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AutonomyandAestheticEngagement

C.ThiNguyen

(Thisisapre-proofeddraft.Pleasecitethefinalversion,forthcominginMind.)

Thereseemstobeadeeptensionbetweentwoaspectsofaestheticappreciation.Ontheonehand,wecareaboutgettingthingsright.Ourattemptsataestheticjudgmentsaimatcorrectness.Ontheotherhand,wedemandautonomyinaestheticappreciation.Wewantappreciatorstoarriveattheiraestheticjudgmentsthroughtheirowncognitiveefforts,ratherthandeferringtoexperts.Thesetwodemandsseemtobe intension;afterall, ifwewanttogettheright judgments,weshoulddefertothejudgmentsofexperts.Howcanweresolvethistension?Thebestexplanation,Isuggest,isthataestheticappreciationissomethinglikeagame.Whenweplayagame,wetrytowin.Butoften,winningisn’tthepoint;playingis.Aestheticappreciationinvolvesthesameflippedmotivationalstructure:weaimatthegoalofcorrectness,buthavingcorrectjudgmentsisn’tthepoint.Thepointistheengagedprocessofinterpreting,investigating,andexploringtheaestheticobject.Deferringtoaesthetictestimony,then,makesthesamemistakeaslookinguptheanswertoapuzzle,ratherthansolvingitforoneself.Theshortcutdefeatsthewholepoint.Thissuggestsanewaccountofaestheticvalue:theengagementaccount.Theprimaryvalueoftheactivityofaestheticappreciationliesintheprocessoftryingtogeneratecorrectjudgments,andnotinhav-ingcorrectjudgments.

Thereseemstobeadeeptensionbetweentwoaspectsofourpracticeofaesthetic

appreciation.First,thepracticeofaestheticappreciationseemsdeeplycognitive.Weseem

guidedbyaninterestingettingthingsright.Wenotonlylookatart;weinvestigateit.We

formtrialjudgmentsandthengobackformore,re-watchingandre-readingtomakesure

we’vecaughtallthedetails.Wetalkaboutthereasonsforourjudgments,pointoutdetails

tooneanother,andargueaboutwhat’strulygreat.Thewaywegoaboutaestheticconversa-

tionandaestheticinvestigationseemstoindicatethatouraestheticjudgmentsareaimedat

thetruth.

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Atthesametime,weseemcommittedtoprinciplesofindividualityandautonomyinaes-

theticappreciation.Forone,weseemtothinkthat,inaestheticappreciation,wemustform

ourownjudgmentsforourselves.Thereisastrikingdisanalogyherebetweentheaesthetic

andempiricalrealms.Inempiricalmatters,weareoftenwillingtodefertothejudgmentsof

others,especiallywhentheyareexperts.Forexample,Itrustmydoctorandtakewhatever

pillsshetellsmetotake.Butinaestheticmatters,wedonotseemsowillingtodefer.There

seemstobesomethingquiteproblematicaboutacquiringtheaestheticjudgmentthatThe-

loniousMonk’s solo renditionof ‘SmokeGets inYourEyes’ isbrilliantly complex, strictly

fromthetestimonyofajazzexpert.

Thisasymmetryhasstrucksomeasquitemeaningful.Consideraparallelasymmetryin

themoralrealm.SarahMcGratharguesthatourunwillingnesstodefertomoralexpertspre-

sentsasignificantchallengetomoralrealism.SupposeIwassimplyaimingtohavecorrect

moralbeliefs.Inthatcase,whenIhadgoodreasontothinkthatsomeotherpersonwasmore

reliablethanmeonsomemoralissue,thenIoughttodefer.However,suchmoraldeference

strikesusasdeeplywrong.Itcanstarttoseem,then,asifweweren’treallyaimingatcor-

rectnessatall.Thebestexplanationofthisasymmetry,somesuggest,ismoralexpressivism

—theviewthatourmoraljudgmentsexpressourownindividualcommitmentsorsubjective

responses,rather thanassertingobjectivetruths(McGrath2011).Notice that theseargu-

mentsapplyjustaswelltotheaestheticrealm.Perhaps,then,ourcommitmenttoaesthetic

autonomyrevealsthataesthetic judgmentsaresimplyexpressionsofourownresponses,

ratherthanassertionsaimedatcapturingobjectivetruths.

Thesetwostrandspullusindifferentdirections.Thecognitiveaspectsofaestheticlife

suggestthataestheticclaimsarelargelyobjective;ourdemandforautonomysuggeststhat

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theyarelargelysubjective.Thisseemspuzzling.AsKantputit,ifaestheticjudgmentswere

groundedprimarilyinourownfeltresponses,thenwhatbasiscouldwehavefordemanding

agreement?Onestandardresponse is tocommittosomeformofsubjectivismaboutaes-

theticjudgment,andthentoofferanalternativeexplanationforallthatseeminglycognitive

behaviorofarguing,discussing,andinvestigating.Thisis,perhaps,Kant’spath.CainTodd

hasofferedsuchanapproachinhismodernizedtakeonKant.1SaysTodd,aestheticjudg-

mentsexpressourownattitudes,ratherthanassertingtruths.Butwehavesocialreasonsto

expresstheseattitudesasifwewereassertingtruths—forexample,wemightbetryingto

demandagreement,orurgingotherstoshareourresponses.Approacheslikethistreatthe

demandforautonomyasweighingdecisivelyinfavorofsubjectivism,andthenattemptto

provideanaccommodatingexplanationforourapparentlycognitivebehavior.

Iwillattempttoresolvethetensionbetweenautonomyandcognitivityintheopposite

direction.Iwillsuggestthataestheticjudgmentsarecognitive,andthenofferanaccommo-

datingexplanationforourrequirementforautonomy.Inmyaccount,aestheticjudgments

canbestraightforwardlycorrectorincorrect,butthereasonweseekcorrectjudgmentin

aestheticappreciationdiffersfromordinaryempiricallife.Inmuchofpracticalempiricallife,

wevaluehavingthecorrectjudgmentsthemselves.Weengageintheactivityofinquiryfor

thesakeofitsproducts.Inaestheticappreciation,ontheotherhand,wevaluetheactivityof

formingjudgmentsmorethanwedogettingourjudgmentsright.Inthisway,thepracticeof

aestheticappreciationhasamotivationalstructuresimilartothatofplayingagame.Inmuch

1Thisexpressivist,quasi-realistreadingofKantwasoriginallyproposed,andthendismissed,byRobert

Hopkins(Hopkins2001).Todd’sarticleisanattempttoresuscitateHopkins’sproposal(Todd2004).Iwill,forthemostpart,avoidcomingdowntoofirmlyontherelationshipbetweenmyviewsandKant’s,becauserelevantaspectsofKant’sviewherearestillbeingdebated.Forrecentdiscussionsofthedebate,see(Gins-borg2015;GorodeiskyandMarcus2018).

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ofgame-play,weaimatwinning,butwinningisn’tthepoint:playingis.Inmuchofouraes-

theticlives,weaimatcorrectaestheticjudgments,butactuallyhavingthemisn’tthepoint.

Theprocessofseekingthemis.Ourdedicationtoaestheticautonomyrevealsthatwevalue

aestheticengagementoveraestheticconclusions.

AutonomyandAcquaintance

Theimportanceofaestheticautonomy,however,hasbeenmaskedinrecentconversa-

tionbythedominanceofadistinctconsideration—thatofaestheticacquaintance.Thefirst

task,then,istodistinguishbetweenthesetwoverydifferentdemands.

Thedemandforaestheticacquaintanceisthedemandthatone’saestheticjudgmentof

anobjectproceedfromone’sdirectexperienceofthatobject.Thedemandforaestheticau-

tonomy, on the other hand, is the demand that one come to one’s aesthetic conclusions

throughone’sownefforts.Aestheticacquaintanceasksthatweexperiencethethingforour-

selves,whileaestheticautonomydemandsthatwedrawourconclusionsforourselves.And

it isthedemandforaestheticautonomy,Ithink,thatwillprovekeyinunderstandingthe

valueofaestheticengagement.Butthedemandsforautonomyandacquaintancehavesome-

timesbeenconfused.Andwhentheyaredistinguished,moreattentionhasusuallybeenpaid

tothedemandforacquaintance.Solet’sstartbygettingcleareronthesetwodemands.

The demand for autonomy concerns the degree to which aesthetic judgments arise

throughourownefforts.Wecanstatethatdemandintheformofaprinciple:

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AutonomyPrinciple:Oneoughttoarriveatone’saestheticjudgmentsthroughtheap-

plicationofone’sownfacultiesandabilities.

Accordingtothisprinciple,oneoughttodoone’sownaestheticthinking,investigating,

interpreting,andthelike.Oneshouldnotoutsourceaestheticjudgmentsto,say,theexperts,

even if theyareknowntobemorereliable. Imean ‘aesthetic judgments’here inabroad

sense,includingbothjudgmentsaboutthepresenceofparticularaestheticinanobject,like

sensuousnessordelicacy,aswellasoverallevaluativejudgments.Oneshoulddecideforone-

selfwhetherJacksonPollockisemptyorprofound,whetherTheloniousMonkisfullofbi-

zarreanglesorfullofsensuoustextures.2

Thesecondprincipleisoneofacquaintance,whichpositsademandfordirectexperience:

AcquaintancePrinciple:Oneoughttoarriveatanaestheticjudgmentonthebasisof

one’sowndirectexperienceoftheobjectofjudgment.3

Accordingtothisprinciple,weneedtohaveactuallyheardJohnColtrane’sAfrica/Brass

2Onesubstantialquestionaboutthispresentationoftheautonomyprincipleiswhattodoaboutcases

whenweactonaestheticrecommendations.Manysolutionshavebeensuggested.Hopkins’ssolutionistosuggestthatthenormofautonomylapsesbecauseofanapplicationof‘oughtimpliescan’-beforeyouhaveseenawork,youcannotactuallyjudgeitforyourself,soyoucannotberequiredto(Hopkins2011).AaronMeskinsuggeststhatrecommendationsonlygiveusinformationaboutthelikelihoodofourrenderinganaes-theticjudgment(Meskin2007).Elsewhere,Ihavearguedthatthatrecommendationspassinformationaboutaestheticmerit(Nguyen2017).Theargumentofthispaperiscompatiblewithalloftheseapproaches.

3Thisexpressionoftheacquaintanceprincipleisintendedtobesuitablyminimalsoastobecompatiblewithawideswathoftheliteratureontestimonyandacquaintance,andtoavoidcommitmenttoanyofthedisputeddetailsaboutthebestarticulationoftheprinciple(Budd2003;Livingston2003;Meskin2004,2007;Laetz2008;Hopkins2011;Konigsberg2012;Whiting2015;Lord2016;McKinnon2017;Ransom2019).

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forourselvesortastedthoselenguatacosforourselvesinordertorenderanaestheticjudg-

ment.4TheAcquaintancePrinciplemakesdemandsaboutourgetting thedirectaesthetic

inputforourselves,whiletheAutonomyPrinciplemakesdemandsaboutcomingtoconclu-

sionsforourselves.5

Thesetwoprinciplesoftenreartheirheadsinthediscussionofthelegitimacyofacquir-

ingaestheticbeliefsviatestimony.Weseemtohavetheintuitionthatweshouldnotacquire

aestheticjudgmentsfrombaretestimonialreports.Thisintuitionisoftentakentosupport

theso-called‘pessimistic’viewofaesthetictestimony—thatwecannotgainaestheticbelief

throughtestimony(Hopkins2011,p.139).6NoticethatboththeAutonomyPrincipleandthe

AcquaintancePrinciplehavetheresourcestoexplainthisintuition.Inacquiringanaesthetic

judgmentfrombaretestimony,Ihavebothfailedtogothroughthecognitiveprocessesfor

myselfandfailedtodirectlyexperiencetheobjectofmyjudgmentformyself.

Thediscussionofaesthetictestimonyoftentreatsthetwoprinciplesascompetingexpla-

nationsforthesamesetofintuitions,andthenproceedstotrytofigureoutwhichprinciple

offersthebetterexplanation.Forexample,Hopkinsconsidersthefollowingargumentinfa-

voroftheAcquaintancePrincipleovertheAutonomyPrinciple.TheAutonomyPrinciple,he

4Thereare,ofcourse,allsortsofboundarycasesinvolving,say,arrivingatanaestheticjudgmentofa

paintingafterimaginingitbasedinarichdescription.Iwillsetthoseboundarycasesasideforthesakeofthepresentdiscussion,andconcentrateontheclearestcasesofviolationsoftheAcquaintancePrinciple.

5Iadapttheseexpressionsoftheprinciple,andthisapproximatedivisionofthespace,fromRobertHop-kins’sdiscussionofaesthetictestimony(Hopkins2011).

6AsMadeleineRansomnotes,thisintuitionisfairlyspecific.Specifically,theintuitionsseemtoforbidac-quiringanaestheticjudgmentfrom‘baretestimony’,inwhichIacquireanaestheticjudgmentthatpbasedonthetestimonythatp.Thisiscontrastedwithacquiringanaestheticjudgmentfrom‘richtestimony’,whereIrenderanaestheticjudgmentthatpbasedontestimonyastoparticular,richlydescribeddetails(Ransom2019).Also,thestandardaccountofthepessimisticintuitionhasbeensometimeschallenged;forexample,JonRobsonhasarguedthatthepessimisticintuitionsareonlyaboutnormsofassertingbasedonaesthetictestimony,ratherthanonnormsofbeliefabouttestimony(Robson2015).Iwillpresumeforthispaperthestandardversionofthepessimisticaccount,whichincludesanormagainstacquiringabeliefthroughtesti-mony.

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says, licensestoomuch. Itwould licenseacquiringaesthetic judgmentsthroughinductive

reasoning,solongasthatreasoningwasperformedautonomously.SupposeIhaveseenfifty

piecesofabstractexpressionismandfindthemallpleasinglytexturedandrich.Ihavenot

yetseenRothko’sNo.61(RustandBlue),butI formtheaesthetic judgmentthat it, too, is

pleasingly texturedandrich,basedon induction frommyobservationsofotherpiecesof

abstractexpressionism.Noticethatthecognitiveprocesses involvedareallmyown.Still,

thisseemswrongway togoaboutmakingaesthetic judgments.TheAutonomyPrinciple,

saysHopkins,cannotaccountforwhat’swrongwithinductivejudgments(p.151-2).Only

theAcquaintancePrinciplecan.ItsaysthatshouldactuallyexperienceNo.61itselfbeforeI

renderanyaestheticjudgmentofthatwork;reasoningfrominductionviolatesthatrequire-

ment.Forreasonslikethese,theconversationaboutdeferenceandaesthetictestimonyhas

largelycometorevolvearoundtheAcquaintancePrinciple.

Thecaseforautonomy

TheAcquaintancePrinciplecertainlyexplainswhatiswrongwithmakingaestheticjudg-

mentsfrominductioninawaythattheAutonomyPrinciplecannot.ButtheAcquaintance

Principle,byitself,cannotexplainotherpartsofthestory.

Considerthefollowingcase:

AudioTour

Brandonconsidershimselftobeanart-lover.Wheneverhegoestoamuseum,herents

theaudiotourandexploresthemuseumatitsdirection.Helooksatthepaintingsheistold

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tolookat,studiesthosedetailswhicharecalledtohisattention,andalwaysassentstothe

audiotour’sjudgmentofthequality,importance,andaestheticpropertiespresentbasedon

thosedetails.Heneverlooksforanydetailsthataren’tspecifiedbytheaudiotour,nordoes

heeverformaestheticjudgmentswithouttheexplicitguidanceandsuggestionofanaudio

tour.Buthedoesmakesuretolookateachspecifiedpainting,andtofindandnoteanyspec-

ifieddetail,beforeallowinghimselftoacceptthesuggestedjudgment.Andheonlyaccepts

thesuggestedjudgmentwhenheseestherelevantaestheticpropertiesforhimself,afterper-

mittinghisattentiontobeentirelydirectedbytheaudiotour.Furthermore,heconductshis

entireaestheticlifeinthismanner.Hedoesnotusetheaudiotoursasajumpingoffpointfor

futureexploration,butalwaysseeksexpertguidancetodirecthisengagementwithanyart-

workheencounters.Heneverattemptstoestablishhisownviewswhensuchguidanceis

unavailable.

Brandon’slifeismissingsomethingimportant.Itmightbeperfectlyfinetobeginone’s

aestheticeducationwithaudiotours,ortousethemasajumping-offpointforfurtherreflec-

tion.ButBrandon’suseofaudiotoursisn’tjustastepalongtheway;itisthetotalityand

endpointofhisaestheticactivity.Hisaestheticlifeseemsnottobefullyrealized.Helacks

independence,wewanttosay;hedoesnotfullyengagewithartworksintherightway.But

noticethatonlytheAutonomyPrinciplecanexplainwhat’smissingfromBrandon’saesthetic

life.Heiscertainlyacquaintedwiththeaestheticproperties,andhisjudgmentsareformed

from direct experience of an aesthetic object and its relevant aesthetic qualities.What’s

wrongwithBrandon’sconductisnotalackofacquaintance;itisthatheisaestheticallysub-

servient.Heisfailingtoreachtheconclusionsthroughtheapplicationofhisownfaculties

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andresources.Heislettinganotherdirecthisattention,suggestinterpretations,andsuggest

conclusions.Thoughhe is certainly engaging someofhis capacities, suchas theones re-

quiredtoseedetailsandtograspinterpretations,heisnotengaginghishigher-ordercapac-

itiesforaestheticagency.Heisn’tchoosingwhichdetailstoattendto.Heisn’tforminghis

owninterpretationsandusingthemtoguidehisattentionandinvestigation.Heisnoten-

tirelylackinginaestheticautonomy,butheismissingasubstantialpartofit.

TheAutonomyPrinciplebyitselfcannotexplainwhat’swrongwithinduction,andthe

AcquaintancePrinciplebyitselfcannotexplainwhat’swrongwithAudioTourBrandon.The

bestaccount,then,isnotthatthesetwoprinciplesarecompetingexplanationsofthesame

phenomenon,butthattheyarebothnormativelyactive.Eachprinciplearticulatesadifferent

demandbearingonouraestheticjudgment.

ItwillbeusefulheretocompareAudioTourBrandonwithsomethingofanoppositecase:

IndependentandInductive

Katewatchesalotofmovies,andformsstrong,personal,carefullythought-outreactions

toallofthem.Aftershehasseenenoughmoviesfromadirectororproductiongroup,she

willsometimesbegin toalso formsome inductive judgments.Shestates these judgments

without qualification. For example, shewill say thatQuentinTarantino’sHateful Eight is

clever,perverse,andpostmodernwithouthavingseenitherself,basedentirelyoninduction

from previous experienceswith Quentin Tarantinomovies. Shewill also say that Justice

Leagueisboring,corporate,ponderousandgenerallyworthless,withouthavingseenitfor

herself,basedoninductionfrompreviousexperienceswithWarnerBrothersversionsofDC

comicbookproperties.

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WhatwouldwesayaboutAudioTourBrandonandInductiveKate?Noticethatwemight

challengeparticularclaimsofKate’s.IwouldnotacceptherparticularjudgmentthatJustice

Leaguewasboringor thatHatefulEightwascleverpreciselybecauseshe lacksdirectac-

quaintance.However,Iwouldalsothinkthat,ingeneral,heraestheticlifewasgoingquite

well,thoughIwouldcomplainthatsomeofherparticularexpressionsofaestheticjudgments

weremisleadingorunfounded.MyreactiontoAudioTourBrandonisthereverse.Iwould

acceptparticularaestheticjudgmentsofhis—say,thatVanGogh’sIrisesdisplayedabold

andimpactfuluseofline,whichrevealsasubtleinfluencefromHokusai.Imight,admittedly,

acceptthoseaesthetic judgmentswithabitofaneye-roll,but Iwouldn’t throwthemout

altogether.ItrustBrandontobeagoodconveyanceofreliableaestheticjudgment,atleast

enoughtoallowhisexpressedjudgmentstodirectmyactionandattention.7However,Ialso

thinkthatAudioTourBrandonislivingamuchmoreimpoverishedaestheticlifethanKate.

IfIwereBrandon’sfriend,Iwouldpushhimtomakemorejudgmentsforhimself,tolethis

attentionroamathisowndirection–tonotonlyfeelforhimself,buttodiscoverforhimself

theaestheticintricaciesoftheseartworks.Ifhesaidthathewasafraidofgettingsomething

wrong,Iwouldreplythatgettingallyourfactsinarowwasn’ttheend-allandbe-allofaes-

theticlife.InductiveKate,ontheotherhand,seemstobeleadingarichandfulfillingaesthetic

life,albeitoneplaguedbytheoccasionalbizarreoverreach.ImighturgeKatetotemperthe

exactwordingofherclaims,butnottochangethebasiccontourofheraestheticlife.Audio

7Iamhere,Iadmit,makingclaimsaboutwhatcountsasaestheticjudgments,withoutofferinganaccount

ofwhatitistobeaesthetic.IamfollowingherethestrategysuggestedbyDominicLopes—thatwetryavoid-ing,forthemoment,gettingcaughtupindefiningtheboundaryoftheaesthetic,andseehowfarwecanget.Iaminsteadtakinghere,asanidentifyingprinciplelooselyadaptedfromLopes,thatamarkerofarealaes-theticjudgmentisthatitisagoodbasisforfurtheraestheticactions(Lopes2018,p.46-8).

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TourBrandon,on theotherhand, is fullyentitled to theparticularcontentofeachofhis

claims,butheseemstobemissingoutonsomethingrathermoregalactic.

IhavesuggestedthattheAutonomyPrinciplecanhelptoexplaintheasymmetrybetween

aestheticandempiricaltestimony.But,onemightworry,theAutonomyPrinciplecan’tdo

thatexplanatoryworkbecauseit is, infact,ageneralrequirementforallagentsinalldo-

mains.Afterall,shouldn’twealwaysthinkforourselves,directingourownattentionand

comingupwithourowntheoriesabouttheworld?Howcouldageneralprincipleofagency

accountfortheasymmetrybetweentheaestheticandtheempirical?

Asamatteroffact,Idonotthinkthatwedemandthesameformofautonomyinboththe

aestheticandempiricaldomains.8Let’sdistinguishbetweentwoformsofintellectualauton-

omy:directautonomyandindirectautonomy.Tohavedirectintellectualautonomyovera

givenjudgment,weneedtograspallthereasons,evidence,andconsiderationswhichsup-

portthecontentofthatjudgmentforourselves.Tohaveindirectintellectualautonomyover

a judgment,wecanacquirethat judgmentthroughtestimonyfromatrustedsource,pro-

videdthatwegraspthereasonsforourtrust.Indirectautonomyistheweakerrequirement:

weneedonlyunderstandourtrusttheexternalsourceofourjudgments,ratherthanunder-

standingthecontentofthejudgmentsitself.9

Inourlifewiththesciences,thebestwecanhopeforisindirectautonomyovermostof

8Ifocus,inthispaper,onexplainingtheasymmetrybetweentheaestheticandtheempirical,leaving

largelytothesidetheasymmetrybetweentheaestheticandthemoral.Thisisbecause,whilealmostallagreeaboutthedirectionofasymmetryintheaesthetic/empiricalcase,notallagreeintheaesthetic/moralcase.Elsewhere,Ihavesuggestedthatourdemandforautonomyisstrongerintheaestheticthanthemoral(Ngu-yen2017).Othershavesuggestedthatourdemandforautonomyisweakerintheaestheticthanthemoral(Driver2006),andothershavesuggestedthattheyarepreciselyonapar(Howell2014).Iwillmakesometentativeremarksonthistopicattheendofthispaper,butIwillotherwiseleavethistopicforlaterdiscus-sion.

9Thisdistinctiondrawnfrommydiscussionofexpertiseandthefragmentationofintellectualautonomy(Nguyen2018).Thediscussionoftrustandintellectualautonomyisvast;forstartingpoints,see(Hardwig1985,1991;Goldberg2010)

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thedomainsonwhichwedepend.Contemporaryscienceissovast,noindividualcanhope

topossessdirectintellectualautonomyoverallthescientificjudgmentswhichtheymustuse.

AsElijahMillgramputsit,thecharacterofmodernepistemiclifeisdominatedbythehyper-

specializationofexpertdomains.Non-scientistsmusttrustthe judgmentsofscientificex-

pertswithoutbeingabletounderstandthoseexperts’reasons.Andevenamongthespecial-

ists,eachexpertmustdependonthejudgmentsofotherexpertswithoutbeingabletofully

graspthegroundsforallthosejudgmentsforthemselves.Thedoctormusttrustthebiologist,

the chemist, and the engineers behind their instruments.Nobody canunderstand all the

fieldsofscienceontheirown;thebesttheycandoistomanagetheirtrustinotherswith

somedegreeofautonomy(Millgram2015;Nguyen2018).Wecannowbetterarticulatethe

keyasymmetry:inempiricallifewedemandonlyindirectautonomy,butinaestheticlifewe

demanddirectautonomy.

Thereare,then,twodifferentpossiblespecificationsoftheAutonomyPrinciple:

DirectAutonomyPrinciple:Oneoughttoarriveatone’saestheticjudgmentsofan

objectthroughtheapplicationofone’sownfacultiesandabilities,withouttheuseof

testimony.10

IndirectAutonomyPrinciple:Oneoughttoarriveatone’saestheticjudgmentofan

objectthroughtheapplicationofone’sownfacultiesandabilities,includingacquiring

10ItaketheDirectAutonomyPrincipletobeastrongerrequirementthantherequirementthatisusually

attributedtoKant.Forexample,KerenGorodeiskysuggeststhatKantrequiresthatanaestheticjudgmentproceedfromthejudger’sownpleasurableresponse,inadditiontothejudger’sgraspingofthemeritofthatresponse(Gorodeisky2010).Noticethat,inKant’sversion,thereisnorequirementthatthejudger’spleasureorgraspproceedfromtheirownself-directedinquiry;theycouldbeledtoit.

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judgmentsabouttheobjectsthroughtestimony,so longasthechoiceoftestimonial

sourcesarisesthroughtheapplicationofone’sownfacultiesandabilities.

MyclaimisthatinaestheticappreciationwedemandtheDirectAutonomyPrinciple.We

donotmaketheanalogousdemandinempirical,scientific life; there,weonlyaskforthe

muchweaker,indirectformofintellectualautonomy.

Whythisdifference?Iwillarguethatitisbecausescienceandartappreciationhavevery

differentpurposes.Inartappreciation,weaimatmakingcorrectaestheticjudgments.But

havingcorrectjudgmentsisn’tthepurposeofthepractice.Ourpurposeistoengageinthe

activityoftryingtomakecorrectjudgments.Weshouldn’tdefertoaesthetictestimonybe-

causefiguring it forourselves is thewholepoint.Ontheotherhand,wedemandindirect

autonomyinempiricallifebecausewesignificantlyvaluegettingthingsright,andthatvalue

oftenoutweighsthevaluesassociatedwithdoingthingsforourselves.

Theaccountalsosuggestsalargerpicture,whichmighthelptoilluminatethecomplex

relationshipbetween theAcquaintancePrincipleand thevarious formsof theAutonomy

Principle.Letmebrieflysketchthatpicture.Suppose, forthemoment,thatweacceptthe

commonviewthattheAcquaintancePrinciplecapturesaconstitutivefeatureofaesthetic

judgments.11Inthatcase,wecouldunderstandthetwoprinciplesasarisingfromdifferent

considerations.TheAcquaintancePrincipleconcernswhatitistobeanaestheticjudgment,

whiletheDirectAutonomyPrinciplearisesfromourpurposeinmakingaestheticjudgments.

Let’scallthisthesplit-levelview;itseparatesthenormsinvolvedintoonesarisingfromthe

11Thisclaimiswidely,thoughnotuniversally,accepted.Noticethat,forthosethatrejecttheconstitutive

normativityoftheAcquaintancePrinciple,allmyclaimsconcerningtheDirectAutonomyPrinciple’srelation-shipwithvaluewouldstillhold.

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constitutivelevelofexplanationandthevaluelevel.Thesplit-levelviewwouldresolvethe

seemingcompetitionbetweentheAcquaintancePrincipleandtheDirectAutonomyPrinci-

ple.AnditwouldexplainwhywethinkAudioTourBrandonismissingsomeofthepointof

aestheticlife,thoughwewouldallowthathewasstillengagedinaestheticactivity.Heisnot

entirelyoutsidetherealmoftheaestheticas,say,wouldbesomebodythatinvestedinpaint-

ingsforeconomicreasons,basedonpurchasingtrends.He’sintherightdomain,buthalf-

asleepatthewheel.Thesplit-levelviewstrikesmeasquiteplausible,butIwillleaveitaside

forfutureexploration.

Whatisthevalueindirectautonomy?

Let’sretreattothemore localclaim,towhichIwilldevotetherestof thispaper.The

DirectAutonomyPrinciple,I’veproposed,canbeexplainedbyaparticularstoryaboutthe

motivationalstructureofartappreciation:thatthevalueofaestheticappreciationliesinor

arisesfromtheprocessesofengagementinvolvedinformingaestheticjudgments.‘Aesthetic

engagement’hereincludesourhigher-levelcognitionofaestheticobjects:searchingforcon-

nections,rethinkinginterpretations,discoveringaffectiveresonances.Italsoincludeslow-

levelformsofengagementsuchasperceptualengagement:activelyshiftingone’sattention

fromoneperceptualdetailtothenext,andthenassemblingthosedetailsintoalargerstruc-

ture.Anditincludesthewaytheseformsofengagementfeedintooneanother,asmyinter-

pretationandaffectiveresponsesinfluencewhereIdirectmyattention,andviceversa.Aes-

theticengagementincludesalltheperceptual,cognitive,andaffectiveprocessesweactively

deployonourwaytogeneratinganaestheticjudgment.

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Hereismyproposal:weperformthevariousaestheticactivitiesofperceptionandinves-

tigationforthesakeofourinvolvementintheactivityofseekingcorrectjudgments,rather

thanforthesakeofactuallyhavingmadecorrectjudgments.Inotherwords,thoughtheaes-

theticactivityofappreciationusuallyculminatesintheissuanceofaestheticjudgments,that

activityisnotmadevaluablebytheissuanceofthosejudgmentsorbytheircorrectness.Ra-

ther,weaimatmakingcorrectjudgmentsforthesakeofengagingintheattempttogetthem

right.Letuscallthistheengagementaccountofthevalueofaestheticautonomy.Theengage-

mentaccountstatesthattheprimaryvalueoftheactivityofaestheticappreciationcomes

fromtheprocessofgeneratingjudgmentsandnottheend-product—thejudgmentsthem-

selves.

Insomesense,theengagementaccountisquiteintuitive.Ilistentomusicforthesakeof

thelisteningitself,andnotforthesakeofhavingmadecorrectjudgmentaboutthequalityof

themusic.Butthissimpleobservationhasmanyphilosophicaldividends.Theaccountan-

swersourquestionaboutthevalueofdirectautonomy.Thedemandfordirectautonomyis

importantbecause itencouragesaestheticengagement.Furthermore, theengagementac-

countexplainstheasymmetrybetweenaestheticjudgmentandscientificjudgment.Therea-

sonwedefertoexperttestimonyinthesciences,butnotinaestheticappreciation,isthat

gettingcorrect judgments is theprimarysourceofvalue in thesciences.However, in the

practiceofaestheticappreciation,gettingcorrectjudgmentsislessimportantthanthepro-

cesseswegothroughinformingthosejudgmentsforourselves.12

12Acomplication:asFinnurDellsénpointsout,weseemtorequirescientificexpertstobedirectlyautono-mouswhenworkingwithintheirownspecialistdomain,butwedonotrequiresuchdirectautonomyfortheirgraspofadjacentdomains—evenwhentheydependonandapplyclaimsfromthoseadjacentdomains.Thebestexplanation,arguesDellsén,isthatscienceisguidedbynormsoflong-termcommunalcorrectness,ra-therthannormsofindividualcorrectness.Thatis,ifascientistwereinterestedinmaximizingtheirownjudg-

16

Whatmightthevaluebeindirectlyautonomousaestheticengagement?Let’sstepbacka

moment and consider our complicated relationship to aesthetic testimony and aesthetic

judgment.Audiotoursandotherformsofcriticalguidancecanplayacrucialroleinahealthy,

well-balancedaestheticlife.Therearemanyfelicitoususesofaesthetictestimonyandmany

contextswherewehappilyrelaxourdemandforaestheticautonomy.TheproblemforBran-

donisnotinhisuseoftheaudiotour,butinhisdisinclinationtomovepastit.Much,then,

seemstodependonhowexactlytheaestheticappreciatorusesaesthetictestimony.Istheir

useopen-endedorclosed-ended?Somewaysofusingaesthetic testimonyseemtoquickly

terminateone’saestheticengagement.Forexample,when two friendsare involved inan

aestheticdispute,itseemswrongtosimplyturntosomeexperttosettlethematter.Suppose

weweretodisagreeabouttheaestheticvalueofSatoshiKon’spsychedelicanimePaprika,

andItriedtosettleitonceandforallbyconsultingthereviewaggregationsiteRottenTo-

matoesandpointingoutthat83%ofcriticshadrenderedapositivejudgment.ThewayI’m

usingaesthetictestimonyhereskimsoffasupposedlyauthoritativeoverallevaluationofthe

film,whileleavingmeoutoftouchwiththeparticularreasonsforthatevaluation.Thisrela-

tionshiptotestimonycutsmeofffromthespecificattention-guidingfeaturesofcriticaldis-

cussion. It terminatesmyengagementwiththeaestheticdetails.13 If,ontheotherhand, I

reactedtoourdisputebyreadingessaysfromsensitivefilmcritics,re-watchingthemovie

ments’correctness,theyshould,infact,alwaysdefertotheconsensusview,evenintheirownterrain.How-ever,itiscrucialthatweenforcenormsofdirectintellectualautonomyforexpertsintheirowndomain.Thesenormsarevitalforthelong-term,collaborativepursuitofcorrectness.Outsidersneedtouseexpertconsensusasaguide,buttheconsensusofexpertsisonlyvaluableiftheexpertshavereasonedinde-pendently.Theidealarrangementforthelong-termcollaborativepursuitofcorrectness,then,isthatwe defertoothersforfactsoutsideofourownrealmofexpertise,butadoptnormsofdirectautonomywheninsideourownrealmofexpertise(Dellsén2018).Theparticularstructureofthedemandforautonomythatwefindinscience—directautonomyforexpertsintheirowndomain,butindirectotherwise—ispreciselywhatweshouldexpectforasocialpracticeorientedtowardsproducinglong-term,collectivecorrectness.Butnoticethatwithaestheticappreciation,wedemandsomethingverydifferent:directautonomyforall.

13ThiscommentisindebtedtoananalysisofMattStrohl’s(Strohl2017).

17

whileattendingtothe featuresthosecriticspointedout,andthenusedwhat I learned in

furtherengagementswithfilm,thenmyuseoftestimonyseemsunproblematic.Thatisan

engagement-encouraginguseofaesthetictestimony.AproblemwithAudioTourBrandonis

notsimplythatheletshisattentionbedirectedbyanauthoritativesource.Rather,itisthat

he terminates his engagement there, rather than using those authoritative directions as

springboardstofurtherengagement.14

Butproblemhereisn’tsimplyabouthowdeferencecanlimitthequantityofengagement

availabletotheguidedappreciator.Fullyautonomousengagementseemsqualitativelybet-

ter.Acrucialpartoftheactivityofaestheticappreciationliesnotonlyinthecontentand

orderofattention,butinthefactthattheappreciatoractivelychooseswheretodirecttheir

ownattention.Anautonomousappreciatorisanagentwithrespecttotheirownattention.

Andthatagencyhelpstocultivateadifferentkindofattentionandadifferentmentalrela-

tionshipwiththeobjectoftheirattention.Thisis,inaveryintuitivesense,whatitmeansto

betrulyengaged.Oneanalyzestheinputanddecideswhichfeaturestoattendtonext,which

possibilitiestoexplore.Oneinhabitsone’sinvestigationsmorefullywhenonehastoguide

themfrommomenttomoment.

ThereisausefulparallelinMill’sdiscussionofthevalueoffreespeech.Millthoughtthat

oneneededtoconstantlydefendone’sbeliefsinordertokeepthemalive.Withoutthepres-

suretoactivelyrethink,reconsider,andreformulate,one’sbeliefswouldfallintohabitand

routine;theywouldtransitionfromlivebeliefsintomerewords—‘theshellandhuskonly’.

14ThisdistinctionlooselymodeledonsomesuggestionsfromPhilipNickelonthenatureofmoraltesti-

mony(Nickel2001).IhaveofferedsomediscussionofNickel’saccount(Nguyen2010).

18

Beliefsneededtobeconstantlydefendedthroughaprocessofanalysisandinquirytomain-

tain‘alivelierfeelingofthemeaningoftheircreed’.15Aestheticengagementstrikesmeas

playing a similar role. Active engagement keeps one’s aesthetic judgments alive in one’s

mind.16

Noticethatvaluableengagementcanariseintheprocessofrenderingeitherapositive

ornegativejudgment.Itcanbeavaluableformofengagementtocriticallyanalyzeamovie

andcome,aftersignificantconsideration,torealizethatitishollowandmanipulative.The

engagementaccount,then,isquitedistinctfromthoseviewsinwhichthevalueofaesthetic

appreciationistobefoundexclusivelyinpositiveaestheticjudgments,ortheexperienceof

valuableaestheticproperties.17Suchaccountsrestrictthevalueofaestheticappreciationto

makingcorrect judgmentsofaestheticallygoodobjects.Theengagementaccount, I think,

bettercapturesthevariedpathstoaestheticvalue.Forexample,Iusedtohaveaveryuncrit-

icalrelationshipwithfood.IateTVdinnersandfastfood.Ilikedfoodthatwascrunchyand

salty,andthatwastheendofthematter.Then,Itookatripwithamoreculinarilycosmopol-

itanfriendandbecomeexposedtomoresubtle,complex,andinterestingfood.Mysensibili-

tiesdeveloped,mytastestransformed.WhenIreturnedtomysmalltown,withitslimited

repertoireoffastfoodjointsandfrozenfood,thosesame-sameyburgersandfishstickshad

15FromOnLiberty(Mill1967,p.247-9).Myunderstandingofthesepassagesfollowsfrom(Millgram

2004,p.172-3).16AlexKingoffersasimilaraccountofactiveaestheticengagementinherdiscussionofthevirtuesofaes-

theticsubtlety.Weseemtovaluesubtletyinart.Thecentralfeatureofaestheticsubtletyisthatitisepistemi-callydemanding.Whydowevaluesubtlety?Theanswer,shesuggests,isthatsubtletymakestheappreciatorworkforit.Subtletypromotesactiveengagementintheappreciator,whereheavy-handednessdiscouragesagencyintheappreciator(King2017).King’sdiscussionheredovetailsnicelywithmyown.Ifaestheticen-gagementisthesourceofvalue,thenheavy-handednessisthefailureoftheartworktopromoteengagement,whiledeferenceisthefailureoftheappreciatortopursuevaluableengagementwhenit’savailable.

17OnesuchviewcanbefoundinKendallWalton’sclaimthattheaestheticvalueofanobjectliesinitsca-pacitytoappropriatelyproduceaestheticpleasure.Aestheticpleasure,onhisaccount,isquitespecific:itisthepleasureonetakesinone’sadmirationorpositiveevaluationofsomething,whenonerecognizesthattheobjectearnedthatpleasure(Walton1993,p.504-9).

19

losttheirappeal.Afterthat,Ihadtotravelalongwaytofindanyculinarysatisfaction.Asa

resultofmyculinaryawakening,I foundmyselfmakingfarfewerpositiveaesthetic judg-

ments.Ifthequalityofmyaestheticlifewasdependentsimplyonthenumberofpositive

aestheticsjudgmentsImade,thenmyaestheticlifewouldhavesimplygottenworse.Butthis

seemslikethewrongwaytothinkaboutthisstory.I’dlearnedsomething,andmyaesthetic

lifehadgottenbetterinsomeimportantways,evenifthatdidn’thaveaclearcashvaluein

termsofanincreasedquantityofpositiveaestheticjudgments.

Suchapositiveaccountofvaluecouldtrytorespondbysayingthatthevalueofgreater

understandinglayinmyclearingthegroundofthecrudandmakingroomforbetterpleas-

ures.ButnoticethatIonlygetthatpay-offifIhaveadequateaccesstobetterqualityaesthetic

objects—whichisn’tthecaseinmyfoodstory.Consider,instead,whattheengagementac-

counthastosayaboutthissortoflifearc.Theengagementaccountisfreetodistributethe

valuethroughallsortsofactivitiesinvolvedwithgeneratingjudgments.Renderinganega-

tivejudgmentofanobjectthroughsensitiveengagementwithitsparticularitiescan,inand

ofitself,beavaluableactivity.Ofcourse,alifefullofonlynegativejudgmentofboringobjects

wouldbelackingmanydistinctivekindsofaestheticvalue;itwouldmiss,forexample,the

valuesassociatedwithhavingdeepandlastingengagementswithacomplex,subtleworks.

Butcomingtohavenegativejudgmentsthroughanengagedprocessiscertainlypartofthe

valuestory.

Thislineofthinking`opensthedoortoallsortsofotherpossibilities.Forexample:we

mighthavethoughtthatwehadlongconversationsaboutartinordertogettherightjudg-

ments.Theengagementaccountsuggests,instead,thatwemightbepursuingcorrectjudg-

mentssothatwecanhavealltheselovely,carefulconversations.

20

Correctnessandengagement

How,then,arewetosquareanengagement-centricpictureofvaluewiththeapparent

driveforaestheticcorrectness?Imeancorrectnesshereinseveralsenses.Wewanttoattrib-

utetherightaestheticpropertiestothework.Wewanttohavethecorrectoveralljudgments

oftheaestheticqualityandworthofawork.Andwewantthosejudgmentsandattributions

toberesponsivetogenuinedetailsinthework.And,asFabianDorschpointsout,weexpect

ouraesthetic interlocutorstobeabletoprovidereasonsfortheiraesthetic judgments, to

defendtheirclaimsandpointoutsupportingdetails—orweloserespectforthem(Dorsch

2013).18What’smore,wedon’tsimplystopwhenwehaveapleasingresponseorinterpre-

tationofawork;wepushontomakesurethatourresponseissensitivetothecomplexac-

tualityofthework.Withoutthatdrivetocorrectness,wewouldbetemptedtostopthinking

abouttheworkassoonaswerepleasedbyit.Wewouldnothaveanyreasontopushon,

sincewemightendupdiscoveringsomesubtleflawthatshatteredourenjoyment.

Onemightbethentemptedtoreasoninthefollowingway:sincemyactionsareoriented

towardsthegoalofcorrectness,thenthepurposeofthepracticeofaestheticjudgmentmust

itselfbecorrectness.ButIdonotthinkthatthisisright.Thegoalatwhichweaimduringan

activityisnotnecessarilythesameasourpurposefortakinguptheactivity,norisachieving

thatlocalgoaltheonlypossiblesourceofvalueforanactivity.Somepeopletrytocatchfish

toachieveacertainmeditativestateofmindandsomepeopletrytoclimbmountainsforthe

18Seealso(Cavedon-Taylor2017)forausefulfurtherdiscussion.

21

sakeoftheirhealth.Imyselfrelaxafteraharddayofphilosophybydoingsomerockclimb-

ing.NoticethatIpursuemylargerpurpose–relaxation–byfocusingonalocalgoal–getting

tothetopoftherock.Butitdoesn’tactuallymatterformypurposesifIactuallygettothe

top;itonlymattersthat,intryingtogettothetop,Imanagedtoclearmyhead.19

Thiscomplexrelationshipbetweengoalsandpurposes is, I think,easiest toseewhen

theyareformalizedingames.Ineverygame,thereisagoal.Forsimplicity’ssake,let’ssay

thatthegoalofagameiswinning.Therearetwokindsofmotivationalstatesonemighttake

towardsgame-play.First,onemightplaythegameforthesakeofthevalueofwinningor

whatfollowsfromwinning.Callthisachievementplay.Second,onemighttakeonthegoalof

winningforthesakeoftheactivityoftryingtowin.Callthisstrivingplay.Wecanfindevi-

denceofstrivingplayinmanyofourgame-playingpractices.First,considerourlong-term

manipulationsofourcapacitytowinagame.WhenIplayboardgameswithmyspouse,we

bothtryourbesttowin.But,solongasourmatchesarecloseandexciting,wewillavoid,

say,readingstrategyguidesonourown.Wearetryingnottooutpaceeachother.Ifoneofus

becometoomuchmoreskillfulthantheother,thenthecontestwouldloseitssavor.This

revealsthatwearestrivingplayersandnotachievementplayers.Winningisnotthepoint

forus.Weeachpursuewinninglocally,duringthegameitself,butinthelongterm,wema-

nipulateourabilities,notforthesakeofmaximizingourwins,butforthesakeofthequality

ofthestruggle.20

19Discussionsofsuchstructureshavesometimescomeupunderdiscussionsofself-effacingends—that

is,endsthatcannotbeachievedthroughdirectpursuit(Parfit1984,p.23-4;Keller2007;Annas2008;Pet-tigrove2011,p.192-3).

20Thediscussionofstrivingplayinthissectionisacondensedversionofmyaccountofthemotivationalstructureofgame-play,developedatlengthelsewhere(Nguyen2019;2020).Thepresentpaperhasitsori-ginsinsomeinvaluablecommentsbyServaasvanderBerg,whosuggestedthatmydiscussionofgamesandstrivingcouldfruitfullybebroughttobearonsomekeyquestionsofaesthetics.VanderBerghassinceap-pliedmyaccountofstrivingplaytoofferhisownaccountofthedistinctivenessofappreciativeperception.

22

Next,considerwhatwemightcallstupidgames.Astupidgameisonewherethebestpart

ofthegameislosing,butfailureisonlyfunifyouwereactivelypursuingthewin.Examples

ofstupidgamesincludeTwister,thechildren’sgameofTelephone,andmanydrinkinggames.

Withstupidgames,wemustaimatsuccess,butwhatweactuallywanttodoistofailinthe

attempt. Instupidgames,ourgoalandpurposeclearlycomeapart. Ifwecanplaystupid

games,thenstrivingplaymustbepossible.

Strivingplay involves amotivational inversion. Innormalpractical life, one takes the

meansforthesakeoftheends.Instrivingplay,oneselectstheendsforthesakeofthemeans

itputsonethrough.Itissimple,then,tosquaretheengagementaccountwiththeapparent

goalofcorrectness.Weneedonlyallowthataestheticappreciationisastrivingactivity.In

aestheticappreciation,weaimatcorrectness,butcorrectnessisnotthepurpose.Itisonly

torightgoaltoadoptinordertobecomeengagedinadesirableformofactivity.

I amnothere claiming that thepracticeof aesthetic appreciation is agame,but I am

claimingthatithasasimilarlyinvertedmotivationalstructure.Importantly,thisdoesnot

commitus to theview thataesthetic engagement is intrinsicallyvaluable.Let’s return to

gamesforthemoment.Thedistinctionbetweenstrivingplayandachievementplayisnot

the same as the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. The intrinsic/extrinsic

valuedistinctionconcernswhethersomethingisvaluableinitselforwhetheritisvaluable

asameanstoanend.Thestriving/achievementplaydistinction,ontheotherhand,concerns

wherethatvalueadheres.Itispossibletobeanintrinsicachievementplayerandplayforthe

valueofthewinitself,ortobeanextrinsicachievementplayerandplayforthevalueofwhat

Appreciation,heargues,involvesthespecialinvertedmotivationalstate,whichexplainsitsdistinctivemodeofattentionalguidance(VanderBerg2019).Itakeourdiscussionstobecompatibleandcomplementary,thoughtheyareargumentativelyindependent.

23

followsfromthewin,likemoneyorhonor.Similarly,itispossibletobeanintrinsicstriving

playerandplayfortheintrinsicvalueofthestrivingitself,oranextrinsicstrivingplayerand

playforthevalueofwhatfollowsfromstriving—asImightif,say,Iranmarathonsformy

health.

Thus,inclaimingthataestheticappreciationisastrivingactivity,Iamonlyclaimingthat

thevalueadherestotheactivityofappreciation,ratherthantotheendsofthatactivity.I

leaveopenthequestionofwhetherthatactivityisintrinsicallyorextrinsicallyvaluable.Cer-

tainly,onecouldthinkthattheactivitywasvaluableinitself.However,theengagementac-

countisalsocompatiblewithviewsthatattributeextrinsicvaluetoaestheticengagement.

Consider,forexample,thelingeringeffectofaestheticexperiences—forexample,thefact

that,afteradayoflookingatpaintingsinmuseums,one’sexperiencesoftherestoftheworld

willbeenhanced(Nanay2016,p.16-17).Thepursuitofthatpositiveaftereffectstillcounts

asastrivingactivity,so longas it is theprocessofengagementthatcreates the lingering

aftereffect.Ihavereasontojudgeformyself,ratherthandeferringtoanother,sinceitisthe

actofjudgingformyselfwhichleadstotheextrinsicallyvaluableconsequence.21

Ofcourse,this invitesafurtherquestion:whyisthepursuitofaestheticcorrectnessa

valuableactivity?Onemightthinkthataestheticengagementwouldbeimprovedifitwere

freedfromtheburdenofcorrectness.Whynotjustletourimaginationrunfreeandascribe

to theworldwhatever aesthetic properties andmakewhatever aesthetic judgmentswe

wished?

Theanalogywithgamesisparticularlyusefulhere.InBernardSuits’saccountofgames,

21ThisiswhyIdousethelanguageof‘striving’ratherthanthatof‘autotelicity’.Thelattertermrefers

specificallytointrinsicallyvaluablestrivingactivities.

24

to play a game is to take on the pursuit of some goal, alongwith some unnecessary re-

strictionsandobstaclesonachievingthatgoal,forthesakeoftheactivitytheymakepossible

(Suits2014).Thegoalsofgamesaren’tusuallyvaluableinthemselves.Thenatureofagame-

goalcanusuallybebestexplainedintermsofthenatureoftheactivityitinspires.Inbasket-

ball,there’snospecialvalueingettingthisballthroughthathoopinandofitself.Wewantto

gettheballthroughthehoopwhilefacingopponentsandobeyingthedribblingconstraint

becausewewanttoengageintheactivityofdodging,jumping,andshooting.Wewanttoget

tothetopofthiscliffbygoingthehardway—upthesteepface,usingonlyourhandsand

feet—becausewewanttoengageintheparticularactivityofrockclimbing.Wewanttobe

forcedtocoordinatedelicatebalanceandpowerful,graceful,precisemovementinaunified

efforttosurmountthechallengesoftherock.22Noticetherelationshipherebetweentheac-

tivity,thegoal,andtherules.Infreeclimbing,theclimbermustascendonlybyusingtheir

handsandfeet,appliedonlytotherockitself.23Theyarenotallowedtopullontheropeor

thevariouspiecesofgearattachedtotherock;theropeisonlythereasasafetymeasure.

Somenoviceclimberscomplainaboutthesestrangerestrictions.Therequirementtoascend

byusingonlytherockstrikesthemasannoyinglyarbitrary.Whysubmittotheserestrictions,

whenonecouldjustswingaroundontheropeasonepleases?Experiencedclimbers,how-

ever,understandthepurposeoftheserestrictions.Whenyouareallowedtoascendbypull-

ingontheropeandthegear,thenyouenduprepeatingthesamesortsofmovementsonany

22Onemightwishtosayherethatthegamegoalmustbecombinedwiththeconstraintstoproducethe

activity.Importantly,Suits’saccountofagamegoalfoldsinthenotionofaconstraint.Alusorygoal,inSuits’saccount,issomedesirablestateofaffairswhichmayonlybereachedwhileobeyingcertainconstraints.‘Mak-ingabasket’,inbasketball,onlyoccurswhenoneisfollowingtherules(36-43).23 Manynon-climbersconfuse‘freeclimbing,’whichisclimbingwiththehandsandfeetonly,whileusingasafetyrope,’with‘freesoloing,’whichisclimbingwithnosafetyropeatall.Thereisaformofclimbinginwhichonewasallowedtopullonthegear–‘aidclimbing’.Thatstylewascommonintheearlydaysofclimb-ingbuthasnowbeenlargelyabandonedinfavoroffreeclimbing.

25

sort of rock. The requirement to ascend using only features of the rock itself forces the

climbertoattendtothedistinctivedetailsofeachdifferentrockface.Itforcestheclimberto

inventnewandcreativesolutionsinresponsetothewidelyvaryingdetailsoftherock.

Wecanofferasimilarexplanationforourpracticeofaestheticappreciation.Aswithrock

climbing,aestheticappreciationisapracticewhichinvolvespursuingagoalinsidecertain

restrictions.Wearetotrytoarriveatcorrectaesthetic judgmentsthroughtheuseofour

ownfaculties,withoutdeferringtoothers.Aswithclimbing,thegoalandtherestrictionscan

beexplainedintermsoftheformofactivitytheyinspire.Theaimofgettingcorrectaesthetic

judgmentsviaourownfacultiesandabilitiesdrivesustowardsaveryparticularsortofac-

tivity:onethatisorientedaroundsensitivity,refinement,care,andresponsivenesstodetail.

Ifmyaestheticactivitiesweren’torientedtowardsgettingitright,Iwouldbefreetoimagine

andimposeasIplease.Iwouldhavenomotivationtosticktothedetailsoftheobjectand

thusnoreasontostudythatobjectwithcare.Suchfree-formactivityislikelytosatisfyone

setofinterests—say,inhavingimaginativefreedom,unfetteredcreativity,andthelike.But

webringtobearanentirelydifferentsetofcapacitieswhenweaimatcorrectaestheticjudg-

ment.Inaestheticappreciation,weengageinperceptionandcognitionundertherequire-

mentofloyaltytothedetailsofexternalobjectsinalltheirpeculiardifferentness.Thebest

explanationofourdemandfordirectautonomyinaestheticappreciation,then,isthatwe

valuethespecificformofactivityinvolvedinpursuingcorrectaestheticjudgment.Wevalue

theprocessofhuntingforsubtledetailsthatwemissedthefirsttimearound,ofstruggling

tocreateinterpretationsthatfitwiththerichactualityoftheworld.

Theparallelwithgamesis, Ithink,particularlyuseful inthinkingaboutwhyweavoid

deferringtoaesthetictestimonyandaestheticexperts.AsSuitspointsout,game-playis,by

26

itsverynature,essentiallyinefficientwithrespecttoitsin-gamegoals(35-36).Weaimat

theendofcrossingthefinishlineofthemarathon,withtherestrictionsofnottakingataxi

orridingabicycle,inordertoengageintheactivityofrunning.Aestheticappreciationis,in

asimilarway,inefficientinitspursuitofcorrectness.Ifwethoughtthegoalofaestheticap-

preciationwascorrectness,thenwewouldbeinterestedinmaximallyefficientpathwaysto

thatgoal,suchasbeingguidedbyexpertsoracquiringbeliefsthroughtestimony.Werefuse

todeferpreciselybecausethatrestrictiondrivesustowardsaparticularformofvaluable

activity.Theaestheticappreciatorwhodeferstotestimony,then,ismakingthesamemistake

asthemarathonrunnerwhotakesataxitothefinishline.Theymistakenlytakethelocal

goalforthepurposeoftheactivityandtherebymissoutontherealvalue.Theirshortcut

defeatsthewholepoint.

Theparallelstructurewillbeevenclearerifweconsidermoreovertlyintellectualgames.

WhenIamreadingacertainsortoftraditionalmysterynovel,Iamtryingtofigureoutwho

the culprit is ahead of the big reveal. Notice a few things about the activity of puzzling

throughamysterynovel.First, there isacorrectanswertomyquestions.Second, Idon’t

value knowing those answers simply for the sake of the knowledge itself—otherwise I

wouldturntothelastpageorreadthespoilersonWikipedia,thussavingmyselfthetime

andeffortofactuallyreadingthebook.Third,theinvertedmotivationalstructureofstriving

explainswhyIdon’tsimplylookuptheansweronline.24Puzzlingthroughamysterynovel

isastrivingactivity.Wechasetherightanswerbyinefficientmeansforthesakeofthestrug-

gle.Thepracticeofaestheticappreciation involvesasimilar invertedvaluestructure.We

24Somepeopledislikethemystery,andonlywantthestory,andsodofliptotheend.Inthiscase,Isug-

gest,theyareengagedwithamysterynovelasaworkoffiction,andnotwithitsgameaspect.

27

makeourjudgmentsautonomouslybecausedeferencetoanotherwouldbelikeflippingto

theendofthebook.

Wenowhaveanexplanationfortheso-calledpessimisticintuitionsaboutaesthetic

testimony.Whydoesitseemsowrongtoustoacquireaestheticjudgmentsthroughtesti-

mony?Itisn’tbecausewecannottransmitaestheticknowledgethroughtestimony.Rather,

itisbecausegettingthatknowledgethroughtestimonywoulddefeatthewholepointofthe

exercise.

Notice,too,thattheengagementaccounthastheresourcestoexplainthecomplexitiesof

ourvariablewillingnesstousetestimonyfromaestheticexperts.Forexample:weseemwill-

ingtouseexperttestimonytogiveusrecommendationsaboutwhatmoviestowatchand

whichrestaurantstotry,butweseemunwillingtodefertotheirexpertiseinformingour

own judgments.25 This is nicely explained by the engagement account. Experts are good

guidestothesortsofobjectsthatcansustainalong,involvedandsatisfyingengagement.So

whenwetrusttheirrecommendationsandpayattentiontowhattheyrecommend,weare

morelikelytohavesuchengagements.Butifwedefertotheirjudgmentsratherthancoming

upwithourown,thenwewillskipovertheveryprocessofengagementwhichwevalue.The

bestwaytousetestimonytofosterqualityengagement,then,istousetestimonyasaguide

forwheretospendourattention,butnotasasubstitutefortheensuingprocessofjudgment.

The engagement account can also explain another asymmetry,whichhas been called

Kant’sproblemofaesthetictestimony.SupposeIhavelistenedtoMigos’sAtlantatrapclassic

Culturea handful of times and found it repetitive anddull. Then,mymusically sensitive

25Seethediscussionofrecommendationsandautonomyin(Hopkins2011,p.154-5;Nguyen2017)and

thedistinctionbetweenaestheticjudgmentandaestheticbeliefin(GorodeiskyandMarcus2018,p.135-7).

28

friendandtrustedconfidantetellsmethatitis,infact,arevolutioninrapbecauseofhowit

deploysitsrhythmicpatternstocreatenewkindsofmusicalspace,andthatI’vemissedits

subtle,butprofound,groove.Thisgivesmeareasontolistenagainandreconsidermyjudg-

ment.AsHopkinsputs it,wetakecontraryaesthetic testimonytobecapableof inspiring

doubt–togiveusreasontoreconsidersomething.ButIwillnot,ofcourse,simplyadoptmy

musicallysensitivefriend’sjudgmentoutright.Hereistheproblem:whatforcecouldaes-

thetictestimonyhave,thatitcouldprovidenegativeweightforinspiringdoubtbut,atthe

sametime,failtoprovideapositivebasisfordeference(Hopkins2001)?26AsKerenGoro-

deiskyandEricMarcusputit,Kant’sProblemishowwethreadtheneedlebetweendoubt

anddeference.Itlookslikeanyexplanationwhichcangroupthedoubtfromtestimonywill

alsoforceustodefertocontraryjudgments,whenthesourceissufficientlyexpert.Goro-

deiskyandMarcusofferacomplexKantiansolutionforthreadingthatneedle(Gorodeisky

andMarcus2018,122-137).Buttheengagementaccountoffersusadifferent,andconsider-

ablysimpler,solution.Wehavesculptedapracticeofaestheticappreciationwithnormsset

todriveustowardsgreaterengagement.Wepermittestimonytoraisedoubtbecauseadopt-

ingthatnormwilldriveustowardgreaterengagement.Thatnormwillgeneratereasonsto

lookagainandincreasethelikelihoodofpayingattentiontoworksthatcansustaindeeper

engagement.Butwedon’tpermitdeferencetotestimonyinformingourjudgmentbecause

thatwouldcutoffanydeeperengagement.Thenormthatpermitsdoubtfromtestimonyis

engagement-enhancing,butthenormthatpermitsdeferencefromtestimonyisengagement-

terminating.Thepermissiontodoubtfromtestimony,buttheprohibitionondeferenceto

testimony,aregoodnormstohavebecause,together,theysculptthepracticeofaesthetic

26 For related discussions, see (McGonigal 2006; Robson 2015).

29

appreciationinawaythatsupportsgreaterengagement.

Importantly,theengagementaccountisintendedonlyasananalysisofthepracticeof

aestheticappreciation.Thereareotherpractices in theaestheticdomainwithotherpur-

poses,towhichtheengagementaccountdoesnotapply.Consider,forexample,thepractice

ofarthistory.Arthistoryisorientedtowardsthegenerationofcorrecthistoricalfacts;itis,

therefore,notastrivingactivity.Thus,theaccountI’veofferedcanexplainthepractice-de-

pendentvariabilityofourdemandforstrongautonomy.WhenmyfriendsandIareinamu-

seum,talkingabouttheabsenceofpresenceofgracefulnessinaparticularpainting,weought

nottodefertothejudgmentsofothers.Ontheotherhand,ifIamanarthistorianandIam

tryingtotrackthemovementofaparticularstylethroughvariousplaces,Isometimesought

todefer.27ThereasonweholdfasttotheDirectAutonomyPrincipleintheappreciationcase,

butnotinthearthistorycase,isthatweareinvokingdifferentpracticeswithdifferentpur-

poses.Thevalueinartappreciationliesmoreintheprocessofjudgmentthaninhavingcor-

rectjudgments.Arthistorians,ontheother,aremoreinterestedinthecorrectjudgments

themselves.Thesedifferentpurposesindicatedifferentnormsforautonomy.

Conclusions

Onemightthenaskwhyweareexpendingallthisstrivingefforthere,onsuchanodd

pursuit?Whyspendallthisenergycognitivelystrugglingoverpaintings,andnotover,say,

solvingworldpoverty?Ifwedon’tcareaboutthecorrectnessofaestheticjudgments,ought

wenotgetourcognitivekickswhereitmightbeofsomeusetotheworld?Consideraparallel

worryconcerninggames.ThomasHurkaarguesthatthevalueofplayinggamescomesfrom

27Caseadaptedfrom(Nguyen2017,p.25-26).

30

theirdifficulty.Thus,solongaswe’renotinutopia,itwillbebettertodothingsthatareboth

difficultandinstrumentallygood.Forexample,ifplayingchessandworkingtocurecancer

arebothequallydifficult,thenthelatteristobepreferred,foritisbothdifficultanduseful

(Hurka2006).

Hurka’sconclusion,Ithink,missesmuchaboutthespecialvalueofgames.Therightre-

sponsetoHurkaisthatthevalueofgamesliesnotonlyintheirdifficulty,butintheexperi-

entialqualityofthatdifficulty—inwhetherthestruggleisinteresting,dull,orfascinating.28

Gamesarespecialbecause,ingames,wearesignificantlyfreertoshapethenatureandde-

mandsofthetasktosuitus.Inordinarypracticallife,ourinstrumentalengagementissignif-

icantlyconstrainedbythegoalandtheinflexibilityoftheworld.Theworldcanrenderour

pursuitsexhausting,dull,andfullofmiserablegrinds.Thesearchforscientifictruth,forex-

ample,mightinvolvesomeincrediblysatisfyingintellectualepiphanies,butthenatureofthe

worldmeansthat italsoinvolvesa lotofmuckingaboutwithspreadsheets, fixinginstru-

ments,anddiggingthroughhardsoilunderthebrutalsummersun.Chess,ontheotherhand,

isapracticalactivityoptimizedforthepleasuresandsatisfactionsofcognition.Thenature

ofitsgoalandthelogicofitsmechanicsshapeaveryparticularpracticalenvironment—one

thathasbeenmadespecificallyforourcognitivedelight.Inordinarypracticallife,wemust

bendourselvesanddesperatelytrytofitourabilitiestothepracticaldemandsoftheworld.

Ingames,wecandesignapracticalworldtofitourabilitiesandourinclinations.29

Somethingsimilaristrue,Isuggest,withthearts.Theactivitiesandstatesinvolvedin

28Foradiscussionofthispoint,see(Tasioulas2006).29Foranextendeddiscussionofthispoint,see(Nguyen2019,p.429-38;2020).

31

renderingaestheticjudgments—investigation,sensitivitytoperceptualandcognitivede-

tails,interpretation,empathy—arealsoinstrumentalresources.30Inordinarypracticallife,

ouruseoftheseresourcesisbeholdentotheinstrumentaldemandsoftheworld.Thearts,

ontheotherhand,arepreciselywherewecanmoldtheobjectsofjudgment–andalsopick

theconstraintsonhowwearetojudgethoseobjects–inordertoshapetheactivityofde-

ployingtheseinstrumentalresourcestoourownsatisfaction.

Ihopeitisclearbynowthatthedemandfordirectautonomyisn’tuniquetoaesthetic

appreciation.Weshouldexpectdemandsforindirectautonomytodominateinpracticesori-

entedtowardsthevalueofcorrectnessitself—theempiricalsciences,history,andthejudi-

cialsystem.Weshouldexpectvariousformsofthedemandfordirectautonomytodominate

inthosepracticesorientedtowardsthevalueofengagementinaprocess—aestheticappre-

ciation,butalsogames,exercise,education,andmore.Weshouldexpecttofindademand

fordirectautonomyforanyactivitywiththemotivationalstructureofstriving,ratherthan

ofachievement.

Much of the discussion of the asymmetry between empirical judgment and aesthetic

judgmenthaspresumedthatourpeculiarattitudetowardsaesthetictestimonyarisesfrom

featuresuniqueto theaestheticdomain. Instead,myaccountsuggests that it isageneral

featureofstrivingactivities.Aestheticappreciationisonetypeofstrivingactivity;butthere

areothers.Andtherearenon-strivingapproachestotheaesthetic,aswell.Thishelpsex-

plainsanotherasymmetry:whywearemorewillingtouseaesthetictestimonyinart-histor-

icalcontexts,butlesswillingtoinart-appreciativecontexts.Anaccountthatmadeautonomy

30Tantalizingly,Suits’sdefinitionofplayis:‘xisplayingifandonlyifxhasmadeatemporaryreallocation

toautotelicactivitiesofresourcesprimarilycommittedtoinstrumentalpurposes’(Suits1977,p.123-4).

32

anecessarypartofanyaestheticjudgmentwouldnotbeabletoexplainthatsecondaryasym-

metry.Theengagementaccount,however,hasatidyexplanation:artappreciationisastriv-

ingactivity,butarthistoryisnot.

Theengagementaccountmightalsoexplainacrucialandunder-exploredaspectofour

relationshipwith art and the aesthetic.We seek tounderstandworks, butwearedisap-

pointedwhenwereachthatunderstandingtooquickly.Wewishtounderstandartworks,

butwhen theartworksare tooeasilyunderstood,we judge thempoorly—wecall them

‘shallow’or‘thin’.Bymanyaccounts,thegreatestworksaretheonesthatarethemostend-

lesslyaccommodatingofinterpretationandinquiry.IlovethepoetTuFupreciselybecause

ItrytounderstandhimandInevergettotheend;everytimeIre-readaverse,Ifindsome

newsubtletyorconnection.Theengagementaccountexplainsthis:correctaestheticjudg-

mentisthegoal,butnotthepurpose.Thus,wearedisappointedwhenourfascinatingjour-

neyiscutoffbyourtoo-quickarrivalattheapparentdestination.Atthesametime,wecan-

notunderminethesincerityofourattemptsatcorrectnesstoforestallsuchafinish,forthat

wouldundermineourabsorptionintheinvestigativeattempt.31Wewantobjectswhichwe

cansincerelytrytounderstandthoroughly,butwhichendlesslydefyacompleteunderstand-

ing.Wewantsubtlety,depth,andmystery.Buttheengagementaccountalsohelpstoexplain

whymostbelovedartworksare,typically,notpurelyambiguous.Forablankorimpossibly

crypticwork,theprocessoftryingtounderstandcannotevengetofftheground.Whatwe

seemtodesire issomethingbalancedontherazor’sedgebetweenincomprehensibleand

shallow—somethingwhichpresentsthepossibilityofunderstandingasanapparent,but

ever-elusivetarget.Ifwesimplyvaluedhavingcorrectjudgments,weshouldseekeasy-to-

31Forafurtherdiscussionofthispointinthecontextofgame-play,see(Nguyen2019,p.440-6).

33

understandworks.Ifwevaluedhavingcorrectbutdifficultjudgments,weshouldseekworks

thatweredifficulttounderstand,butwhichcamewithassurancesthatthetaskofcompre-

hensionwouldeventuallyterminate.Instead,weseemhavethegreatestesteemforthose

worksthatneveradmitofacompletedandfinalizedsetofjudgments.Wecherishasortof

aestheticbottomlessness.Our loveof this tempting,butever-retreatingtarget, isbestex-

plainedbyattributingtousavalueforthepursuit,andnotthehaving,ofcorrectaesthetic

judgments.32

Andhere,Ithink,wecanfindahintaboutthedifferencebetweenmoralautonomyand

aestheticautonomy.Thedemandsofmoralautonomymayforbidusfromsimplydeferring

outright.Butmoralautonomyisusuallytakentobecompatiblearelativelyhighdegreeof

guidance,especiallyforthesakeofcorrectness.33Inthepracticeofaestheticappreciation,

ontheotherhand,wearemoresuspiciousofthoroughgoingguidanceandplacearelatively

higherimportanceonself-directionovercorrectness.Imaginehowwewouldfeelifthefield

ofphilosophicalethics,aftermillenniaofwork,finallycametoanagreementabouttheright

ethicaltheory,andproducedatextwithcarefulandconvincingargumentsthatclearedup

themajormoraldilemmaandsettledthemajorquestions?Ithinkwemightfeelratherre-

lieved;wemightevenfeelthatphilosophyhadpartiallyredeemeditself.Iwouldcertainly

wishtoreadittojudgeitsargumentsformyself,andIwouldbehappyifIweretobecon-

vincedandallmymoralworriessettledonceandforall.AndIwouldcertainlywishtoteach

32Forsomesuggestiveresonancestothispoint,see(Nehamas2010).33Theterrainhereisvast.Somekeyaccountsinclude(Jones1999;McGrath2011;Nickel2001;Zagzebski

2012).Formyowntakeonmoralautonomyandtestimonypleasesee(Nguyen2010).Finally,notethat(Driver2006)hasconsideredtheasymmetrybetweenaestheticandmoraltestimony,butrunsitintheoppo-sitedirection—shethinkswecarelessaboutautonomyinaestheticjudgment,becausewearewillingtoactonrecommendations.Hopefullythecasesfromthispapermakethecasethattheissueismorecomplicatedthanthat.

34

thisbooktomyundergraduates. Iwouldcertainlywant themtoreadtheargumentsand

considerthemfortheirown,tobeconvincedthroughtheirownprocessofreasoning—but

theavailabilityofconvincing,conclusiveargumentsherewouldbeagoodthing.Howwe

wouldfeel,ontheotherhand,iftheworldofliteraryscholarshipcameoutwithaconclusive

analysisofJoyce’sUlysses,whichsettledeverydebate,answeredeveryquestion,anddisam-

biguatedeveryterm,inconvincingandcomprehensiblearguments?IthinkIwouldfeelra-

thersad—thattheworldoftheartshadbeensubstantiallydiminished.AndI,forone,would

notwishtoreadit.34Wepursuemoraljudgmentswiththehopesofgettingitright,butwe

pursueaestheticjudgmentsforthesakeoftheactivityofengagement.35

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