as

no military involvment. This type of autocracy is defined as civilian (ibid.).

To sum up, this paper involves two distinct definitions. One defining democ-

racy as involving competitive elections and a balanced polity, and the other in-

volving autocracy defined as a polity without elections and a guiding ideology.

1This proposition is supported by the lack of rule of law.

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The next section deals with consolidation, which develops an understanding of

the direction of regime. It is followed by one about checks and balances, seenas essential to even minimalist democracies in order to maintain meaningful

democratic elections.

2.2 Consolidation of democracy

Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) argue that consolidation of democracy requires be-

havioural, attitudinal, and constitutional changes. Their behavioural dimension

entails that no actor, whether social, political etc. can spend resources on

developing alternatives to the democratic regime or attempt to secede. The

attitudinal dimension focuses primarily on the ordinary people, who have toaccept democracy institutionally and procedurally as the most appropriate way

to govern the state. Finally, the constitutional dimension requires that actors

within the state solve issues through laws, procedures, and institutions (ibid.).

Thus, as Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) write, a consolidated democracy is the ”[...]

political situation in which [...] democracy has become ’the only game in town’.”

Because the focus of this paper is the attempt to consolidate democracy, it

is important to dwell on the negative side of the consolidation process. That is,

the attempts to weaken democracy. Schedler (1998: 93) argues that there are

principally two dangers, young consolidating democracies faces. The first is the

democratic breakdown, whereas the second is the democratic erosion.

Democratic breakdown necessitates instability, uncertainty, vulnerability, and

reversibility. The confidence in the regime, which is needed for it to avoid break-

down, is absent (Schedler, 1998: 94ff). Schedler (1998: 96) argues that a regime

facing such threats, is a regime that has not been able to eliminate disloyal

players. Using Linz and Stepan’s arguments, the necessary behavioural changes

among the (potential) ruling elites have not been thorough enough. Schedler

argues that if a regime is facing a breakdown, however, it is not only the elim-

ination of disloyal players that lacks. The regime has not been able to create

the mass legitimacy, and thus failed to shape pro-democratic attitudes in thepopulation.

The gradual democratic erosion is a problem, many new democratic regimes

faces. Put bluntly, erosion requires ”[...] the intermittent or gradual weakening

of democracy by those elected to lead it.” (Schedler, 1998: 97). Such gradual

weakening is exemplified by attacks on institutions of democracy such as elec-

tions or attempts to subvert the rule of law. It might also be the creation of

hegemonic parties in order to strangle electoral competition as well as the abuse

of state resources by the incumbents in order to maintain power (Schedler, 1998:

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97ff). Whereas the erosion of rule of law is an attack on the constitutional so-

lution of problems as indicated by Linz and Stepan, democratic erosion is verymuch a question of behaviour.

To sum up, democratic consolidation is changes in elite behaviour, popular

attitudes, and the acceptance of the law as the ultimate arbiter of solutions to

problems. Breakdown and erosion entail a negative development of Linz and

Stepan’s three dimensions.

2.3 Checks and balances

Until now, this paper has considered democracy and consolidation, but to fully

grasp their relationship, the concept of checks and balances must be probed.Following Schedler’s ”gradual weakening”-logic as depicted above, the question

of Diamond and Morlino’s (2005: xxi) horizontal accountability, must be scru-

tinised. Diamond and Morlino argue that horizontal accountability is related to

the ability of one institution to keep a check on another institution. The per-

haps most prominent example is the American system, which has an elaborate

seperation of powers between the Congress and the presidency among other.

Each branch has certain rights that can keep other branches in check. Thus,

the two chambers of Congress can impeach, convict, and remove a president as

an example. They are also able to deny the president legislation as well as taxes

(Kousser and Ranney, 2008: 721). The president, on the other hand, is able to

veto Congress legislation (ibid.).

In illiberal systems, accountability rarely works horizontal, and at best ver-

tical, implying that the president is not accountable to any institutions and only

to the people (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 277). Schedler brought forth, as de-

picted in section 2.2, the concept of gradual weakening. If the presidency is only

subject to the people, it is in a favourable position to weaken other institutions

such as the parliament.

These concerns follow Linz’ critique of the presidency. Solutions to democracy-

related issues depends on the personality and style of the president (Linz, 1990:60). The popular mandate given to the president through the direct election,

might make the president more prone to get head-to-head with the parliament

rather than settling the disputes (Linz, 1990: 52f). However, the parliament are

not necessary ready to give in, as they too have popular backing. This is what

Linz defines as the problem of dual legitimacy. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997:

469) are not as pessimistic as Linz, because of the possibility of solving these

issues through a careful institutional design.

To sum up, the state of the checks and balances is important if democracy

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has to have a chance to consolidate. As Mainwaring and Shugart correctly

points out, the solution lies in the institutional design, and thus, presidentialbiased polities have greater maneuverability when it comes to encroaching the

parliamentarian powers. Hence, the institutional design needs to balance the

presidency and the parliament as well as create the necessary mechanisms that

can provide solutions. This lends credence to two hypotheses:

H1: Imbalanced polities turn autocratic because the presidency is capable of

encroaching parliamentarian power, and thus have more maneuverability

in manipulating the democratic institutions.

HA: A balanced polity can consolidate.

3 Introducing the explanans

As briefly mentioned in the Introduction , the main structure of this paper is

the structure-actor2 dichotomy, and its effect on checks and balances. It is

tempting to define natural resources , party system , and constitution as struc-

tural explanations, whereas a party of power as an actor explanation. However,

as is evidenced in section 3.3, the constitution must be seen as a shallow ex-

planan dominated by actors because of Preuss’ arguments regarding the role of

constitutions in newly established regimes. The explanan overview is depictedin table 1.

Table 1: Overview of explanans

Name Structure Actor

Natural resources X

Party system X

Constitution X

Party of power X

Before delving on the explanans, Kitschelt’s understanding of structure and ac-

tor based explanans needs elucidation. According to Kitschelt (2003: 74), deep

or structural explanations trump its proximate or actor-based counterparts. He

does not deny the usefulness of the actor explanan, yet he stresses that their role

is to complement the deep explanan. Such complementary explanans diverge

from situations where the deep course brings about the proximate explanan

2Throughout the paper deep and structural are used intertwined for the same type of

explanan like proximate, shallow and actor-based are used for the same type of explanan.

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on the cleavages created in society. These cleavages structure the outlook of

parties (Whitefield, 2002: 181) and hence the parliament. According to Aardal(1994: 220), cleavages originate in different conflicts such as the dichotomy

between the centre of a country, and its periphery, the urban-rural conflict, or

the classic worker-capitalist conflict3.

The stability of cleavags are thus essential to the stability of the party system.

Hence, the question of the strength of the stability or the level of volatility is of

greatest importance. Pedersen (1979: 3) quotes Ascher and Tarrow, who define

volatility as the ”[...] net change within the electoral party system resulting

from individual vote transfers.”. The essential question is to investigate what

leads to these movements of votes.

According to Madrid (2005: 2), the most volatile parties are those dependent

on economic cleavages. Fluctuations in the economy are likely to be translated

into changes in voter preferences. Examples of more stable cleavages, can be

found in Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis of the party system dominating western

Europe. They find that parties dependent on ethnolinguistic, religious, and

territorial, as well as class-based cleavages are less subject to volatility (Madrid,

2005: 3). The explanation why this is so might be straight forward and follows

the concept of deep and proximate explanans. Whereas it is easier to change

one’s economic position, to change one’s ethnolinguistic position is impossible.

If choice of party is dependent on economy rather than ethnolinguistics, it isexpected that the voter moves when the economy moves.

The volatility of parties are, however, not only dependent on the type of

parties, but also on the absolute number, fragmentation as well as their age.

Thus, many, young, and fragmented parties are more volatile than their old,

few and less fragmented counterparts (ibid.). Madrid also argues that polarised

party systems are less volatile.

To sumarise, volatility is dominated by substantial and structural factors.

The subtantial factors are related to the type of cleavage, whereas the structural

are related to the different parties and their relationship. Thus, a very stable

party system is one dominated by few, old, and not very fragmented parties

fluctuating around such cleavages as class or ethnicity.

The second argument is related to that of a party of power , which is, according

to Almond et al. (2008: 82), personalistic in the sense that they are built around

a small number of actors and thus void of any ideology. This echoes the traits

3Aardal delves into the demands of what constitutes a real cleavage. In this paper, it is

assumed that those cleavages structuring the Russian and Ukrainian party system fulfill these

demands.

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3.3 Constitution

A constitution is a very unique explanan in the sense that it fuses the deep and

proximate or actor-based explanans. It is deep in the sense that it defines the

political framework of any country. It is proximate precisely because it is the

written foundation of a country, which entails authors and interests. Thus, this

section must elucidate both the structural components of the constitution as

well as the actor-based components.

Preuss’ (1992-93: 641) argues that the constitution ”[...] creates the politi-

cal and institutional preconditions for the emergence of totally new social and

political actors.” (my emphasis). Hence, the constitution defines the country’s

political set up. One pivotal goal of such a constitutionally defined setup, is toplace the elected representation over all other branches of government (Preuss,

1992-93: 642), thus making it the highest source of authority in any society

only subject to the constitution itself. Constitutional superiority is echoed by

Sieyes, who stresses that ”No type of delegated power can in any way alter the

conditions of its delegation.” (Preuss, 1992-93: 653). O’Donnell’s emphasis on

the importance of the rule of law for liberal democracies echo these positions.

He argues that it is the essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy

rests. It ensures political rights, civil liberties, accountability, and a limitation

on the prerogatives of the state (O’Donnell, 2004: 32)4.

The proximate component of the constitutional explanan is vested in Burke’s

argument that constitutions are ”[...] made by the peculiar circumstances, occa-

sions, tempers, dispostions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people ,

which disclose themselves only in a long space of time.” (my emphasis) (Preuss,

1992-93: 639). Hence, while it is plausible to argue that there are structural

factors that shape these moods and habitudes, it is actors that define the consti-

tution, and as mentioned above, newly created countries can to a certain extent

shape their constitution as they see fit. One prominent constraint mentioned by

Preuss is that of the former regime, which in one way or the other inspires the

founding fathers of the new polity (ibid.). As an example, Easter (1997: 187)argues that depending on the structure of the former elites, different types of

regimes occur.

Two issues are worth mentioning in relation with section 2.2. Feher argues

that ”[...] a constitution based on will can only endure as long as those persons

whose wills backed the document.” (Preuss, 1992-93: 640). If the constitution

4Although O’Donnell does not say it explicitly, it assumed that the type of rule of law he

deals with, is that of constitutional rule of law. This is based on his emphasis of what rule of

law ensures.

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does not receive the support described by Linz and Stepan, it might not last.

Hence, in order for a democratic regime to maximise legitimacy, it needs todeliver a constitution that can be broadly accepted especially by all institutional

actors. This lends crendence to the importance of the author that wrote the

constitution. Is it the parliament or is it the presidency. If neither can agree on

it, will they attempt to overthrow the document. Tsebelis (2002: 27) argues that

the unanimity core is dependent on the preferences of the actors in question.

Assuming that the presidency submits a draft that lies outside the indifference

lines of the parliament, conflict arises. It is in such a situation, a constitutional

battle might either weaken or even force a democracy to break down (cf. section

2.2).

To sum up, the constitution entails a definition of the checks and balances

as well as battles between those with interests in the setup. Any constitutional

document built on will, cannot garner mass support, and thus might not sur-

vive its creator. Thus, in order to consolidate, democracy needs a constitution

accepted by the key institutions of the regime, which in this paper is assumed

to be the presidency and the parliament. Or put inversely, any constitution

favouring the presidency might damage the democratic development.

4 Methodological approach

4.1 Most similar systems design and process tracing

The methodological approach is deterministic, or what is known as a most simi-

lar systems design (MSSD) followed by process tracing that probes the findings

of the MSSD. Landman (2006: 29) argues that MSSD seeks to compare cases

that are alike on most explanans, yet varies on key explanans as well as the

outcome. To maximise the difference in the outcome, the case is selected on the

explanandum (Landman, 2006: 30).

As mentioned above, the methodological approach is deterministic. As op-

posed to probabilistic methodology that deems relationships probable, deter-ministic assumes that explanan X leads to outcome Y. Hence, it is very difficult

to know whether the neighbouring case fits the same relationship, and thus

the question of outliers become important. This addressed through the scope

conditions depicted in section 1. SSDs demand that all relevant explanans are

specified, and that the far majority of these are held constant. As is evidenced

below, this is not the case of this study.

To address this caveat, a process tracing method as described by Bennett

(2005: 206) is utilised. It is an attempt to identify intervening causal processes.

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This makes it an ideal companion for MSSDs especially like the one of this

paper. The original purpose of an MSSD is to single out the key explanan anddetermine the deterministic relationship, but because this paper does not have

a single explanan, the process tracing must attempt not only to single out the

most important explanan, it must also define the causal relationship. Bennett

identifies several different forms of process traincing. The one used in this paper

is an analytical explanation, which is basically a detailed narrative couched in

theoretical terms. Hence, it is along the lines of the theory explained in section

2 and the operationalisation depicted in section 4.2 the process tracing takes

place.

4.2 Operationalisation and causal links

In the sections below, each explanan is operationsalised, and the causal links are

spelled out. The model is defined in section 4.3 depicted in figure 2. Regarding

the series of constants depicted in table 2 on page 22 this paper subscribes to

Møller and Skaaning’s (2009: 307) understanding of the economic level, legacy,

and transition (cf. table 2). Therefore further elaboration on these explanans

are not conducted. As depicted in table 1, the two first are understood as

structures, whereas the latter two are understood as actor-based explanans.

4.2.1 Natural resources

Natural resources are a binary and structural explanan. It is either present or

absent. The understanding of what constitutes a natural resource as well as the

effect of such, follows Ross’ (2001: 356f) findings regarding the negative effect

on democracy from both oil and minerals. The presence of natural resources can

be used to control society through the rentier and repression effect as described

in section 3.1.

The causal chain argues that natural resources are either granted the in-

cumbent through private sponsors or through parties of power with a nega-

tive effect on the checks and balances. Natural resources give the incumbent aresource-advantage. To fully understand these arguments, two qualifications are

needed. The idea that natural resources are granted the incumbent through pri-

vate sponsors is based on the assumption that former state corporations have

been privatised. Alternatively, if the incumbent has a party of power strong

enough to nationalise privatised state corporations, the natural resources are at

his disposal without the need of private consent. Thus, it can be argued that

natural resources bolster the negative effects of disloyal elites (cf. 2.3 and the

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behavioural dimension) or parties of power rather than being a negative effect

in itself.

4.2.2 Party system

The party system is based on the concept of cleavages (cf. section 3.2), and

as such, it is considered a structural explanan. The cleavage is the structuring

part of a party system, and void cleavages, make a party system volatile and

thus not very structured. Thus, to measure the presence of strong cleavages or

alternatively, a high degree of volatility, the question of voting behaviour needs

to be addressed. To identify cleavages, voter choices are cross referenced with

the party’s supporter base and fluctuations in support over time. To estimatevolatility, party support from election to election is measured. This method

follow Ascher and Tarrow’s definition albeit in a simplified manner. Instead

of looking at percentage of votes each party gains, the number of seats are

evaluated. Albeit the method is crude compared to the approach defined by

Pedersen, it still gives a rough idea about whether a system is volatile.

The causal chain indicates that on the one hand, cleavages have a negative

effect on parties of power as a result of their catch-all nature as well as a postive

effect on checks and balances. This is so because the parliament is strongly

organised, and thus it might be dangerous to neglect certain groups. The same

positive effect can be found in relation with the writing of the constitution.

Strong cleavages make it more difficult for the author to neglect large parts of

the population. This is built on the assumption that all are able and allowed to

create representation. This follows the lines of section 2.1 and the importance

of meaningful elections. Autocracies might try to prevent certain groups in

participating in any form of electoral process..

4.2.3 Party of power (PoP)

A party of power is unique in the sense that they are personalistic and built

around a small number of actors. Thus, they are not dependent on a specificcleavage (cf. section 3.2), and entails an actor decision, which lends credence to

their definition as actor-based explanans. Hence, to measure a party of power,

the party must as a minimum be the most significant party in the parliament.

This is built on the assumption that parties of power without any significant

influence, cannot tilt the checks and balances. Secondly, yet equally important,

the party of power needs to have clear connections to the presidency.

The causal chain related to the party of power indicates that the presence

of such parties have a negative effect on checks and balances and hence the

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parliament because of its ability to prevent the parliament from functioning. It

is a problem if issues with the presidency must be attenuated (cf. 2.3)5

. Strongparties of power are also in a better position to re-write the constitution and

thus tamper with the institutions of democracy as well as claim power over state

assets. In both scenarios, the party of power slant the checks and balances in

favour of the president.

4.2.4 Author of the constitution

Feher’s argument regarding the survival of will-based constitutions is pitvotal

for the operationalisation of this explanan (cf. section 3.3). Will-based consti-

tutions are assumed to lie outside Tsebelis unanimity core. Thus, the centralaim of this explanan is to measure the conflict surrounding the constitution.

Hence, the essential question to ask is, whether the author (thus actor-based

explanan) has taken other than narrow interests into consideration, and thus

making the constitution a question of will. This measurement is based on the

assumption that a constitution defined by the presidency is pro-presidential and

thus imbalancing.

The causal chain indicates that the strength of the cleavages (or volatility)

and party of power work through the framework of the constitution. However,

assuming that a parliament is already settled, there is an extra-constitutional

parliamentarian framework, which affects the development of the constitution

through its cleavages. Thus, the parliament and the presidency are both affected

and affect the constitution.

4.3 Theoretical model

As indicated in section 4.2 each explanan plays a signficant role through various

chains in affecting the checks and balances. As depicted in figure 2 on page 17

the negative effect of natural resources enters the polity either through private

sponsors or parties of power.

The question of the party system enters independent of natural resouces. Itaffects the strength of the party of power as well as the checks and balances.

The strength of the party of power is dependent on the degree of volatility and

its ability to gain the majority of the votes. It is in scenarios of this kind that

the party of power has a negative effect on the parliament and thus the checks

and balance.

5This argument is built around Mainwaring and Shugart’s understanding that carefully

designed systems can attenuate problems with presidentialism. One such feature might be

the balancing between the parliament and the presidency.

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Despite the traditional understanding of constitutions as a relatively deep

and structural variable, in new countries, it is highly dependent on the powerarrangement. This make it subject to the cleavage / volatility situation as well

as parties of power. Yet because it is the ultimate definer of checks and balances,

it is important to understand who has authored the document and the author’s

position.

Figure 2: Theoretical model

5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine

Russia has an abundance of natural resources, but during the transition-phase,

Russia privatised state-owned enterprises, that mined for natural resources, en

masse (Remington, 2008: 394). This created a very strong group of oligarchs,

referred to as a ”[...] group of seven or so bankers who applied their vast wealth

and influence to ensure the re-election of Boris El’tsin as President in 1996.“(Duncan, 2007: 2). During most of Yeltsin’s time as president, they supported

him ardently, and during his brief struggle with then-prime minister Jevgenij

Primakov, they helped removed the popular prime minister (Duncan, 2007: 8).

Putin changed the privatisation trend, and started a re-nationalisation of key

industries. One effect of this is elaborated in connection with parties of power,

yet for now it must suffice to say that it strengthen it. Ambrosio (2009: 51)

notes that the Russian elite created a series of state controlled NGOs to insulate

Russia from external interference (cf. section 7). Thus, the negative effects of

17



natural resources are found in connection with elections and the rentier effect.

Natural resources is not playing as important a role in Ukraine as in Russia.However, the Ukraine gas transit system transport around 120 billion cubic

metres or 80 percent of Russia’s gas to Europe (Gnedina and Emerson, 2009:

2). The system is administrated by a state energy company, Naftohaz, but

because of economic mismanagement, Naftohaz is constantly on the bringe of

bankruptcy and is indepted to the Russian energy-giant Gazprom (ibid.). Thus,

despite the possibility of rents, mismanagement has prevented the Ukrainian

state access to ”easy” money, and as noted in section 7, it is dependent on

Russia.

The economic cleavage can be seen as a direct consequence of the privatisation

or chock-theory in Russia. Because of the transition many people slided into

powerty, and unemployment rates soared. The difference between rich and poor

as measured by the Gini-index doubled (Remington, 2008: 395f). In 1999 the

CPRF6 gained most votes among the poorest, whereas Unity or Yeltsin’s party

had greatest success among the wealthier (Rose, 2007). This voter allignment is

echoed in the 2003 election, where Unity’s successor, United Russia, gained most

votes among the richer (Remington, 2008: 391). The growth in the supporters of

United Russia is assumed to be explained by the growth in GDP7 (Rose, 2007).

These trends echo Madrid’s depiction of economic cleavages as susceptible to

volatility. Russia holds a Duma election in 1993 and again in 1995. In 1993

Russia’s Choice wins 70 seats. In 1995 it is reduced to meagre nine seats. CPRF

wins 103 seats in the same period. Another way to observe volatility in this

period, is to observe the total number of parties. In 1993 12 parties contested.

Of those 12 parties, only seven of those parties contested in the 1995 election

(cf. appendix A). From the 1995 election, only four parties contested during

the 1999 election. The CPRF, that benefitted from the economic downturn, are

also subject to volatility. They are decimated to 52 seats in 2003, whereas the

new party, United Russia, battered its way unto the political stage with 222

seats. Of the 1999 parties, only four parties contested in 2003 (cf. appendix B).The 2007 election follows this trend (cf. appendix C). Thus, it is possible to

argue that despite the presence of an indeed strong economic cleavage, volatility

is high (cf. section 3.2).

Ukraine is very different from Russia in the sense that Ukraine is dominated

by two large ethnic groups. The majority of the people are ethnic Ukrainian,

6The Communist Party of the Russian Federation7This is supported by the development in the GDP, which is negative until 1998. From

1999 it grows with an average of two to three percent (Remington, 2008: 396).

18



whereas the largest minority is ethnic Russian. These regional patterns are

echoed in the 1998 election8

, where Russians in general backed the Communists,and the ethnic Ukrainians backed Rukh. The latter being an essential part of the

independence movement (D’Anieri, 2006: 111). This is also echoed in the 2002

parliamentarian election as well as the presidential elections (D’Anieri, 2006:

108f). To disconfirm the claim that Russians’ favour the left-wing because

of economy, it is worth noting that the Russians’ did not switch to a non-

ethnic based party during the strengthening of the Ukrainian GDP in the 2000s

(Duenwald, Gueorguiev and Schaechter, 2005: 4). As is evidenced in appendix E

the Russians continued to vote for pro-Russian parties. Despite this very strong

cleavage, volatility is observed. The Communist participated in the 1994, 1998,

2002, and 2007 parliamentarian elections. In the first two elections they gained

seats, whereas they lost seats in both the 2002 and 2007 election. Of all the

Ukrainian parties, the Communist party is the most stable with the longest

election record. Of the other parties three survive from 1994 to 1998, whereas

from 1999 to 2002, only two countinues. The same goes for 2007 (cf. appendix

D and E). Thus, despite the strong cleavage, there seems to be a degree of

volatility in the Ukrainian party system. It is smaller than in Russia, which

is evidenced in the relative smaller changes in voting behaviour among those

voting for the parties that manage to run for more than one election.

The post-Soviet Yeltsin authored constitution was approved by referendum in

1993. However, the run up to the approval was not void of trouble. Two distinct

positions emerged. Anti-Yeltsin forces sought to create a two-tiered form of

government, where presidential powers were limited. Yeltsin’s supporters, on the

other hand, wanted to maximise presidential power and minimise the Duma’s

ability to block Yeltsin (Remington, 2001: 160f). While anti-Yeltsin deputies

took part in a constitutional assembly, Yeltsin’s supporters sat up a presidential

counterpart with the aim of creating a presidential constitution (Remington,

2001: 168). This draft gave the president lawmaking prerogatives, but at the

same time gave the Duma and the Upper Chamber the possibility of overridevetoes by a two-thirds vote in each chamber (Remington, 2001: 169). While the

Duma refused to approve the Yeltsin-draft, Yeltsin decided to take the matter

outside the existing constitutional framework, and thus leaving the question

with the people. 54.8 percent voted in favour of his draft (Remington, 2001:

170). Thus, it is plausible to argue that Yeltsin alienated other parts of the

political arena as well as used will to get his draft approved (cf. section 6.1 for

8It is likely that the 1994 election follows these lines as well.

19



an elaboration of the effects).

The first Ukrainian constitutional document was approved in 1995 calledthe ”law on power”, whereas a real constitution was put in effect in 1996. As

in Russia much of the debate revolved around whether Ukraine should take a

presidential or semi-presidential path. The 1995 ”Law on Power” is a package

suggested by then-president Kuchma, which would give him powers, the parlia-

ment would otherwise not grant him. He used the unpopularity of the Rada and

the threat of referendum to make the Rada approve his package, which was ap-

proved in 2005. In relation with the constitution of 1996, Kuchma used the same

tactics as above, and as Rada speaker, Oleksandr Moroz argued, the constitu-

tion was perceived as the lesser of two evils, and pushed the constitution through

the Rada (D’Anieri, 2006: 84). Hence, in both cases, Kuchma went outside the

existing framework, where he had more power. Another constitutional battle

emerged in 2000, when Kuchma attempted to amend the constitution. This was

resisted by the Rada (D’Anieri, 2006: 90), but the high court decided that if

Kuchma proposed a referendum supported by the people that demanded change

of the constitution, the Rada was legally binded to change it (D’Anieri, 2006:

91). There was great support for the referendum, yet it did not consist of any

actual text to be replaced in the constitution. Once again Kucha threatened the

Rada with his fist, which made the Rada approve the amendments (D’Anieri,

2006: 92). Thus, as in Russia, the Ukrainian constitution is approved by fist,alienating parts of the political society. However, contrary to the Russian case,

the Ukrainian Rada was never in agreement with Kuchma and put up a fierce

fight. Feher’s argument regarding will-based constitutions seem to have merit

in the Ukrainian case, as the Rada repealled the reforms of the constitution in

2004. This reform transferred power from the president to the prime minister

(D’Anieri, 2006: 95).

A real power of party did not manifest itself in Russia until Unity, which was

affliated with Putin, and succeeded by United Russia (Gill, 2006: 71, 73). While

Gill (2006: 70) mentions Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice as a semi-official party,it does not receive the same status as United Russia. As depicted in section

3.2 only strong parties of power are interesting. Russia’s Choice disappears

practically in 1995 (cf. appendix A). Unity contests the 1999 election and wins

73 seats, which is 40 less than the Communists. Thus, a real significant party

of power is only United Russia, which dominates the Duma with 222 seats in

2003 and 315 in 2007 (cf. appendix B and C). Secondly, as specified in section

3.2, United Russia has clear connections to the Russian presidency in the sense

20





T a b l e 2 : C o m p a r i s o n o f R u s s i a a n d U k r a i n e

C o n

s t a n t s

E x p l a n a n s

B a l a n c i n g

E c o n o m i c l e v e l

L e g a c y

T r a n s i t i o n

N a t u r a l

r e s o u r c e s

P a r t y s y s t e m

C o n s t

i t u t i o n a l a u t o r

P o P

R u s s i a

A b o v e

R u s s i a n

S t a l e m a t e

P l e n t y

V o l a t i l e

P r e s i d

e n t

U n i t e d R u s s i a

I m b a l a n c e d

U k r a i n e

A b o v e

R u s s i a n

S t a l e m a t e

T r a n s i t

t a x

C l e a v a g e

B o t h

N o n e

B a l a n c e d

22



6 Case study

In section 5 table 2 argues that the Russian political system is imbalanced in

favour of the presidency, whereas the Ukrainian is relatively more balanced.

To fully understand this claim, and to categorise the Russian and Ukrainian

regimes, a process tracing of each case is conducted. The process tracing follows

a historical narrative structured around figure 2.

6.1 Russia

Russia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, however, it did not

get a democratically elected parliament and new constitution before 1993. The

run up to the 1993 constitution evidenced the differences between Yeltsin and

the Supreme Soviet, as the Russian parliament was called before 1993. The

crisis, as it became, was a power-struggle between elites seeking to gain control

over each other (Nichols, 2001: 63).The leader of the Supreme Soviet, Khas-

bulatov, decided to turn against his former ally, Yeltsin, of reasons unknown.

However, his goal was to deprive the president of any control over the presidency

in an attempt to make him a cerimonial figurehead (Nichols, 2001: 65). Yeltsin

resisted, which created a deadlock between the Supreme Soviet and the presi-

dent, where deputies passed laws counteracting Yeltsin’s decrees (Nichols, 2001:

73). This struggle is briefly sketched out in section 5, with a result favouringYeltsin’s position. Thus, the Russian political system is biased in favour of the

presidency as of 1993. This is best evidenced in the battle between Yeltsin and

the Duma regarding the nomination and approval of prime minister Kiriyenko.

The Russian Constitution demands that any prime minister must be approved

by the Duma. If the Duma rejects the prime minister three times, the presi-

dent must dissolve the Duma, and call for elections to the Duma . The Duma

rejected Kiryenko twice, yet the third time, the Duma approved (Babayeva and

Dokuchayev, 1998). Had the Duma refused to approve Kiriyenko, the deputies

would have to give up their seats just one year before the election in 1999.

Hence, the pro-presidential constitution pushed through a prime minister not

very popular among the deputies of the Duma.

The newly elected Duma, the successor of the Supreme Soviet, was in 1994

dominated by Yegor Gairdar’s Russia’s Choice. The dominance did not last,

however. In 1995 the CPRF becomes the next dominating party, and as argued

in section 5 the CPRF gained votes as the Russian GDP dwindled. This lends

credence to the notion that the main cleavage of the Russian Duma is economic,

and thus parties depending on this cleavage, are susceptible to fluctuations in

23



the economy. This gives the CPRF a central role during the 1990s as seen in

connection with the hestitated approval of Kiryenko. This role evaporates as theGDP increases. The election of 2003 gives Putin’s United Russia overwhelming

support, and thus makes it the new dominating party of the Duma, which in

turn gives the presidency even more control over the political arena. A prime

example of the difference in power over the political arena between Yeltsin and

his successor, Putin, is best depicted by Yeltsin’s attempt to bury the founder

of the USSR, Vladimir Lenin in 1997. Yeltsin proposed to ask the Russians

whether Lenin should be buried or not. His attempt failed because at the time

the CPRF dominated the Duma and ardently refused any such action (AP,

1997). Putin, however, had no opposition against nationalising key industries.

Hence, at the time of the greatest deprivation of the Russian people, the Duma

was strongest, because of the reinforced cleavages. When the economic cleavage

weakend, the space for a party of power grew together with its negative effect

on the checks and balances.

As depicted above, then-president Yeltsin did not have the same political

resources at his disposal as his successor, Putin. During the first post-Soviet

presidency, natural resources entered the political system through private spon-

sorship (Duncan, 2007: 8). Despite the argument brought forth in section 4.2.1

regarding the resource benefit, it is only in relation with the presidential elec-

tions, it clearly manifests itself. The 1996 election proves to be an example of how private sponsorship works albeit by proxy. The media or the proxy, owned

by the oligarchs, denied Yeltsin’s opponents air time in their media (Reming-

ton, 2008: 389). However, with the creation of a succesful and lasting party of

power, United Russia, Putin gets a parliamentarian tool by which he can change

the way Russia is governed as well as nationalise key industries and thus use

the natural resources to his advantage. Hence, while Yeltsin was not able to

bury Lenin because he lacked parliamentarian support, Putin had constructed

an effective parliamentarian control through his party of power, which he used

to among other gain control of the Russian governors. Before 2004 they were

elected, whereas after 2004, the president appoints the governors (Baker, 2004).

Another example is the finalising takeover of Gazprom in 2005 (Denisov and

Grivach, 2005)

To sum up, a presidential constitution together with a volatile party system

leaving space for a party of power controlling the Duma, tilted the checks and

balances in favour of the Russian presidency. Russian democracy never consol-

idated because the elite never accepted the democratic game (cf. section 2.2).

24



They instead attempted and succeeded in manipulating the political game to

their advantage thus creating a system, where the popular change of the in-cumbent is unlikely. Hence, it is possible to argue in favour of a classification

of Russia as a civilian autocracy from the time of the creation of United Rus-

sia, because of its ability to dismantle the Duma as a check on the presidency

(cf. section 2.3). In relation with hypothesis H1, it seems evident that it is

confirmed.

6.2 Ukraine

Before embarking on the process tracing, the Orange Revolution deserves a

short note. It brought Yushenko to power when Janukovich’s election fraud wasrevealed. Yushenko was president from 2005 to 2010 with both Timoshenko

and Janukovich as prime ministers. Janukovich followed Yushenko as president

in 2010, and thus the Orange Revolution is seen more as an interlude between

Kuchma and Janukovich than a defining event, because of Janukovich’s succefull

attempt to boost presidential powers once again (BBC, 2010). Thus, any further

elaborations on the topic is not conducted.

Contrary to the Russian case, the first Ukrainian parliamentarian election

took place before the approval of their constitution. Thus, the question of cleav-

ages and volatility is elevated to a premier position as an essential determining

factor of the future outlook of Ukrainian politics. In 1994, the Ukranians elected

a new Rada, structured around ethnic cleavages (cf. appendix D and Anieri

(2006: 108) for expected future indications of alignments based on section 3.2

and Madrid’s conception of the weight of ethnicity as a structuring cleavage.).

The ethnic Russians primarily live in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine,

which gave them a strong basis for secession, whereas ethnic Ukrainians live in

the western and northern part of Ukraine. Precisely because of the placement

of Ukrainian ethnicities, the possibility of especially ethnic Russian secession

was a possibility. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists, who put a high value on avoid-

ing secession, were aware of this. Thus, they made the necessary compromises(D’Anieri, 2007: 23), and as described in section 4.2.2 took another ethnic group

into consideration. Hence, these cleavages became pivotal in the design of the

pre-constitutional Ukrainian institutions, that in turn gave the presidency to a

pro-Russian president and a significant amount of seats to ethnic-Russian par-

ties. Thus, the ethnic-Russian party, the Communist, supported Kuchma in his

amendments of the constitution as well as in the dismissal of Yushenko as prime

minister in the 2000s (D’Anieri, 2006: 118)

As evidenced in section 5 there is a battle between Kuchma and the Rada.

25



During Kuchma’s tenure, the constitution is changed in 1995, 1996, and 2000.

Because of the strong cleavages, and the lack of a party of power, Kuchmacould not shape the constitution as he saw fit. This is evidenced in the three,

albeit succesful, attempts. However, eventhough these attempts were succesful,

Kuchma still needed to create informal institutions in order to for his regime to

function as he wanted (Way, 2005: 133). This is also evidenced in the immunity,

deputies enjoyed. This gave them a platform by which, they could criticise

Kuchma (ibid.). Thus, Kuchma could not attack the g opposition for critism,

and needed institutions such as processes designed to harass the opposition and

falsify election results (ibid.). Hence, whereas the Russian constitution served

Yeltsin well, Kuchma’s attempts to change it as well as the informal institutions

indicate that his did not. Another indirect effect of the constitution, echoing

Feher’s argument, is the deputies’ repeal of reforms (D’Anieri, 2006: 92).

As depicted above regarding the constitution, Kuchma’s arm-wrestling with

the Rada could have been avoided, had he had a successful party of power. Yet

because of strong cleavages, a real party of power never manifested. This is

best evidenced in the pro-presidential and primarily ethnic Rusian supported

alliance dubbed For a United Ukraine. The alliance did, however, never manage

to be elected more than once. Yet, during its time, it lessened Kuchma’s need to

weaken the Rada (D’Anieri, 2006: 88f). In the following election in 2007 one of

the members of the alliance, the Party of Regions headed by former pro-Russianpresidential candidate, Janukovich, won 175 seats in the Rada (cf. appendix E),

which might indicate a new party of power in Ukraine, though limited to its

ethnic supporter base because of the cleavages structuring the Rada (cf. section

4.2.3). While the Duma is void of any significant opposition to United Russia,

assuming that Party of Regions is the next party of power, it faced a significant

opposition in the Timoshenko bloc in 2007 (cf. appendix E), and it is likely

that any future Ukrainian party of power will face other significant blocs.

As demonstrated in section 5, Ukraine does not have access to natural re-

sources comparable to that of Russia’s. Rents from Russian gas on its way to the

European market, are considered a source of income similar to that of natural

resources, yet it is not large enough to play a similar role as natural resources.

Thus, the negative effect from such sources of income are more or less absent in

Ukraine.

To sum up, strong cleavages manifested in a parliament prior to the approval

of a constitution, situates the different positions vis-a-vis the negotiation re-

garding the constitution. It clearly shows that a parliament structured around

26



stable cleavages are in a much better position to resist encroachments, and thus

forcing the president outside the formal framework. It might also be worth not-ing that this situation enhanced the power of the Russian minority and their

parties, which at times favoured a stronger presidency. Thus, the foundation

for those battles, described above, lies in the compromise made and hence the

cleavages. Another effect of these cleavages is that of the room for a party

of power. Cleavages reduced the room that would otherwise have limited the

ability of the parliament to act as a check on the presidency. Hence, cleavages

seem to be the explanan that most clearly determines Ukraine’s fate. To postu-

late that the Ukrainian democracy is consolidated is premature. Kuchma was

not willing to accept the rules of democracy, and at numerous occassions, he

”overthrew” the constitution through will. Thus, among the Ukrainian presi-

dents, only Yushenko seemed to respect the rules of democracy. The parliament

on the other hand, seemed to be very interested in following the constitution.

Thus, democracy fares better in Ukraine because of the relatively more balanced

institutions, which lends albeit limited credence to the alternative hypothesis

HA.

7 Considering an alternative explanation

The theoretical model does not take external factors into consideration. Inthis section, the question is briefly assessed through an evaluation of leverage or

power to affect other contries, and linkage as the integration with a certain region

(Levitsky and Way, 2005: 21f). The latter concept is expanded by Tolstrup

(undated: 7f) as economic and technocratic or political among other.

Western leverage over Russia is best evidenced through the opening of the

Russian market during Yeltsin’s tenure (Desai, 2005: 100). Especially the Amer-

ican Treasure invested a lot of political time on reforms, they deemed necessary

for Russia (Desai, 2005: 101). The leverage dwindled as Russia’s GDP grew.

During Putin’s tenure, the leverage was not as much a concern as foreign NGOs.

They feared that foreign NGOs might attempt to incite a colour revolution just

like the one neighbouring Ukraine experienced (Ambrosio, 2009: 46). Thus,

Russian elites used the fear of a potential coup to crack down on independent

NGOs such as those dealing with human rights and democracy (Ambrosio, 2009:

51).

The situation in Ukraine is different. Whereas Russia is subject to a pres-

sure from the West, Ukraine is subject to a pressure from the West as well as

Russia. Russia has an interest in Ukraine because of the Russians and the Black

27



Sea Fleet, which they do not want to loose (Ambrosio, 2009: 135). Ukraine is

dependent on Russian energy (ibid.). Thus, there is a strong Russian interest inUkraine as well as space to exert influence. The Orange Revolution is perhaps

the best example of a time where Russia needed to influence Ukrainian poli-

tics, yet failed. The pro-Russian Kuchma’s sucessor, Janukovich, got extensive

support from Russia for his election campaign, yet as evidenced, despite this

support the pro-western Yushenko won. Instead Russia attempted to under-

mine Yushenko’s efforts to democratise by denouncing his attempts as well as

adopting confrontational policies toward Kiev (Ambrosio, 2009: 145), and ath

the same time, United Russia and Janukovich’s Party of Regions established

formal ties in order to help the party in the upcomming 2006 Rada elections.

Then-prime minister Timoshenko criticised the agreement as an illegal attempt

to influence Ukrainian politics.

Despite being a brief interlude between the primary arguments of this paper

and the discussion, it gives at least a couple of points worth noting. Firstly,

leverage and linkage is taken serious in both Russia and Ukraine. The former

has shook of western leverage through growth in GDP albeit paranoia has made

the Russian elite harass foreign NGOs, whereas the latter seems very suscep-

tible to Russian influence, albeit this influence is not succesful at times. The

economic linkage between Russia and Ukraine is best evidenced through the

Ukrainian natural resource dependecy, and the support of Janukovich, whereasthe technocratic linkage is depicted in the relationship between United Russia

and Party of Regions.

8 Discussion and conclusion

As depicted above in section 5 and 6, Russia failed to consolidate its democracy

because of its imbalanced political system favouring the presidency. Ukraine,

on the other hand managed to remain relatively balanced because of its party

system and the lack of a party of power. Thus, the discussion focuses on the

Russian failure to remain on a democracy consolidating path using Ukraine as

a mirror.

The first position to discuss is Russias abundance of natural resources and

its constitution .It is claimed in section 3.1 based on Ross’ arguments that nat-

ural resources impede democracy. However, as shown in section 4.2.1, natural

resources must be transferred to the political system through political actors.

Thus, it depends on the decision to utilise them to repress. Mainwaring and

Shugart rightfully argue that much depends on the institutional design, yet

28



as shown in the Ukrainian case, presidents can go outside the constitutional

framework (cf. section 2.2 and Linz and Stepan). Another criticism of naturalresources as depicted by Ross and used in this paper, is primarily based on

the Middle East and Latin America. There are not many young democracies

with communist origin in these regions (cf. section 1 and the scope conditions).

Thus it might be difficult to assess the impeding character of natural resources

on newly created democracies. The key argument within the framework of the

scope conditions in favour of the resource curse, is the practice in Russia (cf.

section 5).

The party system is considered a prime explanan in section 6.2 as intrinsic

to the preservation of Ukrainian democracy as a structuring factor as well as

preventing parties of power. At the same time, Russia is plagued by a volatile

party system. However, as Pedersen (1979: 9) shows, several consolidated west-

ern democracies go through periods of relatively high volatility vis-a-vis the

general norm. Thus, even in functional democracies, volatility does not neces-

sary damage the regime. On the other hand, the Ukrainian case exemplifies a

situation where the party system is perhaps too polarised thus making it very

difficult for the presidency to have a fruitful relationship with the parliament.

Thus, the volatility Russia experiences are not necessary a democracy delimiting

phenomenon, and Ukraine’s cleavages do not necessary benefit its regime. The

best argument in favour of cleavages is that some cleavages seem to be a betterfoundation for a party system than others. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian

party system seem to embody such cleavages.

Parties of power are considered to have a negative effect on both the Russian

and Ukrainian parliament. As D’Anieri puts it, with the creation of For a United

Ukraine, Kuchma does not need to weaken the Rada anymore (cf. section 6.2).

The Russian case evidences this as well. However, as depicted in section 2.3,

there might be cases where fairly large and dominating parties, are not very

cohesive. Thus, a party of power is not necessary a problem. It depends on

its cohesiveness. As brought forth by Haspel et al. Russian parties are more

cohesive than expected, which might lend crendence to the damaging effects of

such parties. This is depicted in both section 5 and section 6.1. Thus, it seems

evident that a Russian party of power damages the horizontal accountability of

the Duma.

8.1 Diffusion versus the rest

Until know the core explanations of this paper has been discussed. In the final

part of this discussion, diffusion is tested vis-a-vis the rest. The strength and

29



thus wealth certainly reduces any leverage any country might face. Thus, the

acquisition and renationalisation of Russian natural resources gave it a chanceto insulate itself from state-to-state pressure. The resource wealth also helped

Russia to build new organisations as well as ousting other organisations in order

to protect the current Russian regime. Thus, the question of resources bolster

the diffusion explanation.

The Ukrainian party system depicts a situation where Russian attempts to

utilise leverage has been futile not only during the Orange Revolution, but also

during the first ten years of Ukrainian independence. The ethnic-Russian parties

could probably have received some support for secession, had they wanted it.

However, as history has evidenced, the ethnic Russians and their parties did not

move forward with secession (cf. section 6.2). The lack of successful leverage

vis-a-vis the Russians in Ukraine might be explained by a weak Russia. It is not

known whether the West attempted to influence the Russian Duma. It might

have been very difficult considering the domination of CPRF and later the pro-

Soviet United Russia, but it is clear that the West succesfully exerted leverage

over the Russian president.

A party of power (or even a dominating party such as the CPRF) might

pose a serious problem for anyone attempting to utilise leverage in a parliamen-

tarian setting. United Russia is clearly a party of power that is not susceptible

to utilised leverage, albeit it might have something to do with the renewedwealth from the natural resources as depicted above. And precisely these natu-

ral resources as well as the energy dependency might have made United Russia

capable of making a deal with the potential party of power, Party of Regions.

However, it is important to remember that Party of Regions is not a party

that encapsulates the entire population. Because of its pro-Russian stance it

might alienate the ethnic Ukrainian population, thus aligning them among pro-

Ukraine candidates. Hence, if diffusion has any merit in this case, it has the

potential of causing more harm than good to the Russian case.

8.2 Conclusion

The research question proped the puzzle of why Russia slided into autocracy

whereas Ukraine did remain somewhat stable in the same period. The straight

forward answer is that Russia scored negatively on all the explanans and in

particular on the party system and party of power (cf. table 2. This made it

difficult to remain on a consoldiation path because of the imbalances created by

these very scores. In Russia, the party system showed stronger signs of volatility

because of the economic cleavage than the Ukrainian, dominated by ethnic

30



cleavages. The process tracing revealed that with the creation of United Russia,

the oppositional character of the Russian Duma disappeared. As evidenced insection 6.1 the idea that natural resources impede democracy was somewhat

confirmed, yet its importance is dwarfed by that of party system and party of

power. The Ukrainian case reveals that Ukraine scored better on the explanans,

and thus, were able to maintain a more stable system securing consolidation. It

had no natural resources, strong cleavags, a constitution not overly presidential,

and no party of power. Especially the latter three explanans owe their postive

score to the strong cleavages.

While external factors are excluded in the theoretical model as depicted in

figure 2, the model is not seriously impeded by the introduction of diffussion.

Section 7 and 8.1 show that there are signs of diffusion, yet they are not deter-

mining the outcome of neither Russia nor Ukraine. In Russia, leverage is most

clear during Yeltsin’s tenure, whereas Russian linkage is very clear in connec-

tion with Janukovich’s failed attempt to become Kuchma’s sucessor. It seems

evident that certain conditions qua the results of this paper must be fulfilled

if succesful diffusion has to take place. The first condition is the ownership of

the natural resources. If they are privatised, easy rents are not as accessible as

if the state nationalised it, and thus the elite cannot use them as depicted in

section 7. The second condition is related to that of the strength of allies such

as strong parties in the state in question. Such allies might enhance the chanceof succesful diffusion.

The theoretical model addresses democratic development in the long run.

This is why the Orange Revolution is unimportant. Diffusion plays a role,

yet depending on the commitment from the state exerting diffusion, this effect

might be of minor importance. This is best depicted in the short term effect

of the Orange Revolution and the return of the old modus operandi . Hence,

if the West was involved in the Orange Revolution, their effect was minor.

The Russian determined to continue to exert influence in Ukraine paid off as

Janukovich later got elected. Thus, the real transformative effect of diffusion

depends on the endurance of the state. Hence short term attempt leaves long

term effects with the explanans.

31



A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995

1993 1995

Party (12) Seats Party (17/7)† Seats†

Russia’s Choice 70 Communist Party 157

Liberal Democratic Party 54 Liberal Democratic Party 51

Communist Party 48 Our home is Russia 55

Women of Russia 23 Yabloko 45

Agrarian Party of Russia 33 Agrarian Party of Russia 20

Yabloko 23 Power to the People 9

Russian Unity and Concord 19 Russia’s Choice 9Democratic Party of Russia 15 Congress Russian Communities 5

Movement for Democratic Reforms 4 Ivan Rybkin Bloc 3

Dignity and Charity 2 Women of Russia 3

Civic Union 1 Forward Russia! 3

Future of Russia 1 Pamfilova–Gurov–Lysenko Bloc 2

Union of Labour 1

Communists of the USSR 1

Workers’ Self-Government 1

Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc 1

Russian Unity and Concord 1

Independents 146 Independents 77Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.

†) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. ‡) Involves both SMD

and PR seats.

Source: Rose (2011)

32



B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003

1999 2003

Party (12/4) Seats Party (12/4)† Seats‡

Commmunists Party 113 United Russia 222

Unity 73 Communist Party 52

Fatherland–All Russia 68 Motherland 37

Union of Right Forces 29 Liberal Democratic Party 36

Liberal Democratic Party 17 People’s Party 17

Yabloko 20 Yabloko 4

Our Home Is Russia 7 Agrarian Party of Russia 2Movement in Support of the Army 2 PVR-RPZh: Rebirth–Party of Life 3

Russian People’s Union 2 Union of Right Forces 3

Party of Pensioners 1 New Course: Automobile Russia 1

Russian Socialist Party 1 Development of Enterprise 1

Spiritual Heritage 1 Great Russia-Eurasian Union 1



and PR seats.

Source: Rose (2011)

33



C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007

2007

Party (4/2)† Seats‡

United Russia 315

Communist Party 57

Liberal Democrats 40

Fair Russia 38

Independents -

Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.


and PR seats.

Source: Rose (2011)

34



D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998

1994± 1998∓

Party (17) Seats Party (19/3)† Seats‡

Communists 86 Communists 122

Rukh 25 Rukh 46

Peasant Party 18 Socialist / Village 34

Interregional bloc for reforms 15 Popular democrats 29

Socialist party 14 Hromada 23

Republican Party 11 Greens 19

Congress of Ukrainian nationalists 7 Social Democrats (United) 17Communist party of Crimea 5 Progressive Socialists 16

Party of Democratic Renewal 4 Agrarians 8

Labour Party 4 National Front 5

Democratic Party 3 Reforms and Order 3

Ukranian National Assembly 3 Party of Regional Revival 2

Social Democratic Party 2 Forward Ukraine! 2

Civic Congress 2 Christian Democratic Party 2

Conservative Republican Party 2 NEP 1

Christian Democratic Party 1 Social liberal union 1

Soyuz 1 Working Ukraine 1

Razom 1

Menshe sliv 1



and PR seats.

Source: ±) Bojcun (1995: 239) ∓) Birch and Wilson (1999: 1040)

35



E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007

2002± 2007∓*

Party (10/2) Seats Party (5/2)† Seats‡

Our Ukraine 110 Party of Regions 175

For a United Ukraine 101 Timoshenko bloc 156

Communist party 66 Our Ukraine - People’s Self-defense 72

Soc. dem. party of Ukraine (United) 24 Communist Party 27

Socialist Party of Ukraine 22 Lytvyn bloc 20

Timoshenko bloc 22

Democratic Party of Ukraine 4Unity 3

Party of National Economic Revival 1

Ukrainian Marine Party 1

Independents 93Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.


and PR seats. *) Re-run of parliamentarian election of 2006.

Source: ±)Herron and Johnson (2003: 19) ∓) Copsey (2008: 300)

36



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Autocracy and Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia - Kim Andersen