Duke University

The Fall of Rome: Understanding “Barbarization” through the Shifting Strategic and Tactical

Requirements of Roman Warfare in Late Antiquity

Curtis Lee

CLST 551S: Roman Archaeology

Alicia Jiménez

20 November 2020

Introduction

In the 3rd century AD, the Roman Empire had begun to see the incursion of various

aggressive peoples along its borders on the Rhine, Danube, and in the East along the Euphrates.

Contemporaneous to these new threats, the Roman Army had begun to increasingly adapt to the

regional peculiarities present within its respective zones of operations and through its use of

auxilia and incorporation of “barbarizing” affects in the legions. In doing so, it has been said to

have become institutionally barbarized—adopting the same barbarian affects used by the “other”

who they so opposed—which has, in turn, led Classical scholarship to point towards this

“barbarization” as a diminution of the capabilities of the Roman army, and an overdetermined

cause of the collapse of the Roman Empire. However, this paper seeks to upset this traditionalist

narrative through an examination of the archaeological site as Dura-Europos.

Using this mid-3rd century site from the province of Syria Creole, this paper seeks to

understand the shifting strategic goals of the Roman army during the 3rd and 4th centuries AD in

response to the aggressive expansion of the Sassanid Persians, and how the material record

reflects both military cultural changes and tactical alterations—in terms of defenses, town layout,

deployments, etc.—incorporated as a means of adapting to newfound strategic necessities.

Furthermore, by examining the transformation occurring within the Roman army both

structurally and culturally during this period, and combining historical and archaeological means

of investigation, this paper answers how and why the Roman army became increasingly

provincial and why this was not a cause of the fall of Rome, but a sustaining force that defended

the empire during times of crisis.

The Development of Dura-Europos Prior to Roman Occupation

Dura-Europos was a settlement situated along the middle of the Euphrates on the borders

of the Seleucid and Parthian Empires, and subsequently the Roman and Sassanian Empires after

the conquests of the former by the latter in the second and third centuries AD. The city was

founded by Macedonian veterans in the 300s BCE who called the settlement Europos; albeit, the

largely Aramaic-speaking population labeled the city Dura, or “fortress,” giving the settlement

its hyphenated name and alluding to its existence as a crossroads on the liminality of multiple

imperial powers throughout antiquity (James 2019, 3). The Seleucids were the ones who invested

into the Hellenistic city: creating a Hippodamian street grid outlining a much larger city area

than was initially occupied by the veterans, constructing a circuit wall, and rebuilding what has

been labeled the Strategeion, or “Redoubt Palace,” on the plateau looking over the city (James

2019, 50). Following these constructions and renovations of the city’s structures, the city is

thought to have been absorbed by the Parthian Empire around 113-110 BC in which we see a

continued and gradual filling of the city area within the confines of the Hellenistic circuit wall

(James 2019, 50). The buildup of the city under Parthian sovereignty did not alter the cultural

dynamics of the city, as Miller notes it always maintained a Greek public character (Miller

2006), yet it’s transformation into a regional administrative center shows various cultural

markings that indicate the mixed cultural foundations of the city along with the structures of the

city, itself. For example, the Agora more closely resembles a Parthian bazaar than that of the

traditional Greco-Roman forms seen further West. Thus, certain structural characteristics

indicate both the likely chronology of the development of the city; but, more importantly, an

indication of some form of cultural interaction and co-existence between its two primary ethnic

groups—a Greek elite and a Semitic majority—in which the Semitic majority held greater

influence on the architectural forms seen in the material record—housing, sanctuaries, the agora,

etc. Another example of such cultural mixing, is the syncretization of Greek deities with those of

the Semitic population in concurrence with the presence of a synagogue (James 2019, 50), and

various other cult deities which are expanded based on “Babylonian forms” (James 2019, 51),

and which Leriche identifies as being central to immigrant communities in Dura of which the

largest was that of the Palymrenes (Leriche 2016, 181; Kaizer 2017). Thus, the cultural diversity

of Dura-Europos was already firmly established prior to the Roman conquest in which additional

cultural interactions would emerge with new syncretizations—the Mithraeum, the Temple of

Bel, the Temple of the Roman-Archers—but also Roman military standardizations in regard to

the defensive structures brought about through Sassanid Persian aggressions.

The Roman Garrison at Dura-Europos

The Romans gained sovereignty over Dura-Europos in the middle of the second century

AD with the earliest datable textual evidence leaving it within the hands of a garrison of

Palmyrene archers in 168 BC as attested by an inscription in the Mithraeum (PR 7/8, 84-85). The

Roman military presence in Dura-Europos was tenuous during this period, and it is likely the

Palmyrene archers were acting as symmachiarii, or as “allies and proxies for Roman authorities”

(James 2019, 244). From this early dating up until the reforms of Severus, there are only minor

additions to the Roman garrison; however, the arrival of Cohors II Ulpia in Dura, which an

inscription on an altar at the Palmyrene Gate attests to 193 AD (PR 1, 42-44), is one notable

addition as it shows a distinguishable and definitive Roman military presence in the city—and is

a precursor to the shift in significance that the city would truly enjoy under Severus, Caracalla,

and in the Crisis of the Third Century. The Cohors II Ulpia is no longer found in the material

record of Dura-Europos after approximately 210 AD, which coincides with the renovations

under Septimius Severus, after which it is replaced by Cohors XX Palmyrenorum.

Cohors XX Palmyrenorum is first attested in 208 AD from two separate letters; however,

it is not until 225 AD that men from the unit are explicitly mentioned at Dura-Europos (James

2019, 307). Nevertheless, based on several letters concerning the placement of detachments

within surrounding settlements, it can be reasonably confirmed that the Cohors XX

Palmyrenorum was present in Dura following the Severan renovations circa 210 AD. Another

interesting distinction concerning the Cohors XX Palmyrenorum is its unique organizational

structure and leadership. The Cohors XX was led by a tribune rather than a prefect which would

seem to mark it as a milliary as opposed to the expected quingenary, yet there is a lack of textual

or epigraphic evidence to support such a designation and the structure of the Cohors—the

number of centuries and turmae—is radically different from what would be expected of a

milliary (James 2019, 247). James reconciles the various issues with defining the size and

designation of the Cohors XX by assuming the centuries and turmae were double strength similar

to the organization of the first cohorts of post-Flavian legions, and that this was a change that

happened later in the presence of the garrison within the city (James 2019, 247). It can further be

inferred that such a doubling is in response to the rise of the Sassanid Persians and their raids

across the border. For example, Cohors XX Palmyrenorum had a dromadarii attachment (P.

Dura 82 in Campbell 1994), and was itself a unit with roughly equal distribution of centuries and

turmae suggesting a need to remain mobile, and adapting to Persian horse archers. Additionally,

the doubling of the size of each cohort and turmae would allow for larger detachments to

settlements along the Euphrates, and for significantly more populated defenses in the case of a

siege at Dura-Europos, itself.

While the Cohors arrived at Dura-Europos at an early stage in its development as a

Roman settlement, and continually played a significant role in the operations within and

surrounding the city, they were not the only troops tasked with garrisoning the city and region.

Dura-Europos, as a city within the province of Syria Creole, was afforded vexillations from the

provinces two legions—IV Scythica and VXI Flavia Firma—as attested by inscriptions within

the Mithraeum dating to its renovation circa 210 AD (PR 7-8, 85). The presence of the

vexillation from IV Scythica is continuous after its arrival circa 210 AD, and it is noteworthy that

the vexillation becomes connected with the city such that a papyri fragment from 254 AD

denotes it as “the local vexillation;” albeit, as James notes, the chronology of occupation drawn

from the papyri record is open to interpretation (P. Dura 32; James 2019, 248). The significance

of the presence of vexillations at Dura-Europos, the duration and formalization of the garrison,

and the implications concerning manpower and unit strength are all relevant to discussions

concerning the state of the empire during the Crisis of the Third Century; but, also the shifting

strategic goals of the Roman Empire as it entered into Late Antiquity.

Firstly, the significance of the consistent presence of two vexillations based out of Dura-

Europos signifies its heightened importance as an intermediary city on the liminality of the

Roman and Persian empires. The increased garrison at Dura-Europos combined with its

increased fortifications signal a concern of late-Parthian and early-Sassanid aggression aimed at

the heart of Rome’s territorial possessions in the East—its possessions in the newly created

province of Mesopotamia and the city of Antioch in Syria Creole. The capital of the Sassanian

Empire was located at Ctesiphon on the Tigris south-east of Dura-Europos, and as such, any

Sassanid army marching on Roman territory would be forced to march in the vicinity of the

Tigris or Euphrates for access to water. While Rome controlled Hatra and Nisibis, the Persians

were at a great strategic disadvantage as Roman fortifications controlled access to the majority of

Mesopotamia. However, following the campaigns of Shapur I in 241 AD, and Roman concession

of Nisibis and Hatra, Dura-Europos would have undoubtedly became one of the most significant

border cities controlling access into the Roman East. Accordingly, such changes to the walls and

military district, and the doubling of Cohors XX, all occurring in the later period of Dura’s

occupation would match this increased defensive importance placed upon Dura-Europos as a

border city and within a model of defense-in-depth as proposed by Luttwak with the later Limes.

Secondly, and expanding on the concept of Dura-Europos as a border city, the long-

standing billeting of the vexillation from IV Scythica reveals general trends in how Rome made

use of its legions as a function of dwindling manpower and expansive borders with various

enemies just outside of Roman imperium. The designation in P. Dura 32 of the attached

vexillation as “the local vexillation” potentially reveals a source of much discord in the Roman

military usage in Late Antiquity as it alludes to a provincialization of the vexillation and the

legion more widely. While the Syrian legions are recalled multiple times during this period to

combat the Sassanids on various campaigns (Baird 2012), the local connection drawn between

the vexillation and the city populace represents the emergence of the trend of later limitanei and

even later foederati units in which regionalizations are further pronounced as a symptom of the

increasing usage of foreigners and foreign material goods in the defense of the borders of the

empire.

In his study of Dura-Europos, James proposed a new model for examining the

development of the garrison which, if true, would suggest greater ethnic diversity in the garrison,

as he claims Cohors XX Palmyrenorum was “created in situ at Dura directly from the previously

attested body of Palmyrene archers” (James 2019, 249). If this hypothesis is true, then it could

lead to further discussions surrounding the dual tribunals found in the principia, and the separate

headquarters for Cohors XX and the two vexillations—the former in the Temple of

Azzanathkona and the latter in the principia which was most likely constructed explicitly for the

vexillations (James 2019, 76). These spatial divisions within the town could be said to mirror the

social divisions between more “provincial” auxilia and more “Romanized” vexillations; albeit,

this is difference is likely found only in differences with specialty units and perhaps some pieces

of equipment which the Roman legionary would not have employed directly. Furthermore, the

question of “provincial” and “Roman” identities is highly obscured at the site as soldiers and

their camp followers likely interacted with the civilian population outside the military district

and were likely of questionable “Roman” origin anyways, as we see in the case of Cohors Ulpia

II which received Roman citizenship for its service prior to arriving at Dura-Europos.

Additionally, shared experience in mystery cults and shared use of barbarizing affects such as the

wearing of trousers by the

vexillations serve to illustrate

that neither group is easily

characterizable (James, 2019).

Fortifications at Dura-Europos

Having discussed the

increasing geopolitical

significance of Dura-Europos to both the Roman and Sassanian Empires, and a Roman strategic

shift towards a more defensive posture, it seems relevant to discuss the alterations made to the

cities structures to better fortify it against potential Sassanid invasion. The Roman garrison

seems to accompany two distinct phases of construction at Dura-Europos—one with the arrival

of the two vexillations circa 210 AD and another following its reconquest after a Sassanid

invasion in 252 AD saw the city quietly fall to Shapur I following the defeat of a Roman Army

60,000 strong at Barbalissos in the same year (Edwell 2008, 89-90). This defeat revealed some of

the most significant weaknesses in Roman strategical planning; namely, that Rome lacked the

resources to be able to risk its army in offensive, large-scale action. For example, the Battle of

Barbalissos in 252 AD likely required nearly the entirety of the garrison of Dura-Europos to be

recalled and consolidated into the field army which would have faced the Persians at Barbalissos.

The issue with such a strategic choice is that should the primary field army be routed, then the

garrisoned cities which are depleted of troops will quickly be taken if they choose not to

surrender outright. Thus, in Shapur I’s campaigns in 252-253 AD, the defeat of the Roman army

saw Dura-Europos fall into Sassanid sovereignty without signs of siege nor urban combat as it is

likely there were too few troops to withstand any form of siege. Furthermore, following the

recapture of the city by Romans in the following year, there is no longer any reference to the

Cohors XX Palmyrenorum which had likely made up approximately half of the garrison prior to

the Battle of Barbalissos (See Fig. 9.1 from James 2019, 251). Thus, defeat for the Romans in

Late Antiquity was far more damaging than it had ever been before, as manpower and monetary

reserves did not allow for the same level of recovery following a defeat as it did in the Republic

or early Principate. Furthermore, the now weakened defenses in the East required Rome to adapt

new strategies and structures to enact those strategies—transforming Dura from a forward

operating base to that of an advanced stronghold on the Roman frontier.

While the Roman Army had faced large-scale defeats in the Persia before Barbalissos,

these defeats were followed by treaties that generally maintained the sovereignty of Rome on the

western bank of the Euphrates; however, after Barbalissos, Shapur I did not settle with the

Romans, but instead pushed his advantage sacking several cities including the provincial capital

at Antioch. Henceforth, we see renovations of the Hellenistic wall along with the bolstering of

existing defenses for urban combat as the civilian population had been likely evacuated (Baird

2012, 312-317), or deported by the Persians during their short-lived occupation of the site (James

2019, 36-37). Of the changes which occurred after the first Persian occupation—the addition of

artillery to the tops of buildings at E4 and along the Camp Wall, the alteration to buildings and

doorways for quicker access,

the blocking of streets to

effectively channel the enemy

into “kill zones” during urban

combat (See Figure XXIV

from James 2019 for an

approximation of how the

processional routes would

have mirrored artillery

placements and subsequent

kill zones leading into the

military district)—the most significant and explicit modification signaling the change to the

aforementioned defensive posturing at Dura is the largely expanded West Wall which would

have been the only section of wall on which the enemy could lay siege. During this period, the

wall was greatly expanded with an anti-siege glacis, expanded towers and glacial shields for the

towers, a reinforced wall making use of rubble fills from housing that had been attached to the

Hellenistic wall, and expanded ramparts and ramps to make accessing these ramparts easier in

the event of a siege (See Fig. 3 from James 2011, 73). The ease of moving around and accessing

the ramparts can also be seen as an alteration maximizing the efficiency of movement of the

smaller garrison in responding to targeted attacks on certain sections of the wall.

Looking at the original Hellenistic wall in comparison with the alterations made in

response to the invasion of Shapur I, it is quite clear that the devastation wrought by that

invasion in 252 AD had a profound impact on Roman strategic and tactical planning. The

Romans had seen the siege

abilities of the Persians at Hatra

and Nisibis; and, accordingly

fortified their walls to such an

extent that the Persians would

have difficulties sieging them

down. Evidence from the final

siege in 256 AD suggests that

Persian attempts to undermine

the wall were successful in

collapsing the inner tower floors

of Tower 19, but the anti-siege

glacis supported the tower only

causing it to sag (James 2011,

77). Thus, the siege of 256 AD

seems to have been prolonged as

the Persians attempted to

undermine the walls while the Romans continually countermined the Persian mines. While it is

unknown precisely how the city fell, it seems clear that Dura-Europos delayed the Persian

invasion force in 256 AD even with a smaller than optimal garrison. Had Rome not been in the

middle of the Crisis of the Third Century when this siege occurred, it is likely that such a delay

would have allowed for a Roman field army to mobilize to meet the Persians prior to any

significant intrusion into Roman territory—hence why Luttwak argues that such an strategic

arrangement constitutes a “defense in depth” (Luttwak 2016), or an elastic defense as it is more

commonly known; albeit, his argument is outside the scope of this case study as he applies the

term following the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. However, Dura-Europos through its

altered significance as a heavily fortified, yet undermanned, stronghold on the Roman frontier

appears to represent this new strategy of defense with its limited resources being used as a

method of slowing enemy movement so Roman field armies have a chance to respond before

significant loses have been accrued (See Treadgold 1995 and Wheeler 2007 for a more detailed

examination of how these reforms altered Roman military structures and strategy).

Conclusion

The site at Dura-Europos thus reveals an early transformation in how the army was used

on a provincial scale and in provincial command structures. While the Roman army would not be

divided into the comitatenses and limitanei until the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine in the

late-3rd and early-4th centuries (Nischer 1923), the evidence from Dura-Europos seems to

confirm what is known from the historical record—that manpower shortages and internal

political concerns had already led to an informal division of the Roman army into both

praesental armies and a mix of vexillations and auxilia along the border (Elton 1996, 205). The

epigraphic data and material finds combined with the historical record showcase Dura-Europos

as a site in the middle of a transition between the Imperial armies of the Principate and the field

armies of the Dominate, as new threats could not be overcome with old solutions. In 252 AD, the

settlement was left unguarded in order to offensively attack an enemy outside the empire, while

in 256 AD, the defensive structures were improved and the garrisons remained so to occupy and

slow the forces of Shapur I in his continued raids against the Roman Empire. Thus, Dura-

Europos can serve as a type site of the Roman adoption of a “defense in depth” military strategy

which preceded the formalization of such strategy through the reforms of Diocletian and

Constantine, and one which can emphasize the accompanying alterations in military culture,

structures, and identity as observed through its rapid alterations from 210-256 AD.

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