Battle Experiences #4

8/9/2019 Battle Experiences #4

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BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 13 I AUG 1944

*E?attleYhperiences@ re pubxsbd mlpibarly by t h i s heacla_uarbers toenable a t e in t r a i n i ng to p s f $ t from %heh t~as t ombat expeficmoes of o w roopsnow ff&ting the Gemm in F r ~ c e , A l t h s t l g l ? t he experiences sf certain d t s a ta particular Iceation are not necessarily rpplicaliLe t o all. ni t s 5x1 all situations,the item pb&hed wLll be those bsed an pmcideal expf ienee a d ye recommendedf o r c a m M amsiderat ion by units which m y nc:omnter ~ i m i h rrobIPemo &portsof aomoboratf-va m cankraqy axperfmcss are p % i c d a r 8 y deah=ed in order t h a t t h ev&XBfw of the indfeated b t % l e esson may be d !e t emsd ,

I, ~ e r a X , ,' n speratima1 memoramdm 02 t h e 1st Ida n t sy D i v i s i o n con%afPlslaw-o-y recent a%atemerata mpFFasiaing the. a,dvantage of' con%bua3egmbfned%rah&gof'%z%$a,n%rynd tank un i t s &cla are %at fi&t agether, Some exbracts fSPepnthe ht Mvisj.rnos &smssiom of t h e bfm%zy-$%nkf&se=,r~ ~0'01srn re given in su&=OEXdhg pE?Zi@Ti.@'S

2 , Fonuafdm 02 the '%em,' sa%isfactaq o h % % o ~f %he problem cxf $jiagAlmbeheen * - a i m 5s believed ta E e in th e as f g n m n t~ y the WmtiqrP of one of h b r i f l e S ~ I X ? , ~s ~aorbr the tank pPh%~mi.%a U

maar%flof.t~mou-ka sf advance a d - m h h e s i k * ~ ~ t ~ o a ry p y r o t e ~ h x ~ s9"-P d.swd meansu The a~sfgpnent o d d "be csntybu-~fisas tli-e.p f i a ~ s o nmprovespac-kise, The squad lmadgr s h o a be prm5dled w i t h an S C R - S ~ ~adio for cen-+;iaa&w cka-aaon wiW hi s pla%omaia company c70mmdcroa, h otpn%ry here%a=b'%-tat~kines a m 9flaeXy b ke enemkgl"&dghb k m nhay bz mw9mced by a aquads aqinmmo

- The use of e o h hannels forlers is no% almay.a feasiplffe, Fm-TP,dIses not prodde auP%ieient%y lose l ia ison, A nems of dirac:%crmmmica-%%ambWem infantry and tan.la is r e q u 5 d o The Z a U m g Plavs hem % d s dd t hBigpg ~ U ~ C ~ S S :mniexusphcme cw telephone slrr t2m ou%sfdeale certain tanks c m e c We . h h%b t s ~ ~ c a t i o nyskem of the b n k p prea~rmged ymt(8cMesg rn smoke


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and a m ilyJa38, Since the Frrr'antq? hand and arm signals are not exactdy Wle saneas those nomially used by the tanks,pre-arrangement i s necessary and practice i sadwtsable, The foll-g have been used by the ls t Division and are rec0mmended.sa, Target DesignatLon, Basic infantry hand signals for direction, ccwmencefiring, and cease ffring;* The squad or platoon leader who i s directing the progressof the tm h should be equipped with a mapon whch fi re s tracer d t f o n n ordert o pin-point the target quiclilyobo m s f bmditim For 7% EE9 the arm extended pointing with a l l f ingersexte- For PTP smoke, the s a w as f a r HE f l l m d by covering the eyes w i t h thehando 8 d y he tank will use machiae-gun f i r e unless the signal for HE or BPi s given, AP w i 1 1 be used only when the target ' i s seen by the tank commandee

Ce XWe.me~& standard vehicu3ss s i gna l s are used t o c o n t r o lWDBnte

%ere are given below s u b s b t i s l exbrqcts from some of the conclusians machedby a board of ofYicers which recently completed a study of certain operations involv-Fng close co-operation 'betmen ground and a i r farceso

lo Us8 of A i r Wi t b h htiuery Bangee There i s a deFlnite need fo r air sap-pc& Fe- ases, even where the targets are r i t kda range of Mandlg at i l le~ ,The z e b reason for . this i s the tremendous effect of 5OO-Lb and heavier bombsagaimt highly organized defenses and casemated positions, Large bombs, by the i rb b t , will damage f i r e control equipment and stun or k i l l th e cmv& CasematesWe tipped off level by near hits whch also somtimes put the gun out of action bypfllng d i r t i n f'mlit of the ports,, The gum w i l l . alwap be nautrallzed dur ing tbsair attacko The accuracy of the m g UI, dstermFne the duration of the periodof neutralizationo The nature of the objective, not the ab il it y of the arM&ryto reach it , should determine whether aircraft Fs to be use&2, 0 Bp Gbllnd *es must M s h he a;ir forces dewled and complete ih=n regarding the a3.r objectives, including a statement of the effectdesiredobe T%dn g of the atr attack must be carefully and completely coordinated -wi th

th grotpsj. f m s s pbns, including the ovffF-aU. f i r e planoea A g o d example of successful bo=ardbatim based on good plaaning i B fW-nderhbd by a frequently employsd by cme UoS, division* Plan fol lcrs~s~Be r mt h e planss arrive the a r t i l l e ~mothers the targ et with fire, thereby red* t bloss fromW Just befare the planes &ve, the a r t i l l e ry marks Gw t a r g e k d t hred smokeo 'Ehe ar6i lbr-y then withholds i t s f i re tmti l the b d i n g i s finishbd*As t M ende, the NIAv resumes fire, cwering the advance of the W e O

Khich has been held outside of the danger ares during the bcdFng,


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10, I1:.ilurc? t o d i g 1 Il p r o p t r l y nhen co t ; advancingo1 , ;':*ilu.ri: to pronmlj7 s3cure 2nd defsnd rr!l@~:no t adv ;nc i r~g~ on occas ions:ihcil t i t i : ~ ~ ~lc?.sc o r t r e d :;l.lch n p o ; ; ? . t i ~ r r i . i :k , . fire ~ n d . o i lm ; i , d the f i r o he hai

h cun i : i o r crcjund o1.r pos i t i o s ? ~: i t l ioui ;b o i a g d.isc,~v,vered,

%~'tLLuy~ i ;L r ; .d i y :~ ellii:ral, 35th ~nfc.:i-tr.g iv is ic!n, bijlic:rcs t h e t t h o f o l l ow ing~ t . : l ~ ~q i l l j.9 ~ : ; i l : i ~ : i ~ e d.2nge:~to !;ar 01:irr.l f r o ~ . ~ . t ;int: t r o ops ic the cxe-. .~ l l ti i ,~1~ : f ' > i ; 3 ~ : U:~ j ~ l " k 0:r b ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ; ~ gl;;icicic!l-ia


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1 1 j 9 ~ t t l b j i ~ ; : ~ ~ f i n re pub3 ish2d rewlariy by t h i s hoc.dq~::.artars o er~ablewii!;& n t~.ai . l ; i ; l~ L)rcf t fro13 "sic l e 2a c t c;,nh.t - l.l~l:;o i)i' GU L t ~ 0 0 p 9U.mf i l ik i ;q< G9.2i;'c,~z iii fi'211c~;a ~].i;)L101;d1'1;i:~c: oxperic;~ices ~ i ' c o r t ~ i n u i t s a t ap::rticu.lnT l ac~ . t l , o , l ,re nf.,t; ~-lcccns:.riJ.y a2p l i ca t l c - t o a l l u n i t s i n al.1. s i tua - .. t iom, thf: items yi~tlli;yh.;::iill 11c those Se:.;ed cn practical sxpci-ioncc: znci &rel ' ~ ~ o t ~ ~ ~ l i d ~ ddr car$fu l c~ilsid.r , retion y ' : n i t s nh ich ray erlco-u:l,cr si1:lilar prob-J.tjw,, f i q ~ s i ; sf c o r r o b c j ~ ~i y e cr cc?n'ti.'er;r -:xi,cricnccs E . ~ C a r t i c l i l e r l y dcsiyedi n ordur that; tkAevnl i t l i t ;g btha i -;tliidtcd. . i 3 . t , i t ; i,;ssonrfiybe dc tc r i inedo

I, Thtini:: c.,;w:i.:r;ts GG e ~ i i c 1 ~ - t i ~ : ? - if : i c . ~ :~ : . ( I c~ iCI.SOI : :~C:~ a r e f r o 41-+esurgeon,X= co-"ps:8 , ?*sr.:t::.tic:r!. Ti;ni. ~ ~ . . t : - : ; : ; ] . i i : : ~ , ~ ~ flxFLck:tirlli ~:;-t;talicfi ~ sthree :lc3iiical-C.--.l_-.-.-_l,-.- -.., , , ,hall ' +rtl:cks~!. ;~i j .c'nt: 1it.tc:r bc;n.l,er r :!:kcis g:rct.lc;t.:? c r ~ o z l f t r ~ c l r e r corzpny t o

cvac~l .bc ai?;ucltias t r i -th,.: ' r , r ~ ~ t:al:LolL i . d & t ~ . t i d n ~ ,$~L~TE:c ~ s s a r y , i t t e r j eepsf rox i bhe na t l i c u l oo~g.?ny ri-tb .-.acl~i>!>l;:.: ,JC:!;UZ?~:? Carl r e i n f o r c e - th e bn t a l i o n.half . t racks* B:ch neciic~,.l ,.!:!.igi:ny h ; . ~3s c.ro;,s-ccuntry cl;zl;ulen,ces and 24 l i t t wbeerers .t o t7vccuat.z ccswl t ie . ; f r ~ r , : the ks-tjt:giion o i t s ta t icnr- The msdl.ca1 halftr:zcZc3 of .the 'tank; b h t . t z l i ' j ~ l s ~ 1 1 ~ : ~. i ~ ; l ~ l ;~ h i n d h i tarik c o r i p u i e s a ~ dO f ~ rYh2 problem .c!f ovncut~ion kn s boc:; o j q j 2 e ub d i v c l - , ' : ~ ~ ~ i e t h ~ J .f e:~plo:aunt of t h e t&ril':-i~lfCintrJ't eau k g lScli; , d 111 ~1~2 n j c i ~ ~ i t g, a . c Y f cr usink: c . r r x rod n d d i c t ~ l e c t i u n s and tha

armred ix f an t ry nodica l s , r:c tion l i ? ;~-,!lcaz 31 the non..~r.ucrctl. isf a ~ l t r y * Theya r c x ~ j t e - kp f w h i s t y ~ of oE\e~ct t ion= took_ f a c a c o r ~ s i o t i n g f a bat&-talicnu of tanks cad a b a t laZion ol' arfia,ri:d i.nfzufry is brolcen dmri i n t o p l at o ong r t i u ~ i n g s nd ihe - h o i r ~ e 2 i c ; ~ loc t ious : ; u p p ~ r t c ~ r aif c;pc,rz-ticrio Thi;; areai s a.ko i n f i l t r ~ t x d ith. ~ t l ~ p ~ r - t i ~ gl l f a n t r y f r u u r,n i n f a n t r y d i v is i or l* jL1le v e i l h b l c l i t t e r b e c e r s a r c s e n t u? by t j l e : l i t t o r p l c t ~ n ~ l sf %hi.:medical C O L Lpany arid thtjse are ~-+i .~Sc,rcody l i t t e r bc.ai>rs ro12 ~2.ai;oonsof tk.0 ccrps l i t t w3'u';irors

c a - U ~ r , ~ d e r ; e ~ i l' ' D e r j t ~ ~ l c l ; ~ ~ i J r Lf Clo*Lr fl Clo-thing is mmen,ossa i ly dest roy(--La clm.r iag s.5,'t:ionu 1,:y rr ; lut ins cci ; t ing -f~i;cr,c.:i t could, i u mLnycases, be r o l l e ddt. Trn in in~ ;in F i r s t jLj .CIS (:It hzs becn obacrved t h a t f e w nounded rierl a:?ply--t l i ~ - i run ~id.:rcL:;igc,fig b'.:l-.t~ : ~ i tj l t i l tl:i.~~ . i d ~ a r r i vzo . The i : l i i ividwl !.i'lcs o l u i= f s r e s p ~ n s i b l f i t y ur Sirst sic? mu.^ ts i n d o c t r i m t e a coct i? lmll j . ,q


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c, . : y T ; t E~::uotic.zi ; r , thr:'ha .l,c;j.ji.1-1 i f i d ~i:: -iori i ci21il.?rtrj.l;hlitiiUGi.iiiO, tgr x:A:'tk ::;!;its - x c z.br,v,-. .d, , , ; - 1 ' : ; 1$;ru:- :I i!> t7.t i:.,:ls th.: n(:iu:ldi;d. arst ~ ~ ~ 1 : ~ : ~ ~ t ~ 3U A , 1;: ;,:2;,il2.nl2,; lo:.


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TWELTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 16 I0 AUC 1944

r ga ttla m p e r i e n c e s w e pub li shed r egu l a r ly by th i s headquarters t o e n ab l eu n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t roo ps norf i g h t i n g t h e G8-n~ i n m ace , ~ l t h o u & he exper iences of ce r t a i n units et ap a r ti c u la r l o c at i o n a r e n ot n e ce s sa ri l y a pp l ic a bl e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,t h e items publiahed r i l l be those based on pra ct ic a l exper ience and a r e recomnendedf o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter similar problem~l. ~ e p o r t aof cor robor at ive or con trar y exper iences are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e si r ed i n o rd er t h a t t h ev a l i d i t y o f t h e i n d ic a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y e determined.

By c-nd of t h e Army Group Corrmandbr 8

He B e LEWISB r i e d i e r General, Z]SA~ d j u t a n tGeneral

- I - - l - - - - C I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . c - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - "

1, The follo wing i s f rm CO, I & R Platoon, Inf, 9th Divis ionsa Train ing i n booby treps, mines and demolit ions should be given t o a 11 I & Rparsorinel, The p la toon shou ld be au tho r ized mine de tec t o r s f o r t h i s work.b e More emphasis i n training should be placed on ide n t i f i c a t i on of enemy armor,branches of service, rank or '@ado, and organizntion and employment of enemy uni t e .c . S u f f i c i e n t narkermnship tr ai ni ng sh ould be given men armed with t h e t o n wt o enable them t o f i r e f rom any pos i t ion .d. F i r s t a i d k i t s shou ld be autho r ized f a r I & R jeep8 and m r e thorough t ra in i

i n f i rs t a i d should be given I & R parsomel.2 The following is f'rcan 3-2, Id, 9 t h D i v i si o n ;.a. W should have i n o ur i n t e l l i g e n c e p l a t oo n a number of men who can speak Freand/or German. Each as sa u l t ba t t a l io n should have a t l e a s t o ne interrogator who can

speak th e language of t he country and of t h e enemy.b. ' m i n e d i n t e l l i g e n c e 2ersonnel should be amng. t h e f i r s t t o e nt er a capturedf o r t i f i e d p o si t io n, con~~lsndost , o r o the r inathl lat ions t h a t rnay c o n t a i n documsnts

equipment of mi l i ta ry in te l l ig en ce value .

1. purposes and r es u l t s . The 83rd Div is ion has i n i t i a t e d , and va lues t i & l y , acourse of ir~struct ion o r mplacements. ~ t surpose i s t o n d e b ~ k * any of t h e ide


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t h a t t h e s e men h d p lc ke d up p r i o r t o a r r i v a l , a nd t o i n s t r u c t them i n s p e c i a l f i g h t-iq t echniques and the us e of ce r t a i n weapons . '310 ap pr eh en sio n of new men ha s beenreduced and th e i r se l f -conf idence and morale grea t ly be nef i ted by the course .

2 , Descr ipt ion. The cou rse lasts two and one-half days and i s conducted by b a t t l eexperienced personnel . D ur in g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h e men a r e t r a i n e d i n g o u p s o f 1 2 a ndare as s igne d - to subo rd ina t e un i t s by t hose groups. Th i s r educes t he s t r angenes s o f t henew o r en i z a t i o n . he s u b j e c t s s t r e a s e d d u r i n g t h e c o ur s e a r e ta. H m t o l i v e i n a fax ho le , Th i s i nc ludes cons t ruc t i on of t he fox ho l e andmeans of p rese rv ing hea l t h and bod i l y c l a n l i n e s s under such cond i ti ons .be The s p i r i t o f t h e o f fens ive . Emphasi s is placed on the danger of al lowingthemse lves t o become pinn ed down and s ub je ct sd t o mrtar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e .c. The use and ef fe c t i ve ne ss of the f ragmenta t ion grenade, an t i t a nk grenade andth e bazooka. About 25 percen t f i r e t h e an t i t ank g renade and thebazooka and a1 1 ob-s e r v e t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s a ,

d* 3ome t a c t i c s and technique of hedgerow f ig h t i ng .

111 FIELD IMPROVISATIONS.1. U s a s of the SCH 300. A ba t t a l io n commander i n t he 8 3rd Div is ion has used th e

SCR 300 e f f e c t i v e l y fo r cammunicat ion wi th th e b at ta l i on ammunition DP t o d i r e c t t hemvament o r reaupply quic kly wherever needed* He a l s o recammends p lac ing a n sCR 3120,when avai lab le , a t t h e b a t t a l i o n a i d s t a t i o n t o a i d i n t h e e v a cu at io n of wourdedo I ngeneral he has found t he se t one of t h e most depe ndabl e means of colrnnunication w it hi nt h e b a t t a l i o n .

2 I mp ro vi se d m u n t s f o r U. he 2nd Div i s i on ad na nce u f f i c e r r ep o r t e t he u seof t h e f o l l o w i n g e x pe d ie n ts f o r d i r e c t ma ch in e gun f i r e a t r a n ge s of 10 0 y a r d s andless . They a r e g e n er a ll y u se d o nl y f o r f i r i n g s h o r t b u r s t s w i t h t h e l i g h t ma ch in em e o r more o f t h e va r i ous t ypes a r e supp l i ed t o each mich ine gun squad.a. I n s t a l l a t i o n of a BAR bipod on t ru nnio n of the U G . ~n improvised s tock s i u -lar i n shape t o t ha t of th e German MG 42, made f r m she et mt ital , re inf ar ce d wi th wood,i s a t t a c h e d by f o u r s cr e ws t o t h e p i s t o l g ri p. T h is , i n e f f e c t , c o n v e rt s t h e l 9 1 9 ht o a 1919~6 .

b. ~t t a ch me n t f two meta l rods f rom the 105 m c lo ve r l ea f m u n i t i o n p c k , benti n t o r o c k e r shape. They a r e at tac hed lengthways on each s id e, one end t o t h e t runniona nd t h e o t h e r t o t h e e l e v a t i o n lu g. ' f i e shoulder s toc k descr ibed i n a above is used.c. Attachment of a sp ike , 1 2 t o 15 inches long and l/2 t o 314 of-an inc h i n dia-

meter , sharpened a t one end and f i t t e d with a s imple yoke a t the other. 'i'he yoke i sa t t a c h e d t o t h e t r u n n i o n w i th a b o l t . A f l ange , t h re e i nches i n d i amete r, i s a t t a c h e dto th e s to ck about fo ur inches f rom th e poin t. when a t ta che d , the sp ike swings f romthe t runnion . b e hou lde r s t ock m y be used or the gun f i r e d w i th j u s t t h e p i s t o lg r i p *

d. I n emergency th e gun i s somet imes f i r e d wi th no mount a t a l l . l'he b a r r e l i sl a i d o n a hedgerow or any conveni en t ob j ec t , and f i r e d i n sho r t bu r s t s . Asbestosglove s a r e sometimes used by t h e gunner.


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TWELTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 17 I AUC 1944

a m t t l e Bpe r i encesu a r e publ ished regula r ly by t h i s headqua r te r s t o enableunits i n t r a in i n g t o p r o f i t from th e l a t e s t combat exp erience s of our tr oop s nowf i gh t i ng t he ~ m n sn France. Although the experierlces of c er ta in u n i t s a t ap a rt i cu l ar l o m t i o n a r e n o t n ec es sa ri ly a p pl ic a bl e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t io n s ,the i tems published w i l l be those based on prac t ic a l exper ience and ar e rec om nd edfar ca re fu l con aid erat ion by un it s which may encounter si mi la r problems. Reportsof cor robora t ive or con t ra ry expe ri ences a r e pa r t i cu l a r ly des i red i n o rde r t ha t t hev a l i d i t y o f t h e i n di ca t ed b a t t l e l e s so n m y be detarmined.

By cormand of t h e Army Group Comnder :

H. B. r n I SBrigadier Ceneral , U sAd ju ta nt Gene ral- - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - . - - . -

(NCTrE; ?he fol lowing mater ia l i s e x t r a c t e d f r a m a document prepared by the chief othe Armred Sect ion, Twelf th Army Group, a f t e r a v i s i t t o three separa te tank ba t tal io ns which had pa r t ic i pa te d in cambat.. These axt r ac ts appear t o have s o mc h va lufar a l l t an k u n i t s, an d f o r mny u n i t s of other arms, tha t they a re reproduced i n tfarm t o permit wider di s t r ibu t ion. )

I TAM-INFANTRY -HONE C ~ C I I ~ O M .1. U1 thr ee bat tal io ns were ent hu sia st i c about th e telephones mounted on thebacks of tank8 f or c o ~ i c a t i o n ith i n f r nt r y lead ers. They feel, however, thatf u l l actvantage i s not teken of th is equipment f o r th e fol lowing reasonas:a. To nuke the idea comple te ly e ff ec t ive , a l l t anks ahould be so equipped.. ?hhas not been done,be B n y oppor t uni t i es t o ob t a i n ta nk f i r e supp ort have been missed because a l lof t he i n fan t ry were not i a f o m d th a t t he t e l ephones had been ins t a l l ed .

11 W I N I N G OF TANK REPIACBENTS1. The need i s f e l t fo r t r a i n in g courses f o r bo th comniss ioned and en l i s t e d t anreplacements. Such courses, i f wel l planned, would r e s u l t i n increased eff ic iency anrutual confi dence . Reconnnendationa a r e f a r a two-weeh cours e f o r each group, a l lother t ra ini ng t o be suapended dur ing the per iod. Reconmended su bje cts a r e a s fol loa. For Off icer s:: A re fr es he r cours e of two weeks conc entrated on ra di o procedand ra dio presence to give confidence i n t a lki ng over the radio, platoon maneuverinmap reading, s l i de x, f i r s t echelon tank maintenance (crew maintenance), tank weaponand tank driving.


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be Far en l i s t ed men: In te nsi ve t ra in i ng i n dr iv ing; gunnery; rad io ; crew m i n -tenance; , use of s i ght s . b inoculars and o ther tank equipment. These su bj ec ts a r erecommended because rep lacem ents most re qu ir ed a r e of tan k c-nders , dr ive r s andgunners.

I11 SUGGES'IXQIJS FOR SPECIAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE.1. Use o f a r t i l l e ry . a. A rt i l le ry prepara t ion should be concentra ted on improvedroads perpendicular to the ax is of advance. I t has been found that enemy tanks an d ATweapons f re qu en tl y amplace themselves on the se roads.b. A r t i l l e r y f i r e on hedgerows which do not contain a road should be secondary.F i r e on f i e l d s i s n ot p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e . .2.. Sugges t ions fo r in fan t ry . a. In fa nt ry acconpinying; tanks should avo id usingan opening that a tank has just used. The enemy freq uen tly l ay s on these openings

inmediately the passage of the tank i s observed.b. White phosphorous grenades hive been ver y suc ces sfu lly used by inf an tr y t op o i n t o u t targeto t o t h e tan ks.ce In fan t ry supp l i e s such a s grenades and amnunition, and even ra t i o ns and not ar ,can be ca r r ie d i n boxes on the re ar of tanks . This p lan b s been used and bas been

both su cc es sfu l and convenient.

IV RELIEF OF TANKS FOR REPmSHbIENT.lLfter be ing in ac t io n fo r a considerable t ime, t a n k pla toon s must withdraw t orep len i s h a m n i t i o n a n d fue l . When the in fa n t ry obse rves th i s wi thdrawal, they f e e l

they a r e being de se rte d and ten 4 to withdrew themselves. Thia has been avoided bythe following method*. one tank pla toon complete ly fueled and wi th amuni t ion i s kepti n th e r ea r . T h is p l a to o n r e l i e v e s a p la toon on the l in e by in f i l t r a t i on , one tanka t a time. When th e re l ie v ed pla to on i s assembled, i t pro ceeds to t h e company dump,r e p l e n i s h e s i t s f u e l and a,mmunition, an d r e t u r n s t o a p o s i ti o n i n t h e r e a r of t he l i n eand re l i ev es t he next p la toon by the same method. The i n f e n t r p n seeing a tank moveforward a t the same time a tank noves back rea l izes that h is suppor t has not diminished.

V INFAN?RY-ARTIUERY C O O R D ~ O N . (Obeervations mhde by the o f f i c e r s in bc a te d . )1. Addi t ioml FO ' so am th i s coun t ry obse rva t ion i s l imi ted , and a forward ob-

se rve r a t ba t t a l ion s i s n ' t enough. We h ive , the re fo re , p laced an ad d i t ion a l forwardobeerver wi th each f r o nt l i n e company, usu al ly about s i x on the d iv is io n f ron t . mecoqany forward observer i s as s i s t ed by one se rgean t and a r e b o opera tor -dr ive r . Hehas wire l i n e t o t h e l i a i s o n o f f i c er a t t h e i n f an t r y b a t t a l i o n and a n 8CR 610. Assoon a s more open country i s reached, these company observers w i l l not be needed. How-ever , a t p resent they l i v e wi th the i nf an tr y wherever they goon--Executive Off ice r ,2nd Divis ion Ar t i l le ry .

2- W n c t i o n under a r t i l l e r y fire. nqe have had to have our infantry withdrawtwo t o fou r hundred ya rds be fo re s t a r t in g a p repara t ion be fo re an a t t a ck i n t h i s count ry .I th ink the Germam g e t a s c l os e a s posaib le t o our f ron t l in es to gain some pro t ec t i onf r m our e r t i l l e r y . ?hat seems to be a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r t a c t i c s he re . They w i l lnot take what Isavenworth would c a l l a good defens e posit io n. No matter how f a s t theyar e r e t r ea t in g , i f you s top and d ig in , they w i l l in f i l t r a t e r ig h t back to the nex thedg eror sea - -~r t i l l e ry Commnder, 2nd Division.


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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. I8 12 AUC 1944

r a t t l e n pe ri en ce su are p u bl is h ed r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r te r s t o e n a b l eu n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f ro m t h e l a t e s t combat e x pe r ie n ce s o f o u r t r o o p s nowf i g h t i n g t h e ~ e rmn s n F ra nc e. d t h o u & t h e e x pe r ie n ce s o f c e r t a i n u n i t s a t ap r t i c u l a r l oc a t lo n are n ot n e ce s sa r il y a p pl i ca b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i tu h t i o nst h e i tens publ i shed w i l l b e t h o s e b as ed on p ra c t i c a l ex p e r i en ce an d are recommendfo r ca r e fu l co n s i d e ra t i o n b y u n i t s w hi ch may en cou n te r s i mi l a r p r o b l w . Repor t so f co r ro b o ra t i v e r x c o n tr a r y e x pe ri en ce s a r e p a r t i c u l e r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d er t h a t tv a l i d i t y o f t h e i n d i ca t ed b a t t l e l e s s o n may be d e te rmin ed .

By commnd of t h e ~ r m g . o u p C o m u n d e r ~ .

Br igad ier Genera l , U S~d u ten t Genera l

I IAUI\TCHIIJ'G OF BAILEY BRIDGE BY ' I ! ! .The f ol lo wi ng i n c id e n t of t h e I t h l i a n c a n ~ i g n s ex t r ac t ed f ro m a p u b l i ca t i o

t h e B r i t i s h w ar Officeg:s m o t h e r i d e a d eve l op ed d u r in g t h e t r a i n i n g was t h e l au n ch i n g o f e ~ a i l e y ri

by tanks. 'lb c a r ry o u t t h i s t a s k , two t snks were employed, bo th es pe c i a l ly f i t t eand o ne h av i ng t h e t u r r e t an d gun removed. , h e t ask was a c t u l l y execu ted mos t sc e s s f u l l y d u r i n g t h e a s s a u l t , and t h e b r i d g e was s a f e l y h u n c h e d i n t h e f a c e o f eo p p o s i t i o n o n t h e f a r bank. A t that p o i n t i t would have b ee n m p o s s i b l e t o haver Bai l ey b r i dg e i n t h e n o m l way. T h i s b r i d g e was o ne o f t h e o n l y two av a i l a b l ei n g t h e f i r s t day of t h e c r o s s i ng e l

"We a r e s u c c e s s f u l l y u s i n g b a ng a lo r e torpedoes t b blow openings i n hedgerows tanks* We pla ce two o r th re e to rpedcss , dep enb ng on the he i& t and g rowth o f thhed@;e, abou t four f e e t ap ar t and abou t one- th i rd the he igh t o f the mund from ~fie ha ve t h e t a n k s push t h e t o r pe d oe s t hr ou gh t h e h e a g e . * - - & p t a l n , E n g Comba

I11 XEDIUb4 ARTILLERY.1. "re men i n a ba t t e ry should be t ra jined a s computerso I h a v e t r a i n e d my

phone oper ti tor s, and, al thougL t he y my not be used a s computers, I f i n d t h a t t hedo 6 much b e t t e r job a s t e l ephone opera to rs by having had th i s training.

2. n In o r d er t o i n c r e a s e o ur a n g l e of t r a v w s e , we r e v e r s e t h e t r a i l sp ad e -i t f l u s h w i t h t h e g ro und t o f a c i l i t a t e r ap i d movement.


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3. w'rirne f i r e , u n l e s s ob ,so rveri, r e s u l t s i n hn e xc s s s ive number of duu s . *ere i sneed f 'o r a p e r c u s s i o n f u s e s i m il a r t c t h t t used tiy l i & t a r t j I l e r y . * - - I , & JOT, - .I't-i l l e r y Be t a l j . o n (medium).

m . 7 ,-IV P I S FOR ,12.i.f-ig{s.Coriii11:s of a l i e u t e n a nt i n t ke- ,m::>red ~ i v l s i c n )1. I n t r a l n l n g t a nk cr ew s, too much p r h c t ~e 1 1 1 acc1~l1.1 k si.eed ? n I ~ W I a n l p u l a -

t l o n c hn no t b e Cl - ~e n .2. fl;ve &kt. i t SC,> t o f i r e i n t o till ? . t l l t lu i l r , i rLcs , rcc they i : ;vu~*ia l ; c o n t ~ i n

s n i p e r s a n d m c h l n e g u nn er s. 'iie e l s o c u t c m n i c a t i c n l i . ~ le s , s v4e c?c~rel:cs.3. nun t he r e c e n t b r e a k -t h r ough we m v e d our t hnks i u colrura a l o x t h e rokliu ~ m t l

t h e l f t c ~ c i j t&rA wtly i ' i r ec on, then we aeployed or pushed by , de2enal1i.g on t he m t u r eof t h e t e r r a i n . If w e were n o i e b l e t o knc~cko u ~h e enemy k r i c r a n ~ i t a n kun f rom afl an k, vfe by-gassed i t .

4 . Wrlhe anew u s e s .?'J ca l i b e r v ;eapons e .g a ins t t anks t o de t e r m i ne t he r a nge . Atank t h E t r e c e i v e s .30 c a l i b e r f i r e i s v er y l i k e l y t o get a s h e l l i n a s h o r t L l r n e .

5 W r p r o te c t io n a e i n s t b u t t e r f l y tombs we d i g a l a r c e t r e n c h ?r id p ~ r hI t a nkove r i t , l e a v i n g a s m e l l e n t r t n c e ho l e on one end.

6. f l C a s u t l t i e s a a o n e crews of o u r tanks t b a t heve b e e n s e t o n f i r e are s u r p r i s l n g 1l o w , u s w l l y only one o r two. The s u l l erti,o f i r e d i r e c t e d a t c re ws , a ba ndon] np t ar rh si s v e r y ~ n a c c u r s t e ,

7 0 #NO i n f l a m b l e r i t e r i e l s sh ou ld ev;:r be k e p t i n s i d e b tank.8, WCcntinue t o f i r e a t a n eiieny t ank un t i l i t c at ch -e s f i r e t o p re ve il t i t s r e 1 : ~ j . r

end immediate u s e a s p i l lb ox .9. W e m y weap on s e r e u s u t l l y oic:sc: e t $h e f i n e l d r i v e h ou si ne of our t t ~ n k s .l o o Wmnk crews s h ~ u l d ear s t e e l h e l m e t s ove r t h e i r t a nk he lm e ts .11. f lTanks should adver ice th r ouch th e c en te r ~ f a field i n s t e a d of c l o s e t o t he

hedgerows, i n or d e r t o a vo i d baz ookh f ir 6. n

1. ~ g u c c e s s f u l n d r a p i d e v a c u a t i o n o f wounded d ep en ds u po n ta. A g g e s s i v e n e s s o f uni t surgeons - - tha t i s , k eep in g p er so nn el a nd i n s t s l l a t i ~ n sw e l l f o r w a r d .b. C l os e c oo r d i n a t i o n a nd c on t a c t be tw ee n d i v i s i o n s u r geon and s u r ge ons o f s ub -

o r d i r l a t e u n i t s .c. E s t a b l i s h i n g a mb ula nc e l o a d i n g p o i r ~ t s l o n g axis of advance."--3urgeon,

A r m r e d D i v i si o n .2. % A r e e f f i c i e n t ambulance r o u t e m r k i n y s y s t em f ro m t h e f r o n t t o c l e a r l n e s t &

t i o n s i s needed. bjany ambulance Cir ivers lo s e t h e i r way and mdch t ime 1s l o s t I n r e ac h-ing t h e c l e a r i r ~ ~tation."-Captain, 1st I n f a n t r ~ ; iv is io n.


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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 19 13 AUC 1944

a k t t l e D pa ri en ce sn are publ ished regu lar ly by t h i e heradquartera t o enableun i t s i n t r a in ing t o p ro f i t f rom the l a t e s t combat exper iences o f ou r t roops norf i gh ti ng th e Germans i n France. Uthough the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t ap a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r a n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u ni te i n a l l s i tu a ti o nsthe i tems publ ished w i l l be those based on pra ct ic a l experience and a r e reconmendfo r ca re fu l cons ide ra t ion by un i t s which m y encoun ter similar problems. Reportso f co r robora tive o r con t r a ry experiences a r e pa r t i c u la r ly des i r ed i n o rde r tha t tva l i d i ty of the in d ica ted ba t t le les son may be determined .

By colr~llandof the ~ r ? n y roup Carrmanderr t

Brigadier Genera l , US1Adjutant General

I COMBAT YIIAIW1NG9. (From i n f a n t r y p l a to o n l e a d e r s o f t h e 9 t h ~ i v i e i o n )1. Move. none of t he f a t a l mistakes made by in fa nt ry replacements i a to h i t-round and fr ee ze when f i r e d upon. Once I ordered a q u a d t o advance from one he

to an ot he r. During th e movement one roan was h o t by a sn ipe r f i r i n g one round.en t i re squad h i t the ground and fro ze . ?hey were picked of f , one by one, by th esn ipe r .

2. Don't hwve. %!en should be taught t o play 'dead '-- that i a , r a m i n p er fe cs ti l l - - if wounded by sni per f i re . I f they move, th e sn ipe r w i l l f i r e ag ain.

3. Follow Barregee. *?here i e a tendency , especia l ly among new men, t o becamovercon fident when the a tt a c k follow s a heavy bmbardment such as t h a t o f 25 Julyhbny of them thought a l l t he Germane i n th e ar ea would be e i t he r k i l ed or woundea l l they had t o do was to tak e over t he ground. In t r a i n i n g i t ahout be constanst re aaed tha t a i r bombardment and a r t i l l e r y bar rages do not des t roy th e memy butd r ive them under ground and tempor aril y disorga niz e them, thereby m k i n g them, f os h o r t t i m e , m r e vu lne rab le to in fant rynen fo llowing c lo se beh ind th e bar r ages.

4. mow the BAR. " e l i e v e t h e re i a a need fo r more in tens ive t r a i n i ng wi tthe BAR. I have r e c e n t l y l o s t t h r e e men who claimed they were expert U F l men andso c l a s s i f i e d on t h e i r Form 20'a. These men were k i l l e d because they were not mfc i e n t l y t r a i n e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of this weapon. B e BBR i s a m a t s f f e c t i v e weai n hedgerow f i a t i n g and shou ld heve h igh ly t r a ined pe r sonne l to opera te i t .

5 . Be A le rt . won one occasion , the f a i l u r e of two new r ep la ce me nt a t o r e a l i zvalue of co nstan t watchfu lnes and a le r tn ee s res u l te d i n the lo s s of two of my noncmissioned of f icers . The men on the l is te ni n g post mv ed back t o rep ort ~emmnau


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15/36

TWELFTH ARMY CROUPBATTLE EXPERIENCES

No. 2 0 14 AUC 1944#B at t l e Exper iences* a re gub li shed r egu l a r ly by t h i s headquar te r s t o enableun i t e i n t r a in ing t o p r o f i t from the l a t e s combat eq e r ie nc es of ou r t roops now

f i g h t i n g t h e German8 i n France. Although the exper iences of ce r t a i n un i t s a t ap a r t i c u l a r l o c at i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a pp l ic a bl e t o a l l u i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i ~ n s ,th e i tem8 published w i l l be th os e based on p r a c t i c a l expe rien ce and a r e recormnsndedfo r ca re fu l cons ide ra t ion by un i t s which may encounte r s imi la r p rob lem. R e ~ o r t sof co r robora t ive o r con t r a ry exper iences a r e pa r t i cu la r l y des i red i n o rde r tha t thev a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e ss o n may be determined.

Ey comnand of t h e Army Group Commander:

Br igadier Genera l , USAAdjutant General

W A R N I N G TO PATROLS."he Germans w i l l l e t a pa t r o l ge t e r roneous in format ion i n o rde r t o waylay t he

t ro op s t h a t t r y t o us e the inf3rmation. On aeve ral occasions they have allowed cursmall pa tr ol s t o en te r vi l l a g e s and wander mound unmolested; when a combat patrolcame t o t a k e o ve r t h e v i l l a g e , i t encountered atron g resistance.*--&mormdum of

Corps, 24 June 1944.

The method of having each di re ct support ba tt al io n rei nfo rce d by a genera l suppoba t t a l io n proved super ior . I t g e t 8 q uic k r e i n f o r c i n g f i r e s o n m y t a rge t ho ld ing upthe in fa n t ry advance ( i f o f su f f i c i e n t importance to ju s t i f y use of general supportBns). It a l so pe rmi t s p lann ing fo r r e in fo rced de fens ive f i r e s i n case of coun te r -attac k. The th ir d advantage i s t o g i i e each i c f a n t r y ba t t a l io n con tinuous support ding di splacemen t , s ince fo rward obse rve r s can f i r e e i th e r ba t t a l io n whi le t he o the rdisplacing .-- Unit Report of th e 1st lTlfantry Division.

It has been found pa r t ic u l ar ly eaay fo r our air OF'S t o s po t 88 rmn guns when theyare f i r i n g a t h igh ang lee aga in rr t our ai rc ra f t . When c lo se a i r support miss ions ar ef lown in th e V Corps Zone, ad di t i on al a i r Opts a r e usually employed t o tak e advantagof t h i s s i t u a t i o n . These a r e u s u a l l y f u r ni s h ed f l a k maps i n advance by the a i r fo rci r te l l ig e n ce t o d i r e c t ' t h e i r a t te n t io n t o suspected AAA locations.--Report from V Co


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I V CHARACTERISTICS O F GHilKBN GUN POSITIONS.A sys t e ma t i c s tudy o f German gun p o s i t i o n s 80 f a r loca t ed i n the zone of the U S

V Cor ps i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e b a t t e r i e s a r e u s u a l l y p l ac e d i n open f i e l d s w i t h open f i e l d sa l l a round. They are never found i n woods and ra re ly i n hedgerows. Frequen tly they or ec l o s e t o a farmhouse which t h e p e rs o nn e l u s e f o r h ou si ng . F i r e ~ j o s i t i o n s o r 3? gunsare f r e qu e n t ly found a bou t 300 yards a pa r t on s ide roads . These guns usually movea f t e r firing a feu round s,-- Report from V Corps.

V COMBAT RAIWINGS,COments of Ri fl e Cmpany Commander, 9 t h Divis ion:

1, " I t i s manda to ry t ha t a l t e rn a t e mor ta r pos i t i on s be s e l e c t e d two o r three hedye-rows over and two or t hr ee hedgerows i n r e a r of th e primary fiosi t ion. Fa i l ur e t o mzkeuse of a l t e r n a t e p o s i t i o n s c o s t me f i v e men of my mortar pla toon.

2. "The American soldier i s too c a r e l es s i n unduly exposine ; h im e l f when i n viewof the enemy. I n d i v i d u a l l y he f e e l s t h a t some o t h e r n J o e n w i l l g e t s h o t and not he,U n t i l t h i s c o n d it i on i s correc ted , the bes t camouflage i s of l i t t l e v a l u e , "

1. " I n a recent miss ion aga inat tank s W s h e l l a were used, but the smok e ! ~ r o d u c ~ dby the burning phosphorous screened the withdrawal of some of the enemy t anks .

2. *Art i l lerymen need more ph ysi cal cond it io ning acquir ed by digging--as a r t i l l e r ypos i t i ons re qu i re c ons ide ra b l e d igg ing in . * - -Ca p ta in , FA , 1s t Div i s io r .

*Sn ip ers have not been a s nmerou s dur ing the rece nt f a s t moving phase of t hea t ta ck as when the s i t ua t i on was more s t a t i c . They us ua l ly band toge th er in smal lg roups rang ing f rom f i ve t o f i f t y men. Our means of dea l i ng with sni per s i s t o sw e e pt h e area a s c lean ly a s po ss i b l e a s we advance , spraying suspsc ted snip er positions withBAR f i r e . Movements of per son nel in areas i n t he immedia te r e a r o f f r on t l i ne a shou ldbe i n g ro u p s c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l men r a t h e r t h a n g r o u p s of two or t h r e e , o r i n di v id -u a l s . S n i p e r s w i l l n ot f i r e on l ar g e gr oups but w i l l a t t empt t o p ic k o f f i nd iv idu a l sand groups of two or th ree . A l l men ne a r t he f r on t should be re qu i re d t o remain i nf o x h o l e s d u r i ng b r i e f r e s t p e r i o d s o r o v er n i g h t. Some t e nd t o l ea ve t h e i r fox ho l esand wander around over t h e area. They not only sub je ct thsmselv es t o s n ip e r f i r e , b uti n v i t e a r t i l l e r y c o nc en t ra ti o ns on t h e i r position^,^-- Company Cawnander, 1st Division.


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18/36

(From a Fi eld Art il le ry Information Wl llet in fllom th e North African Theater)1. @ It as been found that on long OP l i ne s , the practice of eatabl iahing t e s ts t a t i o m , permansntly manned, a t th e baas of th e OP h~ been adrantagaoun. On thealines the breaks are caused mainly by ehel l f i re , and i t is necessary t o repaix. thelinea several t imes a day. The use of t he forward t e a t e ta tio ne enables crews t oetar t a t both ends of the l in e simultaneously, fin d the br& and put the line bacin service with miniitam delay.2. 'Oling t o the l arg e number of ci r cu it s t h a t follow the same routes, uniteshould dev ise some method of d i s t i n c t t a g marking of c i r cu i te , e. g., la rg e woodentam stenciled with unit code name.3. 'Wire crews soon lea rn the l i t t l e tr ic ka t ha t sim pli fy the whole conmnmica-tion problem. They servi ce a li n e properly and care f i l ly dur ing ins ta l la t ion 80 thbreaks w i l l be minimized, thua a llowing them t o ge t a normal amount of sleep. Whenwire does gp o ut , re pa ir c r m , n stead of running up and down a l in e with t e s t

clips, check the location of enemy shelling and proceed to the scene of the shelledarea, uatjally finding their trouble right there."111TACTICS OF CHlMILN RVANTRY IIWTITUK D lDEXS S .

(Notes The substance of the following descr ipti on of th e ant ita nk methodsof German infantry un its ia extracted from a B r i t i s h source.)1. The defense planrs of Gemn infantry companies usually aaaign to bazooka setions the role of defending narrow tank lanes and defilated approaches. Open area8are covered by A. T . guzm.2. The bazooka is regarded as re la t ively s t a t i c , t o be f i r ed from a prepared

positio n. The grenade diecha rger is t reated as a mobile reserve weapon and held baa t an ti ta nk Company Bq . Bazooka sectiona ar e usual ly al lq te d t o th e i nfa nt ry corn -paniea against which a tank attack is conaidered mst l ikely. Bazookae usually wori n group6 of three, sited i n a @Vm ormation es indica ted i n the achematic diagrambelow. From t h i s formetion a t l e as t two reapoars can engage a tank approaching fromany di re ct ion. 4"7"

3 . The emplacement fo r the bazooka i s ueually a "VV" haped p i t , with the prongtoward the enemy. The weapon is f i r e d from the m e t s uita ble prong, according to thdi re ct io n of approach of the h os ti le tank. After loading the weapon, the loader taksh el te r from the back-blast i n the opposite arm. The loader, srmed w i t h a sub-machgun, ia responeible for protection of the position again& ground troops.


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b. *slow hinking on one occasion oatwed ua aoneidarable loes of tiam. he reonaiasance unit oent t o reoonnoitar f o r a ri ve r cross ing advanoed t o a bridge throughnarrow gorge which prevented the rehioler from leaving the road. They found B spanof the bridge but located a nearby for& Zhey remi ned i n place to guard both bridgand ford. when the engineer equipment tried to e o ~ l e orward to r w k , i t could m t gpaet the reeonrraieeance rshicles. The reoomnaiessace party ahould have l e f t perearnand reaporrs off the road at3 a guard. It should al so have prevebted other vehioleren ta ri ng ahead of th e enginee r equipmsnt.3. speed of advan-. a. *l%e aomnandar of a n ar m re d unit mmt be alert to ta

wary advantage of opportunitiee to use the roads, but he met be equally aler t t oknow- when they =tt be uaed. I do not know any way to t e l l how this can be b e - -i t mat just be aenaed. A corplpander who can do i t oan aake a l o t of tirim with rela-t i ve ly fw losses.b. '(Zn one occasion one of r p ~ r combat conxmnde encountered strong opposition. Il e f t an in fa nt ry force to watch the hoe ti le opposition and re nt ole- around i t t oreach i t e object ive*

4 Air-Tank Team. *& our advance became nnre rapid, four dive bombers aommpeach of our columns a l l the time. a i r Farce officer was with each ool1wnn. I thithe planea aaved us severe lossee on a number of occasione. Onae we were threatenedby a large number of Gerrrnn tanka. One of th e bombere disappeared f o r a few minuteabut soon came back with 15 or 20 othcr planes* when ra pi d movement i a poseible, th itank-dive bomber aombirmtion simply cannot be beaten. m e knowledge tha t the plane8are with then greatly inareasea the oonfidence of the armor. They h r hey w i l lreoeive aarnlng of a threa t and a r e wil li ng t o move aheed boldly. I think t h i s teamdsould always be USsd such ~ ~ r d i t i ~ ~ . m

1. lh e importame of complete and imPediate repor te of hoe tile &el ling ehouldemphasized in training. W e e r e p o r t s should b nmds to the neareat a r t i l l e r y unitthe quickeat m n e r poeaible. 'Ihey should i m l u d e avsrythiag rhioh may furnish thea r t i l l e r y with any information about the ho et ile batt ery or batt eri es, including thedeoigwition and location, by ooordinates, of the point Prom rh iah the obem at io n -4mdsm the direa t ion f ronrrhich the shel l s a r r ive , ea t imte d d ie tame t o the hoet i lew, tiere d ur iw r h i d the sh e l l iw ocourred, n u d e r an8 type of gum firing. numberand cal ibe r of s he ll 8 and nature of the fir+-whether harraaeing, int erd icti on, eta.

2. %e ll iragp~enta, par ticu lar ly those which ehor the ahape and aaoring of t her o ta t in g band reoerrs, o r uhioh show the orig ina l curvature of the ahell , obu ld beren t to the a r t i l l e ry with, or immdia tely following, the report.3. While these reports do not always give the ar t i l le ry s uff iais nt infor~aat ioto bring darn aotmter-battery on the hos t i le guns a t once, they frequently do ro andeven where they do not, ei the r by thsmselves or eonsidered in conneetion with otherinformation, f'urnioh paluable indiaationa of h o ~ t i l e rtill- habits of routine.--Report from V Corpe.


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in su ff i c i en t knowledge of the a i tu at io n and no au thor i ty to make decis ions was l e f t athe old loca t ion , which was an unsa tiefh ctory sol uti on t o the problem.

4. Command Responsibility. It i s the re sp on si bi li ty of corm~andsrs o g.t infor-m t i on back to high- he adq ua rte rs whether w i r e i s in or note AB long as a cormandorhas one runner with him, he i s not rout of conrmnication*.11 USE OF GERMAN THREE INCH MDRTAR.

1. *Captured Germin three inch martars a r e being used ext ensi vely by th e hearyweapon companies of t h i s div is io n. Our a m m i t i o n i m i n t e r ch ~ n g eeb l ewith nmnrnit i o nof German three inch mortars, and we us ua ll y use . i t a s we have had prematurea wi thcaptured Cenmn ammunition. The G- moktar has a range of 4500 yardr, and anexcellent sight which has a r eve re ib le co l l in a ta r and mi rro r t ha t permi ts p lac ingaiming atakes in rear of t he mo rkr.

2. 'The range table for the & m m n mortar with our nmalnition i s t h e reame asou r 81m range t ab le excep t tha t a @mils*olumo m a t be added because the Gerrmanmrtar s i g h t i a p a d u a te d i n hiils*. For ranges between 3290 and 4.00 yards addi-t iona l incrarneata are used.*--Ordnance Officar, - ivision.*When prac t i cab le I l i k e to in i t i a te the a t t a ck t h i r t y minutee p r io r to dan .We hare c a u a t the m a b e off guard a t Uua time, and he does not l i k e night f ight ing.In one instance m captured, with au& a n at tack, a Gemmn posi t ion that I do notbel ieve we could haro taken i f we had waited u n t il dawn t o attack. The met carefu ldaylight reconnaieaance nuat be m d e p r i o r t o auch a n a tt ac ke r- In fa nt ry ~ e g h e n t a lc o m n d o r , - ivision.

IV AAA AS FIEID ARTILLERY.(Views of an a ss is ta n t Corps u t i l l e r y Commander and the Cnnm~nderof anGroup who have employed a n CUP Bet ta l ion a8 f i e l d a r t i l l a r y and have cred i t ed i twith d es tr uc ti on of a n anapurcition ctump, P f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y aad o th e r t ar ge ts .)1. *one exce l l en t use f c c t h e m weapons waa ex ecution of 'tlme-oa-target* f i r e n .Surprise and d m a l i z i n g e f f e ct me achieved by eynchronization, s o t h a t a l l in i t i a lrounds f rom the bat ta l ion ar r ived et the target together . The high velocity and rapidr a t e of f i r e of the 90 mn gun are des i r ab le oharac te r i s t i ce fo r t h i s type f irm. Nonmt a r g e t s were bivouaa areas, corrmand poet areas, a n d known con een tratio ne of personnel.2. am s t r u e t i o n f i r e on p r ot ec t ed t a r g e t s i s not af f ect ive using present avai la bamuni t ion . I t i s f e l t th at two-thirda point detonating and one-third white phoaphar-oug wou l d be an exee l l en t ameLnition r a t i o f a r use o f the gun aa f i e ld art il1ary .m


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TWELFTH ARMY C d 0 8 ~BATTLE EXPERIENCES

No. 24 I8 AUC 1944'Battle Experiencesm are published regu larl y by t h i s h4adquarters t o enableun i ts i n t rainin g t o pro f i t from the l at ea t c mbat experienaes of our t roope nowf i gh t i = t he Germane i n France. Although the experiences of ce rt ai n un it e e t apar t i cu la r loca t ion ar e not necessarily app li cab l e t o a l l un i te i n a l l r i tua ti on tr ,the items published rill be t ho se based on pra ct io al experience and ar e recoolmendedf o r care ful consi deratio n by uni te which may enaounter a imi lar p ~ b l e u u . Reportsof ao mb ora t iv e or cont rary exger iencer a r e par t i cu l ar ly des ir ed i n order tha t theval id i ty of the indica ted ba t t l e l e r so n may be determined,By cd of the lrmy Croup Comnanders

Brigadier Genaral , USAAd jutant Ganeral

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I 29th DIVISION BA!WU N O W(From an a f te r combat report of the 29th Infa ntry Division fo r July)1. Infantry against Armor.W experience has been t ha t prope rl y t ra i ned , w e s a i v e i n f an t ry caaknock out enemy self-propelled guns and srmor i n c lo se country where our off en siv e

amnor cannot op er at e ef fe c ti ve ly . maaeuver Bhould always be employed t o ge t th eenuuy vehicle i n th e f lank with the bazooka o r r i f l e grenade. It wa r , proved i n oneb a t t l e t ha t German Panzer o u t f i t r without heavy in fa nt ry aupport were unable t o copewith aggressive infantry tact ics. '2. M t t l e Dr i l l e .'We have found t h a t when battalion8 and l a r g e r un i t s a r e ou t of t he l i ne ,they ahould eonduct tr ai ni ng t o omphasiza ma rt ne as and precie ion and aimple batt led r i l l s t o inculcate sw ift ne rs of movement i n cambat. Thoae used i n th ia d iv is io n aresa. The movement of e rquad f roq hedgerow t o hedgerow at full speed with a tl e a s t te n yardr i n te rva l between men. Al l more forward on cnnmnnd.

be CoPling under eimulated a r t i l l e r y f i re ,t ha aquad brpake fo r the nearestcorer t o the f ro nt and then continues to advance dur ing lu l l 8 in the f i r e .c, Coming under s imulated r i f l e or machine gun f i re , individuals use coreravai lable, open f i re , and the bulk of the squad 1imneUlrW8 rapidly under the leaderto outf l ank the f i r e , '

3. bbtorized Reinforcements.'During the paet month, the di vi rio n' a experience has shorn th at r ein forc -ing mechanized ca valry, armor, a r t i l l e r y , eta., f a i l t o employ proper methods fo rapproach t o combat. The move up i a too hurried and i n too larg e a maer, resu l t in gi n t he clogging of roads and camplete 'diexuption of wire communications, A r u f f i c i en tfo rc e should be employed to f e e l out the o ppoai tion while ata ging th e main body for-ward by bounds from covered po ei tio n t o oorered po si ti on . When a we& spot isi t ~ ~ - ~ i , , , - , , , + h , ,nn r P O , - n-, 1 ) c ,m


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discovered, and not until then, the f u l l strength of the uolumn ahould be dere1oped.n4. C h i n S t r a ~ s .'I t hae been foqnd tha t a hi n s tr a p s ahould be worn fasten ed ti gh t. If notfastened uhen going over hedgerows and uhen h i t t i n g th e ground f a s t , the helmet must

be held on with one hand o r i t w i l l be lo st . The pr ac ti ce of not wearing the chins t r a p a r ose a s a re su l t of bla st from heavy a i r bombs and heavy ar t i l l e r y f i r e , whicha r e no t p r esent i n t h i s t hea te r . However, a man without a helmet i s l i ab le to headi n j u r i e s from amall arms f i r e and s h e l l s p l i n t e r s m mI1 E3'mmVE b R T I L u R Y USE.

nIn my opinion the enemy has ha bit ua lly tucked himself i n clo se t o our fr on tl i n e e lements i n order to prevent ua fram br inging our mor tar and a r t i l le ry f i r e sdown on him. We ha bit ua lly have had t o place aome a rt i l l e ry prepa ration on the enemyf ront l ines . The moat ef fect ive uae of a r t i l le ry I have found has been to bring timef i r e dorn fo r about 20 minutes preceding the in fa nt ry ass au lt and under cover of t h i sfirm t o make a tank s o rt ie ( ta nks with rhino at tachments) to a depth of about 308 t o4 O O yards. The time f i r e preve nts th e enemy from ueing bazookas ag ain st the tanks ,pins him to the ground, and causes heavy ca su al ti e8 among thoee who attempt t o evadet h e t anke o r t o s h i f t t h e i r positions. ' -- Major Cen. W. M. Robertson. Camnanding 2ndI11 CHMdAN DEFEbWS AND SJCCIGSTIONS FOR USE OF 1.2 MORTAR

1. P corpe chemical officer recently inspected a German position, captured withthe help of a r ol l in g barrage f i re d by 4.2 mortars. The mortar f ired exclusivelyand increased the range 200 yard8 a t s pe c if ie d t h a i nt er va ls . Some of the f a c t sand c on cl ui on a o f t h e c h d c a l o f f i c er 'a report fol lowr

2. The mortar f i r e a s qui te accurate a8 t o rerrge but mas not always evenlydist r ibute d along the l i ne of impact. lhch band of f i r e a s about a ard8 wide.3m A l l of the hedgamws oacupied by th e Germans had pa th s i n rear of them.(Whether theee paths were made by the Oermanr o r whether the hedgerowe w e r e se lec ted

for oooupation becauee of the pathe, ms not indicated.) Sunken ramla w a r 0 uaed,ei th e r a s positi ona or f o r coarrrmnicatiom.4. To increase the ef fect ivenese of mortar f i r e , the observer thought, f i r edata (by platoons, i f necmsaary) ahould be calculated to place the l h e 8 of ippgacton eunlron ro ad s and on o r just back of hsdgerows, inetea d of fi r i n g a rrgularr pa t t e r non a a u a m r m n t b as is . P l u u n w o f t h e b ar ra ge aan be improved i f aerial photoear e avai lable fo r elaminntion f o r possible posi tions. l brward mvement of th e bar-

regcb should be on call of the infant ry, rather than on a time schedule. Whitephosphorous w i l l cau se a b u t th e same numbar of aasualties a8 HE on troops in theopen and rill cause =re ca eu alt ies on troop8 dug in , if they do not have ovorherdcover. Its psychological eff ea t al so i s beli eved to be pe a ta r . 'Ihe 4.2 awdrtar isconeidwed b et t er adapted fo r f i r in g WP than the 10- howitzer, p a rt ly becauao ofthe greater peraentage of VP anarmnition allowed (50% coqared wi th S).End


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SCOUTING rn PmoLLmG.1. A corga Camrgndar i n I t a l y make8 t he following conmentst

a , 'I t should be slqphasized that ground once gained cheaply ahould beheld. Tima a f t e r tiae a patrol i s sent out to determine the enemy strength onaome h i l l and f inds that the h i l l i a unoccupied. Abmat invariably the en tir epa t ro l comes back t o re po rt . Then ~ a m s ni t is ordered forward to occupy theh i l l . It morsa forward and f i n ds t he h i l l a l i v e with Gewans who smother themr i t h f i r e from machine pistols, l i g h t machine guns, and mortars.b. m'lhe same thing hold8 true a t bridgea. Several times a p at ro l h afound a bri dge not b lom end the en ti re pa tr ol haa come back t o report . Beforesane other unit cam get up t o seize the bridge, the Genaana have blom i t . 4

2. A batt ali on exeautf re i n I t a l y reaonnnends 'A t night, don't use birdoa l le as eigndlm. m e r e are no birds i n the batt le arm--they dl leave. How-ever, cats and dog8 stick around, so dog barks and cat howle ar e a l l r igh t i f welldone. The Cernans m e c at howls a lo t . If a Cennan use8 a ca t howl, l i e down andanawer.him the rraeas ray. Be w i l l then mme toward you and you oan gat him w i t hyour bayonet

The followin& i e extra cted from a Br it is h War Office publi cation d ealin gwith counter-mortar o r w i m t i o n effected by same unit8 i n I ta ly;

1, 'A division found i t neceesary t o se t up a countar-mortar or gan ix at ioon the lines of a counter-battery organizarion. One divis ion had a counter-mortarof fi oer with an ageistant, together with an a se i s t a o t aounter-mortar of fi ce r i n eacbrigade. fFheee were assisted by an adequate etaff and p r i d e d with n e a ea w y traawport. In general, all personnel were from the divisional artillery.a. w'lfre most sucaeomhrl methods of engaging loc at ed h os t i l e mortar s werei n t h e fo ll or ln g ordarr 4.2 mortars, 3.7 a i r bu re t , guns f i r e d a t extraordinaryelevation.be mortars were plotted and listed by tha divisional counter-mortaoff ice r .

a. mcnnnplnicatian n s provided froan the divisio nal counter-mortar of fi ce rto e a d of the brigade assistant counter-mortar off ice rs, to divisional ar t i l l er yHqrs arad to the di vi ri ona l oouater-battery of fic ers . Comsrtnication ma al so pro-vided fiam th e as s ia taa t counter-mortar of f ic er t o eaoh 4.2 mortar company, t o eaahmortar OP snd to appropria te divioional art i l lery units .2. a. m&othsr unit se t up tm counter-mortar OPB in emah ba t t al ion and~ i t e dhaal a t l ea st 9 0 yards apart. Theae w r e manned by e it he r o f f i ce r r or senio

rJOOs, Battalion OP pa rt ie s were given in struc tion on t he cha racter ietics of mrtaf i r e t o h elp thar i n l i s t en i ng f o r and i n identify* aortare.b. ' O h made a Claortrep8 rep or t which included time, the code eig aof the OP an8 the gr id bearing. If this 8mortrepbgave an inters ection or pointedt o a known poe it ion, th e uni t aountar-mortar o f f i ce r arsanged fo r immediate count-mrtar f ire . ' End


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f i r e and s t ar t i ng of motors , ca r r ie d over 100 yards . The Germans a lways eased th e i rtanks forward , t r av el le d a t low speed and were -r emarkably qu ie t i n a l l ope rat ionsexwep t f i r i r ig . They used long bu rs ts of the!%? r ap i d f i r i n g machine guns t o d i scou ragegues t s , I f p r essed a t a l l , t hey sho t f l a r e s which b rought down th e i r own a r t i l l e ryand mor tars on t h e i r f la nk s. The ir handling of t h e i r tan ks was bold and sure . Theyac ted as i f th ey knew e x ac tl y where t he y wanted t o go and how. and th en went t he rewith vigor and determination.

5 . * A similar d is r up t i on by a comparable German ef f o r t can, I believe, be pre-v en te d i n f u t u r e by augmenting pres ent AT pr ac ti ce s by some of th e follow ing:a. Equip numerous vehicles with a smoke grenade t h a t co uld be las hed t o zomewell-known, widely dissem inated, and re ad il y acc es sib le spot on th e vehicle --possib lyth e s t e e r i n g column. Upon th e approach of an enemy tank, use of the grenade i n thenormal c ana lize d ro ut e of tank sp1,rcach w i l l prob abl y slow up th e tan k. The Germansfe a r ou r use of gas , and no tank normally w i l l advance i n t o th e unknown hazar ds of asmoke screen.b. Give any u n i t s e n t o ut a l ~ n g he main road down which enemy un i t s may come asupply of s tandard mines . I f these ar e , a s a mat te r of p rac t i ce , t i ed toge the r wi th

a l i g h t cord prev ious ly la id acro ss th e road , they can be pul led out on the road froma concealed pos i t i on as t he tank approaches .

c. The l i b e ra l spray ing o f th e hedgerow with tank machine gun f i r e completely d i s -courage s r if leme n o r bazooka f i r e r s from aiming over o r around a hedgerow. F o r t h i spurpose s l o t s should be dug through t he hedgerow a t such angles and le ve ls tha t f i r efrom th e tan k 's po si t i on on th e road. cannot go t h r o u g h t h e s l o t , but s o s i t e d a s t opermit a r i f l e grenade o r a bazooka t o be aimed and f ir od when the tank reaches someal re ady se l ec t ed poin t . The f i r e r must have cover from th e tank spray whi le he i saiming and f i r i ng . When the f i r s t ta nk i s immobilized, and perhaps burning, the f i g h tbecomes a s tandard in fan t ry f ig h t w i th s t andard t echn iques working a s e f f ec t i ve ly a sever . a

11 SOKE BRITISH PATROLLING METHODS.1. A r epo r t from the I t a l i a n t he a t e r desc r ibes spec ia l o rgan iza t ion and methodsadopted by a E r i t i s h b a t t a l i o n d u r i ng a lteriod when i t s primary mission was patroll ing,a. The b a t t a l i o n commander d ~ s i g n a t e d f i e l d o f f i c e r a s b a t t a l i o n p a t r o l l i n go f f i c e r . The p a t r o l l i n g o f f i c e r e s t a b l i s n e d a pa t r o l l i ng headquar ter s and n p a t r o l l i n g

OP i n t h e b a t t a l i o n a r ea . The h e ad q ua r te r s in cl ud ed a b r i e f i n g o f f i c e r , c e r t a i n i n t e l -l igence pe r sonne l and o pe ra to r s f o r t he OP. The commanding officer laid down generalp o l i c i e s anu t h e p a t r o l l i n g o f f i c e r h an dl ed a l l d e t a i l s .

b. One pa tr ol , with a raission of l iq ui da ti ng an enemy outp ost , es tab lis hed a basewit hin ra di o range of p at ro ll in g headq uart ers and from th a t base moved out on the missionT h i s base, with i t s caannunication f a c i l i t i e s , p er mi tt ed c o nt i nu a l c m u i c a t i o n wit h t heba t t a l io n and would have cons t i tu t ed a su r e r a l ly i ng po in t i f i t had been needed. Ita l s o a s s i s t e d i n t h e ev a cu a ti o n of c a s u a l t i e s .

2. Another pa t r o l , wi th the miss ion of de termining whether a c er ta in posi t ion wasoccupied by the an-, advanced unobserved t o wit hin about 600 yard s of th e pos iti on.The a r t i l l e r y then l a id smoke on the suspec ted poe i t ion , fo l lowing t h i s with a f ived n u t e HE concentra t ion . When the a r t i l l e r y concentra t ion was f in is hed , the pa t r o lopened f i r e wi th fou r Bren guns s ~ a r c h i n g uspec ted a r eas . Observe rs pos ted a t vant-age po in ts i n re ar wai ted fo r re tu rn f i r e . The Germans opened with thr ee guns f romthe suspected posi t io ns end these uere ea s i l y and accu ra te ly located by the observers ,The patrol withdrew without a cnsuhl ty ,


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3. Fezman Poaitiana. 'A n ew type of enemy maehine gun auplaeenent has bcm oa e r ~ e deaently. ~t oonsbts of a care in a hedgeror large enough for a maahine guanmunition, several dwa of food supply, and two men. The only opening is on the fward s id e of the hedgeror. h his disaourages withdraral and forcee men to f ight u nthey are ld l led or have to swends r . we hnve found the f i r e fra n them poaitiam be inaccurate-poasibly unaimed. On one oacasion an en t i r e cunpany inourroil only moasualtiea while oroasing an opening w i t h i n the f ie ld o f auch a position.

6 . Uae of m e . 'We have: used smoke effeotirely, both offeumirely and defemOne especially eff eo ti ve use of smoke oucnrred &en a can- ras out off from therminder of i t s bat tal ion by f i r e of anmy tanka. On reques t of th e bat ta l io n aannaaur a r t i l l e r y quickly plaaed smoke on th e position. The company was ab le to r e jo inbat ta l ion and suffer& only a few tasualties. ,7. German Markizw of their Frant Line. 'One of t he fe u accaaioxm th a t our goet ions have been bombed by eatsay a i rc ra f t , t he enemy ground t m o p f i r ed green f la~et o mark their positions.8. Enerqg W e a r k American Unifonae. 'The ~ermane r e nar attempting t o codu s

us by rearing captured American helmeta and fi el d jackets. A unit the s iz e oi a pltoon rare seen marching along the road dreseed in t h i e manner. They w i l l also use tm e f exposing thanselvea t~ vier i n our clothing, and y e l l i n g to our men in an st o en t ice than t o ahor thsmselvee.n--Rqimental Camand o r , 12th Infan*.If COlMESTTS OF AN INFANlRY BATTALION C m q a

'I am using light machine guns in my heavy~~ aupnny,farther farward w i t h great= apeed while a u r r t a b h g fewer loT h e l i g h t machine gun is juet aa effect ive foas the shorter rangee enaounterred in t htype of terrain. I keep q y heaviee on my jeep t r ai l er a s o they can be readil y moveif aacurate long range f i r e i8 dseired.

20 Guns. smut8 are .quipped with tamny gun6 fo r use in spraying herow positiom. The additional ammunition supply ha8 preeented no serioraa problan.have one jeep and trailer loaded with anmnmiticm with each r i f l e company, and one weach heavy reapom platoon.3. 60 mn Y[ortars. .I have used my bo nm mortare rw off eative ly againat automatie weapons. When moving agairmt intennitt ent remietame, o m mortar i m attachedr i f l e platoon. When st rong reeiatanae i a encountered, the mort8ra remert t o the weplatoon an3 are fifeti f ' r a n positions 75 to 100 yarder in rear of the leading dSW1n4 Enemy ~ i a r m i t i o ~ . Co~$rergo ecnns re pmtr coneemin& s~lemydispoeition

M e lways enaountsred en- riflmen and autamatia reapom in positions one or twhedgerow8 f- of the* t an ks .n -B at ta li on Cmmanrler , 22nd Infantry.


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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 28 28 AUC 1944

r g a t t l e D p e ri e nc e sn are published regularly by th i s headquar te rs to enableu n i t s in t r a in i n g t o p r o f i t i r m th e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t roop s nowf igh t ing t he ~s r roane n Fance. ~ l t h o u g h h e e x pe ri en ce s of c e r t a i n unit8 a t ap a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e n o t n e c e se a r i ly a p p l i c e b l e t o all u n i ts i n a l l s i t ua t i o na ,th e it- published w i l l be thoae based on prac t ica l exper ienca azld a r e r e c o - m n d e dfor ca re fu l considera ti o n by u n it s which may encounter si mi la r problems. Report8of corroborat ive or cont ra ry exper i ences a re pa r t i cu l a r ly des i red i n o rde r t ha t t hev a l i d i t y o f t h e in d ic at ed b a t t l e b s s o n nay be determined.

BY c-nd of t he wmy cxoup Comtiandert

Brigadier General , U aAdjutant General

I TANX RIDIN2 DOUGHBOYS.1. Infantrymen rode tanks in to combat and b ~ t ! ~nf an tr y and tank personnel wereen th us ia st ic about the re s u l t s achieved by the 22nd In fa ntr y Regiment and t h e 66thAr mr ed Regiraent in th e re ce n t breakthrough. ?he Corrmending Of fi ce r of the 22ndInfan t ry mkes t he fo l l owing c o m n t a rega rd ing th i s type of ac t ion .2. a l b c t i c a l Advcrntagee.a. mm infmtry tire above enemy machine gun f i r e which i s g e n e r al l y e e t a t graz-in& l eve l .b. he infantry becomes a m a r e f l e e t i n g t arg et f o r enemy autonratic weeponso I tis di f f i c u l t fo r t he enemy to t r ave rse and e leva t e a machine gun from a dug i n hedge-row poa i t i on t o b r ing accura t e f i r e on a t ank mving from e igh t t o t en mi l e s per hour.c. The t ank tu rr e t a l s o provides some pro tac t ion aga ina t smal l anne f i r e .d. ?he infantrymen on tanks a r e i n a good pos i ti on t o t oes genade s i n t o fox holes.8. The infantrymen a r e ab le to provide exce l lent pro tec t i on f o r the tanks f'rmenemy bazooka and antitank grenade fire.f. The infantrymen help t o provide obs ervat ion f o r t he tank crews.g. This pra ct i ce undarmines the Gernrsn ta ct ic a l do ctri ne of shoot in g the in fan tryfol lowing the tanke. When Gn do ct r ine i s undermined, the ef fi ci en cy of t he ir

ope ra t i ons i s p e a t l y red uced ,he When th e advance i e re ta rded by AT gune, infa nt ry can dismun t , deploy and br ingautomi t ic f i r e on enemy gun posit ions .3. amoblems which ~ i s e ,a. Command and staff o r ~ n i z a t i o n nd coordination.b. Trampor t a t i on f o r i n fa n t ry suppor t i ng weapons i n o rd e r t o rmke them readi lya v a i l a b l e f o r h o l di n g the objec t ive .4. 'The in fa nt ry and armr a r e no t o r gn iz ed t o work toge the r , and ca re fu l endthorough planning a re , t he re fore , e s e e n t i a l f o r s u ch an operat ion. The command pro-

blem wals partially solved by ha r y ba t t al io n colnrrand&e r i d e i n t a n k s


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-with tan k bat ta l i on oommndara--direct ing the at ta ck by radio. '

1. ad+of t h e V Oafpa r e p o r t s that i t ha s beccnm unnecesrsary t o re q u i r e a G-4(3-4) periodic report dai ly and has made i t a weekly report. However, r epor t s o fba t t le lossea of equipment a r e requi red da i l y f rom the Divis ionta ordnance Off icerbased on t he Ordnance M at er ia l W e Report each day.

1. B e fol lowing aec uri t y procedure was developed i n th e V Carps f o r a use i ns t a t i c s i t ua t io n :a. Division8 evacuated civi l ians from the area wi th in approxh te ly two k i lomeof the f ron t l in es , f ixe d i n p lace those i n the next two to four k i lometsra , and esl i s h e d a l i n e i n rear of which c ir cu la ti on f o r an announced dist an ce up to six ki lometere rae permitted. Al l o the r c i r cu la t io n requ i r ed a pas8 from t he C i vi l ~ f f a i rSection.b. Pa tr ol of thes e li ne s, which cre ated thre e zones, was miinte ined by mi li ta rperraonnel in the forward area s , and combined mi l i t ary and c iv i l ia n pat ro ls , p lus aj o i n t MP--Gendarme-C~emtorized p a t r o l i n t h e r e a r a re as .c. The evaauation of a iv il ia n e was accomplished by Division C iv il Aff airs .Of fiand C iv il Aff ai rs Detachments, using d iv is ion refugee cont ro l poin ts and Corps tranareas , to ~ n q y ssembly aenters.

2. Thie system became i no pe ra tiv e a s div is io ns moved ra pi dl y forward i n t he a tOKily a s in g le s ec ur it y l i n e beceme necessary, f a n a r d of which c iv i l ia iu were evacuand i n re a r of which the presence of c iv i l ia ns waa des i red so as to p rovide po ten t ip laces for refugciew.

l?? ENEblY M a W M LOCATION BY FIEID AFCIULERY OBSERVATION BATTALIONe"is ba tt al io n 'has demonetrated th at m o r t a r s can be looated with our presentequipment under sp ec ia l conditions. In t h i 8 inst anc e th e base waa ac ros s the va lleand a t a el ig ht ly higher e levat ion thhn the mortars, ~t was noted that mortars didnot f i r e d i r e c t l y t o t he f r o n t, but a t an oblique t o the f ro nt , which placed themclose to our l ines. Thie apparently is a c o m n praa t ice of the enanlye TO use ourpresent equipment the base must be exactly surveyed in, a s c lose to the f rou t l i ne8

as po ss ib le, pre fera bly wit hin 1200 t o 1500 metare, and th e sound outpost locatedwith and protec ted by fron t l i n e infan try elements. Due to the mobil i ty of mortarsf i r e should be brought down on mortar8 inmediately a ft e r they a r e looated. A d i r e ctelephone l i n e between the mortar baee sound detachment Cp and nearby a r t i l l e r y w i lf a c i l i t a t e th i s . ~ p a r i m e n t s hou ld begin in rmed ia tely , w in g cap tu red mortar s andaranunition t o determine the po s s i b i l i t i e s of our present equipuezat i n the loc at ion enemy martars.@--Report of 8 t h FA Obsarvktion ~ t t a l i o n .

V HANDLEW OF PWt3 BY DIVISION MP'S."Ib.ree e n li s te d nen of the Divisi on I Company are a s sl ga ed t o each i d a n t r y

regime nt a s ESCORT Gum . pr i soner s are taken from regim ental CP(8, and in manycases bat ta l io n CPta , escor ted t o the pr isoner of war inclos ure, and there i n coc-junatian with var ious i ntar roga tion teams a r e searched, interrogated, and evacuatedto the ~ r m y r i soner of w a r incl0sure.n -Repart of pro vos t W a t h l , 2nd ~ n f ive


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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 2 9 29 AUC 1944

r g e t t l e m p e r i e nc e s l a r e pu bl ia he d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h ea d qu a rt er s t o e n a b l eu n i t e i n t r a i n in g t o p r o f i t from t he l a t e s t c ombat e xpe r ie nc e s o f ou r t roo ps nowf i g h t i r ig t h e w r m s i n prranoe. ~ 1 thoug ;h he e xps r i e nce s of c e r t e i n u ni t e a t aP a r t i c u l a r l o a e t i o n are no t n e c e em r i l y a pp l i ca bl e t o a l l u n i t e i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,t h e i t em published w i l l be those based on p ra c t i c a l e xpe r i e nc e a nd a r e r ec o rne ndedf o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d er a t i o n b y u n i t s w hic h may encounter s i m i la r problems, Rep o r t sof c o r r o b o r at i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p er i e nc e e a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d er t h a t t h ev a l i d i t y o f t h e i n d ic a te d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

BY comnand of the wmy cr ou p Comrsnderl

Brigadie r Genera l , USAAdjutant ~ e n e r a l

I EhiPI.OYnlENT OF TANK D 3 l B O m .1. # m e a t oare must b e e x e r ci s ed i n c m i t t i n g towed t an k d es t r o y e rs t o i m r e

t h a t r o u t e s e r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e a s y e n t r a nc e t o and e x i t f r om p o s i t i on s , p a r t i c u l a r l yrrhen there i s no t e nk th re a t .2. *I n p re se n t ope re t i ons most r e c onna is sa nc e shou ld be done i n sma l l ve h i c l e s

en d on foo t un l e e e an a c t u a l t a n k t h r e a t hes been es tabl i shed . The b+8'e of ther e co n na is s pn c e p la t o on draw h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e .

3. *The secondary misaion of TD'a should be e xp lo i t e d t ? t h e f u l l e e t . gne com-PanY m y a ve a n Znd i re c t f i r s miss ion , 3hiSe th e remaining two a r e on d i re c t f i r emissions. By us in gt he r es er ve company on the secondery mise ion, a f i r e effec t corolp ar a bl e t o t h a t of a f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n ca n b e o b ta in ed , A no th er ad v an t ag e i et h e t f i r e m y be c a l l e d f o r t o e up p or t t h e c om pa ni es engaged i n t h e i r p r i m r y m i es i o ndur ing a t ank a t tack .

4. )Care must be taken th a t units whose mission i s e n t i t a nk de fe nse re c e iv e com-p l e t e ta nk w a r n i n g base d on f a c t s , % l e e a l e r t s t end to mike gun crews skept ica l .some i n f s n t r y u n i t e r e p o r t a n y t r a c k v e h i c l e a 3 a t an k , t h w d e s t r o y in & t h e e f f i c i e n co f t h e a n t i t an k w ar nin g e y s t e m . l - ~ ~ f t e r c t i o n e po rt o f 3 2 1s t TD Ba t t a l i on .

XI I L ? ? I ! L ~ ? Y A I R OP PEFENSm TACTICS."The Carmans b v e a ppa re n t ly e tud i e d t h e current e v a s i v s t a c t i c s of t h e ap planesa nd they t r y t o b ra cke t them wi th time f i r e . T h e h i r OPle have adopted t h e po l i cy of

avoidink: cros aroa de and perrmnent l m d ma rk s , because i t i s eviden t th a t the Germansza ro i n o n t h e s e p o i n t s , t h e n r a i s e th e b u r e t a when a p lane i s over.#--29th ~ i v i e i o na r t i l l e r y R e p o r t .


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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCESNo. 3 0 3 0 AUC 1944

ag e t t l e p p e r i en ces f l are publ i shed regu la r ly by t h i s head qu a rt e rs t o s n ab l eun i t s i n t r a in in g t o p r o f i t frorn the la te s t combat exper iences o f our t roops nowf ig h t i ng the Germns i n F rance. ~ l t h o u g h h e e x p er ie nc es of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t ap a r t i c u h r l o o a ti o n a r e n ot n e c e s ea r i ly a p pl i ca b le t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,the itema publiehed w i l l be those based on pr a c ti c al experience and a r e recornendedfo r c a re f u l cons idera t ion by u n i t s whlch mag encounter similar prob lem. Reportsof corroborat ive or contrary exper iences are p a r t i c u l a r l y de s ir e d i n o r de r t h a t t h ev a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i ca t ed b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be d e te rm in ed .

By ccmxrmnd of t h e Group C o m n d a r 8 :

p i g a d i e r G e n e r a l , US^hd jutant General

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 1 1 0 0 ~ ~ . - 1 0 - ~ I - - - - - - - - 0 ~ - . 0

NOTBa The following paragraphs a r e a l l ax tra cte d from re p o rt s snd comments of batt a--io n cam~andere f the 22nd In fa nt ry Regiment.'More emphasis in t r a i n in g s ho uld b e p h c ed on d i s c ip l i n e . In my b a t t a l i o n , cam-

pany wnrmandere who had well disciplined companies mved f a s t e r i n a t t ac k and incur redf e ~ aas ua l t ie s than those i n whose companies d isc ip l i ne was l ax . We a r e i n c u r ri n gh ~ a v y as ua l t ie s among our o ff ic er s and noncomnissioned of f i ce rs , pa r t ly because theyI9ave t o l i t e r a l l y le ad t he men by the hand t o in su re accomplishment of th e ir mi8sion.a

1. W l l y 75 percent of c a s u a l t i e e s i n c e D-Day have been in cu rre d while hold-ing ground i n r r ta t ic o r defens ive operat ions . To avo id theee ca su a l t i es , I hove usedthe following mathob to good advantage aa, w i n g t h e day I plaue my automatic weapom i n de fl la de on the high ground.

and then n e the r e a t o f the ba t ta l io n behind the h igh g round.b ~t night 1 e s t a b l i s h w e l l a n n e d p la to on o u tp os ts and mve t h e r e s t o f t h eplatoon8 back about 400 yards. I permit th e outpoata to f i r e . If t h ei r f i r e dramenemy a r t i l l e r y f l r e , the main body of t h e u n i t i s not eub jected t o it.c. o th e r n ig h t s I have moved mgr e n t i r e b a t t a l i o n a ab o r t d i s t an ae t o the flankafter dark. The on aeverd occas ionr , she l led th e vacated area throughoutthe n igh t , while my men d e p t p m ce f u l l y i n t h e new area.@

NOTE1 Similer mbthodr have been used mcc esef u l ly a e i n s t the Japansee i n the R c i f i ~ .


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1.. Hold Your Fire. @Do not f i r e on enemy pat rol e. I t diec loeea the loc a t io nof your flank8 ao th at a r t i l l e r y f i r e can be brought down on your po8i tion.r2. watch fo r WP, Wlhe only t im I have Been the Gerrnana use rrhite phosphoruss h e l l s i s when th ey were d eterm inin g range. You can alwaya look fo r an ar t i l l e r yconcent ra t i on t o fo ll ow e i t h e r a whi te phosphoru sh e l l o r a t ime- f i re burs to r3. Uae HE and Move. 1 have eff ec t iv e ly used my 57 mn ant i tank guns with HEs h e l l s on d i r e c t f i r e m i ss io ns . ~t ie b es t t o f i r e not m e han ten rounds andthen get out.#

IV SUCCESSFUL INFAN'IRYGANX COOPERATION.NOTE: The attack described below was a successful opera t ion demonat ra t ing the e ff-v e ~ e s s f c l o s e i n f a n tr y - a r t il l e r y- t a n k t e m o r k made poss ible through pr ior plannexcel lent t iming, and capable 1 ader ship .

1. WTbe 22nd In fa nt ry , advancing no rt h, had reached th e i r ob j ec t i v e i n t he v i ci t y of- The regiment on the ri g h t had been unable to take th e i r obje ct ive,h i l l , due t o heavy f i r e fro m t h a t h i l l , of w hat was es t imated to be one infantry copany. It was decided t o have a for ce of th e 22nd Infantry. ass is t i n the capture ofthe h i l l by a t t ack ing from t h e north w i th cne r i f l e company an d one tank company.map rctconnaissance was made and an a r t i l l e r y f i r e p la n g re pa re d by t h e c o m n d e r s ccerned the night before t h e a t teck. The t ime c f a t t ack was s e t f o r 0835 and an LDse le c ted about 1600 yards from th e objec t ive . m r i n g the day before the a t t ack , t hfor- commander (th e Inf ant ry Ba t ta l io n CO), the r i f l e company co m nd er , and tho tc s q q v c o m n d e r , nsde s grcund reconnai8sance up to the II) where they r e r e stopgeby machine gun f i r e .

2. Mfie a t t a c k jumped off on t ime with one platoon of r i f lem en rid in g on thetanka of each tank platoon and on re in fo rc in g tank deetroyer vehiclea. A 45-minutea r t i l l e r y b ar rla ge was placed i n f 'ront of the e t t ec k i~ lg orce , beginning .st H-hour amoving forward a t 13-minute intervals. The objec t ive was taken a t 10130 h he a t taci n g f o r c e i n c ur r e d on ly two c a s u l t i e s , captured 40 prisonera, and e i t h er k i l l e d cfo rce d th e withdrawal of t h e remaining elements which had been occupying th e hil1.rEND

Reproducea'byLnq~ epro. L?e/r: /2thArmy Group

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Battle Experiences #4