AVOIDING MALPRACTICE AND ETHICS VIOLATIONS

MARK ANTHONY CORRERO, Houston Stornello & Correro Law Firm, P.L.L.C.

State Bar of Texas WHAT EVERY TEXAS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW

ABOUT FIREARMS LAW September 12, 2014

Houston

CHAPTER 8

Mark A. Correro is the founding member of the Stornello & Correro Law Firm,

P.L.L.C. In 2014, he was honored by Texas Super Lawyers (Thomson Reuters). The annual

Texas Super Lawyers list honors Texas' top lawyers based on surveys of more than 57,000

active attorneys across the state. The final list is estimated to be only five percent of Texas'

licensed attorneys. He is also a proud member and Fellow of the prestigious Texas Bar

Foundation. The Texas State Bar selects one-third of one percent of the top performing

members of the Texas Bar annually as Fellows. Before forming the Stornello & Correro

Law Firm, P.L.L.C., he worked at Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., concentrating in white-collar

crime, antitrust, and complex commercial cases. He is a graduate of the HYLA Leadership

Academy and was nominated to be an HYLF Fellow. He received his J.D. from South

Texas College of Law, where he was assistant articles editor for the SOUTH TEXAS LAW

REVIEW and an editor for the Texas State Bar’s CONSTRUCTION LAW JOURNAL. He has

published over fourteen scholarly articles and received the Clements, O’Neill, Pierce,

Wilson, & Fulkerson Award for Best Article on Federal Law and the Clair E. Getty, Jr.,

Memorial Award for Outstanding Legal Writing. In law school, he was a Langdell Scholar

in Constitutional Law.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

WARNING ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1

I. PROTECTIVE ORDERS ........................................................................................................................................ 1

II. ASSAULT—FAMILY VIOLENCE ....................................................................................................................... 2

III. PROTECTING YOUR POSTERIOR ..................................................................................................................... 3 ATTACHMENT - State v. Agathis Official Opinion ...................................................................................... 5 ATTACHMENT - Warnings ......................................................................................................................... 10

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AVOIDING MALPRACTICE AND ETHICS VIOLATIONS WARNING

This paper is copyrighted. A license has been granted to the State Bar of Texas to reproduce, sell, and distribute all or portions of it. Copying, selling, redistributing, or publishing this paper without my permission is prohibited.

The purpose of this paper and presentation is to explain to a group of attorneys some of the more significant laws governing the prohibited possession of a firearm in certain circumstances. It is intended to be used solely by attorneys, as an initial guideline in preparing to advise their clients. It is not intended to be used by people who are not lawyers trying to determine what is legal and what is not.

The governing laws change frequently as Congress and the Legislature amend the statutes. They also change unpredictably when various state and federal courts render their decisions. The information was current as of the date of the presentation. Since that time no effort has been made to update this paper unless the paper specifically says at the beginning that it has been revised or updated.

According to the NRA Compendium of State Firearms Law, there are approximately 20,000 gun laws in the United States. There are 94,333 words of federal statutes regulating guns, at least 92 decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding guns, and many decisions more by the Courts of Appeal.1 Many of them might also affect the legality of firearms possession. It is important to consider all those laws in determining whether a certain course of action is legal. This paper may not include all the information necessary to make such a determination.

The work involved in researching and preparing this paper and in giving the presentation was done in order to render a public service by helping educate lawyers in a very specialized area of the law. I am not getting paid for this work, and if a client’s freedom depended on having a definite answer to one of the legal issues discussed in this paper, you can bet I would take the time to get a definite answer. For that reason I take no responsibility for a nonlawyer who reads this paper, thinks he knows the law, and finds out he was wrong. For that matter I take no responsibility for an attorney who reads this paper and then errs in advising a client.

1 David Kopel, Stephen Halbrook and Alan Korwin, Supreme Court Gun Cases 12, Bloomfield Press, 2004.

I. PROTECTIVE ORDERS Temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) are

typically issued on filing of the petition for divorce, in some cases, the filing of another family law case. TROs are issued ex parte, with no notice to the opposing party and opportunity to be heard, and often with no showing of need or fault. Therefore in most cases, a TRO will not subject your client to the rigors of 18 USC 922 (g) (8). Realistically, temporary injunctions are routinely granted upon request, and are made mutual as to the parties.2

Temporary orders (“TOs”) are interlocutory orders, issued soon after the onset of a divorce or other family law case. They often include provisions for custody, visitation, child support, and use of property. They also often include a temporary injunction (“TI”). Normally, TOs are issued after notice and a hearing. Both parties have the opportunity to appear and present evidence. For that reason, if the order includes the language described in 18 USC 922 (g)(8), then the effect may be to prohibit him or her from possessing firearms, ammunition, or components. But these orders rarely warn the parties of this effect.

Protective orders (“POs”) are issued after notice and hearing. Both parties have an opportunity to appear and present evidence. Moreover, they may last for up to two years. A prerequisite for entering a protective order is a finding that family violence has occurred in the past, and is likely to occur in the future. They also, almost always, prohibit the parties from committing family violence. Therefore, virtually every PO will have the effect of prohibiting the client from possessing firearms.

When an application for PO is filed, it is common practice to request an ex parte PO. This order, like a TRO, is often issued without notice to the opposing party. It will be granted if the supporting affidavit satisfies the statutory requirements. Under state law such an order, once served on the opposing party, might prohibit possession of firearms. But under federal law, it does not appear to meet the requirements of 18 USC 922 (g)(8).

Now, imagine you are a hard working salesman and spend most of your time traveling making sales calls.3 You are married to a spouse you hardly see, and are the parent of two kids you don’t know. Your daily

2 See LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW CASES OF SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS, R. 6 (“The Court hereby ORDERS that in all divorce suits filed, a Standing Temporary Restraining Order . . . is imposed on all parties to the suit.”). 3 Portions of this article were taken from the author’s law review article, previously published by South Texas College of Law. Mark A. Correro, Get a Divorce—Become a Felon: United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 419 (2004).

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routine is driving around west Texas on hot summer days worrying about closing the next deal while feeling guilty about all the time you are not around your family. You desperately want to be a better spouse and parent; however, the economy is at an all time low, layoffs are at an all time high, and with a second mortgage on your home you should just feel thankful to have a job. In fact, the only true joy you feel anymore is on the rare occasion when you are able to get in some skeet shooting.

One day your spouse, fed up with your absence, fed up with struggling alone to care for the home and kids, tells you, “I’m leaving.” Taking the kids, they move across the state, and the next communication you get is a petition for divorce and a restraining order. Your life has reached its lowest point. You are completely demoralized and devastated. You grab your shotgun and head to the range; maybe some skeet shooting will improve your mood

As you head out the door, federal agents surround your house. You are thrown on the ground, handcuffed, and arrested. Unable to understand what is going on, you plead with the agent to tell you why you are being arrested. In a cold, conniving voice he responds—“Because you are getting a divorce.” Later, you learn that a federal statute forbids anyone subject to a restraining order from possessing a firearm.

When the petitioner filed for divorce, the spouse did not expect that he or she was subject to criminal prosecution by the federal government for owning a gun.4 The petitioner was only seeking to get a divorce because, perhaps because the marriage was insupportable.5 Instead, the spouse found that because of a federal statute6 and the petitioner’s application for 4 See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 599 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (failing to caution Mr. Emerson that if a temporary restraining order was granted, he would be subject to federal criminal prosecution for the mere possession of a firearm).

5 Id. 6 Id. The federal statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), states that:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—(8) who is subject to a court order that—(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person

a restraining order,7 he or she will be stripped of the right to bear arms and treated like a common felon.8

II. ASSAULT—FAMILY VIOLENCE

As stated above, under federal law, certain persons are prohibited from possessing or receiving firearms.9 These individuals also include convicted felons, persons either adjudicated a “mental defective” or committed to a mental institution, and persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses.10 The list also includes users of any illegal drug, dishonorably discharged veterans, and persons who have renounced their U.S. citizenship.11 As a result, anyone convicted of assault-family violence will be prohibited from possessing any firearm—for life.

And courts are willing to find counsel ineffective when defendants are wrongly advised about firearms law when facing assault-family violence charges. For example, in Agathis, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Agathis plead guilty to the offense of domestic

represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury . . . .

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000)). 7 For further discussion on TROs see Healy Law Offices, P.C., Don’t Shoot Yourself in the Foot: Gun Laws You Need to Know, at www.healylaw.com/gun_cle.htm. 8 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 611. The court stated:

Under this statute, a person can lose his Second Amendment rights not because he has committed some wrong in the past, or because a judge finds he may commit some crime in the future, but merely because he is in a divorce proceeding. Although he may not be a criminal at all, he is stripped of his right to bear arms as much as a convicted felon.

Id. 9 (whether Title I or Title II). 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d), (g) (2006). 10 Id. at §922 (g). 11 See id. § 922(g)(3), (6)-(7); see also Nathan G. Rawling, A Testamentary Gift of Felony: Avoiding Criminal Penalties from Estate Firearms, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 286 (2010) (discussing who may possess firearms, the various restrictions on transfer, and penalties for impermissible transfers).

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violence assault.12 As a result of the domestic violence plea, Mr. Agathis’s right to possess a firearm was forfeited for life.13 In his application for post conviction relief, Mr. Agathis argued that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to advise defendant that the plea would bar him from possessing a firearm.14 The Court agreed with Mr. Agathis and, in reversing and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing held that “[i]f the court finds that defendant would not have pled guilty if he hand known that by doing so he would permanently forfeit his right to obtain a firearms identification card, his guilty plea cannot stand.”15

III. PROTECTING YOUR POSTERIOR

I have included sample forms to warn your clients of the inherent consequences of protective orders and being adjudicated guilty of assault-family violence.

12 State of New Jersey v. Nickolas Agathis, 34 A.3d 1266, 1270 (N.J. Super. 2012) (holding that “defendant has shown that his trial counsel’s performance fell below the standard expected of an attorney licensed to practice law in this State.”). 13 Id. 14 Id. at 1270. 15 Id. at 1271.

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Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division. STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v. Nickolas AGATHIS, Defendant–Appellant.

Argued April 13, 2011. Decided Feb. 1, 2012.

Background: After affirmance of petitioner's con-viction pursuant to negotiated guilty plea to domestic violence offense of simple assault and affirmance of probationary sentence conditioned on forfeiture of firearms identification card during probation, 2007 WL 1574417, petitioner sought post conviction relief (PCR). The Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appealed. Holding: The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Fuentes, J.A.D., held that petitioner made prima facie showing that counsel was ineffective in failing to advise petitioner that the conviction would render him permanently ineligible for firearms identification card, and thus, evidentiary hearing was warranted.

Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes Criminal Law 110 1655(6) 110 Criminal Law 110XXX Post-Conviction Relief 110XXX(C) Proceedings 110XXX(C)3 Hearing and Determination 110k1651 Necessity for Hearing 110k1655 Particular Issues 110k1655(6) k. Counsel. Most

Cited Cases

Petitioner for post conviction relief (PCR), by alleging that counsel had not advised him that a state statute would render him permanently ineligible for a firearms identification card if he entered a negotiated guilty plea to the domestic violence offense of simple assault and accepted probation condition requiring forfeiture of his firearms identification card during his probation, made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, so that an evidentiary hearing by post conviction court was warranted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; N.J.S.A. 2C:58–3(c). **1267 Alan L. Zegas argued the cause for appellant (Law Offices of Alan L. Zegas, attorney; Mr. Zegas, William Nossen, Chatham, and Terel L. Klein, on the briefs). Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore J. Romankow, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Balo, on the brief). Before Judges FUENTES, ASHRAFI and NUGENT.

The opinion of the court was delivered by FUENTES, J.A.D.

*18 Defendant Nickolas FN1 Agathis appeals from the denial of his petition for post conviction relief (PCR). We reverse and remand for an eviden-tiary hearing.

FN1. Incorrectly designated as Nicholas Agathis.

Defendant pled guilty to the domestic violence

offense of simple assault and was placed on probation conditioned upon forfeiting his firearms identification card. Relying on our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Nunez–Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 975 A.2d 418 (2009), defendant argues he received ineffective as-

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sistance of counsel when his attorney incorrectly in-formed him that he could regain his firearms identi-fication card after completing the term of probation. Stated differently, defendant claims he would not have agreed to plead guilty if he had known that by doing so, he would permanently forfeit his right to own and possess a firearm.

Guided by Rule 3:22–5, the PCR court denied defendant's petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, concluding that it was bound by our earlier opinion affirming defendant's conviction on direct appeal. State v. Agathis, No. A–4939–05, 2007 WL 1574417 (N.J. App. Div. June 1, 2007). Relying on State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J.Super. 617, 622, 508 A.2d 1161 (App.Div.1986), aff'd o.b., 107 N.J. 603, 527 A.2d 439 (1987), we held that the trial judge's failure to inform defendant that by pleading guilty he would be ineligible to obtain a new firearms identification card “does not require the vacation of the conviction because**1268 defendant's future ineligibility for obtainment of a firearms identification card is a col-lateral consequence of the plea.” Agathis, supra, slip op. at 5.

We now reverse and remand. As the Court ex-plained in Nunez–Valdez, “the issue is whether it is ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to pro-vide misleading, material information that results in an uninformed plea, and whether that occurred here.” Supra, 200 N.J. at 139–40, 975 A.2d 418. Although the *19 erroneous information provided by defense counsel in Nunez–Valdez concerned the defendant's deportation from this country, an arguably more sig-nificant consequence than the forfeiture of the right to a firearms identification card, the constitutional prin-ciple underpinning the Court's decision in Nun-ez–Valdez is likewise applicable in this case. De-fendant had the right to receive correct legal advice from his attorney in matters material FN2 to him in deciding to accept or reject the State's plea offer.

FN2. Although not dispositive to our analy-

sis, we note that in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), the United States Su-preme Court construed the Second Amend-ment to the United States Constitution as guaranteeing an individual's right to possess and carry weapons in case of self defense. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), the Court made that right applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thus, on remand, the PCR court must conduct an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant would not have pled guilty if he had been advised by his counsel that, by pleading guilty to the domestic violence offense of simple assault, he would be per-manently barred from obtaining a firearms identifica-tion card.

I On February 14, 2006, defendant, an attorney

admitted to practice law in this State, was arrested and charged with committing an act of domestic violence against his wife. The police searched the marital res-idence and, as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:25–21(d)(1)(b), seized thirteen firearms and vari-ous type of ammunition. As a result, defendant was charged with third degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(7), and fourth degree unlawful possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3(f)(1).

Defendant retained an attorney to represent him in this criminal matter. Some time after the initial ar-raignment, defense counsel informed defendant that the State had made a plea offer. *20 Under the terms of the plea offer, defendant would be required to plead guilty to an amended charge of a disorderly person offense of simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(a), and the State agreed to dismiss the charge of possession of hollow point bullets. As to his sentence, the State would recommend a non-custodial term of probation, conditioned upon defendant successfully completing

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anger management counseling, and forfeiting all weapons seized from his home at the time of his arrest, as well as his firearms purchaser identification card.FN3

FN3. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58–3(b).

According to the certification submitted by de-fendant's original defense counsel in support of de-fendant's PCR petition, “[t]here were several factors that were weighed by [defendant], and discussed be-tween he and I[sic], when he was considering the State's plea offer.” The first concerned whether the conviction would jeopardize his status as an attorney. Second, because he owned at the time, and continues to this day to own a liquor store, defendant wanted his defense counsel to determine whether a conviction for simple assault “would affect his liquor license.” **1269 As to defendant's eligibility to own firearms, defense counsel certified that

as owner of a liquor store where he kept a firearm for his own protection, Mr. Agathis was concerned about the condition that he forfeit his firearms identification card. He asked me to inquire of the prosecutor and the Court whether this condition was permanent or whether he could reapply for a fire-arms identification card after he had completed the term of his probation.

According to defense counsel, the plea hearing

was adjourned several times so that “these issues could be researched and resolved.” Defense counsel further certified that he and the prosecutor met with the trial judge at an in-chambers conference in which the judge allegedly represented that defendant could reapply for an identification card after he completed his term of probation. However, there is only an oblique reference to these discussions in the record of the plea hearing.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... We've had several dis-

cussions over the last few weeks about which way we would like to go on this, but it was never because [sic] *21 [defendant] wasn't willing to accept re-sponsibility for his actions. But there was [sic] other extenuating issues that complicated which way we went with this.

THE COURT: I recall our conference.

During the sentencing phase of the hearing, the

court addressed defendant as follows: I think this is a fair resolution of this matter, in light of what both sides have told me. I am going to place you on a period of probation for one year, with the condition that you complete the anger management program, and comply with all of other conditions of probation.

....

You do have to forfeit all weapons that were seized, as well as the firearms identification card. You're prohibited, of course, from applying [for] one dur-ing this period of probation. (Emphasis added.)

Defense counsel certified that at the time he

recommended to defendant to accept the State's plea offer, he was unaware that under N.J.S.A. 2C:58–3(c):

No handgun purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card shall be issued:

(1) To any person who has been convicted of any crime, or a disorderly persons offense involving an act of domestic violence as defined in section 3 of P.L.1991, c. 261 (C.2C:25–19), whether or not armed with or possessing a weapon at the time of such offense....

Sometime after he was sentenced, defendant

learned that he would not be eligible for a firearms identification card after he completed his term of

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probation. Represented by a different attorney, de-fendant filed a direct appeal seeking to vacate his guilty plea and conviction. One of the grounds for relief in this appeal was that the trial judge misled defendant on the firearms identification card issue. As indicated earlier, we affirmed defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court did not err by failing to inform defendant of his inability to obtain a fire-arms identification card as a collateral consequence of his conviction.

In April 2008, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. His petition was denied without an evi-dentiary hearing in November 2008 on the basis that it was procedurally barred under Rule 3:22–5.

*22 II From this record defendant now appeals raising

the following arguments.

POINT ONE

**1270 THE PCR COURT UTILIZED THE WRONG LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S POST CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION.

POINT TWO

AGATHIS HAS DEMONSTRATED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS THUS REQUIRED.

POINT THREE

ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE COURT IS IN-CLINED TO ENGAGE IN A PENAL VERSUS COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT IS NONETHELESS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS PLEA VACATED BECAUSE HIS

RIGHT TO POSSESS A FIREARM IS A FUN-DAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND THE CURRENT PROHIBITION AGAINST POSSESSING A FIREARM DIRECTLY FOL-LOWS FROM HIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SIMPLE ASSAULT CONVICTION.

We agree with defendant's position as expressed

in argument Points One and Two. In Nunez–Valdez, the Court addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “based on [the] defendant's assertions that counsel provided misleading information on the con-sequences of a guilty plea. [The d]efendant con-tend[ed] that his attorneys told him to accept the plea offer in exchange for a probationary sentence and that the plea would not affect his immigration status.” Supra, 200 N.J. at 137–38, 975 A.2d 418. In analyzing the constitutional implications of the defendant's claim, the Court rejected “the traditional dichotomy that turns on whether consequences of a plea are penal or collateral....” Id. at 138, 975 A.2d 418. The Court instead adopted an approach that ensures that a de-fendant considering whether or not to plead guilty to an offense receives correct information concerning all of the relevant material consequences that flow from such a plea. Ibid.

The Nunez–Valdez Court thus incorporated this principle in the traditional paradigm for determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel:

*23 When a guilty plea is part of the equation, we have explained that “[t]o set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a de-fendant must show that (i) counsel's assistance was not ‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases'; and (ii) ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ”

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[ Id. at 139, 975 A.2d 418 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457, 645 A.2d 734 (1994)).]

Applying these principles to the facts presented

here, and in the context of this case where a statute clearly shows that defendant's conviction rendered him permanently ineligible to obtain a firearms iden-tification card, defendant has shown that his trial counsel's performance fell below the standard ex-pected of an attorney licensed to practice law in this State. Under these circumstances, the PCR court must determine whether “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Ibid. (quoting DiFrisco, supra, 137 N.J. at 457, 645 A.2d 734).

This final determination requires the PCR court to conduct an evidentiary hearing as authorized by Rule 3:22–10. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462–63, 609 A.2d 1280 (1992). At this hearing, the court must determine whether the ability to own and legally possess a firearm was a material consideration for defendant in deciding **1271 whether to accept the State's plea offer. If the court finds that defendant would not have pled guilty if he had known that by doing so he would permanently forfeit his right to obtain a firearms identification card, his guilty plea cannot stand.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain juris-diction. N.J.Super.A.D.,2012. State v. Agathis 424 N.J.Super. 16, 34 A.3d 1266 END OF DOCUMENT

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WARNING (Family Law): YOU MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM POSSESSING ANY FIREARMS, IF THIS COURT ISSUES AN ORDER WHICH RESTRAINS YOU FROM HARASSING YOUR SPOUSE OR OTHER INTIMATE PARTNER. This includes restraining orders, protective orders, temporary injunctions, permanent injunctions, and any other orders meeting the definition. Please consult with your attorney and/or review the law if it affects you! 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) states in part: “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is subject to a court order that - (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) IS A FEDERAL FELONY WHICH CAN SUBJECT YOU TO IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE! I acknowledge that I have been advised of this law. ________________________ ________________ Signature Date

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WARNING: YOU WILL BE PROHIBITED FROM POSSESSING ANY FIREARMS FOR LIFE, IF YOU ARE CONVICTED OF A MISDEMEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. Please consult with your attorney and/or review the law if it affects you! 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) states: It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A) defines “misdemeanor crime of family violence” as a crime which: “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim. VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) IS A FEDERAL FELONY WHICH CAN SUBJECT YOU TO IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE! I acknowledge that I have been advised of this law. ________________________ ________________ Signature Date

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