Balochistan- Through Military Actions and Constitutional Evolutionbalochistanstrategicforum.publishpath.com/Websites/bal... · 2005-03-31 · polity.11 thIn the 15 century Mir Chakar

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Balochistan- Through Military Actions and

Constitutional Evolution

_________ Rizwan Ullah Kokab

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This paper attempts to review armed confrontations

between the Baloch tribesmen on one hand and the British and

Pakistan governments on the other hand. Moreover it will also

give a glimpse of administrative and constitutional measures and

policies, which took place in the result of or before these clashes.

As the battles are hall mark of the history of this area and inter

tribal battles were also fought during this period, from 1839 to

this date. For example between Khan of Kalat and different

tribes or among different tribes yet we, in our study, are limited

to only those clashes which happened to be between different

tribes and the British and Pakistani governments. Thus this paper

will serve to take an analysis of the impact of modern rules,

constitutions, and institutions in the face of traditional rules,

methods and resistance. Moreover, it will also help to know how

the British and Pakistani governments tried to tackle the

resistance of the Baloch people or the tribal leaders.

The areas, which today are called Balochistan, have been

an important part of ancient kingdoms. It is presumed that

Balochistan may very probably have been among the one

hundred and twenty seven provinces over which the great king

Ahasuerus ruled.1 Greek conqueror Alexander’s route through

Balochistan, during his retuning march from India, is considered

to be from Pattala, (Presumed to be Tatta) to Bela, crossing the

lower ranges of the Brahuik Mountains. Marching towards Jau,

in Makran, he met with the opposition of the natives of the

country and kept somewhat near the coast, traversing the present

Kolwah district while his admiral, Nearchus coasted along the

shores of Balochistan.2When Seleucus Nicator in 302 B.C. tried

2

to recover Alexander’s Indian province, Chandragupta defeated

him and through a treaty got present Afghanistan as well as a

part of Balochistan, in return for five hundred elephants.

Balochistan was a part of the Mauryan Empire when Ashoka,

extended his dominions further east and south.3In mid second

and early first centuries B.C. the nomadic Sakas occupied

Sakastan (Seistan), the then southwestern part of Afghanistan,

eastern Iran and northwestern part of Balochistan. In the first

century the Sakas were forced by advancing Pathans to move

further east, to the middle Indus valley.4

From third to seventh century A.D. Balochistan was

under Sassanid rule5as a dependent province or provinces,

though at other periods exercising, it is presumed, an

independence of its own, divided possibly among a number of

chiefs of greater or less power and influence6In 644 A.D, during

the period of Amir Muawiya Arab Muslim government

despatched an expeditionary force which occupied Makran and

the districts of Kehan and Naukan (Kalat) and Kusdar

(Khuzdar).7In A.D. 711 Muhammad bin Kasim is supposed to

have effected the subjugation of Makran on its route.8By the end

of the tenth century Balochistan once again slid into Persian

orbit.9 About A.D. 1030 Masaud Ghaznavi extended his

conquests up to Makran, but did not penetrate into the

mountainous portion of Balochistan.10

Sultan Mahmud Khan of

Khwarizem made Balochistan a part of the Saljuk Empire. At the

beginning of the 13th century, Balochistan was attacked over and

over again by the Mongols (1233 A.D.) who destroyed Baloch

polity.11

In the 15th century Mir Chakar Rind (1487-1511 A.D)

established a Baloch confederacy, which stretched from Multan,

through Marri-Bugti territory to Kharan, and from the Sulaiman

Mountain in the north to Makran coast.12

The death of Mir

Chakar Rind ended an era in Baloch history. The Baloch went

deep down in darkness. Tribalism accentuated divisions.

Between 1490 A.D. and 1520 A.D. the Baloch broke into war for

a period of thirty years. There were no historians at hand to

record this clash of arms and, therefore, it has been preserved for

posterity only by tribal ballads. The contestants then separated

once again in different parts of adjoining areas.13

3

A Muslim family, the Sehrais, ruled at Kalat but seemed

to be displaced by a Hindu caste, the Sewahs. The Sewahs were

replaced by Brohuis whose leader Kambar founded a dynasty in

Kalat. When the Mughal Emperor Akbar’s march in this area

resulted in retreat, apparently the tribes had stabilized

Confederacy organization under a local ruling family, the

Mirwaris who are said to have “ruled” for 12 generations.

During the reign of Akbar, however, Sibi was conquered.14

Mir

Ahmad Khan belonging to the Ahmadzai tribe of Qambrani

Brohuis, developed the Kalat confederacy in 1666 A.D.15

In the

late 17th century the Mughals again marched against Kalat but

were defeated by Mir Ahmed, then Khan of Kalat. 16

When Nadir

Shah of Persia invaded India in 1739, the fourth ruler in descent

from Kambar, Abdullah Khan was ruling over Kalat and Nadir

Shah Durrani confirmed him in the government of the Kalati

Kingdom. Ahmad Shah Durrani invaded through the Baloch

province of Sarawan and sent Nasir Khan to Kalat to rule instead

of Mohbat Khan, son of Abdullah Khan, who had revolted. Nasir

Khan’s forty years long and prosperous reign is called the

Augustan age of Balochistan. The extent of territory left by Nasir

Khan at his death in 1795 may be said to have comprised the

present Sarawan and Jhalawan Provinces, the Kachh Gandava

and Harrand and Dajil districts in the east, together with the

greater portion of the entire Makran, the state of Las as a

tributary, and the port of Karachi, in Sindh.17

When the British first set foot in Balochistan in the first

half of the nineteenth century, they found the region divided into

various tribal zones and organizations engaged in perpetual

warfare against each other. They were ruled and governed by

their respective customary tribal laws. The Khans of Klat ruled

Southern Balochistan, while northern Balochistan was divided

between different tribal zones. The Khans of Kalat used to pay

lip service to the Durrani Afghans or the Persian rulers, whoever

of the two happened to be stronger in extracting tributes, form

them through periodic army actions.18

4

The areas of Balochistan were important for the British

in order to counter the expansion of Russian interests in the

states bordering Russia in the south and increasing Russian

threat to British Empire. First Afghan War (1839-42) ended in a

military disaster for the British. They considered the defeat

because of inadequately secured position in the west and

northwest of the Subcontinent. Moreover the Pan-Salvic

Movement, in conjunction with the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire, which caused Britain’s supremacy in the Mediterranean

region to be questioned by Russia, is said to have triggered the

Second Afghan War (1878-80). Thus the British were able, by

subjugating Afghanistan and establishing their power in

Balochistan and North Western areas, to assert their supremacy

in India by conclusively securing and determining Britain’s

north-west and west frontier. The western and northwestern

mountain regions of the Subcontinent, thus, became a buffer

zone, a military glacis, and a springboard to initiate potential

military operations against threats from the north and west.19

As the British came to Balochistan a conflict between

the intruders and natives started. The British, though were the

banner holders of the constitutional governments and

arrangements, produced modern and well-established

constitutional institutions in other parts of the British India. It is

a fact that cannot be denied that they in fact taught the masses

living in this part of the world how to engage in constitutional

style of government. The tribesmen of Balochistan, on the other

hand, were inherent of tribal customs, laws and traditions. They

since centuries lived nomadic life in a pure tribal set-up. The

clash of two altogether different political ideologies was

inevitable. This encounter produced two different streams of

incidents. One was the armed clash and other was the

constitutional, legal or administrative encounter.

The English army, in 1839, passed through Kachh

Gandava and up the Bolan Pass to Quetta. On the arrival of the

force at Quetta Captain Burnes preceded to Kalat as envoy to

effect, if possible, reconciliation with the Khan of Kalat, Mehrab

5

Khan. It is believed that a treaty was signed and sealed, by

which, for a certain money payment made by the British, the

Khan undertook to keep the road open from Shikarpur to

Quetta.20

The Khan was unable to control the Sardars of the area

for the security of road and could not fulfil the conditions of the

treaty.21

Considering Khan treacherous, hostile, and

dangerous,22

in order to punish him for not supporting the British

annexation of Sind,23

a brigade under Major General Willshire

was sent to assault Kalat. It was so sudden that Khan could not

make any preparations for defence. He appealed to the chiefs of

the Baloch tribes for assistance, but a few responded to the call.

On the 5th of November 1839, the English force, consisted of

1261 men and six horse artillery guns arrived near Kalat. The

garrison comprised mainly the inhabitants of the villages near

Kalat, but the greater part of them dropped from the walls and

made off when the assault commenced. One of the gates was

speedily knocked in by the firing, the town and citadel

immediately stormed, and Mehrab Khan, with several of his

chiefs, fell fighting, the loss of his troops exceeding 400. Of the

rest, about 2000 men were made prisoners; the British loss was

31 killed and 107 wounded.24

In the other areas of Balochistan one Bijar Khan Dombki

is recorded to have joined hands with Jhakaris, Bugtis and other

tribesmen of Kach plains and put up tough fights against Sir

Charles Napier25

who, despite his repeated armed attempts

against the Marris and Bugtis, failed to subdue them by force of

arms. He once announced even a public reward of Rupees Five

for every head of a Marri or a Bugti tribesman.26

To get control over the Marris, in 1840, the British sent

an expeditionary force and temporarily occupied Kehan, the

capital of Marris. Marris were besieged and a retrieving force

consisting of 464 bayonets of Light Bombay Grenadiers, 3 guns

and 200 sabres of the Poona Horse and Sindh Horse under the

command of Major Billimore was despatched to subdue Marris.

The Marri tribesmen met it at the Nafusk Pass near Kehan. After

a hand-to-hand battle, the Marris won the day; and except for a

6

couple of persons, the entire force was annihilated, including the

officers.27

The Marris then besieged the British forces in the fort

of Kehan, who surrendered, seeing no way out. They were,

however, given safe conduct by the Marris and handed over to

the British at Phulji.

A report of Captain Jacob tells that the Marris created

disruption against the British in 1845. The report says that the

whole province of Kachchi was being run over by the Marris and

the displaced inhabitants were faced leaving and the country in

the Nali is almost deserted. In the action under Jacob, 600 Bugtis

and an unspecified number of Marris were murdered. It is only

recorded that No single footman escaped capture or death.28

While in 1848, in a clash between the Bugtis and the British,

Merewehter killed around half of the Bugti warriors.29

The fierce battles between the Marris and the British

continued. In 1859 Sir Henry Green and the Khan of Kalat

attacked on Kehan and Dera Bugti to subdue Marri and Bugti

tribes and defeated these tribes.30

Again in 1862, Khan Khudadad

Khan of Kalat compelled by, and with the assistance of the

British, moved forward with 8,000 soldiers and several field

guns against the Marris. After fierce and pitched battles, the

Khan of Kalat had ultimately to face defeat and abandoned his

guns in Mawand region.31

On 26th January 1867 Meer Ghulam

Husain Bugti arranged to attack on Harend area with the 1500

tribesmen of Marri, Bugti and Ketran tribes. They plundered the

fort, burnt the villages, and looted the cattle. The British army

chased them and on Chachar Pass a battle between the lashkar of

Ghulam Huasain Bugti and the British took place. Meer Ghulam

Hussain was killed along with 258 tribesmen and 200 tribesmen

were arrested.32

Shah Jehan, the sardar of Zhob, with the aid of Sarang

Zai sardar Behaee Khan, along with 2000 Kakars, attacked on

the post of Kach. The in charge of the post Major Peterson,

having been informed before the attack, appointed the soldiers

on both sides of pass and Behaee’s attack failed with the loss of

7

73 tribesmen. This was last effort of Panezai tribe after which,

they became loyal to the British. To stop the disturbance from

the Sardar of Zhob a cantonment was established at Dukki. The

establishment of cantonment was a challenge for Kakars. A

group of tribesmen of Kakar, Hamza Zai, Kab Zai and Moosa

Khei tribes killed seven labourers who were constructing the

buildings of cantonment. To control the tribesmen a contingent

with at least 5000 British soldiers and at least 500 levies

marched through Panezai, Sarangzai, Doomer, Thal Chotiali and

Ambar. All the Sardars and maliks of the area were subdued. On

18th October 1884 the fort of Shah Jehan, vacated and

surrendered by Shah Jehan, came under the control of British

without any resistance. At Dolat Zai, next day, a battle with the

tribesmen under the leadership of Malik Hamza and Ghaus

Muhammad took place. The leaders of tribesmen along with 80

others were killed and other tribesmen escaped. One part of the

troops, under the command of Colonel Armstrong was sent to

Hindu Bagh where the Sardars and Malik, who were still at

large, accepted the rule of the British. They were arrested. After

the success in Zhob valley the troops were sent to Murgh Kab

Zai and Sara, the headquarters of Kabzais and Moosa Kheils.

They faced no resistance and the Sardars surrendered. Malik

Shahbaz Khan, the cousin of Shah Jehan who had rendered the

services in favour of the British, was appointed the chief of

Zhob.33

Tribesmen of Khadarzai, a sub tribe of Largha

Sheeranies, established their camp in inaccessible mountains and

started to attack on the British troops and the inhabitants of

Zhob. In August 1890 troops comprising of a British Yorkshire

Platoon, two Baloch Regiments, two squadrons of Bengal

Lancers, one British Battery, and one company of Bombay

Sabres, under the command of Major General George White

attacked on Anmar where the central camp of the tribesmen was

set up. Anmar was occupied, as the tribesmen could not resist.

Sardar Murtaza Khan escaped but he afterwards surrendered. Till

13th November the whole area was occupied.

34 On 20 December

1901 the British Army occupied the Fort of Nodaz after the fight

8

of forty days. During the fight Meer Muhammad Ali Khan

Nosherwani, Meer Murad, many other Baloch fighters, four

officers of British army and many British soldiers were killed.35

The last of the major encounters of the Marris with the

British was in the year 1918-1919. The Marris remained in

armed revolt for about six months and fought successive battles

against the British army at Gunbaz in tehsil Duki and Harab near

Mawan, where apart from heavy guns, bomber aircrafts were

also used by the British forces against them.36

During World War

1 three Baloch tribes; Gumshadzai under Meer Khaleel Khan,

Yar Muhammadzai under Meer Junaid Khan and Ismaeelzai

under Meer Juma Khan started looting and plundering against

the British. General Dayer was sent with Hazara Pioneers and a

Sikh regiment. On 28th July 1916 British Army under the

command of entered the valley of Suridrgan through Gasht pass

to subdue rebel tribes. British fought against Junaid Khan.

Khaleel Khan came to help Junaid Khan and was killed during

the course of battle. Junaid lost the courage and escaped. After

one years’ disturbance Junaid and his disorganized tribesmen

surrendered due to the shortage of ammunition and food.37

Administratively, legally and constitutionally the British

treated Balochistan in different ways in four different regional

divisions. Firstly, British Balochistan consisted of the regions of

Sibi, Hernai, Pasheen, Cham, Zhob District, Tehseel Loralai,

tribal areas of Marri, Bugti, Khetran and areas of Quetta, which

once belonged to Afghan Durranis and passed into British

possession by way of the treaty of Gandarmak (1879), and were

proclaimed part of British India on 1st November 1887.

38 This

area came under the direct administration of the British

government, which was represented by the Chief Commissioner.

The British government levied taxes here. Secondly, the Agency

territories were composed of regions, which had come under the

British government in the result of different arrangements or

agreements. Chagai, Bolan, and Quetta had been leased by the

British under an agreement with the Khan; Zhob and a part of

Loralai fell to them under the treaty of Gandarmak, which,

9

owing to the rebelliousness of the native tribes, did not

completely subjugate this region; Kohlus and Barkhans had

placed themselves under British protection by a ‘voluntary’

decision. ‘Agents of the Governor-General’ administered these

Agency territories. Thirdly, there were native states, Kalat,

Kharan, Makran and Las Bela. Here, administration, imposition

of taxes, and dispensation of justice rested with the native

authorities. The British officials (agents) only performed an

advisory and mediatory function, but directly kept a watch on the

foreign policy ambitions of the local rulers. Fourthly, there were

the tribal areas, which consisted of the tribal territories of the

Marris and Bugtis. Here, too, British influence was exercised

indirectly and with utmost caution, in order not to provoke these

belligerent and pugnacious tribes.39

The administrative and constitutional evolution in

British Balochistan took place in two phases. During the first

phase, following the conquest of Sindh and the Punjab (1842,

1849), their western borders were closed off against the restless

mountain tribes. During this phase, Britain’s political tactics

consisted, on the one hand, of not letting any military power

arise in Balochistan comparable to the Brohui confederation,

which could effectively have countered their interests, and, on

the other hand, in the endeavour to make the khan as the

representative of Balochistan dependent upon Britain, to isolate

him from the tribes by fomenting resistance amongst them but,

simultaneously, to protect him against the tribes’ superior

numbers and, by means of treaties(1841, 1854, 1876 between the

British and the Khan of Kalat) , bind him to the British.

During the second phase the British stressed on the

policy of indirect rule. The tribal leaders constituted the

authorities, and the British relied on them as the representatives

of the forces of law and order and thereby sought to generate

with the conquered peoples the impression of local self-

administration. The British civil servants functioned as advisers

and inspectors. While the colonial rulers’ military might

constituted the foundation of this indirect rule. The indigenous

10

tribes, therefore, if they wished to survive, and the tribal leaders,

if they wished to retain their positions, had no alternative but to

participate in indirect rule in the manner they were meant to do.

Willingness to participate also had its attractions for the tribal

leaders, in so far as their political positions were now guaranteed

by an overarching power and therefore no longer depended on

the tribe’s allegiance. Moreover, the British also subsidized the

tribal leaders economically, liberated them from their

dependence on their tribes and thus created the prerequisites for

a quasi-feudal system which, up to then, was largely unknown to

the tribes of Balochistan.40

It was Sir Robert Sandeman, (appointed as the first agent

of GG on 1st September 1877 and remained on this post until his

death on 29th January 1892 at Lasbela)

41 who practised indirect

rule in Balochistan and employed it as a means of seizing

territory. Sandeman’s policy characterized British action in

Balochistan until the close of the colonial era. The principles of

Sandeman System were; never to make an opinion about any

opponent tribe before investigation, to treat the tribesmen as the

British themselves, not to expect the services of the tribesmen

free of charge, to rely on the present resources and use them

properly, to pay respect to tribal chiefs and leaders and let Shahi

Jirga decide their internal disputes, to increase influence but to

avoid interference in the details, not to interfere in the revenue

areas of Khan of Kalat, to give liberty to every sardar in the

internal matters of tribe and put on him the responsibility of

wrong deed of any of his tribesmen, the disputes among the

revenue payers to Khan of Kalat and tribesmen or between the

servants of Khan of Kalat and tribesmen should be reconciled

trough sardari jirgas, and to maintain Sardar Raeesani and Sardar

Zark Zai on the posts of sir-e-sardaran of Sarawan and sir-e-

sardaran Jhalawan.42

Sandeman realized that the position of the

traditional tribal leaders needed to be supported and preserved,

for they, once they had been brought under British influence and

control, constituted the best guarantors for peace and order in the

tribes. He used, firstly, them, by supporting them financially,

entrusting them with administrative functions, decorating them

11

with fine-sounding titles, partly enticing them with privileges,

and guaranteeing their position (even in the line of succession);

secondly, an inter-tribal council of elders (Jirga), which, upon

his initiative, was introduced with the Baluchis and Brohuis, and

was to attempt to peaceably settle all disputes and problems

between the tribes; and, thirdly, a police and administrative

machinery (levy system) consisting of warriors from the tribes.

Initially, the levies only needed to ensure in their own respective

territories, later on, in overlapping tribal areas, that the peace

agreements reached by the tribes in the Jirga were kept. This

levy system was structured Para militarily and intended ‘to

become a most valuable recruiting ground’.43

Through this policy Britain’s interest in Balochistan lay

not with its people, but was directed at securing British India’s

borders. To this end, the tribes of the mountain province were

merely the means and tools. The supreme goal was to pacify the

land, to safeguard freedom of movement, secure the roads and

passes, consolidate indirect British influence without a sizeable

military engagement, and to seize territory in the strategically

important regions. Sandeman achieved these goals with

remarkable skill. 44

The British administered the area with the

assistance of a strong military force and with political finesse.

Sandeman succeeded only with the help of military might. His

first mission, when he moved to Kalat accompanied only by a

small delegation, remained unsuccessful. He was successful only

when a large military contingent was with him in 1876.45

There

were not any democratic institutions in Balochistan. Baloch

representation in the police and army was negligible.46

Frontier

Crimes Regulation (1871) was promulgated in NWFP. It was

repealed and replaced by The Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation

(1887) and again replaced by Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)

of 1901.47

The FCR was extended to the parts of Balochistan,

including Marri and Bugti territories, leased areas of Quetta,

Nasirabad, Bolan, Nushki, Kachi, Zhob, Loralai districts and

other parts. As to Kalat State, the F.C.R was applied in cases

wherever and whenever the Political Agent of Kalat, called “the

Resident” found it expedient to do so. Under FCR there was no

12

High Court or Supreme Court. The highest Court of Appeal in

the province against a Jirga award was the agent to the

Governor-General and Chief Commissioner. 48

One can note the

emergence of a British-created privileged class headed by tribal

chiefs and Motabars.49

Because of these chiefs or ‘maliks’

known as tumandars, the British were able to consolidate

themselves in Balochistan with a comparative ease as compared

to the tribal belt in the NWFP.50

Thus with great skill the people

of Balochistan were deprived of Ordinary Laws and other socio-

economic facilities. Even Balochistan was kept outside the ambit

of the reforms recommended for other parts of India by the

Simon Commission. Balochistan was denied its legitimate

constitution rights.51

When the partition of British India came close, the Khan

of Kalat approached the Cabinet Mission on March 24, 1946,

claiming that Kalat was an independent state under the Treaty of

1876 and no decision should be made about its future without

consulting the Khan. He substantiated his arguments by drawing

parallels with the King of Nepal who had an independent status,

diplomatic privileges and immunities granted by the His

Majesty’s Government. Both the Viceroy, and Nehru disagreed

with the Khan’s contentions.52

In 3rd

June Plan it was decided to

hold a referendum in British Balochistan on June 30, 1947 in

Shahi Jirga, excluding the Sardars nominated by the Kalat State

and the non-official members of Quetta Municipality. They

would decide the future affiliations of Balochistan.53

While the

states would decide their future with their own accord. On June

30, 1947 The Shahi Jirga by a unanimous verdict declared itself

for joining the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.54

After the emergence of Pakistan until the army operation

for the arrest of Khan of Kalat in 1958 the main focus of the

incidents remained more on the constitutional bargaining,

speculations than on the armed clashes. Quaid-e-Azam, as the

first Governor General of Pakistan, had constantly in his mind

reforms and securing for the people of Balochistan an adequate

say in the administration and governance of the Province. He

13

could not give his thoughts an effect due to the circumstances

over which he had had little or no control.55

Jinnah speculated on

the nature of the political reforms, which could be gainfully

initiated in Balochistan as some sort of interim arrangements

even before finalisation of the Constitution. He said:

And so I wanted something to be done without

delay for the period between now and the time

when the new constitution would finally

emerge and be inaugurated: something that

would enable the people to share the

responsibilities of their Government and give

them a voice in its administration.56

On February 14, 1948 on the occasion of Sibi Durbar he

announced token reforms. Even though there were legal and

constitutional difficulties in the way of setting up of a

representative form of Government,57

he constituted a

“Governor-General’s Advisory Council”58

in Balochistan, as a

stop-gap arrangement until the constitution of Pakisatan was

ready. He explained the composition and functions of the

council. It would have nominated members, but certainly it

would not be a “nominal body”, in the ordinary sense.59

It would

examine all plans and check the future economic, social,

political, educational and other administrative schemes before

the Chief Commissioner submitted them to the Governor-

General.60

At the Sibi Durbar of 1949 Liaqat Ali Khan, first

prime minister of Pakistan, declared that the Central government

intended to bring Balochistan and the four states to the same

level of administration as the rest of Pakistan.61

By the fall of

1950, he appointed a “Reform Committee on Balochistan” with

the mandate to recommend constitutional and administrative

changes in the existing set-up of the province with due regard to

political, social and economic conditions prevailing therein.62

On

November 17, 1951, in a report presented to the Pakistan

Constituent Assembly, committee recommended the formation

of a Governor’s province in Balochistan without disturbing the

14

existing institution of the Sardari system.63

The princely states of

Balochistan were also to be given due protection.64

About five months after the submission of report on

April 12, 1952, the Central Government through an

administrative measure, and contrary to the recommendations of

the report, decided to merge the four states of Kalat, Makran,

Kharan and Las Bela into ‘The Balochistan States Union’ (BSU)

with a common executive, judiciary and legislature, under the

common Constitution of Pakistan.65

A Covenant was entered into

by the four states to which the Government of Pakistan gave its

concurrence and guaranteed its provisions. The Covenant made

provisions for a Council of Rulers with one of the Rulers elected

as its President, a Prime Minister, appointed by the Government

of Pakistan, Rules of Business and, ultimately a

Constitution.66

Then efforts were made to produce a Constitution

for BSU. An interim Constitution provided, besides other things,

for a Legislative Assembly of 28 elected and 12 nominated

members.67

The Balochistan States Union’s passage through its

existence was brief and undistinguished. Its treasury was empty

and it measured hardly enough to pay for its services. The

council of Ministers hardly ever held a meeting.68

Its first

Assembly elections could no be held on schedule in 1954. On 16

February 1954, a number of Sardars of the States Union

submitted a petition to the AGG at Sibi for the merger of the

Union with the former Balochistan Province. Consequently in

early June, Pakistan States ministry dismissed the BSU

Assembly. On June 16, 1954, it was finally decided through the

Council of Rulers of the Balochistan States Union to merge the

four states with the centrally administered Balochistan.

On July 31, 1954 the National Assembly of Pakistan

authorised framing of a constitution for the acceded states which

would be binding and which shall not be questioned in any court

of law. On the One Unit Scheme the Basic Principles Committee

and the Muslim League recommended Balochistan as a

Governor’s Province with the BSU merged.69

On November 22,

1954, Muhammad Ali Bogra, the Prime Minister of Pakistan

15

finally proposed in the Assembly for integration of four West

Wing provinces, namely the Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and

Balochistan, six Princely States, frontier areas, northern areas

and special tribal areas into a single administrative unit.70

The

merger scheme was actually announced by the Government on

January 3, 1955.71

On September 30, 1955, about a year after

securing the support of the provinces and princely states,

including Kalat, these territories were formally merged

together.72

The First Constitution of Pakistan was presented on

March 23, 1956. It provided for a federal Westminister type

parliamentary government guaranteeing a fair degree of

autonomy to the provinces.73

The provinces were given

executive authority over “Special Areas” and “Exclusive Areas”.

A degree of control over such areas was vested in the Central

Government,74

but the former Balochistan States were not

mentioned as “Special Areas”.75

Balochistan was not given the

status of a governor’s province.

When one tries to have a look on the military operations

of Pakistan army in Balochistan he is met with the claim of the

nationalists who say that the first military operation in

Balochistan was conducted in 1948 on the issue of accession of

Kalat to Pakistan. The nationalists claim that after the signing of

Standstill Agreement (formally announced on 11th August 1947),

Balochistan was declared independent by the Khan of Kalat on

12th August 1947, two days before the creation of Pakistan. Soon

after the declaration of independence, elections were held to

legislature of Kalat.76

On 17th March 1948 Kharan, Makran and

Lasbela decided to cede to Pakistan while Khan of Kalat left the

decision for Deewan-e-Aam and Deewan-e-Khas. Deewan-e-

Aam, therefore, voted against the cession to Pakistan while in

Deewan-e-Khas the votes on the resolution for accession could

not be cast.77

The Pakistani Prime Minister ordered his military

commanders on 26th March 1948 to move into the Baloch coastal

region of Pasni Jiwani. Troops were also sent to Turbat. Garrison

commander in Quetta was ordered to march on Kalat on 1st April

1948 and arrest the Khan unless he signed an agreement to

accession.78

Consequently the Khan’s statement on 27th March

16

declaring unconditional accession (to Pakistan) was prompted by

the reports of the troop movements on the Makran Coast and

against Kalat.79

Whether this claim of army’s intervention is true or not

(The Pakistan government claim and the statements and conduct

of Khan describe that the accession was not forced.) the first

obvious military endeavour in Balochistan appeared when

Pakistan Army arrested the Khan of Kalat in 1958. According to

the official sources Khan’s palace was cordoned off and in the

result of a short ambush, the surrendered Khan, alongwith his

son Mohiuddin, was arrested and flown to Lahore. While the

Khan was being whisked away a crowd collected outside the

palace. It refused to disperse. In due course, the troops opened

fire killing three and wounding two others.80

About 50 of Khan’s

retainers and some 300 other activists were arrested in Kalat and

other towns.81

It was stated that the Khan had stored large

quantity of weapons, food to provide for a large private army.82

On the same day, October 6, President Iskandar Mirza issued an

order, whereby he divested Mir Ahmed Yar Khan of Kalat of all

distinctions, privileges and immunities, including his privy purse

of Rs. 600,000 a year. His eldest son, Prince Daud Jan, who was

back home from school in Britain, was formally nominated his

successor.83

On the day following the arrest of Mir Ahmed Yar

Khan, Martial Law was imposed not only in Balochistan but also

in the entire country.84

One of the reasons to impose martial law

described is the insurgency in Balochistan. The Khan of Kalat,

whether independently, on the instigation of India, Afghanistan

or Iskandar Mirza himself85

(A.B. Awan thinks the Khan’s story

in this regard totally unacceptable86

), had repudiated Kalat’s

accession to Pakistan and appealed to the tribesmen to rise in

arms. Khan desecrated the national flag of Pakistan and hoisted

his own ancestral standard on the palace of Kalat.87

Thus the first phase of Pakistan’s association with

Balochistan (1947-58) is marked as a peaceful period because of

absence of use of military might from the side of the Baloch as

well as of the government. But also the absence of constructive

17

constitutional steps proved this period a wastage of precious

time. There was absence of a constructive programme. Despite a

change in the global political situation, the government, in its

own cause, continued to pursue Britain’s previous military

programme and carried on with British security policy vis-à-vis

the tribes. The dissatisfaction, which, in 1955 and 1956, had

spread amongst the tribes and escalated into violent excesses,

forced the central government to its first military intervention, a

punitive expedition on the British pattern.88

The Jhlawan disturbances, which followed in the wake

of the Martial Law, could be split up into two bits. The first set

was spearheaded by Sardar Nauroz Khan Zarakzai and lasted for

less than a year. The second set lasted, with varying degrees of

intensity, from 1959 to 1963, extended over a slightly larger area

and its motivating forces were more numerous and more

varied.89

In fact disturbances started almost immediately after the

arrest of Khan of Kalat. A train was fired upon and a gang of

Mengal tribesmen raided the sub-treasury at Wadh and removed

the firearms, which had been deposited under the Martial Law

Regulation.90

On October 10, 1958 the army located a Lashkar

near Wad, about 40 miles south of Khuzdar.91

Then the army

blocked some mountain passes to check recalcitrant elements in

Jhalawan from neighbouring Sarawan. Some skirmishes were

reported between the troops and the tribesmen. Naoroz Khan

(Namrouz Khan92

), ninety years old Chief of the Zehri tribe

assembled a Lashkar of some 500 men in the mountains of

Jhalawan93

and demanded for unconditional release of the Khan

of Kalat, return of confiscated arms, and annulment of One

Unit.94

The spirit of insurgency grew and a number of guerrilla

bands joined Naoroz Khan in the hills. Soon it spread all over

Jhalawan district and the army got deeply involved in counter-

insurgency measures. On some occasions air strafing, too, had to

be undertaken.95

Nevertheless, the power of the rebels could not

be broken in a regular battle between the Army and Naoroz

Khan’s Lashkar.96

In fact they continued to hit whenever an

opportunity lent itself to them. The insurgency lasted for about a

year.97

18

The course of fight weakened the tribal lashkars and the

negotiations started between the government and tribesmen. The

representatives of both sides met in order to discuss the terms of

cessation of hostilities. During or after the meeting on the night

between the 19th and 20

th May 1959

98, Naoroz Khan and some of

his sons and followers were detained. It was claimed, they had

been promised safety and amnesty99

and their detention was a

case of breach of trust and truce.100

Subsequently, 163 persons

were tried by a Special Military Court set up in Mach Jail near

Quetta.101

Naoroz Khan Zairakazai, his son Batay Khan and fiver

other members of his family were awarded capital

punishment.102

In July 1960, the rebels were executed in Sukkur

Jail but Nawab Naoroz Khan’s death sentence was commuted to

life prison in view of his old age. He died four years later in

Kohlu Prison.103

Giving Pakistan a new constitution of 1962 in which

Balochistan was not given the status of full province, President

Ayub Khan conducted a new ‘tribal policy’ (the so-called system

of ‘basic democracies’), with the aid of administrative machinery

borrowed form the Pathan tribal structure, which attempted

either to hold the traditional tribal authorities accountable or to

circumvent them (Scholz, 1971. pp. 250 ff.). In indirect fashion,

the tribal societies were finally to be opened, made accessible to

influence from the outside, and thereby integrated into the

overarching state polity. At its lowest level, the system of basic

democracies corresponded to the earlier councils of elders of the

respective tribes; on a higher plane, to the Jirga assemblies; and

in further organizational stages, continued right up to the

provincial government. Whilst with the Pathans, elected

representatives sat in the former councils of elders, and with the

Baluchis representatives destined by birth did so, the new

institutions were composed partly of persons elected by the

people and partly of persons nominated by the government.

Eight hundred to one thousand persons, respectively, were

represented by and elected representative. The lower

organizational units, the union councils, were entrusted with

19

local dispensation of justice, planning and selection of

development projects, and local administration. In addition, they

functioned as control and appeal channels in cases of any

decisions by the Sardars concerning the tribal population. Whilst

the new government, on the one hand, sought to limit the power

of the traditional leaders, on the other hand, it still left with

numerous tribes the right to bear arms, or the entitlement to tax

concessions and other privileges. It also continued paying the

subsidies introduced by the British. However, these were now

pegged to the condition of using the funds for projects for the

entire tribe, no longer solely for the sardar’s benefit.104

The second set of disturbances was dominated in the

areas of Mengals. From there they moved up north to the Marri-

Bugti area. The Mengal disturbances took their origin from two

main causes. First was a general Martial Law order of the

surrender of all firearms without a valid license; the second was

the rumour of Land Reforms.105

As soon as the Mengals heard

their Sardar made to deposit his firearms in January 1959 they

raided the depository, manhandled the senior government

representative present and bodily removed the offending

weapons. This brought out the Civil Armed Forces who were

badly mauled. Ataullah Mengal had not yet turned hostile, so he

brought the hostiles to heel and every body patted everybody

else on the back and called it a day.

In another incident Akbar Bugti, sardar and Tumandar of

the powerful Bugti tribe since young age, educated in Aitchison

College at Lahore, by marriage connected with powerful Baloch

families, former MNA and Minister of State of Republican

Party106

was sentenced to transportation for life and his driver

awarded the death penalty in October 1959. While in 1963

prominent tribal Sardars, Akbar Bugti, Ataullah Khan Mengal

and Khair Bakhsh Marri were deposed from chieftainships. The

governor of West Pakistan appointed in their places other men

who were favourably disposed towards the Government. In 1963

the “Ferraries” assassinated the new appointees, Dodha Khan, an

uncle of Khair Bakhsh Marri and Karam Khan Mengal, the uncle

20

of Sardar Ataullah Mengal’s father. 107

In consequence Ataullah

along with his father went to jail. A relative, Ali Muhammad

Mengal, now took up cudgels and made the vicinity of the

Khuzdar-Wadh road the area of his operations causing

considerable damage to the prestige of the government. Ali

Muhammad demanded the release of Ataullah, not licensing the

Firearms, the restoration of customary law of the Baloch, closing

of police stations, stoppage of the construction of the Khuzdar-

Wadh road.108

By July 1963, Sher Muhammad Marri, a towering,

hulk of a man, who already had undergone a total of fourteen

years imprisonment for “seditions activities, had established base

camps in Marri-Bugti and Mengal areas. He avoided pitched

battles and resorted to harassment in the classical guerrilla

warfare fashion and laid ambushes on army convoys, army

engineers engaged in road construction and army signals deputed

on telephone maintenance.109

In December 1964 some five hundred Marris attacked an

army camp in the area, which resulted in heavy casualties on

both sides. The Army bulldozed the fruit gardens of the relatives

of Mir Sher Marri. Another battle was fought in the Gharur area

in December 1965, where the Army reportedly suffered high

casualties. In another battle in Bambore that year the army

allegedly used napalm in its air raids.110

In September 1966, a

big Police Force marched through the Marri-Bugti area from

Kehan Kohlu and Quetta. It met resistance and was brought to a

halt and suffered casualties. The Zhob Militia was asked for

help. Sixteen platoons of Zhob Militia, eight platoons of Pishin

Scouts and thirteen more from South Waziristan came for help.

In a week’s skirmishing the Police and the CAF had suffered 2

killed and 6 wounded. A number of weapons were also lost.111

The Balochistan People Liberation Front became active and

published an underground newspaper called “Spark” in Balochi,

Urdu and English languages.112

On 28th January 1967 the President of Pakistan accepted

the mercy appeal of the Sardars of Kalat and Quetta divisions to

pardon certain tribesmen of Marri, Bugti and Mengal

21

clans.113

Ataullah and Akbar Bugti were released and there was a

general amnesty but in return they did not lay down arms

publicly.114

Before the year was out Khair Bakhsh had come out

with some novel demands of compensation for the losses

suffered in 1965-66, the right of property of the Sardar and the

elders on all mineral in any particular area, right of Sardars to

enlist the levies and Jirga members, the restoration of old

privileges of the Sardars, withdrawal of police and revenue staff,

no construction of roads in their areas and amnesty to the

murderers of his uncle. In the result in May 1968 Muhammad

Akbar Khan Bugti, Gul Khan Naseer, Abdus Samad Achakzai

and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo were taken into custody once again.

Fighting began once again in Eastern Balochistan. Insurgents

also raided some places in adjoining Upper Sindh. There was

trouble in the Fat Feeder Area. The friction stemmed from the

overlapping claims on land of rival tribal groups on instigation of

the Sardars.115

At the beginning of 1968, the Army, under the

command of Major General Tika Khan, GOC 8th

Division, struck

the insurgents. Sher Muhammad Marri put up a stiff

resistance.116

With the second martial law coming into effect (1969)

West Pakistan province was dissolved and the former provinces

were restored. As for Balochistan, it emerged as a full-fledged

governor’s province.117

New martial law administrator and

president of Pakistan Yahya Khan, having restored previous

privileges to the tribal leaders, appealed to them to become

directly involved in political co-operation. He repealed arrest and

deportation sentences with respect to prominent tribal members,

and induced them to stand as candidates in the first democratic

elections held in 1970.The majority of the elected Sardars

belonged to the National Awami Party (NAP) which opposed

Bhutto’s ruling PPP.118

Hostilities of Baloch nationalist ceased

when Yahya Khan had met their principal demand including

disintegration of One Unit. But they did not dismantle their

“Command Headquarters”. Nor did they disband guerrilla

formations.119

22

In 1973 Federal Constitution was passed with the

consent of the National Awami Party NAP(overriding the

reservations of the Baloch leadership). The constitution accepted

Balochistan as a province. The 1973 constitution envisaged that

the concurrent list would go to the provinces in a period of ten

years (by 1983).120

This constitution is claimed to be mostly

agreed document in Pakistan’s constitutional history but it

appears that the insurgency in Balochistan had nothing with the

enforcement of this constitution. It was the provincial politics

that had an impact on the insurgency in Balochistan.

On February 12, 1973, the People’s Party government

dismissed the duly elected Balochistan Government of Ataullah

Mengal and banned NAP and arrested their leaders.121

The

federal government based the reasons for dissolution of ministry

on three major incidents. First was a conspiracy in London,

named “The London Plan.” According to the media reports, in

the beginning of September 1972, opposition leaders, allegedly,

had consultations with Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman, in order to plan

the disintegration of Pakistan by splitting it up into several

autonomous states.122

Secondly all newspapers of the 11th of

February 1973 carried a statement from the Government of

Pakistan to the effect that a party of Government officials

discovered a large consignment of Russian arms and ammunition

from Iraqi Embassy.123

The media built up the story that the

Russian arms were meant for the NAP, who were going to stage

an insurrection in the country.124

Thirdly political and tribal

differences in the leaders of Balochistan province, about the end

of January 1973, made Chief Minister Mengal to lead his tribal

lashkars against the tribesmen of Jamot tribe, the tribe of Jam

Ghulam Qadar, who had created insurrection in Las Bela and the

local police and the levies sat back and did nothing about it. He

was reported wrongly that the Civil Armed Forces of the Central

Government arrived but did not oblige the local authorities by

killing a few of the recalcitrant. The Chief Minister left for the

scene at once, to lead the faithful into battle. On this the federal

government intervened at once and sent in the Army and the

Civil Armed Forces.125

According to Mengal the trouble started

23

with the cutting of telephone wires by “miscreants”. He deployed

the levies to stop them. He also sent a thousand strong Lashkar

to reinforce the levies. But the central government’s version

through Home minister Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, on February

6, 1973, said that troops had been sent to Balochistan to prevent

a clash between the Lashkar of “Bizenjo-Mengal” and some

tribes and residents of Las Bela district.126

The Army formally took over on the 8th of February and

on the 15th February 1973 Akbar Bugti was sworn in as the

Governor of Balochistan. Bugti, as governor of the province,

supported the army action. In his address on the occasion of a

“Barakhana” (an Armed Forces lunch or dinner for jawans for a

special occasion) arranged in honour of 45 Punjab and 44 Punjab

Nawab Bugti congratulated them to save Pakistan with the help

of Army action.127

He disbanded Mengal’s tribal lashkars, the

Dehi Muhafiz, and arrested some of its members. He informed

that the Marri tribesmen had been receiving guerrilla training for

many years, Mengal’s brother, Mehr Ullah, was leading the

dissidents in Jhalawan and that under the new constitution, the

people of Balochistan felt that they had been given equal

representation and were being treated as equal partners. To

tighten his grip on administration he got some senior officers

from the Central pool and discarded some of the local officers

who were suspected to have been involved with the previous

Government. He henceforth exercised all executive, financial

and political powers personally. Funds, developmental and non-

developmental, were under his tight grip and not approved

scheme could be undertaken unless cleared by the Governor. 128

Dismissal of NAP government marked the beginning of

another phase of insurgency in Balochistan.129

In early April

1973, the hostilities were at their peak under Sher Muhammad

Marri’s trusted lieutenant Mir Hazar. Pitched against them were

three divisions of the Pakistan Army. The insurgents were

commanded by seventy-two years old Laung Khan. 130

The

disturbed area was in Jhalawan, surrounding the Mengal tribes

abode. The lashkars retreating from the Bela encounters were

24

indulging in sporadic acts of sniping and wire-cutting. Then an

important Marri recalcitrant, Sher Muhammad Marri, was

arrested. This set into motion a chain reaction. The Army and the

CAF were spreading out into the Mengal and Marri areas and

there were frequent clashes. By the end of April, the situation

had further deteriorated. The RCD Highway was mostly out of

commission or useable only under armed escorted convoy. 131

At

a place called Tandoori, on the Sibi Harnai Railway Line, on the

8th of May 1973. A party of Dir Scouts (from the NWFP)

moving along the track for Railway protection duty was

ambushed and eight were killed or maimed. One light machine

gun, one stengun and five rifles, with quantities of ammunition,

were taken away.132

There was a blockade of the Marri area,

which resulted in scarcity of food grains. The Army cleared the

villages in this sector fairly easily: but, it faced stiff resistance at

Mali, the Sector Headquarters of Laung Khan. In the operation

Laung Khan and 35 other Baloch were killed. The army suffered

14 casualties.133

In December Bugti resigned from governorship

and the old Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baloch, was

the new governor, who reiterated his firm and unflinching faith

in the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan.134

The insurgency remained at a high pitch during 1974. In

July 1974 the rebels blocked gravel roads linking Balochistan

with the neighbouring provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Likewise

oil and gas survey and drilling teams operation in the Marri-

Bugti areas were attacked.135

The area of operations extended

from the town of Dera Ghazi Khan in the Punjab to Sibi, south of

Quetta and from Dadu in Sindh to Nushki, close to the Afghan

border. In the area of their operation the army convoys moved

under protection and prior picquetting of the routes was resorted

to.

In August of 1974 repeated ambushes took place in

Madi Tak, a place in Loralai next to the Marri areas. Casualties

on both sides were high. This must have prompted the army to

launch an attack at the summer grazing grounds of the Marris at

a place called Cahmalang in the Duki sub-division of Loralai

25

district.136

On September 3, 1974 army launched “Operation

Chamalang”, which lasted three days. In this operation Pakistan

Air Force, was employed for spotting and essential strafing. The

army claimed, 120 guerrillas were killed and 900 captured. This

was the bloodiest encounter recorded in Baloch insurgency,

which broke the back of the guerrillas. After this they started

withdrawing to the hills. The army followed them. In the

mopping up operation, the rebels were flushed out of hideouts

and a large number were made to surrender. Many escaped to

Afghanistan. Their sanctuaries dried up and the army

encirclement became all the more effective.137

In late 1975, Mir Hazrat Ramkhani along with some

other commanders moved out to Afghanistan and made a

number of sanctuaries along the common border.138

From there

they mounted cross-border raids whenever an opportunity lent

itself to them. With the moving out of insurgents’ Headquarters

to Afghanistan the guerrilla force level in Balochistan declined

and so did the level of insurgency. Government sources indicated

that in whole insurgency there were 178 major army encounters

of which 84 took place in the Marri area in the year 1974.139

Other took place in Central Balochistan, particularly in Sarawan

and Jhalawan areas and in isolated areas liked Nushki, Kharan

and Turbat.140

Bhutto, speaking to a public meeting at Quetta on 9th

April 1976, in the presence of Khan of Kalat, announced that

legally the Sardari System is being brought to an end. The same

day, the President of Pakistan issued an Ordinance abolishing the

Sardari system in Pakistan. 141

Bhutto’s action of abolition of

Sardari system was responded with a number of bomb

explosions in the Pashtun areas of Quetta, Pishin and Loralai. In

the last week of April, a party of Marri outlaws engaged an army

commando party and inflicted heavy casualties. Small incidents

continued but a serious incident took place two months later

when a party of the Federal Security Force was ambushed in the

pat Feeder area and 11 of them were killed. The Police retaliated

26

with a large number of arrests. Skirmishes at this level continued

till the end of the year.142

The Baloch insurgency lasted for almost four years and

ended with the promulgation of Martial Law of Ziaul Haq in

1977.143

During the Martial Law government there was return to

the old policy of reconciliation with Sardars and peace was

restored in the province.144

The Chief Martial Law Administrator

disbanded the Hyderabad Tribuanal on the 1st of January, 1978,

ordered the release of all the accused and declared an amnesty

for those who had left their homes during the disturbances in

Balochistan. He said that the folding up of the Tribunal was in

the general interest of the country.145

The next two decades remained uneventful in the sense

that both sides avoided confrontation. During the Benazir Bhutto

and Nawaz Sharif regimes there was almost normality. The

presidents and the prime ministers of the time were happy to

visit the province once or twice a year and left the local affairs to

the elected governments.146

Only one exception was that under

Benazir, the Balochistan assembly was dissolved in 1988 but

was revived under orders of the High Court.147

In the start of 2005 the disturbance in Balochistan once

again started. An incident of Gang rape, inside the hospital run

by the gas company in its Sui installations, was apparent cause of

trouble in Sui and Dera Bugti. According to some commentators,

the basic issue in Akbar Bugti’s confrontation with the

government was his desire to earn more from the government.148

Whatever the cause was on 17th

March 2005 in a clash of

tribesmen with the army 10 soldiers of Pakistan Army and

allegedly as many as 60 civilians died and many more injured.

Then there was a regular campaign of sabotage and ambush

while bomb blasts continued at many places. As shoddy

Balochistan Liberation Army was claiming credit for the attacks

on infrastructure –railway tracks, gas pipelines and governmental

symbols. In fact trouble in Sui and Dera Bugti was not an

isolated event, sparked either by the rape incident or by the

27

revolt of Akbar Bugti. The situation on the whole is one of a

slow burning of the fuse of a Baloch nationalist revolt, with

occasional spectacular flare-ups like the Dera Bugti one.149

This

fact can be proved with the fact that Gazeen Marri son of Khair

Bakhsh Marrri, and brother of Balach Marri who commands

Baloch Liberation Army, had arranged to launch Baloch Voice

TV on 15th June. Security forces arrested him during 13-19 April

2006.150

The military operation (denied by the government but

confirmed by other sources) was driven by the mindset that there

was an Indian hand behind the political unrest. The tribal leaders

were seen as getting funds and/or weapons from New Delhi.

(There was no denying the fact that the resistance appears well

funded so there may be multiple financial sponsors. Iran and the

US could also be included in the list).151

The leaders of the Baloch struggle have concern that the

federal government manages most development work in

Balochistan and the provincial government has little, if any, role

in determining the development priorities and the execution of

the development plans. And also there is a disproportionate

allocation of resources to the areas where the federal government

has strong interests like minerals and natural gas, or the existing

or planned army garrisons (cantonment), coastal highway and

Gawadar. Other areas get less attention. The Baloch activists are

worried about the increase in non-Balcoh population in the

project areas – especially Gawadar. They complain the more jobs

are going to non-locals. They complain about the alleged sale of

land in the Gwadar area to people from outside the province.

Moneyed outsiders have purchased in the Gwadar area to people

from outside this has, in some areas, displaced the poverty ridden

Baloch.Almost all Baloch leaders want to increase Balochistan’s

share in natural gas royalty and development surcharge.152

To solve the issue with peaceful conciliatory efforts the

parliamentary committee chaired by Chauhdry Shujaat Hussain

on Balochistan unanimously approved a report by its

subcommittee chaired by Senator Mushahid Hussain. The main

committee decided the constitutional recommendations,

28

separately proposed by another subcommittee headed by Senator

Wasim Sajjad. The committee proposed that the federal

government form a taskforce in consultation with it to ensure the

implementation of the recommendation within 90 days.

Proposing several administrative measures to build confidence

(CBMs) in Balochistan, the committee recommended the

Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Coastal Guard must be

withdrawn from the roads and interior of the Balochistan

province. These forces should only patrol the borders and check

smuggling of narcotics and arms. The committee recommended

that any FC check post, which is necessary in the interior of the

province, must be set up under a specified procedure. The

committee recommended that

Arrears of gas royalty must be estimated by June 30 and cleared

before December 2005.

1- Gwadar Port Authority head office should be shifted

from Karachi to Gwadar and all the appointments from

BS 1 to 16 should be reserved for the people of

Makran and Balochistan.

2- Level of development and degree of backwardness

should be the foremost among the NFC award criteria.

3- Federal Legislative List should be revised to ensure

maximum autonomy to provinces. Concurrent List be

abolished and the Federal List be limited to core

functions of the federation i.e. defence, foreign

relations, federal finance and currency,

communications and inter-provincial harmony,

coordination and national solidarity.

4- Job quota (5.7 percent for Balochistan) defined under

the constitution be strictly implemented in all federal

ministries, divisions, corporations and departments.

5- New dams be built, agricultural loans to draught-hit

farmers and their electricity bills be writ off.

Coming on the report Rauf Mengal said the nationalists

would not compromise on any thing less than complete

provincial autonomy.153

29

It can be concluded that Balochistan is a backward area

and major powers of the world always have been busy to take

hold of this arid and rocky area with force and not law. Lawfully

and according to the rules and rights, the people of this area

fought against every intruder and to much extent remained

autonomous. The British, with the policy of “divide and rule”

tried to rule over the area indirectly. They also used military

power whenever and wherever it was necessary. The tribes of

Balochistan kept on fighting against them or one another always.

The result was that they became more backward due to the

continuous enmities, fighting and worn out traditional tribal laws

without modern reforms. The modern political institutions could

not develop and take firm roots in them. When these areas

became a part of Pakistan, Pakistani governments did not try to

have relations with the masses of area on equal basis and did not

pay proper attention to the development of political and

economic institutions in the area and if there was some effort to

do something it was late or not hitting the right place. The

deprived tribesmen or power thirst tribal leaders carried on

making efforts to get their rights on gunpoint while the

governments answered in the form of the military operations.

The issues have been tackled on ad-hoc basis. Often the use of

force has been considered the solution of the crisis. Balochistan

is looking forward to take active part in the march to

development and progress.

Notes & References

1 A.W. Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, (Quetta: Gosha-e-

Adab, 1977), p. 177 2 Ibid, pp. 177-178

3 Percival Spear, India, (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 54

4 Lt. Col. Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its strategic

Importance, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992), p. 59 5 Ibid., p. 59

6 Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, pp. 178-179

30

7 A.B.Awan, Baluchistan Historical and Political Process,

(London: Century Publishers, 1985), p. 17 8 Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, pp. 178-179

9 Iqbal, Balochistan Its strategic Importance, p. 41

10 Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, p. 179

11 Iqbal, Balochistan Its strategic Importance, p. 41

12 Ibid., p. 42

13 Awan, Baluchistan, p. 26

14 Ainslie T. Embree, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, (Karachi:

Royal Book Company, 1979), p. 88 15

Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its strategic Importance, pp. 43-44 16

Embree, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, p. 88 17

Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, pp. 179- 189 18

Justice Mir Khuda Bukhash Bijarani, Searchlights on Baloches

and Balochistan, (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), p. 307 19

Fred Scholz, Nomadism & Colonialism, (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002), p. 90 20

Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, pp. 204-205 21

Embree, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, p. 91 22


Scholz, Nomadism & Colonialism, p. 90 24


Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Baluchistan, (Lahore:

Ferozsons, 1990), p. 97 26

Ibid., pp. 103-104 27

Brigadier Usman Hasan, Balochistan, (Karachi: Indus

Publications, 1976), p. 74 28


Ibid., p. 91 30

Brigadier Usman Hasan, Balochistan, p. 75 31

Quddus, The Tribal Baluchistan, pp. 103-104 32

Meer Gul Khan Naseer, Tareekh-e-Balochistan, (Quetta, Kalat

Publishers, 1979), p. 209 33

Syed Mahmood Shah Bukhari, Tareekh-e-Balochistan,

(Quetta: Book Land, 1983), pp. 348-351 34

Bukhari, Tareekh-e-Balochistan, pp. 387-388 35

Naseer, Tareekh-e-Balochistan, p. 350

31

36

Quddus, The Tribal Baluchistan, pp. 103-104 37

Naseer, Tareekh-e-Balochistan, pp. 366-367 38

Ibid., p. 302 39

Scholz, Nomadism & Colonialism, pp. 102-103 40

Ibid., pp. 90-92 41

Naseer, Tareekh-e-Balochistan, p. 326 42

Ibid., p. 328 43

Scholz, Nomadism & Colonialism, pp. 93-96 44

Ibid., p. 96 45

Ibid., p. 93 46

Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its strategic Importance, p. 161 47

Bijarani, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 308 48

Ibid., p. 310 49

Ibid., p. 311 50

Dr. Noor ul Haq, “Balochistan: its past and present”,

Dawn(05-02-2005) 51

Justice Shameem Hussain Kadri, Creation of Pakistan,

(Lahore: Wajidalis Limited, 1982), p.43 52


Ibid., p. 112 54

Ibid., p. 112 55

M. Rafique Afzal, Selected Speeches and Statements of the

Quaid-e-Azam, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973), p.

53. 56

Ibid., p. 56. 57

Ibid., p. 56. 58

Ibid., p. 56. 59

Ibid., p. 57. 60

Ibid., p. 57. 61

M. Rafique Afzal, Speeces and statements of Quaid-e-Millat

Liaquat Ali Khan 1941-51, (Lahore: Research Society of

Pakistan, 1975), p. 324 62


Report of the committee on Constitutional and Administrative

Reforms in Balochistan. Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan,

October 11, 1951. Karachi. Cf. Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its

strategic Importance, p. 151

32

64

Constitution Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature), Debates,

November 17, 1951, p. 38 cf. Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its

strategic Importance, p. 151. 65


Awan, Baluchistan, pp. 214-215 67

Ibid., p. 215 68

Ibid., p. 216 69

Dawn, September 16, 1954. cf. Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its

strategic Importance, p. 152 70

Inamur Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development in

Pakistan (1947-1958), (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1982),

p. 82 71


Inamur Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development,

p. 85 73

See the First Constitution of Pakistan, Federation and the

Provinces, Part VI, Chapter 1 paragraphs 106 through 110. 74

Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (London: George

Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1963), p. 336 75

See Administrative Relations between the Federation and the

Provinces. Part VI. Chapter IV, paragraph 125-132 of the First

Constitution of Pakistan. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study,

(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1963), p. 336 76

Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan

Emergence Dimensions Repercurssions, (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab,

1988), pp. 181-182 77

Choudhry Fawad Hussain, “Balochistan ka Masala Tareekh ke

Aeenay main” Jang (04-03-05) 78

Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle, p. 189 79

Ibid., p. 189 80

L. Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development,

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 168 81

Selig S Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch

Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: Carnegie

Endowment for international Peace, 1981), p. 27 82

Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, p. 168 83

Wilcox, p. 206

33

84

Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, p. 163 85


Awan, Baluchistan, p. 225 87

Ziring, Pakistan, p. 163 and Karl Von Vorys, Political

Development in Pakistan, (London: Oxford University Press,

1965), p. 143 88

Ibid., p. 97 89


Ibid., pp. 227-228 91

Selig S Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch

Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: Carnegie

Endowment for international Peace, 1981), p. 28 92

Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle, p. 201 93

Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 28 94

Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 145 95






Ibid., p. 28 101

Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 145 102


Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 28-29 104



Ibid., p. 253 107




Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle, pp. 202-

203 111



The Pakistan Times 28th January 1967 114


Ibid., p. 176

34

116

Ibid., p. 176 117

Ibid., p. 176 118



Imtiaz Alam, “Balochistan: back on fire?,” The News, 17th

January 2005 121

Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 35 and Amir Usman,

“Genesis of Balochistan crisis,” Dawn 23rd May 2005 122

Awan, Baluchistan, p.267 123

Ibid., p. 271 124

Ibid., p. 271 125

Ibid., pp. 274-275 126


Ikram Sehgal, “The Bugtis and Balochistan,” Pakistan Times,

15th March 2005 128




Awan, Baluchistan, p. 279-280 132

Ibid, p. 279 133





Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan Its strategic Importance, pp. 184-

185 138

Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 81-82 139

Ibid., p. 39 140



Ibid, pp. 292-293 143

Amir Usman, “Genesis of Balochistan crisis,” Dawn, 23 rd

May 2005 144

Dr. Noor ul Haq, “Balochistan: its past and present”, Dawn,

5th February 2005 145

Awan, Baluchistan, p. 302

35

146

Amir Usman, “Genesis of Balochistan crisis,” Dawn, 23 rd

May 2005 147

Dr. Noor ul Haq, “Balochistan: its past and present”, Dawn,

5th February 2005 148

Anwar Syed, “Conflict in Dera Bugti,” Dawn, 10th April

2005 149

M B Naqvi, “Simple Facts about Balochistan’s State of

Unrest” Daily Times, 31st March 2005 150

Maqbool Arshad (Gazeen Marri kaisay pakra giya 8-11)

Weekly Nida-e-Millat (13-19 April), Lahore. p. 11 151

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, Balochistan: learning form 1971, 152

Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Challenge of Balochistan, Dawn,

02nd

April 2006 153

Shahzad Raza, “Mushahid’s Balochistan Proposals

Approved,” Daily Times, 03rd

May 2005

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