Autronica Fire and Security - NORWEPGeir+Solem.pdf · Autronica Fire and Security AS 13 ID: It should be noted that a SIL number applies to a complete function (SIF), i.e. the field

ID: ID: Autronica Fire and Security AS 1 Autronica Fire and Security AS ■

Autronica Fire and Security

From Safety to Dual Safety Geir Solem

INTSOK Deep Water Conference

Perth, November 2013

Geir Solem

ID: ID: Autronica Fire and Security AS 2

Autronica Fire and Security AS

A leading innovator, manufacturer and supplier of fire safety equipment

Founded in 1957

Employs more than 380 persons

Protecting life, environment and property

Photo: Gule sider


Autronica O&G Branch offices

Autronica O&G Partners

Houston Busan

UAE

London

Autronica O&G HQ

Stavanger

Dedicated organization exclusively focusing on the

Petrochemical, Oil & Gas market worldwide

Saudi Kuala

Lumpur


Optimal safety – minimal risk in extreme conditions

Designed in cooperation with those who

depend on it

Dual Safety

SelfVerify

Flame and gas detection

integrated in one system

Approved according to

IEC 61508 – SIL 2

AutroSafe Integrated Fire and Gas detection system


AutroSafe Integrated Fire and Gas detection system

Power supplied through the loop

- no need for additional power to detectors


AutroSafe IFG – typical system setup


F&G Safety

System


AutroSafe SelfVerify®

Power supply

Communication- interface

Fire Alarm Fire Alarm Signal

Operating

Fault warning Fault signal

Alarm- signal

Monitored part

SV- control

Detection chamber

SelfVerify®

stimulator STOP!

Calibrated

test

Test gas

SelfVerify®

function:

The detectors are

tested once every 24

hours with a

calibrated signal

Smoke detector


SIL2 certification as a complete system


Functional Safety – IEC 61508

Ensuring that a safety related system adequately performs the

required safety functions under all stated conditions within a defined

period of time.

Assessing the risk reduction required for a tolerable level of risk.

How likely is it that the function in question will perform its

assigned task when needed?


It should be noted that a SIL number applies to a complete function

(SIF), i.e. the field sensor, the logic solver and the final element. It is

therefore incorrect to refer to any individual item or equipment having a

safety integrity level.

An individual component can be certified for use in a particular SIL

application, but such a certificate constitutes only part of the verification

effort, since the target SIL must be verified for the complete SIF.

How does SIL relate to individual components?

Smoke detector

Loop driver module

F&G alarm panel

Output

Safety loop example


Failure Classification

SIS failures may be classified as

Dangerous (D) failures

Dangerous undetected (DU) failures

Dangerous detected (DD) failures

Safe (S) failures

Safe undetected (SU) failures

Safe detected (SD) failures


The Kristin gas and condensate field came on stream on 3rd

November 2005.

The field has been developed with 12 production wells in four

subsea templates, tied back to a semi-submersible production

platform.

Kristin is currently producing 10 million cubic metres of gas per

day. Daily production capacity from the field is 125,000 barrels

of condensate and just over 18 million cubic metres of rich gas.

The Kristin reservoir is located almost 5,000 metres below

ground.

Design and lifetime follow-up according to IEC 61508/61511.

Real life experience

Statoil: Kristin


Summary of detailed fault classification, 2006-2011

System Safety Function SIL No. of Tags No. of

Tests

DU failures SIL target No.

of DU

DD failures SD failures SU failures Spurious

trips

Non-critical

failures

70 06 - Fire detection Flame SIL2 310 1514 4 15 5 10 16 10 1

07 - Fire detection Smoke SIL2 823 5164 12 48 10 67 9 8 34

08 - Fire detection Heat SIL2 43 226 1 2 2 1 0 0 4

05 - Gas detection Open path SIL2 186 922 1 9 73 120 20 10 21

05 - Gas detection Point gas SIL2 204 1101 4 11 8 42 0 2 3

05 - Gas detection Toxic SIL2 21 250 0 2 4 19 2 2 0

04 - Manual Call Point SIL2 213 1241 1 13 1 0 2 0 9

F&G logic SIL2 0 0 1 0 15 8 0 1 14

The review consider dangerous faults (DU) from testing and operation (when needed).

This is in accordance with

IEC 61508/61511 definitions.

2 flame detectors was not connected to logic in SAS (2010).

1 point gas detector gives alarm, but not high alarm (2008).

1 manual call point problem with mechanical switch problem (2010).

1 heat detector in sauna physically damaged (2006).

2 detectors covered, 1 detector not connected to logic in SAS (2006). 2 detectors had wrong type mounted (2007).

Real life experience

Statoil: Kristin


AutroSafe Dual Safety


MFZ 3 MFZ 2

Deck 4

Deck 5

Deck 6




MFZ 3 MFZ 2

Deck 4

Deck 5

Deck 6




Loop diagnostic Tool


Self Verify status printout

Unit OK run Last run Cnt Last test result

00001 2013-07-21 10:00:33 2013-07-21 10:00:33 0008 SV test OK

00002 2013-07-21 10:00:42 2013-07-21 10:00:42 0008 SV test OK

00003 2013-07-21 10:01:14 2013-07-21 10:01:14 0008 SV test OK

00004 2013-07-21 10:01:23 2013-07-21 10:01:23 0008 SV test OK

00005 2013-07-21 10:01:57 2013-07-21 10:01:57 0008 SV test OK


The SINTEF report:

Self-Verifying Detectors

SINTEF Report no.: STF48 F93033 (Restricted)

The SINTEF research institute was asked to make a theoretical study of

the self-verification idea based on offshore statistics and technical

support from oil companies.

The research scope was to compare the different methods of testing

and to do life cycle cost calculations.

About SINTEF: The SINTEF Group is the largest independent research organisation

in Scandinavia. Every year, SINTEF supports the development of 2000 or so

Norwegian and overseas companies via our research and development activity.

www.sintef.no


Oil & Gas statistics: Detector failures

Failure category

% of all failures Coverage of individual tests

Inspection

(i)

Manual

(ii)

SelfVerify

(iii)

Physi-

cal

Detector chamber and electronics failure 40% 0% 95% 98%

Transmission from detector to central system 5% 0% 98% 98%

Detector cover failure (by mistake painted

over) 5% 90% 95% 0%

Func-

tional

Detector wrapped (room cleaning/painting) 1% 95% 85% 0%

Detector left inhibited 45% 0% 98% 99%

Blockage of line of sigth 4% 80% 50% 0%

Total 100% 9% 95% 89%

(Based upon field data and expert judgement)


Test methods combinations

Failure category

% of all

failures

Coverage of test combinations

SelfVerify &

Inspection

SelfVerify &

Manual

Inspection &

Manual

Physi-

cal

Detector chamber and electronics failure 40% 98% 99% 95%

Transmission from detector to central

system 5% 98% 98% 98%

Detector cover failure (by mistake painted

over) 5% 90% 95% 95%

Func-

tional

Detector wrapped (room cleaning/painting) 1% 95% 85% 95%

Detector left inhibited 45% 99% 99% 98%

Blockage of line of sigth 4% 80% 50% 80%

Total 100% 97% 97% 96%


AutroSafe SelfVerify®

Statement from Nemko, January 2007

NEMKO offers market access services based on testing,

inspection and certification worldwide, mainly concerning

products and systems, but also for installations and personnel.


Selected references

27

Project/Field name Owner Application F&G Det. System

Ichthys FPSO H.6054 Inpex FPSO

Gas sampling

system

Petronas FLNG H.6302 Petronas FLNG AutroSafe

Queensland Curtis LNG QCG / BG Group Australia

Onshore Gas

Processing AutroSafe

Prelude FLNG EPCI Project HHI/Samsung/Technip FLNG AutroSafe

Comperje Refinery Petrobras Refinery AutroSafe

Goliat FPSO

ENI Norge AS and partner

Statoil Petroleum AS FPSO AutroSafe

Chirag Oil Project ICSS BP Offshore Production AutroSafe

Ras Laffan Qatar Petroleum Onshore AutroSafe IFG

Van Gogh FPSO Prosafe/Apache FPSO Autrosafe

Documents

Autronica Fire and Security - NORWEPGeir+Solem.pdf · Autronica Fire and Security AS 13 ID: It should be noted that a SIL number applies to a complete function (SIF), i.e. the field