Bataille and Hegel

7/29/2019 Bataille and Hegel

1/12

1. INTRODUCTION

Within tradition o political philosophy and le

gal studies, there is a generally held conviction that

sovereignty is rst and oremost a political and legal

concept. This political and legal character has gained

a special place within the studies o sovereignty.

There is nothing surprising in this i we remember

that sovereignty has become one o most unda

mental concept which rames and shapes the basic

parameters o political and legal organization. Indis

pensable as this legal and political dimension o sovereignty may be, sovereignty has the connotations

and implications which goes beyond the political

and legal dimensions. When stripped rom the legal

and political overtones, it becomes possible to real

ize that sovereignty appears as the undamental con

cept to understand human condition. This, o course,

requires an attitude which compels one to take sov

ereignty as a philosophical concept. To substantiate

this claim, reerring to the concrete historical data is

enough which illuminate the undamental connec

tion between ounding concepts o modern phi

losophy (autonomy, subjectivity and the ounding

principle o modern politics (sovereignty. This study

aims at this hidden or usually neglected dimension

o sovereignty. It is apparent that or this aim, sover

eignty is to be dealt with a certain philosophical out

look. This is the reason why this study takes Batailles

ormulation o sovereignty as its center.

The readers o Georges Bataille are well accus

tomed to his complex attitude toward Hegel. The

rst impression tells us that Bataille, as an ardent

deender o transgression, should have negated

Phenomenology. It is not dicult to reason out whythis should be so: as an account o how a perect

closure pervades the philosophical imagination,

Hegels system does not tolerate the transgression

except in unctional and meaningul orms; that is

in the orm o antithesis. Yet transgression, i being

worthy o its name or Bataille, should put the sys

tem in jeopardy, managing to dodge the dialectical

movement. Thereore, Bataille should have judged

Hegels system as something to be discarded with

no compromise. To our surprise, he rerains rom

taking this easy stance, developing a complex posi

tion visvis Hegel.

Hegel and Georges Batailles Conceptualization ofSovereignty

Mete Ula AKSOY1

Cilt: 11 Say: 2 Nisan 2011pp. 217 - 227

217

1 Assist. Prof. , Gediz University, The Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and PublicAdministration, [email protected]

EGEAKADEMKBAKI /EGEACADEMICREVIEW

ABSTRACT

Georges Batailles intellectual attitude toward Hegel implies

a certain complex structure. This makes it dicult to posit

Batailles attitude as endorsement or rejection o Hegel. Even i

it is possible to iner that Batailles ormulation o sovereignty

directly challenges Hegels Phenomenology, we can still realize

that in Batailles sovereignty, the crucial part is played by the

insights taken rom Phenomenology. This study tries to lookat where this relationship nds its clearest expression: slave/

master dialectics. The main concern o this study, thereore,

consists in analyzing the insights which we realize when we

put slave/master dialectic and Batailles sovereignty side by

side. This shows not only how Batailles sovereignty enlightens

slave/master dialectics, but also how Batailles encounter with

Hegel conditions his ormulation o sovereignty.

Keywords: Georges Bataille, Hegel, sovereignty

ZET

Georges Bataillen Hegel karsndaki entelektel konumu karmak bir yapya sahiptir. Bu karmaklk BataillenHegel karsndaki konumunu ret veya kabul tercihleriyle

snrlandrmay imkansz hale getirmektedir. Bataillen egemenlik kuramnn Fenomenolojinin bir eletirisi olduunuanlamak zor deilse de, Bataillen egemenlii ormle etmede

Fenomenolojiye ok ey borlu olduu da bir gerektir. Bualma Bataille ile Hegel arasndaki bu ilikinin en belirgin

olarak ortaya kt yere bakmak istemektedir: kle/eendidiyalektii. O halde, almann temel k noktas Bataillenegemenlii ile kle/eendi diyalektiini birlikte okumann orta

ya koyaca karmlardr. Bu Bataillen egemenlik kavramnnkle/eendi diyalektiini ne derecede aydnlattn gstermekle kalmayacak, ayn zamanda Bataillen Hegel ile

karlamasnn onun egemenlii ormle etmesini nasletkilediini de ortaya koyacaktr.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Georges Bataille, Hegel, egemenlik


2/12

218

Mete Ula AKSOY

Focusing on this complex relation and exploring

the insights it can oer to us orm the motivation

or this study. However, I eel it necessary to add a

note at this point. Initially, this context, a reading

o Bataille ater Hegel, could give the impression

o being a comparative study which enables us tobroach the important points in Batailles philosophi

cal imagination with the help o its conrontation

with Hegel. The usual paths o a comparative study,

namely shedding light on the dark sides o one phil

osophical account with the help o the other, does

not exactly correspond to what is really at stake in

reading Bataille ater Hegel. The gist o the issue, I

think, is that reading Bataille ater Hegel tells much

more than a comparative study can oer. Batailles

conrontation with Hegel creates a context in which

the oscillations o capital importance or human

mind and or human lie (between taboo and trans

gression, between order and chaos deluge the

philosophical reasoning. Looking at the issue rom

this side, we can saely assume that Batailles con

rontation with Hegel goes well beyond merely pin

pointing convergence and divergence between two

thinkers, providing great insights into the human

condition.

This study, thus, addresses itsel to the purpose

o probing the possibilities oered by Batailles con

rontation with Hegel and o trying to glean what

lies usually hidden but which has existential bearings. This existential dimension, implicated with the

theses on End o History, looms large when a closer

look is taken at Batailles ormulation o Accursed

Share and Sovereignty. Focusing on the implications

o Hegels slave/master dialectics or Batailles or

mulation o sovereignty, this study thereore tries to

make out the extent to which Batailles sovereignty

transcends slave/master dialectics, and in what sense

it is taken back by it. What captures the pulse o this

study is the realization that while Hegel and Bataille

preer the dierent sides o moon to stand, the con

tours o these sides keeps on changing regardless o

their will. Realizing this point, we can come to such

a conclusion: when the issue is consciousness, going

too ar in one direction ends up in what is already

circumscribed by the other direction.

2. BATAILLES UNDERSTANDING OFSOVEREIGNTY

In order to ocus attention on how to locate

Batailles sovereignty visvis Hegels slave/master

dialectics, it is necessary or us to clariy what Batailleunderstands by sovereignty. But this clarication

could be disconcerting given the general condition

o Batailles oeuvre. First o all, Batailles views on

sovereignty can be ound scattered throughout a

period which ranges rom the beginning o 1930s to

the 1950s. Moreover, Batailles style which is ostered

by a vigorous poetic imagination could restraint anacademic mind trying to master the subject matter

at hand by a linear reasoning. Thereore, it is natural

to see sovereignty in Batailles usage as a vague term

appearing more as an ontological category than

as a political issue. Even in La Souverainet, a book

written in view o giving Batailles understanding o

sovereignty in a denite orm, we are caught up in

curiosity when reading his explanation as to why he

does not give the morphology o sovereignty just

at the moment when this is most needed.1 Despite

certain weaknesses, we can regard this book as adocumentation o themes and concepts all o which,

one way or another, are related with his understand

ing o sovereignty (Richardson, 1994, 38. So we can

start our endeavor o giving an account o Batailles

sovereignty with this book.

The rst thing that catches our attention in this

book is Batailles reluctance to permit sovereignty to

be eclipsed by its institutional embodiments. In this

book, sovereignty is not treated as something em

bedded in an institutional setting. Wrested rom such

an institutional setting, sovereignty immediately

strips itsel o the character o being merely political

and social phenomenon, and takes the appearance

o existential matter. Even though this existential

matter (sovereignty evolves into institutional orms,

it belongs rst o all to man.2 Moreover, it belongs to

all man quite irrespective o any social, economic and

social distinction. I some portion o mankind (be it

kings, aristocrats, priests or leaders holds a monop

oly over this asset and excludes others, this does not

alter the basic condition: sovereignty belongs to all

mankind. It is only by means o the spatial and tem

poral conditions that the history has made an allowance or the exclusive orms o sovereignty.

When the political tones lost their hegemony,

sovereignty rose to the prominence as an issue wor

thy o an ontological consideration. Thereore, we

can ask what an ontological perspective can say o

sovereignty. Asking this question enable us to realize

the ontological background o sovereignty which is

obscured by the political connotations imposed on a

concept. And this ontological dimension is elt more

and more vigorously as Bataille articulates his ormu

lation by relying on such philosophically loaded concepts as object, tool, anguish, laughter and death.


3/12

Hegel and Georges Batailles Conceptualization of Sovereignty

219

Let us start the ontological sketch with an etymo

logical reading. Etymology reveals that sovereignty

implies superiority. Thereore, it is useul to athom

out the ontological conditions o being superior.

Considering this point, we immediately attain the

idea that being superior implies relativity. I something is superior, there should also be another ele

ment or elements in the ace o which the superior

position is to be held. That is to say, a superior being

has to have its other. Something or someone cannot

be superior on its own. On this ground, we can ask

what the other o sovereignty is. This question is o

key importance in that without a due answer to it,

we cannot make out what the ontological implica

tions o sovereignty are. For Bataille, the answer is

very simple. Being useul (utility is what deprives

something or someone rom sovereignty. The reasoning at work here is not dicult to grasp. A little

bit o grammar helps clariying this point. Even i

the adjective useful stands by itsel, its articulation

always presupposes a preposition: for. Something, i

it is useul, is always useul or anotherthing. And in

this relation, it is this other thing or whose lot sov

ereignty alls.

In this sense, we come to one o Batailles deni

tion o sovereignty: Lie beyond utility is the realm

o sovereignty (Bataille, 1976, 248. From this deni

tion, we can iner that i sovereignty is to be attained,

one must step out the relations which condition

him or her or being useul. But we should be care

ul not to yield ourselves to an economic reading. It

can only partly explain the phenomenon o being

useul because there are symbolic relations playing

a decisive role in determining whether something is

useul or not. It is exactly at this point that we come

to sense what is radical in Batailles denition o sov

ereignty. Sovereign beings, useless as they may be in

the material sense o the word, still cling to the dis

course o utility to the extent that they occupy the

position assigned by the symbolic space o society.This symbolic space is none other than the realm in

which the essence o the social (codes, norms, values

and identities is made possible and given a denite

orm. The meaning o this is very clear: while remain

ing within the symbolic dimension o society, sover

eign being cannot break with the paradigm o utility,

however useless it looks like.

Realizing this point, we have achieved a deeper

stratum o Batailles text: the impossibility o sover

eignty or sovereignty as impossibility. To understand

this, let us look at the ontological conditions o sovereign beings. A sovereign class apparently sustains

a lie beyond utility; but this is only apparently so.

They consume the resources at their disposal quite

dierently rom the ordinary bourgeois, who are mo

tivated by the calculation and thus are keen about to

render their consumption useul. For sovereign class,

it is mainly the prestige attained only by means ouseless consumption that motivates the behaviors.

With this, we are well acquainted since Veblens A

Theory of Leisure Class which details this classs am

bition to put a distance with the productive works

and skills (Veblen, 1953, 41. Highly critical to high

light here is that their unproductive quality, their

useless position by no means guarantees that they

are set loose rom the realm o utility, still clinging

to this realm so long as their useless position is pos

ited as such by the symbolic space o society. They

are still useul insoar as they reproduce the symbolicrelations o society, an indispensable pillar without

which social lie is bound to collapse. To put it briefy,

sovereign beings that divulge into useless consump

tion are not useul or any specic purpose but they

are still useul or maintaining the society within a

certain conguration.

Leaving institutions and actors thus aside,

Batailles sovereignty maniests itsel only in one

orm: as an experience. So long as an experience

gravitates around the social codes, namely so long

as it is encoded by the social, this experience cannot

pave the way or sovereignty. For sovereignty to ap

pear in the phenomenal world, it must break up the

temporal sequence in which the past, present and

uture are so arranged as to make expectation pos

sible. Expectation is a mode o existence in which

one is bound by uture concerns; and this is the rea

son that experience should be ree rom the yoke

o expectation. This can be only at hand when the

uture, or the chronological sequence leading every

moment into an unknown uture, disappears. This

point is more readily understandable the moment

we recall that so long as man accords his lie to a uture time, this uture dominates over this lie, having

a command in directing the will. From this, it is le

gitimate to conclude that a will under command can

be everything but sovereign. Suppose this granted,

we can get a distinct notion o ontological condition

o sovereignty: dened as the denial o utility, sov

ereignty can only be conceived to exist in the pre

sent moment (which belongs neither to past nor to

uture (Bataille, 1976, 260.

When we see this radical tone in it, Batailles

denition urges us to recognize that sovereignty isthe denial o the primacy o uture over the present


4/12

220

Mete Ula AKSOY

moment, and it thus dees routine. Thereore, it is

quite sae to assume that sovereignty maniests itsel

when a moment thwarts the wellunctioning o rou

tine which operates with a view to utility and which

thus makes the meaningul social context possible.

This ontological sketch, cursory though it is, maysuce to convince us o the miraculous character o

sovereignty. Untied rom the material and symbolic

dimension o society rendering everything mean

ingul, useul and unctional, sovereignty does not

emerge into view except as a miraculous moment.

Whatever the orm it assumes, a miracle is miracle

to the extent that it breaks the smooth continuation

o events. Thereore, sovereignty erupts at the heart

o routine, violating its duration. To this ontological

condition, we can add a urther note which lays the

political connotations o the issue open. Despite hisdierence with Bataille, Carl Schmitt concentrates on

the same point in his political reading o sovereignty,

inviting us to take the miraculous character o sov

ereign into account.3 Further, it is interesting to see

that even at the dawn o modernity, Kings o France

and England were still perorming the public shows

in which they attempted to prove themselves capa

ble o bringing about miracles such as healing cer

tain diseases by the touch o their hand (Bloch, 1961,

431. This suces to bear out how much political

sovereignty too stands in need o miracle to attain a

legitimate ground as a social institution.

Having mapped out the underground connec

tions between miracle and sovereignty, we encoun

ter another o Batailles denition o sovereignty:

sovereignty is the moment when anticipation dis

solves into NOTHING.4 Pondering on the conditions

in which an object (matter surpasses objectivity and

the anticipation o the subject dissolves into NOTH

ING, we are quite prepared to admit that in Batailles

ormulation o sovereignty, the real stake in question

is the boundary between the possible and the impos-

sible. Sovereignty, thus, is a borderline phenomenon;

accordingly whenever sovereignty fashes into be

ing, it is seen that the impossibilitymakes surace to

the realm o possible. In this way, we come to make

sense why Bataille writes o sovereignty as impossi-

ble yet there it is (Bataille, 1976, 257.

3. NEGATIVITY WITH OR WITHOUTEMPLOYMENT?

The above given ontological sketch has already

driven our attention to the similarities and dissimilarities between Hegel and Bataille. In both slave/

master dialectic and sovereignty, the issue revolves

around the question o consciousness. The slave, a

ter being deeated and enslaved by the master, can

only attain autonomy by the work which is made

possible by consciousness (Hegel, 1977, 118. In this

way, we understand that in Batailles sovereignty andHegels slave/master dialectic, there are two philo

sophical views on consciousness: absolute knowl

edge and nonknowledge.5 It is exactly at this point

that Batailles conrontation with Hegel takes on an

interesting appearance. How complex an attitude

Bataille has developed toward Hegel we come to un

derstand when we look at the relationship between

Batailles nonknowledge and Hegels absolute

knowledge: it is not until Hegels absolute knowl

edge is taken into account that we could appreciate

Batailles unknowledge.Thereore, we should, rst o all, lay bare what

Hegel understands by absolute knowledge. Relying

on Hegel, we can dene absolute knowledge as a

homogeneous state in which there would be noth

ing in the external world that is not already a part o

mind or there would occur to the mind nothing that

does not take place in the external world. The rit

between the mind and the worldwould thus evapo

rate, and turn out to be something that belongs to

an era beore absolute knowledge. Batailles position

to absolute knowledge is interesting in that he does

not reproach it or panlogicism. He views it as en

compassing all that belongs to knowledge; or put

ting more precisely, Bataille considers Hegel as the

ormulator o a magnetic circle capable o making

all human knowledge gravitate around it (Bataille,

1972: 126. Stepping back rom the usual course ex

pected o him, such as Adorno presents in his nega-

tive dialectic, Bataille takes absolute knowledge as

act. Yet, even i Bataille endorses absolute knowl

edge, he invites us to take a urther step: realizing

the contingent existence o knower (Baugh, 2003,

8485. Whether absolute or not, knowledge shouldpresuppose a knower. Knowledge is so ontologically

conditioned by a knower that this relation (between

knower and knowledge casts doubt over absolute

ness o knowledge: a knower is by no means com

plete to the degree required by absolute knowledge.

The closeness with Heidegger strikes us: so long as

death is there, man cannot be complete.6

What remains or us is to show what a complex

relationship is ound between absolute knowledge

and un-knowledge and how Bataillian concepts,

antiHegelian as they sound, are in act indebted tothe Hegelian discourse. To ocus on this, let us look


5/12


221

at what the incompleteness o man implicates or

knowledge. Man is not complete until he is struck

by death. Batailles contribution consists in showing

that even i the movement o knowledge accom

plish the absolute knowledge, namely even i there

is nothing in the ace o which knowledge moves(rendering it known, existence cannot be reduced

to knowledge. The reason is clear: the diculty o

a phenomenal discourse in transorming the expe

rience o death into knowledge. From this, Bataille

concludes that there are some occasions when the

mind ails to articulate the objects or to proceed in

the direction rom the unknown to known. Upset

ting the unction o mind, these occasions open up

experience such as is impossible to be grasped by

knowledge. Bataille calls them blind points.There are

certain objects or occasions triggering an experienceresulting in the collapse o the very aculty through

which world becomes known. It is exactly at these

points, or Bataille, that man become sovereign.

This last point strikes our attention as showing

up the dierence between Batailles sovereignty

and Hegels autonomy. Turning our attention to a

list o sovereign moments given in La Souverainet,

we are brought to see the occasions when the mind

runs up against a situation where it is impossible to

bring about knowledge: poetry, laughter, tears o

joy, eroticism, death(Bataille, 1976, 262. Knowing

no other aim than knowledge, (Bataille, 1972, 130

Hegel envisages absolute knowledge as prevailing

over the sequel (history o human mind; o course

not as a psychological theme as an end point o it

and combining every point on this sequel to one

another. Accordingly, the completion o the system

can never be at hand when there remain heteroge

neous elements or blind points such as are capable

o breaking the continuity o the sequel. For the

march o knowledge is crowned by absolute knowl

edge, every moment preceding it should serve the

purpose; but the sovereign occasions, ontologicallyspeaking, ruin the very language through which a

service can be rendered.

Upon a closer examination, we come to make

out what this dierence implies and how it makes

Batailles sovereignty dierent rom Hegels autono

my. In Hegels system, man is designated as negativ

ity, in that his actions orm antithesis to the nature. It

should be emphasized however that this negativity,

through the dialectical process, produces positive re

sults. This indicates the essence o the dierence be

tween Hegel and Bataille: whereas in Hegels system,negativity maniests itsel as beingalwaysalready

putintowork, Bataille considers only the sovereign

moments worthy o negativity. For him, i true nega

tivity is to be seen, it should be beret o any employ

ment. This is why we can conceive o the sovereignty

described by Bataille as negativity without employ

ment. (Corn, 1995, 84.

This comparison makes evident that what is at

hand is two dierent modalities o exerting indi

vidual will upon the external world. Though the re

lation between subject and object in the Hegelian

system comes into being through the mediation o

work, Bataille sees vanouissement as the modality

o negativity. In this sense, the dierence between

Bataille and Hegel is shown in an eminent degree.

For Hegel, autonomy is attained through a dis

course unolding itsel in time. It comes at the end

o a sequel ormed step by step by mediation; a mediation capable o converting the conrontation o

thesis with its antithesis into a synthesis and making

both thesis and antithesis useul. The German term

Hegel chooses to dene the movement o dialectics,

Aufhebung, is utterly suggestive o this point: tran

scending while preserving. In the Hegelian dialectic,

nothing can escape rom the clutch o dialectical

movement, which eventually ascribes meaning to

the act o negativity, and thus allows negativity no

option except to appear only in useul orms. When

we pay heed to Batailles perspective, however, itbecomes clear that the grasp o dialectic is not so

tenacious as it might be supposed. There are always

remnants which the movement o dialectic cannot

inscribe into a meaningul context. To see the true

sovereignty, Bataille invites us to turn our attention

to these occasions in which discourse aces NOTH

ING (Bataille, 1976, 256. On those occasions, the

boundaries o discourse, behind which meaning

enjoys a certain security, are interrupted by gaps

and breaks. Consequently, it is only during these oc

casions that it becomes possible to see negativity

without it being put into useul activity: negativity

that is truly autonomous because o the act that it

no longer submits to anything other than itsel. We

thus understand that Hegels absolute knowledge

closes while the movement Bataille talks about

opens.7 Hegels autonomy is a sort o closure, yet

Batailles is opening. Highly important here is to take

notice o the act that this opening should be only

momentary. Otherwise it becomes another moment

in a sequel, yielding to the imperative o uture.

Thereore, this opening itsel, i sustained a little ur

ther in time, becomes another closure, as Bataillesormulation impossible yet there it is illustrates.


6/12

222

Mete Ula AKSOY

4. DEATH AND RECOGNITION

Our endeavor to mark the dierence between

Hegels autonomy and Batailles sovereignty has al

ready made clear that the dividing line is drawn by

their divergent position on consciousness. Whereas

autonomy in Hegels system is realized by the help

o consciousness, the achievement o sovereignty in

Bataille is premised on the collapse o it. O great im

portance at this point, however, is to take note that

the dierence does not consist solely in choosing

approval or disapproval. This is well understood the

moment we realize how much Batailles sovereignty

is indebted to the opposite discourse: i sovereignty

is dened as the collapse o consciousness or as a

break with work or as the termination o rationality,

we immediately understand that without the exist

ence o consciousness, there could be no collapse oit; without rationality, there could be no termination

o it; and without work, there could be no break with

it.

Since the dierent approaches to consciousness

orm the backbone o the dierence between sov

ereignty and autonomy, we can pursue this issue

a little urther; however this we cannot do without

taking two other notorious Hegelian themes into ac

count: death and recognition. These two strike us as

anthropogenetic in the Hegelian system. In the case

o death, this anthropogenetic role reveals itsel inmans ambiguous attitude toward death. As or every

organism, survival is very important or human be

ings too. Nevertheless, man diers rom animals in

the voluntary acceptance o death: man risks his lie

or no good biological reason. I mans risking his

lie cannot be completely accounted with biological

reasons, there ought to be other kinds o reasons.

Upon asking what kind o reasons these could be,

we should take particular note o recognition. Rec

ognition is not a biological desire directed to a mate

rial presence (object o a biological satisaction; it is

directed to an absence (desire or desire instead. Inrecognition, what is in question is none other than

the desire to be recognized by the other.

In Hegels phenomenology, recognition entails

struggle; and struggle death. When death and recog

nition stand together, the tension immediately rises

to the prominence. This stems rom the act that in

order or struggle to be real struggle, death should

all to the lot o one party. Given the possibility

that other can strike back (Carse, 1980, 350, strug

gle, once set in motion, can escalate to the point

o death. True recognition, then, would not come,except by exposing self to death. It is airly easy to

note the contradiction implied by such a concep

tualization: recognition, i it is dened as the death

o other, is impossible. It presupposes the death o

the being whose recognition is desired and without

whose recognition sel can be by anything but hu

man being. The process o recognition, according tothis schema, necessarily ends up in the annihilation

o the very recognition or the sake o which whole

process is set in motion.8

In order or Hegel to solve this paradox, it is re

quired that the combat, ater which the recognition

is deemed to happen, cease beore putting to death;

and this Hegel proposed in his 18051806 Lectures

and Phenomenology. In those lectures and Phenom-

enology, mere risk o lie, rather than actual death,

appears to be the sucient condition o being hu

man. This requirement, nonetheless, brings no moresolution than the emergence o new one. For com

bat to stop beore the moment o death, one o the

parties should withdraw rom the combat, proving

him incapable o continuing to the end in the lie

and death struggle. And since reaching to the end

in this struggle is indispensable or recognition, we

cannot assume that true recognition takes place in

this case. The part capable o reaching to the end in

this struggle proves itsel to be worthy o recogni

tion. The deeated part thereore recognizes the oth

er without being recognized by this other in return.

Nevertheless, the situation o the victor, who hence

orth assumes the title o master, is no less ragile;

the recognition provided by the vanquished is by no

means the true one because the vanquished, insoar

as reraining rom risking his lie in ull orce, remains

an animal. This inability seems to be a distinctive

quality o the vanquished; however it also aects

the situation o victor: according to the schema that

links death and recognition inescapably together, he

too remains an animal so long as he remains unrec

ognized by the one worthy o recognition.9

Ongoing arguments attract our attention to the

two requirements which, let unullled, cause the

door o humanity to remain orever closed to Hege

lian system: that the struggle be concluded beore

its culmination in death, and equally important, that

the status o humanbeing be bestowed upon the

deeated, incapable o enduring the work o death.

It is only by accepting the humanity o the deeated

to whom the title o Slave is ascribed ater the de

eat that Hegel manages to avoid the paradox o

death and recognition. (Gasch, 1978, 263). Howev

er, we may ask how Hegel justies the humanity othe being who has reused to subordinate the ani


7/12


223

mal lie the biological need o selpreservation to

the anthropogenetic desire or recognition. Hegels

solution comes with the emphasis on conscious

ness. Consciousness o death suces to humanize

man and to orm the basis o humanity. This is ex

actly what the deeated undergoes at the momento recoil and retreat rom the struggle. The dread

o death makes him conscious o his nitude, and

he becomes a human being (Kojeve, 1973, 120-24).

With the help o this twist, he proves worthy o be

ing a source o recognition. Thus we arrive at the rst

stage o human history; a stage that gures in He

gels system as the world o slave and master.

This shit rom Recognition vs. consciousness to

recognition via consciousness is o capital impor

tance. In the rst orm (Recognition vs. conscious

ness, the desire or recognition appears to be a kindo irrational impulse entangled so inseparably with

death that we may nd it resembling, o course with

risk o anachronism, what is called today the death

drive. Nevertheless, Recognition in its second orm

(recognition via consciousness, a orm attained with

inusion o consciousness into the places emptied

rom death, comes to appear either as a kind o ini

tiation rite o primitive peoples, ater which recogni

tion is conerred upon the subject, or as a version o

what we call original position, in Rawlsian sense o

the word, in which a mechanism is so designed as to

yield to a desired situation with its norms and principles determined beorehand. At this point, it is not

too much to say that the rst orm o recognition, so

irrational as to be no more dierent rom death, is

but another expression o what Bataille understands

by sovereignty. What is important or us is to realize

that Bataille himsel is torn between consciousness

and sovereignty. Equally important however is that

Bataille did not take the way Hegel had opted or to

solve this paradox. The implications o such an atti

tude now demand our attention.

5. DEATH, SACRIFICE AND RECOGNITION

Now that we have seen the tense relation in

Hegels phenomenology between recognition and

death, we can turn our attention to how Bataille

looks upon it. For this, his article Hegel, la Mort et

Le Sacrice, seems to be good place to start. The

main problematic in Hegels philosophy is given, as

we have seen, in terms o the dilemma that man

could never have consciousness without the touch

o death, yet meanwhile this touch does not come

except with the annihilation o this consciousness.Sacrice thereore can be taken as a case o how

primitive man could overcome the Hegelian prob

lematic: subteruge used in sacrice makes it possi

ble to maintain an experience o death as immediate

(direct as it can possibly be, without annihilation o

the experience itsel. Hence Bataille explicitly reers

to this point: man must live at the moment that hereally dies, he must live with the real impression o

death. (Bataille,1988 33637

However, the dierence stemming rom the con

trasting approaches to consciousness immediately

seizes our attention. Hegels representation is con

scious par excellence. It is or Hegel a matter o tak

ing the negativity into a discourse, which occupies

the position o a privileged link between conscious

ness and existence. Insoar as being motivated by

the desire to bring negativity into the limits o co

herent discourse, Hegel is let with no alternative butto discard all orms o negativity that are unable to

be reconciled with consciousness: negativity with-

out employment. By stepping back rom negativity

without employment into the coherent discourse

in which negativity does not appear except by tak

ing upon itsel a meaningul character, Hegel closes

the door o his system to heterogeneous elements;

elements only by means o which Bataille thinks au

thentic sovereignty would be realized.

Therein lies the dierence o those remaining

within sacricial circle: they lack the discursive con

sciousness o what they did, but they have the sen

sual awareness caused by unintelligible and irrational

emotion, an element which Hegelian system lacks.10

Then it is plain that we are presented by two orms o

sovereignty: on the one hand, a conscious, discursive

sovereignty, on the other, a nave orm, beret o the

conscious knowledge o its real implication.

Pondering upon these orms, Bataille concludes

that there is no reason to relegate the sacricial sov

ereignty to a lower position than the rational and

unctional sovereignty. This Bataille explains by re

erring to death and absolute dismemberment (theHegelian term or death as the nal experience.

So great an experience as this absolute dismem

berment, nevertheless, cannot be at hand unless

already accompanied by excessive pleasure, an

guish, terror and sacred horror, which the sacricial

situations yield abundantly, but the Hegelian system

lacks. Thereore, the means that primitive man has

at its disposal seem more suitable or absolute dis

memberment than Hegels consciousness unolding

itsel in time with a discursive thinking.

It is then no longer extravagant to draw conclusion that when compared with Hegel, man o sac


8/12

224

Mete Ula AKSOY

rice, nave though he is, has an advantage, or he

possesses the sensual awareness, the only actor

that can bring about absolute dismemberment. Ad

ditionally, Bataille turns our attention to another de

ect in Hegels philosophy. The blind point in Hegels

Phenomenologyis quite readily seen i we take noticeo the act that rom beginning to end, the sacrice

is always already implicated in Hegel. To substantiate

this claim, it would be enough to remember that the

end o history comes only when the WorkerSoldier

sacrices his lie or a universal homogenous state.

It is only by risking his lie or such an ethical totality

that WorkerSoldier becomes Citizen. Thus even the

act that is thought to bring history to the end can be

taken as a kind o sacrice.

Turning a dea ear to sacrice, namely consider

ing it a mere topic to be dealt with within the chapter in Phenomenology entitled Religion, but not as

a crucial theme inherent to the movement o work,

Hegel misses the chance o knowing to what extent

he was right, with what precision he described the

intimate movement o negativity (Bataille, 1998, 338

339 Thereore, it becomes possible to see the blind

point in Hegels discourse: insoar as consciousness

is not conscious o sacrice inherent in it, it cannot

be absolute, however great an emphasis is put on it.

This, however, by no means dismisses the weak

points o sacricial sovereignty rom view. Sacrice,as an irrational and violent moment breaking the

chains o discursive thinking, dooms to ailure in that

a meaningul discourse always nds a way to reduce

the authentic moment o sovereignty to the level o

utility: wellbeing o community, ertility, and all o

rain. James Frazer successully establishes the link

between the institution o sovereignty and this sac

ricial gesture; and he is also successul in showing

how this gesture is encoded by a discourse. (Frazer,

1963, 69. We can reiterate the general ontological

condition laid bare earlier: no sooner does sover

eignty (miracle, the act beyond any meaning and beyond any utility start to emerge than it is absorbed

into a meaningul discourse, and this equally holds

true or sacrice.

Considering all these points, we can come to the

conclusion that we are presented by two orms o

sovereignty: one that has emerged out o a mean

ingul discourse unolding itsel in time; a discursive

sovereignty. In this orm o sovereignty the dier

ence between the autonomy o man and the sym

bolic space, against which this autonomy should be

asserted, wears so thin that autonomy becomes nomore than a symbolic mandate to be assumed by

man, i he is to be recognized. In this situation ree

dom turns out to be another name or regulation.

This point is all the more readily seen the more we

pay attention to the act that in an everincreasing

ashion the autonomy o man becomes the subject

o discourses and documents issued rom the organizations that are themselves likely to menace the

autonomy. What is o capital signicance or us as

regards this orm o sovereignty is that it is achieved

by means o consciousness. In addition to this orm,

Bataille brings us another orm o sovereignty. Unlike

the rst orm, this sovereignty does not stem rom

a discourse, and is thereore not inormed rom the

beginning by a consciousness. Accordingly, this sov

ereignty would be truly sovereign were it not or the

consciousness that arrives aterwards and ascribes

meaning and utility to the phenomenon that should

be meaningless and useless i it is to be sovereign.

6. BATAILLE BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTYAND CONSCIOUSNESS

So ar, we have tried to give credit to the idea

that there are two orms o sovereignty: one which,

attained through mediation and work, appears as

autonomy; and other which, appearing as momen

tary rupture, looms as loss. We have also detected

the ambivalent character in Hegelian system when

noting that Totality inscribed by Hegelian phenomenology cannot exhaust all the possibilities belong

ing to Geist. That is to say, there are remnants that

cannot be captured by the dialectical movement

and, moreover, these remnants are what render the

Totality ethical (sacricial gesture without which civil

society [the pursuit o selinterest] can strip o its

egoistic character and culminate in ethical state. Yet

an attentive look does miss the act that the same

ambivalence is also at work in Batailles sovereignty.

Focusing on this point, we realize that conscious

ness, via its ambivalent character, maniests itsel

as an element that constantly haunts Batailles historical and political readings o sovereignty. Asking

such questions aords us ground to suggest that

the very ambivalence detected in Hegel orms the

background o historical readings in La Souverainet.

A closer examination o this book may suce to il

lustrate that the relationship between consciousness

and sovereignty is that which eects and determines

the historical movement o sovereignty. This be

comes all the more surprising the moment we see

that sovereignty always accompanied by a meaning

ul discourse and is always rendered useul by it.Ater these general remarks, we can turn to the


9/12


225

periodization in La Souverainet. In Batailles histori

cal account, sovereignty passes through such histori

cal periods as archaic (sovereignty o hunters, gath

erers and shepherds, classical (sovereignty in eudal

orms, bourgeois (sovereignty tolerated in minimal

and rational orms and communist (sovereignty thatis totally eradicated. I we ollow these epochs step

by step, we can see that in all movements between

epochs, history has always been accompanied by

certain orms o consciousness. Let us then take the

rst moment: man in the stage o hunters and shep

herds possessed sovereignty. The most apparent

character o shepherds and hunters is given accord

ing to Bataille by their possession o sovereignty and

by their lack o consciousness o it. Voluntary respect

or sovereignty o the other was a matteroact.

(Kessel, 1998, 208 Bataille hardly shares the outlook

o those, Rousseau, or example, who conjure up a

representation o a golden age in this stage o de

velopment. Thereupon we may ask why it was that

Bataille avored eudal sovereignty than this period,

in which everyone enjoyed such a perect sovereign

ty that they needed not submit to any political sov

ereignty political authority and that everyone rec

ognized other and was recognized by this other as

sovereign, is less avored by Bataille than eudal sov

ereignty. To such a question, there seems to be only

one answer to give: because they lacked the very

consciousness that was to be ound in eudal societies. I we note the act that Bataille detects, behind

the dazzling acades o eudal orms, e.g. royalty,

only the muddled orms o sovereignty, mired down

eventually by the world o practice, we may urther

ask what merits the considerable attention that

Bataille has given to the eudal orms o sovereign

ty. Given that archaic societies can nd a place only

in the margins o La Souverainet, while the eudal

orms is one o its ocal points, we can ask: what was

it that archaic societies had not possessed but eudal

orms did? The answer is simple: consciousness. By

allowing the condensation o sovereignty in a singleperson, king or lord, and by depriving others rom

this sovereignty, eudal society had achieved what

was impossible in archaic society. Those submitting

to the exceptional sovereignty o the one became

instantly conscious (aware o what they did not pos

sess, o what they had lost. The contribution o this

orm o sovereignty is that the awareness o the loss

to which it had given rise helped humanity to claim

the very sovereignty o which it was deprived by the

exceptional gure o sovereignty.

When human history is considered as a whole,it is seen that eudal orms have been discarded by

bourgeois and communist revolutions. Let us con

centrate on bourgeois society as treated by Bataille

in his reading o sovereignty. Bourgeois society is

a political and social orm which sees the light o

day ater the evolutionary process during which

consciousness holds sway over irrational and mystic things. With the success o consciousness, there

lurks another problem: reication o consciousness.

Reication runs the risk o turning consciousness

(consciousness conscious o everything except itsel,

namely except how it is still inscribed by its others

into a great machine assimilating everything into

utility.

Communist society, representing a urther stage

o development than bourgeois society, diers rom

it with its strict intolerance to any dierentiation

based on rank and statue. This condition o communist society brings the understanding that the

communist society casts every capricious, whimsical

and useless thing aside. Bataille is apt to glean, how

ever, the drastic possibility inherent to this situation:

perect thinghood, a condition in which, all that is

an end in itsel being terminated, man has no op

tion but to be means or something else. What is the

value (lesson o this plight with which Stalinist so

ciety made humanity ace? The answer, or Bataille,

is simple: consciousness. This situation is so drastic

that that Bataille thought it would necessarily lead

to a consciousness o the reication that remained

inconspicuous and hence undetectable in bourgeois

world. This would drive humanity to be aware o the

act that there are only two alternatives to choose

rom. Either the rationalization, namely the reign o

the consciousness without conscious o itsel, would

continue but lead to a situation in which nothing

that is not useul would remain; a situation in which

everything, including humanity, would be a mere

tool, in which humanity thus would be reduced to

being merely a thing. On the other hand, conront

ed with such a plight, humanity would develop aconsciousness which would nally teach it how to

deal with sovereignty. This was the main concern o

Bataille in ormulating his General Economy: (Ben

nington, 1995, 4650 developing a consciousness

that has respect or the sovereignty o man and does

not deny consumption beyond utility (sovereignty

in avor o accumulation and industrial growth. With

out such a consciousness, Bataille envisions that only

total war and concentration camps would give vent

to sovereignty o man.

Exposed to this kind o reading, Batailles sovereignty is to be seen as always being accompanied by


10/12

226

Mete Ula AKSOY

consciousness, just as Hegels autonomy by sacri

cial gesture. We can conclude without undue temer

ity thereore that sacrice is to Hegels phenomenol

ogy (absolute consciousness what consciousness is

to Batailles general economy. This conclusion can be

more in place, however, i added with a caution: toclosure (reconciliation via dialectic, Bataille always

opposes an agitation that always starts anew. For

him, the balance o reconciliation is always upset by

the touch o transgression. Absence o reconciliation

is the hallmark o Bataille. This is so to such an ex

tent that in Batailles system, there is not even rec

onciliation avoring sovereignty: sovereignty that is

avored by reconciliation or sovereignty that is rec

onciled with a avor becomes a practical, and thus

a useul thing. This is exactly the source o what is

radical in Batailles sovereignty.

7. CONCLUSION

In this study, what we have in view throughout

is the ambivalence inherent in Batailles views on

sovereignty. I this ambivalence is taken as the main

theme, it becomes understandable why we attach

so much importance to Hegel. As we try to clariy,

Batailles relation with Hegels philosophy is always

marked by a tension. On the one hand, we see

Bataille that never hesitates to challenge absolute

knowledge by giving precedence to heterogeneous

elements. On the other, we also see another Bataille

that always acknowledges the importance o abso

lute knowledge or such elements.

When we bring Hegel and Bataille together, the

most critical point o Batailles sovereignty becomes

obvious: the tension between sovereignty and con

sciousness. Reading Bataille ater Hegel shows us the

reasons why we cannot take autonomy as absolute.

The more this autonomy is articulated, the wider the

gap between this autonomy and sovereignty. In ad

dition to this, there is also another lesson to be taken

rom reading Hegel and Bataille together: sovereign

ty unarticulated by a discourse can only be seen as

a miracle in phenomenal world. But this momentary

rupture is always taken back to the world o mean

ing and utility, hence, a discourse always ollows on

the heels o sovereignty that is in eect unarticulated. Though Bataille has always been interested in

heterogeneous elements, he is also quite sensitive

to this dimension. As nal word, it can be said that

importance o Batailles ormulation o sovereignty

stems rom his reusal to take this ambivalence as

something to be solved mechanically. For Bataille, it

is an existential matter exceeding the scopes o epis

temology or text. Moreover, he keenly realizes this

point, suggesting that such an inherently essential

condition as this ambivalence cannot be dealt with

as a mere problem o mechanics.

1 Une morphologie dcrivant des domains complexes ne

pourrait que suivre une position des problmes ondamen-

taus. Ce pourrait tre un resultat nal, qui ne surviendrait

quen dernier lieu. (Bataille, 1976: 252).2 Mais encore: ell [sovereignty] appartient essentiellement

tous les homes qui possdent et jamais nont tout a ait per-

du la valeur attribue aux dieux et aux dignitaires (Bataille,

1976: 247).3 Carl Schmitt explains the emergence o modern sovereignty

in theological terms showing us how much modern sover-

eignty is related with the dispel o miracle: die Idee des

modernen Rechsstaates setzt sich mit dem Deismus durch,

mit einer Teologie und Metaphysik, die das Wunder aus

der Welt verweist (Sshmitt, 1996: 43).4 Te reason or the capitalized orm o nothing is Batailles

usage o this word not as ontological category which de-

notes more than its usual sense does.5 Non-knowledge is the English translation o the philosophi-

cal concept developed by Bataille: non-savoir.

6 Here the closeness between Bataille and Heidegger is highlyprominent. o notice this point, it is useul to look at Hei-

deggers conceptualization o Daseins completeness (Ganz-sein des Daseins) with death (Heidegger, 1986: 235-37).

7 Le savoir absolu se erme, alors que le mouvement dont je

parle souvre. (Bataille, 1976 : 403).8 o realize how death annihilates recognition, Hegels Phe-

nomenology: Tis trial by death, however, does away withthe truth which was supposed to issue rom it, and so, too,

with the certainty o sel generally. For just lie is the natu-ralsetting o consciousness, independence without absolutenegativity, so death is the naturalnegation o consciousness,a negation without independence, which thus remains with-

out the required signicance o recognition. (Hegel, 1977:

114).9 Bataille clearly expresses the plight o the master: Il y a

surement une degradation de la souverainet ds linstant o

la Lutte a lEsclavage de adversaire vaincu pour n. Le roi

qui exerce le pouvoir et se laisse, au-del de ce quil est, sansagir, reconnatre pour ce qul fait, pour sa puissance, entredans la voie o lAction est rellement efcace, et nest plus

depurprestige. (Bataille, 1988: 353).10 (Hegel, 1977: 48).

END NOTES


11/12


227

Baugh, B. (2003) French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodern-ism, 1st edition, New York, Routledge.

Bataille, G. (1972) LExprience Intrieure, 3rd edition, Paris,Gallimard.

Bataille, G. (1976) La Souverainet uvres Compltes VIII, 1stedition,Paris, Gallimard.

Bataille, G. (1988) Hegel, lHomme et lHistoire uvresCompltes XII : Articles II 1950-1961, 1st edition, Paris,Gallimard.

Bataille, G. (1988) Hegel, la Mort et Le Sacrice uvresCompltes XII : Articles II 1950-1961, 1st edition, Paris,Gallimard.

Bennington, G. (1995) Introduction to Economics I: BecauseWorld is Round Carolyn Bailey Gill (eds.)Bataille: Writingthe Sacred, 1st edition, New York, Routledge.

Bloch, M. (1961) Les Rois Taumaturges: tude sur le CaractSurnaturel Attribu la Puissance Royale Particulirement enFrance et en Angleterre, 4th edition, Paris, Armand Colin.

Carse, J. (1980) Death and Existence: A Conceptual Study of Human Mortality, 1st edition, New York, John Wiley andSons.

Corn, . (1995) Unemployed Negativity: Derrida, Bataille,Hegel Bold-Irons Leslie (eds.) On Bataille: Critical Essays,1st edition, New York, New York State University Press.

Frazer, J. G. (1963) Te Golden Bough: A Study in Magic andReligion, 5th edition, New York, Te Macmillan Company.

Gasch, R. (1978) System und Metaphorik in der Philosophievon Georges Bataille, 1st edition, Bern, Peter Lang.

Heidegger, M. (1986) Sein und Zeit, 10th edition, ubingen,Max Nieyer Verlag.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit (trans.: A.V.Miller), Oxord, Oxord University Press.

Kessel, M. (1998) A Sovereigns Anatomy: Te Antique

in Batailles Modernity and Its Impact on His Political

Tought Slavoj Zizek (eds.) Cogito and the Consciousness,1st edition, London, Duke University Press.

Kojve, A. (1973) Te Idea o Death in the Philosophy oHegel (trans.:Joseph J. Caprino) Interpretation, 114-142.

Richardson, M. (1994) Georges Bataille, 1st edition, New York,Routledge.

Schmitt, C. (1996) Politische Teologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehrevon der Souvernitt, 6th edition,Berlin, Duncker & Hum-blot.

Veblen, . (1953) Te Teory of the Leisure Class. An EconomicStudy of Institutions, 5th edition, New York, Mentor Book..

REFERENCES


12/12

Documents

Bataille and Hegel