The Korean War:Documents

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: KOREAN WAR The Korean War was a civil war between the nations of North Korea and South Korea, which were created out of the occupation zones of the Soviet Union and the United States established at the end of World War II. The failure to hold free elections after World War II throughout the Korean Peninsula in 1948 deepened the division between the two sides; the North established a communist government, while the South established a capitalist one. The 38th parallel increasingly became a political border between the two Korean states. Although reunification

negotiations continued in the months preceding the war, tension intensified. Cross-border skirmishes and raids at the 38th Parallel persisted. The situation escalated into open warfare when North Korean forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950.

It was the first significant armed conflict of the Cold War. In 1950 the Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations Security Council, in protest at representation of China by the Kuomintang / Republic of China government, which had taken refuge in Taiwan following defeat in the Chinese Civil War. In the absence of a dissenting voice from the Soviet Union, who could have vetoed it, the United States and other countries passed a Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Korea.

The United States of America provided 88% of the 341,000 international soldiers which aided South Korean forces in repelling the invasion, with twenty other countries of the United Nations offering assistance. Suffering severe casualties, within two months the defenders were pushed back to a small area in the south of the Korean Peninsula, known as the Pusan perimeter. A rapid U.N. counteroffensive then drove the North Koreans past the 38th Parallel and almost to the Yalu River, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the war on the side of North Korea. Chinese intervention forced the Southern-allied forces to retreat behind the 38th Parallel. While not directly committing forces to the conflict, the Soviet Union provided material aid to both the North Korean and Chinese armies.

The active stage of the war ended on 27 July 1953, when the armistice agreement was signed. The agreement restored the border between the Koreas near the 38th Parallel and created the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a 2.5-mile (4.0 km)-wide fortified buffer zone between the two Korean nations. Minor outbreaks of fighting continue to the present day.

Korea remains divided roughly along the 38th parallel. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the two nations is still the most heavily-fortified border in the world. There is constant hope among the peoples in both North and South that Korea will again be united under one flag.

Source:John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy

Truman and NSC-68: While Gaddis has painfully reconstructed the tenets of Kennan's thinking, at the time there was no one place to go to grasp his entire strategy (This was by design - Kennan thought guidelines resulted in oversimplification.) Nevertheless, "it was precisely this need for greater coherence in policy formulation following the shocks of 1949 -- the 'loss' of China, the Soviet atomic bomb, persistent interservice debates over strategy, and the dilemma of how to meet expanding responsibilities with what appeared to be limited resources -- that caused President Truman, early in 1950, to authorize just the sort of study Kennan had resisted: a single, comprehensive statemetn of interests, threats, and feasible responses, capable of being communicated throughout the bureaucracy." (90) Hence, NSC-68. As Gaddis notes, "NSC-68 was not intended as a repudiation of Kennan...The objective rather was to systematize containment, and to find the means to make it work. But the very act of reducing the strategy to writing exposed the differences that had begun to develop between Kennan and the administration...The result, like that more promiment product of a broadly construed mandate, the United States Constitution, was a document more sweeping in content and implications than its originators had intended." (90)

How did NSC-68 differ from Kennan's view of containment? For one, Kennan's emphasis on industrial-military power centers was thrown out the window - "In the context of the present polarization of power," argued NSC-68, "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." Thus, NSC-68 committed America to unlimited objectives and to a "perimeter" defense (defending everywhere) rather than a "strongpoint" one (attacking where the enemy was weakest.) "World order, and with it American security," Kennan notes, "had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was...The effect was vastly to increase the number and variety of interests deemed relevant to the national security, and to blur distinctions between them." (92) Obviously, unlimited interests meant the US required unlimited resources, and thus, prodded on indirectly by "grow the pie" Keynesian economists such as Leon Keyserling, the military-industrial complex began its swell to current proportions.

These changes, crucial as they were, did not represent the entire deviation from Kennan's philosophy. NSC-68 also redefined interests in light of the Soviet threat, rather than articulating any independent US interests - By this logic, any move by the Soviet Union became a problem for the US: "The whole point of NSC-68 had been to generate additional means with which to defend existing interests. But by neglecting to define those interests apart from the threat to them, the document in effect expanded interests along with means, thereby vitiating its own intended accomplishment." (98) Moreover, unlike Kennan, who advocated "a variety of political, economic, psychological, and military measures" in America's arsenals, NSC came emphasized military response to the Russian threat above all else. (99) Finally, NSC-68 did not openly share Kennan's belief in the value of exacerbating inter-Communist splits (perhaps, Gaddis notes, because the domestic furor over anticommunismwould make it hard to sell the American people on the idea of "good" Communists. For all these reasons, NSC-68 finds its best expression in the Korean War: "Despite the fact that the administration had resolved not to let Korea become the occasion for getting bogged down in a peripheral war with a secondary adversary, this was precisely what happened. And it happened, one suspects, because of the extent to which the premises of NSC-68 had come to overshadow, and modify, the original strategy of containment." (117)

Source: www.koreanwar.org

Document 1: A Map of Korean War Strategy and Truce Line

Document 2:Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

Document 3:Truman Doctrine (1947) excerpt: Source: Bernstein, Barton J. The Truman Administration: A Documentary History

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Document 4: Excerpt, Secretary of State Dean Acheson- Speech on the Far East, January 12, 1950

Source: TeachingAmericanHistory.org

What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?

In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australia—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter

of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped military means.

The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very serious economic problems…In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been speaking…

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitations, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.

Document 5: Journal for Conflict StudiesThe GREGG Center- University of New Brunswick Vol. XXII No. 1 Spring 2002

Dean Acheson's Press Club Speech Reexaminedby James I. Matray

Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson's speech at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950 was among the most important and controversial US policy statements in the early history of the Cold War in East Asia. In it, he defined the American "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. This denied a guarantee of US military protection to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Less than six months later, North Korea launched a military offensive across the 38th parallel that nearly succeeded in imposing Communist rule over the entire peninsula. Critics immediately pointed to Acheson's National Press Club speech as giving Pyongyang the "green light" to pursue forcible reunification, based on the premise that the United States had ruled out military intervention to defend South Korea. More than fifty years after the start of the Korean War, countless South Koreans still hold Acheson responsible for igniting this fratricidal conflict. The United States, they bitterly maintain, committed an act of betrayal toward Korea ranking with President Theodore Roosevelt's approval of the Taft-Katsura Agreement in 1905 and President Harry S. Truman's agreement to divide the peninsula forty years later at the end of World War II.

Release of Soviet documents during recent years has removed any doubt that North Korea planned and initiated the Korean War with the reluctant endorsement of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. North Korea's leader Kim Il Sung had begun to press the Soviet Union to support an invasion shortly after creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948. But Stalin withheld approval until April 1950 mainly because he feared that the United States would intervene militarily, thereby risking escalation into a major war involving the Soviet Union. The reaction of shock and panic in the ROK to Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the American defensive perimeter has been well-documented. Still unresolved, however, is the far more important question of the impact of the National Press Club speech on Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il Sung. This article presents evidence from recently released Soviet documents that Acheson's address had little if any impact on Communist deliberations. Stalin worried about US military intervention until the moment the Korean War began. Moreover, he feared that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain South Korea would stage in the future. His approval of Kim Il Sung's plan was a mistake, but it derived more from a sense of weakness rather than strength.

There were two primary motivating factors behind Acheson's delivery of the National Press Club speech. First, the Truman administration was trying to implement a new China policy after the victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War. By late 1949, Truman and Acheson had decided that the People's Republic of China (PRC) would launch an invasion of Taiwan in the near future to destroy the last remnants of Jiang Jieshi's government.1 The president announced his determination to remain uninvolved in the Chinese Civil War on 5 January 1950, explaining that while the United States would continue economic aid to Taiwan, US military aid and advice would cease. Such an approach, Truman insisted, proved that the United States had no predatory designs on Chinese territory and sought no specific privileges or military bases. Acheson denied that the statement constituted any reversal of US policy. The United States, he explained, had recognized Taiwan as Chinese territory in World War II and would not violate its past agreements. Far more important, Acheson insisted that military aid would not help Jiang and the Guomindang. The United States could not give "a will to

resist and a purpose for resistance to those who must provide it for themselves."2 Not only was the Truman administration attempting to build the foundation for future relations with the PRC, it also was defending itself against criticism from the Republicans for its alleged "loss of China" to the Soviet Union.3

A second goal of Acheson's speech was to build support for US policy in South Korea. Since the fall of 1947, the United States had been pursuing a policy there that sought to eliminate its commitment to military protection, but without ensuring Communist conquest of the ROK either as a result of internal political subversion or external military invasion. This explains the US decision to postpone withdrawal of its occupation forces until late June 1949, defying strenuous objections from US military leaders. Just three months earlier, Truman had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, which outlined steps for the creation of a South Korea that would achieve the economic, military, and political strength necessary to provide for its own survival with American financial aid and diplomatic support. A key provision of this plan was a three-year program of economic assistance that required Congressional approval. The administration tried to persuade Congress that despite its failure in China, the United States could succeed in Korea, even hinting at the possibility of future peaceful reunification under a government following the American model of economic, political, and social development. But Congress refused to pass the Korean aid bill, forcing the administration to settle for a continuation of temporary economic assistance to South Korea until 15 February 1950. Economic deterioration in the ROK in the fall of 1949 further reduced prospects for approval of a long-term aid package.4

Acheson's Press Club speech thus sought to build support for passage of the Korean aid bill, which required demonstrating that US policy in Korea would have a better outcome than what had taken place in China. Scholars unfortunately focused attention thereafter on assessing Acheson's reference to the US "defensive perimeter" and ignored the remainder of the speech. After the outbreak of the Korean War, charges that Acheson had provided a "green light" for North Korea's invasion prevented a clear understanding of the address as a subtle, but realistic statement of the administration's policy in Asia after the Communist victory in China. It enunciated a conception of containment in Asia that NSC Paper 48 had outlined in the fall of 1949. Acheson, in his speech, asserted that the main issue in Asia was the struggle against economic privation and foreign domination. Asians considered national independence and self-government as the indispensible ingredients in the resolution of these two problems. The United States, he insisted, always had worked for Asian independence, while the Soviet Union attempted to rob Asians of control over their own affairs. The United States opposed Communism not for any self-serving reason, but because it was the spearhead of Russian imperialism and a new Soviet strategy of domination. Acheson stressed that American efforts had to concentrate on avoiding any actions that obscured the true malevolent nature of Soviet tactics.5

Acheson's attitude toward the military capabilities of the United States in Asia reflected a realistic grasp of the limits of American power. Beyond Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, "it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." In the event of open aggression outside this defensive perimeter, he announced, "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon ... the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression." The secretary of state claimed, however, that the military threat was not as immediate as the challenge of political "subversion and penetration." Communism exploited conditions of economic dislocation and social upheaval to advance the Soviet strategy for world domination. Acheson emphasized that without economic stability, Asian nations could not withstand the Soviet challenge. Through American economic aid, technical skill, and administrative advice, however, Asian nations could develop democratic institutions capable of fulfilling both popular needs and desires. But US aid alone was not enough, since Asian leaders themselves had to demonstrate the will to improve conditions. In China, for example, Jiang had not fostered an improvement of political and economic circumstances and the Chinese people had "brushed him aside."

For Acheson, his strategy in Asia was the only logical US alternative. He pointed to Korea as a place where the United States could utilize economic assistance and foster the development of democracy. In Korea, "a very good chance" existed for successfully resisting Communist expansion. To refuse such aid to Korea would be "utter defeatism and utter madness." Acheson's containment strategy would succeed in Korea because, in contrast to China, the ROK wanted American aid and would use it effectively. The secretary of state concluded that "we have a greater opportunity to be effective" in Korea than anywhere else on the Asian mainland."6 Outlining the US "defensive perimeter" was then a secondary issue in Acheson's speech that reflected in part concern that President Syngman Rhee of South Korea might resort to military aggression against the north to achieve reunification. The secretary of state was attempting to caution the South Koreans that the United States would not guarantee absolutely the ROK's military security.7 Furthermore, Acheson's speech constituted only public enunciation of Truman's postwar strategy of stressing economic assistance in

Asia, rather than military power. Finally, General Douglas MacArthur in March 1949 had placed South Korea outside the same "defensive perimeter" that Acheson defined in his speech, because of his desire to redeploy US forces then in Korea back to Japan.8

Acheson's National Press Club speech thus outlined a realistic approach for addressing postwar American problems in Asia. It was also cautious and judicious in analyzing the relationship between communism and nationalism. As Tang Tsou writes, Acheson's policy "seemed to avoid any immediate risk of war, drew an easily defensible line to protect America's vital interests, and contained a long-term program for Asia which could be implemented by peaceful means."9 It made little sense to advocate direct intervention in the internal affairs of Asia when such a policy only would alienate people hostile to imperialism. But the United States could build friendship based on offers of assistance. Acheson reasoned that Asian nationalism would defeat Soviet imperialism with American aid and then reward the United States with its political support. North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 ended any chance of finding out whether this policy would have succeeded because it justified the militarization of US policy in East Asia. Three days later, Republican Senator from Ohio Robert A. Taft held both Truman and Acheson responsible for the events leading to war in Korea, accusing them of pursuing a "bungling and inconsistent foreign policy" that had provided "basic encouragement to the North Korean aggression."10 For at least the next three decades, his interpretation of the National Press Club speech would become conspicuous in accounts explaining the Korean War.

Presidential candidate General Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged public acceptance of Acheson's responsibility for the Korean War during the fall of 1952 when in a speech in Cincinnati he attributed North Korea's attack to the Press Club speech. In response, an angry Acheson stated publicly that he had "used no language whatever 'excluding' Korea or any other area in the Asiatic mainland or suggesting any lack of interest by the United States in the event of an attack on any area of the Asian mainland in general or Korea in particular." In his memoirs, Acheson explained that his purpose in writing the speech was "to carry some sense of the problem in the Far East, the limitation of our power, and direction of our purpose." He categorically rejected the charge that he "gave the green light" to North Korea:

This was specious, for Australia and New Zealand were not included either, and the first of all our mutual defense agreements was made with Korea. If the Russians were watching the United States for signs of our intentions in the Far East, they would have been more impressed by the two years' agitation for withdrawal of combat forces from Korea, the defeat in Congress of a minor aid bill for it, and the increasing discussion of a peace treaty with Japan.

Acheson was surprised that critics focused on his reference to the American "defensive perimeter" because he believed that he had engaged neither in "innovating policy or political heresy."11 President Harry S. Truman surely agreed with this assessment, choosing not to even mention the speech or the "green light" theory in his memoirs.12

Several American military leaders who were important figures in the Korean War wrote accounts of the conflict. Generals Omar N. Bradley and J. Lawton Collins mentioned Acheson's speech, but discussed it only in the context of an overall US policy that showed indifference toward the fate of the ROK.13 General Douglas MacArthur, in his memoirs, noted that Acheson's policies in Asia received widespread condemnation in the United States. "I felt the Secretary of State was badly advised about the Far East," he wrote, implying that the Korean War proved it was wrong to allow diplomats to make military decisions. For General Matthew B. Ridgway, Acheson's "clear indication that we had no intention of defending Korea did nothing to give the enemy even momentary pause."14 A few early accounts of the Korean War would blame Acheson almost exclusively for North Korea's invasion. Robert T. Oliver, for example, wrote that the reason "why the war came" was because "American authoritative statements indicated that we would not defend Korea."15 For those reluctant to speculate about the impact of the speech on North Korea or the Soviet Union, many agreed that at least it was unwise, if not foolish, for Washington to publicize its policy and intentions toward Korea.16

A consensus soon emerged that Acheson's address was only one element in an overall US policy signaling North Korea and the Soviet Union that the United States would not intervene to halt an invasion of South Korea. David Rees, for example, wrote that "Acheson's Press Club speech only reflected a military weakness which the Communists knew already, that the US did not have the men to garrison South Korea, and that a mere UN commitment in Korea might mean that an indigenous Communist attack in an Asian country would be tolerated by the West out of weakness and miscalculation."17 Most writers agreed that Acheson had not given "away state secrets" and had said "nothing new."18 According to John W. Spanier, Acheson was

only verbalizing the basic American strategy of total war, ... that had not calculated on ... a less than all-out challenge by a Soviet satellite in Asia against an American friend, whose strategic importance was not "worth" the price of total war. In short, it was not American words but American policy that probably encouraged the Communists to believe that the United States would not defend South Korea.19

Certainly, historians had concluded that many US leaders shared blame for the failure to show a stronger commitment to South Korea's survival.20 This policy, according to Korean historian Kim Chum-kon, invited North Korea to launch its invasion and therefore constituted appeasement.21

For thirty years, the consensus remained firmly in place that the United States gave North Korea the "green light" to invade South Korea. In 1982, East Asian expert Claude A. Buss wrote that Acheson's speech was "virtually tantamount to an invitation" for Communist aggression. Buss perceptively added, however, that the address reflected the Truman administration's search for an effective policy in postwar Asia:

Far from abandoning the ROK, Secretary Acheson called for a much broader defense than the United States could provide on its own. In directing attention to the nonmilitary factors in security and to the need for nonmilitary measures to solve problems stemming from the expansion of communism, he voiced ideas which, if heeded, might have avoided many of the most bitter consequences of Korea - and Vietnam.

Buss reiterated that although Acheson's speech included the "first clear-cut statement on a United States defense perimeter in Asia," it only confirmed a long-standing military strategy. Nevertheless, it was "certainly an unwise and unskilled diplomatic maneuver to broadcast it openly to the world."22 Bevin Alexander agreed, arguing that the North Koreans concluded that the United States would not act to save South Korea. "The mistake they made," he writes, "was to believe" the public pronouncements of US leaders.23

Release of classified US documents on policy toward Korea after World War II revived debate about whether the Acheson speech provided a "green light" for North Korea's invasion. William Stueck pointed to the Press Club speech as a prime example of how US "actions did not fall into a consistent pattern that conveyed a deep American commitment" to South Korea. More public demonstrations of strong US support "might have served as warning signals to the Kremlin."24 Robert J. Donovan agreed, claiming that although Kim Il Sung already had developed his plans for invading South Korea before Acheson's speech, "it made Kim and Stalin and Mao more confident that the venture could succeed."25 But for other writers, "why North Korea invaded South Korea in the first place" was not simple to explain because, according to Burton Kaufman, "the conflict between North and South Korea was a true civil war." "Acheson's speech," he surmised, "must have led Kim to expect that the United States would not intervene in the struggle, while he would anticipate continued Soviet military support."26 For Callum McDonald,

Acheson's speech was in fact an exercise in ambiguity, designed to restrain both sides. In this respect, it was a faithful reflection of American policy. Washington did not express uninterest but refused to spell out in advance its attitude towards an armed assault against its Korean creation. In the meantime, Washington hoped that the worst would never happen.27

By contrast, some writers no longer even mentioned the Acheson speech.28

Peter Lowe, nicely summarizing the new consensus that emerged in the 1980s, wrote that the National Press Club speech "was a crisp, forthright address covering much ground but too explicit on a few aspects that would have been better cloaked with at least some opaqueness." Acheson's words were "too blunt" and had a direct impact on igniting the Korean War:

It was unquestionably foolish to convey the impression that Korea was expendable. North Korea and the Soviet Union could only have drawn encouragement in the belief that America would most likely not act with vigour if North Korea moved against the south to reunify the peninsula.29

"Without access to North Korean or Soviet archives," James Stokesbury added, "no one can say the speech was a green light, but it may safely be assumed that it was not a red or even a yellow one."30 John Merrill partially filled this documentary void, relying on North Korean public statements and interviews to support his conclusion that the Acheson speech

was also noticed in Pyongyang. A former North Korean journalist, who claims that he personally delivered the news to Kim Il Sung after reading wire service reports, later recalled that the North Korean leader was greatly excited to learn of the speech.31

In the absence of documentary evidence, however, the actual impact of the address on North Korean policy remained a matter of speculation.

Bruce Cumings advanced by far the most fascinating interpretation of the impact of Acheson's Press Club speech. "South Korea," he wrote, "was not pointedly excluded from the American defense perimeter." "Certain nations (Japan) would be defended, and in other threatened nations (like the ROK), initial reliance would be on those attacked to defend themselves, and if they could not, the implication was, the situation would be reevaluated." Perhaps more important, Cumings noted that "the North Koreans thought Acheson included the ROK in his perimeter" after reading a false report in the New York Times."The real effect of the speech," he argued, "was probably to keep [the North Koreans] off balance, wary, unsure about what might come next - exactly Acheson's intent with regard to both Koreas." His ultimate goal was to use deception to manuever the Communists into taking action that would justify creating through political and economic means American dominance of a "great crescent" from Japan to Southeast Asia to India. Cumings relied on a remarkable metaphor to illustrate his argument:

Acheson is the linebacker and he knows they may come around the end, or throw a pass, or come off tackle. A properly constructed defense encourages the offense to choose one instead of another option; it creates a field of force that constrains enemy decision. ... More noteworthy is Richard Nixon's rendering of Acheson's logic; he chose a metaphor from his favorite game, poker: 'the North Koreans thought our intentions were face up on the board. ... It [June 25] was a miscalculation by them, based upon a misrepresentation by us.'

Acheson, presumably the Dick Butkus of US foreign policy, thus used his National Press Club speech to manipulate North Korea into attacking. "The idea that Acheson naively gave the green light to Stalin or Kim, or that this was where American deterrence failed is," for Cumings, "a fantasy."32

Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai were among the first to make use of Soviet documents and interviews in Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War. Endorsing the traditional view, they claimed that Stalin "consented" to Kim Il Sung's idea for an invasion because American demobilization and the Truman administration's words had indicated the United States would not intervene to save the ROK. Relying on an interview with V.P. Tkachenko, former head of the Korean section of the Communist Party's Central Committee, they wrote that Acheson's National Press Club speech "was quickly sent to Moscow, was carefully studied by Stalin and had a significant impact on his thinking." It was Kim Il Sung who set the date for the offensive, but the invasion was "preplanned, blessed, and directly assisted by Stalin and his generals, and reluctantly backed by Mao at Stalin's insistence."33 Stueck was not as emphatic, writing that "Stalin suspected that in a pinch there would be little support for collective intervention to save South Korea." Confirming his reputation for caution, the Soviet leader "stood willing to accept a certain risk ... owing to his knowledge through espionage of America's lack of readiness for war with the Soviet Union - militarily, politically, and economically - and to his desire to ensure support for his leadership at home and on his eastern and western borders."34

Cold War assumptions and a belief in American exceptionalism have made it difficult for even recent historians to believe that Acheson's words did not have a decisive impact on igniting the Korean War. In 1990, Harry Summers blamed Acheson exclusively for encouraging Moscow and Beijing to "give their blessing" to the North Korean attack. The National Press Club speech, he writes, made "it plain that the United Staes had abandoned [South Korea] altogether."35 Kenneth B. Lee wrote in 1997 that Acheson had decided to abandon Korea and his speech was "an open invitation to an attack by the Communists." After the speech, "Stalin knew the United States would not go to the aid of South Korea if it was attacked."36 Referring to the Acheson address as "notorious," Michael Hickey concluded that the "speech carried enormous weight" because it confirmed that the United States no longer planned to protect South Korea. Along with the withdrawal of US troops and the successful testing of an atomic bomb during 1949, it "lured" Stalin into approving Kim's plans for the invasion.37 And most recently, Stanley Sandler has asserted that Acheson's "notorious speech" "set off alarm bells in Seoul" and "encouraged aggressive thoughts in Pyongyang," "In 1992," he wrote, "a returned [Korean People's Army] general reminisced that Acheson's speech did produce 'a certain influence on Kim Il Sung'."38

Since 1994, the release of additional Soviet documents has added more information to the record of events leading to North Korea's launching of its invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. A more accurate

assessment of the impact of Acheson's Press Club speech on Stalin's decision to authorize Kim Il Sung to initiate the war is now possible. Relying on as yet unreleased documents, Soviet scholar Evgueni Bajanov emphasizes that a desire to avoid war with the United States dominated Stalin's thinking about Korea:

Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea. Instead he was worried about an attack from the South, and did everything to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul. In 1947-1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the possibility of a unification of Korea, ....39 [emphasis added]

However, Kim Il Sung, within months after the creation of the DPRK, had begun to press Stalin for approval of an attack on South Korea. Preparatory to an invasion, Kim Il Sung proposed in January 1949 signing a Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Stalin rejected the idea, arguing that it would receive world condemnation for perpetuating Korea's division. But he no doubt also was refusing an obligation to defend the DPRK if Kim initiated a war and the United States intervened. When Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, Terentii F. Shtykov, informed Kim Il Sung and Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong that "to conclude a friendship treaty is not timely," the two "embarrassed" North Korean leaders suggested a "secret treaty" for Soviet military assistance as an alternative.40

Shtykov played a key role in causing Stalin to be cautious and skeptical in how he reacted to Kim Il Sung's lobbying for an invasion. Starting early in 1949, he began reporting a growing number of military clashes at the 38th parallel, complaining bitterly that North Korea "did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient numbers of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South." When Kim Il Sung headed a delegation that visited Moscow to secure expanded economic assistance, Stalin made it clear that he would not sanction the DPRK provoking a war in Korea. In their meeting on 5 March, Stalin agreed to provide North Korea with Soviet technical trainers and between $40 and 50 million in credit to buy imports, as well as promising cultural exchanges. But he then issued a blunt warning to Kim Il Sung: "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important."41 Nevertheless, Kim pressed for an invasion, telling Stalin that military means would be necessary to liberate all of Korea because "reactionary forces of the South will never agree on a peaceful reunification and will perpetuate the division of the country until they feel themselves strong enough to attack the North." It was the right time to attack because the Korean People's Army (KPA) was stronger than South Korea's army, guerrilla forces would support the invasion, and the southern people hated the Rhee regime.42

Stalin firmly rejected Kim Il Sung's request, explaining that the United States likely would intervene because it would view an attack on the south as violating its agreement with the Soviet Union establishing the division at the 38th parallel, thereby igniting a major war. Moreover, US troops still were deployed in the south and the KPA was weaker than its adversary in South Korea. Stalin said that Kim could not invade until he gained "overwhelming superiority." "Does it mean that there is no chance to reunify Korea in the near future?," Kim Il Sung persisted. "Our people are very anxious to be together again and to cast off the yoke of the reactionary regime and their American masters." Stalin, according to Kim, then predicted that a North Korean invasion was "not necessary" because South Korea would strike first, thus allowing Pyongyang to portray its offensive as a counterattack. "Then your move will be understood and supported by everyone," the Soviet leader explained. But despite these warnings, Stalin's expectations of war in Korea rose after Kim's departure. On 17 April, he cabled Shtykov that an attack on North Korea from the south was imminent. In reply, the Soviet ambassador confirmed that the United States was supporting a military buildup in South Korea, advising that the DPRK could not prevent the outbreak of war. Stalin then castigated Shtykov for failing to act firmly enough to maintain peace.43

Soviet intelligence reports during April of American preparations to withdraw further raised Stalin's level of anxiety. After US forces departed, the

UN commission will also leave Korea. In April-May the Southerners will concentrate their troops near the 38th parallel. In June the Southerners will start a sudden attack on the North in order to finish the total destruction of the Northern army by August.

Shtykov reported that the United States and South Korea were negotiating procedures for withdrawal with participation of the UN commission. South Korea's military leaders thought it could "inflict a perceptible blow" if North Korea attacked because the ROK army had increased in size from 53,900 to 70,000 since the year began. Along with reinforcements from youth groups, the South Korean military was ready to receive additional American weapons and equipment. Furthermore, South Korea was moving troops to the parallel in accordance with completed plans for an invasion and already had acted to crush guerrilla forces in the south. Shtykov predicted an attack in June. In response, democratic forces in South Korea, he urged Stalin, "must carry out

diversion, terror and organize an uprising." The Soviet ambassador had spoken to Kim and Pak about the necessity to raise the vigilance and expand the strength of North Korea's army and police.44

These dire warnings of North Korea's vulnerability only reinforced Kim's determination to gain not only Soviet approval for forcible reunification, but the military assistance necessary to achieve this objective. On 28 April, Kim Il Sung asked Shtykov to deliver a personal message to Stalin stressing the necessity of strengthening the KPA. He proposed implementation of a plan to expand immediately the DPRK's mechanized and airpower capabilities.45 Unwilling to rely entirely on an unenthusiastic Stalin, Kim approached the the Chinese as well, hoping that Mao Zedong would endorse his plans for reunification……..

Soviet documents demonstrate that during 1949 Stalin was consistently opposed to an invasion of South Korea because North Korea had not achieved either military superiority north of the parallel or political strength south of that line. He was more concerned about South Korea's threat to the survival of North Korea, regularly asking for estimates of the military balance on the peninsula.50 Undaunted, Kim Il Sung early in September asked Moscow to approve a limited invasion, claiming that South Korea was preparing attacks to occupy more of the Ongjin peninsula on the west coast of Korea, as well as to shell a cement plant in Haeju north of the parallel. Kim advanced a plan for a campaign to seize all of Ongjin and land adjacent to the south running eastward roughly to Kaesong. This would preempt the southern attack and improve North Korea's defensive position, as well as positioning the KPA to occupy Seoul in two weeks or two months at most. Contradicting rumors of an imminent attack, the Soviet embassy reported, however, that "there have not been any serious incidents" along the border since August 15. Shtykov told Mun Il, Kim Il Sung's personal secretary, that the proposal raised "large and serious" issues, urging that Kim wait for a response from Moscow. But on 1 September, he recommended approval of the limited operation to seize Ongjin, although he did not comment on the logic of Kim's proposal.51

Until the end of 1949, Stalin was committed to avoiding war in Korea, an approach that paralleled US policy toward the divided nation. Cumings writes that the significance of this symmetry was how it demonstrated "the hardwon, learned logic of this civil war by late 1949, namely, that both sides understood that their big power guarantors would not help them if they launched an unprovoked general attack - or even an assault on Ongjin or Ch'orwon."57 During October, Stalin sharply reprimanded Shtykov for not reporting border clashes that the North Koreans had instigated, chastising the Soviet ambassador for allowing attacks on South Korean positions along the 38th parallel. "Such provocations are very dangerous for our interests and can induce the adversary to launch a big war," Stalin bluntly declared.58 But the establishment of the PRC early that month had a dramatic impact on Soviet policy in Asia. Stalin's contentious discussions with Mao in Moscow from late 1949 to early 1950 indicated the difficulties of this reorientation, as the Soviet leader searched for a new strategy to retain his unquestioned leadership of revolutionary Communist movements. After the Communist victory in China, Stalin did not initiate policy in Asia, but allowed events to dictate the decisions leading to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Mao's victory in China motivated Kim Il Sung to increase his pressure on Stalin. Creation of the PRC also allowed North Korea's leader, in the words of Kathryn Weathersby, to employ "the strategy he later used so extensively of playing China and the Soviet Union against one another."59 On 17 January 1950, at a luncheon that Pak Hon-yong hosted at the North Korean Foreign Ministry, Kim Il Sung complained to Shtykov that the South Koreans had not provided the necessary pretext to justify a counterattack. The Communist victory in China meant that Korea "was next in line." He requested approval to visit Moscow to receive "orders and permission" from Stalin for an attack on the Ongjin peninsula, predicting that offensive action thereafter would result in the KPA capturing Seoul within a few days. "I can't sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country," Kim Il Sung moaned. "If the cause ... is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people." Kim, who was intoxicated, then resorted to blackmail, stating that if Stalin refused to see him, he would visit Beijing and ask China to fulfill its pledge to support an invasion.60 This latest plea came five days after the Press Club speech, yet Kim Il Sung, thinking Acheson had placed South Korea inside the US defensive perimeter, made no mention of it.

Stalin approved Kim Il Sung's request to visit Moscow. Responding to Shtykov's summary of Kim's remarks, the Soviet leader, almost three weeks after Acheson left South Korea outside the US "defensive perimeter," was vague and tentative, still stressing the need for caution:

I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea ... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him. ... I am prepared to help him in this matter.

Stalin also asked for Korea to provide yearly a minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. "It is possible that Kim Il Sung needs our technical assistance and some number of Soviet specialists," Stalin added. "We are ready to render this assistance." Mao was in Moscow at that time, but Stalin did not tell him about the plans for war because, despite Acheson's speech, he was not ready to approve an invasion. Shtykov met Kim Il Sung on 30 January to brief him on Stalin's decisions. North Korea's leader received this information "with great satisfaction." "Your agreement to receive him and your readiness to assist him in this matter made an especially strong impression," Shtykov reported. Kim said to convey his gratitude several times, asking repeatedly for confirmation that Stalin had approved a meeting. Kim Il Sung also stated that he would take all the necessary steps to ship the lead and would remove all problems regarding the matter within two weeks.61

To date, only one released Soviet document records a discussion among Communist leaders of Acheson's Press Club speech. On 17 January 1950, Soviet leaders Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Andrei Y. Vyshinsky met with Mao during the latter's visit to Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Significantly, their discussion of Acheson's speech focused on US China policy, without any reference to Korea. In his diary entry, Molotov writes that he raised the issue of the address, telling Mao that Acheson's statements concerning

international matters, in particular, matters concerning China, USSR and their mutual relations ... are a clear slander against the Soviet Union and were designed to deceive directly public opinion. The United States went bankrupt with its policy in China, and now Acheson is trying to justify himself, without shying away from deceitful means in the process.

Molotov then quoted from a translation of the speech, focusing on Acheson's allegations that the Soviet Union had incorporated Outer Mongolia and was in the process of partitioning Manchuria. He gave a full text of the speech to Mao, advising him "to familiarize himself with" it. In response, Mao stated that "until now, as is known, these fabrications were the job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented by American journalists and correspondents." That the US secretary of state was now doing "the dirty work" showed how "the Americans are making progress!"62

Discussion of the speech continued with Molotov explaining that Soviet leaders thought Moscow and Beijing "should respond accordingly." He then remarked that according to a TASS report from Washington on 14 January,

the former consul general in Mukden, [Angus] Ward, while responding to questions from the press, stated the very opposite of what Acheson said in his speech on 12 January. In addition, I quoted the appropriate portion of Ward's declaration, which stated that he did not see any signs which would point to the Soviet Union's control over the administration of Manchuria or its attempts to incorporate Manchuria into the USSR, even though the Soviet Union is exercising its treaty rights concerning the joint administration of KchZhD [Chinese Chungchun Railroad].

Mao agreed with Molotov's proposal for both the Soviet and Chinese foreign ministries "to make a statement on the matter" that "will expose Acheson's slanderous fabrications . . .." He then asked if the speech could "be a kind of smokescreen, using which, the American imperialists will attempt to occupy the island of Formosa?" Molotov replied that "the Americans are trying . . . to create misunderstandings in the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China." It was "impossible to disagree that" it was a "smokescreen, in order to carry out their plans of occupation." Discussion then turned to China's refusal to establish any diplomatic contacts with the United States and Soviet efforts to seat the PRC in the United Nations.63

On 2 February, Stalin dispatched new instructions to Shtykov reflecting his continuing concerns about the dangers involved in launching an invasion of South Korea. Stalin ordered his ambassador to

explain to Comrade Kim Il Sung that at this point the question he wants to discuss with me must be completely confidential. It should not be shared with anyone even in the North Korean leadership, as well as with the Chinese comrades. This is dictated by the preoccupation with keeping the topic unknown to the adversary.

If Stalin had paid any attention to Acheson's speech, apparently it did not eliminate his anticipation of US intervention to block Communist conquest of Korea. Shtykov reported to Stalin on 7 February the issues discussed in his meeting three days earlier with Kim Il Sung. North Korea's leader asked if the Soviet government would grant the DPRK a loan and proposed sending to Moscow representatives with draft bonds valued at 2 billion won. He also wanted Stalin's permission to arm, equip, and train three more divisions to bring the total KPA strength to ten. Shtykov replied that the "question is large and serious" because approval

would require large amounts of material resources. Kim Il Sung then explained that during 1950 he wanted to use the credit the Soviet government had promised to North Korea under the 17 April 1949 agreement for 1951, so that Pyongyang could fund this military expansion. Stalin wrote in response to these three requests in the margin "it is possible" and at the top of the cable to "give an answer today."64

Motivating Stalin's decision to expand North Korea's military capabilities was more a desire to ensure the DPRK's survival than to promote aggressive expansion. Regardless of the reasons, Shtykov reported on 10 February that predictably Kim Il Sung received word of the decision "enthusiastically and several times asked me to communicate to Comrade Stalin his gratitude for his assistance." Shtykov informed Kim Il Sung on 12 March that the Soviet government would approve his request to use the 1951 credit during 1950. Three days earlier, Shtykov had transmitted to Moscow a note from Kim Il Sung requesting that the Soviet government send military-technical equipment to North Korea in the amount of 120 to 150 million rubles. This was pursuant to Stalin's approval of his previous request for help in providing an enlarged KPA with arms, ammunition, and technical equipment. In return, the DPRK would send the Soviet Union 9 tons of gold, 40 tons silver, and 15,000 tons in monazite concentrate, worth a total of 133,050,500 rubles. Kim Il Sung asked that the Soviets dispatch the requested military supplies as soon as possible. On 16 March, Shtykov sent Moscow another note from Kim with an attached seven-page list that itemized the KPA's needs in the categories of artillery armaments, ammunition, engineering supplies, military-medical equipment, and military aviation supplies. Kim Il Sung stated his hope that the needs of the "young republic" could be met in the "shortest period."65

Kim Il Sung thus applied pressure on the Soviets to expand the DPRK's military even before his meeting with Stalin to gain approval for an invasion. On 18 March 1950, Stalin transmitted his decisions regarding Kim's specific requests, first expressing thanks after learning that the North Korea leader was sending the lead. With respect to weapons, ammunition, and technical equipment, Moscow had "decided also to satisfy fully this request of yours." Shtykov met Kim on 20 March and gave him the text of Stalin's letter, with Pak present for the discussions. After expressing his gratitude, Kim Il Sung said that he and Pak wanted a meeting with Stalin early in April, adding that this would be an unofficial meeting in the same manner as had occurred in 1945. Among the issues they planned to raise were first, the "path and methods of unification of the south and the north of the country," second, "prospects for the economic development of the country," and third, "possibly several party questions." After receiving instructions, Shtykov visited Kim Il Sung on 24 March to inform him that Stalin had approved discussions in Moscow during the first week of April. Kim and Pak left on 30 March.66

North Korea's leaders were in Moscow for almost the entire month of April, meeting with Stalin three times. Stalin gave tentative approval for an invasion, outlining his views on preparations for the war. No minutes of the conversations have surfaced, but recollections of those present and foreign ministry reports provide information on what transpired. Stalin confirmed to Kim Il Sung that the "international environment has sufficiently changed to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea." He pointed to the Communist victory in China as having "improved the environment for actions in Korea" because Beijing was no longer distracted and "can devote attention and energy to the assistance of Korea." This included the possible use of Chinese troops. Mao's triumph, Stalin elaborated,

is also important psychologically. It has proved the strength of Asian revolutionaries, and shown the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West, in America. Americans left China and did not dare to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily.

A second factor was the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. "According to information coming from the United States," Stalin explained, this agreement had made the United States much "more hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia." "The prevailing [U.S.] mood is not to interfere" because the Soviets now had the atomic bomb and "our positions are solidified in Pyongyang."67 But he did not mention Acheson's speech.

Despite his decision to authorize planning for an invasion, Stalin still was fearful of US military intervention. In preparation for this contingency, he declared that North Korea could stage an offensive only if the PRC approved. Stalin emphasized the necessity for thorough preparation. He promised to satisfy the need for more mechanized means and weapons for a strike force of fully-equipped attack divisions. He outlined a plan calling for movement of assault troops into position and then announcing a proposal for peaceful reunification. North Korean forces would strike first at Ongjin, "as it will help to disguise who initiated the combat activities," and broaden the front in response to South Korean counterattacks. "The war should be quick and speedy," Stalin stressed. "Southerners and Americans should not have time to come to their senses ... to put up a strong resistance and to mobilize international support." But "Stalin repeated that the USSR was not ready to get involved in Korean affairs directly, especially if Americans did venture to send troops to Korea." Moscow had

too many other problems to cope with elsewhere. Kim Il Sung then reiterated that a military victory would be easy, especially because of support from the guerrilla movement and an expected uprising. "Americans won't have time to prepare," he insisted, "and by the time they come to their senses, all the Korean people will be enthusiastically supporting the new government." Stalin instructed the DPRK's Command General Staff to devise concrete plans with the help of Soviet advisors.68

Bajanov identifies the Communist victory in China and the Soviet testing of an atomic device as key factors motivating Stalin to approve an invasion of South Korea. But he adds the establishment of NATO and the deterioration of Soviet relations with the United States, as well as "a perceived weakening of Washington's position and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia." He also contends that "Stalin was now more confident of the Communist bloc's strength, less respectful of American capabilities and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves." Soviet records do not provide specific documentary evidence to substantiate his speculations. But Bajanov accurately notes that Stalin did not discuss the issue of initiating a Korean war with Mao. According to Bajanov, he wanted to work out attack plans on his own and then present Beijing with a fait accompli. Then "Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it," he writes, adding that while in Moscow, Stalin rejected Mao's desire to seize Taiwan so it would be difficult to secure approval for Korea earlier in the year.69 Stalin in fact had opposed aggressive action against both Taiwan and South Korea at the outset of 1950. It was not until April that the Soviet leader decided to authorize preparations for implementing Kim Il Sung's invasion plan. Even then, however, Stalin's fear of US intervention resulted in him imposing a condition that North Korea could not attack without Mao's consent.

Following the April meeting, Moscow and Pyongyang moved energetically to prepare for war. Meanwhile, the United States was expanding not only its commitments in South Korea, but elsewhere in Asia. By May, Congress had approved the first two years of its economic aid package to the ROK and the Truman administration had increased military aid in response to progress toward economic recovery and political stability in South Korea.70 Certainly, Stalin was aware of this growing US support for the ROK. Undoubtedly, he also knew that Truman and his advisors were studying the recommendations in NSC Paper 68, calling for major increases in defense spending. For both Stalin and Kim, time was running out. By late May, the Soviet military equipment Stalin promised had arrived and North Korea was ready to invade. Kim Il Sung, after inspecting the newly-formed divisions, reported to Shtykov that the KPA would be prepared to launch an offensive at the end of June. He also had approved the specific invasion plan that the North Korean Command General Staff had devised with the advice of Soviet Lieutenant General P. Vasiliev. At first, the Soviets favored an invasion in July, but Kim Il Sung insisted upon late June because he feared Seoul would learn of the attack plans and the July rains would slow the advance. After Vasiliev agreed, Shtykov requested approval for the target date……..

Acheson's National Press Club speech had no perceptible impact on the events leading to the outbreak of the Korean War. Until the moment North Korea attacked South Korea, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong worried about US military intervention. Kim Il Sung displayed remarkable political talent, as he manipulated his patrons into supporting his plan for invasion. He was able to persuade Stalin and Mao that his forces would achieve victory before the United States could intervene not because the Americans would not act to save South Korea. Stalin still hesitated, making his approval contingent on the Chinese endorsing the invasion. Again, Kim manipulated his patrons. When he arrived in Beijing in May 1950, North Korea's leader told Mao that Stalin had said "North Korea can move toward actions," but "this question should be discussed with China ...." Replying to a request for clarification, Stalin informed Mao of his instructions to Kim "that the question should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be postponed until a new discussion."80 Mao gave his reluctant consent, but Stalin had authorized only a limited offensive to seize Ongjin. Predictably, Kim exploited Stalin's exaggerated estimates of South Korea's strength and fears of a protracted war bringing US intervention to secure approval for the full-scale offensive to achieve reunification he had wanted all along.

Stalin thought US military intervention was possible until the very day the Korean War began. But he authorized North Korea's invasion because he feared that delay would give South Korea the chance to stage an offensive to destroy the DPRK at some future date. His anxiety about the North Korea's weakness, though unfounded, had been the principal reason for his refusal to approve an offensive since late 1948. In the spring of 1950, Stalin could not have ignored signs that US policy in Asia was stiffening. "In his mind," Weathersby writes of Stalin, "the American failure to ensure a Guomindang victory in China indicated that Washington 'was not ready' to intervene in Korea, rather than that it had abandoned its intention to take over the North at a more propitious moment."85 North Korea's conquest of the ROK would remove this possibility. Finally, as Nikita Khrushchev recalled later, "Stalin couldn't oppose the idea [of invading South Korea] since it would undermine his reputation as a staunch defender of revolutionary movements."86 For the same reason, Acheson was

confident Stalin would not permit Kim Il Sung to attempt reunification through military means because open aggression would confirm the charges of Soviet imperialism he had made in his National Press Club speech. Ironically, the Korean War began not because Stalin knew the United States would not intervene, but rather because he feared it would do so before North Korea eliminated the gravest threat to its survival.

Document 6Korea: Historians debunk some popular myths about the Korean warSource: The University Times, University of Pittsburgh

JUNE 22, 2000

On Jan. 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a famous speech at the National Press Club in which he failed to include South Korea in America's defense perimeter in the Pacific.Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, campaigning in the 1952 presidential election, charged that Acheson's omission "gave the green light" to a North Korean invasion because it convinced the Communists that America would not defend the south.

Historians and military analysts would debate the charge's merits, but a public consensus emerged that the Truman administration had bungled by signaling North Korea, China and the Soviet Union that the United States considered South Korea to be expendable.

However, recently declassified Soviet documents and Chinese documents available prior to 1989's Tiananmen Square crackdown indicate that Acheson's address "had little if any impact on Communist deliberations," said James Matray, professor of history at New Mexico State University.

Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin "worried about U.S. military intervention until the moment the Korean War began," Matray said. "Moreover, he feared that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain South Korea would stage in the future. His approval of [North Korean leader] Kim Il Sung's plan was a mistake, but it derived from a sense of weakness rather than strength."Acheson's speech was, in fact, a judicious statement that enunciated Truman's emphasis on economic assistance in Asia rather than military power, according to Matray. "Outlining the U.S. 'defensive perimeter' was a secondary issue in Acheson's speech that reflected, in part, concern that President Syngman Rhee of South Korea might resort to military aggression against the north to achieve reunification. The secretary of state was attempting to caution the South Koreans that the United States would not guarantee absolutely [South Korea's] military security," Matray said.Acheson was outraged at being blamed for the war. He hadn't specifically included Australia or New Zealand in America's Pacific defense perimeter either, he pointed out in his memoirs, yet no one could have doubted the West's commitment to those countries. The United States' first Asian mutual defense agreement had been with South Korea, something that the Communists could not have overlooked, Acheson wrote.

Acheson's Press Club speech isn't even mentioned in Soviet documents, Matray found in his research. Instead, the voluminous memos, letters and cables show how cleverly North Korea's dictator played his mutually antagonistic allies, Stalin and Mao Zedong, off each other, Matray said. "Kim Il Sung displayed remarkable political talent, as he manipulated his patrons into supporting his plan for

invasion. He was able to persuade Stalin and Mao that his forces would achieve victory before the United States could intervene, not because the Americans would not act to save South Korea."Stanley Sandler, recently a chaired professor at Virginia Military Institute, detailed other Korean War myths in his presentation, including the following:

* U.N. forces fought "with one arm tied behind their backs" — a comforting myth to generals in the Korean as well as Vietnam conflicts, Sandler said.Indeed, U.N airpower was officially restricted to the Korean side of the Yalu River border with China and the Tyumen River border with the U.S.S.R. But Communists planes rarely ventured south of Pyongyang, well north of the 38th parallel, Sandler said."Joseph Stalin was as determined as Harry Truman to confine the Korean War to Korea, and Stalin faced considerably more provocation than did the American president," Sandler said. For example, in October 1950, U.S. jet fighters penetrated 20 miles into Soviet air space and shot up a Red Air Force base. "The Soviet government made the expected strong protests, the Americans expressed their regrets, paid compensation, and the incident was closed," said Sandler — wondering aloud how the United States would have responded if Soviet forces, fighting a war with Canada, had strayed across our border and attacked New York's Rome Air Force Base.

* The United States engaged in bacteriological warfare.It's true that America was testing bacteriological weapons in the 1950s, with a "criminally irresponsible" disregard for safety by today's standards, Sandler said. And the United States had "shamelessly and uselessly" cooperated with the commander of a secret Japanese chemical-biological warfare research unit that had experimented on Allied POWs and Chinese civilians during World War II, he added."The United States was thus at some disadvantage in its flat-out denials" of employing biological warfare in Korea, Sandler stated.But according to Sandler, declassified Soviet security forces memos indicate that the North Koreans obtained plague and cholera bacteria from Chinese corpses and created false "infection regions" to be found by inspectors from international pro-peace organizations. Communist prisoners awaiting execution were purposely infected, then poisoned, so their bodies could be found.In a secret May 1953 resolution, Soviet leaders rebuked Mao Zedong for having misled the U.S.S.R.: "The spread in the press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information," the Kremlin complained. "The accusations against the Americans were fictitious."These and other documents provide only fragmentary evidence against U.S. use of biological warfare — but it's a lot more substantial than the contrary evidence, Sandler said.

* Communist MiG jet fighters that dueled with U.N. forces were flown by Chinese pilots.Some 67,000 Soviet air and ground personnel served in North Korea, Sandler noted. Stalin was so anxious to protect this "secret" (widely known among U.N. forces) that he ordered his pilots to wear Chinese uniforms and transmit in Chinese — "the latter an obviously impossible requirement," Sandler said.

Sandler concluded: While the United States could freely bomb a fraternal ally of the U.S.S.R. and intrude on Soviet territory, Stalin feared that Americans might be provoked to nuke his country if it became known that Red Air Force pilots were flying MiGs in the war.

* Communist "hordes" over-ran U.N. forces early in the war.The Communists enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority only in the opening stage of the conflict and during the initial incursion of the Chinese, Sandler said. U.S. and Korean forces actually

outnumbered their enemy 2:1 during the desperate fighting in 1950 around the Pusan Perimeter, in which more Americans died than at any other time in the war, Sandler said.Surprise, better discipline and superior weaponry (particularly the Russian T-34 tank, against which the Allies had no defense) gave the North Koreans the advantage in the war's early stages, according to Sandler.

* MacArthur's behind-the-lines Inchon landing was a "desperate gamble."MacArthur played up this myth, but the main problem that U.N. forces faced was the enormous tidal reach of the Inchon waterway, Sandler said."If MacArthur's planners didn't get it exactly right, the U.N. invasion fleet would be left stranded on the mud flats, sitting ducks," he noted. "But sitting ducks to what? The Korean People's Air Force had been pretty much shot out of the sky by then, and the invasion armada contained several aircraft carriers and their crack pilots. The stranding of an invasion fleet would have been a major embarrassment, certainly, but nothing remotely like a disaster."

*MacArthur's march to the Yalu River triggered Chinese intervention.The Chinese were planning to intervene long before U.S. forces reached the Yalu, declassified documents show. "The famous indirect warnings to the Americans by Foreign Minister Chou En Lai against approaching the Yalu seems now to have been merely a means to justify a course already determined upon by the Chinese," Sandler said.— Bruce SteeleFiled under: Feature,Volume 32 Issue 21

Document 7: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950

Perceptions and RealitySource: Central Intelligence Agency, Fall 2011By: P. K. Rose

0n 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) swept across the 38th parallel and came close to uniting the Korean peninsula under the Communist regime of Kim Il-sung. American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise, and only the intercession of poorly trained and equipped US garrison troops from Japan managed to halt the North Korean advance at a high price in American dead and wounded. Four months later, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intervened in massive numbers as American and UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. US military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties.

Two strategic intelligence blunders within six months: yet the civilian and military leaders involved were all products of World War II, when the attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it happened are simple, and they hold lessons that are relevant today.

The role of intelligence in America’s national security is often misunderstood. Intelligence information has to exist within the greater context of domestic US political perception. With the defeat of Japan, our historically isolationist nation moved quickly to look inward again. The armed forces were immediately reduced in number, defense spending was cut dramatically, and intelligence resources met a similar fate. The looming conflict with Communism was focused on Europe, our traditional geographic area of interest.

The war had produced a crop of larger-than-life military heroes, and perhaps the biggest was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Far East Commander and virtual ruler of a defeated Japan.

While many considered MacArthur brilliant, his military career also contained numerous examples of poor military judgment. He had few doubts about his own judgment, however, and for over a decade had surrounded himself with staff officers holding a similar opinion. MacArthur was confident of his capabilities to reshape Japan, but he had little knowledge of Chinese Communist forces or military doctrine. He had a well-known disregard for the Chinese as soldiers, and this became the tenet of the Far Eastern Command (FEC).

In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly declared a defensive containment line against the Communist menace in Asia, based upon an island defense line. The Korean peninsula was outside that line.

Still, America viewed Korea as one of several developing democratic nations that could serve as counterbalances to Communist expansion. In March 1949, President Truman approved National Security Council Memorandum 8/2, which warned that the Soviets intended to dominate all of Korea, and that this would be a threat to US interests in the Far East.[1] That summer, the President sent a special message to Congress citing Korea as an area where the principles of democracy were being matched against those of Communism. He stated the United States “will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time.”[2]

….In the 16 July Weekly Summary, the Agency describes North Korea as a Soviet “puppet” regime. On 29 October, a Weekly Summary states that a North Korean attack on the South is “possible” as early as 1949, and cites reports of road improvements towards the border and troop movements there. It also notes, however, that Moscow is in control.

These reports establish the dominant theme in intelligence analysis from Washington that accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean attack—that the Soviets controlled North Korean decisionmaking. The Washington focus on the Soviet Union as “the” Communist state had become the accepted perception within US Government’s political and military leadership circles. Any scholarly counterbalances to this view, either questioning the absolute authority of Moscow over other Communist states or noting that cultural, historic, or nationalistic factors might come into play, fell victim to the political atmosphere.

Fears of another war in Europe against the mighty Red Army and the exposure of Soviet spying against America created an atmosphere in which the anti-Communist fervor and accusations of McCarthyism silenced any debate regarding the worldwide Communist conspiracy. In addition, the Chinese Communists’ rise to internal power created a domestic political dispute over who had “lost” China. The result was a silencing of American scholars on China who might have persuaded the country’s leadership that China would never accept Soviet control of its national interests.

….On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on human assets, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at any time. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Johnson all received copies of this report.[9] Five days later, at four a.m., the DRPK invaded the South. Both Washington and the FEC in Tokyo were surprised and unprepared. On 30 June 1950, President Truman authorized the use of US ground forces in Korea.

Faulty Perception

The United States was caught by surprise because, within political and military leadership circles in Washington, the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step, and, therefore, that no invasion would occur.

This perception, and indeed its broad acceptance within the Washington policy community, is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities.[10] The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.” The report noted that while the DPRK could take control of parts of the South, it probably did not have the capability to destroy the South Korean government without

Soviet or Chinese assistance. This assistance would not be forthcoming because the Soviets did not want general war. The Department of State and the military intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred.

Washington’s strategic theme also played well in Tokyo, where General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950. It grew even stronger within military circles in Tokyo as American and UN forces pushed back the DPRK troops in the fall of 1950. By then, it had become an article of faith within the FEC, personally testified to by MacArthur,that no Asian troops could stand up to American military might without being annihilated. This attitude, considered a “fact” within the FEC and constantly repeated to the Washington political and military leadership, resulted in the second strategic blunder—the surprise Chinese intervention in the war.

Military and Diplomatic Moves

On 15 September, US Marines rushed ashore, captured the west coast city of Inchon, and began driving DPRK forces north toward their country. This strategic success was a clear signal that the invasion from the North had not only failed, but also that the DPRK forces could be destroyed by the US-led UN force. Two days later, a high-ranking Chinese delegation of intelligence and logistics officers arrived in North Korea to evaluate the military situation and prepare the battlefield for Chinese military action.[21]

Discounting the Chinese Threat

In the face of these warnings, the JCS instructed MacArthur to continue his advance north to destroy the DPRK armed forces as long as there was no threat of a major Chinese or Soviet intervention. These instructions were based upon a National Security Council decision made before the Inchon landing.[26] The Secretary of State also disregarded these warnings, telling the press that Chinese intervention would be “sheer madness.”

By the end of the month, the US Ambassador in Moscow reported that Soviet and Chinese contacts told both the British and Dutch Ambassadors that if foreign troops cross the 38th parallel, China would intervene.[27] This specific warning was also repeated to various journalists, and on 29 September, the Associated Press in Moscow reported that both China and the Soviet Union would take a “grave view” of US forces crossing the 38th parallel.[28] Finally, at the end of the month, in a major public policy address celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou En-lai branded the United States as China’s worst enemy and stated that China will not allow a neighbor to be invaded.[29]

Once again, these warnings were ignored, and US-UN forces continued to push the DRPK forces northward. On 2 October, Mao cabled Stalin advising that China would intervene and asked for Soviet military assistance.[30] Three days later, the CCP Central Committee officially decided to intervene.[31] US intelligence, however, continued its reporting theme that while Chinese capability was present, Chinese intent was lacking. On 6 October, the US Joint Intelligence Indications Committee stated that the Chinese capability to intervene had grown, but the Chinese threat to do so was questionable.[32] That same day, the CIA Weekly Summaryadvised that the possibility of Soviet

or Chinese intervention continued to diminish. It also restated the belief that Soviet requirements would drive any such decision.

Two days later, the Soviet position was delivered to the Chinese. Stalin advised Mao that the USSR could not provide the military supplies and air cover over Manchuria that Mao had requested. He also asked Mao not to engage in a large-scale offensive against US troops, because such an action might lead to a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.[33]

On 12 October, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50, entitled Critical Situations in The Far East—Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded that, “While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950.”[34] So, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw any large-scale Chinese intervention as potentially stimulating a global war, and the US understanding of the Soviet position was, indeed, sound. Internal Chinese priorities, however, continued to be discounted by Washington, which still believed that the Soviets controlled overall Communist actions worldwide.

The next day, the CCP Politburo decided that China should intervene in the war even without Soviet military support. Based on this decision, it was Stalin who relented on his earlier request and agreed to provide military supplies against a Soviet loan extended to the Chinese. He also agreed to turn over Soviet aircraft in China to the PLA and to move Soviet air units into position to defend Chinese territory.[35] Thus, the Chinese not only made a unilateral decision to intervene for nationalistic purposes, but also intimidated the Soviets into supporting them.

Document 8: CIA Files Show U.S. Blindsided by Korean War

Source: NPRJune 25, 2010

Sixty years after it started, the Korean War is not yet officially over, and the story of its origins is still unfolding. A batch of newly declassified CIA documents indicates the United States and the South Korean government were caught unprepared for the conflict, in part because of intelligence failures and mistaken assumptions.

The war began on June 25, 1950, when the North Korean army stormed across the 38th parallel that served as the dividing line on the Korean peninsula between the Soviet-dominated northern half and the U.S.-controlled southern sector. Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, intended to bring all of Korea under communist rule.

He nearly succeeded. South Korean forces offered little resistance to the invading North Korean army. U.S. forces had been withdrawn from South Korea the previous year, with only about 400 advisers left behind to assist the South Korean government in the development of its military capabilities.

U.N. RolePresident Truman, upon learning of the North Korean action, decided it was a test case for the United Nations, which had been established just five years earlier. He asked Secretary of State Dean Acheson to ask for an immediate meeting of the U.N. Security Council, and within 24 hours the U.S. ambassador, Warren Austin, was asking the U.N. to come to South Korea's defense.

"The Republic of Korea has appealed to the United Nations for protection," Austin told the council. "I am proud to report that the United States is prepared to furnish assistance."

But help did not come fast enough for the South. The North Koreans were far superior in numbers and weaponry, and the declassified CIA reports tell a story of panic and disarray on the southern side of the 38th parallel.

"Latest official reports indicate that the capture of Seoul is imminent," said a CIA memorandum   dated June 26. "South Korean units, their morale

deteriorating, are incapable of resisting the determined artillery-tank-air assaults with the equipment now available."Within days, the North had seized control of the entire peninsula, except for a small area at the southern tip.

The United States, with U.N. support, rushed to South Korea's defense, with the news relayed to the U.S. population through movie newsreels.

"Against the Red invaders from North Korea, U.S. planes and U.S. ships are ordered into action," one announcer dramatically intoned. "Based in Japan, U.S. Air Force jets and Mustangs are within striking distance of Korea."

U.S. ground forces soon joined the fight, but the going was tough. In a radio and television address on July 19, Truman said the attack had taken the United States by surprise, because the "communists" had kept their activities in North Korea a secret.

"It was from that area, where the communist authorities have been unwilling to let the outside world see what was going on, that the attack was launched against the Republic of Korea on June 25th," Truman said. "That attack came without provocation and without warning."

CIA RoleTruman meant that the Soviet and North Korean leaders had provided no warning of their war plans, but neither had the CIA, as the agency's own reporting made clear.

Some U.S. officials saw another intelligence blunder, reminiscent of the failure to foresee the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

A newly declassified CIA memorandum   from Jan. 13, 1950, shows that the CIA had not fully understood what was happening in North Korea in the months preceding the invasion. In that memo, the CIA noted the gradual southward movement of the North Korean army but said it was probably "a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army." That report concluded that an invasion of the South by the North was "unlikely."Whether the CIA should be faulted for its failure to predict the invasion, however, is debatable. At the time, the agency was just three years old and lacked resources.

"They didn't have the human capabilities or the technical collection capabilities to provide that kind of warning," says CIA historian Clayton Laurie. "That was something expected [by] the Truman administration, to prevent another Pearl Harbor, but nobody in the government had that kind of capability at the time."

Whatever the explanation, the consequence was costly in U.S. and Korean lives.

Misreading China

The initial intelligence failure was followed four months later by another one. This time the question was whether China would join the fighting on the North Korean side.

Again, the recently declassified documents are revealing.

In a secret report   prepared for the White House on Oct. 12, 1950, the CIA said it saw "no convincing indication" that a Chinese intervention in the war was forthcoming. Even after Chinese forces began moving into North Korea a few weeks later, CIA analysts failed to understand what that movement meant.CIA historian Laurie says the agency was providing strategic guidance but not "tactical" warning, which is far more specific.

"They know there are Chinese troops in Korea, engaging U.N. forces," Laurie says, "but they do not provide the warning that this is China involved in the war and that this is the precursor of a bigger invasion."

One explanation for the CIA's failure to predict neither the North Korean invasion nor the Chinese intervention in the war is that the agency, along with the rest of the U.S. government, was paying attention primarily to Moscow's actions.

A Kremlin-Centric ViewTruman himself, describing the Korean War in a radio and television address to the nation in April 1951, portrayed it as being instigated from Moscow.

"The communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world," Truman said. "If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims."

That Kremlin-centered view characterized all CIA reporting from the time. One report, titled Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime and issued just six days before the North's invasion of the South described the North Korean regime as "a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence."A candid 2001 summary   of prewar Korea reporting, written by a CIA case officer and published by the agency's own Center for the Study of Intelligence, concluded that the agency's assumption that the Soviets controlled North Korean decision-making "accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean attack."The failure to predict China's October 1950 intervention in the war may also have been due to the agency's assumption that Moscow was calling all the shots in Asia.

The Oct. 12 report, titled Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded with this statement: "While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a

consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950." [emphasis added]"The belief here is that this is monolithic communism," says CIA historian Laurie, "that things are being orchestrated worldwide by the Soviet Union, and that nothing is going to happen in Asia or Africa without the Soviet Union saying, 'This is permissible,' or 'Go ahead and do this.' "

The situation in Korea appears rarely to have been considered on its own merits.

Still Paying The Price

A key moment had come in January 1950, when Secretary of State Acheson, in a speech, defined "the defensive perimeter" that the United States was committed to protecting. Korea was on the other side of the line.

That thinking may have explained the controversial U.S. decision, a few months earlier, to withdraw its forces from South Korea.Korea historian William Stueck of the University of Georgia says the issue should have been given more thought and reflected the idea at the CIA and throughout Washington that it was Moscow that mattered, not Seoul or Pyongyang."Given the fact that Korea was not high on our list of priorities, it wasn't given the kind of attention at the very top level that could have resolved the bureaucratic conflicts that existed," Stueck says.Arguably, the United States is still paying the price for the intelligence mistakes of 60 years ago. There was a cease-fire in 1953, but no peace agreement. The United States has long since made peace with both Russia and China, but the Korean conflict continues to this day, with analysts still struggling to understand the Koreans on their own terms.

Document 9 United Nations Security Council Resolution (1950)

Source: www.trumanlibrary.org

Document 10: Republican Senator Robert Taft interviewed on Radio Talk Show (1950)

Source: "Capitol Report" No. 60, Featuring Senator Robert F. Taft June 29, 1950

ANNOUNCER: Senator Taft, as leader of the minority party in the United States Senate, do you approve the action of the President in sending our armed forces to stop this Communist aggression?

TAFT: Well, broadly speaking, yes. Of course, from the past philosophy of the declaration of the Administration it wasn't unreasonable for the North Koreans to suppose that we would do nothing about their attack. The President's statement of policy represents a complete change in the programs and policies he has heretofore proclaimed. I myself have always urged a much more determined attitude against communism in the Far East and China and the President's new policy moves in that direction. Naturally, I don't object to the general policy. It seems to me the time had to come when we would give definite notice to the Communists that a move beyond a declared line would result in war. That has been our policy in Europe and the Atlantic Union. Whether the President in this case, however, has chosen the right time or the right lace to declare this policy certainly is open to question. He knows more about it then I do. I can't be certain. But certainly the new poilcy seems to be adopted at an unfortunate time — and involves the attempt to defend Korea, which is a very difficult military operation indeed. I sincerely hope that the policy won't lead to war with Russia. I do believe the general principle of the policy is right, and I see no choice except to back up wholeheartedly and with every available resource the American men in our armed forces who have been moved into Korea.

ANNOUNCER: Well, we've heard so much about bi-partisan foreign policy in the past few years, I wonder what extent the President consulted with you and the other Republican leaders before making this very drastic decision?

TAFT: Well, the answer is — not at all. The answer is that there hasn't been any

pretense of bi-partisan foreign policy in this move. The leaders of the Republican Party in Congress have never been consulted.

DOCUMENT 11:

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION Bill of Right in ActionSummer 2001 (17:3)

Military Authority

Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War

During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur challenged President Harry S. Truman's authority as foreign policy leader and commander in chief of the armed forces. This resulted in the first major test of civilian control of the military in American history.

General Douglas MacArthur was an American military hero. Like his father, a Civil War hero, MacArthur won the Congressional Medal of Honor, the nation's highest military honor. Brilliant as well as brave, MacArthur graduated first in his class from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Leading the 42nd Division in World War I, he was wounded three times. During World War II, he served in the Pacific theater, operating first in the Philippines. When his troops faced overwhelming opposition, he was ordered to Australia. Before leaving, he issued a famous promise, "I shall return." He put together an island-hopping strategy, which led to American forces recapturing the Philippines in 1944. By the war's end, MacArthur was supreme allied commander in the Pacific. His counterpart in the European theater was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Following the war, MacArthur served as military governor of Japan for five years, getting rid of militarist influences and setting up a constitutional democracy.

Harry S. Truman also served his country as a soldier. Enlisting in the Army in World War I, he rose to the rank of captain and headed an artillery unit in France. He returned home to Missouri following the war, worked briefly in business, and entered politics. In 1934, he was elected to the U.S. Senate. President Franklin D. Roosevelt picked him as his running mate in 1s944, replacing Vice President Henry Wallace for Roosevelt's fourth term in office. Inexperienced and unknown to most Americans, Truman assumed the presidency when Roosevelt died suddenly in 1945. As president, Truman immediately faced many difficult situations. He negotiated the German surrender. He decided to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. To stop Soviet expansion, he instituted a policy of containing communism. As part of this policy, he set up the Marshall Plan to send economic aid to Europe, and he established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide military security for Europe. In 1946, the Republicans gained control of Congress, and Truman seemed likely to lose the next election. Yet in the 1948 presidential election, Truman pulled an upset victory.

In 1950, war broke out in Korea. During this war, a major confrontation took place between Truman and MacArthur over the conduct of the war. MacArthur was the top commander of the American and other U.N. forces in Korea. Truman, as president, was MacArthur's superior. The U.S. Constitution designates the civilian president as the commander in chief of the armed forces and the one who sets American foreign policy.

North Korea AttacksKorea had been a Japanese possession since 1910. Following the defeat of Japan in 1945, Soviet troops occupied Korea north of the 38th line of latitude (usually referred to as the 38th parallel). American troops occupied the area south of this line. By agreement, both Soviet and American forces withdrew from Korea in 1948. By this time, Korea as a practical matter had separated into two countries. North Korea, which bordered China, had become a Communist state heavily armed by the Soviet Union. South Korea maintained close ties with the United States, which still occupied nearby Japan under the command of General MacArthur.

In 1949, the Chinese Civil War ended. Victorious Chinese Communist forces drove the anti-Communist Nationalist Chinese off the China mainland to the island of Formosa (now called Taiwan). Soon after the victory of the Communists in China, news arrived that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb.

President Truman's containment policy sought to stop Communist aggression, especially against Europe and Japan. But Truman administration officials made public statements that seemed to exclude Formosa and Korea as areas to be defended by the United States.

To the surprise of both Truman and MacArthur, North Korea attacked South Korea across the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950. Moving quickly, and without seeking a declaration of war from Congress, President Truman ordered U.S. air and naval forces to attack targets north of the 38th parallel. He also authorized General MacArthur to send American ground troops from Japan to support the rapidly collapsing South Korean Army.

Several days after the invasion began, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for its members to aid South Korea in repelling the attack and restoring peace. This resolution should have been vetoed by the Soviet Union. But the Soviets were boycotting the United Nations for refusing to admit Communist China. Eventually, more than a dozen U.N. member nations under the overall command of General MacArthur entered the Korean War.

By the fall of 1950, the war was going badly for South Korea and its allies. The North Korean Army had cornered American, South Korean, and other U.N. troops in a small area around the southern port of Pusan. Defeat seemed inevitable.

But General MacArthur devised a bold and risky plan. The North Koreans had taken most of the Korean peninsula. He proposed landing troops from the sea at the port of Inchon far behind enemy lines. The troops would cut off enemy communications and supply lines, retake Seoul (the capital), and "hammer and destroy the North Koreans."

But Inchon seemed an improbable site. The approach was narrow and could be easily mined. The currents ran swift and made it hazardous for landing troops. Mud flats prevented any amphibious landing. The landing would have to be made on one of the three days each month when the tide covered the mud flats. Once ashore, the troops would have to climb sea walls and cliffs. The enemy could defend the port from the heights surrounding it. For all these reasons, many of the high command opposed an Inchon landing and proposed other sites.

But MacArthur believed that because Inchon was such an awful place for a landing, his troops would take the enemy by surprise, which they did on September 15. At the same time, the besieged U.N. troops in the south around Pusan also attacked. The combined forces drove the North Koreans above the 38th parallel in 15 days.

Next came perhaps the most fateful decisions of the Korean War. Pressed by MacArthur, Truman authorized him to pursue the North Korean troops north of the 38th parallel. The United States succeeded in getting a new U.N. resolution. It called for the destruction of the North Korean Army and the reunification of Korea under a democratic government.

American troops led the offensive beyond the 38th parallel, pushing the North Koreans toward the Yalu River, which separated Korea from Communist China. Despite assurances by the United States that U.N. troops would stop at the Yalu, the Chinese government warned that any foreign forces north of the 38th parallel posed a threat to China's security.

China Enters the WarOver the weekend of October 15-17, President Truman flew to Wake Island in the Pacific to meet General MacArthur for the first time. The most important question that Truman asked MacArthur was whether he thought China would enter the war. The general confidently replied that the Chinese would not enter the fighting, and the war would be over by Christmas.

Anxious to wrap up the war, MacArthur ordered American and other U.N. troops to press on to the Yalu River. In doing this, he ignored the warnings of the Communist Chinese as well as a directive by military planners in Washington to send only South Korean troops into the provinces bordering China.

On November 25, 1950, nearly 200,000 Chinese soldiers poured across the Yalu River, forcing U.N. forces into a full retreat to the south. MacArthur demanded authority to bomb Chinese bases north of the Yalu in China itself. But fearing a widening of the war and possible entry of the Soviet Union, Truman and his advisors refused. Instead, they ordered him to organize a phased and orderly retreat. On December 29, Truman administration officials informed MacArthur that the United States had abandoned the goal of reunifying Korea.

MacArthur was infuriated at what he considered the Truman administration's sell-out of Korea. MacArthur proposed his own plan for victory. He wanted a complete blockade of the Communist Chinese coastline. He wanted to bomb industrial sites and other strategic targets within China. He wanted to bring Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa to fight in Korea. Finally, he wanted the Nationalists to invade weak positions on the Communist Chinese mainland.

Appalled that MacArthur's plan could launch World War III, Truman and the top military leaders in Washington quickly rejected it. But MacArthur continued to publicly argue for his plan. He also criticized the "politicians in Washington" for refusing to allow him to bomb Chinese bases north of the Yalu River. He did all this in spite of an order from his superiors in Washington not to make any public statements on foreign or military policy without first getting approval from the Department of State or Defense. MacArthur was on a collision course with his commander in chief.

Truman Fires MacArthurWhen the Chinese offensive stalled just south of the 38th parallel in the spring of 1951, Truman began to work on a peace proposal. This would have re-established the original border between North and South Korea and removed all foreign troops from both countries.

A few days after MacArthur received notice of Truman's peace proposal, he announced his own terms for ending the fighting. In a public statement, again without getting any clearance from Washington, MacArthur taunted the Chinese for failing to conquer South Korea. He then went on to threaten to attack China unless the Chinese gave up the fight. He even said he would meet the enemy military commander to arrange how to end the war.

MacArthur's announcement was an ultimatum to China. It completely torpedoed Truman's diplomatic efforts to negotiate a cease fire. America's allies wondered who was really in charge of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Truman was stunned. "By this act," he later wrote, "I could no longer tolerate his insubordination." A few days later, MacArthur's Republican Party supporters in Congress released a letter from him in which he declared, "There is no substitute for victory."

Truman met for several days with his top advisors. In the end, they all agreed that MacArthur had to go because "the military must be controlled by civilian authority in the country."

Truman acted quickly without giving MacArthur the chance to reconsider his views or to resign. His dismissal was final and complete. The hero of the war in the Pacific against the Japanese was stripped of his command of U.N. troops in Korea, his command of all U.S. forces in East Asia, and his position as the head of the American occupation of Japan. MacArthur's half-century of military service had ended.

In a written public statement, Truman acknowledged MacArthur "as one of our greatest commanders." But he went on to explain that "military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution."

Public reaction was overwhelmingly against the firing of MacArthur. Republican congressional leaders invited him to address Congress on his views about how to conduct the war. The Republicans also called for a congressional investigation of American foreign policy in Asia and even discussed "possible impeachments."

Tens of thousands of telegrams opposing MacArthur's dismissal flooded the White House. President Truman himself was booed at a baseball game. A Gallup Poll, however, revealed that despite MacArthur's enormous popularity, only 30 percent of the public agreed with his view of expanding the war to Communist China.

MacArthur returned to the United States and was welcomed by huge emotional crowds. In his televised address to Congress, he repeated his message that, "In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory."

Later, appearing before a joint House and Senate committee, MacArthur argued that the fight for Korea was the critical test of America's resolve to stop Communist aggression. Failure to stop it in Asia, he said, would surely lead to future defeats in Europe and elsewhere in the world. But under questioning, MacArthur admitted that he did not know much about America's foreign and defense policies outside of Asia or how they might be affected by expanding the Korean War.

Truman administration officials and military leaders also testified before the congressional committee. They contradicted MacArthur's judgment that an attack on China would not draw in the Soviet Union. They further stated that the United States would have to bear most of the fighting because our allies opposed an expanded war in Asia.

MacArthur had tried and failed to win the Republican nomination for president in 1944 and 1948. In 1952, taking advantage of his popularity as a critic of Truman's Korean War policies, he tried again. But this time he was beaten by another war hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower. After winning the presidency, Eisenhower largely adopted Truman's peace plan. He negotiated a cease fire in 1953 that re-established the border between North and South Korea at the 38th parallel.

Later, as MacArthur realized that nations could exterminate each other with nuclear weapons, he denounced war. On his death bed in 1964, he warned President Lyndon Johnson not to send American ground troops to Vietnam or anywhere on the Asian mainland. This was the final ironic twist in the life of the general who had once called for America to go to war against China.

Document 12:

Statement by President Truman Relieving Gen. MacArthur of his Duties, 1951

Source:www.trumanlibrary.com

IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 10, 1951

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor. Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling. General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

Document 13: MacArthur's Speech: "Old Soldiers Never Die..."

Source: PBS American Experience

1951 had not been a good year for Douglas MacArthur: after almost losing a war in Korea it seemed he had already won, he was dismissed by President Truman, making headlines around the world. But for thirty-seven minutes on April 19, he held America in the palm of

his hand. MacArthur's address before a joint session of Congress, one of the great moments in the early days of television, offered him a unique opportunity to tell his side of the story. He did not disappoint.

Critics and much of the public soon saw through the holes in his arguments. But his final words, drawing the curtain on an unparalleled military career, surely rank as one of the great exit lines in American history.

Excerpt: General MacArthur's Address to Congress:April 19, 1951

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I said, it proved to be a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of ail litary strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old one.

Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary the intesification of our economic blockade against China, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribution to-their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces in Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American arid allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were riot available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there was to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant

attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as f ew other men now living know it, and nothing to me--and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes.

Indeed, the Second Day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be 'by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out, this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature and all the material and cultural developments of the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh. "

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there can be no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier wars. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Some, may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China, Others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power It can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy, will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity of military and other potentialities is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action was confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it Is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all

against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific.î

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have done their bust there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have all since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barracks ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that old soldiers never die; they just fade away. And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. 

Good Bye.

Document 14: Why did President Truman dismiss General MacArthur?Source: The Harry S. Truman Library

In 1951, President Truman and his advisors were preparing to engage North Korea and China in peace negotiations, in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, issued an unauthorized statement containing a veiled threat to expand the war into China if the Communist side refused to come to terms. When MacArthur continued to support an expansion of the war, communicating directly with a like-minded Republican congressman, Truman, with the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Secretaries of State and Defense, felt they had no alternative but to replace MacArthur with a military commander who would act in concert with the administration’s foreign policy. On April 11, 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur of his command.

The members of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, who conducted an inquiry in the spring of 1951 into the dismissal of MacArthur and the military situation in the far east, acknowledged that, "the removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional power of the President." However they also complained that, "the circumstances were a shock to the national pride (and) the reasons assigned for the removal of General MacArthur were utterly inadequate to justify the act." (Individual Views of Certain Members of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, May 3, June 27, 1951, p 46).

Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., however, in their contemporary account of the MacArthur dismissal, questioned MacArthur’s Korean policy, noting General Omar Bradley’s belief that, "it would have involved us in the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy." Further, they stated that it would have, "wrecked our global strategy in the hope of achieving a magnificent success in a local engagement," whereas then current American foreign policy recognized, "as MacArthur did not, that time is on our side, and sought in Korea to play for time to mobilize, time to rearm ourselves and our allies, time to bring into production new weapons and equipment and test their use, time for Europe to recover and rearm, time to build an ever-widening circle of allies and friendly neutrals, time for discontent to ferment within the sphere of Soviet power." (The General and The President and the Future of American Foreign Policy, 1951, p 244).

Later historians, such as Robert Smith, contend that, "[c]rudely, deliberately, with complete understanding of what would ensue, MacArthur undertook to sabotage Truman’s effort, in March 1951, to open peace negotiations with the Chinese (and that) no one not blinded by hero worship could overlook the arrogance and contempt with which MacArthur deliberately flouted Truman’s directive." (MacArthur in Korea, 1982, p 155).

Truman’s mistake, according to Rovere and Schlesinger, was not the dismissal of MacArthur, but rather was, "a failure in political education. He made all the necessary decisions with great and simple courage; but he lacked the gift of illuminating them so that the people as a whole could understand their necessity." (ps 248-249).

DOCUMENT 15: POLL-VIEWS OF KOREAN WAR BY PARTY AFFILIATION (1952)

Source: Gallup Poll

DOCUMENT 16 TEXT OF THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT July 27, 1953

Source: National Archives

Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

Preamble

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea:

Article I

Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A military demarcation line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces. A demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

DOCUMENT 17: CHART ON U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING (1900-2010) Source:www.usgovernmentspending.com

There were two major peaks of defense spending in the 20th century: World War I and World War II.

Chart 2.31: Defense Spending in 20th CenturyAt the start of the 20th century, defense spending averaged about one percent of GDP. Then it spiked to 22 percent at the end of World War I. Defense spending in the 1920s ran at about 1 to 2 percent of GDP and in the 1930s, 2 to 3 percent of GDP.In World War II defense spending peaked at 41 percent of GDP, and then declined to about 10 percent during the height of the Cold War. Thereafter it declined to 3 to 5 percent of GDP, with surges during the 1980s and the 2000s.