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1 Before (and after) 9/11 What didn’t happen, and what was going on elsewhere?

Before (and after) 9/11

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Before (and after) 9/11. What didn’t happen, and what was going on elsewhere?. Three main “Before” threads. What the U.S. saw as its interests in the Mideast The activities surrounding the alleged hijackers in the U.S. What were they doing here? The (non) investigations - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Before (and after) 9/11

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Before (and after) 9/11

What didn’t happen, and

what was going on elsewhere?

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Three main “Before” threads

• What the U.S. saw as its interests in the Mideast

• The activities surrounding the alleged hijackers in the U.S.– What were they doing here?– The (non) investigations– Osama bin Laden (OBL or UBL)

• Warnings and Foreknowledge

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U. S. Interestsin the Mideast

dominance, oil & gas

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U.S. InterestsProject for New American Century

(PNAC)

• Devoted to matters of “maintaining US pre-eminence, thwarting rival powers and shaping the global security system according to US interests.”

• Consistent position: regime change in Iraq• Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and

Resources For a New Century (2000)– Massive modernization, transformation, expansion of military– Will take massive infusion of money [from entitlements]– Because of public and institutional resistance, "the process of

transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”

• Clip: Everybody’s Gotta Learn Sometime (6:37-12:17)

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U.S. Interests: PNAC

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U.S. Interests: PNAC in Bush Admin

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U.S. Interests

Union Oil Company of California• 1890: founded• 1995: cooperating with CIA, turning over information gained on

Central Asian negotiating trips (part of larger CIA use of business)• 1996: opens office in Kandahar during Taliban take-over• 1996: anti-Taliban Massoud claims Unocal and CIA gave Taliban the

money needed to take over Kandahar; later CIA and Unocal said to give Taliban weapons and instructors

• 1997: agrees to pay ~$1M to set up facility (near Bin Laden compound) to train Pashtuns for building pipeline

• 1998-2005: discussed later• 2005: China tries to buy, stymied by U.S. government “national

security” concerns; merged into Chevron

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U.S. Interests

Central Asia Cheney (CEO Halliburton): "I cannot think of a time when we

have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as

strategically significant as the Caspian.”

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U.S. Interests

Petroleum

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM

1998: Congressional testimony by Unocal• Caspian/Central Asia rich in untapped petroleum• Area is isolated• Most pipelines were built during Russian Afghanistan era,

head north, none south & east• Europe and former Soviet republics slow demand growth• Asia is where big demand expected, where pipelines

should go• One main pipeline option is across Afghanistan, requiring a

stable government having the confidence of governments, leaders, and our company

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U.S. Interests

Unocal India Pipeline

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U.S. Interests

History 79-91 Based mostly on http://www.ringnebula.com/Oil/Timeline.htm

• 7/79: Carter orders aid to anti-govt forces in Afghanistan to induce Soviet invasion (ZbigBrz)

• 12/79: Soviets comply, after initial resistance• mid/late 80’s: CIA works with Saudis to create an

army to inject into Afghanistan– Saudis pick OBL (wealthy construction family, close ties

to royal family)

• 1989: Soviets leave Afghanistan• 12/91: Soviet Union collapses

– Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan formed

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U.S. Interests

History 93-96• 1993: Oil companies start moving for the oil (200

billion barrel estimate); also natural gas • 1995: Unocal signs oil & gas pipeline agreements

with Turkmenistan– Rt: Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, to Indian Ocean

• 1995-97: Bridas (Argentine oil co.) in competing negotiations w/Turkmenistan/Taliban/Pakistan

• 8/96: Unocal & Delta/Saudi sign memorandum of understanding with Russian & Turkmen gas companies for building pipeline (same route)

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U.S. Interests

History 97• 1997: Congress declares Caspian/Caucasus

a “zone of vital American interest” • 10/97: Unocal & others form Central Asia

Gas Pipeline Ltd (CentGas) to build Afghan pipeline

• 12/97: Unocal invites Taliban reps to its Texas headquarters

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U.S. Interests

History• 1/98: Unocal and Pak/Turkmenistan/Taliban

sign agreement on gas pipeline financing, with Unocal also considering an oil pipeline

• 1/98: Bridas wins the competition (?????)• 2/98: Unocal VP tells Congress Taliban

should be removed, replaced w/govt acceptable to Unocal

• 3/98: Unocal announces delay in finalizing project due to ongoing civil war

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U.S. Interests

History• 8/98: OBL-linked terrorists bomb African

embassies• 8/98: Clinton calls in 75-80 cruise missiles

on Afghanistan and Sudan;Unocal suspends pipeline development

• 11/98: Trade & Development Agency commissions Enron to investigate another route to Turkish coast (~$1bil more expensive)

• 12/98: Unocal cites “business reasons,” withdraws from the agreement

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U.S. Interests

History• 4/99: Pak/Turkmen/Afghan reactivate

agreement without the U.S. interests • 7/99: Clinton freezes Afghan assets, prohibits

trade and other transactions• 10/99: 1st UN Security Council Res 1267

sanctions Taliban, demands OBL turnover without delay

• 10/00: USS Cole attacked• 12/00: 2nd UN Security Council Res 1333: more

sanctions on Taliban, demands 1267 compliance

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U.S. Interests

History 2001

1-2/01: Bush administration (BA)– Cheney, Condoleeza Rice and Secy’s of Commerce,

Interior, and Army are all previous oil-related execs– Secy of Energy rec’d more oil $ as senator than all

but 3 others– BA immediately engages in active negotiations

w/Taliban– Taliban hires long-time Mujaheddin ally Laila Helms

(niece of Richard Helms (former CIA head & Iran ambassador) as go-between

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U.S. Interests

History 2001• 5/01: BA to Taliban on pipeline placement:

"Either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs.”

• 6/01: Ambassador to Yemen prevents FBI’s John O’Neill from entering Yemen to investigate aQ/Cole

• 7/01: Senior US officials tell former Pak foreign secretary that US military action against Afghanistan would start by mid-October [BBC]

• 9/11/01: .................................

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U.S. Interests

History 2001• 9/01: 3rd UN Security Council Resolution

1373: more sanctions • 10/7/01: Aerial bombardment of Afghanistan

begins, allegedly to get OBL and 9/11 accomplices

• 10/14/01: Taliban offers to turn over OBL to neutral country if US stops bombing and gives evidence of 9/11 guilt; Bush rejects: “We know he’s guilty.”

• 10/16/01: Taliban moderate drops demand for proof; but U.S. wants Taliban hard-liners out

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U.S. Interests

History: interlude• 11/01: Bush order -- sitting or previous

president (or family) can seal all presidential and/or vice-presidential records, including those of previous administrations; does so for Reagan/Bush1 (also Clinton?)

• 1/02: Bush asks Daschle to limit Congressional 9/11 investigations

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U.S. Interests

History 2001-02• 12/01: US-backed government takes over, under Hamid Karzai

(former Unocal consultant)• 12/01: Bush appoints Zalmay Khalilzad as special envoy to

Afghanistan (former Unocal consultant in talks with Taliban in 1997)

• 2/02: Karzai and Pakistan pres agree to revive pipe-line; Turkmenistan says it hopes will soon be built

• 5/02/02: Karzai and Turkmenistan/Pakistan counterparts hold talks on pipeline;Afghan minister for Mines and Industries says Unocal is “the lead company” for building it.

• 5/30/02: Afghanistan,Turkmenistan and Pakistan agree to build the pipeline

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U.S. Interests

History - later

• 4/10: Afghan, Pakistan, and India sign agreement to buy gas from Turkmenistan

• 12/10: Gas pipeline agreement signed• 5/30/02: Afghanistan,Turkmenistan and Pakistan

agree to build the pipeline• 04/12: Failure to agree on gas transit fees

– India/Afghanistan re: Afghan segment– India/Pakistan: re Pakistan segment

• 05/12: Afghan parliament approves pipeline;India signs gas purchase agreement w/Turkmenistan

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The Hijackers

• Did they even exist?

• What were they doing here?

• The (non)investigations

• Osama Bin Laden

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The Hijackers

Where did FBI get IDs?• Head of Customs & Boarder Protection testifies

before 9/11 Commission• On the morning of 9/11, they pulled manifests

from airlines, noticed several suspicious• Ran through lookout list• In 45 minutes, they forwarded list of hijackers

and passengers to FBI• By 11AM, saw list with all 19 hijackers, all of

whom turned out to be correct.• Note: original list had only 18 hijackers

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The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)

Flight 11• Amir Bukhari 9/13 (died in small plane crash in 2000)• Waleed al-Shehri • Adnan Bukhari 9/13 (alive in FL, passed polygraph)• Wail al-Shehri (Saudi pilot, contacted officials to deny• Abdulrahman al-Omari 9/13 (Saudi Air pilot,

complained)• Abdul Aziz al-Omari (confirmed name & DoB, Saudi

embassy says passport stolen in 1996)• Amer Kamfar 9/13• Satam al-Suqami (passport found before (FBI) or after

(911C) North tower collapse)• Mohamed Atta

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The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)

Flight 175

• Marwan al-Shehhi• Faez Banihammad [FBI: “Ahmed”]• Mohand [FBI: “Mohald”] al-Shehri• Ahmed al-Ghamdi• Hamza al-Ghamdi (also booked flights

in Saudi Arabia for end of September)

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The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)

Flight 77

• Salem al-Hazmi (says never been to U.S., not out of Saudi Arabia in 2 years)

• Nawaf [FBI: “Nawaq”] al-Hazmi• Majed Moqed• Khalid al-Midhar• “Mosead Caned” (9/14 morning DoJ unreleased list)• Hani Hanjour (not on passenger manifest)

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The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)

Flight 93

• Saeed al-Ghamdi (Saudi pilot; name, residence, DoB, occupation match; “shocked and furious”)

• Ahmed al-Nami• Ahmad al-Haznawi• Ziad Jarrah [FBI: “Jarrahi” -- correct on later versions

of “original” manifests that were supposedly basis for identification]

Page 29: Before (and after) 9/11

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The Hijackers

The Atta Story - 9/11 Comm

• Atta and al-Omari drive to Portland in rented blue Nissan

• Stay overnight• Catch commuter flight to Boston• Arrives at 6:45, an hour before Flight 11 departure• Atta’s bags don’t make the transfer, though everyone

else’s do (though Atta was flagged by CAPPS -- Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening)

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The Hijackers

The Atta Story - Problems

• Portland trip -- ringleader risks delay forcing postponement or cancellation of operation

• Atta’s bags -- why didn’t they make the transfer (and why was there a will in them?)

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The Hijackers

The Atta Story develops• CNN (9/12)

– Bukharis involved– 2 individuals photographed going through Portland

security– Arabic flight training manuals found in car at

Logan• CNN (early 9/13, according to law-enforcement):

– Bukharis rent silver blue Nissan Altima in Boston– Drive to Portland 9/10, drive back next morning– Mitsubishi sedan found at Logan w/Arabic flight

manuals, rented by Atta

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The Hijackers

The Atta Story develops• CNN (later 9/13)

– Apology for Bukhari mistake (based on multiple law-enforcement reports)

– Still say flight manuals in Boston car w/references pointing to Atta and al-Shehhi

• CNN (9/14) -- “Arabic language manuals” in car• CNN (later 9/14; per Portland Police)

– Atta one of two who boarded flight to Boston– Nissan rented from same place as Boston car used by

“additional suspects”

• WashPost (9/16) -- incriminating materials found in Atta’s luggage

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The Hijackers

The Atta Story -- FBI 10/5

• Photo from Portland Jetport gas station– Atta & al-Omari (A&O) at 8:28 PM (date cropped)– “same picture” at Moussaoui trial (2006) -- date

shows as 11-10-01 (Saturday) though stamped MON• Timeline has other pictures of A&O at other places at

8:31 and 8:41, getting to Jetport at 9:15

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The Hijackers

The Atta Story -- FBI Affidavit

• Signed by FBI agent and US magistrate judge• Dated 9/12, 9:53 AM• Blue Nissan Altima rented by Atta• A&O on AA flight 11• AA personnel found A’s two bags• Magistrate authorized search• Found incriminating evidence, including A’s will• So why all the misinformation on 9/13-14?

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Entry into US

• 91: Hanni Hanjour comes to Arizona

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Entry into US

• 1/00: Khaled Almihdhar & Nawaf Alhazmi to LA– Passports flagged as terror-related by Saudis– CIA knows them, puts them on NSA watch list (for intercepts)

but not State Dept watch list (to prevent entry) until 8/01, claims lost them in Bangkok after Malaysia aQ summit

– But Almihdhar tells KSM they were followed– Thailand cables CIA about them in March, CIA claims no one

saw this until May– Settle in San Diego w/help from al-Bayoumi (called “Saudi or

other foreign intel” by FBI’s best source in the area)– Live openly (in phone book, cell phone registered, etc.)– Almihdhar leaves 6/00, returns to Yemen communication hub

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Entry into US• 6/00: Ziad Jarrah arrives in Georgia

– Tourist visa from Berlin– Stopped in Dubai

• UAE officials say stop was requested by CIA, question him for 4 hours, inform US, US says to let him go, they’ll track him

• US denies knowing (but appears unlikely)

– Flies to Venice, FL, settles there

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Entry into UShttp://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/suspects/hijackers-visa-express-program-started-3-months-before-911.txt (original WP article gone)

• Visa Express program -- started June 2001– Only at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, to cut long lines,

frees staff time to more thoroughly check suspicious ones– No interviews or background checks -- data checks done by

travel agencies (but 12 of 15 Saudi hijackers interviewed)

• Richard Armitage (PNAC) rejects requests from the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to deny some visas (in July 2002)– “The information we have received from the FTTTF so far has

been insufficient to permit a consular office to deny a visa. The information we have received states only that the FTTF believes the applicants may pose a threat to national security.”

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Flying

• Ziad Jarrah– Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC), Jun-? 2000– Aiming for multi-engine license

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Flying• Mohammed Atta & Marwan Alshehhi

– Huffman Aviation (Venice), Jul-Dec 2000– aiming for commercial licenses– Atta already has private license– Soloing by July– Obnoxious: attitude/authority problem, instructor wants to

expell, owner Dekker talks to them, they improve– Rent planes, gone for days at a time– Go to Sarasota School (Sept), thrown out, return to Huffman– Dekker says they leave after paying in Dec, but reportedly

practice night-landing Huffman planes at another airport in Jan/Feb

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Flying

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Devout?

• Atta and Alshehhi– Venice: frequent two pubs, drink beer– Atta never visits mosques or associates with

Muslims– Coral Springs: Atta chain smoking

• Lots more (Las Vegas lap dancers, etc.)

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Living openly

• Nawaf Alhamzi and Ziad Jarrah– Living in motel a few miles from NSA

headquarters during Aug/early-Sept 2011

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Hijackers -- what were they doing?

Living Openly

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Hijackers -- How did they get here?

U.S. Saudi visa office

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Page 46: Before (and after) 9/11

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

2002 Congressional Inquiry

[Before 9/11, the] “intelligence community possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information linking 16 of the 19 hijackers [including Atta] to terrorism or terrorist groups.”

Well....

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

The Yemen Comm Hub 1• 96?: NSA monitoring OBL phone picks up

Yemen number, later turns out to be a hub• 8/98: East Africa embassy bombing• 8/98: That investigation id’s Yemen al-

Qaeda communication hub (run by Almihdhar’s father-in law; wife there)

• NSA & CIA plant bugs, tap phones, satellite-watch visitors

• “Intelligence bonanza” -- counter-terrorism officials

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

The Yemen Comm Hub 2

• 12/99: major info review to prevent Millennium attacks– turns up two HJs connected to Yemen

hub (& heading to Malaysia aQ summit) also connected to East Africa bombing;

– NSA identifies a number of HJs, fails to pass some of the info to CIA

– NSA report at the time shows clear knowledge of HJs’ connection to OBL

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

The Yemen Comm Hub 3

• 00-01 -- many calls to/from hijackers • 9/11 Commission: NSA shared some but

not all info w/CIA and FBI• FBI agents working on aQ/Yemen said

they never heard of the calls• NSA says it didn’t share Almihdhar-in-US

info because didn’t know he was there (obviously false from other evidence)

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Malaysia aQ Summit (1/00) 1• Many of OBL’s close associates there• CIA tracks Khalid Almihdhar from Dubai

(where they copied his passport, which had a U.S. multi-entry visa)

• KA presence at summit provided to FBI (in an odd way), but existence of the visa NOT!

• CIA notifies Malaysia authorities about the summit, but doesn’t tell them what to look for, so Malaysians concentrate on locals

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Malaysia aQ Summit (1/00) 2• Much surveillance, videotaping,

photographing, cafe hard-drive checking• No audio taping was done (inexplicably)• Plans for Cole bombing and 9/11 allegedly

discussed (how know if no audio taping?)• Large number of hi-quality photos taken,

not clear how many passed to CIA, or why only 2 or 3 circulated in U.S. intelligence

• Some attendees captured in Mideast, US declines custody or doesn’t interrogate

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Malaysia aQ Summit (1/00) 3Knowledge of the presence of Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar provided many future opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot, none taken.

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

CIA doesn’t tell FBI 1

• 1/00: FBI Strategic Info Op Center (SIOC) to deal with CIA/FBI communication problems

• CIA “James” tells FBI SIOC agent (who isn’t a contact for this) about Malaysia summit and Almihdhar

• Then emails CIA people “exactly” what he told the FBI; no mention of Almihdhar visa (dest NYC, 3-month stay)

• New info arrives, does exactly the same thing with another SIOC agent, mentions suspicious activity but not criminal enterprise or impending attack (FBI matter)

• Later refuses to talk to Justice Dept, tells CIA Inspector General he has no recollection of any of this

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

CIA doesn’t tell FBI 2

• 1/00: FBI agent Doug Miller (assigned to CIA OBL unit) reads CIA cables about Almihdar US visa with NY destination and 3 month stay

• Drafts cable to FBI about it• CIA person “Michelle” sees it, notifies deputy station chief, Tom

Wilshire, who blocks it as “not info for the FBI”• Michelle sends cable to CIA (but not FBI) saying info was shared

w/FBI• No one at CIA checks that FBI received info (standard practice)• 9/11 Commission buries it, doesn’t mention Wilshire• Michelle apparently lies to CIA Inspector General, who reports that

the block was due to wrong format or need for editing

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

CIA doesn’t tell FBI 3• 1/00: Another FBI agent in CIA’s OBL unit protests, but

his superiors won’t let him pass the visa info to the FBI• Michelle insists next attack will be in SE Asia, will tell

FBI when something comes up affecting them (i.e., US)• Tom Wilshire sends [CYA?] email prior to 9/11

expressing fear of Malaysia attack• Post 9/11 allegation: CIA trying to prevent FBI from

interfering in (illegal, w/ Saudi intel) attempt to recruit Almihdhar and Alhamzi to monitor highjackers in U.S.

• (CIA says it stopped monitoring Atta in Germany, but German experts suspected this continued in US)

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Able Danger 1, Jan 2000

• Secret U.S. Army Intelligence unit• Uses computer analysis of

connections between people• identifies 5 aQ cells• “Brooklyn” cell related to Brooklyn

– includes Atta, Alshehhi, Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi

– not necessarily living in Brooklyn (or US)

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Able Danger 2

• Identifies Atta/Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (WTC ‘93) connection

• 2’x3’ chart with 5 clusters of names around OBL in the center

• Chart disappears• 2.4 Terabytes of data destroyed by a

captain on pain of losing his job

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Able Danger 3

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Able Danger 4• 9/11 Commission ignores Able Danger in

spite of testimony by Col. Anthony Shaffer• Defense Department Inspector General

investigates– Asks leading questions– Browbeats Philpott, asking him again and again

over several weeks until he apparently gets the picture and changes his story to say Shaffer probably talked him into thinking Atta was mentioned.

– Does not interview the perpetrators

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

John O’Neill• FBI Deputy DIrector, leading authority on aQ,

investigator of WTC 93• Repeated obstruction of his aQ investigations

– “The main obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were US oil corporate interests, and the role played by Saudi Arabia in it.”

– Said the Bush administration slowed down aQ/terrorism investigations related Afghanistan because of negotiations with Taliban over an oil pipeline

• Resigns from FBI on August 22• Offered job as security head of WTC (34th fl office)• Dies in attack -- called son and friend to say fine,

called the FBI, went back into the building to help

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Robert Wright, FBI Chicago• 12 years w/FBI, partner John Vincent, 27 years w/FBI• Following 1998 embassy bombing, part of terrorism task

force, investigating connection between Chicago cell and financial kingpin Yassim al-Kadi in Chicago

• Could follow suspects and file reports, but "The supervisor who was there from headquarters was right straight across from me and started yelling at me: 'You will not open criminal investigations'”

• In response to repeated efforts: "I think it's just better to let sleeping dogs lie.” (1/01)

• Federal prosecutor Mark Flessner assigned to build the cases: "There were powers bigger than I was in the Justice Department and within the FBI that simply were not going to let it [the criminal case] happen.”

• Wright eventually sued the FBI over their obstruction.

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Robert Wright, FBI Chicago

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Phoenix Memo, July 10, 2001• Phoenix FBI office became concerned about possible flight training

by terrorist suspects• Agent Kenneth Williams wrote memo to FBI HQ about this

– http://www.thememoryhole.org/911/phoenix-memo/01.htm (jpg)– “The purpose of this communication, is to advise the bureau

and New York of the possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges. Phoenix has observed an inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest who are attending or who have attended civil aviation universities and colleges in the State of Arizona....”

– The memo recommends the FBI compile a list of all flight training schools and assign liaisons to start watching them, and interagency sharing of info

– Published copy had much redacted material, raising suspicions that it contained names of some of the hijackers

• It was ignored (?) by FBI HQ

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Coleen Rowley, Aug 2001• Chief attorney for Minneapolis FBI, famous 5/02 memo:

http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html• Investigating Moussaoui (“20th hijacker”), suspicion that he

was going to try to fly something into the WTC, confiscated his laptop, tried to get permission to examine it, FBI HQ refused to get permission, finally obtained on 9/11

• FBI HQ never told Minneapolis of the Phoenix pilot memo• In the weeks leading up to 9/11, frustrated field agents in

Minneapolis bitterly joked that key officials in Washington "had to be spies or moles ... working for Osama bin Laden."

• Office head, Marion “Spike” Bowman, given award for “exceptional performance” by FBI Director Mueller, 12/01

• Mueller continued to state FBI had no prior knowledge after repeated attempts by Rowley to disabuse him of that fact.

• No one in FBI was ever investigated about all this

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Coleen Rowley, Aug 2001

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Harry Samet, Aug 2001• http://www.reason.com/news/show/36676.html• Minneapolis FBI investigating Moussaoui

– Moussaoui wanted to hijack a plane and had the weapons with which to do it, “believes it is acceptable to kill civilians” and approves of martyrdom.

– Training on 747 simulator (“just wanted to do it”) suspicious of terrorism

– Suspected connection to terrorist camp

• Filed over 70 reports, ignored– Supervisor Mike Maltbie blocked Aug 31 letter to FAA– Maltbie and David Frasca (radical fundamentalist head)

said only wanted facts on connection to foreign power for FISA court, but suspicions were enough for criminal search

– Samet told pressing to hard for warrant would hurt career

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Hijackers -- the (non) investigations

Harry Samet, Aug 2001

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Sibel Edmonds, 2002• Hired by FBI Language Services Section (high security) as

translator in Sept 01 for detainee interrogations• Dec 01 - March 02: Complaints to superiors about things she

uncovered -- many, including– FBI, State Department, and Pentagon infiltrated by a

Turkish & Israeli-run intelligence network that paid high American officials to steal nuclear weapons secrets

– FBI received information in April 2001, from a reliable Iranian intelligence asset, that Osama Bin Laden was planning attacks on 4-5 cities with planes, some of the people were already in the country and the attacks would happen in a few months

• Retaliation -- access cut, computer taken, polygraph, fired• Subsequently became most gagged person in U.S. history• 9/11 Commission relegated her to a small irrelevant footnote

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Sibel Edmonds, 2002

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So, was OBL guilty?

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In his own words 1

• September 16, read by himself“I stress that I have not carried out this act, which appears to have been carried out by individuals with their own motivations.”

• Broadcast around the world, except in the U.S.: Bush administration told media it might contain secret signals to aQ terrorists

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In his own words 2

• September 28, in Pakistani newspaper"I have already said that I am not involved in the 11 September attacks in the United States. As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid telling a lie. I had no knowledge of these attacks, nor do I consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children and other people...

• "There exists a government within the government of the United States. That secret government must be asked as to who carried out the attacks.ll The United States should trace the perpetrators of these attacks to those person who want to make the present century a century of conflict between Islam and Christianity so that their own nation could survive."

• Bush administration: same response

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In his own (?) words 3• December 13: videotape found in a house in Jalalabad during

Afghanistan invasion• Pentagon re-sequence for release, but available in both forms:

http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/investigation/011213.binladen.tape.html

• So-called smoking gun• Spoken by face very different from OBL in face analysis• Duke University OBL expert Bruce Lawrence: this is not OBL,

and a January tape threatening the US is doubtfully OBL• Muslim world didn’t buy it• Bush: “It’s preposterous for anybody to think this tape is

doctored. That’s just a feeble excuse to provide weak support for an incredibly evil man.”

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In his own (?) words 3"The brothers, who conducted the operation, all they knew was that they have a martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to America, but they didn't know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they were trained and we did not reveal the operation to them until they are there and just before they boarded the planes.... Those who were trained to fly didn't know the others. One group of people did not know the other group."

"....we calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all [inaudible] due to my experience in this field I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it. This is all that we had hoped for."

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Which doesn’t fit?Thanks to Steven Jones, 9/11 Revisited

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Facial Analysis

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Guilty of 9/11?

FBI Website for OBL as most wanted:http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/terbinladen.htm

Usama Bin Laden is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks killed over 200 people. In addition, Bin Laden is a suspect in other terrorist attacks throughout the world.

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No hard evidence?http://www.teamliberty.net/id267.html

On June 5, 2006, the Muckraker Report contacted the FBI Headquarters, (202) 324-3000, to learn why Bin Laden’s Most Wanted poster did not indicate that Usama was also wanted in connection with 9/11. The Muckraker Report spoke with Rex Tomb, Chief of Investigative Publicity for the FBI. When asked why there is no mention of 9/11 on Bin Laden’s Most Wanted web page, Tomb said, “The reason why 9/11 is not mentioned on Usama Bin Laden’s Most Wanted page is because the FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11.”

Surprised by the ease in which this FBI spokesman made such an astonishing statement, I asked, “How this was possible?” Tomb continued, “Bin Laden has not been formally charged in connection to 9/11.” I asked, “How does that work?” Tomb continued, “The FBI gathers evidence. Once evidence is gathered, it is turned over to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice than decides whether it has enough evidence to present to a federal grand jury. In the case of the 1998 United States Embassies being bombed, Bin Laden has been formally indicted and charged by a grand jury. He has not been formally indicted and charged in connection with 9/11 because the FBI has no hard evidence connected Bin Laden to 9/11.”

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The White Paper?

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After 9/11Invasion and escape from Afghanistan

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After 9/11• FBI Director Robert Mueller, April 19, 2002 at

the Commonwealth Club "The hijackers also left no paper trail. In our investigation, we have not uncovered a single piece of paper either here or in the U.S. or in the treasure trove of information that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere that mentioned any aspect of the September 11th plot.

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Warnings and Foreknowledge

Sometimes they are hard to separate....

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Foreign Governments 2001

• 23 warnings from 11 foreign governments

• many specifically mentioning planes and symbolic urban targets

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U.S. Intelligence• June: George Tenet briefing Rice on threat of aQ

attack is described by Richard Clarke as having his hair on fire

• July 5: CIA briefs Ashcroft: a significant aQ attack is imminent and could occur at any time

• July 5: Acting FBI director Tom Pickard briefs Ashcroft about terror threat in U.S.Ashcroft: “I do not want to hear about this any more” (Pickard, under oath)

• July: Ashcroft stops flying commercial [CBS]

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Foreign Governments 2001• Germany, June: The BND (German intelligence)

warns the CIA and Israelis that Mideast terrorist plan to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons against American and Israeli cultural symbols

• Jordan, Summer: intercepts communication on attacks planned for WTC, passes to Washington

• France, Aug-Sept: French intelligence repeatedly warns of imminent attacks

• Cayman Islands, week before: caller to talk show reports imminent OBL attack on US

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Foreign Governments 2001• Russia, August

– Moscow knew about the perpetrators, and warned Washington about their preparations for the attacks two weeks beforehand [Izvestia, 9/12]

– Putin says he ordered intel service to warn the US government "in the strongest possible terms" of imminent assaults on airports and government buildings [MSNBC interview, 9/15

– Bizarre case: Mike Vreeland (Naval intelligence spy) has letter in Russian detailing Iraqi plans to attack WTC, 3-Mile Island, Pentagon with planes, tries to warn US government, rebuffed

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Insider trading on put options The trades

• American Airlines: 9/10 -- 60x• United Airlines: 9/6-10 -- 90x (9/6: 285x)• No other airlines• Morgan Stanley: 9/7-10 -- 27x• Merrill Lynch: 9/5?-10 -- 12x• Worldwide: Japan, North America, Europe• regulators will "certainly be able to track down every

trade.” SEC enforcement chief William Lucas• UK Financial Services Authority clears OBL et al

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Insider trading on put options

9/11 Commission response:

The trades were all investigated and led to investors who had no connection to terrorists.

Ummm....

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Insider trading on put options

Relation to Intelligence

• First report: Israeli Institute on Counterterrorism• PROMIS software

– Incorporates data from variety of databases in different languages into one readable format

– Used by FBI to monitor transactions in a virtual real-time environment

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The 9/11 Commission

How it was delayed,

how it started,

how it was compromised

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The 9/11 Commission

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