baritua case.pdf

7/27/2019 baritua case.pdf

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TRANSPO CASES #1

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondentPKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00). DUMC insured the goods for its full value withpetitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company (Philamgen). During thetransport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank. Upon demand ofpayment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it soughtreimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

(1) Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

(2) WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry.Or, WON PKS Shipping is liable.

Held:

(1) PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others,although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. Theregularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its

part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely becauseindividual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

(2) PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6)to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry ofwater into the barges hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the bargeissued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate wouldattest to the seaworthiness ofLimar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC, commoncarriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goodsdue to any of the following causes, among others:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Baritua vs. Mercader

Facts:

The late Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the buy and sell of drygoods in Laoang, N. Samar, boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line boundedfrom Manila to N. Samar. However, while said bus was traversing the Beily Bridge inN. Samar, the bus fell into the river, as a result, D. Mercader died. Petitioner alleges,

among others, that there is no statement in the complaint of Mercader that he wasissued any passenger-freight ticket.

Issue: WON a contract of carriage existed between petitioners and Mercader. Or,WON petitioners are liable for the death of Mercader.

Held:
http://enoughofprivacy.tumblr.com/post/1676969045/transpo-cases-1http://enoughofprivacy.tumblr.com/post/1676969045/transpo-cases-1


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A contract of carriage exists, thus, petitioners are liable.

Petitioners failed to transport D. Mercader to his destination, because the bus fellinto a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the fall,he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning.

The Court agreed with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that fateful morning.It must be noted that a common carrier, by the nature of its business and forreasons of public policy, is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human careand foresight can provide. It is supposed to do so by using the utmost diligence ofvery cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In case of death orinjuries to passengers, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have actednegligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as prescribedin Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

United Airlines, Inc vs. CA

Facts:

Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, throughthe Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) Visit the U.S.A. tickets for himself,his wife and his minor son Mychal. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned;they used the 1st coupon. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional coupons each forhimself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington DullesAirport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas wereissued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words CHECK-INREQUIRED, for United Airlines Flight No. 1108. However, the Fontanillas were notable to board said flight but instead were able to board United Airlines Flight No.803.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate evidencehis allegations of breach of contract in bad faith; and

(2) What law is applicable, the Philippine Law or the US Law?

Held:

(1) No. Aniceto Fontanillas assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m.,he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in

something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence onrecord. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of theboarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words Check-InRequired.Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed theFontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were theynot assigned seat numbers?

(2) The Philippine Law. The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws ofthe United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law.Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, thetickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that thetickets were rewritten in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change thenature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

PhilAm vs. CA

Facts:


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Coca-Cola Bottlers loaded on board MV Asilda, a vessel owned by respondentFELMAN, 7,500 cases of 1-litter Coca-Cola softdrinks bottle to be transported fromZamboanga City to Cebu City. The shipment was insured by petitioner PHILAMGEN.

The vessel left Zamboanga in a fine weather but the same sank in the waters ofZamboanga del Norte. Coca-Cola Bottlers filed a claim for damages against FELMANwhich it denied, thus, filed an insurance claim with PHILAMGEN. PHILAMGEN now

seeks recourse against FELMAN.

Issue: WON FELMAN is liable for loss of the cargo due to its failure to observe theextraordinary diligence required by Art. 1733, NCC.

Held: YES.

Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, (c)ommon carriers, from the nature of theirbusiness and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinarydiligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengerstransported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case In theevent of loss of goods, common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently.FELMAN, the shipowner, was not able to rebut this presumption.

The sinking of the vessel was due to its unseaworthiness even at the time of itsdeparture from the port of Zamboanga. It was top-heavy as an excessive amount ofcargo was loaded on deck.

Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company

Facts:

Herminio L. Nocum was a passenger in appellants Bus No. 120 then making a trip

within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequenceof the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declaredto its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.

The injuries suffered by Nocum were not due to mechanical defects but to theexplosion of firecrackers.

Issue: WON the bus company was negligent, hence liable for the injuries suffered byNocum.

Held:

No. The Bus Company has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by

showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of itspassengers, according to the circumstances of the (each) case.

Article 1733 qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers forthe safety of the passengers transported by them to be according to all thecircumstances of each case.

In this case, the circumstance that must be considered in measuring a commoncarriers duty towards its passengers is the reliance that should be reposed on thesense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It isto be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the

lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightlyconsidered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. Hecannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness ofhis baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar.(Hence, the bus companys failure to confiscate the baggage cannot be consideredas a negligent act, but in accord to the circumstance of the case.)

N.B.


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Thus, in other jurisdictions, and squarely applicable in the instant case: There isneed for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehensionthat the passengers baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the commoncarriers employee to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes thecornerstone of the common carriers liability in cases similar to the present one.

Elite Shirt Factory vs. Hon. Cornejo

Facts:

Elite Shirt Factory (shipper) delivered to Compania Maritima (common carrier)several cartons of merchandise for shipment to several consignees. While suchcargo was stored in the bodega owned by Compania Maritima, a fire broke. EliteShirt, allegedly damaged, filed with the City Court of Manila a complaint againstCompania Maritima for reimbursement. The latter filed an answer impleading Phil.Steam Navigation as third party defendant, on the ground that the fire started fromthe section occupied by such.

Judge Cornejo of the city court favoured shipper Elite for the recovery of damagesfrom common carrier Compania Maritima, but thereafter denied the judgment ofexecution and set aside its previous decision; the ground: Judge had no jurisdiction,but rather the CFI within its exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

Elite Shirt Factory contends that the liability of the carrier, Compaia Maritima, fromthe time the shipment was deposited in its warehouse, was no longer as a commoncarrier but as a depository, hence, it is the City Court which has jurisdiction.

Issue:

Does the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on a Court of First instance over admiraltyand maritime cases include the suit where the shipper files a claim against thecarrier, the goods having been landed, stored in its bodega but subsequentlyburned, no delivery having been made to the consignee as a result?

Held: YES, the instant case is included in the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI.

THE REASON: the warehouse in which the cargo was deposited at the time it wasburned was owned by the carrier, Compaia Maritima, itself. The cargo was burnedbefore Compania Maritima could deliver it to the consignees.

When, as in this case, the proceeding in effect is one for a breach of a contract of

shipment, the jurisdiction of the court of first instance under the specific provision ofthe Judiciary Act is undeniable.

N.B.

Hence, if the bodega was owned NOT by Compania Maritima, it is the City Courtwhich will have jurisdiction and not the CFI.

City court will have jurisdiction when: the common carrier is liable as DEPOSITORY;

CFI will have jurisdiction when: the carrier is liable as a common carrier, as in the

instant case.

Medina vs. Cresencia

Facts:

A passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque smashed into a Meralco postresulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers. Guillermo Cresencia


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is the registered owner of the jeepney as well as the registered operator. On theother hand, Rosario Avorque, after the jeepney having been repeatedly sold fromone buyer after another, is its current absolute owner as well as the employer ofdriver Brigido.

Issue:

(1) Who should be held liable for the death of Medina the registered owner or theabsolute owner?

(2) WON Rosario Avorque has a subsidiary liability under the RPC for damagesarising from her drivers criminal act.

Held:

(1) The registered owner.

The requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that afranchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased withoutinfringing the certificate issued to the grantee x x x As the sale of the jeepney wasadmittedly without the approval of the Public Service Commission, GuillermoCresencia, who is the registered owner and operator thereof, continued to be liableto the Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation.

(2) No, she has no subsidiary liability.

Medinas action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed against

Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employers subsidiary liability under theRevised Penal Code, but on a breach of the carriers contractual obligation to carryhis passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for thisreason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver BrigidoAvorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpacontractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, butdirect and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code).

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad

Facts:

Jose Cangco was an employee of the Manila Railroad Co. As an employee of thecompany, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride uponthe companys train free of charge. One day, while Cangco stepped off the car, oneor both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result thathis feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His arm wasbadly crashed and lacerated.

Issue:

Whether the liability of Manila Railroad constitutes culpa aquiliana or culpacontractual.

Held:

The liability constitutes culpa contractual (Contract of Carriage).

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, theduty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving itstrains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and


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immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the faultwas morally imputable to defendants servants.

N.B.

Contributory Negligence on the part of Cangco: None. Our conclusion is that theconduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly underway was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty ofcontributory negligence.

Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished: (read from full text)

1. culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mereincident to the performance of a contract

2. those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which

creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum existsindependently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties whenentering into the contractual relation.

3. the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of theduties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing betweenthe person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act oromission, was the cause of it. On the other hand, the liability of masters andemployers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, whensuch acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is

not based upon a mere presumption of the masters negligence in their selection orcontrol, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard doesnot relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.

Test in determining Contributory Negligence of plaintiff: Thompsons work onnegligence-

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty ofnegligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary orreasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of theage, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger actedunder the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to

be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, butthe care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances,to avoid injury.

PAL vs. CA

Facts:

Private respondent Jesus Samson was a regular co-pilot of PAL. During one of his flights from

Manila to Legazpi with Captain Delfin Bustamante, they made a crash landing at Daet whereSamson suffered physical injuries in the head. Samson alleges that the accident was due to the

gross negligence of PAL in allowing Bustamante who was suffering from a long standing tumorof the Nasopharynx but was also allowed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration to fly as a co-

pilot; and that because of the tumor Bustamante has a slow reaction and poor judgment.

Issue:


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WON PAL was negligent as a common carrier in allowing Bustamante to fly as a First Officer

the day of the accident. Or, WON the same carrier is liable for the accident even if Bustamante

was not sick.

Held: YES and YES.

For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First Officer on January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty

of gross negligence and therefore should be made liable for the resulting accident.

(Even) assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing

the plane, the evidence shows that overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at themangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused

thereby. And for the negligence of defendants employee, it is liable. At least, the law presumes

the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of agood father of a family in the supervision of its employees.

As defined in Art. 1732, NCC, petitioner is a common carrier. The law is clear in requiring acommon carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business of

carriage and transportation under Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756, NCC.

The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of

passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the

airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will

certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane,passengers and crew members alike.

Sarkies Tours Phil vs. IAC

Facts:

The Dizons purchased 6 round trip tickets from Sarkies for a tour to Corregidor form Manila,and back. They were given two tickets both with the name SARKIES appearing therein. The

word Edisco was however handwritten on the white ticket. The white tickets were collected on

board by Julian Mendoza, while the blue tickets were collected upon boarding the Sarkies bus.

The MV Edisco owned and operated by Mendoza was not registered nor was it licensed tooperate as a watercraft. On return to Manila, the weather was the same as when they left. After

about thirty minutes of cruising, the boat leaned towards the starboard; the boat capsized. As aresult, Merceditas, the daughter of the spouses Dizon, among others, died. The Dizons filed acomplaint for damages against Sarkies. Sarkies, as an answer, included a cross-claim against

Mendoza.

Issue: WON, under the Civil Code, Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza.

Held: Yes.

Considering that actual negligence for the drowning of Merceditas was the responsibility ofMendoza, it is but fair that Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza for

reimbursement. Although Article 2181 of the Civil Code is not technically invocable, itsprinciple should be applied in favor of Sarkies. The provision of the Civil Code on commoncarriers is based on Anglo-American Law.

In Grand Trunk R. Co. vs Latham, 63 Me. 177, the following was said:


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Where a railroad company had been compelled to pay a judgment for damages for injuries

sustained by a passenger as a result of the maltreatment and misconduct of the conductorthe

Court (held) that the servant was liable to his master for all loss and damage sustained by it.

Documents

baritua case.pdf