Battle of Dogger Bank (excerpt)

8122019 Battle of Dogger Bank (excerpt)

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullbattle-of-dogger-bank-excerpt 122

BATTLE of

DOGGER

BANK

TOBIAS PHILBIN



Contents

Lis of Illusraions xi

Preface xiii

Acknowledgmens xxiii

1048625 Decisions beyond the Balefield 983089

1048626 Building the Bale Cruisers 983090983091 1048627 Prologue to War and Bale 983092983097

1048628 e Order of Bale 983089983088983089

1048629 Chase and Intercept 983089983089983092

1048630 e Engagement 983089983091983089

1048631 e Aermath 983089983092983093

Noes 983089983093983097

Bibliography 983089983095983093

Index 983089983096983091



xi

A1048625 Map of strategic distances in the North Sea xv

A1048626 Capital ship construction (from Tirpitz German

Appeasemen Policy in he World War ) xx

A1048627 e bale cruiser ldquoracerdquo(from Tirpitz op cit) xxi

10486251048625 SMS Mackensen 983089983093

10486261048625 Invincible 983091983092

10486261048626 New Zealand 983091983093

10486261048627 Lion 983091983094

10486261048628 iger 983091983095

10486261048629 Bluumlcher departing for the bale 983091983096

10486261048630 Bluumlcher sinking 983091983096

10486261048631 Scharnhors and Bluumlcher 983091983097

10486261048632 Von der ann 983092983091

10486261048633 Goeben and Molke 983092983091

104862610486251048624 Seydliz 983092983094

104862610486251048625 Derfflinger 983092983095

10486291048625 German Strategic Overview of Operations10486261048627ndash10486261048628 January 1048625104863310486251048629 983089983089983096

Illustrations



xi i

10486291048626 German Chart of the Bale of theDogger Bank 983089983089983097

10486291048627 Sketch of HMS Lionrsquos bridge 983089983090983092

10486291048628 British Strategic Plan of theDogger Bank Action 983089983090983094

10486291048629 British Official Chart of the Bale of

Dogger Bank 983089983090983096



xi ii

983124983144983145983155 983138983151983151983147 983145983155 983140983141983155983145983143983150983141983140 983156983151 983152983154983151983158983145983140983141 983150983141 983159 983145983150983155983145983143983144983156983155 983145983150983156983151 983156 983144983141first bale between the largest fighting machines of the early twentiethcentury It seeks the reasons for the bale in the context of what was ba-sically a stalemate on the ground in the opening phases of World War Ie ships involved were novel powerful and regarded as national assetsthat were not to be risked lightly but which could be gambled in an at-tempt to even the odds for the bale fleets for which they scouted e

prestige and competence of Imperial Germany and the British Empire were at issue Efforts of the previous twenty years and the investments ofhundreds of millions in gold were at risk Dogger Bank involved dozensof ships and it was a large cold and desperate bale but it was both noveland a precedent for engagements to come

It is instructive to understand the roles which time and distanceplayed in the North Sea eater To this event the Germans have leposterity with a remarkable lile chart showing the distance in Seemei-

len or nautical miles (1048626104862410486241048624 yards or 1048630104862410486241048624 feet instead of 1048629104862610486321048624 feet onland) between all the key points on the chart is enables us to view theproblems faced by the combatants both in time and distance e NorthSea is shallow and treacherous providing a challenge to simple naviga-tion much less naval warfare It is hostage to incredibly foul dangerous weather and low visibility which affected both combatants throughoutthe war It is not possible or wise to ignore the role of the other half of

the geography of the north German Coast ndash the Baltic Germany facedthe prospect of a naval campaign against Russia during the First World War e subordination of the Russian navy like the German to the land

Preface



xiv 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141

campaign and the lack of coordination or imagination on their part formost of the war despite Russia having significant resources meant that

the Germans did not have to concern themselves with Russian initia-tives ey could resort to a purely defensive strategy which retainedBaltic sea-lanes for German use especially support of German raw mate-rial imports for her war industries from Sweden throughout the conflictTo a great extent however the Germans were able to deter an activeRussian fleet policy which might have contested control of the Balticand opened the German North Sea coast to a Russian amphibious as-sault ndash Berlin was only ninety miles from the Baltic lioral e Germans

were able to do this because of the Kiel Canal which would allow trans-fer of the High Seas Fleet from the North Sea to the Baltic or the otherdirection in a maer of a day ere was always danger from mines andlater from British submarines but no British Baltic operation was everaempted e Baltic was always relevant to German sea power as thismap shows but it was never operationally decisive except to prolongGermanyrsquos ability to conduct the land war on two fronts and to deny victory to the Russians

e map in figure A1048625 illustrates some basic numbers From the Ger-man main naval bases in the Jade River around Cuxhaven the distances were to Scapa Flow ndash 104862810486331048624 nm (the principal Grand Fleet base) to theFirth of Forth ndash 104862810486311048624 nm (the normal British Bale Cruiser Base andsometimes the Grand Fleet locus) to Hull ndash 104862710486251048624 nm (and most targets onthe British east coast) to the ames ndash 104862710486281048624 nm to Dover ndash 104862610486331048624 nm toPortsmouth ndash 104862810486241048624 nm (main British naval base and repair facil ity) Dis-

tances of this magnitude involving strategic operations either strictlynaval or amphibious would involve planning and logistics on scalesunprecedented but not impossible e real issue was how to win the war and impose the will of either side by force e British knew they would eventually win a war of distant blockade with lile risk but theycould not know the cost in time or lives while the generals and politi-cians gambled on other fronts Fisher and Churchillrsquos Baltic ideas werenot such chimeras as they have appeared A bale which deprived the

Germans of any significant portion of their fleet would alter the calculusfor success or failure in the Baltic thus potentially upseing what was



983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv

for the German army a front that as long as it was guarded by the navycontained no risk or threat but for which there was no reserve or effec-tive defense e risks in the actions which resulted in Dogger Bank thuscontained danger not heretofore obvious

e first bale between dreadnoughts took place on 10486261048628 January 1048625104863310486251048629in the southeastern North Sea e Germans were frustrated becausethe British who possessed what Clausewitzian strategists called ldquobrutal

superiorityrdquo were supposed to aack983089 Because of this mind-set andthe ldquovaunted British offensive spiritrdquo the Germans believed they would

A983089 Map of strategic distances in the North Sea as illustrated in the German OfficialHistory



xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141

aack Instead the war seled down into a series of feints and counterfeints in each of which the other sought to trap their antagonist and

resolve the issue with a favorable outcomeIn his foreword to Te War Plans of he Grea Powers Fritz Fischeradvances the belief that the German body politic and its military leaders were essentially motivated by social Darwinist ideology to fight the First World War e German army had to get the balance of German nationalresources because the army would determine the continued existence ofGermany in the midst of a hostile Europe Germany was surrounded byenemies So from about 1048625104863310486251048626 onward the army was at the head of the line

for resources and the German navy had lower priorityGrand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Admiral of the Fleet Lord

Fisher had coincidentally realigned the British Empire to a regionalpower from a global power by the time of the outbreak of World War ITirpitz was the hammer who metamorphosed both the Royal Navy andthe British Empire into a Eurocentric naval entity by forcing a consoli-dation of British naval strength in the North Sea where the Bale ofDogger Bank occurred at consolidation resulted from a confluenceof economic and political circumstances which no war could actuallyhave brought about e rise of other powers including Japan and UnitedStates and the development of second echelon naval challenges in theMediterranean particularly Austria-Hungary and Italy as well as othersin South America meant the Royal Navy had to neglect the rest of the world to focus on what was a serious threat to the center of gravity to hercommerce ndash the home islands

e High Seas Fleet because it existed as a real and growing forceregardless of its actual numbers and its poor geographic situation hadalready altered the balance of naval power forever from as early as thefulfillment of Tirpitzrsquos first Navy Law in about 1048625104863310486241048632 Britain abandonedthe two-power standard in 1048625104863310486251048625ndash1048625104863310486251048626 because she could focus only onGermany e Royal Navy was designed and built to have 10486301048624 percentsuperiority over that country In addition the British army was beingrecapitalized to overcome the deficiencies revealed in the Boer War and

so it could support France in a conflict with GermanyTo some extent Dogger Bank was an accidental bale in a war of

miscalculation fought by a navy which was not really needed But Dogger



983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii

Bank was fought as was its sequel Jutland is engagement was docu-mented by both sides as part of war propaganda efforts as part of sub-

sequent official histories and then in both multi-volume analysis and inpublished papers on the British side On the German side it has been asubset of the larger TirpitzGerman sea power debates some of whichrevolve around the Imperial German desire to achieve world power sta-tus Most of the literature in the aached bibliography is at least 10486261048624 yearsold ere is no recent work on Dogger Bank per se rather several other works which contain examinations of the bale983090 Of those the mostcomplete and comprehensive is the analysis by Gary Staff in Batle on

he Seven Seas is is full of both insight and flavor of what it felt liketo live as a German admiral officer pey officer or seaman in the fullscope of German World War I cruiser bales It is a complement fromthe German perspective to the Australian James Goldrickrsquos Te Kingrsquos

Ships Were a Sea albeit 10486261048624 year later983091Two principal decision makers with impact both on and off the bat-

tlefield were Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and his British oppositenumber Admiral Sir John Fisher ese two men reflected their nationsand societies during two decades of the first modern arms race whichculminated in the invention of the dreadnought type baleships whose bale cruiser sisters comprised the principal combatants at Dogger Banke context here is social economic political scientific industrial andof course military e social context is that of an evolving global system which contained the roots of conflict both vertically among classes andhorizontally among nation states ose roots comprised both fear and

ambition on the part of every nation which eventually became involvedin World War I A common element was of course jingoistic nationalismreflected in both the press and middle classes of Britain and Germanyand used by Tirpitz as a lever to impose his vision of navalism on hisown country and by Fisher and Winston Churchill to manage the Brit-ish response e nature of the competition was at first political withinReichstag Kaisertum983092 Parliament and Empire It then manifested itselfin industrial products which harnessed the science of the day Dogger

Bank showcased the military and naval production of each side which was the product of the ldquoAnglo-German arms race before the First World War [which] was the most celebrated arms race in modern historyrdquo983093 On



xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141

both sides the ships and the navies evolved over time reflecting almost10486251048630 years of industrial strategic and tactical decisions and experience the

results of which clashed on a cold January morning in 1048625104863310486251048629 in the NorthSea Although the tools of war evolved along relatively incremental linesas succeeding classes of baleships and bale cruisers were built theargument can be made that the submarine long thought too technologi-cally immature for an impact on traditional naval operations played acritical even decisive role in this bale It was in fact a submarine whichdid not exist but the threat of it in Admiral Beayrsquos mind which causedhim to turn away from the Germans at a critical moment and allowed

them to escape ere was in fact no submarine just what looked likea periscope wake in the midst of several hours of combat on that cold January morning

As Lambert puts it the British high command on the outbreak of World War I was so myopic as to fail to reconsider the fundamentals oftheir naval strategy resulting in the Royal Navy going to war in 1048625104863310486251048628ldquowith an outdated strategic doctrinerdquo983094 However there is new evidencethat Churchill and the Admiralty had they not been distracted by the war were about to shi away from dreadnoughts to mine and torpedocarriers which would be cheaper leave the Germans in the ldquomud banksof the Elberdquo with their dreadnoughts immobilized by the threat of un-derwater aack and shi the larger British shipbuilding capacity to sub-marines by 1048625104863310486251048631 Whatever the outcome of that issue it was true that both before and aer Dogger Bank the British did not have to come tothe Germans to enforce the distant blockade the Germans absolutely

did have to come to the British if they wished to break the blockade983095is strategy would have threatened the rest of the worldrsquos dreadnought bale cruisers and baleships and driven navies in a wholly differentdirection Both the Japanese and the Americans were building dread-noughts and the Japanese proceeded to build the four ship Kongo classthe first of which was built by Vickers e Kongorsquos superior design droveimprovements in the British bale cruiser iger the newest ship at Dog-ger Bank983096 For their part when the United States Navy (983125983123 983118) discovered

Kongo was to be one of four which made the current armored cruisersof the Pacific Fleet obsolete it began working on its own bale cruiserdesigns But the 983125983123983118 did not consider the type worth building until



983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x

the Japanese decided to build bale cruisers e early American balecruisers would have resembled the USS Wyoming but would have had

four 10486251048626-inch turrets on a very long hull with baleship like protectionand high speed983097 Aer the Kongo class appeared US designers and theGeneral Board considered an enlarged Kongo class with 1048632ndash10486251048628 inch guns aspeed of 10486271048624 knots and armor on the scale of the Nevada class In essencethese were high speed baleships which was the eventual direction UScapital ship construction followed e 983125983123983118 preferred to build bale-ships so if they found the enemy fleet or it found them numbers andsheer power would tell the tale at least for the period 1048625104863310486241048630ndash1048625104863310486251048629 ere

were additional designs but worthy of note was the comparison of USdesign philosophy to everybody else ldquoUS Ships were not comparable totheir foreign rivals they had a far greater radius of action displacement was calculated on an entirely different basis the US armoring scheme was entirely different and far more extensiverdquo983089983088

For the story of the bale itself sources include the logs of almost allthe ships and aer action reports for Admiral Beay and Admiral Hip-per as well as the papers in their respective admiralties e constructiondetails of the ships on both sides including the compromises are alsoavailable Eyewitness reports prisoner interrogations and war diariesare also available on both sides983089983089 ere is no ultimate consensus yet onthe nature of the context ndash the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse ofcommunism have severely undermined the le-wing model advanced bytwentieth-century political scientists and historians A recent review ofthe literature summarized the dialectic as less than determined or open

to final interpretations983089983090 What has now begun to emerge is another interpretation of the con-text of the Bale of Dogger Bank What we have come to understandabout the First World War and its context is perhaps more about its tragicconsequences than its actual chronology Even the chronology bearsmore scrutiny as this work shows e truth is hard to find particularly when it is buried in paper and enshrined in issue-based dialectical analy-sis of the last century With an eye towards history which he and his ad-

herents have energetically embraced Tirpitz provided a summar y of thenaval race in his work Deusche Ohnmachspoliik im Welkreig [German Appeasement Policy in the World War] His purpose was to document



xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141

A983090 Appendix 1048630 to Grand Admi ral von Tirpitzrsquos Deusche Ohnmachspoli ik im Welkreig [German Appeasement Policy in the World War] is is a comparative table of Britishand German capital ships in the Naval Race

A983091 e boom of the capital ship comparison table this time enumerating the balecruisers of both sides



983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141

the comparative naval efforts in capital ship construction is was tosupport the argument that Germany was not really the aggressor ndash Brit-

ish ldquobrutal superiorityrdquo prevailed ndash and that the driver of the arms race was Britain not Germany What is obvious is the smaller number of German ships listed in

each category by Tirpitz on a year-by-year basis and the lighter caliberof guns and the increase in displacement on both sides e list providedof ships placed in service during the war ends with the program yearof 1048625104863310486251048627 for both sides e baleship and bale cruiser race ends withthe British ahead by a length e bale cruiser ldquoracerdquo can be seen in

figure A1048627 Most interesting is the inclusion of the last German armoredcruiser Scharnhorst and the transition ship Bluumlcher What it does notdo is provide a similar list for all the other powers and show where they were politically in relation to each other and to Britain It is reproducedhere as it is very useful in understanding the balance of power that ledto the bale983089983091

is book posits the view of history that individuals even if heavilyinfluenced by their context were very important in determining boththe way the bale went and the events which were affected by the baleHuman beings were involved in making key decisions which determinedthe design capabilities and limitations of the ships that fought the stra-tegic context in which the bale was fought the actual fighting itselfand of course the issue of war itself e imposition of war on the shipsand navies which fought Dogger Bank upset all sorts of compromisesmade in design operations naval planning and strategy As Field Mar-

shal Helmuth von Moltke the elder once said no plan ever survives con-tact with the enemy Dogger Bank like any bale was determined bythe merit of combatantsrsquo action and the impact of earlier decisions whichturned out to be serious miscalculations or more bluntly put ndash mistakese unappreciated risks and potential losses to British and German fleetsof a greater engagement in the Jade estuary and its concomitant threatto German naval power in the Baltic can now be appreciated if not ab-solutely understood e risks imposed on both sidesrsquo admirals were not

always obvious even to the admirals



xxi ii

983105983150 983137983157983156983144983151983154rsquo983155 983154983141983156 983157983154 983150 983156983151 983143983154983151983157983150983140 983139983151983158983141 983154 983141983140 983137983156 983156983144983141 983151983157983156983155983141983156 983151983142a career in many things other than history must have in that return thegis of many scholars and institutions Of the scholars I would list VolgerBerghahn Keith Bird Patrick Kelly Rolf Hobson Paul Kennedy the lateDr Gert Sandhofer the late Antony Preston Of the institutions I wouldlist the US National Archives the UK National Archives (late PublicRecord Office) the UK Ministry of Defense History Branch (Navy)

the UK National Maritime Museum the Federal German Military Ar-chives and the German Military History Office Above all I would liketo acknowledge the late Professor Bryan Ran without whose inspira-tion and insight this historian would never have le the graving dock

Acknowledgments



Battle of Dogger Bank



983089

983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147 983159983137983155 983142983151983157983143983144983156 983137983143983137983145983150983155983156 983156983144 983141 983137983140983158983145983139983141 983151983142 983156983144983141 983149 983137983150 who commanded the German force Rear Admiral Franz Hipper be-lieved ldquothe expected success is not worth the effortrdquo It was intendedonly o sor ou Briish inelligence sources among he numerous fish-ing rawlers of he Dogger Bank and o roll up any unsuspecing Briishligh forces which migh be scouing he Norh Sea1048625 I was fough inhe wiligh of he Pax Britannica a he end of nearly wo hundred years

of Briish supremacy a sea1048626 Te anagoniss were Imperial Briain andImperial Germany Te later was a coninenal power wih aspiraions osea power which hreaened he vial ineress of Briain a he ime hepreeminen sea power on he plane Imperial Germany risked naionalaspiraions of a secure place as a grea power as well as commercial andmiliary success in a bid for sea power a he rise of he Second GermanEmpire1048627

Tere are many explanaions as o why his happened i could have been an exercise in Social Darwinism1048628 or naionalism1048629 or imperialism1048630Grand Admiral Alfred von irpiz was boh he archiec and he apolo-gis for he flee ha Germany possessed in 9830891048633983089983093 Grand Admiral ErichRaeder chief of saff for he principal German flag officer conducing he batle Admiral Franz von Hipper was anoher apologis and saunch de-fender of he flee irpiz buil oday here is anoher defender of heirlegacy afoo in he German naval esablishmen ndash Kapitan zur See Jorg

Hillmann983095 Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener however was the mostsignifican German naval sraegis in he wenieh cenury and he saw

Decisions beyond the Battlefield

1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147

he Batle of Dogger Bank in very differen erms han he Grand Admi-ralrsquos Wha irpiz did originally was o ake Clausewiz o sea which in

fac could no be done Raeder did he same hing wih he same resulHe was more successful in achieving geographic posiion wih Hilerrsquos Wehrmach behind him ndash Bres was German for four years as was heNorwegian coas and virually all of he Balic Tis was no so in World War I As Wolfgang Wegener noed he High Seas Flee always had woasks ndash o conrol he sea in he Balic o assure Swedish supplies of heGerman war effor and defend he norh German coass If he ImperialNavy were o succeed in defeaing a large porion of he Briish Grand

Flee by depriving i of ldquobrual superioriyrdquo he Briish would sill havehad superior geographic posiion In Wegenerrsquos view he Grand Flee would be able o cu off German rade and access o he Alanic Admi-ral Reinhard Scheer agreed

If he enemy ever succeeded in securing he command of he Balic and landingRussian roops on he coas of Pomerania our Easern fron mus have collapsedalogeher and brough o naugh our plan of campaign which consised ofa defensive atiude in he Eas and he rapid overhrow of he French Army

Te command of he Balic resed on he power of he German Flee If we haddesroyed he Russian Flee our danger from he Balic would by no means have

been eliminaed as a landing could have been carried ou jus as easily underhe proecion of English forces if he German flee no longer exised forsuch a purpose he English Flee had no need o venure ino he Balic iself hey could compel us o mee hem in he Norh Sea immediaely hey made anatack on our coas In view of such an evenualiy we mus no weaken ourselvespermanenly as we could no help doing if we atemped o eliminae he danger

which he Russian Flee represened in he Balic983096

Dogger Bank could have been a disaster for the Germans and asignifican vicory for he Briish If Briain had managed o bring vonFriedrich von Ingenohlrsquos wo squadrons (abou 10486311048624 percen of he Ger-man flee including Hipper) and Hipper o batle here would have beenonly one modern squadron (abou a hird of he German flee) le Ta would have o be spli beween he Balic and Norh Sea Should heGermans have destroyed the major portion of the Grand Fleet with

mines and orpedoes and survived in repairable condiion due o robusconsrucion Germanyrsquos sraegic posiion would have been preservedEnglandrsquos sraegic posiion would have been a risk Bu a decisive batle



983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091

required almos impossible risks Naval power required wo hings geo-graphic posiion and a flee In 9830891048633983089983092 he Germans vis-agrave-vis he Briish

had a weak geographic posiion and only abou wo-hirds of he fleehey needed Te Batle of Dogger Bank ook place in he firs monhs ofhe war when boh he High Seas Flee and he Grand Flee were grow-ing sronger983097 as he pre-war programs of 9830891048633983089983090 and 9830891048633983089983091 were coming ofruiion he Briish had added a pair of dreadnoughs aken over fromurkey for wha was o be a errible price Te Russians were no able odeploy a flee which hreaened Germany because of heir isolaion andechnological dependence for key elemens of heir new flee on foreign

sources Te Imperial Russian Navy suffered from greaer consrainsand bureaucratic lethargy than the Germans ndash the new dreadnoughtcould no be moved wihou permission from he Czar himself and heres of he navy was subordinae o a second echelon land forces com-mander1048625983088 Te overarching reasons for he batle and he war are o someexen only now being appreciaed Wegener long ago appreciaed heGerman miliary posiion which wihou any flee if successful wouldgain he navy boh Bres and he French coas Tis would erase he Bri-ish posiion of oal geographic superioriy and hreaen Briish sea-lanesas well as reopen he Alanic o German shipping10486251048625

In he batle upwards of a housand seamen died One Briish batlecruiser HMS Lion was damaged as was he German flagship SMSSeyd-

litz One German armored cruiser SMS Bluumlcher was sunk Te batleoccurred because he Germans believed a reconnaissance in force mighreveal some criical informaion on he whereabous and operaions of

he Grand Flee he Briish successfully inerceped and read Germancommunicaions and laid a rap for he German force10486251048626

983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147

If a general engagement had developed and had been decisive what would he implicaions be Te real significance of he batle was is inde-cisiveness which guaraneed ha regardless of he oucome he ground

war would coninue unless he resuls spilled ino he Balic Mos wouldsay ha a naval engagemen ill compares o he losses of any day in herenches of he wesern fron Ye he conex of he batle became he



983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147

conex of he war Te batle occurred in he conex of he GermanGeneral Saffrsquos belief ha war mus be fough no laer han by 98308910486339830891048631 les

Germany be overwhelmed by a rearmed Russia and a revanchis FranceTe German navy iself was a lo less ready for war in 9830891048633983089983092 han i would be in 98308910486339830891048631 German naval vicory early in he war migh have had more ofa poliical effec as he re-deploymens of Briish naval forces aer heGerman bombardmens of he coasal owns indicaed A a minimumi would have given he poliicians pause and perhaps ime o avoid hegrea bloodleting which had begun on he wesern and easern frons Amos he real cos of he war would have been brough home o publics

and elies no inured o he cos of endless dreadnough consrucionTa he calculus of he German General Saff was enirely based on

ground forces is one of he saemens of he obvious in he period I didno involve he Imperial German Navy in any meaningful way Tis wasprobably because a he ime he Schlieffen Plan was creaed and laereven as i was amended he German dreadnough batle squadrons and batle cruisers were sill on drawing boards and irpiz was compeing wih he army o ge he flee hrough he Reichsag Te compeiion forresources among he German services and he concomian lack of pariy wih he Briish in batle cruisers dicaed he oucome of he batle asmuch as anyhing else irpizrsquos flee laws had headed oward 9830901048624 batlecruisers by 98308910486339830901048624 allowing for replacemens of older armored cruisers andhe increase of he batle flee o fory ships In order o ge here heflee had o successfully compee wih he army o keep is guns Aer Juland he Second Batle Squadron composed of he surviving eigh

pre-dreadnoughs was decommissioned and los is guns o he armyand coasal defense Much earlier in 9830891048633983089983089 Seydlitz had los her naural sis-er ship o irpizrsquos sillborn disarmamen negoiaions wih he Briish A he ime of Dogger Bank he Germans had Luumltzow and Hindenburg as well as Ersatz Freya (actually Prinz Eitel Friedrich) and Mackensen under consrucion All were slowed by warime shorages especially ofconsrucion workers called up o he fron or acive service in he navyIn peace he Germans could have buil hree or even four dreadnoughs

a year although this was never actually Tirpitzrsquos plan and if half theproducion had been batle cruisers Hipper would have had en more



983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093

by 98308910486339830901048624 Bu ha was no o be Mackensenrsquos very powerful 983091983093 cm guns wen o he army as did hose for all he res of he capial ships under

consrucion aer Bayern In peace Hipper would have had hree moreships and by 9830891048633983089983094 perhaps as many as five more Ulimaely had peaceheld he High Seas Flee iself a he four ship annual consrucion rae was headed for fory batleships by 9830891048633983090983093 which a ha poin would have brough i abreas of almos any foreseen Briish naval order of batleTa order of batle never maerialized Now is he ime o wonder whaanoher Seydlitz would have mean in his batle and o undersand heconsequences of failure in arms conrol negoiaions

Te warime batle cruiser program of he Briish included wo Re-nown class which were high-speed lighly armored versions of heR classslow dreadnough design wih only six 983089983093-inch guns Tey were followed by hree more lighly armored ldquoin cansrdquo of he Courageous class Tislas gasp of he Admiral Sir John Fisher philosophy of speed over safeyforunaely never faced Hipperrsquos ships in acion Tese five ships were noready unil aer Juland so play litle par in he narraive abou DoggerBank Neverheless all five were available by he end of he war whereashe las reinforcemen Hipper go was he Hindenburg which accordingo irpiz acually had 983091983093 cm guns no he 9830911048624983093 cm usually atribuedo her10486251048627

We now know ha he Briish in 9830891048633983089983092 were a a crossroads in navalsraegy having setled on disan blockade and having become awareof he economy of force offered firs by dreadnoughs and hen by hesubmarine Tis combinaion of echnological evoluion and economics

would have posed a major challenge o irpiz and his creaions irpizhad all bu ignored he U-boa unil he las minue in favor of batle-ships Bu a combinaion of Serbian ambiions and Ausrian pride as wellas he inerlocking secre reaies and alliances plunged he coninenand the world into conflict ahead of Tirpitzrsquos fleet laws and buildingschedule Winson Churchill was disraced from he Norh Sea and hisBalic schemes by wha would become he disaser of he DardanellesTus major sraegic change was sillborn on one side and he disan

blockade made he weny batle cruisers of he las German Navy Law(Novelle) a pipedream Cos migh also have made hem prohibiive



983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147

bu his presumes a sagnan economy and frozen ax base hrough hefirs half of he 98308910486339830901048624s Wha matered for he batle was ha he issue was

clearly abou a shorage of money by 9830891048633983089983091983089983092Even so Dogger Bank was imporan Te relaion of he land war ohe perceived salemae a sea was jus being recognized and he U-boaloomed large as he bes way he Imperial German Navy could affec heoucome of he war and U-boa consrucion acceleraed aer DoggerBank10486251048628 Tis was he principal conclusion of he German High Seas Fleecommandrsquos assessmen of he sae of he war aer Dogger Bank TeGermans did no undersand he consequences of doing nohing wih

he flee Te Briish undersood ha he Germans mus be convincedha decisive naval acion was unlikely and suicidal Tis undersanding was also behind he engagemen even if he Briish did no recognizehis aspec of he acionrsquos origins a he ime i can be aken as impliedin heir seup of he acion

o achieve an undersanding of he moives and policy formulaion which underlies he batle i is relevan o look a he influence of AlfredTayer Mahan he doyen of naval hisory who wroe his books becausehe was concerned ha mainsream hisorians did no undersand anddid no effecively chronicle he role ha sea power played I was as SirHerber Richmond pu i ldquoMahan explained ha he definie objeche had in mind was an examination of the general history of Europeand America wih paricular reference o he effec of sea power on iscourserdquo10486251048629 Richmondrsquos houghs are helpful in undersanding he originsissues and ulimae meaning of Dogger Bank He disills Mahan as as-

sering ha conrol of he sea ldquohad exercised an influence no merely indeciding some paricular issue bu in giving a definie direcion o he whole course of evens he aimed a making an esimae of he effecof sea power and the course of history and a chimera of naval socialDarwinismrdquo10486251048630 Tere is absoluely no quesion of Mahanrsquos influence ofhe Kaiser irpiz1048625983095 and he higher echelons of he German navy As An-drew Lamber said ldquoHisorians mus look below he surface of conem-porary debaes over naval policy Tis does no mean adoping inuiive

reasoning or a counerfacual approach o hisory Raher i is necessaryo examine a full specrum of sources raher han jus so-called policydocuments and to understand the range of options open to decision



Contents

Lis of Illusraions xi

Preface xiii

Acknowledgmens xxiii

1048625 Decisions beyond the Balefield 983089

1048626 Building the Bale Cruisers 983090983091 1048627 Prologue to War and Bale 983092983097

1048628 e Order of Bale 983089983088983089

1048629 Chase and Intercept 983089983089983092

1048630 e Engagement 983089983091983089

1048631 e Aermath 983089983092983093

Noes 983089983093983097

Bibliography 983089983095983093

Index 983089983096983091



xi





10486251048625 SMS Mackensen 983089983093

10486261048625 Invincible 983091983092

10486261048626 New Zealand 983091983093

10486261048627 Lion 983091983094

10486261048628 iger 983091983095




10486261048632 Von der ann 983092983091

10486261048633 Goeben and Molke 983092983091

104862610486251048624 Seydliz 983092983094

104862610486251048625 Derfflinger 983092983095


Illustrations



xi i





Dogger Bank 983089983090983096



xi ii






Preface



xiv 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv







xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









xi





10486251048625 SMS Mackensen 983089983093

10486261048625 Invincible 983091983092

10486261048626 New Zealand 983091983093

10486261048627 Lion 983091983094

10486261048628 iger 983091983095




10486261048632 Von der ann 983092983091

10486261048633 Goeben and Molke 983092983091

104862610486251048624 Seydliz 983092983094

104862610486251048625 Derfflinger 983092983095


Illustrations



xi i





Dogger Bank 983089983090983096



xi ii






Preface



xiv 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv







xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









xi i





Dogger Bank 983089983090983096



xi ii






Preface



xiv 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv







xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









xi ii






Preface



xiv 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv







xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









xiv 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv







xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv







xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









xv i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xv ii










xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









xv iii 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



983090 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147












983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







983123 983156983154 983137983156983141 983143 983145983139 983124983144 983145983150983147 983145983150983143 983137983150983140 983108983151983143 983143 983141 983154 983106 983137983150983147





983092 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983093









983094 983106983137983156983156983148983141 983151983142 983108983151983143983143983141983154 983106983137983150983147









983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xi x









xx 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141





983120983154983141983142983137983139983141 xxi



xxi i 983120983154983141983142983137983139983141










xxi ii



Acknowledgments






983089






1



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983108983141983139983145983155983145983151983150983155 983138983141983161983151983150983140 983156983144983141 983106983137983156983156983148983141983142983145 983141983148983140 983091







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Documents

Battle of Dogger Bank (excerpt)