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AUTOMATION SCENARIO
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections
BackgroundThe Commission on Elections started its efforts at
modernizing or automating the electoral process way back in 1992 with Operation MODEX (Modernization and Excellence), immediately after the first Synchronized National and Local Elections (NLE). 1. The first try of an automated election system using the
Optical Mark Reader (OMR) technology in the 1996 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections
2. The partial implementation in the ARMM provinces of the same automated system in the 1998 National and Local Elections
3. The halted nationwide implementation of a centralized automated counting system in 2004
4. The fully automated election system in the 2008 ARMM Elections
COMELEC continues to fulfil its mandate of conducting election – be it manual or automated.
Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
BackgroundFor the coming 2010 elections, the COMELEC is set to
conduct the country’s first nationwide fully automated elections – from counting of votes to transmission and canvassing of election results.
Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
Kinds of Technologies Considered The following shows the kinds of technologies considered
by the Philippine inspection team during the 15-day inspection trip to the US in October 1993:
1. Mechanical Leverage Machine - a voting machine, wherein a voter would face or enter a cabinet-type booth to cast his vote. All the names are already presented to the voter in the booth, and the voter would just have to push a button corresponding to the name of a candidate of his choice, and pull a mechanical lever afterwards. His vote automatically gets counted.
2. Punch Card System - a voting device, wherein a voter is given a ballot, with hole slots corresponding to the candidates' names, and a puncher (similar to that used by our provincial bus conductors in ticketing their passengers). To cast his vote, the voter has to punch a hole corresponding to the name of the candidate of his choice. A separate reader machine does the counting afterwards.
Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
Kinds of Technologies Considered3. Optical Mark Reader (OMR) - a ballot counting
machine: wherein a voter is given a ballot, with pre-printed candidates' names, with corresponding ovals to shade or broken arrows to connect. The votes in the shaded ballots would be scanned using an OMR.
4. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Machine - a voting machine wherein a voter is presented with a screen showing all the names of the candidates, much like the locator screens in the Glorietta Shopping Malls. To cast his vote, the voter has to touch the name of the candidate of his choice on the screen, and his vote automatically gets counted.
Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
Electronic Voting Machines Used in other Countries
Australia (eVACS) Type: Bar code reader
authenticates ballots, which are completed with a keypad.
Usage: Eight of 80 polling places voted with the Electronic Voting and Counting System, or eVACS, in the Australia Capital Territory.
Addressing distrust: The government specified that the program's code be open source.
Addressing multiple votes: Voters sign in and receive a bar-coded ballot that gives them one vote.
Still at issue: On intellectual-property grounds, the company that created eVACS, Software Improvements, wants to restrict the source code.
Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
India (EVM) Type: Battery-powered
electronic device has buttons next to choices.
Usage: The Electronic Voting Machines, or EVMs, were used countrywide in May for the parliamentary elections by about 390 million people.
Addressing distrust: The simple-to-use machines are built to address illiteracy and be tamperproof. Vote data is stored in nonremovable memory.
Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink.
Still at issue: Questions remain about the security of the devices and the tabulator that collects votes from the devices.
Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
Venezuela (Smartmatic) Type: The integrated voting
device has a small touch screen and a receipt printer.
Usage: Almost the entire country voted on the device for an Aug. 15 referendum on the ouster of President Chavez.
Addressing distrust: Paper receipts were kept by polling stations for random audits.
Addressing multiple votes: A voter's fingerprint is transmitted to a national database, ensuring that each person votes only once.
Still at issue: The voting process still lacks adequate checks on system integrity.
Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
United States (Diebold, among others)
Type: System has a touch screen and, in some cases, a receipt printer.
Usage: An estimated 31 percent of voters in the United States will use the system in the November presidential election.
Addressing distrust: Easy-to-use terminals include accessibility features for the handicapped.
Addressing multiple votes: A chip card given to the voter contains a key to allow only one vote.
Still at issue: Many questions remain about device security and the secrecy surrounding machine development and certification. Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-
5387540.html
Philippines (Smartmatic)
Type: Bar code reader, scans ballots, with built-in printer
Addressing distrust: Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review
Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink.
Project Specifications• Component 1: PAPER-BASED AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM (AES)
Component 1-A : Election Management System (EMS) Component 1-B : Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS)Component 1-C : Counting/Consolidation System (CCS)
• Component 2: PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION USING PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS
• Component 3: OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS
• Estimated 47,000,000 registered voters• 44,009,069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB Hearing
• 58,327 registration records cancelled by reason of death• 1,246,272 registration records deactivated
• Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009
• 80 Provinces • 1,631 cities and municipalities• 320,415 Established Precincts (estimate)• 80,136 Clustered Precincts (estimate)• 37,884 Polling Centers (estimate)• 82,200 PCOS Machines• 80,136 PCOS Machines for distribution to clustered
precincts
Board of Election Inspectors
• One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct• Three regular members
– Chairman– Delivers ballot to voter
– Poll Clerk– Third Member
• Support Staff– Depends on number of precincts clustered– To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in managing
– List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters
Board of Election Inspectors
No. of Precincts Clustered
No. of Support Staff
Total no. of personnel
(BEI + Support Staff)
1 none 32 none 33 1 44 2 55 3 6
Establishing Identity of Voter
LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS Photograph
Establishing Identity of Voter
Establishing Identity of Voter
If identity cannot be established through photograph Compare signatures
Use Book of Voters Contains applications for registration
• Includes specimen signature of voter Other methods to challenge identity
Official Ballots
Pre-printed names of candidates
300 candidates can be accommodated 150 names per
side of ballot
Official Ballots
Ovals opposite names of candidate
Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate
PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan
• One unit per clustered precinct
• Voter personally feeds ballot into machine
• Ballot can be fed at any orientation
• Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously
TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURESAt least three days before election day
Public shall accomplish test ballots Ballots shall be manually counted and election
returns accomplished Same set of ballots that was manually counted
shall be fed into the counting machine Manual count shall be compared with the print-
out of the election returns If public is satisfied that the manual count is the
same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses
TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURESAt least three days before election day
Machines shall be sealed without any connection to transmission links
Public shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installed
The only time that the counting machines shall be opened is on election day in the presence of watchers
Voting
Voting period 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to votePoll Clerk lists down names voters
queuingPoll Clerk calls voter to cast ballotVoter who fails to appear after being
called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote
Precinct set up At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one
time
Voting
Before voting starts Show that ballot box
is empty Transparent plastic
Turn on and initialize PCOS
Print “Zero Report” To show that there
is no entry/vote in machine’s memory
Counting
• At close of polls– Perform close function
• To prevent additional ballots from being inserted
– After close function, PCOS automatically• Starts counting
process• Prints election returns
after completion of automated count– Eight (8) copies
Counting
Insert transmission cable After printing first eight (8) copies of ER
To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely
Perform electronic transmission functionPrint additional twenty-two (22) copies of
ER Automatically performed by PCOS after
completion of transmission
Canvassing/Consolidation
• Electronically transmitted results– Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and
proclamation of winning candidates for• City/municipal officials• Provincial officials• Members, House of Representatives• Senators and Party-list
– Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results• Constitution authorized the Congress to
promulgate rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice-President
Municipal/City Board of Canvassers
Provincial Board of
Canvassers
National Board of
Canvassers
Congress COMELEC
Precinct
Election Returns
Mun./City COC
SOVP
Prov. COC
SOVM/C
Physical transport
Physical transport
Physical transport
Manual System of Canvassing
Municipal/City Board of Canvassers
Provincial Board of
Canvassers
National Board of
Canvassers
Congress COMELEC
Precinct
Physical transport
Physical transport
Physical transport
Electronic Transmission
Comelec Central Back-
up ServerAdvance Results/
Monitoring
Server for Dominant Majority/
Minority Parties, Citizens Arm,
KBPAdvance Results
Secured Public
Website
Election Returns
Mun./City COC
SOVP
Prov. COC
SOVM/C
SECURITY
Security measures under a manual election system still applicable
Strengthen security through automationPasswordPINDigital signaturesEncryption
SECURITY
128-bit encryption 2
2 = 4 2 = 8 2 = 16 2 = 32 2 = 64 2 = 128 2 = 256
128
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
• 2 = 512• 2 = 1024• 2 = 2048• 2 = 4096• 2 = 8192• 2 = 16,384• 2 = 32,768
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
• 2 = 65,536
• 2 = 131,072
• 2 = 262,144
• 2 = 524,288
• 2 = 1,048,576
• 2 = 2,097,152
• 2 = 4,194,304
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
SECURITY
128-bit encryption
• 2 = 8,388,608
• 2 = 16,777,216
• 2 = 33,554,432
• 2 = 67,108,864
• 2 = 134,217,728
• 2 = 268,435,456
• 2 = 536,870,912
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
• 2 = 1,073,741,824
• 2 = 2,147,483,648
• 2 = 4,294,967,296
• 2 = 8,569,934,592
• 2 = 17,179,869,184
• 2 = 34,359,738,368
• 2 = 68,719,476,736
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
SECURITY
128-bit encryption
• 2 = 137,438,953,472• 2 = 274,877,906,944• 2 = 549,755,813,888• 2 = over One Trillion
combinations
37
38
39
40
SECURITY
128-bit encryptionSame security system used by banks
Random EncryptionTemperature of machineVoltageUnique machine identityUser identity
No single/master decryption code
SECURITY
• Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result
• Transmission takes at most 2 minutes• Copies for distribution
– 30 copies of election returns at the precinct level
– 30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal level
– 14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial level
SECURITY
Audit LogActivitiesTimeDate
SECURITY
Paper BallotBallot digital imageData storage deviceTransmitted resultsHard copies of election results
FIELD TEST/S
8 areas2 for NCR 2 each (1 urban/1 rural)
Luzon Visayas Mindanao
To test system and transmission in the same environment/conditions as on election day
CONTINUITY PLAN
Types of Systems BreakdownFails to scanAble to scan but fails to print ERAble to print ER but fails to transmit
Able to transmit but fails to consolidate
CONTINUITY PLAN
Fails to scan Use spare PCOS Use PCOS of another precinct
Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct
Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct
Scan ballots If all PCOS fails
Manual counting
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Able to scan but fails to print ER– Use spare PCOS– Use PCOS of another precinct
• Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct
• Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct• Use removable storage device of defective
PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER– If all PCOS fails
• Manual counting
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Able to print ER but fails to transmit– Go to nearest precinct or polling center
which has a functioning transmission facility
– Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let the functioning facility transmit precinct results
– If all transmission facilities bog down• Physically transport removable storage
device to canvassing site – In the presence of watchers and security
escorts
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Able to transmit but fails to consolidate Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS)
of another municipality/province Use the removable storage device and let
functioning CCS consolidate the results Provide back-up canvassing through the
Central Server Print results and send the same to
affected board of canvassers Print results and constitute special board
of canvassers to take the place of the affected board
Basic Elements of Elections
• People– Vote-buying– Coercion– Intimidation– Terrorism
• Systems & Procedures– Misreading of ballots– Unreadable handwriting– Error
• Honest• Deliberate
– Fraud– Manufactured election
returns– Tampering of election
results
Successful Implementation
Vigilance of citizenryCooperationCoordination
Support
THANK YOU!