Autonomy of Functional Linguistics - William Croft

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Linguistic Society of America

Autonomy and Functionalist LinguisticsAuthor(s): William CroftSource: Language, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 490-532Published by: Linguistic Society of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/416218

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2/44

AUTONOMY AND

FUNCTIONALIST

LINGUISTICS

WILLIAM

CROFT

University

of

Manchester

Functional

analyses

of

grammatical phenomena,

and

the functionalist

approaches

that

promote

them,

are

appealing

to those who believe that an

integrated

view of

language

structure and

language

function is desirable.

But functional

analyses

have been

held

to

founder

on basic

grammatical

facts that are taken

to

support

the

autonomy

of

grammar.

The

concept

of

autonomy

is a

complex

one,

and at least two

different notions are

found

in current

linguistic theory:

arbitrariness and

self-containedness.

These notions of

auton-

omy

apply

either to the

syntactic component

of the

grammar,

or

(a

more

recent

claim)

to the

grammar

itself,

with

respect

to

change,

use,

and

acquisition.

The

arbitrariness

of

syntax

must be

accepted;

and

many

functional

analyses

are

compatible

with

self-

containedness. However, mixed formal/functional analyses provide an argument against

the self-containedness of

syntax,

and in

fact even

many

formal

theories of

syntax accept

non-self-containedness. The arbitrariness

of

grammatical

knowledge

must also be

ac-

cepted;

and

many

functional

analyses

of

the

dynamic

process

affecting

grammar

are

compatible

with self-containedness.

An

argument

against

the

self-containedness of

gram-

mar

comes

not

from these functional

analyses

but from

sociolinguistics.*

1.

INTRODUCTION.

Functional'

analyses

of

grammar,

though

rather

varied,

center on

linguistic

explanation

based

on

language's

function in a

larger

con-

text.'

While

t is

commonlyagreed

that

many aspects

of

human

inguistic

behav-

ior can

be

explainedonly

in

terms

of

the

functionof

language,

what

distinguishes

functionalistapproaches s the hypothesisthat at least some basicfacts of syn-

tax

can

be

accounted for in

functional

terms as

well. In

this

respect

functional-

ism

appears

to contrast with

formalist or

more

accurately structuralist

approaches,

whose most

prominentexample

is

generative

grammar.

Unfortunately,

here

has been

very

little

dialogue

between

structuralists

nd

functionalists,

and as a result

there has been

little

serious

comparison

of their

competinghypotheses

about

the

nature

of

grammatical

xplanation.

The

mutual

isolation of

theoristsand

their

approaches

s in

contrast

to

the

dialogue,

acrimo-

nious

though

it

was,

in

the

'linguistic

wars'

between

generative

semanticists

and

interpretive

emanticists

n

the

early

1970s

Harris1993).Newmeyer (1983,

1991,

1992)

s

virtually

the

only linguist

to

examine

seriously

the

literature

on

both

sides of this divide

and

present

provocative challenges

and

proposals

to

functionalist

linguists (but

see also

Morgan 1982,

Green

1982,

Sadock

1984,

Nichols

1984).

This

paper

addresses

one issue that

is central

to

language yet problematic

for

functional

analyses:

the

notion of

autonomy.

The

notion

of

autonomy

emerges

from

a

undeniable act

of

all

languages,

'the

curious

lack

of accord

...

*

I

would

like to

thank

Matthew

Dryer, Mark

Durie, MartinHaspelmath, Frederick

J.

Newmeyer,

and David Wilkins for reading and commenting extensively on earlier versions of this article; others

too

numerous

to

mention

for

their

advice

and suggestions on

particular points; and

especially the

two

referees,

one of

whom

later

revealed

himself

as Russell Tomlin. Their combined

efforts vastly

improved

the

result.

I

accept

responsibility for

all flaws in the final product.

F

or

general

approaches

to

functionalism,

see

Dirven

&

Fried

1987,

Givon

1979,

Hickmann

1987,

Langacker 1987,

and

Tomlin

1990.

490


3/44

AUTONOMY AND FUNCTIONALIST LINGUISTICS

between form

and function'

(Sapir

1921:89).

One could

say

that the basic

differ-

ence between structuralismand functionalism is the

opposite

direction

each

goes

in

from

this fact. The structuralist akes the lack of accord to be

evidence

for

autonomy,

while

the

functionalist

nsteadfocuses on the 'unconscious

analy-

sis into individual

oncepts

which is never

entirely

absentfrom

speech,

however

it

may

be

complicated

with or overlaid

by

the more irrational actors'

(Sapir

1921:90).

Of

course,

there are

many

intermediate

positions

that

integrate

he two reali-

ties

Sapir

describes. In fact the structuralist-functionalist

ichotomy

s a contin-

uum. This article discusses

the issue of

autonomy

and

how

linguistic

theories

must accommodate

the facts that are said to

support autonomy,

while

finding

a

place

for

linguistic

function.

My goal

here is

to

argue

that structuralistand

functionalistapproachescan be compared,even if theycannotalwaysbe recon-

ciled;

to raise the fundamentalssues on which

they

differ;

and

to

suggest points

at which differenttheorists are

comparing

similar

phenomena.

The

question

of

autonomy

is not a

simple

one.

What

s

claimed to be

autono-

mous?

In

?2.1,

1

argue

that the

autonomy thesis,

and its functionalist

critiques,

have been

applied

to two

very

different

linguistic systems.

The

autonomy

de-

bates

of the 1970s

largely

centered

around the

status

of

syntax,

relative to

semantics

or

pragmatics that

s,

semiotic

function)-all

within

the

grammatical

competence

of

the individual.

Around 1980

here

were

parallelconceptual

shifts

both in

generative grammar

and

in

functionalist

thinking.

The

debate shifted

to the status of the grammar, hat is, the linguisticknowledgeof an individual,

relative

to

its

larger socio-psychological

context:

language use, language

change,

and

languageacquisition.

Because

of

this,

the

notion

of

function

also

changed,

from

representing

he

signified

n

the

semiotic

system

of the

grammar

to

representing

he

goals

and

purposes

of

the

linguistic

behavior

of

the individual

in the

speech community(external function).

In

?2.2,

1

argue

that

the

autonomy

thesis

can be

brokendown

into two claims

about

a

linguistic system:

a

weaker

claim,

that

it

includes

arbitrariness,and a

strongerclaim,

that it

is self-contained.

Thus,

for

any given functionalanalysis

(henceforthFA), one must ask: which of these autonomyclaims does it actually

challenge?

With

respect

to an FA

in

syntax,

there are

three

logically possible conclusions

that

might

be

drawn,

with

functionalist

positions

associated

with each of the

conclusions:

(1)

a.

syntax

is

arbitrary

and

self-contained

(AUTONOMIST

FUNCTION-

ALISM)

b.

syntax

is

arbitrary,

but not

self-contained

(MIXED FORMAL/FUNC-

TIONALISM

and

TYPOLOGICAL

FUNCTIONALISM)

c.

syntax

is not

arbitrary

r

self-contained

EXTREME FUNCTIONALISM)

In

??3-6,

I

survey

the

four named

functionalisms and the FAs that support

them. In

?3,

it

is

shown

that

many

FAs

simply provide

a

semiotic function that

can

explain

constraintson

syntactic

behavior or

which

syntactic analyses have

been

offered; they

do not

challenge autonomy.

In

?4,

I

argue that there are

valid

FAs that

demonstrate that

syntax

is not

self-contained-and that there

491


4/44


5/44

AUTONOMY AND FUNCTIONALIST LINGUISTICS

syntc.ax

refers to the

relationship

between

the

syntactic component

and the

com-

ponents

used

to

represent

the semiotic functions. Functional

analyses

in

syntax

argue

for a

certain

degree

of

interpenetration

of semiotic

function and

syntactic

form.

In

?3-6

I

evaluate

particular

kinds of FAs as to whether

they

constitute

valid

arguments against

the

autonomy

of

syntax

in

any

of its

forms.

All

parties

to the 1970s debate

agreed

that

semantics

was

a

component

of

the

grammar.

However,

by

the

1980s,

other critics

questioned

the

autonomy

of the

grammatical system

as a whole-from the

forces or

processes

involved

in

language change,

language

use,

and

language

acquisition.

The fundamental

relationship

now

highlighted

is between the

psychological

linguistic system

of

the

individual-called

grammar-and language

as a

social

entity,

that

is,

some-

thing resulting

from

the

communicative interactions of individuals

in

social

contexts. For lack of a better term, I will use

language3

to refer to this latter

concept.

This is a

quite

different

relationship

than

that

between

syntax

and

semiotic

function,

and

the

term

function has been redefined to

accommodate this new

perspective.

In this

context,

function

refers to

EXTERNAL

FUNCTION:

the

pur-

poses

to which the

grammatical knowledge

of the

speaker

is

put

in social

interac-

tions,

most

importantly

the

communication of

information

but

also

other social

purposes.

It

is called

external

because

it

pertains

to

phenomena external to the

psychological grammar. Nevertheless,

these

external

functions

interact

with

the

grammar,

the result

being language

use, language change,

and

language

acquisition.-

The

question

now

is,

how

much

interaction is

there,

and

how much does it

affect an

individual's

grammar'?

The

expression

autonomy

of graimnmar will

be

used

to describe this issue-the

relationship (or

lack

thereof)

between the

grammar

of

an

individual and

the external

functions

embodied in language as

a

social

phenomenon.3

This

issue has

importance

beyond linguistics. The social

sciences have

long struggled

with the

dichotomy

between

the

social and the

psychological.

Different

subdisciplines

of

linguistics

find

themselves

on either

side of

the divide. A

better

understanding

of the

issues

underlying the autonomy

of grammar may shed light on this very interdisciplinary problem. These issues

will

be

discussed in

??7-8.

So

when the

autonomy

debate

was

resumed

by Newmeyer in the 1980s (New-

meyer

1983),

it

was a different

sort of

autonomy

that

he

was

arguing

for, and

2

There is

another

type

of function that is often

referred to in the

literature,

which can be called

SYSTEMIC

FUNCTION.

Some

European

structuralists

argue

that

(systemic) 'functional' forces cause

languages

to

change

in

order to create or

preserve symmetry

in

phonological,

morphological, or

syntactic paradigms

(e.g..

Martinet

1952).

This

is not

an

external

function

as

defined here. That

is,

preserving symmetry

in

formal

paradigms

in

itself is

not

an

interactive (communicative) goal.

Only

if

preserving symmetry

can be

empirically

demonstrated

to

serve

a

communicative goal can

it be an external function. Some critiques of FAs (e.g. Labov 1994:547-68) are directed at systemic

FAs. We

will not

discuss

systemic

FAs further

here.

3

The

autonomy

of

syntax

and

autonomy

of

grammar hypotheses must not be

confused with yet

another

autonomy hypothesis,

the

autonomy

of

language

from

other human

cognitive (and social)

abilities.

The

autonomy

of

language hypothesis

is

logically independent

of the

other

two autonomy

hypotheses.

493


6/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

71,

NUMBER 3

(1995)

it

was

a different

sort

of

functionalism

that

he considered to be

autonomy's

opponent.

Discussions about

autonomy

and

function,

however,

still

confuse

the

two issues.

Newmeyer

1992 does

not

clearly

distinguish

the two

claims:

in

his

argument

that

generative

grammar

already

accommodates

functionalist

iconic

principles,

he

argues

that

generative

grammar

already

includes a

seman-

tic

component,

which

does not tell us

anything

about

the

autonomy

of

grammar.

And in

many

functionalist

accounts of

syntax,

evidence

that

a

particular

con-

struction has a

discourse

function is taken

to

entail that

that

function is

external

to the

grammatical system,

when it is in

fact

simply part

of

the

signified

for

that

construction

(see

??4,

9).

2.2.

THE

DEFINITI()N

OF

AUTONOMY.

The

term

AUTONOMY

as been

used

am-

biguously

in the

literature to

express

different claims.

1 argue

here

that there

are

three different claims

associated with

autonomy

that are

relevant to the

debates on the

autonomy

of

syntax

and

the

autonomy

of

grammar.

Since

autonomy

has been central

to

generative

grammar,

it

is

logical

to

begin

with the

generative

account as it was

applied

to the

autonomy-of-syntax

prob-

lem. The

principle

of

autonomy

of

syntax

is

most

extensively

discussed

by

Chomsky

(1977,

esp. pp.

37-44).

A

succinct

formulation of this

autonomy

thesis

as

generally

understood is

given by Newmeyer: 'According

to the

autonomy

thesis,

there exists a set of

nonsemantic

and

nondiscourse-derived

grammatical

properties

whose

principles

of

combination make

no

reference to

system-exter-

nal factors' (Newmeyer 1992:783).

The

hypothesis

of

autonomy

of

syntax

is

not a

take-it-or-leave-it

claim. It

can

be

broken down into

three

subclaims;

the

three

need

not

be

accepted

or

rejected

in

toto.

The three

subclaims are:

(3)

a.

At

least some

elements of

syntax

are

arbitrary (ARBITRARINESS);

b.

The

arbitrary

elements

participate

in a

system (SYSTEMATICITY);

c.

That

system

is

self-contained

(SELF-CONTAINEDNESS).

The first

and

in

some

respects

most

fundamental

property

of

autonomy is

ARBITRARINESS:

he

syntactic component

contains

elements

and

rules

of

combi-

nation that are not derivable from semantic or discourse categories and their

combination.

By

not

derivable,

it

is

meant

that

the

syntactic

element

(say,

adjective)

or

rule

of

combination

(say, passive)

cannot

be

replaced with some

combination of

semantic

and/or

discourse

properties

and

produce

the

same

(correct)

predictions

of

syntactic

behavior.

For

example,

the

claim

is made

that one

could

not

replace the category adjec-

tive with a

set

of

semantic

properties

and

correctly predict the distribution

of

adjectives

in

English

(and

every

other

language),

or

replace the syntactic

categories

of the

elements

of the

passive

construction

and

rules of

combination

for

creating

the

passive

with

a

set of

semantic or

discourse-functional category

definitions and rules of

combination,

and

correctly predict

the

acceptable and

unacceptable passives

of

English (and every

other

language).

Arbitrariness is a

property

of

the

mapping

between

form

and

semiotic func-

tion;

if

correct,

it

means

that

formal

syntactic

structure

must

be

posited indepen-

dent

of

semantic

structures. In

fact,

arbitrariness

alone

appears to be what

494


7/44

AUTONOMY

AND

FUNCTIONALIST

LINGUISTICS

Chomsky

(1977:37-40)

refers to

by

the

phrase

'independence

of

grammar'.

Chomsky

makes his case for the

independence

of

grammar

(in

our

terms,

the

arbitrariness

of

syntax) by

showing

that some

interpretations

of

ambiguous

sentences are excluded by pragmatic or real-world factors, but others are ex-

cluded

by

syntactic

constraints. The existence of the

syntactic

constraints

dem-

onstrates the

arbitrariness of

syntax.

Chomsky distinguishes

the arbitrariness of

syntax hypothesis

from the 'thesis

of

autonomy

of formal

grammar'

(Chomsky

1977:42),

or as

it

is called

here,

the

autonomy-of-syntax

hypothesis.

The latter

hypothesis

is of course the

stronger

one.

Autonomous

syntax

in the

generative

view is not

simply

a

random

inventory

of

lexical items and

grammatical

constructions

governed by enough

ad hoc constraints

and rules of combination to be

descriptively adequate

for

the range of facts to be analyzed. It is not just enough that the mapping relation

between

meaning

and form

is

(at

least

partially) arbitrary;

the form end

of

the

mapping

must itself

be a

system.

We will take the term

SYSTEM

here to mean

that

there

is a set of

interlocking

regularities

that structure the

phenomenon

in

question

(in

this

case,

the

syntactic

units and constructions of a

language)

that

'holds

together'

overall-tout

se

tient,

as the

Saussurean

saying goes

(Koerner

1989:404-6).

The

degree

to

which

everything

in the

syntactic system

must

'hold

together'

is

generally accepted

to allow

a bit of

leeway

for advocates of the

systematicity

of

syntax.

Some

irregularity

is not

incompatible

with

systematicity

in

syntax.

Irregularities and exceptional features have to be stipulated in an autonomous

syntactic system, although

such

stipulation

is

kept

to a minimum.

While this

is

clearly

a

necessary

and reasonable allowance-no

theory

would

be

empirically

adequate

if

such

an allowance were not made-it does lead

to some

degree

of

subjectivity

in

determining

whether the data merit the

establishment of a

system

in this

sense.

One

linguist's elegant

and

principled system

is

another

linguist's

grab-bag

of

ad

hoc

generalizations;

this

is

true

of both

structuralist and

function-

alist theories.

Our definition of

system deliberately

leaves

out the

question

of whether the

regular, interlocking patterns in question include only the concepts of syntax

or not.

If

they

include

only

the

concepts

of

syntax,

then we

may say

the

system

is

SELF-CONTAINED.

That is to

say,

the rules of

the

system interact with each

other

but

do not interact

closely

with

the

rules

existing

elsewhere.

For the

autonomy

of

syntax,

'elsewhere'

is

generally

taken to be

semantics.

Again,

there must

be a

loose

interpretation

of

self-containedness in the auton-

omous

syntactic system.

Not

all

regularities

in

syntactic phenomena need be

attributed to the

autonomous

syntactic system; some may be governed by other

components

of

the

grammar, specifically

the

semantic

component (Chomsky

1977:45-48). Chomsky suggests

for

example

that the

parallel syntactic and se-

mantic differences between restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses are

not

a

'choice

of

grammar [syntax-WAC]' (Chomsky 1977:46). There must

also

be

interface rules between otherwise

self-contained systems. For instance,

the

semiotic relation between

syntax

and

semantics

requires

at

the least inter-

face rules

referring

to

both

form

and

meaning. To the extent that interface rules

495


8/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

71,

NUMBER 3

(1995)

are

allowed,

a

system

is not

self-contained

in an absolute sense.

However,

it

is

generally

taken that

syntax

is

self-contained if at

least statements

of

categories

and

rules of

combination do not make reference to

nonsyntactic

elements

(see

the

Newmeyer quote

at the

beginning

of this

section,

and

see

?4 for

further

discussion).

Given these

caveats,

the

autonomy-of-syntax

hypothesis

is

the

hypothesis

that

the

syntactic component

of

the

grammar

is

independent,

(largely) system-

atic and

(largely)

self-contained with

respect

to the

semantic,

pragmatic and/

or discourse-functional

components.

But one need

not

buy

the

whole

autonomy

package.

Syntax

may

be

arbitrary

relative

to its semantic

counterpart,

and

systematic

also,

yet

not

self-contained,

the

rules

of

syntax

being

interwoven

with those of

semantics

(or discourse,

or other

components

of

the

grammar).

Arbitrariness and systematicity do not entail self-containedness. Arbitrariness

does not

entail

systematicity

either;

it is

logically possible

to

believe that

syntax

is

arbitrary

and not

systematic

as well

as not

self-contained,

being merely

a

residue of

irregularities.

In

fact,

those

functionalists who

accept

arbitrariness

also

accept

systematicity

(see

n.

20

below).

Hence,

in

the

classification of

func-

tionalisms in this

paper, acceptance

of

arbitrariness also

includes

acceptance

of

systematicity.

The

remainder of this

article will

survey

FAs

and

the

corre-

sponding

functionalist

positions,

in

order

to see

what

sorts

of

arguments

have

been,

or

can

be,

presented against

which

hypotheses

of

autonomy. Arguments

can be

made

against

the


both

syntax

and

grammar.

The

former

argument

is

widely accepted

in

practice.

The

latter

argument

is

much

newer,

and

many questions

still

remain. I

begin

with

the

autonomy

of

syntax,

proceeding

from

the

fully

autonomist

position (?3)

to

various

nonautonomist

positions

(??4-6).

Turning

to

the

autonomy

of

grammar,

we

proceed

in

the

same

fashion,

from

fully

autonomist

positions (?7)

to

the

one

plausible

nonautonomist

position

(?8).

I will

specify

what

substantive

claims are

being

made

on

each

side,

and-as

much as

can be

done

in a

single

article-evaluate

those

claims.

3.

AUTONOMIST

FUNCTIONALISM:

COMPATIBLE

WITH

THE

SELF-CONTAINEDNESS

OF

SYNTAX.

Many

FAs of

syntactic phenomena

are in

fact

compatible with the

strongest

version of

autonomy,

self-containedness.

Specifically,

an

FA that

accounts

for constraints

on

syntactic

behavior in

terms

of the

semiotic

function

of

a

syntactic

construction,

but

does not

attempt

to

account

for

the

structure

of

that

construction,

is

compatible

with

the

self-containedness

claim. I

will call

such

analyses

AUTONOMIST

As,

and

linguists

who

make

no

stronger claims for

their

analyses

AUTONOMIST

UNCTIONALISTS;

hese

include

Kuno,

Prince, Ward

and

their

associates and

students

(see

Prince

1991:79

for a

representative list).

Note that

this does

not mean that

linguists holding stronger functionalist posi-

tions do not

also

offer

autonomist

FAs.

However,

autonomist

FAs cannot be

used to argue against the self-containedness of syntax, let alone against weaker

claims of

autonomy.

Autonomist

functionalists are

chiefly

concerned with

determining the dis-

course

functions of

the

grammatical

constructions

sanctioned

(or perhaps not

sanctioned)

by

the

autonomous

syntactic component, using naturally occurring

496


9/44

AUTONOMY AND

FUNCTIONALIST

LINGUISTICS

discourse data.

No claim is made

for a

motivated

(e.g.

iconic)

relationship

between the

syntactic

structure

of the

construction in

question,

such as

English

it-clefts,

and the discourse

function that

they

perform-in

fact,

Prince

explicitly

argues

against

iconicity

in

this

particular

example

(Prince

1988:168-71).

How-

ever,

autonomist

functionalists do

argue

for a

conventional relation

between

syntactic

structure

and discourse

function,

and

moreover

argue

that

'many

sentences that are

judged ungrammatical

can be

shown to be

flawed

for

dis-

course

reasons,

with

no need to

invoke the

(autonomous)

grammar

to

account

for

their

infelicity'

(Prince

1991:80-81). In

other

words,

many

constraints on

the

behavior and/or

distribution

of sentences need

not be

provided

by

the

syntactic

component.

Nevertheless,

the

conventions

governing

the

formation

of

the

syn-

tactic

structures themselves are

not

provided by

discourse

(or

conceptual

struc-

ture, for that matter).

Thus,

functional

explanations

for

constraints on

the

distribution of

sentence

types

need not

represent

a

direct attack on

the

autonomy

of

syntax.

They

may

reduce the number

of

principles

found in

autonomous

syntax.

And

with the

increasing emphasis

on

principles

governing

constraints in

generative

syntactic

theory

over the

past

two

decades,

any

research

program

that

attempts

to

replace

formal

grammatical

constraints with

functional

ones,

if it

is

empirically

success-

ful,

would

narrow the

scope

of

autonomous

syntax

considerably.

But

the

sen-

tence

types

themselves,

that

is the

syntactic

elements and

the

combinatoric

rules

by

means

of which

they

are

formed,

are

left

to the

syntactic

component.

So there is no inherent contradiction in being a functionalist in this sense and

believing

in

autonomous

grammar

(cf. Morgan

1982:201).4

In

fact, many

FAs

challenge

purely syntactic

approaches

even

for

basic con-

straints in

generative

core

grammar.

The

basic

strategy

in

challenging

a

purely

syntactic

analysis

is

to

demonstrate that

sentences

excluded

by

a

given syntactic

constraint are

acceptable.5

This would

imply

that

the

given syntactic

constraint

must

at

the

least be

weakened. At

this

point,

a

functional

constraint

may

be

sought

that

accounts

for the

exceptions

as well

as

the

normal

cases. If

total

elimination of the

syntactic

constraint

is

possible,

then

the

syntactic phenome-

non can be shipped off to another autonomous component of the grammar. In

the

remainder

of this

section,

I

briefly

examine

examples

of

FAs that

purport

to

provide

a

complete

reduction:

FAs of

root

transformations,

the

anaphoric

island

constraint,

and

constraints

on

extraction

phenomena.

Certain

transformations were

once

argued

to

be

restricted

to the

root S

node

of a

syntactic

tree

(Emonds 1976;

examples

from

Green

1976:383):

4

One

anonymous

referee

suggests

that

autonomist

functionalists

are

not

necessarily

endorsing

autonomous

syntax.

Instead,

they

are

providing

descriptions

of

semiotic

functions without making

any

claim

as

to

whether

these

functions in

fact

challenge

or

undermine

the


syntax.

However,

at

least

for

those

Prince

(1988:165-66)

calls

'generative

discourse

analysts', it

appears that the self-containedness of syntax is assumed.

5

A

possible response

is

to

argue

that

a

reanalysis

occurs

that

changes

the exceptionally

accept-

able

sentences

into a

structure that

is not

subject

to

the

syntactic

constraint. But

then the question

remains,

how

is

reanalysis

licensed in

these

cases

but

not in

other

structurally identical

cases in

a

noncircular

fashion'?

497


10/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

71,

NUMBER 3

(1995)

(4)

Never

before

have

prices

been so

high.

(5)

*Nixon

regrets

that

never

before

have

prices

been so

high.

There are many cases, however, in which root transformations are found in

subordinate

clauses.

(6)

1

knewr

hat never

before

had

prices

been so

high.

[Green

1976:383]

(7)

I

know that all too seldom

does he

bring

her

flowers.

I[Bolinger

1977:515]

(8)

I'm gonna

have

breaukfastnowt, becauLse

am

1

ever

hungry

[Lakoff 1984:474]

Grossly simplifying,

the basic

story

on which FAs of

4-8

converge

is

this:

root transformations

are all what Lakoff calls SPEECH ACT

CONSTRUCTIONS,

con-

structions

which indicate some feature of an

illocutionary

act.

Illocutionary

acts are

normally performed

in main

clauses;

hence the

apparent

restriction to

root Ss. But

there are a number

of

contexts

in

which

a

speaker may perform

an

illocutionary

act in a subordinate

clause,

and use a

speech

act

construction

in

the

process

(see

Hooper

&

Thompson

1973,

Green

1976,

Bolinger

1977,

Lakoff

1984

for

the

complex

details).

This

argument appears

to have been

ac-

cepted;

more

precisely,

root transformations

per

se are no

longer

a

part

of

core

grammar and

the

phenomena analyzed

in

the references mentioned here

have

dropped

out

of

the

autonomous-syntax

literature.

Similarly,

Ward et al. 1991 show

that

pronominal

reference

inside anaphoric

islands is possible, contrary to the anaphoric island constraint (Postal 1969):

(9)

1

think if

I

were

a

PERUVIAN

I

wouldn't

want

to

live

THEREffor

the

next

couple of years. {Ward

et al.

1991:470,

from

a

conversation]

They argue

that this

phenomenon

is

governed by the same pragmatic principles

governing pronominal anaphora,

and the

syntactic anaphoric

island

constraint

should be

dropped;

and

in fact it

also

has

disappeared

from

the

literature on

core grammar.

A

similar tack

has

been

taken

on

phenomena

dearer to

the heart of formal

syntacticians,

the

constraints

asSociated

with

extraction

phenomena (Kuno

1976, 1987; Erteschik-Shir & Lappin 1979, Grosu 1981, Lakoff 1986, Takami

1989,

Deane

1991).

This

is

a

far

more

complex area of grammar than speech

act

constructions

and

we can

only

outline

an

equally oversimplified version of

the

proposed

FAs. These constraints are

manifested in a

class of constructions

usually called extraction constructions (including wH-questions and relative

clauses).

We

may

divide the extraction

constructions into three

parts: the ex-

tracted

element,

the

matrix

phrase

from which the

element was

extracted,

and

the

intervening syntactic structure.

In

essence,

syntactic accounts argue that syntactic properties of the interven-

ing structure

render an extraction

construction

ungrammatical,

while FAs point

to exceptional extraction as counterexamples to the syntactic accounts.

(10)

a.

Who

did

you

see

a

picture

oJY

[Takami 1989:309, after the literature]

b. *Who

did

you destroy a picture of? [ibid.]

498


11/44

AUTONOMY

AND

FUNCTIONALIST

LINGUISTICS

(11)

a. *What did

he

grab

and write

to his

Congressman?

[after

Deane

1991:23]

b. Who

did

he

grah

his

pen Cind

write to?

[after

Deane

1991:24]

c.

Whalt

did

he

gralb

clnd

throw to his

sister?

d. How

manly

courses

caIn

yol

tClke

or

credit,

still

realnIin

scane,

and

get

all

A 's

in?

[Lakoff

1986:153]

Deane's

FA,

the

most

general

proposed, adapts

Anderson's

(1983)

spreading

activation

model of

memory

and

attention and

argues

that

cognitive

or

discourse

properties

of all three

parts

of an

extraction

construction

jointly

license

or

prohibit

extraction.

Very roughly,

the

extracted

element and the

matrix

phrase

must be in the center

of attention while

the rest

must

be

backgrounded.6

Nor-

mally,

the lexical head

noun that

appears

to

block extraction

is

informative

enough to attract the focus of attention (as in lOb), but in lOa it is evoked by

the semantic frame of

see

and

thus

permits

extraction. In 1

a-b,

Deane

argues

that the

first event is a

preparatory

action

for the

second event

in the

coordinate

structure. Hence the first

event is

backgrounded

(although

the

structure

remains

coordinate;

see

Lakoff

1986);

extraction is

possible

from the

second clause

alone

(but

not

the

first

clause

alone)

because it alone

is the

center

of

attention.

The

normal

case for

coordination

is

for both events

jointly

to be the

center

of

attention,

and so

across-the-board extraction

from

all

conjuncts

is

possible

(I

Ic); but

any

combination

of

focused/nonfocused events is

possible

(lid).

All of

these

FAs postulate a semiotic

function

associated

with

the

construc-

tion

in

question and

deduce the

syntactic

behavior from the

conventional

func-

tion. Root

transformations are

speech

act

constructions; pronominal

anaphora

denote a

salient

entity in

the

discourse; and

the

extraction

constructions

signify

a

certain

distribution of

focus of attention.

Likewise,

Prince's

accounts of var-

ious

clefting and

fronting

constructions

(Prince

1978,

1981)

specify an

informa-

tional status

that they

signify. This

important

point is

often

overlooked.

Some

functionalists

claim

that these

FAs

provide

evidence

against

the

autonomy

of

GRAMMAR,

ecause

they

involve

semantic,

pragmatic

and

discourse-functional

principles.

But

autonomist

FAs

make claims

primarily

about facts

IN the

gram-

mar, namely that certain words or constructions have particular conventional

discourse

functions or

cognitive

statuses-that

is,

semiotic

functions.

It is

by

virtue of

the

semiotic

functions

of

particular

constructions that

functional

princi-

ples

account

for the

syntactic

constraints.7

4.

MIXED

FORMAL/FUNCTIONALISM:

CHALLENGING

THE

SELF-CONTAINEDNESS

OF

SYNTAX. s

demonstrated in ?3,

complete

reductions of

syntactic

constraints

6

Kuno

1976 argues

that

the

extracted element

must

be topical

in order to

be

extracted,

while

Takami

1989argues

that the

matrix

must be the

informational

focus;

Deane

argues that both

require-

ments must be met to license extraction, and that both requirements may be analyzed in terms of

focus

of

attention.

7

Of

course,

opinions may

differ as

to what

needs to be

specified as

conventional and

what

is

derived

from

pragmatic

principles;

'radical

pragmatics'

(Cole

1981) tries to

maximize

the

latter

with

respect to the

former.

499


12/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

71,

NUMBER 3

(1995)

to

functional

constraints

do

not

challenge

the self-containedness

of

syntax,

though

they may

shrink

the

autonomous

syntactic

component significantly.

Partial

reductions of

syntactic

constraints to functional

principles,

however,

pose

a more serious

problem

for the self-containedness of

syntax.

If

only

a

partial

reduction

is

possible,

then

we

are left

with a

partially

structural,

partially

functional account,

and

the question can

be

raised as to how self-contained

the

syntactic

component

is.

I

argue

here that such

analyses

are

quite

common,

and

in

fact

cannot

reasonably

be avoided. I will call such

analyses

MIXED

FORMAL/

FUNCTIONAL

analyses,

and the

position

that

accepts

such

analyses

MIXED

FOR-

MALISM/FUNCTIONALISM.

will

conclude

this section

by

suggesting

that

indeed

many

structuralist

as well as functionalist theories are

mixed,

that

is,

they

accept

mixed

analyses.

Existing FAs of control theory and binding theory do not fully replace syntac-

tic accounts

by

functional ones. Ladusaw &

Dowty

(1988)

argue

that

thematic

control

is determined

by

the

semantic

properties

of the

situation

being

described

rather

than

thematic

roles,

but

assume

that

obligatory

control is

at

least

partially

syntactically

determined.

Farkas

(1988)

argues

that the semantic

relationship

of

responsibility

determines

the

difference between

promise-

and

persnuade-type

obligatory

control,

but allows a stipulated but semantically

motivated

extension

of her

principle

to accommodate

the multiple control possibilities (for

some

speakers)

in examples like 12 (Farkas

1988:47).

(12)

THE

PUPIL asked

THE TEACHER to

leave

early.

The

literature

on binding, both syntactic

and functional,

is as

voluminous

and

the

phenomenon

is as complex as with constraints

on extraction.

Here

there

is

also

some

question

as to whether binding

is a unified

phenomenon.

The contrast

between anaphoric pronouns (Pronominals)

and lexical

NPs-the

Principle

B/C

contrast-has

been argued

to be purely pragmatic, based

on

information

structure

and attentional phenomena

(see inter

alia Bolinger

1979,

Koster

1986,

Ariel 1990, van Hoek 1992, Gundel et al. 1993).

In

fact, it is

widely

accepted

that

most

pronoun/NP

choice is determined

by pragmatic

factors

(Reinhart

1983,

Ward et al. 1991:440), and

the dispute centers around whether

a

syntactic condition such as c-command is an appropriate description for certain

intrasentential

pronoun

uses-for instance,

Bolinger 1979 explicitly

argues

against

the

syntactic

description; Koster

1986 suggests it is purely

pragmatic

but

sensitive

to

syntactic criteria;

and Gundel et al. 1993 propose

a

general

attentional

account

of

pronoun/NP

choice tested

in texts in a variety of

lan-

guages

(though

not

with

attention to the c-command

cases).

If

these analysts

are

correct,

then

an

autonomist

FA can be provided

for the Principle

B/C

contrast.8

Levinson

(1987,

1991), on the

other hand, argues for only a partial

pragmatic

x Incidentally, the relationship between functional accounts of pronoun/NP choice and con-

straints on

extraction

constructions

in terms of levels of attention (Ariel 1990 for the former,

Deane

1991

for

the

latter)

suggests

that even for functionalists, these two phenomena

are related,

while

NP-movement

phenomena

are distinct; cf. Levinson 1991:133,

fn. 31. This is an interesting

example

where

otherwise

conflicting

formalist and functionalist

analyses both converge on the same

ideep'

relationships

among

syntactic

phenomena.

500


13/44

AUTONOMY AND

FUNCTIONALIST LINGUISTICS

account

of

the

Principle

A/B contrast-the

distribution

and

interpretation

of

reflexives and

reciprocals

(Anaphors)

vs.

Pronominals. He

argues against

speci-

fying

(non)coreference

as

part

of the

meaning

of the

Anaphor

or

Pronominal,

depending

on the status of

Anaphors

in the

language.

In

B-FIRST

anguages,

with

no

Anaphors

or

weakly grammaticalized

Anaphors,

Principle

B

is

grammatical,

while

Principle

A is

pragmatic;

in

A-FIRST

anguages,

with

grammaticalized

Ana-

phors,

it is the other

way

around.

These mixed

analyses

are

controversial.

However,

apparently

mixed

syntac-

tic

phenomena

are

quite commonplace

in

syntactic

descriptions.

I will use

two

simple

examples

to illustrate

the

plausibility

of

the mixed

analysis

and

argue

that an

attempt

to

reanalyze

the

phenomenon

as

purely syntactic

smuggles

semantic

properties

into the

self-contained

syntactic

component.

Babungo is a Grassfields Bantu language (Schaub 1985).Its noun class system

is

typical

of

Bantu

languages,

in that

nouns

fall

into a

range

of noun

classes,

and the noun classes are

quite

arbitrary

in

their class

membership.

That

is,

there

is no

way

one could

completely predict

noun class

membership

on

semantic

principles, although

Schaub notes some

correlations,

e.g.

class 1/2 with

humans

(1985:174;

the

paired

numbers refer

to

singular/plural

forms).

These

agreement

patterns

indicate

that

noun

classes are not

only

arbitrary

but

participate

in

a

system

of

syntactic

rules. Modifiers

agree

with

their head

nouns in

class,

and

verbs

agree

with

their core

arguments

in

class.

Anaphoric

pronouns

agree

with

their

antecedents

in

noun class

in the same

way.

There is

one

exception

to

this

generalization: anaphoric pronouns that refer to humans, regardless of the noun

class of the human

noun,

take

class

1/2

agreement

(Schaub

1985:193).

Ana-

phoric pronouns

that refer to nonhumans

agree

in

the noun

class of their

nominal

antecedent.

The facts

as

just

described

argue

against

the


syntax. If

one

ships

out the

human-anaphoric

agreement generalization

to the

semantic

component,

then a

very unsystematic

hole

has been

punched

into the

syntax

of

agreement

in

Babungo,

and

hence into

the

system

of

a

large range of

syntactic

dependencies.

If

one

tries to

ship

out a

more

natural

class of

phenomena, say

the phenomena of anaphoric reference, then one loses an important linguistic

generalization

also: the

anaphoric

agreement patterns with

respect to nouns

referring

to

nonhumans are the

same as

those

for

modifiers and verbs,

which

remain

in

the

syntactic

component.

The

simplest

way to save

systematicity and

the

linguistic generalization

(applying Ockham's

razor) is

to say

that there is a

single grammatical

system here,

but

syntactic

and

semantic primitives

coexist

peacefully

in the

statement

of

grammatical rules

(using

graminatical

in the sense

of

grammar

as

defined in

?2.1).

Phenomena of the

Babungo type

are

quite

common

in

the

world's languages: a

particular syntactic

phenomenon

is

sometimes

constrained by (at least

partially

arbitrary) syntactic factors, sometimes by purely semantic or discourse-func-

tional

ones,

and

they

are

interconnected

to

a

high degree.

Many field

linguists

write

mixed

grammatical

descriptions,

including some

who

call themselves

functionalists

(e.g.

Haiman

1980a,

McGregor

1990). These

functionalists as-

sume

the

independence

and

systematicity

of

syntax. But in

practice they deny

5O1


14/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

71,

NUMBER

3

(1995)

the self-containednessof

syntax: they

make reference to functional

categories

and features

in their

syntactic descriptions. Although

these functionalists

do

not

generally

work in one of the

officially

named theoretical

frameworks,

it

is

a

logically possible

and

empiricallyplausible

intermediate

position,

and some-

thing

like it

has been

developed

in Dik's

Functional Grammar

Dik

1981)

and

in Role and Reference Grammar

Foley

& Van Valin

1984,

Van Valin

1993).

All

of

these

approaches

fit

the

definition of

mixed

formal/functionalism

t

the

beginning

of

this section.9

There

is a

solution to

the

Babungo problem

that

appears

to

save

the

self-

containednessof

syntax.

One could

provide

an

additional ormalfeature

to the

lexical

entries

of

nouns,

let's

call

it

[

+

H],

which is

[+

H]

for nouns

referring

to humans and

I

-

H]

for nouns

referring

o

nonhumans.

Rules for

agreement

other thananaphoricpronominalagreementwill requirematchingof the class

value with

the class of the noun

agreed

with. The

rule for

anaphoric

reference

will

yield

[class

1/2]

for

IL

H]

nouns and

[class

a]

for

I

-H]

nouns

(a

referring

to

the class feature for

the

L-Hi nouns).

This

may appear

to

be

an ad

hoc

description

of the

anaphoricagreement

system.

But

the mixed

syntactic-seman-

tic

account also has to

specify

when the

syntactic

classes

dictate

agreement

and

when

the semantic

property

of

humanness

does;

so

both

accounts are

equally

ad

hoc

in

this

respect (but

see

?5.1).

And

the

purely syntactic

account

preserves

the

self-containednessof

syntax.

This

strategy

is

in fact

an

instance

of

a

general technique

for

reanalyzing

putative

mixed

syntactic-semantic

rules. In the mixed

formulation,

there is a

grammatical

rule that makes

reference

to

both

syntactic

and

semantic

primi-

tives.

The

purely syntactic

formulation

shifts the

semantic

part

of the

mixed

formulation

o

a

mapping

rule

between

syntax

and

semantics,

namely

the

map-

ping

rule

that

specifies

that

the

syntactic

feature

[?

H]

is

mapped

into the

se-

mantic

feature

[?

HUMAN].

In

general,

this

strategy

can be

employed so as

to restrict

reference

to semantic

primitives

to

mapping

rules

between

syntax

and

semantics.

Nevertheless,

an

important eneralization

has

been lost

in

the

purely syntac-

tic account. There is a precise match between the distributionof the [?H]

featureand the

semantic

property

of

humannessof

referents.

That

is,

the

feature

?

H]

CAN

be

reduced to

a

nonsyntactic primitive(cf. Newmeyer's definition

of

autonomy

at

the

beginning

of

?2.2).

The


syntax can only

be

maintained

by essentially replicating

a

semantic

primitive

in

the

syntactic

component.

Semantics is

smuggled

into

the

syntax

via a

syntactic

feature

that

duplicates

a

semantic

one.

If

the

employment

of

this sort

of reformulationof

syntactic

rules

is

taken as

proof

of

the


syntax, then the

self-containedness

of

syntax

is

an

unfalsifiable

proposition.'0

9

Van Valin

refers to

Role and

Reference

Grammar

as a

'structural/functionalist' theory (Van

Valin

1993:2).

'0

This

last

statement

must be

qualified.

The


syntax, while not falsifiable

in

this sense,

may

be

proven

to

be true if

every

case

in

which

a

grammatical rule is described to

be

sensitive

to

a

semantic,

pragmatic

or


property

is

empirically demonstrated

to

be false. This

is

unlikely

and as

we will

see

shortly,

is

hardly

an

issue any more.

I

am indebted

502


15/44

AUTONOMY AND

FUNCTIONALIST LINGUISTICS

One

might

consider the

Babungo

example

as an

instance in

which the

price

to

pay

for semantic

smuggling

is

relatively small,

since

the

agreement

rules are

by

and

large governed by syntactic

factors.

However,

one finds

examples

of

all

proportions

of mixture of

syntactic

and semantic or other functional rules

in

the

grammars

of the

world's

languages.

Obviation

in

Cree is an

example

of

the

opposite

balance between

syntax

and

semiotic function. Cree

(and

other

Algonquian

languages) possesses

a nominal

inflection whose values are

termed

PROXIMATEnd OBVIATIVE.n

general,

the

rules for the

employment

of

the

proximate

and

obviative are

exclusively

a matter of

discourse

pragmatics

(see

for

example

the brief remarks in Wolfart

& Carroll

1981:25-27).

That

is,

there

is a

mapping

rule between the

noun forms and

the

values

[proximate,

obviative]

and


properties,

and the

distribution

of

proximate

and

obvi-

ative noun phrases is dictated by the discourse component of the grammar.

There are

a

few

cases,

however,

in

which

choice of form

is

determined

by

the

syntax.

Specifically,

in a

possessive

construction

the

possessed

item

is

always

obviative,

though

the

possessor may

be

proximate

or

obviative

(Wolfart

& Carroll

1981:47-49).

In some

sense,

this is worse

for the

self-containedness

of

syntax

than the

Babungo

case.

One could

provide

a

wholly syntactic

account

only by

importing all of obviation into the

syntax.

In

this

case,

the

syntactic

component would

dictate

the distribution

of

proximate

vs.

obviative

in

possess-

ive

constructions. But it would

only

be able

to

specify

that

either

value is

licensed in

virtually

every

other

syntactic

context,

and leave it

to the

discourse

component to filter out the discourse-functionally inappropriate utterances. In

contrast, a mixed

formal-functional

account

would license

only

the

syntactically

and

discourse-functionally

acceptable

utterances.

As a matter

of fact,

it

may

be

that semantic

(or

discourse)

smuggling

is

no

longer a

black

market

activity. Consider the

grammatical structures

of Head-

driven

Phrase Structure Grammar

(HPSG;

Pollard &

Sag

1987, 1994)

and

Fill-

more &

Kay's

version of

Construction Grammar

(1993). Both

theories use

typed

feature

structures to

represent

grammatical

structures,

including elements and

rules of

combination. Each typed

feature structure

contains

both

syntactic and

semantic information, as values for the (syn) and (sem) features respectively.

They are

both

semiotic theories in the

Saussurean

sense. Neither

theory,

as

far as I

can

tell,

explicitly excludes reference

to either

(syn) or

(sem) values

or

subvalues

in the

formulation

of

grammatical

generalizations,

though particular

generalizations

may

involve only

(syn)

subvalues. Both

of these

theories are

mixed

theories, by our

definition.

It

is worth

quoting the

proponents of

the

supposedly more

formalist

of

these two

theories:"1

to

Matthew Dryer

and Russell

Tomlin

for providing

essential

parts of

the semantic

smuggling

argument.

"

At this point, it

is also worth

pointing out another

use of the term

formal

in describing

linguistic

theories,

namely that a

formal

theory is one in

which

descriptions of

grammatical structures

and

generalizations are

formulated in a

rigorous

mathematical

metalanguage.

In

principle, it is

quite

possible to

characterize any

formalist or

functionalist

theory in a

rigorous

mathematical

metalan-

guage, although in

practice

rejection

of formalism

has often

included

rejection of

mathematical

formalization.

503


16/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME 71,

NUMBER

3 (1995)

HPSG differs

from all the

syntactic

theories which have influenced its

development,

for

it

is

not at heart a

theory

of

syntax.

Rather, it is concerned with the interaction

among

all

the

forms of information that

bear

upon

the

linguistic meaning

relation,

including

(inter

alia)

both

the syntactic information borne by signs as well as their semantic content ... syntactic and

semantic

aspects

of

grammatical

theory

are built

up

in an

integrated way

from the start,

under

the

assumption

that neither can be well understood in isolation from the other.

(Pollard

&

Sag

1987:16-17)

Finally,

it

is

a serious

question

as to whether even recent versions

of

Chom-

skyan generative

grammar

are autonomous in the sense of a

self-contained

syntactic component.

For

example,

the

theta-criterion

(Chomsky

1981:36,

335)

imposes

a

restriction

on

syntactic

structure

depending

on whether a theta-role

is

assigned

to

a

particular

position,

but

theta-roles

are

semantic entities

(Chomsky

1981:35).

This

appears

to

be

a

constraint on

syntactic

structures

in

which

seman-

tic structure

plays

a direct role. Matthews makes this

point

more

generally,

discussing

different

passages

in

Chomsky's

recent work

(Chomsky

1981,

1986)

which

appear

to

equivocate

on

whether certain

components

of the

grammar

(in

particular,

LF)

are

syntactic

or

semantic.

In

citing

these

passages

I

am

not

trying

to

suggest

that

Chomsky

was

confused or

inconsistent,

but rather

to

illustrate what

now

seemed to be

true,

that in the

'principles-and-parameters'

model'

to

call one level

'syntactic'

and

another 'semantic'

no

longer

made

any

real

sense

..

Insofar

as

[the

levels]

were

like

those

envisaged

before what

Chomsky

calls his

second 'concep-

tual shift', we could

perhaps

continue to

use the

old names. But if

I

have

understood

the

logic

correctly,

they

were mere names.

(Matthews

1993:245)

LF

may

have

begun

as

a

semantic

level;

when

syntactic

processes

such

as

movement were

sanctioned

in

LF,

it

appears

to have

become a

syntactic

level;

but

Matthews

suggests

that

LF hasn't

fully

lost

its

semantic

character in

the

process.

Properties

internal

to

the

grammatical

system,

some

of

which

were

once

called

semantic,

now

appear

to be

part

of the

grammar;

and

what really

matters is whether

they

are

a

manifestation

of

Universal

Grammar.

More

re-

cently,

Jackendoff

writes,

'we

ought

now to

be

willing

to consider

mixed alter-

natives

when

the facts

push

us that

way'

(1992:30).

Thus,

it

appears

that

in

fact even

contemporary

Chomskyan

generative

gram-

mar is mixed. Instead, it appears that Chomsky's attention has now turned to

the

autonomy

of

grammar.

Chomsky

describes

'real

semantics'

as 'the

study

of the

relation between

language

or

language

use and

the

world'

(1981:324).

The

minimalist

program

takes

X

(formerly

LF)

as the

interface between

the

grammar

and the

'conceptual-intentional

system'

(Chomsky

1993:2),

not

as

an

interface between a

syntactic

and a

semantic

component

of

the

grammar.

These

issues

will be

taken

up again

in

?7,

after a

survey

of

two

stronger

positions

that

have been taken

against

the

autonomy

of

syntax.

5.

TYPOLOGICAL

FUNCTIONALISM:

LIMITING

ARBITRARINESS IN

SYNTAX.

Some

typologists

have

argued

for

grammatical

analyses

that

integrate

form and func-

tion

more

profoundly

than

other

mixed

models.

These

accept

that

the

grammar

includes

arbitrariness,

and

they provide

mixed

analyses.

However,

the

mixed

analyses

are

such

that the

arbitrary

parts

of

the

analysis

are

language-specific,

while

the

universal

properties

instantiated

in

the

analysis

are

functional.

These

5()4


17/44

AUTONOMY AND

FUNCTIONALIST

LINGUISTICS

FAs are more functional than

mixed

analyses

with

regard

to

universals,

not

with

regard

to

autonomy.

We will

call such

analyses

TYPOLOGICAL

As,

and

their

proponents

TYPOLOGICAL

UNCTIONALISTS.

The

basic

strategy

for

constructing

a

typological

FA is to examine a

correla-

tion

between

syntax

and

semantics

(or

perhaps

discourse

function),

seek

a

functional

prototype

that is

found across

languages,

and construct

implicational

universals

(particularly

implicational

hierarchies)

holding

between

nonproto-

typical

semantic

types

and

the

prototypical

ones. The

universal hierarchies and

prototypes

are

the

crosslinguistic

manifestation of

particular

kinds of

relation-

ships

among

semantic and/or discourse

elements

in a

speaker's

mind.

These

functional elements

and

relationships

partake

in the

grammatical

knowledge

of

an individual. Hence the

grammatical

system

is

mixed,

but

the

mixture

is

of a

specific type: it is made up of functionally defined universal elements and rela-

tions

as well

as

arbitrary language-specific

elements and

relations.

We illustrate this

analytical strategy

first with a

typological

FA

of

basic

syn-

tactic

category membership-a

fundamental

syntactic

primitive

if there

ever

was one. As with the FAs in

?3-4,

this

illustration

is

highly

simplified

(the

general

analysis

is based on Dixon 1977 and

Croft

1991:36-148;

other

studies

are cited

below).

The basic

syntactic

categories

Noun,

Verb

and

Adjective

are

generally

de-

fined

in

terms

of

morphological properties,

mainly

inflectional categories (tense-

aspect,

number,

case, etc.),

and

syntactic

distributional

criteria

(e.g.

occurrence

with articles, auxiliaries, etc.). These properties are language-specific, but we

may compare

the

major syntactic categories

of

languages

by comparing across

languages

the

function

of the

inflections and

co-occurring

words

used to define

category

membership

and

the

semantics

of

the

word

classes that

combine with

them. In

particular,

the

functions of

the

usual

inflectional

and

syntactic criteria

used to define

the

major syntactic categories

are

associated

with

the pragmatic

functions

of

reference,

predication

and

modification

(Searle 1969; Croft 1991:

101-26

integrates

Searle's

pragmatic

analysis

with

conceptual-semantic

and


analyses

of the

same

concepts).

Dixon (1977) observes that in comparing adjective classes across languages,

using

comparable

syntactic-semantic

criteria,

certain

semantic

classes of prop-

erty

concepts

form the

prototype

of

the

adjective

category. Wetzer (1992)

slightly

modifies

Dixon's

analysis

and

argues

that

even

in languages

where

adjectives appear

to be a

subset

of nouns

or

verbs on

the usual morphosyntactic

criteria,

peculiarities

in

morphosyntactic

behavior

distinguish

the adjectival se-

mantic

classes

(properties)

from

true

verbal

semantic

classes

(actions or pro-

cesses).

Croft

(1991)

extends

this

typological

FA

to

nominal and

verbal categories.

Certain

semantic

classes of

words

consistently display

the

full

range of morpho-

syntactic behavior and the most simply encoded syntactic structure for the

pragmatic

functions of

reference and

predication-that

is, they are unmarked

in

the

typological

sense

(Croft

1990:64-154).

Words

denoting

objects are the

least

marked

referring expressions,

and

words

denoting actions are the least

marked

predications.

Consider

the

following English examples:

5()5


18/44

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

71,

NUMBER

3

(1995)

(13)

The BIRD

lew

away.

[object,

reference]

(14)

The bird FLEW

way.

[action,

predication]

(15)

That WASA BIRD.

[object, predication]

The

word

bird

in

15 is considered

syntactically

to be a

noun;

it shares

nounlike

morphosyntactic

behavior with bird in

13,

and in contrast it is

unable to

take

verbal

inflections of the sort

acceptable

with

flew

in 14.

However,

bird in

15

is also

characterized

by

the fixed

use

of a

(or

bare

plural

for

plural subjects),

in contrast with

ordinary

nouns

(as

in

13)

and the

obligatory presence

of

the

copula

in

predication,

in contrast with

ordinary

verbal

predications

(as

in

14).

In other

words,

the

English predicate

nominal

does not

display

the

full

range

of

morphosyntactic

behavior

of

a

noun

in

a

referring expression.

Also,

unlike

verbal

predications,

the

predicate

nominal

requires

a

copula.

And

even

though

the copula expresses some verbal categories such as tense, others such as the

progressive

are

unacceptable:

(16)

*That was

being

a

bird.

Moreover,

in other

languages,

the

predicate

nominal

displays

even

fewer

noun-like

properties,

in fact almost none at

all,

as

in

Classical

Nahuatl

(Andrews

1975:146):

(17)

n-

oqiiich

-tli

1ST-

man

-sG

'I

am a

man.

Predication of object concepts varies considerably across languages, but are

consistent in

lacking

some

morphosyntactic

nominal

criteria in

comparison

to

reference with

object concepts,

and

in

lacking

some verbal

criteria in

compari-

son to

predication

of action

concepts.

In

other

words,

predication

of

object

concepts

is

nonprototypical

in

comparison

to

reference to

objects

and

predica-

tion

of

actions,

both

of

which are

consistent in their

coding

and

behavior across

languages.

If

one

brings adjectives (more precisely,

word

classes

denoting

properties),

into

the

picture,

one

can

construct more

precise crosslinguistic generalizations

about the predication of various sorts of semantic word classes. The (non)use

of a

copula

conforms

to

a

hierarchy

of

predication:

(18)

Action word

(verb)

Documents

Autonomy of Functional Linguistics - William Croft