1NCOFF CASE1NC K Their epistemology of threat production justifies nuclear lashout to eliminate the threat -- causes extinction Massumi 07 Brian, Communication Department of the Universit de Montral, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/ v010/10.2massumi.html, Potential Politics and the Primacy of PreemptionIt is certain that there will be adjustments. But it should be remembered that Bush referred to a change in "tactics," not a change in "strategy." Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States. It can be argued that preemption is in any case far more than a specific military doctrine of a particular administration. It can be plausibly argued that preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age in as infinitely space-filling and insiduously infiltrating a way as the logic of "deterrence" defined the Cold War era. By an "operative" logic I mean one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency that is not in the sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible sweeps them up in its own dynamic. Preemption is not prevention. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ epistemologically and ontologically. Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought to avoid their realization. Prevention operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect. As we will see, this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption, and entails a divergence from it on the ontological level as well. Prevention, in fact, has no ontology of its own because it assumes that what it must deal with has an objectively given existence prior to its own intervention. In practice, this means that its object is given to it predefined by other formations, in whose terms and on whose terrain it must then operate. A preventive approach to social conflict might analyze it, for example, as an effect of poverty, objectively quantifiable in terms of economic and health indexes. Each index is defined by a specialist formation (economics, medicine) in relation to a norm specific to that domain and against which goals may be set and success measured (annual income, mortality rates, life expectancy, etc.). The preventive measures will then operate as a political extension of the concerned specialist domains (economic analysis extended into politics as aid and development, medicine extended into vaccination programs, etc.). They will be regulated by the specialist logics proper to those fields. Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end. Because of this, preventive measures are not self-sustaining. They must be applied. They must be leveraged from an outside source with outside force. They are not an organizing force in their own right. They run on borrowed power. Deterrence takes over at the end of this same process, when the means of prevention have failed. Deterrence makes use of the same epistemology prevention does, in that it assumes knowability and objective measurability. However, because it starts where prevention ends, it has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised. Since it would not hold the key to its own knowledge, in the urgency of the situation it would be haunted internally by the spectre of a possible incompleteness of the knowledge coming from the outside. Since its operations would be mediated by that outside domain, neither would it hold a direct key to its own actions. Since it would be responding to causes outside its specific purview, it would not be master of its own effects. The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself. The quickest and most direct way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one. The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic (deterrence). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause. Past causes are in any case already spoken for. They have been claimed as objects of knowledge and operational spheres by a crowded world of other already-functioning formations. Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." In fact, the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's, give or take a few half-lives. The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life).

Alternative Reject the affirmatives security logic Neocleous 08 Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6]could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sewnse, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

1NC TRIPS CP The United States should cease its public and diplomatic opposition to the initiation of WTO-authorized suspension of Antiguas obligations towards the United States under the TRIPS Agreement, and encourage Antigua to proceed with such suspension so long as legally authorized. The United States should not retaliate against Antigua for such suspension.

Solves trade and creates TRIP credibility Danish 13, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case, Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.phpAs of June 2013, Antigua had not initiated any proceedings aimed at profiting from suspension of the intellectual property obligations owed to the US. However, many reports seem to suggest that it may soon set up a website for the sale of American intellectual property, if the negotiations deadlock is not broken.44 In the decade that has passed since the initiation of this case, there has not been any significant shift in the American position regarding its obligations under the GATS. Antigua is still engaged in the use of pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply with the rulings. However, whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws. The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after all the procedures laid down in the DSU were followed to the letter without any breach in its legality. Further, the way in which Antigua has proceeded against the US has conformed to all the standards expected of a country using an international trade dispute redressal forum. Yet there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities. Notwithstanding extant jurisprudence, the levelling of such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures. Irrespective of its non compliance with the WTO rulings and disregard of the threat of cross retaliation, the despicable way in which the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy has also raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs.

1NC Ban CP The United States should make all online gambling in the United States illegal. The United States should clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing and all online gambling, amend the Interstate Horse trading Act to prohibit internet gambling on pari-mutuel wagering, adjust the UIGEA to fit within the GATS public morals exception. The United States should repeal the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, taking upon itself all responsibilities for enforcing anti-gambling legislation and provide all necessary resources to financial institutions to ensure its enforcement.

Default ban brings in technical compliance Heather A. Bloom 8, J.D. @ The George Washington University Law School; B.A., Georgetown University, Upping The Ante: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act's Noncompliance With World Trade Organization Law, Fall 2008, South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business, 5 S.C. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 75, Lexis[*101] VI. PROPOSED MEASURES THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE TO COMPLY WITH GATS AND WHY COMPLIANCE IS NECESSARY A. PROPOSED MEASURES To comply with GATS, the U.S. should first clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing, as well as amend the IHA to prohibit internet gambling on pari-mutuel wagering. Second, the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the GATS public morals exception. The following suggestions are the most practical measures for the U.S. to take because they involve little change to existing U.S law, yet are significant enough to prevent further internet gambling complaints from member countries. n160 Amending the UIGEA would put the U.S. in a better position should future WTO complaints against the U.S. arise. Modifying existing U.S. law is necessary because it is difficult to amend the list of GATS commitments. n161 1. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE IHA AND UIGEA TO APPLY TO ONLINE WAGERING ON HORSERACING First, the U.S. should amend the IHA and clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing. n162 Currently, the IHA discriminates against foreign service suppliers: it permits "domestic, but not foreign, services suppliers to offer remote betting service in relation to certain horse races." n163 Despite the DOJ's position that all types of remote internet gambling are illegal under existing federal law, the U.S. should follow the Appellate Body's interpretation and modify the IHA and [*102] UIGEA. n164 The DOJ's position conflicts with (1) the Fifth Circuit's holding in In re MasterCard; n165 (2) general principles of statutory construction; n166 and (3) the exceptions carved out in the UIGEA. n167 2. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE UIGEA TO ENSURE THAT IT FALLS WITHIN THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION Second, the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the public morals exception. Although a WTO panel would likely find that the UIGEA satisfies the first prong of the public morals test, the scope of public morals exception, the U.S. should nevertheless amend the statute to clarify that the purpose of the UIGEA is not only to target debt collection and to improve law enforcement, but also to prevent fraud, money laundering, and underage gambling. n168 With respect to the second prong of the public morals test, the necessity requirement, the U.S. should amend the UIGEA to ban all forms of remote internet gambling. Prohibiting all offshore internet gambling is a more "WTO-consistent alternative measure" that the U.S. should take, given the likelihood that future complaints against the U.S. would focus on this second prong. n169 Thus, the best way for the U.S. to prohibit all forms of remote internet gambling is to apply the ban to horseracing. n170 [*103] b. The U.S should comply with the WTO to avoid future complaints and retaliation from member countries, and to support the legitimacy of the WTO The U.S. should comply with GATS and the Appellate Body's decision in the Antigua case for three reasons. First, compliance would help avoid future complaints from larger WTO member countries or the European Union. n171 For example, the European Union has already considered raising a prospective WTO claim regarding the new law. n172 Future complaints will most likely focus on whether the new UIGEA excludes pari-mutuel betting on horseracing and meets both prongs of the public morals exception. Second, complying with GATS is important to avoid patent retaliation from member countries. Under WTO law, if the U.S. ignores a WTO finding or decision, member countries will have the option to disregard treaties requiring them to comply with U.S. patent laws. n173 For example, because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings in the Antigua case, WTO arbitration panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights on (e.g.,) videos, music, electronics, or software. n174 This type of retaliation will pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries bring internet gambling complaints. Moreover, member countries [*104] might also retaliate by refusing to allow U.S. companies to use certain geographical indications. n175 Third, the U.S. has "interests in supporting the legitimacy of the WTO." n176 Continuing to ignore its commitments under the WTO with respect to the new law will cost the U.S. "significant trade capital" and lead to trade sanctions or concessions. n177 If the U.S. ignores its WTO obligations, then other countries might ignore their WTO obligations toward the U.S. n178 C. CRITICISM There are three main counterarguments in response to this proposal that focus on the public morals exception. First, critics might argue that a WTO panel should hold that the U.S. has not met the first prong of the public morals exception, and find that the U.S. intent behind the UIGEA is economic-based. Second, existing U.S. federal laws are the most WTO-consistent measures available. Third, the U.S. should not prohibit online wagering on horseracing. 1. THE U.S. HAS NOT MET THE FIRST PRONG OF THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION First, because the UIGEA presents no clear moral or cultural rationale in either its text or legislative history, a WTO panel might find that the public morals exception cannot encompass the UIGEA. Proponents of this view argue that the purpose behind the UIGEA is almost entirely "economic in nature." n179 The problem with this argument, however, is that the UIGEA's reference to money laundering and corruption in section 803 suggests that there are moral-based purposes behind the statute. n180 Moreover, because the WTO tends to [*105] loosely interpret the public morals exception's scope, section 803's reference to morals will be enough to satisfy this prong. n181 2. EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS ARE WTO-CONSISTENT Second, another area of contention centers on whether the U.S. could use any less trade-restrictive alternatives. n182 In line with the DOJ's position, critics argue that prohibiting all types of internet gambling is not a less trade-restrictive alternative, because the Wire Act already prohibits all forms of internet gambling. This reasoning, however, conflicts with the Appellate Body Report as well as the In re MasterCard decision. n183 3. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET WAGERING ON HORSERACING Lastly, the U.S. should not prohibit pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing. n184 Proponents of the horseracing industry have argued that horseracing is a major industry in the United States, whose "fastest growing segment" is the pari-mutuel business. n185 Carving out an exception for the IHA, however, discriminates against foreign internet [*106] service providers. If the U.S. does not wish to outlaw online betting on horseracing, its only other option is to allow "foreign racebooks to take [horseracing] bets" from the U.S., which would have "virtually no [negative] impact" on the current status of internet gambling. n186 Yet, Congress is not likely to pass a law expanding the scope of legal internet gambling. n187 Thus, the most realistic option for the U.S. is to include pari-mutuel wagering on horses within the overall reach of the UIGEA. VII. CONCLUSION The UIGEA violates GATS, in particular as examined against the backdrop of the Appellate Body Report. To comply with GATS, the U.S. should modify the law to include interstate gambling on horseracing and to satisfy the public morals exception. Instead of evading its WTO commitments altogether, the U.S. should amend the UIGEA as soon as possible to avoid future WTO complaints from larger member countries or the European Union.

CP solves burdens of UIGEA---repeal frees up bank resources Jason Miller 8, * cal author * Partner at Miller & Monroe PLLC, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Law, JD with Honors Siena College, Dont Bet on This Legislation, https://www.law.unc.edu/components/handlers/document.ashx?category=24&subcategory=52&cid=105Under this approach, Congress could either repeal the UIGEA or leave it in place. If the UIGEA is repealed, the government, not financial institutions, would assume responsibility for enforcement of the anti-gambling laws.248 If the UIGEA remains, financial institutions would have a clear determination from Congress as to what constitutes illegal Internet gambling.249 As it stands, financial institutions are forced to make this determination on their own accord.250 Thus, whether the UIGEA is repealed or remains in effect, a law explicitly prohibiting all Internet gambling would permit financial institutions to focus more of their resources on their own business activities and cease spending their private funds on law enforcement and law interpretation.251 In this way, a law explicitly prohibiting Internet gambling and amending or repealing the UIGEA would greatly reduce the impending burden that the UIGEA, in its present state, creates for financial institutions.252 Furthermore, express prohibition would likely be more effective in curbing Internet gambling than the UIGEA.2531NC Economy DA Plan creates a speculative bubble - causes economic and trade collapse - turns the aff Kindt 13